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Part 1 Cities and Citizenship
This part is concerned to return politics to its roots by defining an urban public sphere in contradistinction to the centralised, abstracted form of politics practised within the nation state. The book makes the case for expanding 'the political' as a public life at the expense of centralised abstract state politics through making available extensive public spaces for the exercise of local citizen power at the level of the neighbourhood, town, and city confederation. The key principle here is federation so as to achieve a genuine universalism through the inter-linking of ascending purposes. The perspective is developed against the narrowness of localism. Self-sufficiency or autarchy is a key principle but not in the sense of communities that remain independent of each other. Universalism through interconnection and mutuality as opposed to parochialism is crucial. Indeed, self-sufficiency in a parochial separates communities from each other and cannot fail to re-create the anarchical war of all communities against all over scarce resources that is precisely the political problem to be resolved. From this perspective, the globalisation of economic relations is valued in creating the supra-national material ties that make communal interdependence ensuring universalism possible.

Part 2 The Philosophical Idea of the City
This part grounds the conception of public life in a normative philosophical anthropology which identifies the city as a moral and social realm promoting culture and civilisation. Proceeding from chapters on Plato and Aristotle, this part details the evolution of cities alongside changing conceptions of citizenship, up to and including the Hellenic world.

Part 3 Universitas
The City from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance This part examines attempts to establish universalism up to and including the Renaissance. The flaw in the attempt to establish the universal state is easy to identify: universalist theories and programmes have tried to impose beliefs, practices and identities from above and from the outside, from the centre outwards and downwards, which can only be achieved on an enduring basis by consent. These attempts pay insufficient attention to the need to identify the conditions and relations facilitating the individual grasp of the universal via social and discursive interaction.

Part 4 The Rationalisation of the City
This part traces the evolution of reason via the processes of abstraction, quantification and commodification proceeding from the scientific and industrial revolutions. The argument establishes a concept of “rational freedom” through the work of Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx. Through these philosophers, freedom is defined as an interdependent notion connecting each individual with all other individuals. This defines an ethic of urban justice which affirms values and structures of reciprocity, interaction and solidary exchange within the associational space of civil society. The modernist break with the “rational” philosophical legacy is located in a Weberian process of rationalisation, implying the commodification, instrumentalisation and bureaucratisation of the urban lifeworld. The city is no longer conceived as the embodiment of a rational telos but instead emerges as an instrument of force, of autonomy-denying alien power. This part locates the structuring and functioning of the city in the interplay between relations of production, consumption and exchange, revealing capital to be the architect of the socio-spatial order of alien power, creating the physical landscape for accumulation. The perspectives of Harvey (1973 1975) and French urban theory (eg Lamarche 1976) are developed to show how the expansionary dynamic of the capital system generates the overscale anti-city which violates the “rational” urban principles pertaining to the physical, socio-relational and anthropological infrastructure for human self-realisation. Global shifts and connections are examined with respect to economic relations, as well as to the media, electronic landscapes and communications to contest assertions of the end of geographic space (Lash and Urry 1994). The argument identifies possibilities for a renewed emphasis upon place, highlighting the intersection of the local and the global in a regional politics of scale (Storper 1997). The chapter adapts the “glocal” conception of Swyngedouw (1997) to project the recovery of the city state ideal in the face of the globalised city region. Taking the view that a genuine regeneration depends upon the quality of human relationships, the key task emerges as that of reconciling the new techno-urban paradigm with place based social meaning so as to check escalating metropolarities.

Part 5 The Economic Concept of the City
The critical focus of this part is upon abstracting and diremptive tendencies within the city, particularly with respect to new symbolic and informational economic geographies. Critical attention is paid to the iniquitous realities behind the provision of post-industrial infrastructures (convention centres, office developments, finance-insurance-real estate stations, consumer landscapes, gentrified downtowns) in contemporary urban development and regeneration. The argument concludes that the result of social division and exclusion is an “ecology of fear” generating the militarisation of urban space and the privatisation of residential and commercial space. This part examines the urban consequences of social and spatial injustice, paying particular attention to the work of Mike Davis (1990 1998).

Part 6 The City as Social Movement
This part addresses the problematic character of the “common good” in a modern plural world by developing a conception of urban justice. This is achieved by locating the “rational” philosophical ideal within contemporary social and political theory. The argument defines a conception of reasonable commonality which integrates the “politics of difference” (Young 1990) within a universal frame. The conception of urban justice builds upon the work of John Rawls (1973) but rejects Rawlsian universalism as abstract and disembodied in being identified with formal legal-institutional structures. Instead, an ethic based upon the responsive social intercourse of individuals within community is developed. This ethic draws upon essentialist (Nussbaum 1986 1992), feminist (eg Gilligan 1982), communitarian (Sandel 1982) and ontological liberal (Raz 1986) modes of thought to locate individual rights within a conception of human flourishing within expansive structures of community interaction and communication. This part proceeds to examine the possibility of reasserting place-based social meaning through the principle of community control. Developing themes and perspectives drawn from the work of Castells (1983), urban social movements are examined as social experiments in the transition from the top-down, centralised “monological” modes of thought, action and organisation to recursive-interactive “dialogical” modes which emphasise the citizen interaction, association and discourse capable of constituting urban life as a public sphere. The principle of “rational freedom” connecting the freedom of each individual with the freedom of all individuals thus comes to be placed on an associative basis within community."

Part 7 The Ecological Concept of the City
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Part 1 CITIES AND CITIZENSHIP

Introduction of Principles 

‘No reality is ever as beautiful as the vision’.
No vision ever matches up to reality.

1 Cities and Citizenship - The Conception of an Urban Public Realm

This book is concerned to return politics to its roots by defining an urban public sphere in contradistinction to the centralised, abstracted form of politics practised within the nation state. The book makes the case for expanding politics at the expense of centralised abstract state politics through making available extensive public spaces for the exercise of local citizen power at the level of the neighbourhood, town, and city confederation. The key principle here is federation so as to achieve a genuine universalism through the inter-linking of ascending purposes. The perspective is quite opposed to the narrowness of localism. Self-sufficiency or autarchy is a key principle but not in the sense of communities that remain independent of each other. Universalism through interconnection and mutuality as opposed to parochialism is crucial. Indeed, self-sufficiency in a parochial separates communities from each other and cannot fail to re-create the anarchical war of all communities against all over scarce resources that is precisely the political problem to be resolved. From this perspective, the globalisation of economic relations is valued in creating the supra-national material ties that make communal interdependence ensuring universalism possible. The principle of self-sufficiency or autarchy derives from ancient Athens. Yet Athens was not a closed city-state but engaged in a Mediterranean-wide trade in order to secure the resources it needed to satisfy its everyday needs. 

The globalisation of economic relations which is proceeding at present is creating universal material and institutional ties but is doing so in pursuit of the narrow purpose of private accumulation. The principal agency of this capitalist globalisation is the transnational corporation. The TNC’s preside over an international process of accumulation and are in control of vast processes of investment, trade and employment. The power and resources that the TNC’s command give them a power over the geographically limited nation-states and enable them to sway the public agenda to their interests. The nation-state may have robbed the citizen body of their sovereign power within their communities but is now in the process of having its authority hollowed out by a globalisation of power in which the key protagonists are the transnational corporations. Capitalist globalisation is the end of a long process by which politics is divested of its original meaning and purpose. Politics began as the art of conscious determination of affairs of collective interest by citizens as a condition of human self-realisation. In the contemporary age, the citizen – or what remains of the citizen after having alienated sovereignty to the central state – no longer has any sense of identity in relation to everyday life. The figure of the citizen lacks content and context. In terms of Being and Place, the citizen no longer exists. A vast institutional-systemic apparatus of alien power – possessing an existential significance and purpose of its own – has supplanted the control that human beings require over their material existence if they are to be able to define themselves as citizens. A human made regimen has replaced its human creators and extinguished agency and ethics. No-one is in control, only the self-directing and all-encompassing system which all must obey.

The argument of this book identifies the realm of possibility as capable of existing outside of the narrow – and narrowing – parameters of official state politics. ‘Realists’ argue as though the nation-state is and has always been the only form of public life that human society has known throughout the ages. The historical ignorance is breath-taking. In truth, the nation-state is a relatively recent phenomenon and strengthened its position against city-states, communes and communities only in alliance with the capital it served. The realm of possibility with respect to public life is far wider than the nation-state. Yet even supposedly radical proposals for a new politics all centre upon the continued centrality of the nation state. The republican turn seeks to apply certain practices from the past to the nation state, proposals for democratisation seek no more than the extension of participation within the nation state. The institutions remain unchanged. Attempts to achieve a ‘civic republicanism’ are merely vain attempts to cloak the nation state and its bureaucratic apparatus with a citizen garb, emptying notions of citizenship of their content and meaningful, destroying it as a critical and emancipatory tool. Ultimately, these proposals amount to an attempt to conceal the declining authority and legitimacy of the state through artificially boosted levels of participation. Significantly, the proposals equate participation with voting and seek to improve turn out rates by postal-voting. Whatever happened to citizen deliberation and discussion and place-based, face-to-face interaction? Ballot boxes in supermarkets are appropriately tacky symbols of consumer democracy. And compulsory voting. If political participation was sufficiently empowering and had demonstrable effects, individuals would rush to the assemblies and willingly identify themselves as citizens. Contemporary politics is so enfeebled that individuals have to be compelled to activity every periodic occasion. The nation state and its centralised, bureaucratic apparatus of control is designed not for citizen interaction, deliberation and empowerment but for managerial elites, career politicians who see politics as the management and manipulation of the people in the service of a pre-determined agenda of serving entrenched power.

Necessity is a classic standby for those wedded to the identification of politics with the nation state. Society is too complex to function without the state apparatus. Globalisation is the latest version of the thesis, even though the evidence is that globalisation withdraws power from nation centres and favours instead appropriately scaled centres from the locality and the region.

‘The Left’, as it sought to distance itself from the class analysis and hence bothersome politics of Marxism, staked its future on what it called ‘double democratisation’. The state is not to be abolished but is to be democratised at the same time that the institutions of ‘civil society’ were to be democratised. Such thinking had the value of emphasising the extent to which politics could conceivably be grounded in a civil sphere comprising a plenitude of cooperatives, social clubs, neighbourhood centres and organic stores that provide natural foods. But attempts to democratise capital and the institutions of the private economy were conspicuous by their absence. With a wealth of history and experience to draw upon, ‘the Left’ still prefers to avoid conflict, and chooses to ignore Tawney’s simple lesson that you cannot skin a tiger claw by claw. ‘Vivisection is its trade and it does the skinning first’.

Do our contemporary democrats and republicans on the left imagine that it will be any less difficult to extend and embed active citizenship and democratic participation within or against existing centres of power than it was to ensure the social ownership and control of the means of production? The attempts to define a politics for post-socialist times amount to a reversion to pre-socialism, with lessons again having to be learned the hard way. William Morris once wrote of how people fight and lose the battle only to fight again and win under different terms and names. The present scenario is one of how people barely put up any kind of fight in the first place, give up any struggle and quickly re-brand the product. There will be no victories here. Political institutions became centralised and became remote from citizens, destroying civic and communal autonomy in the process, for a reason. The new civic republicans will find themselves like the socialists of old to act within the systemic constraints of process of accumulation upon which all states depend.

All such views are based on an unstated premise that the current system is not merely the best system possible but is the only system possible. At a time when innovations in technology and communications seem to offer human beings limitless possibilities, the human vision has been narrowed to nothing more than the ‘is’. History has ended and the future has been abolished. Nothing exists any more than the present enlarged.

This book maintains the optimistic thesis that human beings can do better than what they are doing at the present. The book presumes that it makes sense to imagine a politics that is independent of the nation state. Politics emerged in the Greek agora, the market place of citizen interaction. The modern state has laid claim to a monopoly of political power and has centralised citizen and community sovereignty in the process. But this is not genuine political power but oligarchical power. To subvert the nation state requires the promotion of an emergent and expansive public power grounded in direct popular citizens’ democracy. This public is co-extensive with the everyday social world of individuals and is therefore something in which individuals participate as a matter of everyday existence. This public power is sharply distinguished from the state power exercised by various parliaments, ministries, and republics.

This argument makes clear the extent to which politics originated and can exist quite independently of the state. Political theory and philosophy has persisted in identifying politics with ‘statecraft’. The state has been the dominant political institution in recent centuries, hence the casual way in which it is presumed that politics is something that proceeds within the state sphere only. That casual use also serves to identify politics as something that politicians rather than citizens do.

Even worse is the identification of the state with a benign politics of administration, a professional apparatus concerned with the efficient ordering of collective affairs. The state is a power-infused apparatus of control designed to control subject populations either by consent or coercion and possessing a monopoly of violence and of propaganda to that end.

Denying the identification of the state with the political also makes it clear that citizen refers to much more than electoral constituents, the individuals who are currently decaying into a condition of torpor in the slack passive representative systems of Western capitalism. A genuine civic republicanism looks to abolish such a ‘citizenship’ not to inject it with new life. For the same reason, democracy means precisely what it originally meant and is therefore quite opposed to the system of representative government with which it has been conveniently identified. Of course, ‘representative democracy’ is a contradiction in terms. Its proponents and practitioners are anti-democratic servants of state power and are keenly committed to a representative form that keeps ‘the demos’ well removed from the centres of political power, control and decision making. This book takes in a wider view than the last two or three centuries and seeks to redefine, reorient and quite often simply recover the original meanings of politics, citizenship, and democracy in terms that counterpose a genuine public life against the hollow shell of the contemporary nation state.
The attempt to recover public life proceeds from classical origins. In this perspective, the city is as important to the understanding of the politics as the state. From this classical perspective, contemporary cities hardly qualify as cities at all, lacking the essential qualities that define city life as a humane existence. Modern cities are vast overscale expanses of mortar, brick, steel, and glass that exceed both the physical and the mental horizon of the individual. Such cities are overscale in the sense of being beyond the control and comprehension of their inhabitants. The demand for human scale is a demand that cities be restored to human dimensions and proportions and are scaled to a size that makes them comprehensible in size and function to city dwellers. It is no coincidence that the classical giants of political philosophy were also pioneers of urban studies. To Aristotle there would be no need to argue for the humanly scaled city. A city is scaled to human dimensions and proportions by definition. A city that exceeds this scale has ceased to be a city.

These observations make it clear that the recovery of the classical conceptions of politics, citizenship and democracy implies the recovery of the city as a public sphere. The political once more becomes co-extensive with the everyday sphere of work, interaction and activity, in the process recovering the ontological dimension of politics. Within this public life of the city as polis, human beings associate and mix together to discuss collective affairs, creating a citizen identity for themselves and enhancing their lives as civic beings. This conception of public life persisted for many centuries until suppressed by the modern capitalist state in its concern to monopolise politics. At the heart of the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance cities were public squares, copied at neighbourhood level and operating as places where individuals would meet to argue about public affairs and make decisions about the city’s affairs. To argue for the creation of extensive public spaces in villages, towns, neighbourhoods, and eventually in reconstructed cities only sounds unrealistic if one ignores the historical and indeed anthropological evidence. Human beings have created such public spaces for themselves throughout history as a condition both of their effective self-government and of their creative self-realisation. The monopolisation of the political by the nation state is a threat to these essential human needs. Being and Place go together.

A genuine public life is located within city life and counterposed to the nation-states. In the modern world, the city is conceived in spatial and demographic terms as an area which is occupied by a densely populated human community. In such a conception it is size that defines the city, distinguishing it from a town or a village. This quantitative conception is also seen in the ranking of cities in terms of their importance determined by population. The more millions, the greater the city. The presumption is that the cultural and economic importance of the city increases in proportion to its population. That this quantitative conception is wrong is indicated by the fact that individuals who can afford to quit the cities are doing so in increasing numbers, hence the continuing flight to the suburbs and the creation of new towns and satellite cities. The USA and the UK are characterised by new settlement patterns as a result.

Peter Hall concludes his massive study Cities for Tomorrow on a pessimistic note, asking why economic growth and welfare reforms and urban regeneration have seen not merely the persistence but the growth of the urban underclass. Had Hall chosen to investigate his question further then he may have ended up even more pessimistic with regard to the urban future. The old system is moribund, decrepit but seemingly cannot die, only linger on in ever advancing senility. Human beings seem to have lost the capacity to create the future to meet their needs. Not that human beings lack needs or do not know what they want. It is evident enough what human beings are yearning for. Yet they are still searching for political ends within political means – the state and electoral parties – that could have been designed to suppress those ends. The result is a malaise of seemingly never ending uncertainty in which fear and paranoia growth the more a new politics fails to emerge.

The city is its history, the accumulated wisdom of its inhabitants over the centuries. The city unfolds according to a dialectic of growth, realising certain important social potentialities through various phases of development.

The modern overscale city has grown to such proportions only by producing social and ecological crises that render the survival of society problematic. Ideas of civic republicanism and democratisation are wildly optimistic in such circumstances.

Biological evolution joins social evolution in the creative agency of human beings. Human beings are not simply animals but are political animals, meaning that their culture and consciousness gives them a capacity to develop their biological equipment into a social capacity and identity. The city originated in this evolution from the biological to the social, transforming human relationships from associations based on biological facts, such as kinship, to associations based on social facts, such as geographical proximity. Critically, the city engendered the universalising cultural relations and economic activities that continue to this day as a narrowly understood and poorly appreciated globalisation. The city emerged as the public space which transformed biological affinities into social affinities. The modern city has lost this significance as a result of being turned into an economic machine subject to the jurisdiction of the state. But the fact remains that the city was the crucial public arena for forming a body a secular citizens apprehending a universal civitas out of a parochial tribalism. In the process kinship relationships were expanded into political relationships, replacing the exclusivity of the clan and the tribe by a wider perspective that embraced a shared humanitas.

This history gives the city an ethical and political dimension that is rooted in the human ontology and its realisation. From its inception the city has had the purpose of enhancing and expanding essential human qualities and these have informed the conception and evolution of politics. The history of the city is bound up with ideas of public life, freedom and democracy and the notion of a civic commonality that establishes human bonds at a universal level beyond the parochial bonds of blood ties, gender distinctions, age and ethnicity.

The history of the city is the progressive unfolding of the human ontology; this process is therefore cumulative and rational in an ethico-anthropological sense. The city embodies and articulates civic and humanistic that have their origins in Athens, Jerusalem, and Rome. This may be as latency and potentiality rather than as actuality in any particular time and place. Notions of civic order, urbanity, communal autonomy, rationalism, legality, and consociation are drawn into a common human stock that survive the rise and fall or transformation of particular cities, upon which human beings may draw and add to at any time they make cities innovative cultural centres again. Thus, the cities of the Renaissance, the Baroque era, and the Enlightenment emerged by reworking ancient and medieval themes and forms, adapting their architecture, literature, art, religion, and philosophies to the needs of a new era, adding to the common stock.

The rise of the nation state emptied civil society of its political content and turned cities in vast economic sites for the accumulation of capital. The city was thus divested of its ethical and anthropological functions, resulting in the depoliticisation and denaturing of human beings. At the same time, cities grew to vast proportions and took the form of mega-cities beyond human scale. With the monopolisation of the political by the centralised national state, politicians replaced citizens as the principal political actors. Democracy was reinterpreted as the right of individuals as voters to be passively represented by politicians. At the same time the state extended increasingly authoritarian controls over the individual in civil society, suppressing all alternative spaces of public life in order to preserve its monopoly of the political. The identification of the state with the political needs to be challenged as a condition of restoring content and meaning to democracy and citizenship and public life. This justifies an historical search for the elements of a true public life as exemplified in the communalism and civility of past forms, evaluating these forms according to the extent to which they promote or inhibit the unfolding of the human ontology, and formulating a synthesis of their historical achievements to carry the human race onwards towards the rational society that is the end of history as a process of self-realisation. This perspective places the rational society at the heart of politics. The public life facilitating human self-realisation is this rational society, rational in the sense of serving and enhancing immanent human powers and potentialities rather than in frustrating them. The city contains this ideal of the rational society in its history, practices and vision. The view explicitly defends reason as a process of progressive unfolding through the realisation and integration of Being and Place, anthropology and ecology as two aspects of the same nature. The view thus repudiates the identification of reason with the cybernetic vision of a world digitally united and controlled. It also rejects the postmodernist vision of the future as the enlarged form of the highly irrational present. The idea of public life as inherently rational stems from the definition of the city as an ethical association of citizens. This definition is an ideal, the potential ought-to-be of the city qua city as distinct from what any city actually is at any given time. As a process of human unfolding towards the rational society, history can show no example of this ideal city. The recovery of Hellenic and medieval conceptions does not imply a return to those cities as perfect but lost forms. It involves the recovery of their ideals, however imperfectly realised at the time.

This ought-to-be of the city does not indicate some geographic or cultural relativism dependent upon historic accident. The ethics of the city are objective rather than arbitrary and are grounded in the human ontology and its unfolding in time and place. This is the ethics of reasoning as embodied and expressed in an unfolding process of urbanisation and civilisation proceeding from the immanent potentialities of the human ontology to transform purposively, self-consciously, and innovatively environing conditions to ensure that the world corresponds to rather than contradicts human nature.

This does not imply the separation of society and nature or reason and nature. The reason referred to here is that of human nature-in-nature. The realisation of human nature is thus the realisation of the natural qualities of human being within nature. Whilst humanity has developed biological evolution into social evolution, these evolutionary processes are conjoined since human self-realisation is integral to the self-regulation of nature. Ultimately, human nature and nature synthesise in a higher order in which nature achieves self-reflexivity through the infusion of culture and consciousness to create the rational society as the natural society. Human beings will be at peace with the world when they are at peace with their own nature and their own creative agency. The rational society is thus an ecological society in which human beings, living in accord with their own nature and with others, ensure that social evolution is a natural evolution rendered self-conscious, encultured and guided by an ethics of harmony.

The public life envisaged according to the principles of eco-sophy emerges as the Commune of communes, the all-embracing universal sphere composed of the interactions of the particular spheres. Such a public life is the ideal immanent in the original city-states and represents the end point of the progressive unfolding of reason through humanity’s long process of self-civilisation.

The theorists and practitioners of this public life have always appreciated the extent to which citizenship is an educative process, paideia, the personal and social training through which citizens emerged to form the content of the city. In the classical conception, citizenship refers to the self- and social formation of private individuals, idiotes, into citizens, polites, active participants in governing the affairs of their communities. It doesn’t matter that such citizens formed a minority of the Athenian polis. What matters is the ideal, the ought-to-be, and the way that this set the high and eminently human standard of citizenship to be realised in the rational society.

City and town governance should be transformed so as to enlarge civic democracy through the extension of grass-roots structures. The creation of extensive public spaces by these means within civil society give the citizenry a political power and moral authority that enables them to countervail, subvert and gradually reoccupy public life over against the nation-state. In the process, civil society comes to be covered by a range of autonomous and confederated municipalities creating a public life in contradistinction to the centralised public of the nation-state. Indeed, since the state power is derived from and parasitic upon the communal power of civil society, the expansion of the power and autonomy of confederated municipalities implies the hollowing out and ultimate collapse of the nation state.

The limitations of a democratisation or a civic republicanism that places the emphasis upon voting processes and structures are evident in this respect. For all such electoral posts and offices are, by definition, representative in being removed from the sovereign power of those represented. The citizen identity is defined by active participation and hence requires participatory structures. To constrain political reform within state institutions is certain to reproduce the domination of passive and abstract representation over participation. The individual remains an elector and not a citizen. 

The awareness of the dialectic of progress and catastrophe informs the argument of this book. That dialectic commits human beings to live forever in the best of times and the worst of times. What makes the issue so pressing in the contemporary age, however, is the escalating scale of the problem. If human beings do not resolve the issue and assume responsibility for their creative power, then the age will be characterised by continuing urban sprawl, the destructuring of city and community life, the dehumanisation and denormalisation of social life, the degradation and destruction of nature. If human beings do not live up to their powers and potentialities at the present stage of development and hence bring about the best of times, they will passively acquiesce and fade away in the worst of times. In seeking to negotiate a path towards the ecological public as the rational-natural society, the argument of this book resolves the series of alienating dualisms and separations that pervade the process of civilisation – of human beings from each other and from their own nature, of reason from nature, of public life from civil life, of society from nature. 

By grounding the pursuit of the ideal city and citizenship in the historical evolution of a philosophical anthropology and ecology, this book offers an alternative to the contemporary dissolution of humanity into the anonymity and impotence of an increasingly totalitarian capitalist urbanisation. 

The objective is to treat questions of politics, urbanisation and ecology in an integral sense, recovering the connection between cities and citizenship as integral to the bios politikos necessary to health and expansion of the human ontology. The end in view is an eco-communalist conception of the rational society. This conception reaches backwards into the origins and historical practice and evolution of public life in order to identify potentialities immanent in current forms and go forwards to the future. The approach is not nostalgic and makes no claim that the golden age existed somewhere in the past. It does claim that golden elements have existed in the past, certainly in the way that an imperfect real has often been accompanied by aspirations and ambitions that point to an ideal. This ideal is traced throughout history with reference to cities, states, thinkers and movements. The weight of historio-philosophical evidence is used to outline the contours of the truly rational, free and ecological society that has still to be created.

The grounding in history, anthropology and ecology is intended to underscore culture and consciousness in the progressive unfolding of reason. This is to bring an informed perspective to bear upon the contemporary crisis as both human and ecological. The intention is to widen the focus of the contemporary crisis of political authority and legitimacy by emphasising the extent to which ‘the political’ is a sphere much greater than the institution of the nation state. The crisis of social freedom and personal autonomy and the deterioration in citizenship and civic order cannot be solved within the nation state but requires that we draw upon a wider conception of public life, one that proceeds from the city as the authentic arena of public life, a public life, indeed, that was once lived in balance and harmony with the natural world.

It would appear that not only is the division between town and country irremediable but that the continuous process of urbanisation has ensured the almost complete domination of mega-cities over the countryside. With suburbs continuing to claim nearby open land at ever increasing levels, the modern city is swallowing the agrarian and natural worlds whole, absorbing surrounding towns and villages to create sprawling metropolitan entities. The process is cannibalistic in that it involves an obese and unhealthy form of human society eating up its own conditions of life. But far from representing the triumph of the city over the country, these developments indicate the destruction of both. The consequences are hard to exaggerate, destroying the social and natural environments that humanity and, indeed, all life forms, require. The social environment and the natural environment are being destroyed by not so much capitalism as by the pernicious universalism of capitalism of capitalism at its advanced stage. Capitalism creates the material potentiality for universalism through the extension of its economic relations across the globe. But the only universalism that the CMP will entertain is that of organising the process of accumulation. So capitalist universalism takes the form of the globalisation of economic relations centred upon accumulation, of urbanisation concerned with the expansion of cities as economic machines, and of technological surveillance and control to ensure a pacified social existence within a regime of accumulation. This capitalist universalisation threatens to destroy Being and Place, transforming identity, extinguishing custom and tradition, and suppressing diversity and variety. Capitalist universalisation is absorbing city life and country life within a totalitarian regimen. This involves the transforming of human identity so as to fit the new techno-commercial order. Human beings really are being turned into atoms, self-seeking monads capable of being chipped and ordered. Such universalisation wipes from memory the norms, values, consciousness and culture nurtured by community ties and civic relationships. Throughout history the origin meaning of public life has been preserved in urban and rural space in the form of proximity to people and nature, face-to-face interaction within neighbourhoods, practices and cultures of mutual aid, strong ties of kinship and friendship. These practices and cultures, through which human identity is formed, are being suffocated and flattened out by capitalist universalisation as defined above. A rich, evolved culture giving meaning to Place and Being is being smothered by anonymity, homogenisation, and impotence that is associated with a universalisation organised around a narrow purpose and which suppresses the particular. Universalism, the dream of humanity as expressed in its religions, empires and philosophies, will be achieved at the cost of erasing from existence all that constitutes a human life. The crucial values of the human race, the freedom and democracy and justice over which movements have fought for centuries, will become social, cultural, and political anachronisms. The universal order will be essentially hollow and will lack human content.

The term civilisation derives from the Latin civitas. The word could refer to city and denotes the cultural sophistication commonly associated with the progress of the urban form. In secular or religious form, human beings have continually framed their visions in the form of a city. Political philosophy has been haunted by the ghost of the Hellenic ‘city-state’, religion has continued to pursue its ‘New Jerusalem’. Other examples of how attempts to project or imagine the ideal society have taken shape in the form of the city are to be found in The City Reader, Berneri’s Utopia, in Campanella’s City of the Sun, Bacon and so on. There is something about the city that connects with human ideals and dreams for the better society. 

The city and country no longer exist in their traditional form but have instead become economic machines incorporating corporate enterprises, industrial networks, distribution systems, and administrative mechanisms. The buildings and facilities stretch high and wide to dwarf and engulf the landscape with the result that place, crucial to human identity in setting the context for sociality, lacks all definition and centrality. It becomes impossible to ground human identity in such a faceless and meaningless landscape in a way that was once possible with reference to a temple, a palace, a public square, or a small marketplace. The new universal landscape evinces a centralisation that is lacking in centres defined as strongly distinguishable areas for human association through which human identity would emerge. Identity is the spirit or culture, the polis as a holistic supra-institutional notion. The city embodies and expresses moral, even spiritual, attributes which are grounded in the human character and in the natural environment. It is in this respect that the city is an historical institution associated with the unity of Being and Place. And it is this which defines contemporary mega-cities as anti-cities, as at war with and destructive of human nature-in-nature. The modern city is merely a physical shell designed to be functional within a global process of accumulation. To be worthy of the name, a city needs to be a moral association expressing and passing down a shared sense of what it is that human beings have in common and a public commitment to nurture the common bond, to promote the common good and achieve the common end. Civic identity and public concern within the city revolved around a common belief in the good life for all. And here is the connection of the city with civilitas, civilisation. For the good life in the city context refers not to material affluence and security. On the contrary, these are private goals. The classical Greeks applied the term idiotes to those who were concerned only with such private concerns, with the life of personal pleasure as divorced from the wider picture. The term polites, from which politics derives, was applied to those who were actively concerned with the public affairs of the city. And this public concern entailed a life of goodness, virtue and probity in the service of the common good. Politics in the city was a civic calling open to all as citizens.

The modern city has been reduced to the material requirements of the capital system. The result has been to dissipate the moral purpose and anthropological dimension of the city, with the spiritual, cultural, communal, ethical, and ecological qualities that served to create citizen identity and bind citizens to the city coming to be dissolved into the faceless quantitative landscape of the external world.

The city as an economic machine is not even like the old marketplace of face-to-face interaction. Instead, interaction is a privatised encounter between anonymous buyers and sellers who lack relation to each other above and beyond commercial exchange. Economics is not located within a solidary exchange that forms the basis for the socially and ethically meaningful association that formed city life. The modern city has ceased to be evaluated as a cultural and ethical datum and is instead measured in terms of the material resources accruing through private enterprise. Urban regeneration proceeds according to business models in which civic leaders gain their position through their abilities to promise employment and investment.

Civic identity is as much a personal issue as a social one. The relationship between the city, citizenship and civilisation through the figure of civilitas makes clear the extent to which achieving citizenship in its true sense of public selfhood is inextricably linked to the realisation of one’s personal selfhood.

There is a need to understand how the ideal of an active, informed and enlightened citizenry with a sense of self and of place grounded in a cherished natural environment was embodied in various historical ages and cities, however imperfectly, and how that ideal came to retreat before the forces of modernity. Capitalism asserted the primacy of economics over politics, of the private over the public, the individual over society. Capitalism generated a systemic imperative of accumulation that orders the external world and all that it contains around the process of accumulation. The diversity of material life processes are organised around the one overriding purpose – accumulation. The system separated from public life, city and community to assume an existential significance of its own, reducing city and countryside to its systemic imperatives. The capital system is based upon a series of expropriations, of people from the land, of workers from their means of production. In general terms, expropriation refers to the separation of human beings from the means of control over their everyday social and material existence. In one aspect, this refers to the separation of the citizen from the decision-making processes of the city. In the politics of the state there is a separation between the represented and the representatives. The individual loses citizen identity at city level and gains in its place the role of voter-taxpayer as part of a passive mass electorate separated from the active means of government. The sense of self-identity which the individual has lost at city level is not replaced at the level of state politics. The expansionary dynamic of capital ensures that economics invades every sphere, reducing culture and community to quantification and mechanicism.

The argument of this book deals with the relationship of city, citizenship and civilisation in terms of the progressive unfolding of human nature within nature to actualise rational freedom through ontology and ecology. The book therefore concerns Being and Place. In socio-philosophical terms, rational freedom concerns the quality of human interaction and communion. The relationship of each and all to form the social association is shown to be an ethical concern of the highest priority in the work of a range of key philosophers including Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Marsiglio, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Habermas. The book traces the ideal of rational freedom through the variety of ‘social contracts’ that individuals have formed in various times and places in order to create the collective environment that enables them to secure and promote their goals.

The book proceeds from the civic ideal expressed in the theory and practice of classical Greek. That this ideal has continued to re-emerge throughout the centuries is to be explained by much more than nostalgia. There is a much more grounded reason for why human beings of quite different times and places reach back to draw upon classical themes – the fact that the classical civic ideal is rooted in a universal human nature that reaches across the ages to embrace all on account of the essential humanity they share. Classical Greece realised its own ideal only very imperfectly. Those who draw upon the Greek example do so in pursuit of the future oriented ideal rather than by a concern to imitate the time-bound practice. This civic ideal exists to challenge and inspire humanity to create a future worthy of its nature. The civic ideal compels us to investigate the socio-institutional and cultural conditions that are required to generate the communities, civic identities, and politics that enable and articulate the free and full expression of the essential humanity of each and all.

The traditional interpretation associates the rise of the city with cereal cultivation, plows and the domestication of animals forming the agricultural revolution. Yet the historical record points supports a spiritual, moral and cultural interpretation as distinct from the economic materialist argument. The city emerged around the sites of shrines, cultic practices, and temples. This awareness should be highlighted in order to challenge the contemporary economic reductionism that equates urbanisation with commerce and enterprise. Karl Polanyi’s historical investigation of the economy of early society clearly repudiates the claim that the economic marketplace was necessarily the decisive element in the founding of the city. Polanyi shows that it was not until Hellenic times that a domestic marketplace appears in the city. This was the Athenian agora, an arena for social, symbolic and cultural exchanges in addition to exchanges of good. As a site of intense citizen activity and interaction, the agora gave birth to politics. As an economic market, the agora is a quite modest institution. Aristotle did no more than express the conventional Greek wisdom that money-making as an unnatural urge that ought to be subject to public control and self-restraint. The real exchange on the market pertained to services. The ‘economic life’ of classical civilisation was communist in that individuals associated together to create a shared pool of the means of life by contributing to the common fund of material goods upon which all could draw.

The civic ideal of classical civilisation conceives citizens as self-empowered individuals who are ethically united by principles of civic virtue, rational in their social practices, and free to participate in the governance of the cities through discourse and practice. These attributes pertain to the practical reason involved in creating and governing a community – what Greek thinkers called phronesis.

Rousseau made clear the extent to which politics is as much related to the city as to the state when he argued that ‘houses make a town but citizens make a city’.

2 The Creation of Politics
The bad odour into which politics has fallen in the contemporary world indicates the extent to which it is no longer conceived as integral to the realisation of the human personality and is instead identified with remote institutions of power and representatives. For most people, politics refers to techniques for the management and manipulation of the masses. Whereas in the original sense politics concerned the ethical end of the realisation and exercise of the power belonging to all by all as an attribute of their essential humanity, politics now designates techniques for the instrumental end of exercising power over human beings. Politics has become a means of mass management and manipulation. In its original conception, politics was integral to human self-realisation and associated with the health and well-being of humanity through the actualisation and exercise of essential power. In the contemporary world, politics is no longer ethical but instrumental, denoting the acquisition and retention of institutional and instrumental power – the power of some over others – and inherently corruptive of both its practitioner and people over whom it is exercised. That politics is considered to possess an inherent tendency to corruption indicates the extent to which it has been perverted to mean the precise opposite of its original meaning. Far from being corrupt and corrupting, politics in the classical conception denoted the means and ends of human health and well-being through the creative unfolding of immanent human power.

Politics has been identified with the state so casually for so long now that to argue for a politics that is autonomous of the state seems too shocking, unrealistic and wildly utopian to even consider. The confusion that this identification causes can be seen in the endless controversy over Marx’s ‘end of politics’ (Polan 1984). What Marx actually theorises is the end of the state. Understanding the classical roots of Marx’s argument, it soon becomes clear that Marx is advocating the end of the state in order to detach politics from its equation with – class-based - institutional and social coercion – and restore it to its rightful place as integral to human self-realisation. Marx, indeed, is highly significant for the way that he focuses upon Hegel’s distinction between the state and civil society as the distinguishing characteristic of the modern polity. By arguing that the state is a secondary and derivative power parasitic upon the social power of civil society, Marx makes it possible to envisage a public sphere centred upon the civil sphere. The all-pervasive nature of the modern state, particularly in the extent to which the state intervenes in civil and private life to organise the conditions of accumulation, creates a culture and a mentality which means that many cannot contemplate a distinction between the state and civil society. This makes it difficult to conceive of a politics and a public sphere that exists other than in the state. That the state, the political and the social are not equivalent but are, in terms of origins, histories and purposes, spheres capable of being clearly demarcated, has been wiped from the public consciousness and from the purview of theoretical and philosophical understanding.

This book seeks to investigate the distinction between the state and civil society in order to conceive the possibility of a public sphere that is autonomous of the state and is capable of constituting a political order in its own right. The argument challenges the distinction between public and private as a distinction between political and non-political issues. According to this reasoning the political pertains to anything of ethical and social and anthropological significance to human beings. The personal is indeed political to the extent that politics concerns personhood and personality. Clearly, the state is not the same kind of thing as the family, workplace, friendly groups, religious congregations, unions and professional societies, but this does not mean that whereas the state is a public realm then these latter groups and associations must inhabit the ‘private’ sphere. That categorisation only applies in the context of the state-civil society dualism in which the public and the political are equated with the state monopoly. Since the world of groups and associations and clubs and unions is an everyday social world formed by individuals to serve their personal, social and spiritual needs, this very much qualifies as a public and political world. But not in the sense of the abstract state politics or public. For this everyday lifeworld is a social world and remains so despite state encroachment upon, intervention in and, in totalitarian regimes, expropriation of communal forms. It remains an everyday lifeworld which satisfies the conditions for the personality and personhood of each and all its members.

To have identified the separation of the state from civil society is one of Hegel’s major contributions to political philosophy. To have focused upon the overcoming of that dualism through the critique of alienated power is one of Marx’s lasting contributions to political praxis. The argument of this book surveys these questions from classical origins to modern political theory to argue the possibility of a public sphere which is autonomous of the state and is grounded in an everyday associative social realm that is capable of transcending the private realm of necessity.

The question arises as to where, when and precisely how politics came to be removed from the body politic, defined as an autonomous sphere and finally came to be appropriated and monopolised by the institution of the state. With the classical Greeks, politics and public life are still grounded in human association at the level of the polis. It is well known that democracy was born in the Greek agora, that the term is Greek, meaning the rule of the people. There is no word for the state in Attic Greek. What is significant is the lack of curiosity with regard to the origins of the term on the part of those who so readily proclaim the ideal. For such a universally trumpeted value, democracy is a remarkably little known and hugely misunderstood political ideal. The apogee of Athenian democracy came some time towards the end of the fifth century B.C. Athens at this stage had still to see any institution that even resembled a state conceived in the modern terms of a professionalised institutional apparatus exercised for purposes social control. Indeed, Athenian democracy is the complete antithesis of a bureaucratised system of governance organised strictly for social control, explaining why no modern political leader dares to investigate closely the actual meaning of the democratic ideal.

With the rise of the modern nation-state, first with the highly centralized monarchies of the sixteenth century, politics came to be separated from the body politic and vested in professional civil authority at the centre. Where once politics proclaimed the power of the body politic to govern itself, politics came to be equated with a state bureaucratic apparatus claiming the power to govern over the ‘body politic’.

The conception of politics as affirmed in this thesis is one that identified not with the institution of the state but with the notion of practice within a public sphere. The institution of the state is not identical with such a public sphere. This notion of a public sphere constituted by political praxis implies a consciously amateur system of governance, based upon active civic participation within popular assemblies, a judicial system structured around juries and the selection and rotation of civic officials by lot or sortition. Such a notion of ‘the political’ is based upon a public sphere that is constituted by the scale and quality of citizen activism, interest and interaction. The public sphere which rests upon such a politics is the very antithesis of the centralisation of decision-making power and administrative control, the professionalization and bureaucratisation of the political within the modern state. 

The emphasis upon citizen activism and participation is highly significant. The classical public sphere is characterised by a moral purpose founded upon the emotional and psychological involvement of individuals who, interacting together and learning a common humanity, come to make themselves a citizen body and their government a public sphere. The most significant features of the Athenian polis are not so much institutional as ethical or anthropological. Political praxis was inherently a moral praxis in which individuals developed their common humanity. The polis was distinguished by its high level of public consciousness, its civic activism, its emotional and physical commitment and aesthetics. That the origins of Western civilisation lie in classical Greece is well known. That the idea of politics, its practices and terminology, originated in the Greek agora is familiar. But what is not appreciated is the kind and quality of politics practised in the classical age, the extent to which politics was integral to the common purpose of the purpose of the community as a whole and was integral to the realisation of the humanity of each citizen by unfolding the common humanity of all on account of their essential human nature.

The state is central to modern political thought, so much so that the point appears no more than a trite observation. Only when one insists on the distinction between politics and the institutions through which it is practised does the observation become critical. As a political philosopher, Aristotle is concerned not with the state but with politics as a social, ethical and anthropological discipline. The institutions are a means to an end. The polis which was central to Aristotle’s political and ethical philosophy is much more than an institutional body concerned with administering the collective affairs of the citizens of the community, it is bound up with the very lives, activities and aims of those citizens. They are the polis.

In Book Seven of the Politics, the distinction between politics and the state becomes evident. In this Book Aristotle addresses the question of quantity and size, going into detail on the appropriate scale of the ideal polis. Aristotle understands that a small community that is overly dependent on its own resources is unlikely to be capable of furnishing its members with sufficient means for a decent existence, let alone for anything that approximates the ‘good life’. But Aristotle is clear that the greatness of a public community is determined not by quantity and size but by scale. Aristotle rejects the view that equates demographic and territorial size with greatness. Quantity in terms of numbers and resources is important but not decisive. Quantity and size must be evaluated in relation to appropriate scale. As Aristotle argues, a polis with too large a population and an area cannot have a ‘good legal government … Law [nomos] is a form of order, and good law must necessarily mean good order, but an excessively large number cannot participate in order: to give it order would surely be a task for divine power, which holds the universe together. Hence the polis also must necessarily be the most beautiful with whose magnitude it combines the above-mentioned limiting principle; for certainly beauty is usually found in number and magnitude, but there is a due magnitude for a polis as there is for all things – animals, plants, tools’, otherwise it will lose ‘its true nature’ as well as its functional efficiency. Aristotle’s conclusion makes it clear ‘that the best limiting principle for a polis is the largest expansion of the population with a view to self-sufficiency that can be taken in one view’.

It would fail to do justice to the magnificence of Aristotle’s conception here to state that these views anticipate the work of social ecologists by hundreds of centuries. Social geographers and urban theorists have made the case for human scale countless times and continue to do so on any number of grounds as they attempt to check the depredations of the overscale modern civilisation. Aristotle is distinguished in his argument by the extent to which he encompasses logistics, politics and ecology within an overarching ethico-anthropological framework. This thesis has focused upon reason and traced its evolution back to classical Greece for precisely this added dimension. These questions are not merely institutional. They concern power not merely as numbers and resources but as human capacities and the unfolding of human nature within a wider nature. Aristotle’s argument is remarkable in focusing upon a ‘beauty’ achieved through ‘magnitude’ and ‘limit’ with respect to ‘true nature’ as the essence of a human community. 

Aristotle summed up his ideal as a community ‘that can be taken in one view’. Aristotle’s definition of the ideal community as one that is decentralized so as to be comprehensible and attractive to its members. For Aristotle, magnitude and harmony form the essence of the polis as a truly human community. There is an aesthetic and anthropological dimension to Aristotle’s argument that makes the classical conception of the polis ideal qualitatively different from the instrumental pragmatism of the contemporary urbanism, whatever the similarities between the two in terms of the desirability of human consociation.

The anthropological concern means that politics, for Aristotle, is inherently ethical. Aristotle’s Politics proceeds on the basis of the assumption that human beings are ‘animals’ of a very special kind. The telos of the human animal is to live in a polis in order to fulfil ‘true nature’. This polis, therefore, is more than a community but is a koinonia that has achieved the ‘good life’ in the form of a shared commonality of realised beings. Human self-realisation forms the good life within the polis. Further, the ‘good life’ comprises a level of material self-sufficiency that goes further than mere survival. Human beings are animals with transformative capacity, capable of changing and creating nature within and without due to the possession of reason and speech. These attributes combine to form a logos which drives human creative self-realisation. For the complete fulfilment of human potentiality, this capacity must be manifested in the creation of a socio-institutional and cultural world. Human beings require institutions, culture, ethics so that the society they naturally create have form, order and substance. The polis is constituted by a wealth of social activities that cultivate and facilitate everyday interaction, discourse and exchange between citizens. This social activity proceeds within the civic centre or agora, the gymnasium, and in the theatre as well as the popular assembly and courts. This activity reveals politics to be a mode of character development and public education, what the Greeks referred to as paideia, emphasising the value of everyday citizen interaction to the progressive unfolding of ethical and intellectual insight.

The essential principle or logic at the heart of this conception is human solidarity or philia. This principle is most frequently translated as friendship but actually connotes something far more than the English term conveys. Philia implies an expansive degree of sociality that goes much further than the personal intimacies between a few close individuals to create and sustain a civic commonality. Philia expresses sociality as a civic attribute of the polis and its political organisation and administration. Hence the full meaning of Aristotle’s well known phrase that man is ‘by his nature’ a political animal or zoon politikon is that human beings are inclined by nature not merely to live in a community but also to communise with each other within community.

The polis, then, is no mere means to an end but is an end in itself. The view challenges the modern instrumentalist view of politics which sees the state as a necessary evil, designed to impose the civil peace between warring individuals pursuing their own private ends as they see fit. This ‘modern’ conception is actually one that Aristotle confronted in classical times. Aristotle singles out the arguments of the Sophist Lykophron, for whom the polis is a ‘mere alliance’ to which privately motivated individuals agree in order to facilitate the exchange of material goods to satisfy private needs and to prevent mutual antagonism breaking out into actual harm. For Aristotle, the polis is not the means to private ends but is an end in itself, the public context that all human animals require in order to fully realise their human nature. The polis is the embodiment of the human need for consociation above and beyond the securing the material necessity which is merely the basis for self-realisation as human happiness and freedom: ‘If men formed the community and came together for the sake of wealth, their share in the polis [would be] proportionate to their share in the property, so that the argument of the champions of oligarchy would appear to be valid…; but if one the other hand the polis was formed not for the sake of life only but rather for the good life .. and if its object is not military alliance for defence against injury by anybody, [and] it does not exist for the sake of trade and of business relations’, the polis would be more than a community and its citizens would ‘take civic virtue and vice into their purview”. A political community that is united by mere economic and military alliances does not constitute a genuine public realm and is no different from the associations formed by individuals who, for all ‘agreements about imports and covenants [to abstain] from dishonesty and treaties .. for mutual defence’, have no ‘officials in common’ and have no ‘concern as to the moral character of the other’.

Just as there is no classical term for the state, so there is no modern distinction between the state and civil society, the central dualism of contemporary politics. Many commentators draw attention to the distinction between the social and political in Aristotle’s thinking, but this distinction is qualitative rather than quantitative and institutional. Aristotle’s thought is organic and emphasises the process of unfolding and growth by which the social expands to form the political. Aristotle’s conception is quite distinct from the antagonism of the modern state-civil society relation by which one side thrives at the expense of the other. In Aristotle’s thought there is no scope for the emergence of the political as a dimension apart from social life let alone of the state as a body equated with politics and held in superior relation to the social.

It is well known that Western civilisation owes its conception of politics to the ancient civilisation of Greece. The terminology of politics derives from Greece. But one should be careful of assuming that what these terms now mean are precisely what they originally meant. The Greeks invented ‘democracy’, but what we now understand as democracy, the slack, representative non-participatory affair of professional politicians organising passive collectivities would strike the classical citizen as remarkably undemocratic. By the same token, Aristotle was a critic of democracy, even though much of what he described as the normal functioning of the polis would strike the modern citizen as a remarkably democratic practice. Aristotle himself identifies the best ordered polis as one in which the most ethically and materially meritorious stratum of the population manages the polis’s affairs in the interests of all. Aristotle therefore argues in favour of what would now be called a ‘meritocracy’ rather than a democracy. But that is not the end of the question. For Aristotle’s anthropological premises are inherently democratic in that the abilities to achieve ethical and material merit are available to all individuals as part of their essential humanity. Conceiving politics in terms of the telos of the realisation of human potentiality on the part of the species as a whole rather within the species as the power of some over others, the end is an ethical union of a completely realised humanity that yields the ‘good life’ in both a moral and material sense. Politics consists of the practical reason (phronesis) and action (praxis) that enters into such a felicitous koinonia. This conception is most certainly not a meritocracy.

The democratic character of the Athenian polis refers to much more than citizen participation in the decision-making activities of the assembly but also to the way that a citizen culture was nurtured and enabled to flourish in the everyday activities of the agora. Democracy here is not an institutional question over specific means but an ethic and a culture, a modus vivendi formed by the social practices of each and all.

The politics that is at the heart of the Athenian polis refers to a form of citizen activity administering the affairs of a public life that is quite distinct from the notion of the state, conceived as a professionalised, bureaucratised and centralised system of governance, but also from civil society, conceived as forms of mutual alliance and contract for preserving peace and promoting material satisfaction between warring individuals.

Although the Greek roots of Western civilisation are frequently noted, the modern world has come to view the political terminology of the classical age through the lens of Rome, first the Republic but then most of all the Empire. The Roman conception of a public sphere is quite contrary to the Athenian. The American and French constitutionalists of the eighteenth century drew directly upon the Roman theory of republican government and were quite explicit in changing the meaning of terminology that owed its origin to Greece. Democracy became representative government under law made by professionals and proceeding through elites. 
 
The identification of representative government with democracy is specious. Classical authority for this historical reinterpretation was found in Polybius, but Polybius’s work is thoroughly anti-democratic. The appeal of Polybius lies in offering a conception of democracy that keeps the demos shackled by institutions and law, largely passive and almost completely excluded from the main business of politics and decision-making. Democracy for those who do not like democracy. Polybius celebrated the consuls, the two chief magistrates of the Republic, as embodying all the virtues of monarchy. He valued the Senate for giving the Republic the advantages of aristocracy, with its gradations in descending order of consular, praetorian, aedilitian, tribunitial, and quaestorial ranks. Polybius is therefore firmly committed to the descending theme of power. His thought proceeds on hierarchical rather than democratic lines, affirming a complex mix of weighted voting groups arranged according to military status, property and age.

That of all classical authors, Polybius should have had the greatest influence upon the modern age is not so surprising. Greek terms with Roman meaning provide a democracy in which political power remains safely in the hands of the rulers and far removed from the people. The Roman republic lacked a democratic component in the Hellenic sense. Moreover, whilst speech referred to verbal interchange between political equals in Greece, it was an affair of delivering elitist rhetoric to manipulate audiences in the Forum. The Hellenic idea of a face-to-face relationship between active citizens ensuring government by consensus is alien to republican systems of government. This point got lost in the early modern age, but a democracy is participatory whereas a republic is representative. Among the few political philosophers to understand this and make the case for democracy were Rousseau and Marx. Marx is quite explicit in criticising notions of the ‘democratic state’ as a republic. True democracy, Marx argues, implies the dissolution of the state. Democracy entails the active exercise of power directly by the people. In a republic, power is delegated to selected surrogates. It doesn’t matter how these surrogates are chosen and by how many, the point is that these supposed representatives of the people come to reconstitute the political realm so that what once existed at the base of the koinonia becomes a distinctly separate, professionalised power at the centre. Politics is the preserve of elites. A division opens up between an active political elite and a passive depoliticised mass. The republic rests upon political power which is beyond the immediate reach of popular control. In contrast, in a democracy worthy of the name, the issue of the alienation of power does not even arise. Democracy is by definition the active exercise of political power by the citizens. 

The modern confusion of democracy with representative government is inherently Roman rather than Hellenic. The Roman cult of libertas is directly parallel to the core value of ‘autonomy’ in modern liberalism in that it is structured around personal rights held in independence of the public community as against political freedom exercised collectively by each and all within the public community. There is, therefore, a highly significant distinction to be made between autonomy and freedom. The principle of individual ‘autonomy’ rests upon the notion of the individual as a sovereign, self-contained monad lacking roots in social life. In contrast, the idea of freedom implies that a true individuality is embedded in deep social roots and responsibilities uniting each and all in a collective modus vivendi.

The distinction between autonomy and freedom is directly related to the dualism of representative and participatory democracy dualism.

The balance that Athens achieved between aristocratic values and public rights proved beyond Rome. For all of the celebration of Roman civic culture, strictly speaking, Rome did not realise the potential of the Republic but instead degenerated under the Empire. To be precise, Rome can be criticised for the failure to develop the governance of the civitas into a genuinely public community which gave a political life to all. In losing the landholdings that gave them independence of mind and spirit, figures like Cincinnatus found that they had lost the social base for public commitment without simultaneously developing a politics that was capable of constraining the new order that arose in its place. As Rome expanded it came to be drawn into a broad environment of regional power relationships and responsibilities. The civic realm began to lose scale and proportion, resulting in a diminution of citizen and civic identity. Citizens started to lose a sense of themselves and of their place. Rather than reworking its yeoman society into a vital public realm that continued to nurture an active citizenship among all its social elements, Rome committed to a policy that equated power with expansion, even though this resulted in the dissolution of its yeomanry into rootless constituencies. In time, Roman public life began to deteriorate. The result was a republic rather than a democracy. Rome is celebrated for its administrative and legal innovation and efficiency and for its military prowess. But effectiveness in legal and physical coercion does not signal the health and vitality of the body politic. The hard shell expanded but was hollow inside. The body politic was corrupted, became soft and flabby and finally fell away. By the end of the Republic, even before the Empire, Rome was condemned for its moral debasement, lasciviousness, and extravagance in the writings of Marcus Portius Cato. Politics had ceased to be integral to the body politic but was instead treated as the exclusive property of the patriciate to be preserved from any serious intervention on the part of the people. It is therefore misleading to set up a sharp polarity between the Republic and the Empire and claim that Rome failed to realise its democratic and civic potential. Republican Rome was an elitist regime. The transformation of the Republic into the Empire amounts to the logical development of an increasingly oligarchical regime into a thoroughly despotic one.

At a distance of centuries, the differences between political models drawn from classical civilisation may seem fine. The problem is one of the blurring of meanings and categories in the modern age, particularly the wilful misreading of representative government as democracy. Athens and Rome offer contrasting and competing models for two types of popular government: a democracy and a republic. Some time around the eighteenth century, as the movement for resting government on the consent of the governed grew, republic conceptions won out over democratic conceptions but, in time, came to be redefined as democracy. That such thinking was quite compatible with constitutional monarchy – the favoured option of the likes of Montesquieu – showed the extent to which political reformers wanted not democracy but a more modern, updated elitist model of politics, a new monarchy based upon the consent of the wealthy sections of society. Later movements for democratisation through increased civil rights and an expanded franchise were proceeding within a republic shell. In the process, democracy came to be equated with its observe of representative government, a confusion which continues to this day.

Democracy as a value and as a practice runs throughout history as a subterranean current. It can be seen in the ideas, demands and activities of religious sects throughout the Middle Ages, such as the Brethren of the Free Spirit, Anabaptist movements, and explicitly anarchistic conventicles formed in the wake of the Reformation and which saw their full explosion during the English Revolution. The anarchistic and communistic implications of such notions of democracy can be seen in the Levellers and more obviously in the Diggers.

The struggle for democracy is an ongoing struggle for popular power as against government by and for elite groups and classes who owe their power to the exploitation of the people. The dominant forms of government have been republican rather than democratic for good reason. There is a need to ensure that the power and wealth of elites are protected from popular interference by a political regime that, whilst making provision for the consent of the governed, ensures that political power remains free from popular control. The trick, as Thomas Jefferson understood, is to devise a political system that ensures that people come to be manacled by their own consent. This was achieved by hybridising republican theories of governance with the democratic notions popular among the people. Although the most important work here came in the eighteenth century – building upon Locke’s earlier work – perhaps the most interesting political theorist is Machiavelli. A close and careful reading of Machiavelli’s Prince and Discourses reveal not the overly-familiar figure who wrote advice for tyrants but a civic philosopher whose work is replete with a creative, fairly consistent but always dangerously ambiguous synthesis of republican and democratic ideas. That Machiavelli’s model is the Roman Republic is plain enough. But there are Athenian elements which, if pursued to their logical conclusion, would subvert the confines of that model and replace it with a more expansive public order.

Democracy cannot be defined and redefined out of existence. At the time that the political philosophers were working on mixture of republican and democratic notions to theorise representative government, the likes of Rousseau pressed the converse democratic case with a vigour and eloquence that could not be overlooked. Rousseau’s principles are redolent of democratic Athens and struck a chord with the rising demands for self-governance on the part of the people. The historical irony is that the revolution which Rousseau’s words inspired was thoroughly Roman rather than Hellenic and represented everything that Rousseau was arguing against – centralised, professionalised, bureaucratised politics concentrating power – the people’s alienated sovereignty – at the summit. The French Revolution made explicit the emergence of the modern nation state.

The emergence of the large, centralised nation-state from the sixteenth-century changed the whole framework of political theory and practice. Prior to this point, the most fundamental unit of public governance was that which was closest to the people, the local community, the city, the village, the manor rather than greater entities like the province or nation. Among the Greeks, civic loyalty was all-encompassing. Throughout history, the allegiance of a person to the institutions of governance was apprehended in terms of a clear and distinct hierarchy of loyalties. The basic locus of personal and public life was the town or city. The identification with a province or the region was secondary. The idea of owing loyalty to and participating within a centralised nationality did not exist. 

Stoic philosophers criticised this notion of civic loyalty for the way that it contradicted the view that all men were brothers. The Stoic view implies a search for the unity between each and all as against an identities predicated as qualities of some as distinct from others. Stoicism here paved the way for the universalism articulated by Christianity over against particular states.

The emergence of the nation-state subverted the hierarchy of loyalties and, in the process, transformed the conception of politics. The value of the Stoic critique lies in its universal ethic. Loyalties begin with the particular but ought not end there. Ancient and medieval civic identity could degenerate into a parochialism that dehumanises urban life and degrades human beings. Without an overarching universal ethic which emphasises what each has in common with all, there is a danger of a local chauvinism in which cities come to see each other as rivals and enemies. Ethnic divisions, wars, and cultural introversion result. Indeed, wars between cities have been amongst the most barbaric and destructive in history, with the conquest of one city by another frequently being followed by the extermination of a people as a distinct community. The total destruction of Carthage by Rome in the last of the Punic wars represented the complete effacement of a people through the deliberate wiping out of their identity, culture, history, uniqueness, indeed their very physical existence. Rome inflicted the same punishment upon Jericho, Troy, and Jerusalem amongst many others. The potential for systematic urban destruction amounting to genocide is inherent in any socio-political organisation and is not particular to the modern nation state. 

With the emergence of the modern nation state, civic institutions which made face-to-face democracy a feasible everyday practice came to be replaced by vast institutions which exceeded the mental and physical reach of the citizens. In this historical context, republicanism formed the ideology of popular government by consent in an age of large scale structures making consent necessarily passive and tacit rather than active. The politics of republicanism is appropriate to nations rather than cities and is defined in terms of the statecraft of centralised and bureaucratic structures rather than civil associations.

It is difficult to exaggerate the problems that have been caused by the ideological relocation of politics from its origins in the civic life of the polis to the centralised structures and institutions of the nation state. The biggest impact has been made on the notion of the body politic. In the modern world this term is identified with an ‘electorate’ and ‘constituency’. In its classical meaning, the body politic formed the actual and living content of politics, the political body as a real, corporeal, and clearly observable entity. In the classical conception, politics presupposes the existence of a body politic in this sense. The body politic is the essential ecology of politics and its health and vitality is the condition of a thriving politics. The body politic could be observed as an everyday politics in the public squares where citizen interaction, discourse and exchange concerning political issues merged symbiotically with the talk of personal and business problems. The body politic gathered together on a hillside of Athens, the Pnyx, where meetings of the ekklesia were convened, or it assembled in the open spaces of the Roman Forum where the comitia tributa would hold its sessions.

The face-to-face contact of active citizens within the body politic forms an organic political ecology. As an ecological entity, the body politic thrives as a participatory entity. The continuous assembly of the citizens formed the living, breathing body of the political community. The citizen body was no mere passive audience to be managed and manipulated by politicians seeking public office. Politics was no mere statecraft practised by an elite but was integral to the self-realisation of the citizens and, as such, the self-realisation of the politics. These assemblies of active citizens constituted legislative communities unified by a shared commonality of reasonable ethico-political concerns.

Politics within the confines of the nation state parcels up the people’s sovereignty among the elitist rules of aristocracies, monarchies, and republics. Rather than being united around a reasonable commonality, the body politic comes to be fractured into a formless, passive and hence manipulable mass of privatised beings – the modern electorate or constituency. It was this that Rousseau had in mind when he criticised modern politics for the way that the people and their assemblies came to be displaced by the ‘deputies of the people’ and bureaucratic institutions.

The modern confusion of politics with statecraft persists only so long as the historical origins of politics in the assemblies of active citizens in the city are occluded or obscured. The blind spot not only applies to political analysis but also to urban studies. Urbanologists too easily accept the state monopoly of the political, failing to challenge those maintain a strict institutional separation of the state from civil society. The result is that the close historical relationship between the city and the development and growth of politics comes to be ignored. Not only does this devalue the political significance of the city but it also means that persistent attempts to reinvigorate citizenship are doomed to fail since attempts at revitalisation proceed through the state rather than through the real locus of citizen power – the urban roots. Urban studies tend to concentrate upon the evolution from village to megalopolis with a perspective that presumes the permanence of the existing urban environment. Against this narrow urban vision there is a need to revalue the political, ethical, and economic substance of the civic institutions and structures of the city, reclaiming the power and control of the body politic from the alien media of money, capital and the state.

The political revaluation of the urban environment focuses upon the recovery of the civic forms and practices that foster an active citizenry. This challenges those liberal theorists for whom the end of the state amounts to the end of politics. On the contrary, the continued domination of the state amounts to the effective occlusion of politics through the suffocation of the body politic. The realisation of politics requires the recovery of the social forms of citizen intercourse that proceed within the everyday environment. From this perspective the city as a public order functions as an ethical entity based upon a union of reasonable and reasoning beings, a public form of personal empowerment which is scaled to human proportions. This is to create an ecological system of politics which thrives through the participatory modes of civil structures and institutions. The health and well-being of the parts is determined by the extent to which the body politic exists as a living and breathing entity. This political conception of the urban environment as a public community must be critically reappropriated as a mode of thought, organisation and activity that fosters consociation, solidarity and exchange, that revalues the political significance of family, work, friendship, art, culture and morality within the greater context of an expansive civic order. Politics must be recovered in its original sense as a condition of personal and collective sovereignty over material processes of existence. The citizen is the principal agent of this politics. Citizenship embodies the classical ideals of philia, freedom, rationality, civic culture and public commitment. With the participation and activity of the citizen, and without a concern with the genesis, growth and unfolding of human potentialities, the body politic ceases to exist and politics becomes anaemically institutional and formal within the shell of the state. Such a politics lacks the institutions and forms required to ensure the flourishing of the body politic through an active citizenry. It is the citizens that invest forms and institutions with life and vitality. Without citizen involvement they become lifeless – the body politic becomes ecologically denatured and dehumanised.

3 The Ideal of Citizenship

My argument seeks to recover politics as a creative and rational arena of discourse capable of uniting disparate individuals within a reasonable commonality.

The citizen ideal as it was originally conceived and practised in classical Greece formed a complete contrast with modern notions of citizenship. The overarching ethic uniting citizens with each other within the polis was the organic and ecological conception of politics as integral to personal development. This is what the Greeks defined as paideia. As with so many of the classical terms defining politics, there is no adequate English translation with which to translate the meaning of this term in all of its richness. Paideia is normally translated as education, but the term connotes much more than this. By paideia the Greeks understood a formative and life-long process through which the individual became an asset to the polis, to his friends and family, capable of and willing to live up to the highest ideals of the community. The term is expansive and adumbrates a range of potentialities from the personal to the public. There is no English equivalent. The closest is the German concept of Bildung, which played a crucial role in Hegel’s political philosophy. This concept encompasses character development, growth, and a well-rounded enculturation so that the body politic is equipped with the knowledge and skills it needs to flourish. Bildung affirms the creative integration of the individual into the environment through the ability to shape, appreciate and transform that environment as his or her own world, an extension of one’s flourishing humanity. Educated thus, the individual acquires a comprehensive sense of duty as well as becoming capable of assuming ethical and political responsibility for the world around. The modern instrumental notion of means and ends is totally inappropriate in this context. The individual and the polis are simultaneously means and ends – the end of the polis is human self-realisation, the self-realisation of the citizen is the means by which the polis flourishes. Excellence in personal and public life are mutually conditional. The polis is the realised community of realised individuals. Education is therefore a unified process of self- and civic-development. Here is the answer to Marx’s question as to who shall educate the educator. If the polis is the ‘school’ in which the highest virtues of the individual as citizen were formed and given expression, it is also informed by the public commitment of the citizens. Politics was concerned not simply with administering the collective affairs of the polis but also with nurturing its members as public beings who were capable of assuming a citizen identity through developing the competence to appreciate and to act in the public interest. Paideia was both a civic schooling and personal training which cultivated both independence of mind and individual responsibility within an overarching civic culture and commitment. In comparison, modern notions of politics as the effective administration of public order and of education as the acquisition of knowledge and skills are remarkably thin. To the Athenians, politics and education go together as social practices. The conception is inherently organic and holistic, ruling out any instrumental means-ends rationality and the strict demarcation of distinctive spheres which pervades the modern world. Hellenic politics is concerned not merely with the efficient transaction of public business and the making of laws but with the human growth of its participants. The process by which the Athenians gathered as an ekklesia to decide upon policies was simultaneously a mutual education in which each learned the judgement to act justly according to an appreciation of civic ideals of right and wrong. The political realm was not strictly institutional and administrative but was indeed a process in being a continuous, everyday framework for intellectual, ethical, and personal growth. Paideia nurtured the capacity of individuals to participate in public affairs in a creatively meaningful sense, engaging their best abilities to promote the development of the polis and ensuring their own self-development, succeeding in determining their private affairs in accordance with the collective affairs of the public community.

The polis formed an expansive public sphere based upon the provision of a variety of public spaces for citizen interaction and intercourse in an intimate, everyday environment. The most important of these spaces was the agora, which M. I. Finley defines as ‘town square’, an informal meeting ground where the people could assemble whenever they needed to (p. 64 16). As Finley points out, the original meaning of the agora was a ‘gathering place’, indicating the most important aspect of town life that predates the forming of shops, stalls and temples. Later, the formal assembly of the people – the ekklesia – came to be located on a hillside (the Pnyx). 

The agora furnished the essential physical space for ensuring that citizenship functioned as a living, everyday practice rather than being merely a periodic institutional ritual. The Greeks were essentially public beings, making the details of private life the concern of the home and of no great importance. Life was not the atomised, privatised existence that it has become in the modern world but was lived in the public space of the agora. Here, citizens could meet freely to discuss the affairs of the community, exchange small talk, meet friends, and engage in vigorous political discussion on the main issues of the day.

For all of the ritual with which they were enveloped, the democratic institutions of Athens were merely the structural forms through which everyday communicative interaction was articulated into the legislated expression of an unstructured and spontaneous popular politics conducted by the citizenry. With respect to Athenian democracy, there can be no question of divorcing form from content in order to theorise ideal structures and institutions. Athenian democracy was more existential than institutional. The everyday interaction of the agora formed the fundamental and fruitful basis for ‘libertarian’ structures that, without active citizen involvement, would have ossified into oligarchic institutions with a democratic veneer. Such is the fate of form divorced from content. The active citizenry formed the substance of Athenian democracy, creating and sustaining that democracy as a reality. Citizenship, in effect, involved a continuous process of educational, ethical and political unfolding.

At this point it is worth distinguishing the conception of autonomy within individualist liberalism from the conception of autarky as public freedom. Autarky requires an emphasis upon the principle of the state, that is, a form of public life and government implying authority, law, mutual bonds and codes and compacts.

The word autarkeia is most often translated as ‘self-sufficiency’. This fails to grasp the full meaning of the term as ‘self-rule’. The modern reading understands this concept as autonomia, the condition of living by one’s own laws. This renders the concept of autarkeia to mean independence in a juridical rather than a political sense. There is great potential for mischief and misunderstanding here. By autarkeia the Greeks meant self-sufficiency and self-rule as a collective or public freedom which requires an emphasis upon the principle of the state, e.g. authority, law, mutual bonds and codes and compacts. The modern understanding of ‘autarchy’ to mean economic self-sufficiency and ‘autonomy’ to denote personal liberty owes more to individualist liberalism and anarchism and is founded upon a dualism of private and public, individual and collective, material and political that is quite antithetical to the Greek ideal of independence. The reason that Aristotle argued that tradesmen, artisans, merchants, and servants should be denied the franchise had nothing to do with class based notions of a property franchise. Aristotle was not arguing against labour and trade as such but the way that material clientage in any form served to prevent independence of judgement on the part of the citizen. Without the substance of material self-sufficiency and personal autonomy, independence could only have been empty and merely formal. No matter how materially well-off, clientage ensured that a person would defer to exogenous authorities and interests rather than reason freely and render an independent judgement. In arguing for a classless society in order to realise true democracy, Marx was taking Aristotle’s critique of material clientage to its logical conclusion (Miller 1989).

Greek thought and practice is characterised by its essentialism and organicism. Origin, history, potentiality and realisation form an integral whole. Whether one chooses to focus upon the universe, the polis, or the citizen, they are all aspects of the same substance and express the unity of civic, natural and social life. Autarchies in the sense of self-sufficient communities proceed inexorably to independence, competence, and isonomia.

‘The Greek polis has its arche in this germinal phasing of a highly competent farmer who, by an immanent process of socio-political development, found his fulfilment as a highly-competent citizen’.

The content created the form. The system of participatory governance was not an institutional form or ideal which was introduced to a passive demos. Rather, the body politic created the institutional structure most appropriate to its health and vitality. This is politics as an existential reality lived in the spaces of the everyday terrain, not the formal politics of lifeless institutions and structures, ‘offices’ occupied by professional elites. It has become customary for modern politicians, having had to accept the language of liberal rights, to lecture ‘citizens’ that rights are accompanied by duties. The implication is that rights are some form of private entitlement held against the state and need to be buttressed by some form of onerous duty towards the state. Both interpretations indicate the extent to which the modern citizen has become divorced from the institutions of government. In complete contrast, in Athens the everyday practice of paideia and the institutional structure of the polis were synthesised into an ideal of citizenship that the individual would achieve as a form of self-realisation. There is no notion of citizenship as an obligatory burden of self-denial as there is in rights based modern liberalism. Citizenship is an ethos, a creative art, indeed, a modus vivendi rather than the burdensome body of duties accompanied by a palliative body of rights to which it has been reduced in the modern world. The most fundamental difference lies in the public sense of happiness and freedom that is in complete contrast to the individualism of the modern world. The sense of a shared commonality and solidarity underpinned the classical conception of citizenship and ensured that any duty or obligation within the polity was actually a self-realisation achieved within a collective sense of responsibility.

In stark contrast with modern liberalism, the Greek citizen ideal is collectivist rather than individualist. Individual self-realisation proceeded within and could be attained only within the realisation of the whole. The bourgeois conception of individual liberty would have struck the Athenian citizen as so partial and limited as to amount to an unfreedom. The autonomous individual as the monadic buyer and seller is not free but is in a condition of bondage to material and psychological necessity. The ‘free’ choices of this self-seeking atom are constrained by internal psychological and physical infirmities that can only be overcome by connecting self-realisation with the wider process of a realised public life. The pathos of this bourgeois self-deception has now become so gross as to be simply pathetic. Aristotle’s point concerning material clientage affecting judgement in politics is well-made. The Western ‘citizen’ is more materially well-off than any citizen has ever been and yet Western politics still speaks the language of necessity. Even faced with ultimate ruination through human-induced climate change, the Western voter refuses to abandon the ‘necessities’ of modern life. The self-identity of the modern individual as free is a pathetic delusion. The material clientage of the ‘free’ individual within class relations is accompanied by the clientage of all upon ‘the system’, condemning all to a nihilistic pursuit of material expansion, despite the evidence showing how this expansionary drive is rapidly depleting the resources of the planet and damaging the biosphere beyond repair. Politics ought to be about the realisation of life but, in the modern world, it expresses the reduction of life to the acquisition of things. Human beings are exchanging their inherent capacities for the possibility of buying freedom and happiness on the market. Such ideals are to be found only within. By pursuing an illusion, human beings find not freedom or happiness but a moira or destiny governed by ananke or necessity.

Although classical citizenship is a collective designation, it comprised individuality. The connectedness of the individual and the collective ensured that the one could not be realised without the other. Thus, citizenship implied a personal wholeness that was grounded in tradition, a complexity of social bonds, richly articulated civic relationships, a shared experience of festivals, cults, rituals, philia, independence from clientage and freedom for collective self-determination through participatory structures and institutions rooted in the everyday practices of a living, creative body politic. Citizenship of this rich quality requires a polis, a city organised around an agora, with extensive and expansive public spaces with which to convene general assemblies of the people, the city as theatre dramatizing freedom as ideal and real, and the ceremonial squares, avenues and temples that unified the inner and outer landscape to give it reverential meaning. To isolate and identify any of these particular elements as ‘democracy’ or ‘citizenship’ is to destroy the whole intricate psychological and physiological fabric, perverting the ideal and destroying the real. It has to be emphasised once more that form and content flourish in a unity in the Athenian conception. The substance of the Athenian ideal of citizenship is to be found in the living, creative body politic whose essentialist and organic conception of politics as human self-realisation gave formal institutions and structures their content. Citizenship as paideia ensured individuals became citizens capable of apprehending public life as an extension of their own personality and humanity. Without this content, the formal structures and institutions would become empty and hollow and would soon atrophy.

The Athenian ideal has continued to haunt Western politics and civilisation. From the practices of the medieval city-states to the township democracy of the American revolution and the radical communes of the various French revolutions, there has been a continuous harking back to the patterns of civic freedom of the democratic polis. This could easily be dismissed as nostalgia, as Connolly’s Foucaultian critique would have it. Of course, as Max Weber has shown, capitalist modernity and rationalisation systemically prevents the possibility of reviving the Hellenic Sittlichkeit pursued in various forms by Rousseau, Marx, Hegel and many, many socialists and radicals throughout history. The problem is that the extent to which the Athenian democratic ideal keeps returning throughout history indicates something essential rather than merely historical about the ideal. As one would expect from the classical conception. The conception is an organic and essentialist one rooted in the human ontology and concerning politics as creative self-realisation to achieve freedom and happiness as an anthropological reality. That ideal will continue to return to the historical stage for so long as human beings remain human and seek to humanize their environment as a condition of their self-realisation.

Classical Greece in general and Athens in particular gives evidence of popular self-governance as a real and practicable achievement rather than an appealing but utopian ideal. Overshadowed by the Roman Republic and Empire that came after, the achievements of Greece were very real and indicate the extent to which an active citizen democracy can flourish as a permanent form.

The Athenian civic democracy suffered from many flaws (treatment of women, alien residents, the use of slave labour). These are problems of the particular and the universal, exclusion and inclusion and are to be addressed by the rational ethic that identifies the freedom of each and of all as mutual.

This conception of politics is far from the contemporary statecraft which sees democracy as the management and manipulation of passive masses, citizens as voters and taxpayers who demand nothing more of politics than it interferes in their private affairs as little as possible and that it costs them even less. An organic, essentialist politics revolve around entities such as the cooperative, vocational communities and bodies intermeshed within society. Continuous activity within the social practices of this everyday terrain is a civic paideia, an education that fosters and ensures the spiritual and institutional empowerment of the citizen.

 The question is contemporary. In its own self-image, contemporary politics justifies itself in terms of administrative efficiency and fiscal probity. All parties seeking election sell themselves to the electorate in these terms. And the voters who form the electorate seem content in sufficient numbers to accept this self-image of state politics. The onerous business of politics should be undertaken by the professionals, should interfere as little as possible in the private pursuit of endless wealth, and should cost as little as possible. 
Against this, the Athenian ideal is alive in the community and grass-roots politics emerging in the perspectives of ‘localism’, ‘decentralism’ and ‘bioregionalism’.

The strength of the Roman republic was a strong peasant population. The institutions which were once so strong could only flourish and persist with the health and vitality of its social roots. The waning of the republic indicated a decay of these roots, something which institutional changes could not remedy. Once Rome ceased to be a city in the Hellenic sense of the term, the whole republican edifice crumbled within. As Rome became the centre of an emerging empire, it ceased to be a civitas, a republican term which owed much to its Hellenic origins in connoting a ‘union of citizens’ and instead became an urbs in the new Latin sense. The terminological shift is significant and is the origin of the loss of the Hellenic sense of scale, balance and proportion in defining a city. As early as the second century B.C., the Roman urbs had started on its journey of uncontrollable growth. And to the extent that the urbs sprawled outwardly in size and scope to encompass the known world, so the civitas diminished.

Municipal democracy atrophied and died away under the Roman Empire. The Empire was not a civilisation as such but a purely parasitic growth that lived only by conquest and exploitation. The Roman Empire was extremely suspicious of municipal autonomy and frequently acted to raze cities to the ground, annihilating its peoples, in order to suppress the very idea of autonomy from Rome as a possibility. Rome provided cities with sufficient freedom to police themselves and extract tribute from subject populations but no more. Under Rome, the city ceased to function as a political entity and with it went the notion of civic culture, and shrivelled disastrously, at least in Europe and the northern rim of the Mediterranean basin. It was only in the eleventh century that urban life began to revive in this area, the birthplace of western civilisation and politics.

The ideals and achievements of Athens and Rome proved to be of enduring significance in effectively creating Western civilisation. The long decline and final collapse of the Roman Empire did not imply the end of Hellenic and Roman ideals and practices. The key issue is the extent to which the Greek and Roman heritage could be merged and treated as some homogeneous classical civilisation. The idea that there is some clear and distinct classical heritage is the cause of endless confusions and controversies. The one which is still to be resolved concerns popular government – the conflict between direct and representative notions of democracy. The ambiguity of modern politics – the formal shell of democratic institutions governing a fundamentally undemocratic civil society – can be traced to the ambiguous legacy of Greece and Rome. Those to be found arguing either side of the controversy can easily cite classical authority and precedent to justify their views. From the medieval cities and communes to the modern nation states, movements and parties have continued to swing between Hellenic and Roman conceptions as if caught between ideals and reality. Always, the ideal to be achieved, the more radical cause, is that of Hellenic democracy and citizenry, always the ideal is sacrificed for the more immediately practicable Roman republic. The verdict will always depend upon the extent to which the demos constitute themselves as an active citizen body capable of developing their moral, intellectual, and organisational capacities to such an extent that the institutions and structures of Hellenic democracy would have content and live as viable, organic, vital entities. Without that, on grounds of realism, the Roman perspective will prevail. What makes Machiavelli such an interesting theorist is the extent to which his thought constantly fluctuates between ideal and real. His model is that of the Roman republic but his claims for the indispensability of an active citizenry are Hellenic. 

Europe in the Middle Ages developed enduring patterns of civic freedom which were as rich and as vital as those of classical civilisation. It is from this period of communes and free cities that the urban character of Europe derives. The emergence of city-states from the thirteenth century in Italy and in the lowlands of modern Belgium and Holland represented the increasing abstraction of urban life from its rural environs. These city-states were structured around distinctively urban tasks – artisan oriented, financial, commercial, and industrial – and gave the town with an authentic civic life and identity of its own.

Of course, the medieval towns and cities remained dependent upon the rural environment for food and raw materials. However, in time, the increasing wealth and power of the city in an increasingly commercial civilisation gave it the capacity to remake the countryside in its own image, thus entangling agriculture and landed wealth within new economic and political priorities. This is the origin of the dualism of town and country. At this time, the city came to impose its technology, economic imperatives, instrumental relationships, culture, and values upon rural communities. But, far from ensuring the victory of the city over the country, these same forces destroyed the city from within, emptying it of its civic content and replacing it with commercial and monetary concerns. In the war between town and country, both lost to the same forces of capital.

For a time, the city recovered the political significance it had had in classical times. The famous medieval maxim “Urban air makes for freedom” referred not only to the freedom of trade and property but also to political freedoms of citizen participation, intellectual freedoms of thought and scientific-technological freedom to experiment and innovate.

The expansion of personal and political liberty proceeded hand in hand within the medieval city-states– Flemish, German, French, and Swiss. This expansion witnessed the emergence of a clear pattern of civic freedom, not merely from territorial lords but also structurally, within the medieval civitas itself. The Italian city-states are distinguished by their ‘power and imagination’ (Lauro Martines) making them so institutionally, architecturally and artistically creative. The Italian city-states possessed a degree of organicity and roundedness that made them a beacon of the civic freedom which soon spread up through Europe into Flanders, northern France, and southern Germany until western and central Europe as a whole expressed a new municipality. 

The Italian city-states practised democracy in richly articulated forms, as an active practice on the part of citizens rather than simply representative forms of governance. Something of the character of the Italian city-state is expressed in the medieval Latin name of its locale – commune. This form of civic freedom covered most of the northern and central areas of Italy and counted the great cities of Florence, Venice, Verona, Pisa, Sienna, and Cremona in their numbers. At the heart of the city-state was the popular assembly and its centrality emerges almost parallel with the emergence of the commune itself. The commune was a community or town in the general civic sense of the term, but more specifically was an association of burghers united by an oath or conjuratio. The commune, therefore, was more than a community formed by force of circumstances and events, since the conjuratio undertaken by the burghers made the town a vital fraternity. The conjuratio was a means of placing shared practical concerns on the terrain of reasonable moral purpose. The oath was the means by which the burghers foreswore the personal self-interest that separated them in order to embrace a common interest that united them. This was a conscious act of mutual fealty that was given not to a local noble, cleric, military chieftan or distant monarch but to each other. The conjuratio was an act of citizenship on the part of the burghers, quite distinct from the undertakings of religious congregations in being an explicitly political act, pledging each member of the commune to respect the civic rights of all other members and to extend these rights to newcomers as well as to future generations. As a reasonable act of union, the conjuratio expressed the civic dimension of rational freedom, evincing the capacity of human beings as rational beings to morally order their environment so as to ensure the common good. The conjuratio committed the members of the commune to a broadly consensual mode of self-government. The citizens asserted their capacity to engender public order and govern themselves on the basis of a mutual respect for each other and a pledge for the mutual defence of individual liberty.

The Italian city was not the recovery of the Athenian polis. The Italian city-state lacked the Hellenic respect for and training in balance, scale, proportion and harmony amongst the parts. On the contrary, these vibrant and innovative urban entities were characterised by excess and explosive political theatrics. With the expansion of the wealth and power of the city-state, the popular democracy that had accompanied the commune since its inception came to be displaced by republican forms of governance. Civic leadership came to be concentrated in the hands of the large, wealthy urban families who vested the powers of the city in a large legislature redefining the character and contours of civic politics for centuries to come.

A characteristic of the Italian city-state which represented an advance over Athens and Rome is the many neighbourhood communes that flourished within the larger urban commune. These formed the strength of the Italian city-state and have no precedent in classical civilisation. Regardless of the forms of governance that prevailed within the city, its neighbourhoods had an autonomy in civic governance that was quite without precedent.

The popolo were not the people as such but men with a degree of material substance. These could be master craftsmen, professionals, notaries, well-off tradesmen, and, of growing importance, financiers and the commercial bourgeoisie who were rapidly accruing fortunes from foreign trade. Whilst there was some connection of the nobilia with the more wealthy popolo so that it is difficult to establish precise class boundaries in their conflicts with each other, in the main the popolo were excluded from the political life of the city and were treated like resident aliens, the metics of Athens. Whilst the popolo paid taxes, served in the militia, they lacked the right to hold public office or to participate in its civic councils.

“The popolo’s breakthrough into politics was the result of revolutionary organisation” (Martines p102 42). As the thirteenth century progressed, the popolo increasingly assumed the reins of power the Italian communes – Bologna by 1231, Pistoia in 1237, Florence in 1250 – and to become increasingly influential in the governance of Piacenza, Lodi, Bergamo, Siena, Parma, and Genoa. 

The key to this revolutionary organisation and its effectiveness was the highly localist and organic mode of political action, something which is the very antithesis of modern concepts of party politics. The Marxist-Leninist conception of ‘the party’ as the vanguard of the proletariat are quite puny and empty in comparison, lacking in activated and energised social and civic roots. The popolo had formed themselves into a neighbourhood movement, intermeshed and interlinked with each other. 

The specific structures the organisation showed great variety but distinctive forms emerged from the neighbourhood base. Most important here are the vocational guilds and the way that they established a pattern for connecting individuals from different neighbourhoods into a common organisation according to occupation. These guilds are the earliest forms of popular organisation according to vocation on record and their range covered the social composition of the popolo as a whole - merchants, physicians, jurists and notaries, smiths, cloth finishers, butchers, bakers, furriers, tanners, leather makers and so on. The conception is functional and organic, grounded in neighbourhood and work, the everyday lifeworld of individuals.

In time, the conciliar system and popular assemblies were transformed into oligarchies. However, for a period, the ancient civitas as an association of active citizens lived again, forming the culture and character of the European citizen body to an extent that ensured that its civic spirit endured long after its institutions had ossified and been overtaken by oligarchic forms.

Time and again, the source of corruption is wealth and power held by some in independence of the many others. The more powerful sections of the popolo would soon lose interest in a shared and reasonable commonality of citizens and would express a clear preference for elite rule and territorial centralism. The emergence of the nation-state had powerful support from the rich merchants. Paradoxically, the supporters of local autonomy were members of the nobilia, the barons who had once held superiority in the class hierarchy. The centralised power of the nation-state was essential to overcome local feudal interference with the free movement of trade and ensure the subordination of the labouring classes. The cities had been taken over by civic oligarchies whose priorities of wealth and power brought them into alliance with the centralised authorities over against the city. The first indication of these new developments came as early as the late fourteenth century, when Philip van Artavelde, the son of the great champion of Flemish liberty, Jacques van Artavelde, led the Flemish communes to comprehensive defeat by Count Louis in the Battle of Roosebeeke in 1382. “Henceforth, Flanders was to give up the dream of government by a league of independent towns and submit to the ever more and more centralised rule of powerful territorial lords, whose model was naturally the aggressive monarchy of France… the Low Countries were drawn into the politics of France, the Empire and Spain. The cities, still great and powerful, enjoying very wide privileges, were to be only incidents in the larger relations of the country” (p. 108 45).

From being integral to the new city-states, civic freedom became a subterranean current in antagonistic relation to the increasingly dominant nation state. The abstracting, bureaucratising and centralising trends and tendencies of capitalist rationalisation and modernity worked to suppress this civic freedom. Nevertheless, the ideal of civic self-government through popular assemblies and of the city as the nuclear area an active citizenry constituting the political real endured. The rising power of the centralised nation state, the expansionary and universalising dynamic of capital, the demographic boom all worked against the scale, balance, proportion and harmony upon which civic freedom depended. That it continued to reappear, in the township democracy of New England or in the Parisian communes, is indicative of the essential need that human beings have for an expressivist mode of politics as a form of self-expression. Hence the tendency for politicisation to take the form of face-to-face decision making and direct democracy. 

For Daniel Guerin: “The bourgeois philosophers who had pronounced direct democracy unworkable in large countries, on the grounds that it would be materially impossible to bring all the citizens together in one meeting, were thus proved wrong. The Commune had spontaneously discovered a new form of representation more direct and more flexible than the parliamentary system and which while not perfect, for all forms of representation have their faults, reduced the disadvantages to a minimum”. Indeed, so direct and flexible was this form of political expression that it could not be considered as a form of representation at all, not in the sense that representation implies the alienation of sovereignty. The Commune form of self-expression establishes complete control over civic affairs through the confederation of face-to-face neighbourhood assemblies, free communes as the nuclear unit of the new politics.

The Commune form of self-governance is characterised by a politics which is co-extensive with social life, and expresses a popular politics with deep roots in guild systems of mutual aid, a civic militia, and the strong awareness of a shared commonality.

The medieval guild combined the functions of the ancient collegium, the modern trade union and much more, undertaking material purposes within a moral commitment. The guilds combined economics, politics and ethics in being a sworn, covenanted brotherhood that imposed sanctions against members who sought to lower the quality of goods or charge higher than prescribed prices. The guilds were a form of education or training in regulating not only the production of material goods but of personal, moral, and religious character to ensure good behaviour. Members were punished for usury, blasphemy, gambling and other cases of immoral behaviour. The medieval guilds also exercised extensive social and civic functions in caring for members’ widows and orphans, the ill and infirm but also in giving alms to the poor, performing charitable works, and in celebrating feast days.

Of the greatest importance is the extent to which medieval guilds acquired legislative and governing authority to an extent that they became the principal municipal institution of many communes. Thousands of European towns exercised a degree of autonomy that only the greatest cities had had in the past and which remains a goal which modern cities, for all of their material wealth and power, can only aspire to in relation to the dominant forces of national states and global capital. The commune’s autonomy was achieved as an organic process within a decentralised agrarian society that was feudal rather than capitalist. Growth and elaboration proceeded from the localised world of small artisans, craftsmen, and merchants, giving it a corporate rather than a commercial character.

The commercial imperatives that accompanied the expansion of foreign trade – more precisely the capitalistic carrying trade that emanated from the Italian city states and the Flemish communes – served to network Europe’s towns and cities whilst undermining their communal autonomy. The independence that each possessed apart from the others was replaced by a union of dependence of all upon commerce. The potential for a Europe-wide system of self-governance through interlinked confederal institutions based on local community control remained latent. Instead, the commercial network created by trade between cities facilitated the rise of civic oligarchies who favoured the formation of centralised nation states, monarchical and later republican systems of government working hand in hand with capital.

The intercity carrying trade that absorbed Europe within an all-encompassing commercial network from the twelfth century onward shredded the intricate patterns and solidarities of the many personal and communal dependencies through which production and personality was carefully regulated. Rapidly, the expanding trade between cities generated a new social infrastructure of institutions and media more appropriate for a commercial order – regional rather than local, and then overwhelmingly national. Far from ensuring the assertion of civic and communal autonomy of the city, the expansion of intercity trade drew all cities in subordination within an extra-urban commercial network that established the infrastructure for the nation state and nationalism. The Europe-wide commercial interlinking of towns and cities generated new material dependencies for goods that severed the intimate and grounded relationships and solidarities fostered by corporate society.

With its legitimacy codified on paper in legal and administrative documents and compacts, the nation state achieved pre-eminence more as a social contract than as an organic historic phenomenon. Behind the small print and the legalese of the ‘contractual’ state is a history that contradicts its rationalistic claims to authority. Reason, clearly, was a contested claim. The legalistic rationalism of the state is one form that reason could take over against the ontological and anthropological claims of human beings that their reason is more properly embodied in the corporate entities of the body politic. The state’s reason, in contrast, is an empty formalism, a legalistic casing or shell imposing one form of reason upon other, more humanly rationalistic claims. The state proved to be parasitic upon these rational aspects of social and community life, those forces which human beings create in the process of promoting their self-realisation. To defetishize the authority of the state as the institutional embodiment of reason is to begin to revalue and recover the rational dimensions of public activity as coextensive with social life as constituted by an active citizenship. This is to return politics to its original meaning against its contemporary redefinition as statecraft, the preserve of professional politicians, officials, and bureaucrats.

The legal and contractual self-image and legitimation of the modern state owes a great deal to the fact that its emergence could not be organic and socially rooted in a genuine social and civic rationality. The centralised nation state emerged in alliance with the commercial forces of capital in and against a social milieu that was distinctly customary, solidary and organic in character. An organic development favoured a Europe-wide interlinking of confederal communes. The state and capital proceeded in alliance against these organic forces, systematically suppressing alternative bases of social and civic autonomy to force all upon the market. These forces for communal autonomy were systematically suppressed in order to secure the power of capital within state authority.

In the process, the state suppressed the intricate, evolved loyalties and solidarities of a highly decentralised, localistic, and organic society, canalising the rich diversity of cultural, economic, and communal attributes into the increasingly homogenized forms of the state bureaucracy. The localist politics which once contained the potential for a corporate confederalism of interlinked towns and cities was transformed into nationalist statecraft concerned with imposing civil peace upon a society fractured by market relationships and with creating the appropriate public order for the private accumulation of capital. What we now recognise as the modern world emerged in the next two or three centuries through the struggle for popular government, rights, representation and democracy. The problem is that this struggle proceeded within inherently narrow and flawed parameters. This is where the conflation of direct and representative forms, Athens and Rome, becomes decisive. For the state which emerged at this time completely redefined politics as the statecraft of professional elites, emptying citizenship of its active and participatory content and thus supplanting energetic, empowered, and self-realising, self-governing citizens with passive, disempowered, and politically obedient ‘subjects’. Politics became the management and manipulation of the excluded and passive masses. No amount of democratisation, extended franchise, rights etc. could compensate for the basic hollowness of the new state politics.

The familiar picture of ever quarrelsome, continually warring city-states is an extremely misleading one in that it focuses narrowly upon some city-states at certain periods in their history. What lends credence to this reading is the historical triumph of the nation state, encouraging a tendency to read this development as a necessity written into the fabric of civic oligarchies quite happy to give up communal autonomy to the state in return for being allowed economic freedom. Against this narrow view of historical inevitability, there is plenty of evidence that, far from always being at war, cities were inclined to form leagues and confederacies with each other, networks of mutual aid and protection which sustained an infrastructure of communal liberty counterposed to the state.

Histories of rebellions and revolutions pay scant regard to patterns of civic freedom and communal autonomy capable of producing confederations with which to supplant the state. The congregations and sects of Protestantism, the movements of the English Revolution, how these came to democratic fruition in the townships of New England, the clubs and societies of the French Revolution, and the many unions, councils and communes of proletarian politics have been examined. The Marxist approach naturally focuses upon a class analysis. Unfortunately, one always gains a sense of human agents struggling vainly against the forces of historical necessity. The civic roots of historical rebellions and revolutions and of proletarian politics are rarely appraised from the perspective of containing the potential for constituting a confederal municipal order independent of class politics. This despite the evidence of impressive political creativity on the part of popular movements. The democratic ideals and practices of the English Revolution may have been dashed by the return of the monarchy and rendered safe by being placed on a constitutional and legal basis, but were to have an active fulfilment in the townships of New England. Could the radicals have altered the course of the French Revolution to ensure that France came to be governed by a confederation of autonomous, interlinked communes rather than by the centralised apparatus of the state functioning for the benefit of capitalism as a private regime of accumulation? If that is a politically loaded question, then it is no less true that history, social reality, is always loaded. The Marxist approach can tend to reduce human agents to a struggle over pre-determined outcomes. The ideal of communal confederation was once more invoked in the popular demands that arose during the French Revolution. Lacking the infrastructure of communal autonomy ensured that the Revolution issued in one of the most centralized nation-states in Europe through first the dictatorship of the Jacobins and then the rule of Napoleon. Whilst the ideal remained, it was forever in search of the social and civic substance that would enable it to create the infrastructure against the state and ensure its permanent reality. The ideal continues to return in all popular upsurges. The Paris Commune of 1871 sought to organise France through communes or ‘city councils’ unified in a huge civic confederation. The ideal, however easily it may be expressed at the level of popular demand, requires content and substance, the actual infrastructure which trains and educates citizens to ensure its enduring significance. This is the real damage that state politics has inflicted upon citizenship and the citizen body. Excluded from public life and political activity other than voting in a periodic election, people have lost the habits and mentalities of citizenship. They can press their citizen identities in a vague, spontaneous sense at a time when the state is suffering a crisis in its legitimacy and authority, but the state always retains an institutional power with which to face the citizens down.

Centralisation at the top is associated with civic deterioration at the base of society. Divested of its political significance, society ceases to foster a civic culture and instead becomes a panoply of bureaucratic agencies that are charged with the task of imposing unity upon monadic individuals within a strictly legal and administrative structure. Where once civil institutions fostered a civic culture, educating people into citizenship, the instrumental relationships and possessive individualism of market society fosters the dissolution of the self into mere egoism. Unity is possible only through the imposition of an impersonal legal-administrative bond whereas once the city could generate its own unity from within as an ethical bond. Society thus ceases to be a public life united by a range of collective purposes and solidarities and instead disintegrates into a market, a formless economic unit lacking civic structures and loyalties. Hobbes’s portrayal of the state of nature as the war of all against all was a purely fictitious justification of the need for a strong central state authority to impose civil peace upon the emerging market society of his day. This antagonism subverts society’s organic tendency toward communal diversity, complexity and solidarity. This is an ontological problem in that the city, as the most elemental form of human consociation, is crucial to human self-realisation. The city is the place where being is realised, where individuals learn to extend the kinship bond to a public awareness of the connection between each and all, expanding as human beings by coming to produce, share, and develop the material and cultural means of life, sharing the good life as truly human beings. This is to ascend to a reasonable commonality, a conscious state that transcends immediate bonds. This is to achieve humanitas as distinct from ‘folk’. 

Returning politics to its original meaning is to recover its ontological and indeed ecological aspects. Capitalist urbanisation destroys the diversity, variety and participation upon which the stability and the creativity of human consociation depends. Society loses its capacity to continually evolve and innovate richer, well-rounded social forms and instead is overwhelmed by an urban homogeneity and formlessness. This urbanisation is the product of the symbiotic relation between the state and capital, the abstract institutional-systemic apparatus of alien power pursuing its own imperatives at the expense of a living human culture and social ecology.

Capitalism has had a disastrous impact upon the city, turning a political and civic entity into nothing more than an economic unit for accumulation. Handing over the city to the expansionary dynamic of capital has ensured that urbanisation proceeds by swallowing up its surroundings. The expansionary dynamic of capital translates into urban form in terms of the continuous extension of concrete over town and country alike, with pavements, streets, houses and industrial, commercial and retail structures encompassing the whole landscape. The result of this amorphous development has been that cities have ceased to be humanly scaled and comprehensible politics units and have thus lost their form as distinctive cultural and physical entities. In the original conception, the city is an ethico-political arena which provided the civilised form of consociation which human beings require to realise their human potentialities to the full, above and beyond kinship ties and family loyalties. The dehumanisation of capitalism has invaded the city and has hollowed them out from within until they function as no more than impersonal centres of accumulation and valorisation. This economic reductionism has indeed extended to the culture of cities, culture being objectified to assume commodity status. Capitalism’s economic reductionism does not imply that production and consumption have become ends in themselves. The situation is far worse than that. The whole process is endless. Social life and the biosphere have been objectified within an expansionary economy that is literally nihilistic or meaningless. The process is endless. The purpose of production and consumption is accumulation and valorisation in order to generate the resources for further accumulation.

As against the diverse identities of the pre-modern age, the modern individual is a strangely anodyne and simplified being, a passive consumer and taxpayer, a bystander of political and economic processes they neither control nor comprehend. Citizenship requires that individuals be active participants in the processes by which their lives are governed. This implies the existence of political, economic and organisational capacities and communal solidarities, autonomies and roots that foster participation in social life and enable self-assertiveness against entrenched power.

Whereas citizenship and politics once had the function of character formation and training into the appreciation of a shared and reasonable commonality, its economic reduction has resulted in an individualism characterised by private egoism and a personal indifference to the public purpose. The supplanting of the citizen by the bourgeois and the disappearance of the individual personality in an anonymous mass society has been accompanied by an expanding institutional and structural giantism that has inflated the means of social existence way beyond human scale and proportion. The world is beyond human comprehension and control. Defenders of rational modernity argue that its complexity makes democracy impossible in other than representative forms. The vacuum left by citizen participation comes to be filled by a growing bureaucracy. Whereas society was once a richly articulated, sinewy organism, it has become a simplified, one-dimensional machine for accumulation. Modern capitalist rationalisation stands condemned for the degradation of the ontology of human beings and the ecology of cities.

The promised proletarian transformation of politics never quite materialised. However, it possessed the potential to recover classical conceptions of politics and reinvigorate citizenship by means of an added social content. Proletarian clubs, trade union centres, cooperatives and clubs, mutual aid societies, and educational groups contained the potential to reconfigure the public sphere along the lines of everyday social reality. Socialists obsessed with ‘the party’ – parliamentary reformist or revolutionary – display a remarkable myopia here and fail to see the public significance of proletarian self-activity. Incredibly, although proletarian self-activity and self-organisation has covered the range of material, civil and educational issues, working class politics has been condemned for its economism and trade union consciousness. All the evidence is that it is the professionals of ‘the party’ who suffer from narrowness, displaying a complete lack of imagination and insight in continuing the identification of the state with public life and politics. Against this, proletarian clubs and corporate bodies generated a holistic organisational, moral and political infrastructure which would have enabled them to generate a public life in autonomy from the state. The workers created libraries, produced periodicals, gave lectures, and organised discussion groups in order to educate workers into a public consciousness as well as creating the organisations capable of mobilizing workers for political and economic ends. This proletarian activity pertained to a way of life, with picnics, athletic pursuits and games, trips into the countryside ensuring that educational and political purposes were well-rounded.

Just as participatory public life was an everyday training that fostered citizenship, so the psychological impact of being confronted by vast blocs of economic and political power has been to induce passivity on the part of the individual. Everywhere, the individual in market society is confronted with impersonal powers than emphasise the reality of human disempowerment. Confronted with institutional giantism and systemic necessity, the individual becomes passive, inert, and introverted. Politics is redefined as a technology of power in the service of elites. Democracy becomes a means of manufacturing public consent. Public life dissolves into private life.

Capitalist economic reductionism is characterised by the extension of economics into all areas of life. Thomas Hobbes’s war of all against all demonstrates an early awareness of the extent to which a market economy has a tendency to become a market society organised around purely instrumental relationships. The nexus of callous cash payment is the most obvious manifestation of an all-encompassing commodification. Relations between human beings have come to be mediated by objects. This is Marx’s condition of alienation. Human beings have been reduced to the status of things to the extent that things have acquired existential significance.

The significance of the dissolution of the city through urbanisation is indicated by the concept of urban regeneration. The economic model is simply assumed by not merely business interests and conservative politicians but politicians and governmental officials as such, with even trade unionists and labour parties in agreement. Towns and cities should be considered as growth machines to be ‘managed’ by ‘entrepreneurs’. The regenerated town or city is one that has succeeded in growing through being able to attract private investment. Towns and cities are to be measured by their capacity for generating ‘revenue’. That city has a civic dimension does not enter the argument, unless one refers to the way that even the culture of cities is now being objectified and marketed.

Capitalist urbanisation destroys the form and function of the city as a civilising and humanising arena. The city was once the essential arena for the unfolding of human potentialities. It follows that the dissolution of the city is simultaneously the dissolution of the personality. Urban sprawl is accompanied by the privatisation of city space, an increasingly impotent bureaucracy coming to fill the vacuum left by the retreat of an active community life. The destructuring of social life from home to community, the disappearance of heterogeneity, and decline of interaction, and civic creativity means that society ceases to exist as a civic order and community. Human beings lose the capacity to order their own existence and hence are forced to rely upon artificial and coercive institutional machinery. The state, the very institution which is responsible for disempowering society, is called in to prop up a failing social order. Armed police become the last guarantor of order in neighbourhoods that are rapidly unravelling just as the social worker becomes the last custodian of order in a disintegrating domestic life. In order to support a faltering order, the state is forced to intervene in every sphere of society, coming to approximate a totalitarian state. The result is that society becomes something inert and inorganic. The passivity of human beings as a consequence of the destruction of citizenship makes totalitarianism not only possible but impossible to resist. Withdrawn into a privatised and passive existence, the individual lacks the capacity to resist and to constitute an alternative order. Self-identity has been dissolved, the means by which individuals were educated into public awareness and collective solidarity have been eroded. Mass impotence makes the ersatz collective power of totalitarianism plausible.

Nostalgia tends to take the form of nationalism, selective reminiscences for a time and place that never were. There is a need to look deeper and further than this so as to appreciate the extent to which nations comprise cities, towns and villages. It is upon these that human well-being, culture, and security have always depended, long before the nation state emerged and proceeded to empty them of content. Jane Jacobs makes it clear that economic well-being depends on cities rather than nation states. Although nations may be ‘political and military entities it doesn’t necessarily follow from this that they are also the basic, salient entities of economic life or that they are particularly useful for probing the mysteries of economic structure, the reasons for rise and decline of wealth… We can’t avoid seeing, too, that among all the various types of economies, cities are unique in their abilities to shape and reshape the economies of other settlements, including those far removed from them geographically’ (p203 79). Despite the wealth of historical evidence supporting this argument, there remains a reluctance to consider the state as anything other than the central institution in politics. Not only is this assumption questionable, the very character of state politics is open to challenge. The state stands condemned for not only monopolising politics but for reducing politics to a mockery. Politics as the pursuit and retention of power on the part of parties and politicians has systematically destroyed the idea and practice of the individual as a public being, as a citizen playing a participatory role in communal affairs. By perverting politics in this way, the nation-state has served to obstruct the development of essential human potentialities.

The state is parasitic upon the community. It exists only by divesting the community of its material and cultural resources and hence of its capacity to order its own existence and engender a public life in opposition to the state. The state preserves its own existence by disempowering civil society in such a way as to prevent the emergence of forms of local self-management and civic autonomy capable of offering an alternate public order to the state. The key to recovering the connection between politics and the realisation of personality is the achievement of municipal freedom. For most of its existence, the city functioned as a public sphere for politics and citizenship and for a while struggled to preserve its autonomy against the encroachment of the nation state. The city retains the capacity to engender forms of civil association with which to resist the imperatives of the state and capital and to create a public order based upon municipal freedom, communal autonomy and civic loyalties.

The argument for the necessity of the state as against municipal freedom and participatory citizenship refers to ‘complexity’. Yet, in comparison with the richly articulated interlinking communes and cities of pre-modern times, capitalist modernity is a remarkably simplified and homogenised civilisation. Moreover, all the evidence is that the state is incapable of managing ‘complexity’ efficiently and gives all the appearance of a doomed bureaucratic intervention from the outside. History is full of examples of pre-modern solidarities and connections between cities and communes ensuring an economic and political coordination far beyond the capacity of the state.

The individuals who formed the township democracy of New England in the seventeenth century not only restored Christianity to its ‘pure’, ecclesiastically untainted, biblical form but also re-created society itself according to a pristine, egalitarian, and devoutly communalist pattern derived from the ethical and social covenants that appear in Acts. As against the liberal contractarianism which looks upon society as an association for personal and collective security, each community was conceived as an ethical compact to achieve a ‘good society’. The concern was as moral as it was material. The individual and the collective were therefore conceived as two sides of the same coin by the New England colonists, just as they had been at the time of the classical polis.

In this conception, the church ceases to be a rigid institution and instead becomes a spiritual concern. This supports the idea of a self-governing congregation that is capable of extension into the civil world as an equally self-governing political body, the town meeting. Puritan religious belief and forms of organisation led logically to the practice of the periodic meeting of the entire male population of a community for the purposes of governing its own affairs.

The Founding Fathers created a relatively centralized republic on the basis of a basically confederal, face-to-face municipal democracy which they had no choice but to accept. The American Revolution and Constitution is incredibly ambiguous, poised between the objective of a centralised nation state and the reality of municipal democracy. The fracture is between popular experiences of agrarian commitments to freedom, a participatory politics, and an involved citizenry on the one hand, and the vision of an acquisitive individualism represented by ascending capitalist forces in the ports and inland market towns.

This possessive individualism constitutes a social malignancy that threatens to destructure society and unravel social ties. Its most basic impact lies in simplification and homogenisation so that individuals are stripped of richly articulated relationships to become merely anonymous buyers and sellers. The personal is rendered impersonal, the organic inorganic, with the result that community atrophies and the individual ossifies.
Far from being capable of recreating public life, the political party is merely the state in miniature, formed in the image of state politics in being a structured hierarchy of descending purposes. Insofar as the political party has its roots in the state rather than in the body politic, it merely reconstitutes state power whenever it achieves its goals. The political party is no more political in the classic civic sense than is the state. Like the state, the political party operates to parasitize and constrain the power of the body politic, to manage and manipulate the citizens rather than enabling them to autonomously express their will. Political parties are formed to mobilize and command the masses in order to acquire state power and ensure the rule of an elite. The political party, like the state, is an excrescence of society, a form that parasitizes society but has no roots within it.

Politics in the classical conception is an organic phenomenon in being the activity of the body politic, citizens actively constituting and participating in a public life as a condition of their self-realisation. By recovering the connection with the human ontology, politics comes to be conceived as an activity which involves reasonable communication and citizen discourse, public empowerment, the exercise of practical reason, and the actualisation of rationality in a shared commonality. The attempts of political parties to engineer public life are manifest from this perspective, revealing the lack of deep roots in the community. In contrast to parties, genuinely political movements are social movements which emerge as a spontaneous creation of the body politic, their conceptions being drawn from the lived experiences and traditions of the citizen body. These movements are capable of engendering communal autonomy through the municipal association of people, broadening out through the confederal interlinking of surrounding communities networking on a local and regional scale. The failure to interlace with grass roots forms and organs reveals that the political party is not political in the classical sense of the term. Rather, the party is an administrative entity abstracted from the body politic and quite antithetical to the development of a participatory and expressivist mode of politics through an active citizenry. The authentic unit of public life is not the state but the city, the municipality, the neighbourhood.

To articulate a public life that is connected to ontology and ecology is to define a concept of politics and citizenship that is capable of transforming cities ethically and politically as well as spatially and economically.

Any city that has definable neighbourhoods is capable of reconstituting politics as popular assembly. This politics proceeds from the neighbourhood to envisage an ever-broader confederation of neighbourhoods. Delegates from a number of neighbourhood assemblies participate in confederal councils. Coordination is therefore achieved by mandated delegates who are subject to rotation and recall and act in the confederal councils according to instruction in written form. The major stumbling block is not political but administrative: how to produce the material amenities and provide the infrastructure necessary to city life.

Those seduced by ICT have raised the prospect of ‘computocracy’, direct electronic participation in which citizens push buttons in support of policies. There is no reason why political debates cannot be settled by electronic voting conducted in the privacy of the home. But this scenario leaves politics untransformed and is merely an easy and facile way of conducting existing politics. A privatised politics conducted by autonomous individuals who neither meet nor interact does not constitute public life. There are crucial issues concerning the nature of citizenship and public life and the connection of politics with human self-realisation which need to be addressed here. To accept the equation of political participation with the act of voting represents a failure of the imagination and nerve given the possibilities that are currently opening up. The electronic conception of participatory democracy continues the error of identifying the citizen with the ‘autonomous’ individual qua ‘voter’. Confined within the private sphere, the ‘autonomous’ individual is an isolated being lacking the public life which is required for true freedom. In order to be truly human, individuals require a living social and political matrix, a relationship to other individuals through which individuality acquires its meaning.

From this perspective, the autonomous individual celebrated by individualist liberal philosophy has neither autonomy nor individuality. The autonomy referred to here is actually the separation of each from all others combined with the subjection of all to external forces and necessity. And since human beings need each other in order to be themselves, the autonomous individual is incapable of achieving individuality. As Max Horkheimer has argued, ‘individuality is impaired when each man decides to shift for himself .. as the ordinary man withdraws from participation in political affairs, society tends to revert to the law of the jungle, which crushes all vestiges of individuality. The absolutely isolated individual has always been an illusion. The most esteemed personal qualities, such as independence, will to freedom, sympathy, and the sense of justice, are social as well as individual virtues. The fully developed individual is the consummation of a fully developed society. The emancipation of the individual is not an emancipation from society, but the deliverance of society from atomisation, an atomisation that may reach its peak in periods of collectivisation and mass culture’ (p225 95).

Human beings are social rather than solitary beings, with capacities and needs for solidarity and reciprocity. Human beings require collective institutions and warm affiliations for the mutual enhancement of our self-development and creativity, and for the flourishing of our abilities. Freedom is attained within a socially supportive and institutionally rich collective life.

Detached from the community of others and placed only in instrumental and antagonistic relation to others, the individual becomes passive and impotent. In this degraded condition, the individual lacks the self-assertion required for citizenship but is dependent. The masses composed of such individuals are easily controlled and manipulated, and form the fodder for the mass media, the market for the corporations and the electorate targeted by the parties. Both individuality and community are denied by the dissolution of public life as the common ground through which the relationship between each and all proceeds.

The essential and genuine attributes of the rational and free society are communal and individual at the same time, revealing two aspects of the same human nature. Conceived in an institutional sense, the urban public realm forms the setting for the free and rational society and is the irreducible ground for a genuine individuality and commonality. The importance of the urban public realm lies in the way that it constitutes the discursive arena in which individuals can intellectually and emotionally interact with one another, engage in dialogue, and communicate in the fully human sense of body language, personal intimacy, and face-to-face modes of expression. Communication is more than words and ideas but is a physical interaction that involves the body, the integral personality. This is communication as communising, an act of social intercourse that proceeds at many levels of life and that fosters solidarity, mutuality and reciprocity, the very qualities that make organic interpersonal relationships meaningful. 

Voting which is conducted in the privacy of the booth or in the electronic isolation of the home privatises democracy and hence undermines it. Democracy as the counting of individual preferences represents the quantification of citizenship, the reduction of politics to numbers, and is the complete antithesis of debate and deliberation as a mutually informative process. The act of voting represents a poll of perceptions and values in relation to predetermined positions, not the free and full expression of rational judgement. Again, modern ‘complex’ society is distinguished for its simplification. Voting represents the reduction of views to preferences, replacing ideals spontaneously formulated in rational discourse with taste and image fashioned by the opinion makers, the quantification of comprehension so that aspirations and principles are reduced to numbers.

Most important of all, the autonomous individual is detached from the support systems, affiliations and organic intercourse which are provided by the community context and which are crucial to fostering citizen identity and personality, the paideia and the Bildung which form are integral to politics as an educative process. An authentic politics and a genuine citizenship involve the continuous formation of personality through the growing awareness of public responsibility and commitment. This character building creates the citizen and gives the body politic an existential reality.

The end of paideia as an educational and self-formative process is philia or solidarity. Philia involves a sense of public commitment which is generated by knowledge, training, and experience. Political participation therefore possesses an inbuilt educative function which ensures freedom as the triumph of rationality. This politics as self-realisation of personality and public life requires a city-state which is scaled to human proportion and is therefore accessible to human reason, comprehensible and institutionally controllable.

In an era of vast alien power concentrated in the state and capital, when bureaucracy, property ownership, production, investment and trade are entrenched in centralised institutions, it would seem that a localist, municipally-confederalist society is as impossible as, for instance, conciliar government in the Middle Ages and commune democracy in eighteenth and nineteenth century France. The tendency of capitalist rationalisation is plainly towards increasing abstraction, concentration and centralisation of instrumental and administrative power, bureaucratisation. In such conditions, ‘democracy’ is easily canalised into the forms of public massification. The prospects for a decentralist, and participatory vision of urban self-governance and personality seem distinctly dim.

The problem of dealing with the vast alien power of the state and capital is a question of power and control. As against Michel Foucault, who equates power with force, it makes more sense to identify power as something essential and organic, residing in all living beings and as crucial to their self-realisation. From this perspective, the power of the state is revealed to be the sovereignty it takes from the people and the commonality it takes from society. Similarly, power of capital is the surplus value it extracts from labour. This alien power is power that can be reappropriated by its agents and exercised socially. The reempowerment of communities and of the people is simultaneously the disempowerment of the state and capital. The practical reappropriation of alien power and its reorganisation as social power makes it possible for people to reconstitute their power in popular and democratic forms. Since the state and capital are supra-individual powers, there is a need to innovate supra-individual forms of social control. Power of this kind must be collective in order to be effective. Democracy requires form and content. That is, it needs popular organs and institutions such as assemblies that furnish the permanent structures for the continuous direct participation of citizens in public affairs. Without such a project creating the infrastructure of the civil public, political protest is merely a futile guerrilla warfare that challenges the existing totalitarian concentration power with sporadic demonstrations, occasional riots, eye-catching gestures and permanent protests – all of which lacks and fails to generate the power necessary to really contest the issue.

There is no political education other than a living and creative public life that fosters a capacity for citizenship on the part of participating members, enabling them to assume the management of collective affairs. In an age of concentrated alien power, the task is to recover the connection of politics with human ontology and social ecology, to re-establish the connection of freedom with an increasing rationality, and to create a public sphere that will inculcate the values of reciprocity, solidarity, communication, community, and public service within everyday social practices.

The class issues of capitalism have not been resolved. The proletarian transformation of politics has been blocked by the buying off of the wealthier sections of the working class. The crisis tendencies of capitalism are still evident. But the lamentable attempts of socialist parties to engineer the public life – and continued proletarian passivity in face of crisis – demands a renewal of radical politics. If the levers of class politics no longer work, then there is little to be gained by nostalgia for a revolution that never was. What is striking about the contemporary world is the extent to which popular participation and mobilisation is inspired by post-materialist cross class issues such as ecology, the deteriorating urban fabric, community and neighbourhood politics, things which are of immediate, everyday concern to people and which affect all as human beings regardless of class. In this sense, the attempt to project and realise public life becomes a radical movement aimed against entrenched forces operating to block the public realm. There are plenty of cross class public issues with which to mobilise the people against the state and capital – war, terrorism and the increasing militarisation of the planet, growing authoritarianism and encroachment upon civil life on the part of the state, the degradation and militarisation of the urban environment, the destruction of the biosphere. At a time when the old monological modes of politics have become clearly outmoded and unable to deal adequately with the new issues, there has been a participatory revolution underway. Political parties struggle to attract and retain members, elections struggle to get the voters out, yet in a myriad of ways on a wide range of issues through a wide range of organs, individuals are acting as citizens. There are any number of community organisations and citizens’ groups involving individuals from all class backgrounds in common projects to resolve problems that concern the social, material, environmental and ecological welfare of the community as a whole. This movement contains the potential for an active citizenship pressing demands for communal autonomy and civic self-government, a demand for a genuine public life that pertains to self-realisation as a radical need that embraces all humankind above and beyond class politics and material interests.

Aristotle here defined the Athenian ideal of the politically sovereign citizen who is capable of making a rational judgement in public affairs on account of being free from material need or clientage. On this assumption, a genuine citizenship that is democratic in embracing all is predicated upon the abolition of class relations.

The case for a civil public does not imply the false and transitory unity of alliance politics. The Left has displayed a tendency to embrace a shallow and uncritical pluralism that falls far short of serious pluralists like Dahl and Lindblom. The result has been to underscore the intellectual and political irrelevance of the Left. 
The shallow relativism of identity politics and of ‘no necessary relations’ between anything has dissolved critical rationality into a vague eclecticism. Issues and problems have to be clearly identified and traced to their sources. Projects must be taken to their logical conclusions.

The nuclear unit of public life is the municipality from which politics emerges. Citizenship, community, communication, confederation, and freedom originate from the elementary forms: the villages, towns, neighbourhoods, and cities in which people achieve a public life and establish connections with each other beyond private life. This is the everyday terrain upon which individuals can apprehend the political process and begin to emerge as active, informed, empowered citizens. It is on this terrain that individuals acquire a public awareness that enables them to transcend the insularity of their private existence and to innovate those public institutions that facilitate extensive community participation and consociation.

The broad historical and philosophical scope of this book has had the purpose of identifying real ideals immanent in the human ontology, in social practices, and in political institutions. It is easy enough to engage in wishful thinking and define a never-to-be-realised utopia that pays scant regard to realities. The point is, however, the ideals of the civil public, active citizenship, commune democracy, participatory modes and scaled units of self-governance can all be traced in the realities of human nature as manifested historically in different times and places. Realisation may have been partial and transitory but history, as the progress unfolding of rationality into a universal freedom, identifies rational practices in lived experience as stages in the process towards the end of rational freedom. That these practices were overwhelmed or checked by irrational developments in history does not contradict the overall progress towards rational freedom. There is process in this history as the story of human self-realisation. This view takes its stand on reason as evidenced in anthropology and ecology, in the health, preservation and unfolding of the natural conditions of life. Democracy is indeed the truth of politics, as Marx argued, in that the self-realisation of all humankind logically implies self-government as the direct management of social affairs by the people. Letting power unfold as a condition of health and vitality requires democracy as a public empowerment. It remains to show how this argument from power embraces all life forms within nature.

The question is one of power. Power exists, it is natural. Power must originate somewhere and must reside somewhere. In simple terms, power is either retained and exercised by the people or it is alienated to some alien institution or organisation. In the contemporary world, the state and capital possess power that properly belongs to the demos. There can be no system of dual power here. The one or the other must have this power. The state exists by parasitizing society and can prolong its existence only by divesting the people in society of their power. It follows that popular control exercised through society must disempower the state as a condition of reempowering the people in their communities. Only if the whole hierarchical organisation of rational modernity is uprooted and power radically dispersed throughout the social body will exploitation and domination be replaced by participation and the principle of cooperation.

The reappropriation of power from the state – and capital – and its reorganisation as the social power of the people implies the deprofessionalisation of the institutions by which society is managed. This is to refuse to accept the ‘complexity’ of modern society as a given. For ‘complexity’ read overscale. Society must be simplified. The common conscious control of citizens requires that collective affairs be transparent, accessible, and manageable. Amateurism as distinct from professionalism was practised in Athenian democracy for generations. Indeed, so ingrained and well-developed was this principle that Athens practised sortition rather than election. For the practice to have worked so well over so lengthy a period required the existence of an active, informed citizenry willing and capable to assume public office. The principle continues to resurface at times of popular radicalism and participation, in the early medieval city charters and confederations, and in the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this context one can see how the attempted proletarian transformation of politics came to be hindered by the colonisation of socialist parties and movements by the professional middle class and the way that they would quickly assume leadership roles. This subverted the revolutionary process – the praxis – whereby the proletariat developed their organisational, intellectual and moral capacities and constituted themselves as a revolutionary class capable of assuming conscious control of society. Marx’s crucial point concerning praxis is that in transforming society human agents would transform themselves. This process is continually short-circuited by the intervention of professional leaders, politicians, intellectuals etc. 

The presentation of the civil public envisages a political society which has which replaced the state by a confederal network of popular civic assemblies; all socially productive forms of property would be socialised into cooperative forms within this public to form a truly political economy in which publics would coordinate their economic and political affairs through citizen discourse and interaction in open assemblies, not only in terms of professional functions and sectional interests, but as citizens. People would then create a complete citizen identity for themselves that transcends their occupational identity. No longer would human beings be defined by their work but would instead be capable of presenting themselves in a public realm as communally-oriented citizens, public beings capable of appreciating and contributing to the common good. In due course, a series of networked civic communities emerge that are carefully fitted – technologically, architecturally, institutionally, structurally, psychologically and spiritually – to the social and natural environments in which they exist.
Involvement, participation and practice are all important, drawing people into ever widening processes of development. This activity is educative. Revolution is not an event but a process in which the human personality grows to the extent that existing institutions and ideas of freedom are slowly enlarged and expanded.

The recovery of the classical meaning of politics and citizenship is a precondition for a free and rational society and for the survival of the species. For the destructuring and homogenisation that human practice is inflicting upon the urban environment – divesting society of its variety so that, as a complex life form, human beings will be incapable of functioning as viable beings – is also being inflicted on the natural world.


The most frequent argument employed against demands for face-to-face participatory democracy concerns the fact that modern ‘complex society’ is simply too large and too sophisticated to allow for direct decision making at a grassroots level. Paradoxically, the argument is applied only to politics and not to economics. For the liberal argument against state planning in the command economy was always that the economy is too complex to allow for central decision making and instead human agents should be trusted to make their own choices and decisions on a free market. Centralised control of decision-making is inefficient compared to decision-making by the agents themselves.

The same argument applies to politics. The professionals are remote from the people they represent; they represent communities but have no roots in them. At this distance, professional parties and representatives are lack the knowledge to unravel the intricacies of issues arising in communities. In a vain attempt to compensate for inadequacy and ignorance, the preferred option is not to decentralise politics but to extend the reach of bureaucratic institutions, thus compounding the problem.

To continue to ignore the fact that the ‘complex’ world is the product of the expansionary dynamics of alien power out of human control is plainly ideological in Marx’s sense of the term. To trace the problem of overscale to its source in specific social relations is to expose asymmetrical relations of power and resources within society. This would be quickly followed by demands for social transformation. Inequalities in power are best preserved by being concealed behind claims of necessity, inevitability, the general interest and so on.

There are many sound ecological reasons for pursuing the classical goal of self-sufficiency as a sustainability. Far from being efficient, the national and international division of labour is extremely wasteful in the literal sense of that term. The globalisation of economic relations has generated overorganisation through the expansion of vast bureaucracies and requires exorbitant expenditures of resources in transporting materials over great distances. At the same time, the possibility of recycling wastes, reducing pollution, and of making sound use of local or regional raw materials is drastically reduced.

The biggest impact of these wasteful, excessive, overscale systems is upon the human character and psyche. Human beings in such societies are characterised by their egoism, narrowness of outlook, shallowness, passivity and dependence. The self-sufficient community in which industries, crafts, and agriculture serve wider communal networks expand and enrich the range of opportunities to which individuals are exposed and foster the development of more rounded personalities with an enhanced sense of selfhood and competence.

What then is the civil public sphere as distinct from a state? It is a network of administrative councils whose delegates are elected from popular assemblies practising face-to-face democracy and decision making. These exist in the most basic units of society, in the various villages, towns, and even neighbourhoods of large cities. The members of the civil public are mandated and subject to instruction, continually accountable, recallable and responsible. Their function is an administrative and practical one rather than a policy-making one as in systems of representative government. This is a functional democracy in which assemblies send people to a higher level for the purpose of coordinating and administering the policies formulated by the assemblies themselves. Coordination and administration are the responsibility of higher levels in the network of villages, towns, neighbourhoods, and cities. This affirms the ascending as against the descending theme of power and government. Power flows from the lower levels and ascends upwards so as to find the effective level of competence.

An integral part of giving reality to the civil public is the interlinking of communities through the practise of mutualism involving shared resources, produce, and policy making. This interdependence establishes the institutional foundation of the rational unity between each individual and all other individuals. Interdependence widens the scope and ensures inclusivity and broad-mindedness. A community that interprets self-sufficiency in an insular sense, does not engage with others to satisfy important material needs and realize common political goals risks degenerating into exclusivity and parochialism. Only by interpreting self-sufficiency in a holistic sense of an expanded, interlinked common purpose is it possible to define decentralisation and localism in such a way that the good of each community is enhanced by being drawn into ever wider areas of human consociation. Networking is therefore a way of democratising the interdependence that is necessary to expand, enrich and enhance the good without losing the principle of local control.

The point is that there is no need to choose between centralisation and decentralisation, as though these terms are necessarily antithetical. The crucial principle is appropriate scale. The ascending theme of power affirms the rationality of the continuum from decentralisation to centralisation. It all depends upon whether power flows from the bottom up or is imposed from the top down and at what level this power comes to rest. Confederation is therefore the rational framework that encompasses decentralization, localism, and self-sufficiency through the functional interdependence of the parts. Further, the location and exercise of power at its appropriate and most effective level creates spaces and opportunities for paideia and Bildung, for the moral education and character building that fosters active citizenship in a participatory democracy capable of apprehending and promoting freedom as a shared and reasonable commonality. The passive consumers and voters of the modern world have so little of this citizenship that one is entitled to argue that politics as classically understood barely exists in the modern world. Liberal critics of radical democrats have frequently made reference to the ‘End of Politics’ (Polan, Schwarz etc.). Radicals who draw their models from classical civilisation can easily respond by arguing that politics ended some time ago. Certainly, the way that capitalism split the state and civil society and asserted the primacy of economics – the private realm – over politics – the public realm – has been experienced as a depoliticisation. Politics is no longer co-extensive with the everyday lives of the people but proceeds from a distance. On the everyday terrain people are absorbed in their private lives, governed by material necessity within instrumental relationships. The only education and character-building that proceeds in this context produces idiotes rather than polites, individuals absorbed into private affairs and unable and unwilling to appreciate the public good.

Once one goes beyond the modern state-civil society dualism to realise politics in the classical sense of managing the affairs of the polis or community, the individual can be transformed from an egoistic individual governed by necessity into an active citizen, from a private being into a public being. Activity within extensive public spaces renders the citizen a functional being who is capable of participating directly in collective affairs. Here, power is a more intimate phenomenon, more closely bound up with the realisation of personality, than is the case with representative forms of governance, where the collective power of the people is transformed into alien power invested in a few individuals.

These highly populated, sprawling, and overscale entities must be rescaled structurally and institutionally to function according to human dimensions. To transform the modern city into authentic municipalities and ultimately communes requires a physical and institutional decentralisation that must take time. It can only be achieved by a process which is driven by citizens themselves. It cannot be a programme or an agenda imposed from the top-down but must be part of a process by which individuals reclaim and redefine their communities, creating new identities for themselves as citizens in the process.

The pursuit of the civil public is concerned to render politics ethical in character through its connection with ontology and ecology. There is need for a rational reconstruction of our relationship to each other within society and of the social world to the natural world. The concern is to reclaim public life as the sphere in which a rational, active citizenship flourishes. Such a politics makes a clean break with the demoralising cycle of Ins and Outs that characterises a failing parliamentarism. The contemporary world is suffering from a crisis of political socialisation and representation. The ‘party’ form is not an appropriate means for engendering public life but, rather, is an administrative tool for denying public life to people.

The civil public is grounded in an unfolding and flourishing human nature and conceives power as immanent in all living beings, as something that much expand outwards and be realised in a wider society. This is to envisage power as latent democratic potentiality that, as an ascending theme, is capable of achieving a radically new configuration of society itself – a communalist public life which is oriented toward realising human potentialities and satisfying needs, creating an order which corresponds to the human ontology as appreciative of ecological imperatives, creating an ethic based on sharing and cooperation. Capitalism is a social order that not only contradicts the human ontology but also ecological imperatives. By restoring harmony between social and natural worlds human beings will find themselves at peace with each other and with themselves, with their own nature within and with nature without.

This implies not the end but the recovery of politics in the original Hellenic sense of the management of the community or polis by means of direct face-to-face popular assemblies respecting the ethics of complementarity and solidarity.

Liberal critics are sceptical of the notion of the common good and are wary of active conceptions of citizenship. They distrust ‘the people’ and would prefer that they are shackled, given limited participatory possibilities and be rendered subordinate to an elite of professionals. And then they are mystified when public life dissolves into a privatised war of all against all. Having denied the educative process by which individuals learn to become citizens, they then scorn the people for their limited capacities.

There is a common good, certainly with respect to the conditions human beings require to realise their potentialities and live as human beings, and certainly with respect to the conditions of life as given by the biosphere. In the most limited sense, there is a need to secure our relationship with each other in society and our relationship in society to the natural world. This is certainly a common good, a good that embraces all equally. 






What is the public sphere? Is freedom a public or a private good? Is the freedom of the individual something private or is it something that is attained within relationships to other individuals in a collective context? That is, does freedom imply the social? This book addresses these questions in relation to the conception of public life as integral to the well-being of individuals. This conception is founded upon social justice as a universal notion that serves to connect the freedom of each individual with the freedom of all other individuals. The book will seek the proper location of public life so as to facilitate citizen engagement and social inclusion, thus overcoming the passivity and exclusion that characterises the contemporary social order and which is contributing to a growing urban, civic and political malaise.

For political, social, cultural and sociological reasons, the future of the city is one of the most important questions facing the contemporary world. Since most of the world live in an urban environment and since even more people are likely to be living in an urban environment in the future, it follows that for ethico-anthropological reasons this environment needs to be humanised. The urban environment needs to correspond with rather than contradict the human ontology. This book addresses this question by reconstructing the philosophical conception of the city (Part I), proceeding to show how capitalist urbanisation has subordinated this conception to economic forces (Part II), going on to argue for the social conception of the city that integrates all aspects in a true public life (Part III). The purpose of this book, then, is to unravel the question of what the city is, what it ought to be and what it could be.

This Introduction is concerned to lay the foundation of the argument by emphasising the extent to which the city is constituted by the urban associative culture and society. The argument rests upon a notion of the city as process. This is a relational conception that emphasises the reciprocity, exchange, interaction and solidarity between the individuals composing the city. The argument affirms the city as the essential physical terrain for the development of a viable commonality. The city is not the place of the individual, but the place of the individuals who together constitute a community; it is the relation between individuals that continuously draws together the threads of ideas and expanding information. The city supplies the physical, social and relational context for this information, facilitating access to the product of that information and ensuring the implementation of any public policy based on that information. There is no civilisation without these three factors and the city is crucial to their effectiveness.

The city is not merely a physical entity or a site of economic activity but is the embodiment and expression of the human spirit. There is a connection between the processes of urbanisation and of humanisation. Where some, like Davis (1965), predict the end of urbanisation, this book defends the city as integral to human growth. The question, then, is not whether the process of urbanisation will end but how, as an ongoing process, urbanisation can be consciously controlled so as to respect the qualities of scale, balance and form constituting a viable urban order. 

In some analyses, the city is associated with social problems and is even considered a social problem itself. There is a substantial and growing literature that indicts the city for being the primary site of economic, ecological and moral dissipation, totally unsustainable in the long run. The city stands condemned for being the built environment of Leviathan and Mammon, expressing the alien power of the bureaucratic machine and the systemic imperatives of capital (Zukin 1996). Such analyses are concerned not so much with the alternative city as with the alternative to the city. The city is condemned as a social pathology, as responsible for moral and social breakdown, poverty, crime, ill-health, disorder and the dissolution of community. 

The persistence of urban problems over a period of two to three decades has come to suggest a permanent urban problem. As Hall puts the point, ‘instead of getting better, some parts of some cities – and definitely some people in parts of those cities – were getting worse, at least in a relative sense, possibly also in an absolute one’. Hall even suggests the negative view that ‘these people were simply transmitting their plight from one generation to another’ (Hall 1996:11 ch12). Hall’s perspective is negative in arguing that ‘we are almost back where we started, back .. to the view of the city as a place of decay, poverty, social malaise, civil unrest and even insurrection’ (Hall 1996:45). The city in this sense is a site to be policed and regulated; urban planning becomes a law and order problem. A more profitable approach is to study the tendencies to inequality and injustice in the structures and relations at the heart of the contemporary city and to concentrate efforts upon their transformation rather than to subscribe to a discourse that too easily sees the social problem as one of regulation. The fact that significant numbers of urban populations are becoming further detached from the mainstream economy and society must be viewed as a consequence of asymmetrical structures and relations within the mainstream rather than a moral problem passed on through the generations of the urban poor. 

Some question whether the city can be said to have a future at all, at least in its current form (Morgantau and McCormick 1991). The task that this thesis undertakes is to chart a path by which cities can transcend their apparent destiny of long-term industrial decay and post-industrial militarisation of urban space. This involves more than defining the post-fordist city, arguing that older cities should reposition themselves in the expanding markets of the global economy – services, high technology, media and communications. Such a transition represents the solution of one problem but only within a much larger problem. The problem of asymmetrical relations not only remains but is intensified. In the Carceral City that emerges there is a division between a permanent underclass, a casual, part-time and low paid sector, and a core dependent upon headquarters style development. There are no grounds for a universal public out of such differential publics. The failure to institute such an inclusive public, however, issues in a deeply divided city and in the carceralisation of urban space. And with urban incarceration, the meta-narrative of the good city is lost.

There is also the question as to whether the city can be treated as an independent unit of analysis. ‘Is there an urban sociology?’ asks Manuel Castells. Castells denies that there is such a thing, arguing that urbanism is the expression of industrial capitalism. In the Marxist conception, the city is secondary to the socio-economic forces that order and compose it. It follows that industrial capitalism is the proper subject of analysis.

The city is also under assault from newer theoretical trends. Contemporary theorising makes reference to the ‘postmetropolis’, to the postmodern or postindustrial city, and the electronic city. Such notions fetishize particular aspects of a transformation that may well be underway but which is far from complete. Closer inspection reveals that the forces behind this transformation have greater continuities with the past than the contemporary writing indicates. These ‘new’ cities are emerging alongside ‘old’ cities, both integrated within the same political economy, an argument taken up in Part II. 

The city is an ambiguous phenomenon, both a problem and a possibility, split between emancipatory and repressive themes. This dialectic of enlightenment contains the awareness that development contains its opposite, that alienation is an instrument of progress. The conflicting prognoses of urban development do not establish progress and disorder as alternatives but as possibilities and actualities coexisting within the same process of development. To comprehend the nature of the city and how it changes but endures over time requires a multidisciplinary approach. The city is a spatial fact, a built environment exhibiting specific characteristics, from land use to population distribution, a site of locational decisions and an interconnected system of locational advantages and disadvantages, amenities and disamenities (Lake 1983:ix/x). But it is more than this. The city comprises all that defines human life and nature, from morality and culture to politics and economics. There is a need to grasp the city in terms of the interrelationships between these various factors and to understand how these shape the lives, activities and thoughts of citizens. The argument of this book concentrates on the city, its spatial structure, the socio-economic forces composing it, the global trends reshaping it, the normative philosophical concept that makes the city essential to human self-realisation. 
Urban studies can be differentiated into three different emphases – metatheory, political economy and practice (Sandercock and Forsyth 1990). The metatheory approach focuses upon fundamental epistemological and methodological questions concerning urbanisation as the incarnation of rational human activity and as the actualisation of knowledge. This book incorporates this approach in an ontological sense with respect to a particular ‘rational’ tradition in philosophy (Part I). The political economy approach examines urban planning within the context of capitalist relations. The political economy approach delineates the evolution of reason and rationality from the normative-emancipatory character they possessed in the philosophical concept of urbanisation as civilisation to the institutional-repressive character in its modern incarnation (Part II). The emancipatory-normative themes of reason affirming the unity of the freedom of each and of all come to be transformed under the systemic constraints and imperatives of capital, becoming actualised in a repressive institutional form that contradicts the human ontology.

The question is how did the rational city promised by the normative philosophical tradition evolve into the carceral city?; what forces were at work to transform emancipatory reason into repressive rationality? Where the one promises an inclusive society based upon the unity of the freedom of each and the freedom of all, the other institutionalises exclusion and division so as to reduce urban policy to the policing of separations within the urban population.

The argument affirms a philosophical conception of the city as a civilising and enlightening force that is integral to human fulfilment. The socio-economic and political analysis of urban form is thus rooted in ontological and anthropological conceptions. The question of spatial form and structure, embracing physical infrastructure and social relations showing how various forces working on the city affect its foundation, is thus addressed within a normative framework concerned with human self-realisation within a conception of the good life. The recovery of the meta-narrative of the ‘good city’ makes it possible to challenge the forces for and the tendencies to fragmentation, division and the institutionalisation of otherness within the urban environment.

This overarching moral orientation shapes the approach taken to urban questions – the way that the forces operate behind the structure of the urban environment and its spatial distribution of land use and population, how these distributions change over time, the social and political implications of these transformations and what degree of control human beings may exercise over these processes. ‘There is no end, no boundary, to the relationships’ (Hall 1996:5).

A major concern of this thesis is the awareness that the city has come to lose what have been perceived to be its traditional functions – as a place of human interaction and reciprocity, as a meeting place and as an associational space forming the content of political, civic and cultural life. The conceptual formulation of the ‘urban public realm’ identifies the city as more than a commercial centre and the individual as more than a consumer. Acknowledging that the city is the key site for efforts of civic and cultural renewal (Landry et al 1989), the argument makes it clear that urban regeneration is more than economics and concerns the mode of life. This perspective is critical of the modern urban environment, revealing it to be an ersatz experience sustained only by financial aid, permanent regeneration strategies, short-term government programmes, grants for gentrification, measures for policing and surveillance. As a consequence of these factors, community lacks the popular commitment and emotional involvement that gives it content. This makes it clear that a viable and sustainable urbanism is conditional upon the quality of human relationships constituting community.

A particularly important aspect of this argument is the attempt to achieve what David Harvey calls a ‘genuinely humanising urbanism’ by embedding social justice within urban relations. This is to apply the philosophical value of justice within the social structure. The book thus reflects normatively upon the urban future in relation to a ‘rational’ philosophical tradition that connects the good life for human beings with the organised socio-institutional environment of human life, interaction and activity, whether this is the city and/or the state. The argument is premised upon a concept of ‘rational freedom’ that is articulated within a philosophical tradition that emphasises that the well-being of the individual is realised only in relation to the well-being of other individuals. 

The locus of this principle is the public community, whether this is understood as the city, the state or some other collective entity. A truly genuine community would be constituted not in any abstract collective but in the real social sphere of individuals in their everyday life world. As Lewis Mumford writes:

In the utopia of the National State there are no natural regions; and the equally natural grouping of people in towns, villages and cities, which, as Aristotle points out, is perhaps the chief distinction between man and the other animals, is tolerated only upon the fiction that the State hands over to those groups a portion of its omnipotent authority, or “sovereignty” as it is called, and permits them to exercise a corporate life. Unfortunately for this beautiful myth, which generations of lawyers and statesmen have laboured to build up, cities existed long before states – there was a Rome on the Tiber long before there was a Roman Imperium – and the gracious permission of the state is simply a perfunctory seal upon the accomplished fact.

Mumford in Berneri 1982:5

As against the ‘national utopia’ that makes the inhabitants of a territory a single, indivisible group, Mumford emphasises the importance of natural regions and natural groups, ‘the things that bind men together in particular civic or industrial groups’. This concern of Mumford’s ties in with the ‘rational’ philosophy defined in Part 1. For the basic concerns of the ‘rational’ tradition pertain to the natural social community highlighted by Mumford as much as they do to the project of the central state. The ‘rational’ tradition defines the purpose of political philosophy in terms of the search for the appropriate regimen for the realisation of the human ontology. In time, these questions came to be addressed to the form of human association within the state under law, the nature of sovereignty, the legitimacy of authority, the notion of reason being defined with respect to formal political institutions. Nevertheless, these questions of human association and its terms arose in relation to the city as the most immediate, sensuous, material environment of human interaction, reciprocity and exchange. In founding political philosophy, both Plato and Aristotle were the pioneers of city studies.

Pursuing this line of thought, the argument treats political philosophy as an attempt to establish the moral basis of human relationships, conceiving human association in terms of the ‘good life’ as creative human self-realisation. The book thus examines a range of philosophical approaches to human freedom and its embodiment in the social order, tracing classical ideas through a particular, ‘rational’, tradition of freedom. This ‘rational’ tradition is characterised by values of reciprocity, mutual respect and recognition, communication, personal exchange and solidarity. This principle understands the modern concept of subjectivity as an intersubjectivity that affirms the unity of the freedom of each and the freedom of all. This ‘rational’ tradition of exhibits a normative concern for the appropriate regimen for human self-realisation. The realisation of Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s community of communities, Rousseau’s moral order, Kant’s noumenological society, Hegel’s state as ethical agency and Marx’s communism demands a practical politics which, as regards the end of the rational society, is completely uncompromising. The question concerns where power originates and where it legitimately resides – in the abstracted realm of the state or with the demos self-organising within civil society as itself a political order. The practical reappropriation of social power from external agencies to the self-organising citizen body makes compromise impossible. Since power is, in origin, social, arising within the demos, it ought to be organised as such for an active citizenship – and hence self-realisation of the human ontology – to be possible. The locus of this notion of the ‘rational’ could be the city as much as the state, since the city is the most immediate sphere for the exercise of sovereignty. This exercise of sovereignty, entailing a notion of active suffrage and active citizenship, is established as the condition for the constitution of a genuine public life. The task is to formulate the institutional framework capable of embodying and articulating the universal interest. Detaching the ‘rational’ themes and values of political philosophy from their identification with the state makes it possible to conceive of an urban public sphere constituted by citizen discourse, association and interaction. 

The concept of an urban public sphere critically appropriates and reworks the ‘rational’ themes and values of philosophers in this tradition and integrates them within the material terrain. The urban public is premised upon a rational process deriving from the progressive realisation of the objective potentialities of human beings to transform consciously and purposively the world in which they live. The human world is a self-made world and is accessible to human consciousness and control as a result. The concept of the ‘urban public sphere’ is developed in such a way as to revalue the goals of freedom, radicalism and democracy, reappropriating the terms from those who use them to promote an explicitly pro-business agenda. The book articulates expansive notions of community, democracy and freedom in relation to a new inclusive politics. 

The argument rests upon an emancipatory moral sensibility that transcends the particular questions of material distribution and class interest to affirm universal notions of political, social and spatial justice. This approach acknowledges that the project of constituting a genuine public sphere is not exhausted by the class struggle against power and exploitation. The question of the urban public sphere is set within an older philosophical tradition that conceives freedom to be a collective as much as an individual project but as neither exclusively. This approach goes some way towards reinstating ‘the political’ as a public good integral to human growth and well-being. The recovery of ‘the political’ informs the conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere as the attempt to constitute a civic order and achieve citizen democracy by focusing attention upon libertarian political structures as constitutive of public life in the city of the future.

The rational tradition expresses principles, values and terms which are alien to thought of Anglo-American individualism. Frederic Jameson has commented that the ‘mixture of political liberalism, empiricism and logical positivism which we know as Anglo-American philosophy ..is hostile at all points to the type of thinking outlined here’ [German philosophy] (Jameson 1971). But Graeco-Germanic rationalism is also under attack from postmodernism, for which rational claims to truth betray a totalitarian impulse to power and control. This state of affairs underlines the extent to which the modern world lacks a moral language or discourse. Attempts to construct morality are too easily denigrated as ‘essentialist’.





There is value in relating contemporary issues of politics and city studies to a philosophical tradition that dates back to the Plato and Aristotle. The ‘rational’ tradition makes a genuine public life essential to the growth and development of the individual as a citizen and hence as a realised human being. In this tradition, politics and ethics are united in a public realm that secures the achievement of virtue in the form of justice and the good life for human beings. Reason possesses an ethical component in being integral to the realisation of the human ontology. This is a very different conception to that of the liberal tradition that reduces the state to the position of a neutral umpire maintaining order whilst leaving individuals to work out vice and virtue, good and evil, according to their own predilections. The political association – the state – cannot, in the rational conception, be a neutral arbiter between the private inclinations of individuals. The ultimate goal in Aristotle’s Politics and Plato’s Republic is to constitute a political order that ensures the triumph of virtue over vice, good over evil, reason over superstition. There can be no compromises on the good for reasons of realism and pragmatism.

One of the virtues of locating the urban public sphere within the philosophical tradition of ‘rational freedom’ is that it offers a means for criticising the modern denormalisation of public life from the perspective of the recovery of ‘the political’ as a realm in which the demos participate in the conscious determination of their common affairs. In the modern world, politics has been reduced to a pragmatic body of techniques whilst ethics has become merely a corpus of relativistic values selected according to personal taste and opinion. Such politics has severed itself from ethics. Where once politics concerned the triumph of the good over the evil, it has now become a necessary evil wedded to the state. Politics no longer speaks the language of the good, the right and the just but the language of compromises and trade-offs. Such a politics secures not so much the greater good as the lesser evil. Often, politics expresses no moral opinion. Politics merely enforces the civic peace, leaving it to private individuals to determine their own good as they see fit in an atomised society. This shift subverts the notion of public life and has the effect of blocking the idea of a collective purpose that counts as ethical in facilitating human self-realisation. It denies the idea of the body politic as an active entity capable of realising the goal of the good life. 

This argument is a distinctive attempt to formulate a ‘new politics’; it envisages a communalist politics based upon the reintegration of political and social relationships and as proceeding through the urban public sphere. This involves conceiving democratisation as a repoliticisation that is articulated through the extension of public spaces throughout the urban realm. This is achieved by a decentralisation involving the relocation of power from the abstracted political realm to the social realm.

Historically, ‘rational freedom’ has been institutionalised in the form of law rendering the freedom of each compatible with the freedom of all through universally applied rules (Unger 1984:66/7). The argument of this book embeds this universal ethic in an everyday urban environment beyond the illusory community or national utopia of the abstract state. The urban public sphere thus practises a collective and reciprocal freedom. The state built upon legal force has operated to regulate and rationalise rather than transcend the diremptive forces of modernity in the interests of a true public. In transcending the abstractly legalistic and moralistic framework of the rational principle of the state, the urban public will be conceived as realising rational unity within the everyday social life world of human exchange, reciprocity and solidarity. The incorporation of rational principles into everyday individual relationships implies such an internalisation of norms that the recourse to external legal regulation via the state is diminished. Public authority continues but, in resting upon participatory structures, is democratically constituted and ordered by regulative principles rather than externally imposed rules. This realises the ‘rational’ principle of self-assumed obligation, the notion that individuals subject themselves to collective authority. The institutional form of this self-government entails opposing the internal, moral, peaceful coordination of human affairs to the external, coercive institutional-systemic control imposed by the state (and capital). 

The argument presents the urban public sphere in terms of an anarcho-Aristotelianism. Any sustainable urban regeneration and development is revealed to depend, crucially, upon the quality of human relationships within urban space. The term anarcho-Aristotelianism emphasises that Aristotle’s concern with scale, balance and order implies an attack upon the fetish systems and megastructures of politics and production in the modern world. The recovery of public life, as creative self-realisation in the Aristotelian sense, points beyond the abstract incarnation of public life in the institutions of the state. The reconstruction of an urban public on the basis of the ‘rational’ equation of politics with creative human self-realisation grounds the project of replacing the coercive coordination of human affairs through external power with an ethico-social coordination via an internal conception of power as something which inheres in the demos. 

The reality of contemporary urban space contradicts the ‘rational’ philosophical roots and historical origins that identify the city as a civilising and humanising process. The modern city is no longer the social realm centred upon human association. Instead, the instrumental exchange relationships of the city of capital make it impossible to project and embed a genuine reciprocity between individuals. The city is characterised by anonymity, isolation and atomisation and is incapable of embodying a genuine commonality. Its civilisation and culture is shaped by commodity production rather than the accumulated wisdom of the agora. The connection to individuality and rationality is severed as urban space is instrumentalised. The rational ideal of the active, informed citizenry comes to be realised as a passive mass, a mere aggregate manipulated in terms of their egoism. The result is the dissolution of civic integrity. The modern city is the antithesis of the classical city, hence Mumford’s reference to the ‘anti-city’.

The thesis stems from the concern to develop a conceptual framework through which to analyse the city in all of its dimensions, showing how the built environment is produced, what forces shape the processes of urbanisation and how they may be managed to produce an urban order that corresponds to the human ontology. Above all, the thesis adopts the view that the most important part of the city is the individuals composing it, constituting its character through the quality of their institutions and exchanges. The issue is primary social, ethical and anthropological and only secondarily a matter of physical infrastructure and economics. As Mumford quotes Rousseau: ‘Houses make a town but citizens make a city’ (Mumford 1961:93). Which begs the question of what makes citizens?

In answering this question, the argument makes a distinction between a social citizenship, which refers to the community on the one hand, and a market citizenship, which pertains to private individuals pursuing self-interest on the other. The latter is the dominant conception in modern politics but is the antithesis of citizenship. The concept derives from the way that capitalism asserts the primacy of the economic over the political, opposing a ‘democracy’ – an atomised mass - of egoists and consumers to political democracy and, in the process, undermining citizenship, democracy and community as public notions which recognise a common good. The subordination of public policy to the imperatives of capital – a private, non-democratic, non-discursive power – subverts public life. The citizen has been systematically deprived of power over everyday life and, without the ability to exercise power, has lost identity as a citizen. An immense economic and political system and apparatus has been raised above the habitus of human beings and has, in denuding the life world of individuals of power, centralised power and turned it against real individuals in abstract form. This institutional-systemic world is a human-made world that has come to exert power in alien form over the demos. 

The conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere aims to recover the public significance of politics, citizenship and democracy. This requires the recovery of society as the real life world of individuals, as the everyday lifeworld of reciprocity, interaction and consociation, as against the abstracted institutional-systemic world. This means revaluing society as a potential public realm, revaluing those public spaces that permit and enable the discussion and determination of common affairs. The reabsorption of the abstract citizenship of the state into individual relationships within civil society would thus define individuals as civic beings participating in public life.

At a time when the real community of individuals has been grossly denuded of its power by the rise of the centralised, abstract, bureaucratic state, when politics is identified with increasingly authoritarian and manipulative power exercised over the individual, it is more than ever necessary to reach back into an older tradition of public life to find a richer conception of democracy and of community, of freedom and happiness as public goods which are achieved by individuals in relation to each other. The task is to reformulate the themes and values in this ‘rational’ tradition concerning politics, citizenship and democracy so as to define the urban public sphere as the rational-ethical community of civic beings. This repoliticisation is conceived in terms of individuals as citizens in conscious control of their common affairs. This view contrasts with the liberal conception of the political and of the individual. The liberal conception subordinates the political to the economic, reduces the political to the problem of order, and leaves the individual powerless in face of supra-individual powers.

The definition of the good city that emerges from this argument affirms the city as the common place of those individuals composing it. The most distinctive characteristic of urban space is that it exists as an arena for association. A social life is an integral part of self-identity and self-hood. Individuals are not atoms but require a social realm if they are to realise their individuality. The purpose of the city is to provide a communal life that is truly human and social. The argument shows how the creation of the city followed a long process through which a civil order crystallised out of particular bonds and associations, of family, clan, tribe, etc. The high economic value of physical space in the city derives solely from the fact that it is the site of the activities of millions of associating, interacting, exchanging, communicating individuals. These individuals, not the owners of physical infrastructure or the investors of capital, create values within the city. And not only do the inhabitants create the values of the city but also know how to how to use the city and make it work. The recovery of the meta-narrative of the good city entails the recovery of the city as a public good, involving the idea of the city as ‘the common property of its inhabitants’ (Ward 1983:1). 

The approach of this thesis is timely in the way that it integrates classical conceptions of public life with modern achievements to envisage a future society that is self-regulating, self-organising, rational and free. Timely, that is, at a time when postmodernists celebrate the irrational present and project its nihilism into the future, castigating the ‘dream’ of the ‘rational city’ as a nightmarish vision of a world subjected to technocratic control. The concept of the urban public sphere keeps alive the ideal of a rational and free society at a time when many are inclined to abandon the hopes raised by the Enlightenment concerning the realisation of such a society. 

The conception of the city as a public good has been lost through the rise of the capital city, the city as the site of private accumulation. In this context, urban regeneration has come to be identified with economic development. Against this, community self-development, involving capacity building on the part of city dwellers, has shown the possibility of reconstituting the city as a public good, thus stemming the tide of urban degeneration. The book examines these issues in Part II.

The argument here develops the human ecology approach pioneered by Robert Park and the Chicago School of urban sociology. Park extended the Darwinian model of plant and animal communities to the human urban community, emphasising the interdependence of the parts in an organic or ecological model. Change in one part of the community initiates change in the other parts, changing the character of the community as a whole. Harvey Molotch has extended this human ecology approach to take account of the human capacity to initiate and control change in the urban community (Molotch 1983:ch5). What distinguishes the urban community from the plant or animal communities is the human capacity to engage in organised instrumental action in order to transform the conditions of competition in their favour. Molotch demands a ‘more human human ecology’. The basis of such humanisation lies in the human capacity to engage in transformatory activity. Creative human agency possesses the capacity to humanize the urban built environment, to assume responsibility for and to take control of the external world as a human creation. John Logan develops the political implications of this demand for humanisation, calling for a ‘more political human ecology’ through the ‘continuing collective effort to influence the pattern of development among places through political action’ (Lake 1983:ch6). Logan develops Molotch’s argument to make the point that political, social and economic inequality among places is as much the cause as the consequence of spatial differentiation and stratification. This has important implications. For if this is the case, it follows that human beings possess the capacity to transform the urban built environment in more egalitarian and just directions. This approach admits the ‘general orienting concept .. of places as collective actors’ and introduces an organised political aspect to the ecological model, making the urban environment subject to political intervention and transformation. The city is a political phenomenon and as such it is loaded with ideology and with political praxis.

This political transformation perspective builds upon the distinction between use and exchange value. The city has been the focal point for a wide range of human activities, performing a whole range of essential functions. The city has provided shelter, offered protection, has been the site of human association and interaction and of the exchange of goods and services. The market place at the centre of city life was more than an economic mechanism but was fundamental to extra-economic exchange between individuals. The agora was the birthplace of democracy. The relative weight of these activities and functions has changed throughout history. The economic factor has come to be the central determining factor in the era of the capitalist city. This represents the domination of exchange value over use value, the former determined by economics, the latter by inhabitants. This is to establish a possible contradiction within the city between its economic functions and its social/human/citizen functions, between the city as a site of private accumulation and the city as a public domain. This suggests C Wright Mills’ view of the city as the site of an interplay between a public issue concerning what kind of city is being developed and the ‘private troubles’ of the citizens (1959). There is a need to conceive this interplay so as to transcend the way in which public and private conflict within the modern city.

Under the capitalist mode of production, the dominant interests are concerned above all with the mechanisms of valorisation and accumulation. The city is restructured to facilitate these processes, giving a particular character to the city, determining its meaning. The economic necessity of the capital system and, further, of the global dimension of this systemic imperative is recognised in contemporary schemes for urban regeneration. Schemes for regeneration are increasingly based upon the necessity to attract mobile multinational capital and to facilitate accumulation. This systemic constraint shapes the character of regeneration undertaken, involving an emphasis upon tourist developments, office blocks, commercial openings as crucial to success in an increasingly competitive global market. But none of these quantitative developments in themselves satisfy the need to address the qualitative dimension of the urban experience. They are the necessary but not the sufficient aspect of urban renewal. The qualitative dimension, the human factor, infuses the quantitative dimension with its life and meaning. This is the very heart of the city as the essential entity in human growth and development. This answers the question of what living in the city entails for people, what existential qualities of life and opportunity are made available to city dwellers that would not be available without the associational space of the city.

Postmodernist analyses of the city emphasise this ambivalence of the city (Wilson 1991), even tend to celebrate it against modernist attempts to realise an inclusive vision of the city. Such works lack a conclusion, a moral point. They have an incomplete quality. The city is a variegated entity, exhibiting all the ambiguity of a space containing emancipatory potential and opportunity on the one hand and oppression, exclusion and coercion on the other. The city is a terrain of struggle and is subject to the competing visions of its inhabitants. This is a struggle of class, a struggle for empowerment and control, for a version of the city. The city is a contested concept. Historically and philosophically, the city has promised emancipation and has been the hub of human activity whilst simultaneously being at the centre of the regulation of relations of domination and exploitation. The city is a political phenomenon and as such it is loaded with ideology and with political praxis. The competing visions of the city are thus closely related to the struggle for the control of social space. In asking ‘Whose Culture? Whose City?’, Sharon Zukin raises the question of who are the hegemonic and the subordinate groups in the city (1995). Zukin argues that public life and culture are being progressively privatised for commercial reasons as corporations become dominant in the urban environment. The result of this process of commodification is that the authentic democratic public culture may be lost for good.

The argument proceeds to identify the strains upon the city through the impact of remote, abstract, global forces upon place. The various links and loyalties that tie people to localities are increasingly subject to global pressures, threatening to unravel the local urban fabric. The globalisation of economic relations places a question mark against the notion of an urban environment as a distinct and discrete entity in itself, against the idea of urban regeneration as applying to a particular area in isolation from wider processes. ‘The urban’ cannot be isolated as a distinct unit of analysis when it is so deeply penetrated by and subject to a range of forces that are global in their nature and priorities. Globalisation has created a unique inter and intra-urban geography whose character is evident on a number of scales. Globalisation possesses a distinctive spatial form characterised by the concentration of major financial activities crucial to the global economy into central cities possessing a genuinely global orientation and cities placed in relation at the immediate levels below them. The centralisation of financial activities is accompanied by the decentralisation of other activities, generating new urban forms in the process. Distinctively new cities, known as Edge Cities, are forming around the central cities.

The book examines the social and political implications as well as the economics of this spatial form, paying particular attention to the fact that the contemporary city exhibits a tendency towards exclusion as against inclusion, dividing society from within. Edge cities are exclusive cities of the wealthy seeking to seal themselves off from existing city life and are thus characterised by gating, surveillance and policing by private security firms. Emerging in America, the phenomenon of the Edge City is spreading throughout the developed world, institutionalising within the urban fabric the social division at the heart of the global economy. Such a development poses the question of social justice. The issue is whether justice is to be made available in the universal sense that connects the freedom of each and all or whether social divisions are to become permanent within the social and spatial form of the city.

The evidence is growing that such pressures have the effect of weakening the public realm. The city as an urban public realm has been in decline as, under capitalism, happiness and freedom have been defined as private goods to be obtained in the sphere of exchange. The retreat of the public realm has a visible effect upon the urban environment. Public spaces, public access, freedom of movement and association for all within cities, participation in civic life has been increasingly restricted with the redefinition of urban life as a social problem to be policed and regulated (Worpole 1992:3). These issues are taken up in Part II in the chapters concerning the carceral city.

Against the view of the city as a diremptive sphere, there are visions of the city as the site of joy, play and hope. Debord’s society of the spectacle focuses upon the ambivalent character of the city as both the site of freedom and repression, expression and exploitation (Debord 1983). Debord’s project centres upon recapturing the urban sphere by reconceiving as the embodiment of jouissance. Such a vision is quite distinct from the anodyne ‘spectacle’ of the theme park and late capitalist urbanism as a war of attrition against a genuine public space.

The capitalist city is an instrument of power; it is a mechanism of accumulation and valorisation and of administrative control. Community mobilisation contains the potential to challenge this identification of the city with abstract, non-discursive forms of power, reasserting the city as use value against the dominant conception of the city as exchange value. If the city is to be regenerated, if citizen participation is to have a decisive input into the regeneration process, then it follows that commercial and administrative power must cease being the dominant goals and instead be subordinated to priorities determined by the everyday users of the city. The city defined as a public good is a shared and lived experience that ought to be governed by its inhabitants.

The book thus proposes to investigate not merely the ills of capitalist urbanisation insofar as it alienates the power of control – socially and politically – from the demos, but also to explore the conditions for true democracy, active citizenship and repoliticisation. The urban public sphere places great value upon the activism of individuals in relation to their environment, to their political life and to their community. It is this active relation that makes the urban public the ethico-rational community which is the embodiment of human being and which ensures the creation of the public life as a fulfilling expression of human nature. And it is this activism that makes individuals citizens.

The urban public sphere is a thoroughly politicised society in being constituted by citizens defined as self-empowered individuals who are ethically united by ideals of civic virtue. This presentation of the urban public as citizen democracy demonstrates those attributes that the Greeks called phronesis, practical reason. The realisation of the principle of citizenship means that individuals exercise practical reason in creating, managing and sustaining a community. Ultimately, the conception supposes that these citizens are also free individuals able to dissolve any social institutions constraining their freedom.

The argument concerns the creation of a public life within the everyday life world and sustained by an active citizenry. In such a society, the individuals constituting the demos would be civic beings determining their common affairs. The argument upholds the view that a public life, in which the development of each and the development of all is united, is integral to human self-realisation. This conception seeks to realise what the Greeks called politikos bios, political life and culture, in the real lives and relationships of individuals. Politics is integral to human self-identity. The concept of the urban public sphere revalues the public significance of the ‘private’ world of social reciprocity, interaction and exchange over against the institutional world presided over by the state. The concept attempts to transcend the egoistic, competitive character of this world so as to make it a civic world of publicly motivated behaviour.

The concept of the urban public sphere implies that there could be a public realm that is independent of the state and which is founded upon civil society as itself a political society. The abolition of the state, therefore, need not entail the abolition of ‘the political’. Rather, by rooting public life in the everyday life world of individuals, it is possible to subvert the monopolisation of the political by the state. What changes is the location of ‘the political’.

This approach affirms that politics is a phenomenon that can be distinguished from the state. The Aristotelian roots of the concept of the urban public sphere are evident here, implying a classical, Athenian, conception of political life, citizenship and public empowerment. For Aristotle’s polis is most certainly not a state. Even the familiar translation ‘city-state’ only inadequately expresses precisely what was entailed by the polis. For Aristotle, the state is understood as the community of communities. Such a conception is concerned with the institutional embodiment of individuals as civic beings, with enabling citizens to participate in the determination of their common affairs. This community of communities could thus be regarded as the culminating point in the development of reason in humanity’s long process of self-civilisation. This entails a notion of citizenship premised upon all individuals as rational beings able to reflect upon and identify with the common or public good as their own personal good. Citizenship, as is clear in the classical conception, involves both the self- and the social formation of the individuals constituting the demos into active participants in the management of their common affairs. 

In Athenian polis democracy, the idea of a state as a professionalised, bureaucratised and centralised apparatus exercising power for purposes of social control and civic peace is conspicuous by its absence. Indeed, it is only after the sixteenth century that, following the centralisation of power and the corresponding disempowerment of social forces, that the term ‘state’ came to mean a legal, legitimate and professional public authority with the power to govern a body politic. And it is such a state, associated with the rise of the capitalist mode of production, which represents the destruction of the public significance of the urban sphere. As capitalism developed, towns and cities proceeded to lose their political autonomy to the centralised state. 

There is a distinction of some importance to be made here between freedom and autonomy. The ideal of autonomy in thought and politics is appropriate to the notion of a sovereign, self-contained individual whose identity is given abstractly rather than being rooted in social life. This is the liberal notion, autonomy as an individualistic, rights based conception. The public conception of freedom affirmed in this book has different roots in the classical Greek and modern German conception of ‘rational freedom’. This conception of freedom possesses universalist and communalist components. The term ‘freedom’, as derived from the German ‘Freiheit’, comes with the implication that individuality possesses social roots and responsibilities. It is this wider significance that is missing in the individualist liberal conception.

The post-bourgeois conception of publicity that emerges from the socialisation and democratisation of the normative framework of ‘rational’ philosophy is thus employed against individualist liberalism. This book considers that the moral priority that liberalism assigns to the individual needs to be an integral part of a conception of the good society rather than existing as an abstract substitute within the illusory community of the state. Whereas contemporary deontological liberalism asserts the priority of the right over the good, this thesis shows the emphasis upon rights to be misplaced and hence defends a conception of the good. Karl Marx makes an important and often overlooked contribution here in identifying the communal-political character of the discourse on rights and justice, opposing the ‘public’ rights of the citoyen to the private rights of the egoistic bourgeois. This distinction is valued for containing the potential for a future sociality in a community of free individuals interacting in a condition of reciprocal freedom.

The city as public space is a terrain of struggle, a site of collective experience and solidarity, of interaction and exchange, where issues arising from diremption are aired in encounters between different groups and interests. Democracy was born in the agora, the Athenian market place where individuals came together. Individuals have always met to argue and demonstrate in public view, an activity which embodies a claim to the public space of the city on the part of individuals defining themselves as citizens. The concept of citizenship as an active designation forming the personality and self-hood of individuals is examined in the chapters on political philosophy, particularly with respect to Aristotle and polis democracy. The book develops a concept of active citizenship as a social movement from below. Part III develops this theme in terms of ‘the social concept of the city’ (Castells 1983:262). Community mobilisation initiates urban, political and cultural changes which transforms the city by reinstating its social and relational dimension against its systemic-institutional dimension. 

This perspective reveals the extent to which bourgeois society rests upon an economic reductionism that devalues the status of the political in favour of private economic affairs. The individual in bourgeois society tends to acquire a very precise identity. It is not the identity of the citizen, which involves active involvement in and control over public affairs, but the identity of the self-interested being concerned only with private affairs. Bourgeois individuals are, in the classical Greek sense, idiotes rather than polites. Insofar as these individuals are concerned with public affairs, they are concerned not as citizens but as taxpayers. These individuals do not possess a sense of identity appropriate to a public or civic being but, rather, an identity of a private, self-contained being. The individual as taxpayer tolerates only a minimalist government. In such a society, government is not a good integral to human self-realisation but is a necessary evil which is required to impose order upon an antagonistic and egoistic civil society which, as a sphere of universal antagonism, has become incapable of constituting order for itself. The state is reduced to being merely the instrument of the civil peace as opposed to being the agency of human self-realisation. The individual as taxpayer is not concerned to participate in public affairs, only to control the taxes levied by the state as an external agency of public control. This conception empties citizenship of its active, political and, indeed, anthropological content, breaking the connection between public life and the realisation of the human ontology. The citizen as taxpayer is the law abiding, tax paying, voting (periodically) individual who is content to leave the management of public affairs to a professional minority whilst they – as idiotes – concentrate purely upon private affairs. The only ‘democracy’ possible with such a citizen body is necessarily ‘representative’ rather than participatory. 

Liberal and bourgeois conceptions thus assert that that government is best which governs least – and in the process restricts politics to the keeping of the civil peace – and hence, as a logical corollary, that that citizenship is best in which citizens do least and their representatives do most. The sense of political activity and interest in public affairs as essential to the definition of the human being, as necessary to human growth and development, is lost in the process. The civic re-empowerment of the individual as citizen, which is entailed by the reintegration of political and social relationships, is not merely a political question but also an anthropological question. With the view of politics as essential in constituting truly human being, the question of citizenship is also a question of personality. To absorb the abstract citizenship of the state into individual relationships enables the individual to develop their selfhood as public and private beings. 

The conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere demonstrates a concern with the achievement of true democracy as the ethico-rational community. In this conception, the public sphere is located in the social realm as the real world of reciprocity, interaction, and communication – that is, as the realm where individuals actively relate to each other and associate in order to realise a greater range of purposes. This recovery of community, democracy and freedom is concerned with the social bonds that individuals form as ethical beings and the institutional forms they engender as political beings to embody their ethical potentialities as human beings. The idea that civil society could itself constitute a public sphere in its own associational space challenges the liberal fetishism of the law, the notion that law is necessary for order and that without law society would be torn apart. The concept of an urban public sphere is one that affirms that society creates the state and that as a result society is capable of regulating its affairs without the external imposition of law. This is to argue that the more that society becomes capable of regulating order within its relationships, the less will law be required to impose order externally. The democratic principle of self-legislated obligation and authority is thus developed in terms of a morally and socially self-regulating order. There is a need to address the social forces and relations that have come to make the state and the law necessary to maintain order. And there is a need to understand why, in bourgeois civil society, a participatory public community is an impossibility, and why the common good needs to be imposed institutionally from above as an abstract principle rather than being something that is generated from within society. 

The modern conception of the state as an instrument of the civil peace and of politics as the efficient management of public affairs would strike the Athenian citizen of classical times as a remarkably impoverished notion. The demand for an active citizenship and an active suffrage exercised in the daily reality of urban space embodies the Greek ideals of philia, freedom, rationality, civic responsibility and public activity. That elusive figure which has haunted political thought and practice throughout the ages – the active, informed citizen – can be brought into the foreground. The Athenian citizens assembled as an ekklesia not simply to formulate public policy but also for purposes of mutual education, learning how to act justly and coming to expand their notions of right and wrong. Political activity, then, was not merely institutional and instrumental but an educative process that fostered an active, informed citizenry. Politics was integral to the intellectual, ethical and personal growth of the individual as a citizen. And this process, as a continuous education, developed the ability of citizens to participate creatively in public affairs. 

This active citizenry would employ their abilities in the service of the polis and would also manage their private affairs in a way that corresponded with the highest ethical standards of the whole community. The social identity connecting private interest and the public good was available to the Athenian citizen in a way that that it is not to the modern individual split between the citoyen and the bourgeois, the one a political being, the other an economic being.

The Greek ideal of the citizen forms a complete contrast to the modern citoyen in pertaining to an active membership of a citizen body. The free individual as a sovereign, autonomous, self-sufficient being is a monadic conception that presents the individual as an atomised, competitive buyer and seller whose choices are constrained only by the particular deficiencies of that individual. The origins of this contrast are to be sought in the mode of production. The external economic determinism imposed by the capital system has entailed the systemic devaluation of the distinctively political themes and values of democracy, community, citizenship and freedom. The concept of the urban public sphere makes the point that the material struggles for social justice and equality are not exhaustive of the struggle for freedom and happiness as creative self-realisation and human self-determination. The recovery of ‘the political’ as against the economic determinism of capitalism makes it possible to conceive an urban public sphere whose expansion is of central importance in the development of a new, civic, communalist politics.

These critical comments concern the conditions required to make citizenship an active reality. The citizenship conceded by the state is a citizenship abstracted from a genuine community, a fictitious designation that lacks genuine content. Such content can only be supplied by a common conscious control over relations and powers that have acquired an independent existence and an existential significance. It requires the substitution of a genuine social control for the alien control of the fetish systems of state politics and production. Without this community, the individual cannot be a citizen and instead remains the isolated self-serving, self-maximising being absorbed within private affairs. In this ‘bourgeois’ condition the individual is subservient to supra-individual forces, dependent upon alien forces in both public and private life, upon the state and capital with all that that entails. 

Centralisation and bureaucratisation have become more acute by being accompanied by degeneration at the base of society, within the everyday sphere of real individuals. The state comes to severe every common interest from society and appropriates this communality as its own. Society is emptied of its communal content and of its political significance. Society loses its capacity and then its will to govern itself. Denuded of its content as a governing sphere, society becomes an atomistic entity of monadic individuals requiring an ensemble of bureaucratic agencies to compensate for the absence of a genuine public life. Thus, genuine public community is dissolved and replaced by an administrative structure managing civil society as a sphere of ‘possessive’ and acquisitive individualism. Denied in the everyday social life of individuals, public community comes to be projected upwards to the ideal level of the state.

Such a situation, and the type of public life it fosters, represents a dissolution of the tendency of humanity and society towards community. This is a social problem since it pertains to the most elemental form of human consociation – community – where individuals advance beyond private considerations to achieve a mutual interest. The destruction of the social realm as a sphere of reciprocity, interaction and human exchange represents the denial of the communal essence of human beings.

The concept of the urban public sphere is a critique of liberal society and the way that social relationships are reduced to exchange between egoistic, acquisitive individuals. With relationships becoming external to individuals, the social identity of each individual loses connection with the common good. The acquisitive individualism associated with an atomistic market society based upon external relations is the reduction of society to a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism. This constitutes a social pathology that threatens to destructure society, dissolving the real social bonds that connect individuals together in a common endeavour, and hence destroying a genuine public life. 

The conception of ‘rational freedom’ upon which the urban public sphere is predicated as a just social order affirms the interdependence of the individual and the social within the process of human growth and development. The full and free development of the individual requires the full and free development of all individuals within the realised community. It is this community that fosters the rationality, solidarity, creativity, and the sense of justice and freedom that makes for a rational and informed citizenry.

True citizenship is an active citizenship, an educative process in which personality is formed. Citizenship as participation in public life fosters a growing civic responsibility and commitment on the part of individuals as they come to realise that both their individual freedom and the freedom of others are interdependent within community. Citizenship as an active concept thus involves communising within an active body politic and also the creation of a public life that gives the demos existential substance. This conception implies the extension of public spaces in which the vital personal and political attributes of each and every individual are formed. These public spaces enable individuals to participate in the determination of common affairs as active and rational citizens, achieving in turn a responsive and discursive public sphere.

The city is at the centre of new and emerging political struggles. The reason for this lies in the split between the societal determination of the alien power of capital and the state and the transformatory input of purposive social agency located in place. Given the encroachment of the former upon the latter, reducing the space for creative urban processes and practices that enable citizens to make cities their own, urban issues and struggles are at the forefront of contemporary political conflicts. Overcoming this split requires reinstating the urban lifeworld against alien control and its globalisation via an international and inter-regional spatial division of labour. The struggle against external imposition thus contains an implicit – and sometimes explicit – vision of an alternative city.

The actions of various urban social movements will be examined from this perspective, showing how their rejection of certain spatial forms contains an implicit commitment to a new relationship between urban space and society. Urban social movements subvert hegemonic political institutions and cultural values and explore new meanings for cities. Part III will explore the extent to which urban social movements offer the opportunity for democratising the political agenda, generating complex networks of relationships between urban space, state and civil society. 

The contemporary city expresses the multifarious experience of the modern world. In the details of its everyday existence and activity, the clash of its mixed histories, cultures, languages and interests, the combination of its local roots and global connections, the city is a map for reading, evaluating and understanding modernity but with this difference. However, whereas a map consists of stable references to places, the city comprises the unstable interactions of individuals and groups and is therefore the site of an everlasting flux and fluidity. The city plan is both a rationalisation of space and of time; its streets, buildings, bridges and roads are also temporal indices. The map permits us to grasp an outline, a shape, some sort of location, but not the contexts, cultures, histories, languages, experiences, desires and hopes that course through the urban body, pierce the logic of topography and spill over the edges of the map (Chambers in Bird et al 1993:188/9). Chambers’ point enables us to recover the roots of the city in citizen interaction and discourse in an everyday reality comprising different identities of class, race and gender, with shifting centres and peripheries. The architecture of the city, in terms of design, commerce, urban infrastructure and government, comes to be infused with meaning by the plasticity of citizen discourse and interaction. This requires recovering real urban voices and elevating the sphere of citizen discourse and interaction. This absorbs the abstract rationality of the philosophical concepts of the city within the mundane and routine patterns and practices through which individuals appropriate and make use of the city, making cities their own. These real urban voices lead in different directions – over issues of class, gender, age and ethnicity – but together they form an urban public realm.

In What is the City? Lewis Mumford argues that the city is the expression of the human spirit and registers the evolution of human personality (Mumford 1945). The relational conception of the city defines the city in terms of its processes and practices, seeking to dissolve its abstract structure into the everyday life world. This is to reinstate a concern with the living systems constituting the city, particularly the way that they are generated, transformed and experienced by individual city dwellers. ‘Urban forms and functions are produced and managed by the interaction between spaces and society, that is, by the historical relationships between human consciousness, matter, energy, and information’ (Castells 1983:xv).

Comprehending the city in terms of an analytical approach to everyday life looks upon the city as process and relation. The analysis of the city should be concerned to grasp ‘the nature of the organisation which is the complex of these relationships’ (Williams 1965:61). It also means addressing the socially structured relationships within and between urban practices. This approach is suggested by Peter Hall’s concern ‘to study how the interactions between all these practices and patterns are lived and experienced as a whole, in any particular period. This is its “structure of feeling”’ (Hall 1981:22). The phrase ‘structure of feeling’ comes from Raymond Williams and concerns the intangible ‘elements of impulse, restraint and tone’ as well as the ‘specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships’ (Williams 1977:132).

Overall, this thesis attempts to combine philosophy, political economy and social theory so as to analyse the processes behind the structuring of the urban environment within a moral framework concerned with the questions of the good society. Although threatening the city as the central unit of analysis suggests a narrow focus, the thesis embraces a broad perspective that relates general social processes structuring and restructuring cities in the modern world to a specific moral and political perspective. In this sense, urban regeneration is more than an economic phenomenon concerned with attracting investment and facilitating accumulation. For Lewis Mumford, regeneration was not simply a physical process but mainly spiritual and moral. The human contents are more important than the physical container. The concluding part of the thesis develops this wider conception of regeneration, broadening the conception so as to prioritise community self-development and self-organisation. 

The argument will be concerned to develop the implications of the ‘rational’ philosophical tradition for contemporary urbanism, examining the possibilities for a ‘new’ urban public realm in the (post)modern world. Informed by these ‘rational’ themes, the concluding part returns to the questions of balance, scale and form identified in the philosophical ecology of Plato and Aristotle. The ‘rational’ perspective is developed in terms of limiting the size of the city, limiting growth, locating the urban in the rural so as to unite city and country. By such means a way is found to combine social justice with ecological justice, overcoming the ecological destruction that has accompanied industrial urbanisation.





5 Citizenship and Western Civilisation
The modern world is suffering from a crisis of political socialisation and representation. So many people in so many parts of the developed world are disengaging from politics as now practised and expressing increasing levels of dissatisfaction with the way that politics is currently being conducted. At the same time there is a participatory revolution underway. More and more people are getting involved in issues that, by any definition, can be considered political. With these developments comes an increased interest in what politics is, has been and ought to be. What are the origins of political concepts and how have they come to be what they now are? This book takes a philosophical and historical approach to the origin and evolution of political ideas, attempting to reveal the how and why of politics, continually tracing the unfolding of the ideal within the real, the rational within the actual with a view to its complete fruition in the future.

This book is not another history of ideas on the subject of freedom. Rather, it is an historical socio-philosophy of rational freedom with an explicitly political purpose and goal. The aim is to understand how individuals are capable of becoming citizens through socially constructing freedom as a public value. In the course of this inquiry the extent to which freedom is a contested concept becomes clear. Freedom means different things to different sections of society at different times and in different places. Since the value of freedom has been a staple of philosophy, there is a need to examine the works of political philosophers to see how far they have clarified or obscured the potentials of the value. The question concerns how this freedom, which emerges in the social practices of the people, comes to be reconstructed politically and philosophically in order to provide norms for the state and law. The arguments of philosophers have influenced the valorization, articulation, comprehension, dissemination, and institutionalisation of the value. The question is whether codification and institutionalisation represents the realisation of freedom or its denial.

What is most striking about the history of freedom is the continuity. Throughout the rise and fall of civilisations, empires, states, parties, movements, freedom survives. Suppressed in one time or place, it re-emerges elsewhere. Freedom as a supreme value is as old as Western civilisation itself, emerging around the sixth and fifth centuries BC. As an idea and a practice, freedom, emerged fully in ancient Greece. From those origins, the value has persisted for two millennia, meaning different things to different peoples at different times, but always being treated as the supreme political value.

Typically, discussions of the concept suffer from a narrow focus. Classical origins will be recognised only to emphasise the extent to which modern ‘complex’ society renders such notions as participatory democracy, popular assemblies and active conceptions of citizenship impossible. The target here is contemporary radical democrats, followers of Rousseau and Marx who are concerned to repudiate the individualist liberalism that has dominated politics since the eighteenth century. The liberal case is remarkable for its historical myopia. Alternative social or corporate conceptions of liberalism, as shown in the Germanic states, are dismissed as feudal relics. Centuries in which freedom was valued, pursued and practised as a goal simply disappear. Modern liberalism does not have the monopoly of freedom and modern liberal institutions are not the only way by which freedom may be expressed. The liberal assumption that the pre-modern experience of freedom is of little value is the plainest historical illiteracy. In the “Two Concepts of Liberty” Isaiah Berlin made the outrageous and ignorant claim that personal liberty “is comparatively modern. There seems to be scarcely any discussion of individual liberty as a conscious political ideal (as opposed to its actual practice) in the ancient world”. The truth completely contradicts this claim. Discussions of liberty can be found in almost any place at any time, in the works of philosophers and the speeches of politicians, certainly, in the various compacts and charters of the Middle Ages, in the documents dealing with who is and who is not entitled to citizen status in the medieval city states and so on. In every respect, what is conceived to be the modern understanding of freedom is clearly discernible in the ancient world and can be traced by an almost unbroken pattern through to the modern world. There has been no break or lapse in the Western idealisation of freedom, least of all in the much maligned medieval world. Indeed, some of the most outstanding philosophical world and most fevered political controversies concerning freedom took place in the medieval age. If, by personal liberty, Berlin means the most minimal individualist liberal conception of negative, personal autonomy, then this concept was certainly known to the medieval world and at times jealously guarded. Freedom has been the core value of Western civilisation since its inception and failure to understand that point and take account of the evolution of the value which necessarily narrow perspectives.

In writing about the connection of politics and human ontology, this book has a clear moral and political purpose. The book acknowledges the extent to which the basic terms of politics – freedom, the common good, citizenship, democracy etc. – are all contested concepts that have a complex and mixed nature and history. The argument clearly seeks to revalue the persistent idealism of the philosophical tradition by accentuating instances of the ideal within the actual practices and lived experiences of the people. This is to read history in line with the high values of political philosophy. The book also highlights the extent to which concepts such as citizenship are ambiguous. If, in one place, citizenship has implied virtuous and disinterested public mindedness, in other places it has involved the plainest self-interest and the undertaking of public duty for reciprocal benefit. Highlighting the ideal within the real does not entail idealisation. To present public life in terms of self-sacrificing service for the common good is neither realistic nor idealistic. The conception of citizen identity within public life offered in this book conceives politics as integral to self-realisation and is therefore the very opposite of the self-abnegation implied by selfless service on behalf of society. On the other extreme is the historical connection between citizenship and self-interest. This aspect of citizenship has never been elevated to the status of political philosophy. Its neglect has fostered the impression that citizenship is, by definition, selfless service to the community. Historical practice clearly shows that citizenship can also involve selfish service of one’s own interests at the expense of the community. There have always been in great number practitioners of this self-interested citizenship. The work of medieval lawyers in various codes and covenants and charters reveals how sophisticated this concept was. There is a tendency to indulge in nostalgia and condemn capitalism for its reduction of the public-minded virtues of politics to commercial imperatives, but money has always impinged on politics. There is no single definition of citizenship but many. And in many medieval city-states, citizen rights were defined by property interests. No political philosopher of any stature emerged to raise this self-interested commercial conception of citizenship to the status of virtuous truth, but the idea existed at the level of practice and legal codification. This point should be enough to make it clear that these terms should be treated with care and that there should be extreme caution when employing the term recovery. Which citizenship is to be recovered? What kind of democracy, politics? Which notion of freedom? From when and where? In many places the line ‘this is to recover politics in its classical conception’ will be employed as short hand. The implication is that politics meant something clear and distinct within classical civilisation, in every place at every time. This is not so.

Another problem with the notion of recovery is that the institutions employed by ancient Greeks and Romans and medieval citizens to address their problems cannot be expected to work in the same way in the modern world. Politics no longer cultivates a common morality and it is hard to assert the necessary connection between virtue and the public realm when public service has become a job like any other. From where does the moral education and character-building now come from? The community is in an advanced state of disintegration. The affluent and the well-educated are withdrawing into their private world of clubs, schools, and gated, self-policed neighbourhoods, excluding the rest and abandoning them to the nightmare scenario of drug-related turf wars.
 
The path to virtue that was once integral to politics is now little in evidence. The idea of freedom as a public good, of citizenship as participation in a shared commonality, has all but disappeared at the level of official society. All that is available is private self-interest as the route to social advancement.

But elements which merit the designation of public life are still discernible, in voluntary work, involving altruistic service by members of the community for a greater good, and in occasional office holding at the level of local councils, school boards, hospital boards, in professional and service organisations. In all these instances, individuals do a great deal of work for very little pay. Such public minded activity expresses values such as friendship, professional collegiality, shared commonality, community spirit, and bonding and generates the cultural capital upon which all viable societies depend. An important point is that such participation is a form of moral and political education which equips individuals with the skills and awareness defining the citizen. Such practices within the interstices of everyday life are the pathways to an active moral life. It is in these small, intermediary associations that individuals begin to associate with each other and apprehend the common good that transcends the self-interested existence. These are the primary units through which individuals learn to become citizens in Aristotle’s sense of ruling and being ruled in turn. The individual is active in a collective or supra-individual environment, learning how the individual good depends upon the common good and vice versa. This is the conception of citizenship that needs to be revalued and recovered on the modern terrain. In the modern world, citizenship has been redefined so as to be compatible first with monarchy and later with republicanism. This is not an active but a passive citizenship, more of a subjectship in that individuals are placed in direct subordinate relationship to their rulers, be they princes or politicians. This relation of superordination and subordination prevails in every liberal democracy of the modern world and it is a clear contradiction of the meaning of citizenship and a plain denial of public freedom.

 This book affirms the value of citizen identity as integral to any effective public life. The book reveals the extent to which citizenship creates individuals capable of exercising moral choice and engaging in rational action as a condition of their self-realisation as human beings.

Like freedom, citizenship has persisted throughout history in a variety of political environments as a practice by which individuals make their own lives better by making that of their neighbour’s better. This virtuous conception of citizenship made sense in the public life of Greece and Rome. Public life has been an attractive ideal in both pagan and Christian guises and citizenship has been one of the basic forces for its realisation.

The argument is structured around two contrasting themes of power and government. The ascending theory locates the law-creative power is located in the people itself, (leaving aside debates as to who does and who does not count as a member of the people). Its principal feature is that original power is located in the people or in the community itself. Tacitus described precisely this ascending theme in relation to the way in which the Germanic tribes were governed. Since power originates in the people, it must remain subject to their control, in popular assemblies or diets, in councils or other organs which governed by representatives chosen by the people. It is the people through their popular assemblies or organs who elected a leader or a duke or a king, and other such rulers. The main concern of the ascending theme is that the people should always be in charge of the direction of its own affairs in society. Representatives do not act or speak or decide on their own behalf, but on behalf of the people who elect them. Representatives are empowered by the people to give consent to legislative measures. The idea that government depends upon the consent of the governed is a structural element of the ascending theme. The Ruler may be at the top of the political hierarchy but remains no more than a representative of the people, responsible at all times to the people. Since power ascends from the broad base of the whole people upwards, the power of the Ruler is derivative. The Ruler has only that power conferred by the people. The Ruler has no power other than that conferred by the electing assembly. It follows that the Ruler is subject to the people rather than vice versa. The Ruler is considered the representative of the community and as such is accountable to the popular assembly. There is an inherent right of resistance to the ruler’s commands as a leader built into this theme. The people can oppose, depose or restrict the power of the Ruler in any way it they see fit (Ullmann LP 30). Although over time, kingship tended to be restricted to certain families, the principle of representation remained the same and many kings were disposed for failing to adequately represent the people. The government of the Ruler was controlled by the popular assembly. This ascending theme therefore adumbrates a populist theory of government, since original power is located clearly in the people and hence properly belongs there.

In contradistinction to this ascending theme is the descending theme of power and government. In this conception, original power is located not in the broad base of the people but in a supreme being. Because of the prevalence of Christianity, divinity came to be considered the source of all power, public and private. Power was distributed downward – or ‘descended from above’. The descending conception was theorised in the fifth century by St Augustine, who argued that God distributed the laws to mankind through the medium of kings. Thomas Aquinas would later articulate the same idea in affirming that power descended from God’ (Ullmann 13).

The descending theme generated the medieval notion of society as a pyramid. At the summit is the Ruler, receiving power from divinity and distributing it downwards. Any power at the base of the pyramid could be traced to the supreme head at the summit. The office holders are not representatives of the people but delegates of the supreme being. Whereas according to the ascending theme of power the Ruler is always accountable and responsible to the people, and can be opposed or deposed by the people, in the descending theme the people are subject to the Ruler. Any power the Ruler has conferred upon the people can be withdrawn. The Ruler is accountable only to the supreme being from whom power derives. The people cannot hold the Ruler to account. The descending theme therefore lacks a right of resistance. Office holders are appointees and hold power as a matter of grace or good will on the part of the supreme head. There is no role for consent in the descending theme. It is the principle of suitability that matters here. Suitability for a particular office is determined by the way that the organ possessing the totality of power decides to confer power upon lower-placed delegates. Whereas the ascending theme of power inherently democratic, with no necessary reason for the ordering of society by rank, the descending theme necessarily generates a hierarchical social order with a range of higher and lower offices determined by proximity to or distance from the supreme head (Ullmann LP 31).
 
In the descending theme, the people possessed only such power has had been given to them from. The supreme head, responsible to God alone, conferred power, not the popular assembly. The descending theme of power was thus theocratic, elitist and hierarchical.

Throughout the Middle Ages there was a constant struggle between these two themes, representing the struggle between people and rulers over political order. The legacy of Rome and the prevalence of Christianity ensured that the theocratic-elitist conception came to dominate and struggle involved attempts to preserve the descending theme against popular demands. The ascending theme remained a subterranean current which was always likely to reappear at times of popular struggle. It was only in the late thirteenth century, however, that the ascending theory was given explicit theoretical expression. From that moment, the ascending theme started to prevail over the descending theme until, by the seventeenth century, the descending theme was in full retreat before claims made for the power of the people. By this time, however, the hierarchical pyramidal structure formed under the influence of the descending theme was firmly entrenched. The result is a confusing and contradictory hybrid, a nation state that claims to be representative of the sovereign people and yet which continues as though power comes from the top and the people are subjects. Political relations of superordination and subordination are in place which clearly affirm the descending theme of power in flat contradiction to claims that original power is located in the people. If the descending theme has been defeated as far as the claim that power originates in a supreme being is concerned, then the full democratic implications of the ascending theme have still to be completely worked out in an institutional setting. The theory behind the modern state may be the ascending one, but the practice is plainly descending.

The triumph of the descending theme of power is expressed in the distinctly ecclesiastical and Latin-Roman complexion of political theory and practice in the early Middle Ages. The intellectual domination of the descending theme is explained by the fact that those who were sufficiently educated to be able to express ideas adequately were clerics, who would clearly opt for the theocratic model. It would be a long time before intellectual representatives of the people could be found to express the democratic case, lawyers being the principal group here.

Citizenship would seem to be quite an easy concept to define. However, the fact that it is one of the oldest figures of Western political theory and practice, struggled over for centuries, defined and re-defined according to political victories, means that citizenship is incapable of being expressed by a single definition.

It is possible to identify a King and to define where the King sits. But it is less easy to define who or what the citizen is. Citizenship is not clearly an office. Nor is it clearly a theory or a legal contract. Citizenship can be placed everywhere generally but in no person, place or situation specifically. Citizenship functions in times of war, in legal struggles, in political conflict, in tax collector’s office. There have been a wide range of citizenships throughout history, each expressing particular goals and powers. And just as there is no definite place or practice of citizenship, so there is no definite theory. Definitions of citizenship can be found in religious, political and legal books, tracts, handbooks, in inspirational heroic poetry and song, in handbooks concerning moral training. But none of these are definitive.

Which means that the term must be handled with extreme care. Citizenship is a seductive concept, a bait and a trap for idealists. The temptation is to write out of disillusionment with the politics of one’s own time and express a nostalgic yearning for times when politics was healthy and vital. Images of an active, rational citizenry flocking to the assemblies and discharging public affairs certainly appeal to democrats. But if this is true citizenship, then one can locate it in particular places within classical civilisation and only at particular times. The equation of citizenship with democracy making the good life cannot be supported by history alone but must be accompanied by a strong philosophical anthropology. In historical terms, this designation can be made to fit only the slack non-participatory democracies of the modern world – the very liberal regimes which radicals accuse of betraying classical ideals of citizenship and democracy. For which classical city-state practised democracy as the rule of all the people as opposed to the rule by some of the people? Citizenship has indeed been connected to the emerging theory and practice of democracy from the start, and has certainly been considered the moral education which renders the individuals composing the demos capable of participating in public affairs. But citizenship has also been practised within nondemocratic regimes. The classic confrontation between Athens and Sparta is instructive here. Whilst Athens has been celebrated as a democracy and Sparta has been condemned as an oligarchy, there is no question that Sparta exhibits the clearest example of a strong conception of citizenship in support of a vigorous public life, with patriotism, military service, rugged personal character, closely connected with government concentrated in the hands of the few. So where does that leave the connection between citizenship and democracy?

The truth is that citizenship is compatible with a wide variety of political forms and is not necessarily, or even principally, democratic. On the contrary, the historical record makes it clear that citizen status has always been used to separate some as legitimate political actors from others. From its inception, citizenship has been a category of privilege and exclusion and has been employed as a mechanism by which to discriminate against non-citizens. This is not the ‘dark side’ of citizenship but its dominant side. Citizenship has been explicitly undemocratic throughout its history, taking its character from the dominant political regimes through which it has been practised. As a category of privilege and exclusion, citizenship has buttressed the power of the few against the many and has ensured that the membership of a political community, with all the benefits that follow this, is restricted to a chosen few. 

So what, then, is the democratic case for citizenship? Why have radicals since Rousseau argued as though the connection between citizenship and democracy is clear and necessary? The notion of ‘citizen democracy’ pervades Marxist and socialist writing. The case for a necessary connection is not so much historical as philosophical and anthropological. Here, Aristotle’s argument is crucial. For Aristotle, human beings are political beings, animals who individuate themselves and realise their human potentialities only in the ennobling sphere of a politikos bios or political life as the public life of human beings as social beings. Aristotle also argued for the participatory conception of citizenship as the act of ruling and being ruled in turn. Aristotle didn’t put the two conceptions together to argue for a participatory democracy based upon the category of a universal citizenship. Indeed, Aristotle can be found justifying citizenship being restricted to the ‘best’ people, the ‘middle’ people. But his philosophical anthropology is democratic. All human beings have a species need to participate in public life and hence to function as active citizens. Such a society has yet to exist and hence no support will be found for it in history. It is an ideal immanent in human potentiality and its partial realisation in historical practice. It is the telos of history, the end of the free and rational society, the realised public life of self-realising human beings. 

Another problematic aspect of freedom implicates it in the state and civil society dualism that also afflicts modern politics. This dualism has been considered to distinguish the modern from the pre-modern world, with Hegel being the first thinker to raise the distinction to philosophical status. Yet citizenship has always been an ambiguous phenomenon with one foot in public and private camps. The great appeal of citizenship to individuals throughout history has not been the distinction of public office and service to the common good but its potential to serve and secure the private interests of the individual. Time and again one can find struggles to achieve citizen status relation not to notions of the public good to the promotion and protection of business and family interests and other private goods. There has been a continuous struggle through which the public realm has been forced to use citizenship as a means with which to bargain and compromise with private forces. The public realm has always required resources, money, manpower, the loyalty and patriotism of subjects, cooperation, and commitment; individuals in the private realm has always sought security, justice, leadership, the protection of land and occupation. Notions of citizenship as a disinterested public minded virtue are simply irrelevant here. There is a need to embrace a realistic conception of selfhood, one that holds public and private in reciprocal relation to each other so as to avoid the twin evils of selflessness and selfishness. Citizenship is always interested. This does not deny that citizenship is also a form of personal ennoblement in accordance with the lofty ethical goals of philosophy. But lofty ethical goals must be rooted in human nature and the self. The ennobled individual is also the empowered individual, a fully rounded self who engages in public life in order to promote self-realisation not self-abnegation. Avoiding a simple antithesis between private and public makes it possible to avoid bifurcating the individual between the extremes of an undesirable self-interestedness and an impossible disinterestedness. By conceiving politics as creative human self-realisation it becomes possible to establish citizenship and democracy existing and unfolding in necessary connection as part of the long term development of a rational and free public life based upon a universal citizenship. This universal designation means that citizens come to be concerned not only with the well-being of their own particular political society and of all members of that society, but also of all humankind and of nature.

Citizenship eludes simple definition. But that doesn’t mean that the concept is confused or meaningless. Citizenship is a political value that is capable of inspiring political struggle and activity. If a clear statement must be given, then there are good reasons for singling out Aristotle’s conception. In Book 3 of the Politics Aristotle argues that: ‘The good citizen should know and have the capacity both to rule and be ruled, and this very thing is the virtue of a citizen’. Regardless of the extent to which citizenship varies according to time and place, the value of Aristotle’s insistence lies in placing the notion of self-rule under law at its heart. Of course, Aristotle had his own views as to who could and who could not have citizen status. His preference was for the ‘middle’ sort of people, people with enough time and property to be able to participate in public affairs and give independent judgement. The true citizen is empowered and independent, a free person who is not subject to necessity or constraint and who is capable of engaging freely in debate and capable of deciding according to the force of argument rather than the force of interest. Throughout this book, this conception of the active, informed citizen constituting the free and rational society is always close to what is meant by public life and citizenship.

The character of citizenship has altered in time with the changing character of political organisation. The small-scale city-states of early history are clearly very different political entities compared to the large scale nation states of the modern world and one would expect the category of citizenship to register that change. At first, citizenship reflected the character of the city-states in which it arose in being small-scaled, culturally monolithic, hierarchical and discriminatory in places but democratic, communitarian, ethical, spiritual, active, and participatory in others. 

The public in which Aristotle’s true citizen functions and flourishes is ‘organic’.

With the rise of the modern nation state since the eighteenth century, citizenship of a very different order and scale has prevailed. There is a great deal of nostalgia in evidence in delineating this change. The steady decline of civic virtue and the progressive encroachment of property into public life has been a source of regret. There are a number of points to be born in mind here. The notion of civic virtue as disinterested and untainted by private interests of any kind – property, family etc. – is Plato’s ideal and in the practice of the city-states remained an ideal. Aristotle identified a legitimate role for property in his ideal public order and this gave later theorists and jurists the opportunity to reconcile high philosophical purpose with new realities of increasing property ownership. By the time of Aquinas, private property had been reconciled on the legal and philosophical terrain with ethical conceptions of religious and secular life. The new age is defined by the growing size and power of the state and the growing importance of private property in politics. Older conceptions of citizenship survived into this age, but the slowly but surely the terms began to convey different meanings, meanings which were often quite contrary to original meanings.

Citizenship in its inception was practiced in a small-scale, face-to-face environment. Citizens were not all of the people and nor even a majority but were usually a minority who lived within a limited geographical area. Scale is important to this conception. What defined the city is that it could be taken in one view. Within this clearly demarcated area, the citizens knew and knew of each other. Political activity could therefore be quite intense. A citizen was one who participated in this activity and one was not considered a citizen without this active involvement. The health and existence of the community depended upon the active contribution that the relatively few citizens would make, which included military action as well as political activity.

In contrast, the citizenship of the nation state is based upon birth or specified residence in a large geographical area whose size renders face-to-face interaction impossible Citizenship here is universal, or is ideally and feasibly so. The nation state governs according to a constitution which has the approval of the people. Government proceeds with the consent of the governed, though this consent is tacit rather than active. Personal heroism is not a requirement of this citizenship. Instead, public commitment is measured more in monetary terms, as the contribution citizens make as taxpayers to the exchequer. The intense devotion of the few has been supplanted by the slack consent of the many, with the result that modern citizens have lost the possibility for gaining virtue through active participation in governing. 

The paradox to explain is how individuals could demand and be given citizenship as a universal designation, obtain the full range of civil and political rights, gain democracy through universal suffrage, and yet find themselves excluded from political participation, confined to a passive existence and subordinate as never before to an increasingly powerful and remote state. The modern nation state has unified democracy and citizenship and on a scale never before achieved. The ascending theme seems triumphant, with all entitled to participate in electing governments and all protected by a full range of individual rights and liberties. Governments require a popular mandate in order to govern. And yet genuine citizenship in terms of self-rule is non-existent. Citizens have been absorbed into an amorphous general will, not Rousseau’s general will, but the indistinct mass electorate. Gaining individual rights, the individuality has that individuality which the pre-modern philosophers made integral to politics.

It now appears that as the ascending theme of power came to win out in the struggle with the descending theme, the terms of the debate underwent a concurrent change so that the old forms could continue under a new guise. The idea that power originates and is located in the people slowly began to prevail over the top-down conception. But political institutions remained hierarchical as they expanded in size to accommodate ‘the people. From the late Middle Ages, the ‘citizen’ started to be conflated into the ‘subject’. The people were admitted into politics, but not as active political beings capable of participating in government but as passive beings giving consent to their rulers but contributing little else beyond their revenues. The terminology changed but not the political reality – individuals were called citizens but they remained subjects. Even worse, the growing size and scale of the state further increased the distance of the people from political power.

Politics pre-dates the classical Greeks. Hebrews, Egyptians, or other ancient peoples all had politics and have left written or other records. Every human group has developed institutions by which it recognised and characterised its members and made new members. Language, literature, military service, history, religious belief and practice, cooperative farming and husbandry have always served to bind people to each other. But there are strong reasons for starting in Greece. The Greeks were the first to theorise and practice self-government through the participation of citizens, to engage in elaborate and sophisticated attempts to define and apply citizenship, and to theorise and legislate about social and political organisation. Every human grouping has created institutions by which to govern itself and has produced language, culture, morality and religion, and the various other things by which people are bound to one another. The Greeks did all of this to the highest degree and produced philosophers of the greatest stature who were capable of reflecting upon what this experience actually revealed in terms of human nature, community, the nature and possible forms of government, and on the relationship between individuals and groups can be ordered according to law and justice. The Greek achievement can be measured at the level of both theory and practice. A functioning political order produced the political philosophy and not vice versa. The Greek experience was rich and varied and evinced a wide variety of different governments. This experience informed the theoretical work of some of the greatest philosophers who ever lived. The Greeks may not have been the first to develop an organized civil existence. What distinguished the Greeks was their capacity to observe their practice as philosophers, subject their political experience to critical examination, and establish a body of ideas informed by and capable of informing political praxis. That recursive quality makes the Greek legacy an enduring one.










THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAL OF THE CITY


6 THE IDEAL CITY

The contemporary city is caught between ideals and reality, between its historical and philosophical promise on the one hand and an actual world that denies that promise on the other. The city, in a specific sense, no longer exists. The contemporary megalopolis is not a genuine city but is the expression of an overscale urbanism that fails to respect the form of the genuine city. Lewis Mumford referred to this modern city as the ‘anti-city’ for this very reason.

Hall asserts an anti-Mumford thesis: ‘if our concern is for human creativity, size in itself is not necessarily a bad thing .. big places could be great places. Great in terms of the flowering of the human spirit; but not at all, of course, in terms of the quality of the everyday lives of ordinary people’ (Hall 1998:282/3). If the city does not count as ‘great’ in terms of the quality of the everyday lives of its inhabitants, then it does not count as a state at all in the original Greek sense of the term. Hall is right in his terms; Mumford is right in his. It all depends upon what is measured, what is deemed to count in the living of a good life. What it is to not just live but live well as a human being.

Philosophically, the city is the sphere of the human good, freedom and association; this is its rationality as freed from the imperatives of natural necessity. The city is the social realm that individuals require in order to become citizens and hence realise their selfhood in relation to other individuals. The ‘fortunes of the individual have always been bound up with the development of urban society. The city dweller is the individual par excellence’ (Horkheimer 1947:131). Herein lies the philosophical roots and utopian promise of the city. Richard Sennett traces the close relationship between urban design and ideas about the city in the modern world, showing how this relationship charts the crucial steps in cultural history (Sennett 1976; 1990; 1994).

The most distinctive characteristic of urban space is that it exists as an arena for association. This expresses the fact that individuals are not atoms but require a social realm if they are to realise their individuality. A social life is an integral part of self-identity and self-hood. The creation of the city followed a long process through which a civil order crystallised out of particular bonds and associations, of family, clan, tribe, etc. The high economic value of physical space in the city derives from the fact that it is the site of the activities of millions of individuals. These individuals and their activities create the values in the city, not the physical infrastructure and its owners. Only by investing this everyday world of solidarity and reciprocity with political and economic power is it possible to recover the definition of the city as a public good. Market- and property-led regeneration lacks this perspective and, in prioritising the economic factor to the exclusion of social and environmental justice, lacks a sense of the urban as a public life. Regeneration on these terms is unable to stem the tide of urban degeneration. Indeed, market-led regeneration actually worsens the situation of low income individuals living in urban areas in driving them out of the market (Ward 1983:3).

All of this begs the question of how excluded, poor and marginalized groups are to develop their organisational capacities and generate socio-political and cultural resources so as to lead regeneration efforts themselves, sustaining it within a viable community.

Urban planning and regeneration is currently in a vulnerable position, expressing the very social alienation that is institutionalised in the built environment. Urban planning and regeneration have both been turned into an economic development and that not only fails to address the roots of this alienation but instead works within its relations. Urban planning attempts to apply rational technique in pursuit of rational ends in an urban space that is substantively irrational in relation to the true form of the city.

By locating the question of the city in the philosophical roots of the ‘rational’ tradition, identifying the normative component of past concerns with civic urbanity, the intention of this book is not to portray the good city as an abstract or ahistorical utopia. The intention is to do more than project and formulate the vision of the good city out of the philosophical ideal. However much that ideal informs the project, outlining the moral contours of the good city, the realisation of such an urban order depends crucially upon the forms and agencies present in an existing society. The projection of an abstract ideal continually vitiated the experience of town planning, adapting utopian and idealistic visions to a bureaucratic machinery to produce urban failures increasingly rejected by the masses. The preoccupation with a philosophical ideal breaks down in the interface with reality.

The argument of this book is not that the rational conception of the city is automatically, unambiguously or even necessarily translated into the urban fabric. On the contrary, a major concern will be to expose the structures and relations of power that have denied and which continue to deny the direct articulation of reason in the social fabric. The argument will therefore proceed to examine the socio-institutional constraints upon the rational ideal, explaining how the city as a philosophical-anthropological desiratum came to be transformed into a concentrated power entity, a capital city buttressed by instrumental relations. This book examines the philosophical roots of the city and urbanity in order to envisage an urban public realm. But it makes it clear that such a project has to emphasise the grounding of the ideal in the material life processes of society.

The conception that emerges from the ‘rational’ philosophical tradition emphasises the need to restructure society so as to create cities that enable human beings not just to live but to live well, realising and exercising their faculties. This perspective emphasises civic renewal as a collective project in which individuals have the opportunity to assume a citizen identity and regulate the circumstances of their lives. This introduces a concept of citizenship as a social movement from below rather than as the aim of the central state abstracted from social life. The book takes the view that it is impossible to conceive good cities without good citizens and hence addresses the quality of political participation as being crucial to the city. The city is both the cause and the effect of these civic arrangements.


The questions of inequality, domination and exploitation at the level of social relationships are clearly crucial. The good city rests upon social justice, uniting the freedom of each and the freedom of all. This question is not simply one of material conditions but is one of moral import. Towards the end of his life, Lewis Mumford emphasised this point in relation to the ‘breakdown of law and order at the very peak of metropolitan power and prosperity’. Mumford described this eventuality as ‘one of the chronic puzzles of history’. Mumford went on to refer to the ‘moral stability and security’ which characterised the city of his youth, noting that this quality has now been lost, ‘even in such urban models of law and order as London’. For Mumford, contemporary New York recalled Petrarch’s account of fourteenth century Provence in the aftermath of the Black Death, ‘desolate, wolfish, robber infested’ (Mumford 1982:5). Where morality fails, individuals lack the ability to give order to the communities in which they live; there follows a necessary recourse to institutional and legal force. Failure to put the city on a sustainable moral footing means that the phenomenon of urban incarceration is likely to increase as the only alternative to urban collapse.

Quite clearly, the contemporary city lacks an overarching moral code binding each and all in a common project. Peter Hall asks why social progress has left behind, as stubbornly evident as ever, the ‘vicious’ and ‘degenerate’ ‘semi-criminal’ classes who had so concerned the Victorians. Neither planning nor the welfare state has eradicated the problem. Hall is mystified to explain why the problem of the underclass persists, given substantial social and economic progress (Hall 1996:400). The problem is not one of riches and poverty but of a class division that ensures that there will always be a structured inequality at the heart of the social system. This inequality is systematically reproduced and is ineradicable as a matter of material progress.

 The question of social justice in the city needs to be addressed on a moral level buttressed by a critical political economy. As David Harvey comments, it makes little sense to measure the growth of cities as if there were no trade, capital flow, migration (Harvey 1989:9). However, the city cannot be reduced to its socio-economic processes. Always, there is an ‘ideal’ of the city which pertains to the nature of the relations between associating individuals within urban space. There is a principle of the city and this exists as a critical standard by which to evaluate empirical cities. Introducing The City Reader, Le Gates and Stout draw attention to the values and principles underlying the city. ‘We tell our beginning students that the best city planning is utopian, or at best idealistic, and encourage them to envision urban futures that they would like to see’ (Le Gates and Stout 2000: xviii). It is in this spirit that this book proceeds, finding its utopia and ideal in the normative philosophical roots of city studies and applying them within social relations. The argument proceeds from the identification of the city with the process of civilisation, rationalisation and humanisation. The question that this book addresses is that of why the ‘rational’ ideal has only been partially realised and how its realisation could be fully achieved.

The use of philosophical themes and values to inform and orient the direction and content of the argument stems from the conviction that it is still meaningful, even in these globalising, post-fordist and postmodern times, to have a grand narrative of the city based upon a universal notion of the good. Urban voices are not to be suppressed in favour of a ‘rational’ philosophical ideal. The creation of an urban public is achieved through the creative praxis of real urban individuals. The view of reason pursued in this book is one that is constituted through citizen interaction, not the abstract principles of an a priori rationality. The argument in this book seeks to build a conception of the ‘good city’ upon rooted, active ways of life in the city, on actual urban experience.

7 THE PRINCIPLE OF RATIONAL FREEDOM

This section locates a conception of public life in a philosophical tradition which emphasises the communal and corporate character of freedom, situating the individual within a rich socio-institutional fabric which serves as the locus of public activity. This section defines the principle of ‘rational freedom’ – the idea that the freedom of each and the freedom of all is an independent notion entailing a reciprocity, interaction and solidarity between individuals. 

Freedom originated in the agora of classical Greece and continued to be expressed within the corporate matrix of the Middle Ages (Patterson 1991: ix/xvi chs 3 4). The pre-modern concern with constructing a civic order came to be subverted by the relocation of freedom from the public realm of individuals to the private realm of the individual through the institution of private property (Wheeler 1971:75/76 80/2 82/4; Arendt 1973:217 218 221/222). The argument emphasises the difference between the political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke on the one hand and the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle on the other as a difference between classical and modern approaches to public life. Whereas the former base the polity upon property, the latter base the polity upon justice and civilisation (Strauss 1953:178/80 181 190/1 233/4 247).

The value of personal freedom is not an end in itself but requires a supporting infrastructure of a more collective or civil freedom. That is the lesson that the ‘rational’ thinkers have taught since Plato and Aristotle. Plato and Aristotle have been criticised from the liberal individualist perspective as ‘totalitarian’ thinkers for seeking to locate personal freedom within a general moral, institutional and social framework of civil freedom. Plato and Aristotle were concerned to show how personal freedom, unsupported, has a tendency to turn liberty into licence, with socially corrosive consequences in terms of inducing selfishness, alienation from public life, the celebration of greed, and the callous disregard for others in society. Plato and Aristotle were right to criticise these characteristics of personal freedom as being corrosive of freedom. These dangers have continued to plague the history of freedom as though the inevitable counterpart of personal freedom. Despite unprecedented industrial expansion generating riches beyond what is necessary to sustain life, the downside to personal freedom has not only not been overcome but in many respects has been exacerbated. For what has not been put into place is the collective infrastructure which ensures that the freedom of each is necessarily connected with the freedom of all.

The organic conception of freedom affirms the idea that individuals are most free when obtaining their rightful place in, and wholly identify with a purposeful order that is more powerful than the sum of its members. In its hierarchical form, this conception has been the dominant conception of freedom throughout Western history. The individualist liberals condemn Plato as an enemy of freedom, whereas it is Plato’s hierarchically organic conception which has been the most historically prevalent conception of freedom in the West.

The ‘rational’ conception of freedom need not be hierarchical in the Platonic sense but democratic, establishing reciprocal relationships which ensures that the collective framework which connects the self-realisation needs of each and all functions on the basis of active and continuous consent.

If personal freedom without civil freedom is a partial liberty that too often degenerates into licence, then civil freedom can become tyrannical if unconnected with personal freedom. Plato and the other conservative thinkers of ancient Greece were profoundly sceptical of civic freedom and the democratic system of government. Of the many faults that Plato found in democracy, he ignored the crucial one – the tendency to exclusion as against inclusion. Citizenship and the franchise were employed as mechanisms of discrimination and exclusion buttressing the domination of others in society. Robert Michels argued that ‘democracy leads to oligarchy, and necessarily contains an oligarchical nucleus’. Michels is right but did not consider that the oligarchic clique could be not an elite but also a majority of free men as was the case in Athens and the United States of America, the most celebrated democracies of ancient and modern times founded on exclusion and discrimination.

The section locates the urban public sphere in a philosophical tradition that conceptualises freedom differently from the individualistic liberal tradition. The concept of ‘rational freedom’ identifies freedom as relational and as communal, as emerging through the personal interaction and exchange between individuals. Jurgen Habermas defines this principle in terms which emphasise the universal principle of social justice. Freedom, even personal freedom, can be conceived only in ‘internal connection with a network of interpersonal relationships’, in the context of the communicative structures of a community, so that ‘the freedom of some is not achieved at the cost of the freedom of others’. There is a need, then, to ‘analyse the conditions of collective freedom’ so as to remove the ‘potential for Social Darwinist menace’ inherent in individualist liberal philosophies. ‘The individual cannot be free unless all are free, and all cannot be free unless all are free in community. It is this last proposition which one misses in the empiricist and individualist traditions’ (Habermas 1992: 146).

The empiricist and individualist tradition of Anglo-American liberalism upholds a ‘negative’ and ‘protective’ character in having less to do with the relations that individuals have with others than with the power individuals possess to pursue private inclinations over against others. Individualist liberal freedom is thus the absence of external opposition to the individual pursuit of private goals.

The liberal individualist conception identifies the state as a neutral instrument for imposing the civil peace (Levine 1987:26). Without the state as a coercive instrument, the argument goes, society would revert to a condition of the war of all against all, Hobbes’s state of nature characterised by unrestrained appetitive desire. It is no business of the state to be involved in realising the common good; the good is for individuals to work out for themselves. The state is merely a form of protection whose task is to secure order and impose the civil peace upon self-seeking individuals. 

Against this empiricist-individualist conception, the ‘positive’ conception of ‘rational freedom’ possesses democratic possibilities in conceiving power as internal to the demos. Whereas negative liberty applies to the absence of external hindrances in the way of individuals satisfying their desires, positive liberty consists of the removal of restrictions in conceiving those desires in the first place. Berlin criticises that, as a result, positive liberty could lead to the imposition of a code of conduct upon the empirical individual in order to realise the ‘real’ self. And positive liberty does indeed rest upon a code of conduct, a way of life, which it is appropriate for human beings to adhere to if they are to realise their essential powers. Berlin’s concentration upon negative liberty results in a narrow conception of freedom. As the removal of external hindrances to satisfying wants, liberty in the negative conception can be improved only by reducing the scale of wants. The need to recognise a much greater range of human possibilities even induces Berlin, ultimately, to state that the concepts of negative and positive liberty appear to be ‘at no great logical distance from each other’ (Berlin 1969:128 131).

Nevertheless, the distinction between positive and negative liberty does have political implications in generating quite distinct approaches to government and its role in the lives of individuals. There is a clear contrast between empirical-individualist Anglo-American conceptions and Continental conceptions (Sabine 1952; Sartori 1965; 1987). The positive conception of government contains the idea that the pursuit of desire by individuals is subordinated to the guidance of the state as the organisation for the promotion of the common good. Since the common good is the rational end of all individuals, the state is conceived as the ‘rational will’ of all individuals. Public life is thus not a limitation of individual freedom but a component of it. 

The argument seeks to combine the architectonic character of public life deriving from classical roots with the modern concern for individual autonomy. The conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere is an attempt to reappropriate Aristotelian conceptions of an essentialist public life on a philosophical terrain prepared by Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, a terrain radically reconfigured by Marx and developed in the contemporary world by Jurgen Habermas.

Jurgen Habermas has complained of the contemporary absence of constructive models for the new society (Habermas in Carlehedon and Gabriels 1996:7). The foundations of such a model are present in the concept of the urban public sphere. Incorporating the themes and values of ‘rational freedom’ within a conceptual formulation of the associative urban public sphere/s, the intention of this argument is to outline the contours of a self-governing civil order functioning within an extensive public sphere that is autonomous of the central state. Using the philosophical resources of the ‘rational’ tradition, the argument opposes a decentralised discursive mode of rational coordination to the non-discursive forms of alien control exercised by the state and capital. The argument acknowledges that ‘no emancipation is possible in the modern world .. without a strong civil society that can strengthen the public sphere and can provide a haven from and a center of resistance to the Behemoth state’ (Gouldner 1980:371/2). 

The conception of the urban public sphere emphasises the importance of creating and maintaining a dense infrastructure of communities, institutions, organisations and groups within which the individuals composing the demos live and through which they seek the satisfaction of their needs. This reduces the dependency of the demos upon external forms of mediation.

The model of an urban public sphere requires a supporting architecture and a normative framework for self-mediation. Crucial here is to distinguish the urban public from attempts to abolish the state-civil society dualism from above, an approach which encompasses civil society within the abstraction of the state and leads to the bureaucratic regulation of civil society (Habermas 1990:70). Rather, the urban public sphere is oriented towards the absorption of the state by civil society so as to enable an extended public sphere or spheres in which the whole citizenry participate. 

8 THE RATIONAL UTOPIA

Political philosophy proceeds from a conception of the nature of human beings as essentially rational. This concern has political implications. For if human beings are essentially irrational, then a great deal of institutional coercion will be justified in order to impose and maintain social order. If human beings are essentially rational, then it becomes possible to envisage coercion diminishing and social order being generated and reproduced through the reciprocity practised within everyday relationships. This is a political question to the extent that human beings associate in order to form a political community or state concerned with realising their rational nature. The state is invested with the end of enabling human beings to realise their ultimate purpose.

The discussion concerning the ends of the state proceeds to the consideration of the nature of the state. How are the functions of the state to be organised in pursuit of its ends? This raises the question of political authority. On what grounds may the claims made by the state in relation to the individuals composing society be considered legitimate? This question relates to the nature of absolute power, sovereignty, where it originates and resides, where it is located. The question of political obligation addresses the reasons why individuals ought to and can be expected to recognise the commands of the political community as worthy of assent.

Political philosophy answers the question of how human beings ought to live. ‘Philosophy as a rational utopia is always the utopia of a form of life’, concerning how individuals should act, live and think (Heller 1984:20). As a form of life, philosophy has a view of ‘the good’, criticising one form in favour of another (Heller 1984:26). Political philosophy contains an implicit ought-to-be in its concern with the ‘good’ social order (Heller 1984:10/1 11 12/3 20). This is radical in that this ought-to-be implies a potential world that contrasts with the ‘is’ of the actual world (Heller 1984:10). From the perspective of the highest good, the facticity of the existing world is to be abolished as untrue, ungood and inauthentic (Heller 1984:22). 

Heller interprets Marx in terms of this quest for philosophy as a rational utopia. Rejecting the atomistic bourgeois perspective, Marx takes the standpoint of humanity as a social entity, knowledge constituted through the unity of the true and the good. Marx thus launches a total critique of an existing form of life from the point of view of a form of life beyond relationships of subordination and superordination. The realisation of species essence, so that individuals become truly human beings, means that the present must be abolished as not truly rational (Heller 1984:142).

The principle of ‘rational freedom’, developed in terms of an emancipatory interaction, generates both a critique of the existing political and social order and a normative vision of public life as the good society. This vision incorporates the principle of public community as the supreme embodiment of the collective life of a people and rests on the idea of a common good and a universal humanity. The ‘rational’ conception of freedom implies that it could be possible to abolish coercion and even law in the regulation of human affairs. This envisages the internal moral coordination of human affairs through the coincidence of the individual and the general will. For liberals, the existence of formal political institutions is crucial since social order depends upon rules and procedures (Collins 1982). However, the harmonious society envisaged by rational philosophy is predicated upon legal order being dissolved naturally and spontaneously through citizens internalising the rational ethic embodied in law and voluntarily obligating themselves within reciprocal relationships. This does not destroy the rational process of order but preserves it within everyday moral practices. It is precisely because these laws are laws of nature, embodying the rational nature of human beings, that they are open to internalisation. The potential for the dissolution of legal-institutional order is contained in the very principles of that order.

Antonio Gramsci’s city of the future is pertinent here. Gramsci’s conception of ‘regulated society’ envisages civil society coming to encompass political society so that the coercive moment of politics is eliminated in the emergence of the ethico-rational community (Golding 1992:118). The coming of regulated society implies ‘the disappearance of political society’ so that ‘the conception of necessity is superseded by the concept of freedom’ (Gramsci 1971:382).

Gramsci’s perspective suggests how philosophy as a ‘rational utopia’ connects with the concept of the urban public realm situated on the terrain of civil society. Gramsci’s ‘regulated society’ refers to a society that has achieved the internal coordination of its affairs as against the external systemic-institutional regulation. Society regulates itself by means of self-organising and self-governing forces within rather than being regulated from without. This is a self-organising social order that integrates the rational principle of the state into its everyday activities so that the coercive element of the state withers away.

We are still on the terrain of the identification of State and government – an identification which is precisely a representation of the economic-corporate form, in other words of the confusion between civil society and political society. For it should be remarked that the general notion of State includes elements which used to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion). In a doctrine of the State which conceives the latter as tendentially capable of withering away and of being subsumed into regulated society, the argument is a fundamental one. It is possible to imagine the coercive element of the State withering away by degrees, as ever more conspicuous elements of regulated society (or ethical State or civil society) make their appearance.

Picking up on the ‘utopian’ aspect of normative political philosophy, particularly the notion that human beings as rational beings are capable of supplying the law for themselves, Gramsci criticises the existing coercive function of law as the repressive and negative aspect of the state’s activity, which should be chiefly positive and concerned with civilising its people (Germino 1990:241).


Depicting regulated society as ‘ethical State or civil society’, Gramsci explicitly relates his conception of the social order of the future with the ‘rational’ philosophical tradition.





This vision of the stateless society does not entail the end of politics, as liberal critics argue (Polan 1984; Schwarz 1996), but is actually the realisation of politics. There is a need to separate ‘the political’ from the particular institutional forms through which the political is practised. In making a distinction between state and government, John Hoffman is able ‘to identify within state centred societies activities which do not, in and of themselves, have to be underpinned by a monopoly of legitimate force’ (Hoffman 1995:4). The state acts illegitimately when it employs force and governmentally when it regulates order through relationships. On these premises, democracy is not a form of the state but an anti-statist concept based upon the empowerment of the demos (Hoffman 1995:13). Liberal critics make the mistake of identifying politics with the formal sphere of the state, a view which stems from the separation of the state from civil society. This separation robs civil society of the political and governing significance that it once had, locking politics away in the attic of the state. Overcoming this state-civil society dualism means that the depoliticisation of contemporary civil society can be abolished in favour of the repoliticisation of civil society (Sassoon 1987:223). The concept of the urban public sphere connects this idea of government as the peaceful regulation of affairs exercised through social relationships with the case made for a rational and moral freedom in ‘rational’ political philosophy. And this entails the end of the state (Levine 1987).

Gramsci envisaged the ‘construction within the shell of political society of a complex and well-articulated civil society, in which the single individual is self-governing, without this self-government coming into conflict with political society but, on the contrary, becoming its normal continuation and organic completion’ (Gramsci 1971). The ‘new relationship between State and society cannot be fixed by a set of legal rules but has to be rooted in a new concept of politics based on a changing reality in which the whole of the citizenry come to participate in a full sense in political activity’ (Sassoon 1987:225).

Gramsci’s contribution to the concept of the urban public sphere can be appreciated by posing the question as to whether democracy can survive and be extended by a system of guarantees of formal rules and formal structures, i.e. within the narrowly conceived realm of constitutional practice, or whether the maintenance and expansion of democracy requires a consideration of the conditions and institutions of civil society which can no longer thought of separately from political society? (Sassoon 1987:226/7). Gramsci affirms the latter view against the former in his conception of ‘regulated society’ as embodying the themes and values of ‘rational’ philosophy within the terrain of social reality. The transformation that Gramsci envisages through the realisation of the rational ideal involves the abolition of class and coercion through the transcendence of exclusion in favour of inclusion. This places social justice at the heart of the politics of the good. This overcomes the dualism between centres of privilege and power on the one hand and peripheries of marginalisation and oppression on the other.

Gramsci extrapolated the ‘city of the future’ from the ideals of rational political philosophy, seeking to embed a genuine universality in an inclusive public. Gramsci explicitly rests the city of the future upon social justice in rejecting the division between core and periphery as ‘an abstraction, not a reality’.





The purpose of the city council or government is to serve the general interest, the good of the whole city. If anything is amiss in any particular sector of the city, the whole city will be affected. It follows that any particular wrong is the concern of the whole city. Further, where one sector of the city is privileged over other sectors, the city council should be concerned to eradicate this privilege in the cause of justice rather than create a counter-veiling privilege in reaction. Socialisation to deal with the problems of division caused by capital cannot be pursued through the bureaucratic authority of the state. Rather than ‘create two vampires’, the state alongside capital, the objective should be ‘to kill the one vampire now sucking the blood of the majority’.

Gramsci’s argument is normative as well as spatial. He is pursuing an inclusive politics of justice that overcomes the split between centre and periphery. Whereas the old dualistic politics rests upon relations of superordination and subordination and results in the entrenchment and escalation of the privileges for each group involved, the new inclusive politics abolishes such privilege. Gramsci relates the overcoming of privilege to the abolition of the ‘one vampire’ of capital without thereby creating another ‘vampire’ in the form of the state. The systematic production and reproduction of privilege is attacked in the name of justice as a universal category. The end is to achieve inclusive social relations sustaining a politics that is applicable and available to all. 





‘Tutti’ is the most inclusive word that Gramsci could have used, applying to all individuals equally without regard to distinction. Gramsci seeks to construct the future city on the basis of the knowledge that all individuals wish to participate in freedom. Freedom embraces both material and spiritual aspects of the human ontology and is enhanced by being shared between all rather than being denied by some to others. Freedom is a joint enterprise that connects each and all in mutually beneficial relations. Freedom requires a supporting architecture. True freedom, as the birthright of all human beings, will be enjoyed fully by that privileged some only when it is enjoyed by all. Gramsci is therefore clear that the distinction between the ‘few’ (pochi) and the ‘many’ (molti) has to be overcome if freedom is to be realised in the city. Gramsci thus defines the ‘City of the Future’ as an inclusive order that ensures that the freedom of each individual is coexistent with and conditional upon the freedom of all individuals. ‘All men have this aspiration .. to become proprietors of freedom, of a freedom that is secure and transmissible [to others]. If liberty is the highest good, it is natural to seek to have one’s loved ones share in it, just as it is natural to accept sacrifices for oneself to create this liberty to insure that one’s loved ones will enjoy it, even if one cannot do so oneself’ (Gramsci 1982:866/70). 

A new urban politics is oriented towards replacing the dualism of centre and periphery with an inclusive society; this is achieved by the oppressed, marginalized and excluded sectors moving in on the centre, expanding this centre and absorbing it into their sphere. This is the era of human emancipation in general, achieving a complete humanity beyond class designation. Human emancipation is the triumph of inclusiveness, creating social relationships connecting each with all and all with each. This is more than the victory of an oppressed class in the class struggle but represents triumph over class division itself to achieve the universal public sphere.

The Origins Of The Rational City

Public or civic freedom is based upon the capacity of individuals to participate in the collective affairs and governance of the community. The individual is free in the sense of belonging to and having a recognised place within a community, and plays an active role in the way it is run. Civic freedom is therefore a public freedom in implying the existence of a political community, with clearly demarcated responsibilities, rights and obligations for every citizen. It does not necessarily imply a particular form of political government. The assumption that civic freedom necessarily entails democracy is erroneous. In ancient Athens, where democracy originated, citizenship was restricted to certain sections of the male population, and excluded women and resident aliens. Republican Rome defined citizenship even more exclusively, restricting it to male aristocrats.

The essential requirement of civic freedom is the existence of a politically centralized community with governmental institutions. This is something that took millennia to develop. The discussion starts with ancient Greece not because the Greeks were the first to create a political community of this kind. The importance of ancient Athens stems from the fact that it was the first political entity to combine a centralised polity with a participative citizen-based politics. This combination formed the necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence and viability of democracy.

Freedom comprises a number of interlinked elements: the personal (individualism, individual liberty, autonomy), the public (statist, collectivist, legal, government), and civic (democratic, urban, social, civil).

Personal freedom, at its simplest, signifies that an individual is free from the constraint or coercion of another individual in acting in a certain way in pursuit of a desired goal. The element of reciprocity in this value is of the most elementary kind. The individual is free to do as s/he likes within the limits of the desire to do likewise on the part of other individuals. Isaiah Berlin attempted to give this elementary definition of personal freedom the status of philosophical truth by making a distinction between negative and positive conceptions of liberty. The political significance of Berlin’s definition the importance the work has assumed far beyond its intellectual merits. Berlin’s two liberties is a manifestly political attempt to restrict this personal freedom to a negative meaning compatible with individualist liberal and the minimal state as against more positive, public notions of freedom in which government is actively concerned with the good of its citizens. This public conception is one that we see in the ancient and classical tradition, carried over by the likes of Plutarch (Plutarch, "Solon" 1960: 57). 

Philosophically confused and sociologically illiterate, Berlin’s two liberties forces us to consider just why individualist liberal philosophy should be so sensitive and feel so threatened on this question. The penetrating analytical mind of Bertrand Russell clearly identified the social and philosophical confusion at the heart of Berlin’s argument, pointing out that ‘the absence of obstacles to the realization of desires” implies, in both logical and practical sociological terms, “the attainment of a condition for the satisfaction of our impulses’ (Plutarch, "Solon," in The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives, trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert (New York: Penguin Books, 1960), pp 56-59; M. M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1977 pp 210-17).

There is a potential for personal freedom to degenerate into the licence of the individual doing what they like regardless of the wishes of other individuals. Liberty as licence is the inclination backed by the power to act as one pleases, irrespective of the wishes of others. With personal freedom there was always the check of the wishes and power of other individuals. Personal freedom is the therefore the ability to do as one pleases insofar as one can given the wishes and power of others. All individuals desire freedom in order to satisfy their impulses. The point is, however, is that these impulses often involve conflict between individuals. Individuals frequently desire more than their fair share and ‘desire to control not only their own lives but also the lives of others’ (Mondolfo 1952: 5). Russell excludes such impulses in his attempt to define a philosophically pure, entirely logical conception of freedom. But theory and practice cannot be divorced from each other. Any definition of freedom that is worthy of consideration must be sociologically and historically rich and meaningful. Philosophy can show why asserting liberty as the absence of obstacles before one’s own will and the imposition of restraints upon the will of others is contrary to logical and ethics. The politics of every time and place shows examples of powerful groups asserting their liberty as licence whilst subjecting the less powerful to constraint and satisfying themselves that such an arrangement constitutes freedom for one and all. The view that this is inherently wrong stems from the protests of those such to the licence and constraint of others and from philosophical attempts to conceive freedom in a general or universal sense. Personal freedom as licence means that the autonomous individual possesses the capacity to empower others to do as they please with others with less power or to subject the less powerful to restriction. This conception of freedom is always concerns power and is always relative in terms of holdings of power. The challenge is to moralise power by establishing the relation of each to all on a rational basis.

The Greek Origins of Freedom
On a philosophical level, this book discusses citizenship in relation to the work of Plato and Aristotle. There is a need to understand, however, that citizenship had been a functioning institution, practised in many ways, for hundreds of years before Plato and Aristotle raised the category to philosophical status. Citizenship had been contested and modified continually before the philosophers set to work.

There is no mystery as to why the uniquely Western institution of citizenship should emerge from the Greek city-state world. Ancient Greece was composed of many small fortified places, each surrounded by countryside and possessing some tutelary deity, ruling families, traditions, and cultures. From the end of the seventh to the early fourth century BC, ancient Athens underwent a number of revolutions, the upshot of which was to transform the history of the West.

The first major transformation was economic and concerned the creation of a preindustrial economy of independent family farms and large peri-urban estates. These were focused upon an export oriented mining and urban craft economy and were occupationally dominated by slave and ex-slave labour.
A profound social transformation marked the second revolution. There are two aspects to this change. In the first aspect, a relatively large slave population emerged to an extent that it could support the aristocratic, and a good part of the nonfarm, population of a society. In the second aspect, the majority of a population emancipated itself from ties of economic and social dependency on its ruling class.
The third major transformation was political and refers to the creation of the democratic polity in Athens, entailing the full participation of all adult male members in the affairs of the political community.

The fourth revolution involved a fundamental change in human thought. The key here is the discovery of rationality as the unique characteristic of the human species and the promotion of rationality as an end in itself. This discovery led to the development of philosophy and the social and moral sciences. Human beings developed the intellectual tools to become conscious of their existence, to learn from and in turn to inform their practice.

The fifth revolution refers to the social construction of freedom as the central value.

These developments involved a shift from the palace to the agora, the market place which formed the centre of the local community. From this shift emerged the Greek city-state (Vernant 1982: 51).

Towards the end of the seventh century BC, class struggle broke out on a wide scale in many parts of Greece, including Athens (De Ste. Croix 1981: 279. However, the dangers of relying too heavily on these poems should always be borne in mind. (On Theognis, see Figueira and Nagy eds., 1985, esp. chaps. 1, 2, and appendix. See Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 206-7).

The introduction and spread of literacy signalled the growing importance of culture in mediating social existence. This development enabled the codification of laws, starting with Draco from the middle of the seventh century. These early laws may have been oppressive, or ‘written in blood’ (The remark of Demades came much later. Plutarch, "Solon," 1960: 59) as Demades remarked, but they were still laws and they still set limits. Most importantly, the codification of the customs of Athens established a measure with which to assess later judgements. The expansion of culture, through law and language, is highly significant. The late eighth and seventh centuries witnessed an increase in the power of speech over other instruments of power. At this point, the art of politics became increasingly the management of language. Aided by the introduction and spread of literacy, a “double impulse toward democratisation and disclosure” was soon underway. “Greek culture took form by opening to an ever-widening circle – and finally to the entire demos – access to the spiritual world reserved initially for an aristocracy of priests and warriors’ (Vernant 1982: 51). These developments entailed profound and enduring changes: “Knowledge, values and mental techniques, in becoming elements of common culture, were themselves brought to public view and submitted to criticism and controversy” (Vernant 1982: 51).

The codification of the laws, the citywide generalisation of religious cults and “the transformation of secret wisdom into a body of public truths” (Vernant 1982: 54; Harris 1989) together signified the gradual supplanting of scribal literature by rational standards common to all. 

It was not manual labour as such that the Greeks did not respect but the lack of independence that such work entailed. The distinction that the Greeks made between manual labour and independent labour is the crucial point to grasp (Finley 1981, chap. 7). This distinction certainly applies up to around the middle of the fifth century. The emergence of an extensive slave system during the sixth and fifth centuries minimised the impact of this important distinction. The expansion of the slave economy served to encourage a more general contempt for all manual labour, independent or not, in the urban areas (Mosse 1969: 25-30).

Throughout the sixth century there was a continual struggle waged by the Attic lower classes to expand the limited gains achieved through the Solonian reforms. Their principal demand was for a redistribution of land.

The development of Greek society involved not just the expansion of power and resources but their contestation between groups and classes. At this point citizenship emerged and became an important issue. The material conditions behind the emergence of citizenship are important to emphasise in order to check overly-idealistic and ethical accounts. The category of citizenship is bound up with material interests and signifies a contest concerning inclusion and exclusion. The connection of the struggle over citizenship with the expansion of power and resources would occur again as Rome grew into a proto-imperial power. The same thing happened after the late eleventh century, when the increasing commercial and political importance of the city-states of Europe forced governments to decide which of their inhabitants deserved to participate in the new wealth and power through being conferred with citizen status. With respect to ancient Greece, as the people who had gained wealth through trade or primitive manufacture came to demand political participation, so citizenship became the mechanism by which land and privilege was apportioned.

Not that the expansion of wealth meant that the Greeks had solved the fundamental problem of subsistence. On the contrary, Greek material existence remained precarious. If citizenship developed against the background of expanding wealth and power for some within conditions of scarcity. Inevitably, citizenship functioned as a mechanism of exclusion, discrimination and distribution. There was constant dispute over the requirements for citizenship, the terms changing many times. Confronted time and again with material hardship, rulers had to continually consider the category of citizenship in terms of the question as to who should and who should not be rewarded. 

Citizenship therefore became a central political issue as a result of changing material circumstances. From the first, it was used as a means of discriminating between groups according to who has most power. Which person had what privilege was determined by their importance to the state. There is no historical support for an ideal conception of citizenship. The category was infused with material considerations and politics from the start. Citizenship was integral to the politics of leadership contests, faction fighting, votes, struggles, goals, the distribution or denial of rewards. The slightest modification of the terms of citizenships had implications of which rulers were well aware. These implications were military, referring to sources of manpower, but social and political, determining the extent to which a specific class or interest group could press their demands to shape city policy. The activities of rulers indicates that approached citizenship in these terms. Every alteration in the law determining who does and does not belong to the citizen body was associated with a corresponding change in the constitution of the polis.

Demosthenes argued that ‘A city’s laws are its character’. This claim emphasises the moral, cultural, and legal environment which shapes the character of all individuals within it (Demosthenes 1935: 206-9).

James H Oliver is concerned to show the religious basis of the Greek invention and promotion of the value of freedom. He does this when detailing the achievements of Solon:





One can accept the importance of this religious factor. However, the principal factor is material. The Athenian ruling class extended political rights and citizen status to the formerly semi-enslaved masses in response to the growing threat of revolt on the part of Greek farmers who were being reduced to domestic and foreign slavery. The process continued with the struggle of the small Athenian farmers for greater economic equality and the enslavement of non-Greeks in the Attic homeland. The awareness of and desire for freedom arose not only among the citizens of Athens but also among those excluded from citizenship. The fact that slavery gave the Athenian ruling class an alternative labour force meant that increasing numbers of native Greeks achieved independence. Slavery did not only make large numbers of native Greeks independent; it also made the ruling class independent of native free labour. This had political implications. Independence gave native Greeks power in one sense but removed it in another. Material independence of the ruling class meant that native Greeks had lost their leverage power over the ruling class. With the ruling class turning to slave labour, no longer could native Greeks force political concessions by threatening to withdraw their labour. In the continuing struggle for political rights and a greater share of resources, newly independent native Greeks had to appeal to renegade members of the aristocracy. The pressing of a distinctive social and class identity against the ruling elite and the increasing civic participation of native Greek elements terrified the more traditional aristocrats, who began to worry for their own freedom. The threat from below served to foster an increasing consciousness of freedom on the part of the aristocrats. From this soul searching emerged a definition of freedom as power and political equality, but only for members of their class. ‘The concept was transferred from the private sphere when in the class struggles the victory of the other party was described as slavery, so that freedom came to be appreciated from the point of view of home politics’, rather than just external defeat (Pohlenz 1966: 9). To the masses, freedom also meant power and equality, but as extended to class unequals rather than being limited to class equals.

Long before it has been raised to theoretical and philosophical status, freedom, as social value, was already known and established by the end of the sixth century BC. Particularly important here is that way that personal freedom was developed into civic freedom through the agency of the male small farmer in their struggles with the wealthy large scale slaveholders.

The concerns expressed about the resident alien in The Suppliant Maidens increased in the years immediately after the production of this play. 

9 THE IDEAL OF POLIS DEMOCRACY
The developments of 450 BC are instructive. With the most generous expansion of democracy for free native Athenians, with individuals now being paid for the performance of civic duties for the first time in history, came further restrictions upon the requirements of citizenship. Whereas previously just one’s father had had to be a citizen in order for a free person to become a citizen, now both parents had to be citizens. This development makes the point that there is no necessary relation between democracy and citizenship and that both categories are politically contested and this struggle determines the balance between inclusion and exclusion according to wealth and power. The high point of democracy as civic participation was also the high point of the exclusiveness of citizenship. Why this should be so is easily understood: ‘part of the idea may have been a selfish desire to limit citizenship to as few people as possible, now that it brought greater material advantages’ (Hornblower 1983: 44-5). The result was that it ‘made the Athenian citizen body into a closed group, inaccessible from outside, which it remained until the late third century BC’ (Davies 1983: 73).

In terms of physical power, Persia should have been able to destroy the Greek city-states easily. Xerxes demanded to know why the Greeks were willing to resist against such apparently irresistible force. Demaratus explained that ‘poverty is my country’s inheritance from of old, but valor she won for herself by wisdom and the strength of law. By her valour Greece now keeps both poverty and bondage at bay’ (Herodotus 1973: 475). How could a country that idealised freedom raise soldiers who were strong and obedient, Xerxes asked. ‘They are free – yes’, Demaratus replied, ‘but not entirely free; for they have a master, and that master is Law, which they fear much more than their subjects fear you’ (Herodotus 1973: 471). Demaratus’ words celebrate aristocratic valor and wisdom committed to the protection of the civic community from external bondage and internal liberty as achieved through the submission of all to the rule of law.

Throughout the centuries, Athens functioned as the ideal model of civic freedom and democracy. This model is an overly idealised portrayal of Athens at a particular time in its history. In truth, the dominant form in ancient Athens was one of aristocratic freedom. At the time, the intellectual and political elites of Athens in the late fifth century were reactionaries, vociferous critics of democracy.

There is a tendency to think of the polis as having an exclusively urban character. This is encouraged by the definition of the polis as a city-state and the conception of the city as an urban environment. The truth is that the ancient polis possessed an intrinsically rural character. Certainly, the polis did have its urban centres. Whilst many citizens lived near the agora, most Athenians lived scattered over the countryside and came to urban centre only to do political, religious or other business. And Athens was the most urban of the city-states. Other places had a much smaller proportion of its inhabitants engaged in mercantile, artisanal, intellectual, and similar activities. The point is that Greek citizenship, in both its celebrated Athenian and Spartan forms, is not an exclusively urban product but inheres in the countryside. Many of the key characteristics of citizenship which have endured throughout the ages reflect geographical considerations that are independent of the political organisation of the polis.

And not only was citizenship not universal, it was not egalitarian either. Citizenship developed along hierarchical lines, arranged according to the ownership of land, proper tribal membership, or regional residence. In other words, distinctions of birth and/or registration were built into citizenship.. The introduction and development of citizenship proceeded through rulers having to distinguish the loyal and worthy members of the community from the rest. With the expansion of new forms of wealth, this became an ever more pressing issue. Rulers therefore needed to know these details in order to determine who was to be given citizen status and hence receive the full benefits of city-state membership. 

Pericles, from the traditional nobility, and Sophocles, the son of a wealthy arms manufacturer, throughout the rise of Athens to becoming an imperial and urban slave power (Thucydides, esp. 2.34-65; and Plutarch 1960, chap. 6. On both men, see Ehrenberg 1954). They represented the two sides of the elite but were actively committed in serving the political and cultural life of the democratic state. They were well aware of the dangers of democracy, and what distinguished the democratic conception of freedom. In the funeral oration, given at the end of the first year of the Second Peloponnesian War, Pericles sought to reconcile the various elements of freedom, public and private, with each other for the greater civil good. Before the oration, the elements had not only been separated from each other but had frequently been in antagonistic relation. Pericles’ funeral oration is distinctive for conceiving the word freedom in terms which combine all the basic components of the value to create a general value. All the elements of freedom recognisable in the modern world are present in Pericles’ statement.

The first element that Pericles incorporates is civic freedom: ‘Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses. No one, so long as he has it in him to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity because of poverty’ (Patterson 20).

This freedom also entailed personal freedom: ‘And just as our political life is free and open, so is our day-to-day life in our relations with each other. We do not get into a state with our next door neighbour if he enjoys himself in his own way, nor do we give him the kind of black looks which, though they do no real harm, still do hurt people’s feelings’ (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.37) ‘I declare that in my opinion each single one of our citizens, in all the manifold aspects of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and owner of his own person [self-sufficient], and do this moreover, with exceptional grace and exceptional versatility’ (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.41) [ie without suspicion]

What is important to note here is the way that personal freedom is defined as the antithesis of slavery. The individual is personally free in being the ‘owner of his own person’ [literally “body”] whereas the slave lacks such self-ownership.

Pericles, an aristocrat of ‘majestic bearing, of course incorporates aristocratic freedom in the generalised conception. He favourably compares the Athenian version of arête with the Spartan version based on autocracy, secrecy, and a restrictive educational system. Pericles’ point is that there is a distinctive form of courage and manliness, one based not on fear as in Sparta but on openness, connecting to civil and personal freedom (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.39). The Athenian way is to meet danger ‘voluntarily, with an easy mind, instead of with a laborious training, with natural rather than with state-induced courage’ (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.39).

Pericles has sought to define a generalised freedom that incorporates civil and personal elements whilst nevertheless retaining a place for the old aristocratic freedom. Pericles is aware of the extent to which these differing conceptions of freedom can contradict each other at certain points and hence that the generalised conception is always capable of imploding. He is also aware that one the elements of freedom must dominate. In the first half of the speech, Pericles accepts on an intellectual plane that civic freedom is fundamental. In the second half, however, Pericles takes the elitist position in arguing that aristocratic freedom should dominate. Thucydides described Pericles as an aristocrat who ‘could respect the liberty of the people and at the same time hold them in check’, and this does indeed seem to be the character of the funeral oration – the first in a long line of attempts to achieve a freedom and a democracy that was safe for the elites and preserved existing relations of rule and power. Thucydides adds that ‘in what was nominally a democracy, power was really in the hands of the first citizen’ (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.65). The rulers were having to accommodate an irresistible democratisation and shift their categories and conceptions accordingly. If a managed change is not delivered from above, fundamental changes in society will drive a fundamental social transformation from below. The principle that guided Athenian social life and change from the sixth century was the extension ‘downwards, to the rest of the descent-group, [of] the applicability and appropriateness of aristocratic life-styles and values’ (Davies 1978: 37).

For Loraux, it is not so much what Pericles’ says that is important than the ambiguous way he says it or, indeed, what he doesn’t say. Pericles speaks of government for the people but not of government by the people. Pericles is carefully silent on the idea that the demos could and should participate in government. Loraux concludes that the funeral oration ‘draws widely on the repertoire of arête and makes aristocratic democracy the very symbol of unity’ (Loraux 1986: 199). The celebration of values of freedom and democracy within institutions that significantly bias their practice is nothing new. Similarly, nostalgic rejections of modern liberal political institutions and values in favour of ancient and classical concepts suffers from the assumption that these forms equated simply with freedom and democracy and active, universal citizenship. That society has yet to be achieved and exists as an ideal within past practice. Loraux notes the striking absence in ancient Athens of a democratic way of speaking about democracy. Pericles’ funeral oration amounts to ‘an aristocratic eulogy’ on democracy (Loraux 1986: 172-220). Pericles incorporates civic and personal freedom in a generalised conception of freedom in which the elitist-legal-statist style of aristocratic freedom dominates.

In this political reconstruction of freedom in response to fundamental social transformation, the nature of democratisation becomes a significant issue. How much changes through terms being widened or expanded? There seems to have been democratisation to the extent that the aristocratic ethos, arête, the manly Greek virtue which alone is free, has been made accessible to all. But there has been a mutual exchange which, in a sense, has empowered the rulers and disempowered the demos. Freedom in civil and personal meanings is no longer exclusive to the demos. From this perspective, Pericles’ funeral oration represents an attempt to achieve a generalised conception of freedom that would be of service to the ruling class and which the subordinate classes could find acceptable. Freedom is now a value common to all classes. Confusion arises here. All sides proclaim freedom from this moment on. The subordinate classes composing the demos still struggled for freedom, of course, and would still find themselves struggling even after they had been granted freedom by the ruling class. There are different emphases and elements being contested here within the generalised conception of freedom to which all subscribe. Which element dominates depends upon the control of meaning in relation to class and struggle. 

Pericles (495-429) is noted in his political career for modifying the Cleisthenean constitution on citizenship. In 451-450 he passed a law which made citizenship dependent upon the Athenian origin of both parents. Previously it had depended upon the Athenian origin of the father. Aristotle condemns Pericles for this act. From this point on, Aristotle criticises, ‘it was always the common men rather than the better men who were eager to participate in drawing the lot for duty in the law courts’ (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 2.37). A number of reasons are given to explain Pericles’ action, from reducing the costs arising from paying citizens on state service, to concern for young Athenian women seeking husbands, for racial purity, or to boost the prestige of Athenian citizenship by making it rarer (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 2.37.). The various reasons offered indicate that Pericles is alert to the utility of citizenship as an instrument of social or political control and how it can be manipulated by legal definition. 


Pericles understood the benefits accruing from citizen status, understood its significance with respect to status and allegiance, and was alive to its symbolic meaning. All of this is apparent in the funeral oration. Such points temper the image of Pericles as a noble man of principle as distinct from a politically astute and sensitive character.

Pericles is well aware of the tension between public and private interests. Pericles praises those who have not been ‘enervated by wealth’ but who put public service before private advantage. His target is personal, self-indulgent, material existence. By the end of the Peloponnesian War, many citizens were asking not what they could do for the polis but rather what the polis could do for them. Citizens were competing for paid spots on the juries and places in the fleet, in search of a guaranteed income. The ‘social problem’ of Greek education has been defined as ‘how to repress individualism and develop the character of every citizen on one communal model’ (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 2.43.).

From here arises the tendency to idealise citizenship as disinterested public service. And there seems to be an ideological purpose at work here, the celebration of the value in terms of public service serving to conceal its restricted definition. The restrictive Periclean definition of citizenship, associated with legislation aimed against immigration and the claiming of citizen status by aliens, is the reality behind the idealisation of citizenship as a value. During the latter half of the fifth century, Athenians were becoming increasingly protective of the achievements and material rewards of their society as against those who wished to claim a share. Were those who had not participated in Athens rise by undertaking the full range of citizen obligations to be granted access to the honours and riches now available through citizen identity. The idea of citizenship as a form of contract was lurking behind these disputes. Would newcomers be as prepared as the native born to commit themselves to the polis? And would newcomers comprehend the complex socio-institutional and spiritual infrastructure of Athens, its rich and elaborate civic fabric of interwoven political institutions, religious festivals, theatrical offerings, and military responsibilities? The concern of Plato and Aristotle to establish the proper size of the perfect polis is in part related to this conservative defence of the status quo in times of change. Hippodamus and other town planners had been exploring the question from this angle long before the philosophers. These concerns reveal a certain closing of ranks among dominant groups who were increasingly aware of the extent to which the increase in the power of the demos constituted a threat to their own power.

Citizenship originated in the ancient world as a principle of exclusive inclusiveness and this principle was intensified as the metic group expanded in numbers and material power. This distinction was all important as Athenian citizens came to be confronted by the increasingly wealthy metic (Whitehead 1977:121). For the Athenian citizens, civic freedom was the primary value and was placed higher than personal freedom. To the freedman and other metics, denied civic freedom, personal freedom was the primary value. 

Human beings as they ought to be and public life as it ought to be were the very stuff of political philosophy in the pre-modern age going back to classical Greece. The first point to make here is that Athens was the first in many of the fields that have been at the core of western civilisation throughout the centuries – the terms and practices of politics, the structure and concerns of philosophy, the forms of architecture, science etc. Lewis Mumford claimed that the Athenians did more in two centuries than the Egyptians had achieved in two millennia. To a very large extent, the world has been Greek since. Certainly, these achievements have been at the core of European life in all the centuries since. (Hall 1998:24). It is well known that the Greeks invented democracy. However, the Greek contribution to politics and philosophy cannot be reduced to this. Democracy was just one form of government that the Greeks pioneered, theorised and practised. Democracy means rule of the people, the demos. But democracy – or anything else in Greek political philosophy – cannot be abstracted from the polis, the Greek unit of social and moral life, order and association.

First and foremost, the Greeks gave the world philosophy. The classical Greeks were a people who, although not very numerous, not very powerful, not very well organised, ‘had a totally new conception of what human life was for, and showed for the first time what the human mind was for’ (Kitto 1951:1). The Greek philosophers asked an apparently but deceptively simple question that has proved of enduring significance and which the world stops asking at its peril: ‘What is the proper way for human beings to live?’ How that question is answered – indeed whether the question is even asked at all – determines the kind of society in which one lives.

Both Plato and Aristotle identify politics with a concern with the good life for human beings. Before going into the specific philosophical conceptions, this section examines the polis as an historical institution with a view to defining a public life that is constituted by a plurality of communities and identities and is empowered from below. 

Politics and philosophy were born in the agora, the citizen assembly and market place in Athens (Heller 1984; Doyle 1963:ch 2). ‘Most modern political ideals – such … as justice, liberty, constitutional government and respect for the law – or at least the definitions of them, began with the reflection of Greek thinkers about the institutions of the city state’ (Sabine 1937: 3). Finley presents the Athenian polis offers an historical example of an expansive public life that may serve as a model for emancipatory urban governance in the modern world. The polis was founded upon a ‘sovereign assembly .. open to every citizen’ and convened at least 40 times a year. The polis made a virtue of its amateurish principle. The fact that it was managed by a rotating council of 500, with the chair selected by lot and sitting for just one day, checked the bureaucratic principle. The extensive use of selection of lot throughout the institutions of governance indicated the high value placed upon selfhood as something obtained through participation. Free individuals possess politike techne, the skill and techniques of the statesman, the ‘art of political judgement’ (Finley 1973:18). 


These political arrangements reflect a philosophical anthropology. The classical conception defines humanity as a social and cooperative species, possessed of philia (friendship) and dike (justice). This points to public life as a solidaristic conception in which each and all unite for purposes of individuation. Human beings are by nature inclined to live in a polis. These characteristics of citizenships imply a controlled self-hood, a ‘self-control’ that makes community life possible (Finley 1973:29/30).

Importantly, the polis made justice integral to its mode of life. ‘It was the common assumption of the Greeks that the polis took its origin in the desire for justice. Individuals are lawless, but the polis will see to it that wrongs are redressed. But not only by an elaborate machinery of state-justice, for such a machine could not be operated except by individuals, who may be as unjust as the original wrongdoer. The injured party will be sure of obtaining justice only if he can declare his wrongs to the whole polis. The word therefore now means ‘people’ in actual distinction from the ‘state’ (Kitto 1957:72). 

The pursuit of justice becomes a question of making available a social identity that connects public and private interest. This social identity was available in the city-state. The city-state is a quite distinct institution from the modern state and is crucial in envisaging a smaller scale public sphere located in everyday social activities. The all-important political unit in classical Greece, the polis was more on the scale of a modern medium sized town than the modern nation state or metropolis (Jones 1964; Davies 1978; Mayo 1960: ch 2). The size of the city-state was kept in check in numbers and in area deliberately so that citizens could meet within its centre and engage in meaningful political activity (Doyle 1963:25).

In Aristotle’s conception, the original polis was a self-sufficient and self-governing group of villages, in a narrow and closed region lying around an urban centre. The poleis were mostly very small. When Aristotle wrote there was probably no town in the classical world with a population of more than about 150,000. In all likelihood, there were not more than half a dozen with a population of more than – 50,000 (Hall 1998:35).


If the polis was less than a state in the modern sense of the term, it was also something more than a city. The polis had an urban centre but also embraced the surrounding agricultural land. It consisted of farmers, craftsmen and sailors, and many individuals would combine a couple or more of these roles (Bowra 1957:9; Chamoux 1965:291). When Marx speculated that in the future communist society the individual could assume a number of roles rather be restricted to one specialised task imposed by the division of labour, he was adopting the position of the Greek polis.

The obvious question is that, if Athens really was so successful and really did achieve so much in all areas, why did it not presume to conquer and lead the city-states in a unified Greek state. The question would have struck the Athenian – and other Greeks – as illogical. The polis is what was integral to the identity of each individual and nothing beyond the polis, no amount of riches or power, could have the remotest significance with respect to that sense of self-identity. As Kitto put it, ‘if the Greek was not within a day’s walk of his political centre, then his life was something less than the life of a real man’ (Kitto 1951:121).

Every Greek knew the polis: ‘there it was, complete, before his eyes. He could see the fields which gave it sustenance .. he could see how agriculture, trade and industry dovetailed into one another.. The entire life of the polis, and the relation between the parts, were much easier to grasp, because of the small scale of things’ (Kitto 1951:73).

Kitto defines the polis as a ‘community’ since ‘its affairs are the affairs of all’ (Kitto 1957:71). In the polis, every Greek understood the functions of other Greeks: ‘he could see how agriculture, trade and industry dovetailed into one another; he knew the frontiers, where they were strong and where weak .. The entire life of the polis, and the relation between its parts, were much easier to grasp, because of the small scale of things’ (Kitto 1957:73).

The polis conception of scale is rational in that it is premised upon self-consciousness as the distinctive attribute of the human species. Human beings engage in rational action, are teleological and reflexive beings, projecting ends and reflecting upon their actualisation. Reflexivity is built into human action. Praxis is rational. The human habitat is to be evaluated according to whether it promotes the good life, realising human potentialities, expanding rather than inhibiting the growth of human capacities.

A human habitus is premised upon human scale and is, on that account, a public life in the classical conception. A habitat that is beyond human comprehension and control is unjust according to these premises. For reason of size and quantity, its centralisation and concentration modern society is overscale and hence inhuman. The exclusivity of its political and economic functions denies citizens the opportunity to participate in the determination of the forces and decisions affecting collective life. Denied the opportunity to participate in public life, individuals lose not only their citizenship but also their sense of self-identity.

The physical form of the polis emphasised public space with temples, stadia, the agora (combined market place and public forum) and theatres. This everyday public life made possible an everyday public life in which all could participate. The accent was upon association and interaction. Appropriate scale facilitates public comprehension. The question is not, however, settled by establishing human proportions. Beyond scale, there remains the ethical question of the just and the good. A mode of life qualifies as ‘good’ to the extent that it achieves material sufficiency and reflexivity in an ethical community founded on justice, participation and mutual justice. This emphasises the importance of the polis.

The polis embraces much more than the institutional make up and is both the community of citizens and their collective sense of community. There is no equivalent word for polis in the modern world. For Kitto, the usual translation ‘city-state’ may be the nearest we can get but is still a bad translation since the polis was not much like a city and was much more than a state (Kitto 1957:64). The Athenian would not have understood the difficulty of translating polis and how inadequate the term city-state is. To the Athenian, city and state are inextricably linked as one and the same. And to complicate the issue even further, the Athenians did not conceive the city-state in institutional or geographical terms, as a set of institutions or as a definite territory. The polis was the people, it is as simple and as complex as that. There is an important distinction to be drawn between the polis and the state. This distinction makes it possible to separate public life from the institutional machinery of the state and locate it in an autonomous self-governing urban realm. Kitto uses the term polis rather than city-state so as to describe the reality of a self-governing community. 

The polis establishes the social context within which individuals fully realise their spiritual, moral and intellectual capacities (Kitto 1957:78). They realise these essential capacities only in relation to each other. The polis is therefore a holistic and moral framework. The polis ‘is so much more than a form of political organisation. The polis was a living community, based on kinship, real or assumed – a kind extended family, turning as much as possible of life into family life..’ (Kitto 1957:78). The Athenians conceived the polis as a mode of life fostering a sense of community, as a communal modus vivendi. The polis is an integral part of the realisation of the good life, is a dimension of it. ‘The Greeks thought of the polis as an active, formative thing, training the minds and characters of the citizens; we think of it as a piece of machinery for the production of safety and convenience. The training in virtue, which the medieval state left to the Church, and the polis made its own concern, the modern state leaves to God knows what’ (Kitto 1957:75).

At the heart of the polis was a moral purpose based upon a philosophical anthropology. The polis was a physical place, true, but more than geography and space it was a collectivity composed of citizens (Chamoux 1965:309; Hansen 1991:62).. ‘it is the men that are the Polis’ (Ehrenberg 1965:88 quoting Thucydides). The Athenian city-state was not the republic of Athens in its institutional form but the Athenians as a people: the Athenians as citizens were the city-state; the city-state had no independent significance but was embodied in the person and idea of demos, the people.

Whereas the modern state is merely a piece of institutional machinery for the protection and utility of private individuals, maintaining a neutrality between competing perspectives of the good, the polis possessed a positive function in realising a notion of the common human good. The polis pertains to ‘the whole communal life of the people, political, cultural and moral’, also ‘economic’ (Kitto 1957:75). Although Athens did have a private life, Kitto argues that life was essentially public. The Greek ‘was essentially social’, ‘essentially individualist’ in the ‘winning of his livelihood’ but ‘essentially communist’ in the ‘filling of his life’. ‘Religion, art, games, the discussion of things – all these were needs of life that could be fully satisfied only through the polis – not, as with us, through voluntary associations of likeminded people, or through entrepreneurs appealing to individuals.. Moreover, he wanted to play his own part in running the affairs of the community’ (Kitto 1957:78).

There is a need to avoid nostalgia and idealisation The Athenian polis suffered many flaws as an historical institution. The polis excluded women, refused rights to foreigners and rested upon the basis of slavery. Further, it demonstrated public opulence and private squalor (Hall 1998:40). Nevertheless, acknowledging these limitations in relation to the rights and freedoms of modernity, the political life of the polis was remarkably democratic. Its participatory structures make democracy possible in an ‘active’ sense rather than as something conducted indirectly through an abstract system of representation.

This actively democratic conception of public life is denied by the centralisation and bureaucratisation that characterise capitalist modernisation. Problems of quantity and scale are crucial in the recovery of an associative urban public against the alien modes of the modern state and capital. ‘The entire life of the polis, and the relation between its parts, were much easier to grasp, because of the small scale of things..’ (Kitto 1957:73). Kitto concludes that as a result, public affairs possessed an immediacy and a concreteness which they cannot have today (Kitto 1957:73). Joseph Schumpeter is adamant that modern size and scale renders the democratic ideal of the classical polis obsolete (Schumpeter 1943:242 269 283 295/6). At best, democracy is the right of the people to choose between different sets of elites. Public life, the determination of common affairs, has been separated from the demos. The only place where democracy could survive is in the abstract public of the central state, a public that rests upon the highly ambiguous relationship between the represented and the representatives.

The modern city and the modern state, in symbiotic relation with capital, are centres of alienation, of depersonified, bureaucratised social power that disempower citizens. The normative humanistic values that the polis embodied are to be recovered from within the processes of alien rationalisation within which modernity has encased them. Social empowerment and civic engagement are inextricably connected. The contemporary situation is characterised by political and work structures that do not encourage individuals to fully develop their faculties and exercise their abilities as citizens. Such structures suppress the creativity of individuals, resulting in cities that are hollow shells, having no space for the goodwill and intelligence of their inhabitants.

This problem of scale and complexity is to be investigated by showing the relevance of the polis ideal to modern community and democracy. This approach identifies a principle of active citizenship that dissolves systems of alien mediation in favour of self-mediated forms. The dissolution of alien control in favour of social control enables the reduction of scale and complexity to human proportions. The crucial argument of this thesis is that the good city is to be constituted through the practical reappropriation of power alienated to the state and capital and the reorganisation of this power as social power. The dissolution of the state and capital as alienated social power expresses a demand for humanly scaled political and social units. This empowerment enables individuals to consciously determine the circumstances of their lives through actively democratic structures and social arrangements. This amounts to the achievement of a modern polis democracy.

The Philosophers 
Such was the socio-political context for the work of Plato and Aristotle, the greatest ancient philosophers whose perspectives understandably dominate cultural, historical and political perceptions of ancient Greece. Like all philosophers, Plato and Aristotle theorised in a specific social and historical context and the issues and controversies and conceptions of their time and place enter into their thought. From a distance of a couple of millennia, there is a tendency to read the works of Plato and Aristotle as somehow ideal, products of the pure realm of thought, untouched by the material concerns of social and political reality. The fact is, however, that Plato and Aristotle are intellectual conservatives. The ideal ‘ought-to-be’ that can be identified in their philosophical works is as much an idealisation of what had been in the Athenian past as a radical demand for what should be in the polis democracy of the future. Their views of citizenship articulate a desire to preserve the best qualities of Athenian culture, that is, the traditional institutions and morals infused with a political consciousness that was able to respond to a call to subordinate private interest to the cause of the public good.

To identify the ideas of the philosophers with the popular politics and morality of the day is to inflate the importance of ideas in history and politics. The views of the intellectuals of any period owe as much and probably more to their ability to reflect the consciousness of the political establishment as they do to popular views. There is no doubt that ‘moral philosophy and popular morality are sharply contrasted in respect of reason and reflection’, even without taking ‘idiosyncratic moralities’ into account (Dover 1974), 5. See, in particular, chaps. 3 and 6). One should not presume that this implies a sharply antithetical relation between philosophers and people. Some periods show a closer relation between the intellectual representation of the conceptions of society and popular perspectives. With respect to ancient Greece, the relationship was closer than most other periods. From the late fifth century to early Roman times, the perspectives of intellectuals were of a great deal of importance to the lives of the people; similarly, there is clear evidence that the thoughts and feelings of the ordinary person fed into the perspectives of the philosophers and coloured the way that they defined their conceptions.

From its inception, freedom has been a contested concept. From the moment it became intrinsic to the struggles of the people, freedom has been subject to attempts to appropriate it, separate it from its popular base, incorporate it within existing institutions through intellectual redefinition and refinement. The purpose of this activity is to produce a coherent conception of freedom that is acceptable to social and political elites and their constituency. The result is that there have been competing definitions of freedom. There is freedom as ordinary men and women have understood it. This conception may lack intellectual clarity and logical rigour, but makes up in content what it lacks in form. This is freedom as a value learned in the struggle for one’s own essential humanity. Paralleling the struggles of the people to achieve freedom for themselves in their everyday lives has been the theoretical work of philosophers to produce an intellectually coherent and logical conception of freedom. Moralising and intellectualising the term correctly would identity the essence of what freedom really is. The conclusions depended less upon logic than upon which concept a philosopher favoured, the premises upon which the intellectual rested. As a philosophical concept, freedom could be anything from truth, god, the world soul, private property, or communism. The fact is that, in ancient Greece, the philosophical conceptions of freedom and the everyday conceptions of freedom circulating on the streets or in the market place, popular assembly, or palaestra, would often be quite contrary to each other.
 
The centrality of the value of freedom in Western civilisation can be gauged by the concern that the philosophical mind has shown in every age with defining the idea. Freedom is a value that has been raised to the highest intellectual as well as political status. This elevation has, in turn, served to extend and entrench the common idealisation of freedom as a value that all classes and categories of people can respect. Freedom, which originated in the struggles of ordinary people in affirmation of their essential humanity, was appropriated intellectually but, in turn, came to be reincorporated into the popular understanding. In other words, intellectualisation could be an appropriation of the value of freedom to render it serviceable to the ruling class but it could also be a reappropriation which informs the popular consciousness. Robert MacIver has criticised that, with respect to freedom, ‘the greatest sinners against reason have been the reasoners, the philosophers, and high priests’. The anti-intellectual implications of that position seems to imply the rough and ready practical wisdom of the people as the only genuine reason. There is a clear danger here of a reactionary theory and politics. One can criticise the intellectual appropriation of the value of freedom. The attempt to establish its philosophical status could and did result in a value that originated in popular struggle coming to be placed in the service of the ruling class. Even if this is the case, it is significant that the dominant classes should feel the need to respond to the demands of the demos. In making freedom as a generalised conception, something which all may claim on account of their essential humanity, the philosophers in alliance with the rulers opened up a path to the free and rational polity of the future. With freedom as the central value, those sections of the demos who created that value could legitimately claim to take their place within an expanded polity. For this reason, one can firmly reject the criticism of the philosophers as ‘sinners against reason’ and argue that such an explicitly anti-theoretical notion has a clearly reactionary political purpose. Freedom rationalised is capable of concealing existing power relation; it is also capable of being reappropriated by the people and incorporated back into their social practices as they claim their legitimate place in an expanded political order.

This is to recognise that the philosophical delineation of freedom is an ambiguous phenomenon. On the positive side, intellectualisation has generated a substantial body of work developing the idea and showing what it meant and how it was applied throughout the ages. In however diluted and prejudiced a form, this record even applies to what the generality of ordinary women and men thought the value meant at any one time. The problem here is that much of what is presented as typifying the ordinary person’s view comes from the pen of writers who wrote from the perspective of the legitimacy of the status quo and were frequently contemptuous of popular values and demands. The only reason that we know of freedom as a popular value in late fifth century Greece is that the intellectual elitists and conservatives of the time subjected it to withering criticism. The philosophy of rational freedom is very much a philosophy from above, making sense of – or simply dismissing – popular understanding from the perspective of what is rational in respect of the dominant conceptions of the existing political order. 

A similar point applies to the discussion of freedom within the intellectual tradition. A great deal of what is known about the philosophical and political ideas of various parties and movements of ancient Greece stems from the work of Plato and Aristotle, philosophers who were not disinterested in the matters, but who had their own distinctive view. There is a tendency from a distance of two millennia to accept that the work of Plato and Aristotle constitutes the whole of Greek political philosophy, which is far from the case. There is a danger of an extremely biased conception of reason and freedom emerging from an acceptance of the authority of Plato and Aristotle. This can be seen in the tendency for succeeding ages to accept the criticisms that Plato and Aristotle made of the Sophists as decisive whereas in fact they are quite contentious. The Sophists were the first philosophers to have a popular influence in Greek politics and culture, particularly in the way that they expounded the idea of freedom. The Sophists had a popularity and an influence which can be overlooked in light of the damaging criticisms of Plato and Aristotle. (Plato, Protagoras, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie in Edith Hamilton Cairns, ed., The Collected Dialogues (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press), 1961. On the distortion of the Sophists, see Guthrie 1971: 51-54; Havelock 1957, chaps. 7 and 11).

There are quite distinctive conceptions of freedom in opposition here between the Sophists on one side and Plato and Aristotle on the other. As Erik A Havelock observed “liberalism was in the field first” (Havelock 1957: 400). The crucial point is that in a number of key areas, the clash between the Sophists and Plato and Aristotle is parallel with the modern conflict between individualist-empiricist liberalism on the one hand and rational freedom on the other.

All of the principal doctrines of the Sophists pertains directly upon the idea and value of freedom (Guthrie, Sophists; Havelock, The Liberal Temper; Dodds, 1985 esp. Chaps. 6 and 7; Ehrenberg 1967; Farrar 1988).). The Sophist position was characterised by a humanistic individualism. The Sophists transformed the Delphic injunction “Know thyself as a human being, and follow the god” into a wholly secular precept, as can be seen in the homo mensura maxim of Protagoras: ‘Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not’. This position implies an epistemological shift in focus from people in their relation with god to people as the basis for all judgement about the world (Guthrie, Sophists, chap. 2; Ehrenberg, 1967: 338-51; Farrar 1988: 38-43. The translation of the fragment of Protagoras is Freeman, ed. and trans., Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers 1948: 125.). Allied to agnosticism, the Sophists established the ethical principle that the focus of reflection should be individuals in their relations with each other. 

A significant characteristic of Sophist theory and practice is the bias toward relativism. This was made clear in the way that the Sophists approached the basic distinction in Greek thought between phusis, or nature, and nomos, or convention and laws, what could also be called culture (Guthrie, Sophists, chaps. 4 and 7.). 

Ostwald identifies the Cleisthenean democratic revolution as responsible for the profound shift in the conception of, and attitude toward, nomos – defined as “a social norm accepted as valid and binding by those among whom it prevailed”. ‘Norms which before Cleisthenes were thought of as having existed from time immemorial, now came to be regarded as having been enacted and as being enforceable in a way similar to that in which statutes are decided upon by a legislative agency’ (Martin Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1986), 93. Guthrie makes the same point, although he gives it less emphasis, in his Sophists, esp. 19-20). 

The conception of norms as resting on qualities of timelessness and immutability engendered by the gods was replaced by ‘the idea that human agents now became the authors, formulators, enactors, and enforcers of a nomos that could no longer be taken for granted as a perennial pattern of human existence’ (Dodds 1951: 130.). Whilst the development was pronounced amongst intellectuals and leaders, it also had an impact upon popular thought, although archaic patterns of though persisted alongside the new, often in contradictory relation (Dover, 1974: 133-60).

This example reveals the interplay between social practices, political thought, and philosophical reflection. The Cleisthenean democratic revolution was the product of social struggles involving interests and values. A consequence of this reflection upon social and political processes and struggles is to create a body of social thought, what Ostwald calls ‘the language of rule and the language of practice’ (Patterson 150).

Alongside humanism and relativism in philosophy and social life, the Sophists asserted the value of individualism. Together, all these notions fed a distinctive conception of freedom. Given the relativism of Sophist thinking, it is difficult to give a clear and concise definition of Sophist freedom, particularly when one adds the culture-nature distinction. The way that any particular Sophist thinker interprets nature and its role shapes the definition of freedom presented to a large extent. The Sophists were the first social thinkers and it is striking how many of the ideas and issues with which they dealt remain problems in the modern world. 

Relativism can impact in any number of ways. With Antiphon, Hippias, and most radically Alcidamas, relativism cultivated a feeling of respect and tolerance towards other cultures. With the likes of Gorgias, relativism generated a scepticism, even cynicism, with respect to human values. Such was the price to be paid for losing the objective foundation of morality, for conceiving norms as something subject to alterable human convention.


The situation is made worse where these contrasting approaches are linked to different conceptions of nature. In this scenario, the doctrines which were produced tended to extremes, from a left wing revolutionary utopianism to being a right wing tyrannical politics. The split between human nature and law confronted Sophists with this ‘grand question’: “Is the social restraint which law imposes on nature a good thing or a bad thing?” (Dodds 1985:99).

Protagoras and his followers taught that all individuals were by nature equal, that good laws and justice were mutually conditional and were improvable. For Protagoras, virtue was not dependent upon birth or nature but could be taught (Guthrie, Sophists, chap. 10.). Protagoras had been referred to as the ‘first democratic political theorist in the history of the world’ (Farrar 1988: 77 and, more generally, 77-98). Against Socrates, Protagoras argued that ‘civic virtue as a whole’, or political wisdom, could be found in all human beings and constituted an essential precondition for democracy. For this reason, Protagoras commended the Athenian citizens for identifying civic virtue as a special quality which was possessed by all individuals: ‘when the subject of their counsel involves political wisdom, which must always follow the path of justice and moderation, they listen to everyman’s opinion, for they think that everyone must share in this kind of virtue; otherwise the state could not exist’ (Plato, Protagoras, 323e). 

The arguments of Protagoras and his disciples form the earliest formulation of the value of civic freedom and were influential throughout the fifth century BC. Protagoras and his followers “rationalize[d]” the democratic achievements of the age of Pericles (Havelock 1957: 190. See also, Ehrenberg 1967: 348-49). 

For Protagoras, the social universe was a socially constructed order which was constituted by as a result of the interactions of individuals with each other and with their culture, itself the result of accumulated interactions. Individuals are influenced by culture as inherited patterns created by previous interactions, but not in a passive sense. Protagoras employs the metaphor of the practitioner or craftsmen to underscore the reality shaping praxis involved. Individuals are change agents engaging in the everyday practices and discourses of living in its totality. In practicing the ‘art of politics’ individuals make themselves ‘good citizens’, in engaging in the art of living they teach each other virtue, and the whole creative process issues in ‘civilised and humane society’ (Plato, Protagoras 319a, 327e-328a).

Protagoras developed a conception of human knowledge which located the evolution of beliefs in the interaction of individuals as they experience the world and each other, and a conception of human needs which entailed that all individuals could and should display its qualities. Order is not transcendent, but emerges through interactions implicit in the world of experience as a world of change. (Farrar 1988: 47).

Sophists with a ‘liberal temper’ (Havelock) reconciled the claims of each individual for personal fulfilment with the needs of the polis by arguing that the polis exists fundamentally to realise these individual needs and by applying a reductionist theory of the relation between human nature and the prerequisites of society (Farrar 1988: 95-96).

Sophists of a more radical temper developed Protagoras’ thoughts into an outright egalitarianism. Hippias, therefore, considered all individuals his ‘kinsmen and family and fellow citizens – by nature, not by convention’. Hippias went so far as to repudiate convention as ‘the tyrant of mankind’ which ‘does much violence to nature’ (Plato, Protagoras 337c-d). The radical individualism of the fourth century Sophist and rhetorician Alcidamas was even more extreme: ‘God has left all men free; Nature has made none a slave’. Such views form the basis for an outright rejection of all institutions and belief systems etc. which are based upon slavery, relations of domination and exploitation of all kinds (Dodds 1985: 101). The realisation of the goal of personal freedom therefore implies the repudiation of all-man made authority and of the enslavement to convention as unnatural constraint.

The Sophist movement ‘shows the same typical traits as the liberal thought of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the same individualism, the same humanitarianism, the same secularism, the same confident arraignment of tradition at the bar of reason, the same robust faith in applied intelligence as the key to perpetual progress’ (Dodds 1985: 101-2).

The value of personal freedom had emerged out of the conflictual and creative social dynamics of master, slave, and freeman. The achievement of the Sophists’ is to have raised the value of personal freedom to the level of conscious, philosophical reflection, engendering a conscious civil culture. The value which had been created and given expression at the level of social practice was given the weight of reason.

However, the Sophists’ emphasis on nature over convention combined with their relativism could easily take illiberal and outright reactionary forms. Depending upon where one placed the stress, nature could be as inegalitarian as egalitarian. If, as Protagoras claims, that man is the measure of all things, then some men are by nature superior to others. The argument from nature is not necessarily egalitarian. If some are leaders by nature, then others are followers; if some are free by nature, then others are slaves.

A similar argument applies in the realm of convention. Laws, institutions, culture in general may be human-made, but this does not necessarily mean that they are all of equal worth. Some pertain to free cultures, others to slave cultures. Some are superior, others inferior, according to the superiority or otherwise of the people. And it is the genius and natural superiority of the leaders that makes for the superiority of the superior collectivity. The greater the superiority, the better and more free a culture. This line of thought came to articulate a conception of freedom as power. The person is more or less free according to how much power he or she has. And the more free a person is, the greater his or her right to rule those with less freedom. The argument comes with the claim that the true freedom of the less free lies in the rule of the powerful and the free and that the less free best serve their interests by recognising the fact. By such means, the value of personal freedom, emerging through creative social struggle, comes to be reconstructed in terms of an explicit aristocratic freedom. This conception became the dominant one amongst elitist and conservative thinkers, but originated in the thought and actions of the likes of Thrasymachus, Critias, Alcibiades, and Polus. Their attitude is located in the cynical rhetoricism of Georgias, who taught ‘the power to convince by words’ (Patterson 155). 

Liberal in one wing, the Sophist movement could also be downright reactionary. The relativism of the Sophist movement gave it a certain arbitrary character, a consequence of rejecting the view of morality as being founded upon eternal and unchangeable qualities. The idea that human beings were creative agents in relation to convention and culture was in one sense liberating but in another could leave humanity rootless, subject to arbitrariness and uncertainty. This was the point at which Plato, followed by Aristotle, attacked. Plato and Aristotle May have bequeathed a biased interpretation of the Sophist movement to history, but the points on which they target Sophist doctrine are the key ones. Plato and Aristotle defined their philosophies in opposition to the key principles of the Sophists.

10 PLATO’S REPUBLIC
For good reason, Plato and Aristotle are the first philosophers discussed in this book. For not only did they define the key concepts of political philosophy, they were also pioneers in city studies. The most important question discussed by Plato and Aristotle concerns the nature of the political community or the ‘state’. The human being merited philosophical interest, not as an isolated entity but as a part of society, living in a social context that is devoted to realising the good life. Individuals as human beings realised their essential human potentialities in and through the political community. The main concern of Plato and Aristotle was to discover the norms and rules that govern the life of the city-state, uncovering the ultimate purpose beyond the competing factions.

Plato addresses the problem which is central to the argument of this book – how to develop the overarching moral framework of the common good in a fractious or pluralist society characterised by an irreducible polytheism of values: ‘the more closely I studied the politicians and the laws and customs of the day .. the more difficult it seemed to me to govern rightly .. in an age which had abandoned its traditional moral code but found it impossibly difficult to create a new one’. 

Plato discovered the remedy for political ills in philosophy: ‘I was forced .. to the belief that the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy and that mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become by some miracle true philosophers’ (Plato The Seventh Letter 1987:xvi). Good government is to be realised through the integration of politics and philosophy. This is the central theme of The Republic.

Plato has exerted a substantial influence on the Western mind. It is difficult to imagine Western civilisation without Plato and without all the thinkers and beliefs and developments his philosophy inspired. And Plato’s influence has endured throughout the centuries. This enduring and substantial influence is very difficult to explain if one accepts the modern characterisation of Plato as an outright totalitarian thinker. For Hall, ‘Plato .. was a reactionary, harking back to the solidarity of the old polis. His ideal city .. is an utterly joyless place in which the individual submits totally to the demands of a rigid society: everyone must undergo rigorous mental, ethical and physical conditioning.. The terrifying objective was to produce a society of one mind, run by a handful of superior legislators’ (Hall 1998:27). But if that was all that Plato’s philosophy amounted to, how can one explain its enduring influence. Plato was certainly no democratic, for reasons he set out. But there is a need to take Plato’s philosophy seriously, even if one dissents from Plato’s actual prescriptions.

The words of R H S Crossman on Plato are often heard: ‘Plato’s philosophy is the most savage and most profound attack upon liberal ideas which history can show. It denies every axiom of “progressive” thought and challenges all its fondest ideals. Equality, freedom, self-government – all are condemned as illusions which can be held only by idealists whose sympathies are stronger than their sense’ (Crossman 1959:92). 9-42). For liberals, Plato is a ‘totalitarian’ thinker. Karl Popper charges that for Plato ‘morality is nothing but political hygiene’ (Popper I 1962:107). 

Is that all that Plato’s thought amounts to? The most cursory reading of Plato’s works reveals a serious attempt to grapple with the issues of politics in the most profound way. There is a need for intellectual clarity and logical rigor in order to identify precisely what Plato is criticising and to address the reasons why. To deal quickly with Crossman’s polemic with one point, Plato did not deny every axiom of progressive thought. Far from denying freedom, Plato presented his own distinctive conception as the true definition of freedom. His position is supported by a vast and impressive intellectual edifice. It doesn’t matter whether one can accept the reasons Plato offered in defence of his conception of freedom or whether one can accept Plato’s freedom as the only true freedom. The point is that Plato defined a conception of freedom. If Plato does not hold a monopoly of the value of freedom, then neither does the individualist liberal tradition, from where these attacks upon Plato as a ‘totalitarian’ thinker derive.

It should be made clear, however, that these criticisms come from a very particular perspective. These views come from a particular – individualist-empiricist – tradition of liberalism that emphasises the self-contained, self-moving private individual; this tradition conceives any collective purpose as an infringement upon liberty. The charges can be turned around since, in the ‘rational’ tradition founded by Plato and Aristotle, the relationships that each individual has with others that enhance rather than inhibit individual liberty. The crucial question concerns the nature of those relationships. Plato cannot be simply presented as an enemy of liberty and democracy. His target is not individual liberty as such but the selfishness and egoism that characterises individualism. Plato is concerned to show how individual liberty degenerates into the licence of an unconstrained society of self-activating atoms, experienced as a universal constraint upon all. Against individualist liberals, Plato shows how the maximum of individual freedom is also the maximum of unfreedom.

In defining his own conception of freedom, Plato subjected various other conceptions to systematic criticism. The liberal assault on Plato is important in drawing the battle lines between alternate and contrasting conceptions of freedom. Plato does not deny freedom as such but the liberal conception of freedom as something individualist, empiricist, arbitrary. The most important aspect of Plato’s approach is his underlying essentialist epistemology. This distinguishes clearly from the modern liberal conception and this is no surprise. Plato’s immediate target was the making of morality and norms as something conventional, arbitrary, as distinct from eternal and immutable, something grounded in objectivity. Having seen the extremes to which morality as convention could go, Plato sought firmer foundations. Plato is now condemned as a reactionary. The truth is that Plato was seeking a firm, objective foundation of morality to avoid the reactionary inegalitarianism that the Sophist position could express, the identification of freedom with differentials in power and the resting of government upon the doctrine of might is right and justice is the interest of the strongest. Such views are reactionary and contradict every axiom of progressive liberal democratic thought. But here is an important question for liberal critics to answer: has liberal democracy issued in an egalitarian social order free from relations of exploitation and domination or is liberal democracy merely a formal shell for substantive inequality and unfreedom? A loaded question which is appropriate for a social order loaded with asymmetries in power and resources. Whether Plato is to be condemned or celebrated for asking whether or not accepted values and conventions are no more than illusions depends upon one’s own politics. One can understand why, within prevailing capitalist social relations, any philosophy equipped with the critical intellectual tools to expose illusions in government and culture may be treated with a certain amount of opprobrium. 

The subtitle of The Republic, ‘Concerning Justice’, reveals Plato’s central purpose. Plato’s Republic attempts to conceive the form that justice takes in the ideal state. He Exposing the extent to which the unchecked pursuit of self-interest continually governs and ruins public life in contemporary city-states, Plato is concerned to argue that justice is the founding principle of the political community or state.

There is a need here to define the term ‘Republic’ to make clear how expansive Plato’s ideal is. By ‘Republic’ is meant ‘constitution’, ‘state’ or ‘society’ in the Greek, encompassing the political and the social, the formal and the substantive. As has been made clear in the section defining the ‘polis’, the problem of good government in the state and good government in the city were one and the same for the Greeks. 

In The Republic, Plato is concerned to identify the principles of the ideal state rather than discuss the specific details. Plato’s Republic seeks to discern the fundamental principles and ideals of human association and action. In this regard, The Republic is a utopian tract. Plato is explicit that his argument distinguishes between theory and practice (Plato 1987:201 358). It is in The Laws that Plato attempts to embed these principles and ideals in a realistic frame (Guthrie 1971 4 ch 3).

Plato’s distinctive conception of freedom emerges as he establishes the basic principle of inquiry early on in The Republic. To discover the true nature of political and social justice it is necessary to ‘first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less’. Such an approach seeks an objective foundation for freedom. If god is not the measure of all things, as the Sophists claimed, then neither is man. Plato’s principle of inquiry holds that abstractions or forms are the measure of things human and that these determine an intellectual progression from the forms to their collective approximations and then to real individual. This approach emphasises that freedom is a collective project and involves an explicit repudiation of individualism as capable of only a limited, narrow freedom. The danger of Plato’s holistic approach is that it elevates pure forms and abstractions over empirical individuals, a criticism that Aristotle would later make. This misunderstands Plato’s approach. Plato notes that whilst his argument concentrates upon justice in the individual, the question is best studied on the large scale. Plato thus proceeds to discuss justice in the community as a whole, going on to apply his conclusions to the individual.

The most important aspect of Plato’s argument is the extent to which he emphasises that social justice is a desirable goal to be pursued in the city, over and against material affluence and economic growth. In Part One, Book One of The Republic, Plato is concerned to show that the just are happier than the unjust. Plato proceeds from the idea of function to argue that the individual needs justice so that he is able to perform a particular function and hence achieve happiness. The just man is happy and the unjust is miserable: ‘injustice never pays better than justice’ (Bk I 1987:41/2). Human beings conforming to their nature as active beings achieve happiness. Plato argues against the view that, since it is natural for individuals to pursue self-interest without regard to others, justice is simply a question of convenience. In this view, the purpose of morality is to regulate an amoral society of self-seeking individuals. If the sanctions of morality were removed, individual behaviour would be as self-interested as ever, suggesting that injustice pays more than justice (Bk ii 1987:49/55).


In countering these assertions, Plato identifies two underlying principles at the heart of society. In the first place, there is mutual need. Since individuals are not self-sufficient beings they need to combine in society. In the second place, there is difference of aptitude. Each individual specialises in those things for which they have a particular aptitude. There is a need for the individual to specialise ‘on a single job for which he is naturally fitted’ (Bk ii 1987:59 60). Society regulated on these principles is a natural growth.

Justice in this view possesses a fundamentally social dimension (Bk ii 1987:58). The origin of society stems from the fact that the individual is not self-sufficient but has many needs that require many relations to others for their satisfaction. The individualism that characterises the liberal conception of liberty is untenable from this perspective. Specialisation implies necessary interrelation. Since each is fitted to one type of work, individuals need to associate together so as to supply all with what each lacks. ‘The formation of a city is due .. to this fact, that we are not individually dependent, but have many wants .. and because each seeks the aid of others to supply his various requirements; we gather many associates and helpers into one dwelling-place, and give to this joint dwelling the name of city’. This results in a settlement which goes by the name of a ‘community’ or ‘state’ (Bk ii 1987:58).


11 PLATO AND JUSTICE

The Republic begins by asking the question as to what justice is. The question is both a moral and a political one, pertaining both to the individual and the community. Plato is enquiring into the basis of socio-political and moral obligation. Rejecting the conventional view of giving each individual his due as inadequate, Plato argues that the problem cannot be solved in the individual but must be studied ‘in larger letters’ in society as a whole. Plato proceeds to analyse the key elements of the human mind so as to argue that its well-being, full development and happiness are secured by doing right and by not doing wrong.


In the individual, justice consists in maintaining the proper balance between the three elements of the mind so as to ensure that each is ‘doing its own job’ (1987:145). True morality depends upon each of the different elements being given due satisfaction, with no one coming to dominate at the expense of the others. Intellect, desire and ambition must all receive their due and proper fulfilment, being given their proper place in the good life.

In society, justice consists in everyone fulfilling his or her proper function in the social order. This principle checks social disintegration, the evil that most concerned Plato. Social justice is achieved by each class in society coming to fulfil its proper function, not encroaching on the functions of the others. 

Plato’s definition of justice is the origin of the ‘rational’ conception of freedom, integrating short and long-range interests, the immediate and the long term, the individual good and the collective good in the service of the common good. Self-discipline is ‘a kind of order’ in which the better, rational element controls the weaker element, stretched beyond the individual ‘across the whole scale’ of the city-state (Plato Bk iv 1987:142 143). ‘It produces harmony between the strongest and the weakest and middle elements, whether you measure by the standard of intelligence, or of strength, or of numbers or money or the like’ (Bk iv 1987:143).

Since justice is the result of society being properly ordered, Plato’s Republic devotes substantial space to this ordering. In the Republic, Plato defines a conception of social order which is based on what may be called an organic or naturalistic functionalism. Plato conceives society as a structured form of organic functionalism, ordering society according to a hierarchical division of functions – leadership, protection and labour – each belonging to their corresponding collectivities: rulers, guardians and auxiliaries. The members of each group are selected for each class according to their natural capacities with respect to the three basic functions. Placing each individual according to their natural capacity will result in the thoroughly harmonious and fully integrated state, a state which exhibits the four cardinal virtues or ‘qualities’ of wisdom, courage, discipline and justice (Bk iv 1987:138). Wisdom is the product of the knowledge of the Rulers; courage comes from the Auxiliaries. Discipline is the self-discipline that issues from the harmonious relationship between the three classes and their common agreement over ‘who ought to rule’. Justice is the realisation of the principle of functional specialisation with individuals doing jobs for which they are fitted according to their natural aptitude, not interfering in areas for which they are not fitted.

Plato thus divides society into three classes according to an ascending hierarchy of functional purposes. The first class is the class of rulers, the Guardians, a governing elite whose function is to govern (Bk iii 412d). The Guardians ‘must always do what is best for the community’ and a close watch is kept upon them to ensure that this principle is adhered to (Bk iii 1987:119). The function of ruling is restricted to the wise. Fit to rule, the wise are given the power to manipulate religion and education, to deceive, and to impose strict censorship of the arts and all forms of oral and written literature.

The second class is the class of auxiliaries, whose function it is ‘to assist the Rulers in the execution of their decisions’ (1987:121). The auxiliaries combine the functions of the civil service, the police and the army. The third class comprise all those engaging in economic activities, the farmers, manufacturers and traders. The function of this class is to secure the material needs of the community. The third class is kept under strict control and has no involvement in matters of government. Nevertheless, the Guardian class serves the interest of this third class and governs with the willing consent of the governed (1987:123 143). The knowledge of the Guardians ‘is exercised not on behalf of any particular interest but on behalf of the city as a whole’. This benefits the state ‘both in its internal and external relations’ (Bk iv 1987:139).

Plato’s argument, it will be noted, concerns good government. The public good comes before all else. The implication is that the best regime for human beings will, by definition, be the one that realises true freedom. Plato makes no attempt to rest his argument upon the value of freedom or to make freedom the central point at issue in debates with other conceptions. Freedom follows as a consequence of right principles and reasoning. Plato is establishing the foundations for his ideal state, his functional naturalism emerging as the organically free state of truly free human beings.

The Rulers and Auxiliaries are to live an austere life without private property and the family. The purpose of these requirements was to check the tendency for the public good to be sacrificed to the pursuit of personal interests. The end to be served is the happiness of the ‘whole community’ rather than ‘the particular happiness of a single class’ (Bk iv 1987:126).

The Guardians take care to secure the conditions for social unity. The Guardians must ensure that extremes of wealth and poverty in the Third Class are avoided and that the state does not grow to become too large. Plato’s argument here is pertinent today, in an age characterised by overscale cities that are riven by increasing polarities. The Guardians ‘must at all costs’ prevent ‘wealth and poverty’ from ‘slipping unobserved into the state’. ‘One produces luxury and idleness and a desire for novelty, the other meanness and bad workmanship and a desire for revolution as well’ (Bk iv 1987:129).

The state should .. be allowed to grow so long as growth is compatible with unity, but no further.
So we can add to the instructions we shall give our Guardians one to the effect that they are to avoid at all costs either making the state too small or relying on apparent size, but keep it adequate in scale and a unity.

Plato Bk iv 1987:131

The Guardians must ensure that individuals may pass between classes according to merit and aptitude so that ‘the integrity and unity both of the individual and of the state will be preserved’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:131).

Plato is now in a position to define justice. Plato’s ideal city is founded upon justice defined in terms of ‘giving to each his due’. From this perspective, justice ‘consists in minding your own business and not interfering with other people’, each individual doing ‘the job he was naturally most suited for’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:145).

I think that the quality left over, now that we have discussed discipline, courage and wisdom, must be what makes it possible for them to come into being in our state and preserves them by its continued presence when they have done so. And we agreed that it would be justice that was left over if we found the other three.

Plato Bk iv 1987:145

With these arguments Plato has been concerned to repudiate a number of political positions, all of which can still be found in the governance of contemporary states and cities: the idea that justice is merely the interest of the stronger; the idea that justice is merely the result of legal contract; the idea that justice is merely a virtue practised by a few since it is an unprofitable activity. The repudiation of an overarching moral framework, of the meta-narrative of the good city, is not the product of ‘postmodern’ times but rests upon arguments that the ‘rational’ tradition in philosophy, founded by Plato, was developed to contest.

Plato establishes a parallel between the state (society) and the individual since the qualities expressed by the community are those of the individuals composing it. This implies that there are three elements of each soul:

1)	reason – the faculty that calculates and decides;
2)	desire or appetite – instinctive craving;
3)	ambition, indignation, pugnacity.

Plato affirms that the rational element of human nature controls the instinctive element so that human beings realise themselves fully as human beings (Bk iv 1987:149/55). Human beings are easily manipulated and managed at the level of desire and appetite and are too prone to identify their liberty at this level of immediacy. The result is that human beings limit their liberty well within its potential. Plato’s ‘rational’ argument holds that there is a need for an ethico-institutional framework that enables human beings to access their rational faculty, demonstrating a greater capacity for reflective action, conscious determination and moral choice. This enables individuals to attain a richer freedom by realising the full range of human capacities, well beyond desire and appetite.

In Plato’s account, justice in the individual forms the counterpart of justice in the state. The individual is wise on account of reason, courageous on account of spirit and disciplined in subordinating ‘spirit’ and appetite to reason. The individual is just on account of the harmony that results when all the three elements of the mind are fulfilled in performing their proper function. Since ‘the state was just when the three elements within it each minded their own business’, ‘each of us will be just and perform his proper function only if each part of him is performing its proper function’ (Bk iv 1987:159). 

‘So the reason ought to rule, having the wisdom and foresight to act for the whole, and the spirit ought to obey and support it’.

When these two elements have been so brought up, and trained and educated to their proper function, they must be put in charge of appetite, which forms the greater part of each man’s make up and is naturally insatiable. They must prevent its taking its fill of the so-called physical pleasures, for otherwise it will get too large and strong to mind its own business and will try to subject and control the other elements, which it has no right to do, and so wreck the life of all of them.

Plato Bk iv 1987:159

The principles of the good city identified by Plato are scale, balance, form and proportion. Self-control or discipline in a city or in an individual results ‘when all these three elements are in friendly and harmonious agreement, when reason and its subordinates are all agreed that reason should rule and there is no civil war among them’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:160).

This results in justice in the city and in the individual. Justice prevents the three elements from trespassing upon each other, keeping all three in tune, binding these elements ‘into a disciplined and harmonious whole, and so become fully one instead of many’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:161). Once reason is in control and just rule ‘looks after the common interests of all by reconciling them with each other’, human beings can realise their potentiality for the good.

Plato therefore defines justice in the reciprocal terms of ‘rational freedom’, uniting the freedom, good and happiness of each with all and the freedom, good and happiness of all with each. Justice is social justice; it possesses an ineliminable social component that acknowledges that individuals live in relation with each other. Some pursuing private interest at the expense of others harms the common good of all, including that of those pursuing their private interests. The private self-seekers harm their own good when they harm the good of all. Each is part of the society of all. The moral is clear: reason must control desire.

Then on this reckoning .. can it possibly pay anyone to make money by doing wrong, if the result of his so doing is to enslave the best part of himself to the worst? .. if one ruthlessly enslaves the divinest part of oneself to the most godless and abominable, is it not a miserable piece of bribery?

Plato Bk ix 1987:355

Each individual should be under the control of wisdom. ‘That wisdom and control should, if possible, come from within; failing that it must be imposed from without, in order that, being under the same guidance, we may all be friends and equals’ (Bk ix 1987:356). The argument is important and concerns whether the ‘rational freedom’ that secures the good of each and all is imposed externally by legal-institutional compulsion or whether human beings, as rational natural beings, can internalise reason and supply the internal moral coordination of common affairs. The latter is the ideal; the former a self-educative process that leads human beings to reason. The ‘intention of the law’ is to have educated the best element within citizens so that they may be given their freedom (Bk ix 1987:356). This view envisages legal-institutional coercion giving way to rational self-regulation practised by each in reciprocal relation to all. The rational, ‘humaner’ part is to be set free so that individuals make the best of their natural gifts (Bk ix 1987:356/7). It cannot pay to be unjust if by acquiring more money and power the individual becomes a worse human being (Bk ix 1987:356/7).

Plato’s innovations in educational theory mark his proposed ideal city-state as unique. For Plato, the citizen was produced by proper education and activity. Plato took education out of the hands of the family and made it a public activity. The function of this education is ‘that training in virtue from childhood which makes a man eager to become the perfect citizen, knowing both how to rule justly and how to obey’. No cultural form evaded this training in virtue: music, dance, athletics were all scrutinized with a view to providing moral benefit. Plato was concerned to eliminate overexcitement of the passions and the exacerbation of individualism. The accept was upon group effort and harmony, all pulling together for the common good. Training, in the chorus and athletics for instance, was designed to involve the youth in collective activities. These activities, on the playing field or the stage, involved a training of the will and the inculcation of self-discipline. In the long run, public life would benefit through the citizen learning to restrain his ego and regulate his life to harmonize with the needs and desire of all other citizens’.

Plato considered every occasion from the perspective of potential moral education. He advocated that public festivals be carefully organised to ensure maximum effect. Plato wanted the accent in culture and art to fall exclusively on the positive. The negative was banned. It followed that poets should be constrained to speak only of the lawful, just, beautiful, or good. The consistent principle is the deliberate subordination of all things, art and culture included, to the needs and purposes of the community.

For Plato, there are four types of imperfect society – Timarchy, Oligarchy, Democracy and Tyranny. Each type shares certain features with contemporary cities and states, failing as they do to conform to the standards of justice.

Oligarchy is a society in which wealth is the criterion of merit and ‘in which political power is in the hands of the rich and the poor have no share of it’ (Bk viii 1987:305). Oligarchy originates from Timarchy through ‘the accumulation of wealth in private hands’. ‘The men find ways to become extravagant, and for this reason, pervert the law and disobey it’ (Bk viii 1987:305). ‘The further they go in the process of accumulating wealth, the more they value it and the less they value goodness. For aren’t wealth and goodness related like two objects in a balance, so that when one rises the other must fail?’

The oligarchy is set up through the imposition of a property qualification of office (Bk viii 1987:306). This is an unsound principle since it gives office according to wealth, even if the poor may make better leaders according to merit (Bk viii 1987:306). Money-making is the principal objective in an oligarchy, something which ruins public authority (Bk viii 1987:310).

While reason and ambition squat in servitude at its feet, reason forbidden to make any calculation or inquiry but how to make more money, ambition forbidden to admire or value anything but wealth and the wealthy, or to compete for anything but the acquisition of wealth and whatever leads to it.

Plato Bk viii 1987:309

The type of character who rules in an oligarchy possesses ‘no moral conviction’, ‘only the compulsion of fear’ (Bk viii 1987:310). An oligarchic society, therefore, comes nowhere near the real goodness of an integrated and balanced character’ (Bk viii 1987:311). Democracy originates as a reaction against oligarchy as the poor triumph over their opponents and extend civil rights, opportunities of office, appointment by lot (Bk viii 1987:313/314). 

Plato rejects democracy with a barbed comment; democracy is ‘an agreeable, anarchic form of society, with plenty of variety, which treats all men as equal, whether they are equal or not’ (9-47). But Plato’s criticisms of democracy go much deeper than an acerbic aside. In criticising democracy, Plato confronts the both civic and personal freedom and the way in which they are related. Plato draws attention to the way that civic freedom is the principal objective and dominant feature of the democratic state, while personal freedom is its prevailing quality. Conditions of civic freedom produce persons characterised by personal freedom. 

“And what is this objective?”
“Liberty”, replied, “for you may hear it said that this is best managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care to live in.”

Plato condemns democracy for its inherent tendency to mob rule, demagoguery, and anarchy. He also identifies the inherent tendency of personal liberty to degenerate into personal license and selfishness. ‘A very good description of one who believes in liberty and equality’ is the comment on the definition of ‘democratic man’ as one who has ‘no order and restraint in his life’ and who ‘reckons his way of living .. pleasant, free and happy’.

In democracy, there is no compulsion to exercise or submit to authority (Bk viii 1987:314/5). This undermines the ‘good environment’ that trains individuals in ‘good habits’. Democracy ‘doesn’t mind what the habits and background of its politicians are; provided they profess themselves the people’s friends, they are duly honoured’ (Bk viii 1987:315). Tyranny describes the society which issues as a result of the struggle between the rich and the poor in a democracy: ‘an excessive desire for liberty at the expense of everything else is what undermines democracy and leads to the demand for tyranny’ (Bk viii 1987:321). As liberty becomes licence ‘all discipline is swept away and madness usurps its place’ (Bk viii 1987:332).

Plato’s criticisms of democracy are heavily focused upon the lack of critical reflection upon the general and long term good that a system of active mass democracy implies, and which an extension of greater mediation by representative bodies could check. Popular control involved ‘committing the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude’ (Plato B ii). Against this, Plato affirms that politics is the ‘art of navigation’ requiring a captain (B vi 1987:222/3).

Plato’s criticisms of democracy refer to the need for sound judgement and leadership in navigating the ship of state. For Plato, the people are bad judges on many important political matters, lacking the necessary experience or expert knowledge concerning such vital issues as finance and foreign policy. Describing the demos as ‘a large and powerful animal’, Plato states that philosophy is ‘quite impossible’ among ‘the common people’ (Bk vi 1987:228). The people will make judgements based on impulse, sentiment and prejudice rather than reason. The popular leader is dependent upon the ability to please the crowd, selling the people a package that conforms to their prejudices but which does not necessarily imply good policy (Plato 1987:222 228). This results in popular leaders who are as bereft of true knowledge as the people whom they lead.

In Book viii, Plato identifies the chief characteristic of democracy as liberty, the idea that ‘every individual is free to do as he likes’ (Plato 1987:314). Though this gives society a variety and diversity, its effects can be diremptive. There is a weakening of the bonds of political and moral authority so that ‘the minds of the citizens become so sensitive that the least vestige of restraint is resented as intolerable’ (Plato 1987:322). Without this restraint, freedom ceases to be a common purpose and instead fractures into dissension. Society is no longer capable of generating the principle of cohesion from within itself.







12 WHO RULES – PEOPLE OR PHILOSOPHY?
The Philosopher Ruler

For Plato, the only hope for realising the ideal is for philosophers to become rulers exercising political power.





Here are the origins of the educative model for realising ‘rational freedom’. This model introduces a certain ambiguity into the rational project of freedom. The question is how can reason be realised and extended when the world and the people in it fall short of rationality? To make good the deficit in reason, the gap between ideal and real, an educative model is required to inculcate reason. This has authoritarian-elitist implications that holds that only those few who have access to truth and knowledge may legitimately hold power. This theoretico-elitist practise subverts the emancipatory-democratic promise and premise contained in the view that since all human beings are rational beings they are to be treated as equal and free. 

It would be wrong, however, to accuse Plato – and later philosophers in the rational tradition – of an authoritarian-elitist purpose here. The educative process has the end of extending reason to all so that the educative apparatus would no longer be required. What should be underlined in the above passage is Plato’s reference to humanity, more correctly translated as the human race or the human species. The point that Plato makes with regard to the rule of reason applies to all human beings, regardless of whatever or whoever they are.

Plato’s philosopher-ruler may be read as less an institution or person presiding over the ruled than the fusion of politics and philosophy. The end is the fusion of politics and philosophy. Politics is to become philosophical and express ideals of truth and good. Philosophy is to become political, worldly, and lose its abstract nature. Reason is to rule the world for the common good of each and all. Plato sought to assert reason over instinct and desire, ranking physical pleasures low and seeking to restrain potentially unruly appetites and instincts.

Plato introduces his theory of forms, ideals or patterns that have a real existence independent of human minds. These yield knowledge by referring to a realm of reality beyond the sensible world of which full knowledge was not possible (Bk v 1987:206/220). ‘The good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power’ (Bk vi 1987:248). Plato makes use of the simile of the cave to portray a society of individuals who mistake appearance for reality. The prisoners of the cave, their necks fastened so that they cannot move their heads, see only the shadows that the fire throws onto the wall. They naturally believe these shadows to be real (Bk vii 1987:256/61). The moral is that truth is the result of reflection, insight and experience that is beyond the immediacy of most people living in ordinary life. Much of what most people accept as truth as given by their everyday experience is in fact false, mere illusion (Bk vii 1987:263).

Whilst it would be easy to convict Plato of elitism in this argument, since the claim is that there is a deeper reality which, at first, is accessible only by a few, it should be pointed out that the end that Plato has in view is that truth is to be made available to all so that all can see reality as it is, not that truth is the preserve of the few, giving them power to rule over the many. Truth rather than power and wealth is the end that Plato pursues.





The philosopher-ruler is the culmination of Plato’s central theme, the integration of politics and philosophy. The aim of education is to produce the philosopher-ruler. They are identified as possessing the highest talent, receive the highest training and are put in the service of the state. They are fitted to rule by their education. They have been trained to be a dedicated elite committed to governing in the interests of all.

The most obvious objection here is that the concept of the philosopher-ruler is an elitist and anti-democratic notion. Plato’s defence is that such a ruling class is meritocratic, comprises the highest talent, and is devoted to serving the common good. Plato rejects democratic government in which public policy is determined by popular will in favour of competent government in which public policy is the product of professional expertise. Plato’s overriding concern is the public interest, which is the interest of all. This is precisely the reason why Plato abolishes private property and family among the Guardian class, since both entail private interests and motivations that get in the way of serving the common good of the whole community. Plato is concerned to check the desire for wealth which is generated by private property and which is a force for social disintegration and political corruption. Any elitism on Plato’s part is an elitism designed to serve the public good, not the private good of the ruling class.

The most damaging criticism is that Plato invests too much faith in the Guardian class. Like Hegel’s state bureaucracy, public bonds are abstracted from real society and invested in a minority class devoted to serving the universal interest. This demands a public spiritedness that is unlikely to be found or maintained since knowledge of a shifting reality is always limited and transitory. Plato attempts an ideal solution to a real problem. The key question is how public bonds can be forged so that everyday individual exchange and interaction proceeds in such a way as to ensure the common good of all. Plato opts for the rule of the wise, the embodiment of reason.

But who guards the guardians? There is the danger of the ruling class coming to appropriate the public interest to serve its own interests. Public bonds need to be diffused throughout the social fabric itself so that all individuals could develop a public consciousness in their everyday existence. Public bonds cannot but be illusory when located in a realm abstracted from the real lives of individuals composing the body politic. The task, then, is to diffuse the public interest throughout civil society so that public bonds are forged at the heart of social reality. With this, Plato’s fusion of politics and philosophy is no longer located in the ideal realm of the Guardian class but throughout social relationships as a whole.

The Statesman
In the Statesman, Plato expresses the view that the best state is one which is subject to the rule of the expert statesman as opposed to the rule of law: ‘the political ideal is not full authority for laws but rather full authority for a man who understands the art of kingship and has kingly ability’. It is here rather than in the presentation of organically functional order that Plato exhibits his reactionary side. The rejection of law in favour of the skill, power, and vision of the natural-born leader is the argument of a reactionary Sophist. Where once, for Plato, the skilled statesman was the philosopher, wise in all things, now he is one who is wise in the art of politics, which is compared to weaving. The skilled statesman weaves together the basic characters of the ‘herds of free bipeds’ into the unity of a single cloth, creating the state as the embodiment of the one in the many and the many in the one. Those who cannot acquire virtue are banished from the state whilst those who lack nobility of character – who can be neither moderate nor courageous – become the slaves of the rest of the community.

A rational state beyond the necessary imposition of reason via law is Plato’s ideal for the city. Plato conceived government as an art. Those who understood that art of government and had been trained to exercise it ought to rule (ii 817B). And this meant training in philosophy. Further, if the ruler really were all-wise then there would be no need for laws. Laws would hinder the full exercise of the gifts that the ruler possesses (ii 295). Whereas the wise ruler could apply wisdom to determine each case according to its merits, laws apply in only a rough and ready manner to particular cases (ii 294B). For Plato, then, it was necessary to educate and train a ruling class so as to make it fit to produce good government.

This argument provokes some interesting questions. Is not the end of the philosopher-ruler producing good government beyond the law really a philosopher-people that is able to govern itself according to the good, a good that it directly apprehends? Is it possible to conceive education as a democratising purpose extending to all? How can the universal be democratically constituted from below? These are the questions that arise if one wishes to affirm Plato’s principles whilst avoiding a theoretico-elitist model of politics, philosophy and power.

Plato’s presentation of the state subject to the rule of the statesman as opposed to the rule of the law is reactionary in its foundation upon the idea that some, an elite, are natural-born leaders. It is, however, interesting to explore Plato’s ideal of the best state as one without laws. Can Plato’s ideal be shorn of its elitist naturalism? Can democratic foundations of this best state be found in an essentialist epistemology? Are human beings as such, on account of a rational nature inherent in the human species, capable of ruling themselves beyond institutions, laws, conventions? Is not this the implication of the philosopher-ruler as a general designation? If all individuals are capable of being philosophers, in that all are rational beings, then are not all individuals capable of being rulers?

For there are limits to what training and education can accomplish. The good cannot simply be the result of an educative model but has to connect with principles operative within real society. The concept of the philosopher-ruler presumes the existence of the very quality that is missing in society. As a result, the rational ideal is projected upwards and outwards to an abstract level. A philosopher-ruler is an ideal, not a reality. The ruler would rarely be fit to fulfil the function of ‘ever dispensing perfect justice with intelligence and art’ (ii 297B). Which begs the question of how Plato’s ideal of rule for the common good of the whole citizen body could be actualised. How could the educator be educated so as to democratise reason and rationalise democracy? This question would be taken up with the democratic revolutions of the modern age.





In the later period of his philosophy, Plato is concerned to develop his ideas on freedom in a more sociologically realistic context. Whereas The Republic is abstract and utopian, The Laws represent a statement of political possibilities in relation to social reality. Plato’s concessions to practice, however, do not imply a value-free pragmatism. On the contrary, Plato affirmed reason as an operative within the realm of politics, with increasing spheres of human affairs coming to be subject to rational principles. In fundamental principles, The Laws is in conformity with The Republic.

Plato undertakes the task of specifying what the laws in the second-best state should be in the Laws. Here, Plato accepts the rule of law. There is a retreat from the ideal forms of the Republic, and from the skilled ruler of the Statesman back to god as the measure of all things. And Plato shows a greater openness to the idea of freedom in other than its aristocratic meaning. ‘A community should be at once free, sane, and at amity with itself, and … these are the ends a legislator must keep in view in his enactments’. All the different kinds of constitution partake of the two basic kinds: monarchy and democracy. The Laws is a full exposition of the second best state, blending liberty, amity and wisdom, showing how this state requires elements of both monarchy and democracy.


Athens, as the most advanced example of democracy, declined as a result of ‘extravagant liberty of living’, particularly amongst the masses. This had created a lack of respect for their betters amongst the mass of people. The masses had grown impudent through ‘a reckless excess of liberty’ (Laws 701b). To check such growing impudence there was need for a willing submission on the part of the people to virtuous laws. Plato’s solution is autocracy based upon a mixed constitution. In this ideal state for the real world, the virtuous autocrat is aided by wise elders and educated guardians in ruling the masses, whose role is restricted to passive ‘conformity to the traditions embodied in the laws’ (Patterson 159).

One of the most important features of Plato’s argument in The Laws is the concern he demonstrates with scale. Plato seeks to fix the limits in order to retain human scale. One should remember the context here. Classical political communities were limited in size and contained no more than half a million people at the largest. It was a frequent practice for city-states to be limited to a fixed number. Beyond this number the city-state would be a mere aggregation and no longer a political community. 

This notion of limits is important. Since the end of the polis was the good and happy life, success was not measured in terms of increasing numerical strength but in terms of proportion. The character of the city-state was to be measured in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. And this measure could only be achieved by proper scale ensuring the close connection of the parts. Every individual is to be closely affected by the community. Communal ties would be close and access in all areas would be crucial. For a city-state to be a cohesive, comprehensible unit, quantity was to be limited to the right number. Plato’s argument concerning the right ordering of society is premised upon scale. For Plato, the city-state is scaled to human dimensions in that its boundaries are within the scope of a good day’s walk from the centre. For Plato, this is the only community in which a good life can be lived. 

Plato’s comments on the monarchies of the Eastern empires are critical of the way that overscale cities deny the good life. Plato identifies Persia as representing the most advanced example of a monarchy, explaining its degeneration since the days of Cyrus in terms of a too ‘excessive curtailment of the liberty of the commons’ (Laws 701b). (In contrast, Athens, as the most advanced example of democracy, declined as a result of ‘extravagant liberty of living’, particularly amongst the masses. This had created a lack of respect for their betters amongst the mass of people. The masses had grown impudent through ‘a reckless excess of liberty’ (Laws 701b). Plato made similar criticisms of the sprawling empire of Egypt. Persia and Egypt were tyrannies of unconstitutional monarchies in which the ruler could not possibly know what the good would amount to for the over-numerous subject population. The monarch rules according to personal interest since it is impossible in overscale cities to determine the common good. Overscale removes public affairs from the life of the people and concentrates them at the centre. The population cannot take part in public life. They are not citizens determining public affairs but subjects obeying imperial edicts. As a result, rulers cannot determine the good and the people cannot live it.

This situation contrasts with the classical city-state where public affairs were the business of every citizen and where proper scale made it possible for rulers – even tyrants – to discern and promote the good of the whole community. Of course, citizenship was an exclusive category, applying to free male adults aged over twenty, about one in nine people. Classical democracy did not imply universal suffrage. That said, the conduct of political life on the part of the citizen body was remarkably democratic, realising a participatory mode of government that contrasts markedly with the ‘slack non-participatory democracy’ of modern society (Patterson 1991). Members of the citizen body would vote in assemblies, elect officials, serve on juries and act in an official capacity in a most extensive system of popular control. Merit was assumed on account of the citizen identity, so selection by lot was a widespread practice. The citizen body thus comprised free and equal individuals.

The principle of scale was central to Plato’s argument for the realisation of the good city. The crucial feature of a humanly scaled and largely self-sufficing community is that in critical respects the conditions of its material life and governance are fixed. Quality predominates over quantity; quantity is not allowed to overwhelm quality. For this reason, the size of the city was to be fixed. In The Laws, Plato fixes the number of free families in the city-states at 5040 in order to achieve self-sufficiency (ii 738A). In this context, each person is able to know or know of all other citizens.

With the size of the city-state fixed according to human scale, Plato proceeds to discuss the constitution most appropriate to good government. 

In the Laws, Plato sets about designing the ideal community in order to reduce social friction to a minimum. Plato argues that disruptive enmities will be diminished if each person is able to live a moderate life. To achieve this requires a rough equality in the distribution of land, the economic base for a citizen’s support. Along with a fair distribution of land, cultural uniformity will also diminish social friction and foster social harmony. Plato details essential cultural requirements in terms of a ‘community of race and language and laws, and in common temples and rites of worship’. The commitment of citizens’ is fostered and sustained through having a stake in property and a stake in culture. By such mechanisms can the legislator persuade citizens to virtue. Plato’s ideal state is therefore a culturally homogeneous, agrarian citizenry living lives of modest comfort. It is a communitarian conception in that it is belonging in the sense of place rather than of property that confers citizenship. In this community, it is membership in a hearth rather than possession of land that counts. Plato was concerned more with social origins than with material interests. What matters here is proper ‘descent from citizen parents’, probably from both parents. Here, Plato reflects the traditional Athenian consciousness, a common belief and practice throughout the city-state world.

Plato’s argument for the ideal state is an explicit repudiation of the position that identifies freedom with personal liberty. Plato rejects democracy in its connection with personal freedom. His presentation of an organic or naturalistic conception of freedom can, from one perspective, be interpreted as the intellectual refinement of traditional aristocratic freedom. To this extent, Plato is an intellectual conservative, seeking to preserve traditional Athenian concepts in face of the challenge arising from new conditions. 

Plato argues that the individualism of each generates excess and issues in an unconscious collective constraint upon all and is the very antithesis of freedom. Plato is not an enemy of personal liberty. Rather, he seeks to incorporate it within a more structured, collectivist conception of freedom. Harmony issues from a combination of external constraint and internal self-control so that each is taught to define their personal freedom as a freedom that is attained in relation to other individuals. Ingrained in the soul of each will be ‘the habit of never so much as thinking to do one single act apart from one’s fellows, of making life, to the very uttermost, an unbroken consort, society, and community of all with all’ (942C). 

The individualist liberals who condemn Plato as a totalitarian thinker need to answer these questions: does personal liberty really issue in the maximum of freedom? If the individual is conceived as a sovereign autonomous being, does this not ignore the fact that the individual lives in relation to other individuals? And if individuals do live in relation with other individuals, does this not make freedom a collectivist project? And does it not then follow that the nature of these relations within a community is the crucial issue in realising freedom?

Without the communal and relational context, the maximum of personal freedom can coexist with the maximum of collective unfreedom. Freedom is a collective project that establishes the connection of the freedom of each and the freedom of all. Where freedom is stressed in only one of these aspects, liberty (emphasising each) becomes corrosive of community (emphasising all) or community becomes oppressive of liberty. 

Even with the personal liberty that individualist liberals advocate and the periodic elections that democrats advocate, Plato shows that there is no guarantee that the just social order committed to the universal interest and securing the freedom of each and all follows. Plato gives good reasons for believing that the just public could actually be destroyed as a result of liberal individualism and democratic sectionalism. Plato understood this and was therefore concerned to emphasise good government based upon justice in the universal interest.

Plato’s ideal state is an organic, harmonious social order. He identifies the crucial problem undermining the state to be anarchy, which ‘we should expel root and branch from the lives of mankind’. This was an understandable concern following the turmoil of the Peloponnesian War and the civil strife that followed. The question is whether, in repudiating the anarchy of excessive liberty, Plato goes too far in the opposite extreme, embracing the peace and order of totalitarianism. The military metaphors are telling. Plato compares society to the situation of an army at war in which ‘no man, and no woman, be ever suffered to live without an officer set over them’. Plato justifies not only external coercion but also internal coercion in the sense of indoctrination. Each individual will have ingrained in his soul ‘the habit of never so much as thinking to do one single act apart from one’s fellows, of making life, to the very uttermost, an unbroken consort, society, and community of all with all’. The way that Plato presents his case shows an awareness on his part of how extreme his conclusions are, but he deemed his strictures to be necessary. 

Plato presents what may called an organic conception of aristocratic freedom. This view is able to envisage an organic social order which incorporates civic and personal freedom in a holistic conception. This implies a harmonious society which promotes the cardinal virtues against liberty as licence and against egoism. Plato’s own ideal version of this order, one led by a pious and wise autocrat, has been influential throughout the history of the West. Indeed, as against libertarian and democratic critics who seek to deny the legitimacy of Plato’s philosophy as a philosophy of freedom, the Platonic attempt to order society according to an organic aristocratic freedom has been dominant throughout Western civilisation. This embraces a period of centuries much longer than contemporary liberal democracy. It represents a cultural and intellectual achievement that liberal condemnation of ‘totalitarianism’ cheaply dismisses.

A possible explanation of why Plato went so far in detailing every aspect of his ideal blueprint lies in the context in which Plato wrote. The Athenian polis was changing rapidly in the aftermath of its imperial phase, the old ties were withering and public commitments were dissolving. In these circumstances, Plato expresses a heightened awareness of the bonds connecting individuals to each other and to the traditional community precisely because these bonds were in the process of disappearing. Plato, aware of the value of what was being lost and fearful of the probable consequences, created a blueprint of the ideal society of the future modelled on the scaled organic community that he knew had served Athens well in the past. Perhaps the often extreme way in which Plato was led to express his views stems from an awareness of the extent to which he realised his project was futile, already lost to history.





Plato has received a great deal of attention for the reason that his political philosophy defines the concerns, concepts and terms of the rational city as constituted by justice. Plato’s concern that the common good of the whole should prevail over the potentially ruinous dissension of private interest shows why human beings require a public life in order to realise their human capacities.

Although Plato and Aristotle are frequently set in opposition to each other, so much so that it could frequently be said that one is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, their views and certainly their purposes are remarkably similar, often disagreeing over details – Plato thought private property would interfere with the public good, Aristotle thought private property would be a bulwark of the good. On the question of citizenship, Plato and Aristotle are in agreement on essentials. For both, the community is the primary entity, the essential foundation for the individual’s care and security and happiness. For Plato, society is religious at its core. The citizen is therefore to be educated in traditional religion, and to what amounts to an holy obligation to protect its values. Aristotle makes no reference to religion. Nevertheless, his definition of the human being as a zoon politikon expresses the same obligation to work at public life for the benefit of each and all. Each individual realises his or her existence to its full meaning by fully functioning within the public community. In this respect, the citizen is the highest form of political being – at least in a democracy.

Aristotle defends much the same position as Plato, though with a different approach. Like Plato, Aristotle subjects the democratic Greek city-states of his time to extensive criticism, his observations generating a valuable political sociology. Also like Plato, Aristotle’s work exhibits a clear inclination towards a mixed constitution that combines the best elements of oligarchy and democracy, although with a more ‘bourgeois’ and less elitist character than is evident in Plato. 

In other areas, Aristotle departed more widely from Plato. Aristotle believed that the division of the city into three classes caused Plato to concentrate on the life of the minority constituting the Guardian class and hence to neglect the majority of the citizens. One could counter that the function of the Guardian class was to secure the common good of all citizens, so that no group was neglected ultimately. Aristotle also argued against Plato’s arguments that the family and private property were private interests obstructing the public good. For Aristotle, the family and private property were the chief motives of human industry and formed the natural basis of the state. Crucially, Aristotle rejected Plato’s argument that human beings were specialised animals. Human nature was instinct with variety for Aristotle.

Aristotle has been treated as a ‘totalitarian’ thinker, most notoriously by Karl Popper. The ‘illiberal nature’ of his thought is considered to be tempered only by his view that the best governed polis is one in which citizens take a turn in governing (Kleinenberg 1991:21). The view that all human activity must be regulated in the common interest is, in a certain sense, ‘totalitarian’; it addresses the whole of life’s conditions to ensure the good life. But it is the nature of this regulation that determines whether ‘total’ control is illiberal in the sense of being inimical to individual liberty. The question is whether the common good is external to the individuals subject to it or whether it is constituted by these individuals as a genuine common will.

The source of the controversy lies in the individualist liberal location of freedom in the private economic realm, assigning the state merely the negative functions of keeping the civil peace. Any conception which comes to assign positive functions to the state in realising the good life for human beings is bound to seem totalitarian. Thus Barnes accuses Aristotle’s state of being ‘highly authoritarian’ in its concern to regulate the lives of individuals. Each regulation, from this individualist liberal perspective, is a curtailment of liberty, however benevolent that regulation may be. Barnes finds in Aristotle’s claim that the citizens ‘all belong to the State’, the ‘infant voice of totalitarianism’. Barnes locates Aristotle’s error in assigning ‘a positive function to the State, supposing that its goal is the promotion of the good life’. Barnes proceeds to portray a nightmare vision of the State intervening in any aspect of human life, compelling subjects ‘to do whatever will make them happy’. Since those who view the state as a promoter of good often end up as advocates of repression, the ‘lovers of liberty will prefer to assign a negative function to the state and to regard it rather as a defence and a protection against Evil’ (Barnes 1982:82/3).

Barnes presents the liberal definition of the state as an agency removed from individuals pursuing their private ends in civil society. This view presupposes the separation of state from civil society, i.e. from individuals. But this separation did not apply to Aristotle. Thus he could assign a positive function to the state as essential in realising the purposes of the individuals constituting the state.

There is a communality inherent in the concept of rational freedom in that it conceives of interaction, the union of each and all, as occurring within the political community. The ‘totalitarian’ potentialities only apply if one half of the relation, the individual as a free and moral being, is suppressed. Far from being repressive and totalitarian in potentiality and implication, the principle of rational freedom possesses an inbuilt libertarianism in the sense that it makes the freedom of the individual an integral part of the freedom of all others.

Aristotle takes pains to root ‘the state’ as the supreme natural association in the smaller national associations. The state is the ‘most sovereign’ association of the number of associations that comprise it. Each association is formed ‘with a view to some good purpose’ and, therefore, the state as the supreme association ‘will aim the highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods’ (P I.i).

The polis is good in that it was made by human beings acting in accordance with their nature. Since the end of the human being is to live well or happily, the state or polis is created naturally by human beings ‘to secure the good life’ (I.ii).

The individualist liberal privileging of the individual as against social units in developing a concept of freedom is alien to Aristotle. Since to be a substance entails being self-actualising and independent, the individual appears more as a part (P 7.8.1328a22-24; 7.9.1329a34-39; 8.1.1337a27-29). Indeed, the individual is even more of a zoon politikon than other gregarious animals through the possession of speech, which means that human beings can group together around notions of justice and good. Achieving the good life is the purpose of the polis, something ensuring the goodness of the individual. Virtue is formed by habit acquired and exercised in the polis (P 1.2.1253a2-30; NE 1.7.1097b7-11; 2.1.1103b20-26; 10.9.1179b32-34). Thus for Aristotle there is no human life outside of the polis.

To stress the individual as something distinct from the larger social units is something that is incomprehensible in Aristotle’s account of human freedom. ‘Man is by nature a political animal’ who can be free and self-realising as a substance only within the greater substance of the polis (P I.ii). Human beings act and communicate in pursuit of the good life. To realise the good life is the purpose of the polis, ensuring the goodness of the individual. There can be no human good outside of the polis (P I.ii).

To state the matter plainly against individualist liberal critics, Aristotle’s principles recognise individual freedom. More specifically, they recognise that individual freedom is best served by being located within a political and civil freedom which balances the legitimate self-realisation needs of each and all in a mutually enhancing framework.

Aristotle’s conception of the state as a component of the good life challenges the liberal and anarchist view in the form of the views of the sophists and the cynics.

For Sophists like Thrasymachus and Lycophron, the state and the law are products of convention and are thus artificial limitations upon the individual, interfering with liberty. They are imposed by the strong or are self-imposed by the weak to afford protection against injury. The modern comparison here is with contractarian liberalism and the state as policeman. The comparison with Thrasymachus is the state as the instrument of the dominant class. Although there have been those who have associated Marx with such a view (Grey 1947:325), this is misleading. Marx criticises the reduction of the state to being the instrument of the dominant class and affirms something more than justice being merely the interests of the stronger (Korner 1969:145).

For the Cynics, the individual is self-sufficient and a citizen of the world. Freedom here is pursued not in and through the state or the political association but independently of it. This position corresponds to the anarchist view and, indeed, is to be found in the criticisms that Marx uses to set up an inclusive community which does not allow human beings to pursue freedom outside of politics (Connolly 1989).

Aristotle enables us to separate the principle of the state from its reality as an instrument of private interests. The challenge to the protective state of liberalism and its negative conception of freedom is apparent when Aristotle writes that ‘a state’s purpose is not merely to provide a living but to make a life that is good’.





There is in this a principle of the political, of public life, of the state, which involves it in human growth and development and which is concerned with the common good. This ethical significance assigned to politics and the state that serves to distinguish the rational tradition from the individualist liberal tradition which effectively collapses the state into the private interests of civil society and which reduces politics to a legalistic concern with order. Aristotle himself writes that the state reduced to a military pact or exchange is hardly a state at all but a mere instrument for imposing the civil peace, a mutual guarantor not so much of justice, as Lycophron claims, but of protection.

Aristotle developed the rational conception of freedom by defining politics as creative self-activity within a mode of public life which counts as ‘good’ in realising human nature. More precisely, the good life which is the goal of the state is identified with what Aristotle calls eudaimonia, happiness, which is the goal of individuals. Aristotle’s view establishes the contextual and communal basis of individual freedom and assigns a positive function to the state in promoting the good life for all (Clark 1975:103/4). Aristotle therefore defines the purpose of politics in terms of ensuring the good or best life so as to realise the best or ‘good man’.





For Aristotle, this end of the good life is to be secured through ‘politeia’, a term that is only inadequately translated as constitution or polity, insofar as these terms imply a purely formal existence. Politeia is not confined to the formal political institutional realm but encompasses the whole social, political, economic and legal structure of the state. A politeia is an association of individuals united in their acceptance of the moral, spiritual and cultural standards prescribed by the constitution within which they live. The citizens are required to learn these standards. For this reason, Aristotle – like Plato – devotes a great deal of attention to education. The aim of this education is the good and happy life (P 1981:429/30). And this requires justice defined in terms of the universal interest of all. ‘In the state, the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community’ (P 1981:207).

The approach of Plato and Aristotle to education as a public moral training is similar. Something that modern liberal societies will struggle to understand is how such an approach could be considered as creative human self-realisation. The training involved implies not only the totalitarian intervention of the state into private life but the plainest attempt to inculcate conformity. Hence the claim that ‘What is striking in the two greatest thinkers of Greek civilisation is a massive commitment to conformity’ (Riesenberg 43/4). Is this fair and accurate? It all depends upon how one identifies the public community. If it is conceived as an external institutional body remote from the body politic, as in modern liberal society, then the charges against Plato and Aristotle would seem clearly proven. If, however, the character of the polis as an organic entity integrating the public and private selves of individuals considered as a living community, then this education is a moral training designed to raise active, rational citizens capable of identifying their personal freedom in relation to its public dimensions. ‘Conformity’ here means not some passive act that surrenders individuality to an external polity and its norms but a public awareness which fosters and enhances individuality within a living, creative, organic community to which the citizen actively contributes.

Aristotle is concerned that the young citizen should develop sense of ‘belonging to the community’, of ‘being a part of the community’. Aristotle praises Sparta for the careful attention it displays towards the young in this respect. He expresses a clear preference for a constitution in which the community rather than the family or some other private agency, organises education. Since a community has a common end or purpose, it follows that a public, rather than private, institution rightly undertakes the obligation to organise all citizens in the fulfilment of that purpose. Aristotle delineates music, athletics, social skills within a framework concerned with serving the common end of the polity. In each instance Aristotle evaluates the moral dimension of the curriculum and pedagogic technique from the perspective of usefulness to the community.

In many respects, Aristotle argues as a conservative political theorist and moralist, sceptical of innovations in government and society. The concern with the connection of good government and right morals leads Aristotle to take a public interest in every aspect of private life. There is no detail of life that Aristotle does not scrutinize and prescribe for (e.g. Book 7 of the Politics). The personal and the public are so closely integrated in Aristotle’s perspective that it comes as no surprise that private life was to be subject to close regulation for the good of the whole.

Aristotle defines political philosophy according to its central purpose of clarifying the just social order that secures the good life for each and for all (1981:207). The polity must be composed of free members. ‘But obviously something more is needed besides: I mean justice, and the virtue that is proper to citizens. For without these additions it is not possible for the state to be managed. More exactly, whereas without free population and wealth there cannot be a state at all, without justice and virtue it cannot be managed well’ (P 1981:208/9).





Justice is a ‘social virtue’, ‘one which is sure to bring all the other virtues along with it’. This points to democracy as against oligarchy, the rule of the people as against the rule of the rich, since ‘the majority have a better claim than the minority, as being stronger, richer, better, if we balance the larger numbers against the smaller’ (P 1981:211). Aristotle seeks to determine ‘what is the most desirable life’ (P 1981:391), something which he finds in the ‘proportionate relationship’ between virtue and external goods, the soul and property and the body (P 1981:392).


An important point to establish is that Aristotle’s concept of the polis is not to be identified with the state or with the formal political sphere but applies to the organised community in all its aspects. Aristotle’s ‘state’ forms part of an integral public life as the supreme natural association formed out of smaller natural associations, each formed ‘with a view to some good purpose’. The state is the supreme association of all associations and ‘will aim at the highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods’ (Aristotle P 1981:54; Edel 1982:319).

Against Plato’s ‘extreme unity’, Aristotle argues that there must be diversity in functions and membership (P 1981:103/126). The smaller associations are crucial in generating and sustaining public life and culture. The way that individuals group together within various forms of association, from household to village to city or state, emphasises the extent to which smaller groupings promote the natural aims of the participating individuals and foster a public awareness in that individuals come to take account of wider relations within the polis (Aristotle P 1981:I.ii; Evans 1987:157/8; Edel 1982:319/20).

Aristotle criticises Plato’s view that there should be as much unity as possible in the state:





For Aristotle, it is ‘reciprocal equivalence’ which keeps the state in being. Reciprocal equivalence is the principle of mutually supporting diversity of function, as Aristotle argues in the Ethics (NE V.v). In the Politics, Aristotle uses the term in a wider, more political sense, to embrace the ‘services’ which the rulers and the ruled render each other through the proper performances of their duties according to their function (P 1981:104).

Aristotle’s polis rests upon a functional system of mediation. ‘We should therefore take it that the same conditions inevitably prevail in regard to the moral virtues also, namely that all must participate in them but not all in the same way, but only as may be required by each for his proper function’ (P 1981:95).

Aristotle’s view rejects both the notion of an autonomous liberal self that is privileged over against larger social units and the notion of society as a supra-individual organism. Public life integrates both the individual and collective aspects of human nature. ‘Man is by nature a political animal’ who can be free and self-realising as a substance only within the greater substance of the polis (P 1981:59).

The polis is the community of communities; it represents the supreme community as the culmination of a process of growth and development from the social and biological part of human life. The smaller communities – the family and the village – are not devalued in Aristotle’s conception but, rather, are encompassed within the fuller and richer domain of the polis. The polis is not something external to individuals but is the supreme community that enables individuals to live the good life as self-fulfilled human beings.

What is striking about Aristotle’s conception of the community of communities is the absence of the distinction between the political and the social. The social sphere contains an inherent political significance that the concept of an urban public sphere attempts to revalue.

Aristotle establishes the ethical roots of the urban public sphere. For Aristotle, human beings are animals of a very distinctive kind. The destiny of human beings is to live in a polis if they are to fulfil their true nature. This is the telos of human beings. This polis, however, is not simply a community but a community that has achieved a shared commonality of purpose amongst individuals whose self-realisation is the good life. Politics, a politikos bios, is essential to this ethical vision of the good life for human beings, the fulfilment of their telos. 

By ‘politikon zoon’ Aristotle means ‘whose nature is to live in a polis’ (Aristotle NE I.vii). The purpose for which the state has been formed, hence the purpose of the kinds of authority for controlling individuals as members of an association, derives from the nature of human beings as political animals who ‘have a desire for life together’. ‘Common interest .. is a factor in bringing them together, in so far as it contributes to the good life of each. The good life is indeed their chief end, both communally and individually’ (P 1981:187). 

The free individual is at once self-determining and social. Individuality and communality are coexistent as expressing essential aspects of the same human nature. The polis is created by human beings ‘as a means of securing life itself’ but continues in order ‘to secure the good life’ in accordance with human nature (P 1981:59). The end of the polis is happiness (eudaimonia), the ‘complete utilization’ of human faculties under the guidance of virtue (P 1981:394/401 427/30; NE 1980:I.vii; Clark 1975:145; Evans 1987:142; Edel 1982:266ff). There is a moral imperative to exercise the human faculties as a condition of the good (P 1981:178).

That Aristotle considered that personal and civic freedom were inextricably connected in the ‘actual practice’ of the time emerges clearly in his critical examination of ‘democracies of the extreme type’, those ‘regarded as being peculiarly democratic’. The polis expresses the needs of the individual on a high plane (Edel 1982:319). For Aristotle, the polis rationally constrains self-seeking individuals in such a way as to achieve the political order which secures the framework for the common good. Aristotle thus distinguishes a genuine liberty from the licence of individualism, an individualism that is ‘divorced from law and justice’. This law and justice is available only through the state (P I.ii 1981:59/60). Aristotle is in conformity with Plato in criticising excessive personal liberty as a license that is destructive of true individual liberty. Such excessive personal liberty promotes license among slaves, women and children and therefore ‘ensures a large body of support’ for demagogues. (Patterson 161). This does not mean that Aristotle rejects personal freedom in favour of civil freedom. On the contrary, his point is that personal freedom is preserved and enhanced by being located within a collective and institutional matrix which ensures a reciprocal relationship between each and all. This matrix protects against tendencies to excess. Criticising as ‘bad’ the individualist conception of ‘liberty’ as ‘doing what one wants’, Aristotle argues that an integral framework is essential for a genuine liberty. This is the meaning of Aristotle’s argument that ‘To live by the rule of the constitution ought not to be regarded as slavery, but rather as salvation’ or ‘self-preservation’ (P 1981:332; P Barker 1958:1310a). Personal freedom requires and depends upon civic freedom. Without the civic freedom provided by the existence of, participation in and respect for the public community the individual lacks personal freedom. Individual freedom, therefore, requires a collective environment. Aristotle proceeds to identify these two forms of liberty as the ‘political’ and the ‘civic’. The recognition of legitimate political authority is not inimical to individual liberty, as the individualist liberal position maintains, but is a dimension of a deeper and richer freedom that the individual obtains in relation to other individuals and hence in relation to a much wider range of possibilities for the self-development of the full human capacities.

The simplistic liberal view that society is but an aggregate of individuals leads to a conception of freedom as licence, a society in which each lives as a self-sufficient entity pursuing merely private ends, apart from and in opposition to all others. Liberalism’s private liberty, as the limitation of the state to a negative and protective function, amounts to the abandonment of the good life.

Aristotle argues against the atomistic conception of democracy which reduces the demos to an aggregate of individuals pursuing immediate self-interest. This is licence for each individual to live as s/he likes. There is another definition of freedom in democracy, the principle that each citizen possesses the opportunity to rule, something which ensures that the polis will act according to the wishes of the citizens (P 5.9.1310a25-36; 6.2.1317b2-9).

Nevertheless, Aristotle considers both conceptions of freedom to be flawed, leading to irresponsibility and anarchy in practice. Aristotle’s argument here betrays a liberal-protective character in that it assumes evil inherent in human nature requiring the constraint of an undemocratic constitution. It is this principle of political coercion that democrats deny, so that, for Aristotle, democratic government produces evil (P 5.9.1310a25-36; 6.4.1318b39). Aristotle’s criticisms here apply to individualism; his target is the atomistic model of democracy in which politics comes to be governed by majorities of self-seeking individuals. Strauss defends the anti-democratic implications of classical thought by reference to the good of the whole as being for the good of the individual (Plato’s criticisms of democracy in The Republic VIII; Held 1987:28/32; Strauss 1988:36/8). For Aristotle, the democratic conception of freedom ignores the fact that society is composed not only of good persons but also bad persons, whose evil has to be restrained by government coercion given the flaw in their substantial nature (P 3.4.1276.b36 seqq).

Aristotle values citizenship to such an extent that a whole book of the Politics is given over to its theory. Aristotle’s discussion of the citizen and citizenship is complicated, combining both dispassionate and very interested treatment. He adopts an analytical approach to the institution, observing and examining it as a part of Greek public life. In classifying, demonstrating function and indicating ethical implications, Aristotle is cool. This Aristotle is no interested conservative or radical, determined to prove the superiority or goodness of one form over another. But that Aristotle is an ethical philosopher concerned with the search for the best regime and the best being emerges when he considers the education and actions that ensure that human beings are brought to their highest accomplishments and dignity. Aristotle is clear that the polis exists for the sake of ‘worthy and beautiful actions’. Within the polis, the citizen realises his full human potential when governing well when called and in submitting to law when obliged.

In searching for an adequate definition of citizenship, Aristotle places the emphasis upon functions as opposed to residence, legal capacity, or age: the citizen is one who governs, ‘a man who shares in the administration of justice and the holding of office’. Whatever Aristotle’s criticisms of democracy, this active conception of citizenship implies that the citizen par excellence is the member of a democracy, since democracy is the form of government that depends upon the political activity of many.

Of course, as Aristotle makes clear, other forms of government produce citizens. Oligarchies produce citizens fit for life in an oligarchy. Aristotle’s definition recognises variety and has a role for change – generation and corruption. It is activity that matters everywhere in politics, the precise nature of which defines the constitution of each polis. Aristotle’s functionalist perspective identifies this constitution with purpose or end in that an activity is maintained for a formal purpose or cause. It is this functional emphasis upon activity that gives ‘citizen’ its distinctive meaning in Western political thought and which explains the tendency to assume an automatic identity between citizenship and democracy as the rule of the people. The citizen is distinguished from the subject by active participation in the political process, action that presumes a sense of ownership of that process and which implies a creative impact upon conditions or policies.

Aristotle’s analysis revealed to him the existence of a citizenship tier in the Greek world. On this basis, Aristotle develops a hierarchical theory.

In arguing that human beings need the greater community in order to be themselves, Aristotle exposes as superficial the sophistic view that the state is an artificial restriction of the liberty of the individual. On the contrary, the politikos bios as community is natural to human beings and essential to human freedom. And it is a view that hits directly at the way that the liberal state confines ‘the political’ to specialised functions removed from the demos.

Aristotle’s state is ‘an association of free men’ as against those constitutions which are based upon the dualism of rulers and ruled (P III.vi).





The statesman is not a modern politician but a ruler over equals, persons of the same status as himself, as distinct from rulers in, for instance, a household. The statesman (politicos i.e. a citizen) is the ruler of equals, taking a ‘turn at ruling and at being ruled’ (I.i). There is a principle of citizenship here that could be turned against the liberal representative state. Similarly, Aristotle supplies the principle of the state as concerned with the common good which also serves as a critical tool to condemn the reduction of politics to private, material advantage (P III.vii).

The public life that Aristotle proposes rests upon an active conception of citizenship. Aristotle defines citizenship as ‘participation in giving judgement and in holding office’ (P 1981:169). Since Aristotle’s statesman is not a modern politician but a ruler of equals, of people of the same status, the polity is essentially a companionship of free individuals, each of which takes a ‘turn at ruling and at being ruled’ (P 1981:54; Clark 1975:105; Edel 1982:309ff). In comparison with this citizen ideal, modern representative government is a denial of the principle of citizenship, challenging the way that the liberal state confines ‘the political’ to specialised functions removed from the demos. And without citizens there is no state.





Public office is not removed from the citizen body as a specialised task. Rather, there is a conscious despecialisation of the organs of public life as policy is formulated in face-to-face citizen assemblies, as public officials are chosen by lot and decisions are taken by a show of hands. This civic structure affirms individuality in an active sense but contains it within a society of other active individuals. The citizen is individuated in social relationship to associated others. By this definition, modern representative democracy is a denial rather than a realisation of the principle of citizenship. Hence the paradox that the modern world has given birth to the individual but has prevented this individual from being a citizen. Aristotle argues that this definition of a citizen ‘is best applied in a democracy’ (III.i).





This individual life is public rather than private, taking place in the agora, the market square or market place. In this social context, politics acquires an everyday existential dimension in the discourse of real individuals. Human association, interaction and intercourse define the classical sense of urban space. This implies that physical space is subordinated to the individuals who occupy it. Urban space is humanised and internalised, acquiring a subjective character above its physical one. 

Aristotle restricts citizenship to the virtuous minority, the ‘middle people’ who are superior in goodness and in wealth (P 1981:181 180/3 267 270/2). Nevertheless, Aristotle’s conception of citizenship entails a notion of civic friendship that implies an egalitarianism which can carry over into the radical idea of a classless society of equals (Miller 1989:203 204). Aristotle’s argument offers a principle that, radicalised as a universal principle, demands an inclusive, participatory public based on the continuous and active involvement of all as citizens.





The question is how to ensure that all get a share of happiness. ‘Property too must belong to these people; it is essential that the citizens should have ample subsistence; and these are citizens. The mechanical element has no part in the state nor has any other class that is not productive of virtue’ (Aristotle P 1981:416).

Aristotle excludes the mechanic from the ranks of citizens. The mechanic is dependent upon the world of material things, a slave to property and self-interest. Continuously preoccupied in the world of commercial affairs, the mechanic lacks the time necessary for the pursuit of that leisure spent thinking about higher matters: ideals, improvement, abstractions, all those things which train the intelligence and foster judgement. The points apply to all labourers and slaves. Such groups are absorbed in material affairs, in necessity, and their minds will express that enslavement. They lack the time and interest to cultivate their minds. Although such groups are productive, Aristotle excludes them from citizenship. The reasons for this exclusion underline a major difference between Aristotle’s conception of citizenship and the modern conception. Whereas the main activity of modern citizens is limited to casual participation in a periodic elections or on an occasional jury, Aristotle’s citizen performs civic duties as an ongoing and extensive public activity. The citizen in this respect participates in debates, votes on laws and judicial decisions, and serves in executive capacities on a rotating or elective basis. For this reason Aristotle insists that citizens must have a trained intelligence. There is no room here for the casual participation and passive involvement of the modern citizen as voter-taxpayer.

Since citizenship entailed active participation in the political process, Aristotle believed that it should be restricted to those who are superior in goodness and wealth. The ‘good citizen must possess the knowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling as well as for being ruled’. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle distinguishes between rule over slaves and menials and rule of one’s equals in the political process. Here, in modern terms, Aristotle emerges as a bourgeois democratic. The bourgeois character of Aristotle’s thought emerges in his ethics when he describes the good life in terms of happiness as ‘living well and doing well’. Although this is essentially an activity of the soul in the pursuit of virtue, it requires a degree of security with respect to property and leisure with respect to the environment. In the Politics Aristotle declares that ‘a truly happy life is a life of goodness lived in freedom from impediments’. For Aristotle, members of the middle class make the best citizens and dominate the best sort of states. The rich and noble exhibit a tendency toward violence and are unwilling to obey; the poor display a tendency toward roguery and ‘are far too mean and poor-spirited’. Between the rich and poor, the middle class ‘forms the mean’ and displays that tendency towards moderation which is always best. The middle class are materially secure and comfortable and hence do not envy others. For this reason, its members listen to reason. Celebrating the life of virtuous moderation as freedom, Aristotle writes a paean to the middle class: ‘It follows that a state which is based on the middle class is bound to be the best constituted in respect of the elements [i.e. equals and peers] of which, on our view, a state is naturally composed. The middle classes [besides contributing, in this way, to the security of the state] enjoy a greater security themselves than any other class. They do not, like the poor, covet the goods of others… Neither plotting against others, nor plotted against themselves, they live in freedom from danger.’

Locating these arguments in their time and place reveals Aristotle to be a conservative thinker with a pronounced ‘bourgeois’ bias. He has presented a bourgeois interpretation of organic aristocratic freedom. Indeed, the is a reactionary dimension to Aristotle’s thought in that his celebration of the middle class implies a return to a pre-Cleisthenean conception of citizenship in which ‘the over poor, the over-weak, the utterly ignoble’ are excluded from the ideal democracy. This ideal is governed not by the opposite extreme of ‘the over-handsome, the over-strong, the over-wealthy’ but by personally free, civic-minded men of solid middle-class backgrounds. These are individuals like Solon, Charondas, and Lycurgus, all of whom Aristotle insisted belonged to his own, virtuous class.

If there is an ideal in Aristotle, then this is less the ideal of polis democracy than of ‘the true future of democracy, the middle class rule of our extended and developed modern states… the utopia which consists in making two separate spaces coincide, namely the social middle and the political centre’. Aristotle’s ‘realist utopia’ ‘is still part of the attempt to carry out the Platonic project: to place the many beneath the law of the One, to institute the reign of moderation rather than that of the democratic apeiron’ (Ranciere 1995).

Ranciere’s argument underlines the need to exercise caution in the attempts to extract an ideal of the democratic community from classical Greek thought. Much of what Plato and Aristotle write justifies the curtailment of democracy in favour of the well-governed polity. Aristotle is preoccupied with this question in the way that he distinguishes between good and bad forms of democracy in Books IV and VI of the Politics. Whereas a bad democracy is defined in terms of the demos actually coming to exercise power, a good democracy comes as close as possible to the ideal regime of the politeia by contriving to distance the demos from power (Ranciere 1995:14/5).

Aristotle’s argument is not to be dismissed as an example of class exclusivism, effecting closure around the state through the category of citizenship. Marx was very much an Aristotelian in condemning wage slavery, not merely on account of exploitation but also as a denial of citizenship and the ‘true state’. In the context of social inequality within exploitative relations in which some are dominant over others and some are dependent on others, the citizen ideal of free and active participation in public affairs is necessarily a chimera.

This is to raise a political ideal that is not to be reduced to material interest but which represents the triumph of a self-determining human species over the realm of necessity. Aristotle’s definition of the polity as a natural entity devoted to the common good exists as a critical tool with which to condemn the reduction of public life to private material advantage (P 1981:189/90). For Aristotle, ‘a state’s purpose is not merely to provide a living but to make a life that is good’. This defines a genuine public life as against the reduction of the public to power, class and material interests. ‘The state is an association intended to enable its members, in their households and the kinships, to live well; its purpose is a perfect and self-sufficient life’ (P 1981:198). The state is more than ‘a military pact of protection against injustice’ in a society concerned principally with the ‘exchange of goods’ but is concerned with the ‘virtue and vice of the citizens’. Without the conception of the good, ‘the association is a mere military alliance’, ‘a mutual guarantor of justice’ that is ‘unable to make citizens good and just’ (P 1981:196). Aristotle’s ethical conception of politics repudiates the individualist-protective liberal conception that reduces politics to a legalistic concern with civic order in the context of diremptive exchange relations.

For Aristotle, the best ordered polis is structured around a system of government that ensures that the affairs of the polis are managed in the interests of all. The polity proposed by Aristotle is an ethical union that achieves the good life in both a moral and a material sense. The political in this context consists of the practical reason (phronesis) and action (praxis) that constitutes the community (koinonia). Aristotle is a meritocrat rather than a democrat, but the task of the meritorious stratum of the population remains that of managing the affairs of the polis for the common good. Further, with the extension of democracy, opening up public life to every adult male, power ceased to be the prerogative of the well born stratum of the population and instead became a citizen activity. Athenian polis democracy remains unique in enabling an active citizenry to participate not only in the decision making processes of the assembly but also in the everyday activities of the agora.

Aristotle’s idea that the state was a natural growth from below, a supreme community which represented the consummation of all other natural unions, proved to be influential throughout the centuries. Since nature willed the good and since the state is the supreme expression of all natural associations, it followed that the state aimed at the highest good. Walter Ullman describes the influence that this idea had upon social and political thought in the Middle Ages: ‘The instrument by which this aim could be achieved was, for Aristotle, the law, that is, the articulated will of nature pronounced by the citizens. The statement of Aristotle that “the principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best could be satisfactorily proved” has always been hailed as the most important thesis of Aristotelian thought .. the popular assembly was the “sovereign” (“supreme” in Aristotle’s diction) which aimed at the promotion of the common good. The citizens possessed the natural right to partake in administration and government of the State, their State’ (Ullmann 1965:168/9). The recovery of Aristotle’s thought in the Middle Ages contained a democratic impulse which emphasised the rights of the citizen body in making the law to which they are subject. The idea of political obligation as self-assumed and the idea of sovereignty as popular and active lay just around the corner.

Aristotle offers the possibility of distinguishing between politics and the state so as to root politics in everyday life.

14 ARISTOTLE’S URBAN ECOLOGY

In arguing that human beings are natural beings and that human associations are a natural growth, Aristotle is very much an ecological thinker. Aristotle’s concern for the appropriate regimen for creative human self-realisation is an ecological concern. Aristotle’s ecological perspective is permeated by the teleological view that happiness is a form of activity, that human beings cannot be happy unless they are active. Successful action requires virtue. ‘But it should be remembered that virtue in itself is not enough; there must also be the power to translate it into action’ (P 1981:400). ‘If all this is true and if happiness is to be equated with doing well, then the active life will be the best both for any state as a whole community and for the individual’ (P 1981:401).





The problem is that some occupations – handicraft and trading – preclude this use. The individuals within these occupations cannot be members of the state, citizens. As argued earlier with reference to Marx’s Aristotelianism, the problem of exclusion in Aristotle can be addressed by restructuring work relationships and the division of labour so that the creative talents of all may be harnessed within the sphere of productive life activity.

Aristotle is very much a pioneer of urban ecology. He discusses the geography of the good city and how it relates to the organisation and purposes of the city. Aristotle investigates ‘the size of the ideal state’ (P 1981:VII.iv), going into detail on the material basis and conditions of the state in terms of population, situation, climate, functions, institutions and arrangements. Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not give numbers. For him, it is more important to establish the principles determining appropriate scale in relation to function: ‘one ought to look not at numbers but at capacity’ (P 1981:403). Both the individual and the state have functions to perform and the ‘greatest’ condition is that which is most capable if fulfilling these functions.

Aristotle argues for human scale to avoid the pathological consequences of urban overscale: ‘experience has also shown that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a populous state to be run by good laws; at any rate, we know of no state with a reputation for a well-run constitution that does not strict in numbers… law is itself a kind of order, and to live under good laws is necessarily to live in good order. But an excessively large number cannot take on any degree of order.. Moreover, beauty commonly arises in a context of size and number; so the state, too, will necessarily be most beautiful if, though large, it conforms to the limitation just mentioned’ (P 1981:404). This limitation is that of being small enough to facilitate order (taxis).





Aristotle applies a principle of limitation to the state:





Aristotle’s ethical rather than quantitative approach defines ‘habitat’ in thoroughly humanistic terms, his definition of the ‘best polis’ forming one of the greatest statements on human scale in the history of ideas. The population of the polis must be neither too small nor too great but must be of a size compatible with the good life and self-sufficiency in a political community. Moreover, it must be of a size which makes it possible for citizens to ‘know each other’s personal characters, since where this does not happen to be the case the business of electing officials and trying law suits is bound to go badly; haphazard decision is unjust in both matters, and this must obviously prevail in an excessively numerous community’.


Making the case for a more active and participatory conception of citizenships has implications for the size and scale of social and political units. When Aristotle wrote of the polis he was writing not of the state but of the city-state. For Aristotle, the size is important. ‘A state cannot be made from ten men – and from 100,000 it is no longer a state’. For Aristotle, the city state is not simply the highest form of political life, but the optimal form. A larger aggregate would produce an ill-knit congeries of people. A truly human life, Aristotle argues, is possible only in a community in which individuals know each other and are willing and able to participate in public life, ‘ruling and being ruled’ in turn. The end of the rational community is self-rule. Freedom is participation in government. Aristotle thus discusses citizenship as something to be valued highly in terms of the ‘participation in giving judgment and in holding office’ (P III.i).

Aristotle rejects the view that the greatness of a community is to be measured by its great size, demographically and geographically. People and resources are important, but the most important thing of all is balance. A polis with too large a population and area size cannot have a ‘good legal government. Law is a form of order, and good law must necessarily mean good order; but an excessively large number cannot participate in order: to give it order would surely be a task for divine power, which holds the universe together. Hence the polis must necessarily be the most beautiful with whose magnitude combines the above-mentioned limiting principle; for certainly beauty is usually found in number and magnitude, but there is a due magnitude for a polis as there is for all thing – animals, plants, tools’, or else the polis will lose ‘its true nature’ as well as its ability to function. Aristotle concludes ‘that the best limiting principle for a polis is the largest expansion of the population with a view to self-sufficiency that can be taken in at one view’ (P 1981 VII.v).

The urban public sphere is grounded in these Aristotelian premises. The concept finds appropriate scale defining magnitude and harmony as the true nature of the community or polis. Human scale is necessary for an authentic public life. This case may be argued on anthropological, democratic and political grounds. Not only will such an entity be better governed, it will also enable individuals to live the good life as truly human beings. The human scale community is decentralised, comprehensible and manageable. 

Human scale determines appropriate size, ensuring individual comprehension and control of common affairs. This view affirms that the individual exercises human powers in a social context. Aristotle’s insistence upon human scale is based upon an awareness of the conditions appropriate for enabling individual control over the common affairs of the political community and for the exercise of power in the social realm by the individual as a citizen. A large community might well command greater military and economic power but it would be ‘unjust’ in that its individuals would not be capable of participating in public affairs and making the decisions of importance. An overscale community might be generated out of political, economic and military imperatives but is ‘unjust’ in the sense that citizens are unable to participate in decision making relating to social existence. Overscale is inappropriate in that it prevents citizens from realising their distinctive human capacities for rational judgement in the social realm. 

The principle of limitation applies in other areas. The way that Aristotle deals with natural and unnatural methods of acquiring goods suggests a distinction between use value (natural) and exchange value (unnatural). Aristotle differentiates between economic activities that are natural in not being pursued beyond satisfaction and those which are unnatural in being pursued beyond the satisfaction of needs. The exchange of goods for goods or money is naturally for maintenance and self-sufficiency and is not natural.

The problem is that with the invention of money, money-making turns a means into an unlimited end in itself. Aristotle refers to the legend of Midas in order to emphasise the ‘ridiculous’ kind of wealth in which people may starve in the midst of abundance, in which there is great poverty amid great wealth (P 1981:83). There may be no limit to the amount of riches to be obtained from this mode of acquiring goods but its key characteristic is excess which fails to satisfy human needs. There ‘is no limit to the end which this kind of acquisition has in view, because the end is wealth in that form, i.e. the possession of goods .. all those engaged in acquiring goods go on increasing their coin without limit .. the end is sheer increase’ (P 1981:84).

The modern capitalist era is characterised by a heavy emphasis upon growth as an end in itself. The health and happiness of urban space is identified with sheer material increase. This expansionary tendency, generating the overscale city, is the product of capitalism’s central dynamic of accumulation. Aristotle had already identified the expansionary imperative as destructive of the limitations necessary for the appropriately scaled city.





Aristotle exposes the causal processes generating the pathological city. He targets the inflation of desires as being destructive of the principle of limitation: ‘even if one were to fix a moderate amount for all, that would still be no use: for it is more necessary to equalise appetites than possessions, and that can only be done by adequate education under the laws’. Aristotle thus argues against equality of possessions as a solution to urban problems like crime: ‘to secure the necessities of life is not the only purpose for which men turn criminal. They also wish to enjoy things and not go on desiring them; and if their desire goes beyond mere necessities, they will seek a remedy in crime’. Aristotle is emphasising the tendency of demands or desires to become unlimited. ‘For there is no natural limit to wants and most people spend their lives trying to satisfy them’ (P 1981:131).

Aristotle’s argument concerning size, scale and limitation is important in defining the good city. Aristotle makes it clear that an increase in the population above a certain number changes the relationships that exist between them and the changes the character of the city for the worse. For limits have been breached. It follows that population size needs to respect limits so that the city is comprehensible to individuals through their relationships with each other.





Aristotle favours neither small nor large scale but an appropriate scale. An appropriate scale optimises human potentiality. Aristotle is clear that potential differentiation between individuals is expanded by a greater number of individuals participating in a process of individuation. Aristotle defines the ‘best limit of a state’: ‘it must have the largest population consistent with catering for the needs of a self-sufficient life, but no so large that it cannot be easily surveyed’ (P 1981:405).

Aristotle applies this principle of limits when discussing the territory of the ideal state. ‘As regards quality of land, everyone would be in favour of the most self-sufficient; that is to say, it must be the most universally productive, for to have everything on hand and nothing lacking is to be self-sufficient. As to the size and extent, these should be such that the inhabitants can live a life that affords the leisure of a free man, but one lived in a spirit of moderation’ (P 1981:406).

The principle of limits impacts upon the conception of civic self-administration. Power is to be kept within human proportions so as to ensure everyday human contact and exchange. Human scale is not merely institutional but intellectual and spiritual and anthropological. This principle defines an existential civic arena based upon an active, rational citizenry. This rational citizenry forms the content of the city.

A particularly important classical principle with respect to the regulation of material life is autarchia. ‘Self-sufficiency’ as ‘both end and perfection’ (I.ii) refers to autarkeia, by which Aristotle means the independence of human beings living the good life in accordance with the virtues, which are an essential part of being a human being. ‘The state is an association intended to enable members … to live well; its purpose is a perfect and self-sufficient life’ (P III.ix). This implies material self-sufficiency and, as such, is important in emphasising local solutions and local control. But it means more than this, referring to a balance between mind and body, reason and instinct, needs and resources, individual and community. The principles of subjectivity and collectivity are mutual, each being conditional upon the other. The overarching moral and social community of the polis does not deny individual uniqueness. Rather, the polis is a civic arena that ensures the wholeness and roundedness of the individual. The polis rests upon a relationship between individual and community that is reciprocal. The question of the priority of the individual or the community over the other presupposes the modern antithesis of public and private, state and civil society. This simply does not apply in the classical polis. The modern divided self and the classical citizen are quite distinct. The polis is an integral civic entity in which individuality is a fusion of the personal and the social whereas modern society is predicated upon their antagonistic separation. The polis does not assert community over individuality but establishes the integral foundation for its development.

An overscale city removes urban space beyond human control and comprehension and so violates its end of social community. In contrast to the overscale city of capitalist modernity, the classical polis conception acknowledges the principle of limitation. The urban values which this book values as the permanent legacy of the polis centre upon limit, balance and harmony.

The character of the urban space depends upon the quality of its human relationships. The physical location and design of the polis was less important than the fact of human consociation. The externalised sense of urban space that characterises the modern city, prioritising design and economic function over intercourse, represents the inversion of means and ends.

The problem with any direct attempt to derive modern categories from their classical origins is that it neglects historical processes of rationalisation that have reshaped these categories along with the society within which these processes operate. Changing social relations alter the content and meaning of categories. This is particularly the case with respect to the economic factor (Anderson 1974:29/33). The bourgeois conception of political freedom represented a fusion of notions of citizenship with the economic relations of urban society. This economic factor has been the decisive agency driving modern processes of rationalisation, changing the content and character of classical themes and values in the process, violating the principles of scale, limitations and balance, generating overscale power which is quite irrational, unjust and inhuman in its effects.


15 CONCLUSIONS ON PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 
Finley makes the important point that ‘Aristotle and the classical polis died at about the same time’. ‘Henceforth the search for wisdom and moral existence concentrated on the individual soul so completely that society could be rejected as a secondary and accidental factor’. The importance of Aristotle’s politics to Western civilisation was not immediately apparent. Whilst Aristotle’s logic and physics remained influential, his politics, Finley adds, faded through being considered too intellectually tied to a political form that had faded and died and was therefore historically irrelevant. It would be a long time before Aristotle’s politics would be recovered. Similarly, it was Plato’s mysticism and his emphasis on the soul that exercised the greatest influence in the centuries that followed. Plato endured by being ‘depoliticized’ by secular and, later, religious minds concerned with salvation outside of the city-state, outside of the political community. (Patterson 181). That this should have been the case is not so surprising when one considers that both Plato and Aristotle agreed that the contemplative life of the intellect is best. True, Aristotle argues in the Politics that the active life is best, but this is written with an eye to practicality. In the Ethics, on the level of absolute principle, Aristotle insists that ‘the activity of the intellect … as the perfect happiness for man’. The individual should strive for the highest and supreme, and ‘so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and to do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us .. the best and most pleasant life is the life of the intellect, since the intellect is in the fullest sense the man’.

Plato’s conception of the soul exerted a profound influence upon Stoicism, the most important of the three schools of thought – the other being Cynicism and Epicureanism – that dominated the Hellenistic world (Patterson 181). Certainly, there was a pronounced concern with the inner life, but the inner life as directly interpreted by the senses and in the here and now (Patterson 181/2).

But the political and ethical dimensions of the work of Plato and Aristotle came back in time. To a substantial degree, the category of citizenship is a distinctively Western political phenomenon as a result of the political and ethical work on the category by Plato and Aristotle. At the level of practice, citizenship pre-dates Plato and Aristotle by centuries. They did not invent the concept so much as intellectualised it and made it available culturally across the ages. Plato and Aristotle gave the category of citizenship and the institutions supporting it a principal meaning which endured through the centuries, forming the basis of continuing controversy and speculation. One can easily dismiss Popper’s snit of Plato and Aristotle as ‘enemies’ of the ‘Open Society’. Plato and Aristotle defined and elevated to the philosophical plane the crucial terms and institutions of political practice. The concepts and theories they developed proved to be influential throughout the history of Western civilisation – though not always in the service of the modern individualist liberal position. Any number of the great thinkers from the critical eras of political change have sought inspiration and guidance from one or other or both of these founders of political philosophy, and this study will address the work of many of these - Cicero, Aquinas, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Plato and Aristotle rationalised the practice of the Greek states and raised it to the level of intellectual and theoretical reflection, thus creating the terms and values and concepts of political philosophy from which every age would continue to draw as they continued the search for the ideal within the real in their own time and context. Individualist liberal philosophers may regret the extent of the influence exerted by Plato and Aristotle. But there is no doubting the positive contribution that their philosophies have made to two millennia’s worth of politics, culture and civilisation. On Platonist and Aristotelian grounds, one can seriously doubt whether an exclusively individualist liberal culture can be viable and sustainable for anything like that length of time.

In theorising and conceptualising the issues and problems that have proved to be perennial in government and politics, and in reaching conclusions, supplying definitions and proposing solutions, ancient Greece, especially Athens and particularly through Plato and Aristotle, has profoundly influenced, and in substantial part created, Western politics. Ancient Greece has supplied not just the philosophically ideal polity in the work of its philosophers but a real, working model for participatory democracy in Athens. The philosophical and conceptual delineation of this political practice raises the real to the level of the ideal and therefore sets the benchmark for following ages. This philosophical ideal is important. In terms of the practice at the level of the real, Greek democracy and citizenship is easily criticised for its incompleteness, its discrimination and its exclusion. But from the real it was possible to discern an ideal of an organic society reasonably successful in distributing power and property in an egalitarian sense to its all people. This is the ideal which has inspired and guided later ages. To these ages, which include the even more influential Roman age, Greece bequeathed a vision of the good community founded on active participation by the best men. The ancient Greeks theorised society as human made and hence as capable of change through the creative agency of human beings thinking and politicking under law.

A great deal of the ancient Greek ethical and political intellectual achievement was absorbed by the Romans, appropriated and modified by them in particular ways. As a classical civilisation, Rome was close enough to the political practice of the Greek city-states as to make a rough adaptation of concepts and categories possible. Rome had already developed citizenship fully as a legal and political institution. There was, therefore, a great deal of continuity, with the Romans extending the discussion of duties and privileges in the Latin language, ensuring that the category continued to play a central role in Western civilisation.

What one takes from the Greek civic experience depends upon the extent to which one is capable of keeping both the real and the ideal in view, seeing the actual in terms of its potential to be rational. In terms of historical fact, Greek citizenship could be highly restrictive, with more people excluded than included. Does one emphasise citizenship as the participation of equals or the inequality implicit in a hierarchy of citizenships?; the principle of citizenship as ‘the right to rule and be ruled’ or the fact that the numerical majority in any polis were excluded from this right? Even without reference to the ideal, placing the emphasis firmly on the historical actuality, the evaluation of the Greek city-states is overwhelmingly positive. Certainly, the Greek city-states were remarkable in the ancient world in allowing a substantial number of persons citizenship privileges, numbers which expanded progressively. Also worthy of praise is the fact that the city-states created and practised an education and a politics that placed the highest value upon responsible participation. ‘Binding decisions reached by discussion and argument and ultimately by voting was a Greek invention’. On balance, taking into account not only the historical experience of the actual practices of the city-states but also the potential this experience has when raised to the level of philosophical ideal, a fundamentally positive evaluation of the Greek political experience is justified. This emphasises not citizenship as a mechanism of discrimination and exclusion but as a principle of participation which is capable of functioning democratically through the incorporation of all social classes into the political class. The idea that all human beings possess a rational nature and are therefore capable of being educated into citizenship credits the ordinary person with public awareness. The citizen is aware naturally of the importance of the public life of the community in creating, shaping and preserving self-identity, indeed civic life. As such, the ancient Greek conception of citizenship tends to democracy, addressing the potential citizen that lies within the rational nature of all human beings. In this way, the total citizenship of Greek experience speaks beyond the old city-states to the democracy of the modern age.

16 THE ECOLOGICAL INHERITANCE OF GREECE
Greek philosophy bequeathed an ambiguous legacy to Western civilisation. The process of separating humanity from the world of nature began with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in the emphasis that they placed upon the unique rationality of the human species and through their separation of the soul from the body. That said, the rationalism of these philosophers was holistic, essentialist and organicist rather than atomistic and empirical. They made use of plainly ecological categories of form, real natures, immanent growth, potentiality and its realisation.

The ancient Greeks believed that the natural world was animate, that the universe as a whole was a living organism. This idea derived from a simple analogy with the human body, with its thoughts and feelings and senses. The criticism that Plato introduced the mind-body/reason-nature dualism in contradistinction to earlier Greek thinkers is misleading in this respect. The potential to exalt reason above instinct, emotion and appetite was already inherent in the pre-Socratic analogy with the human body. Plato developed this analogy to its logical conclusion of privileging the head. Plato’s philosophy is redolent of the mind-body/reason-nature dualism. In Phaedrus, Plato refers to the psyche (soul or mind) as a charioteer controlling two horses, appetite and emotion. In Timaeus, Plato locates the powers of reason and decision in the head; the emotions and feelings in the heart; and the physical appetites in the stomach. The divine and immortal part of the soul resides in the head only. One should be careful of too sharp a separation. Plato confirmed Socrates’ argument that ‘no man does wrong willingly’ by making wrongdoing the result of a failure to coordinate mind and body. Error is merely a form of ignorance. The view emphasises the interconnection between mental and physical disease. Yet, in many respects, Plato’s thought is a striking departure from the pre-Socratics. The earthy naturalism of the earlier thinkers is placed within a clear and precise intellectual framework. This is Plato’s achievement, his contribution to ideas, science and knowledge. But there is a price to be paid to the extent that concepts are capable of becoming abstracted from that which they purport to delineate and gain a reality and significance of their own in relation to the reality they are designed to grasp. The abstract ideas and concepts of the rational human being start define nature in anthropocentric terms. Where once the sensuous human being was alive to the sights and sounds of nature, the danger becomes that of the rational human being seeking to manipulate nature conceptually and physically to meet purely human ends.

Plato and Gaia: The World as a Living Entity
With his essentialist rationalism, Plato (c427-327 BC) could incorporate the primal roots of Greek civilisation in his conception of creation which perceived the world to be a living organism. In Timaeus, Plato states that the creator created ‘a single visible living being, containing within itself all living beings of the same natural order’ (Plato Timaeus, trans HDP Lee (Harmondsworth Penguin 1965:54 42-3). Plato offered a cosmological interpretation of the world. A passage from Plato’s main treatise on nature, Timaeus, makes this clear:

Desiring then, that all things should be good and nothing imperfect, the god took over all that was visible .. and brought it from disorder into order…
 For the God, wishing to make this world most nearly like that intelligible thing which is best and in every way complete, fashioned it as a single, visible living creature .. with sense and reason.

Plato recounts how the creator made:





This interpretation contains a number of significant elements. Plato affirms the ecological principle of unity in diversity. Plato’s argument is an important anticipation of Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis. Plato emphasises the interdependence between the micro and the macro, nature within and without. Plato shows how the character and potentiality of the human species is inextricably connected with the structure and behaviour of the world. The most striking claim is that the world is not created by God. Rather, God is more craftsman than creator, fashioning a pre-existing and disordered natural world to make it fit an eternal and ideal pattern. Plato identifies this pattern with an intelligible world of forms or ideas, an unchanging world which underpins the changing and visible reality.

For Plato, all parts of the universe are aspects of, ‘contained’ within, an ideal living creature with mind and reason. There are four different forms of this living creature: ‘one, the heavenly race of gods, second, winged things whose path is in the air; third, all that dwells in the water; and fourth, all that goes on foot on dry land’.

Plato conceives nature and all natural things essentially and potentially as in the process of ‘becoming’. In moving towards the realisation of their essence they ensure the realisation of this ideal form, conceived by God.

Nature here means much more than the totality of natural things, as is it now understood. The distinction in this conception is not between nature and spirits (or supernatural) but between the changing world of necessity and the unchanging world of ‘forms’, the blueprint being founded upon a living creature. ‘Nature’ was the essence belonging to a thing, which made it behave the way it did.

The biospheric character of Plato’s thought – and of Greek thought generally – is remarkable. Plato identifies air, fire, earth and water as the basic constituents of nature and argues that these elements are linked to various aspects of human experience (for example Greek disease concepts and the theory of the four humours).

The world to the Greeks was a living organism, a world of essences in the process of becoming. Plato’s contribution here is to have shown that the world is not only alive but is rational and intelligible, a world capable of being understood and known. All life forms, including human beings, are simply parts of this totality, ordered if not created by divinity. From this perspective, perfection as divinity is the end of a process rather than coming at the beginning. As such, Aristotle could argue that the world loved God.

There are differences between Plato’s ecological consciousness and previous Greek speculation upon the origin of the world. Plato’s account is scientific – or purports to be - and seeks knowledge through more precise concepts, conceiving the physical world in terms of purpose and function as in psychology and biology. Earlier views saw creation largely in terms of sexual reproduction and growth: the Orphic world-egg was laid and hatched. Other views, like that of Democritus, saw the origin of the world as an evolution from material origins through the agency of some inherent but undersigned power (Marshall 71/2).

Plato is castigated for his rational justification of hierarchical and authoritarian structures. The ideal he portrays in the Republic is a rigidly hierarchical society ruled by an elite of guardians and soldiers. Religion is of utilitarian significance only and poetry is banned. Women are second class citizens and the whole structure is founded on slave labour. So what good is Plato?

There is a pronounced conservationist quality to Plato’s thought. Plato was a vociferous critic of the despoliation of the environment as a consequence of grazing and logging. He complained that the reckless destruction of ancient forests meant that it was no longer possible to obtain the wood in some Greek temples. Deforestation was causing erosion, climate changes and crop failure throughout the Mediterranean environment. With the multiplication of flocks, the ring of grazing land expanded uphill, enclosing the last islands of forest. As loggers felled timber for ships or cordwood for smelting, herds of goats moved in to eat the saplings, preventing the woods from growing back. Running out of good pasture, herdsmen would set more fires in order to open the way for fresh grass. Where once Attica was a fecund landscape criss-crossed by streams and rivers, now all was arid:

There are remaining only the bones of the wasted body, as they may be called .. all the richer and softer parts of the soil have fallen away, and the mere skeleton of the land being left. But in the primitive state of the country, its mountains were high hills covered with soil, and the plains .. were full of rich earth, and there was abundance of wood in the mountains.

Plato, Critias, trans B. Jowett (Oxford, 1982, 111b,c.

Plato’s criticisms applied not only to Attica but to the way that most of Greece came to suffer grievous soil erosion as a result of wanton human-made development. ‘Soil profiles in the valleys show layers of alluvium washed down from the hills; pollen sediments from lake bottoms show oak giving way to hornbeam, pine, scrub oak, and heather, which typically spring up on cleared land. Since the dates of strata in different regions do not match each other, but do match the archaeological and literary evidence of dense humans settlement, it is plain that the main culprit was not climate, but a two-legged creature and its various allies. And this has been going on for the past eight thousand years – since shortly after the start of farming in Greece’ (Eden 148/9).

Plato’s ecological legacy is ambiguous. He viewed nature as a living, interrelated organism and his criticism of the despoliation of the environment mark him as a conservationist. Yet Plato’s thought marks a clear departure from the thought of the pre-Socratics and identified reason as a category which encouraged the separation of civilisation from nature. In affirming the superiority of the mind over the body, reason over emotion, the ‘real’ world of ideas and forms over the ‘illusory’ world of the senses, Plato made a powerful contribution to philosophical and scientific knowledge but at the cost of a dualism that has run throughout Western civilisation as a fault line. Plato’s rationalism is of a peculiar kind, abstract rather than empirical. Dividing the world into two orders of Becoming (Heraclitus) and Being (Parmenides), Plato argues that the world of Being is the only real world and, as such, is the only world which contains forms and ideas which are objects accessible to rational understanding and the operations of logic and mathematics. Since the world of Becoming contains only objects of our senses it offers no firm basis for knowledge. Truth can be discovered only by logic and mathematics, not by physical science based on empirical knowledge. To the extent that they rely exclusively on their senses, human beings are enclosed in a cave of illusion and ignorance, a world in which the shadows cast on the wall appear to the sense as reality itself. The reason of logic and mathematics leads the path out of the cave of our five senses.

Aristotle followed Plato in arguing that the soul consists of reason, sensation and appetite. Like Plato, Aristotle argues that reason is the supreme controlling power. Reason distinguishes the human species from all other species, since only human beings are capable of considered action. ‘The life of the lower animals is defined by the capacity of sensation, of man as the capacity for sensation plus thought’ (Aristotle Ethics trans J.A.K. Thomson Harmondsworth: Penguin 1963:279). Although Plato and Aristotle have been criticised for introducing the dualism of reason and nature into Western civilisation, strictly speaking these arguments affirm the unity of mind and body, not their antithesis. It would be more accurate to argue that Plato and Aristotle placed reason at the top of the hierarchy of human attributes. This is a hierarchical unity which one may agree or disagree with, but it is a unity all the same.

Part of this hierarchical conception places the human species higher than other species according to the capacity of reason. The designation zoon politikon embraces the rational nature of human beings. ‘There is even such a thing as ‘natural’ virtue – the good qualities which men share with the lower animals. Every animal has a pleasure, as it has a function, of its own, and its pleasure is derived from the exercising of that function’ (Aristotle 1963:299). The ‘brutes do not share with man the power of deliberate choice, but like him they feel desire and passion’ (Aristotle 1963:83). Aristotle tempers this view with the caution that: ‘We should approach the inquiry about each animal without aversion, knowing that in all of them there is something natural and beautiful’ (Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, I, 645a, 15f).

Aristotle pioneered the method of classification by genus and species. Of the many possible ways of classifying the natural world, Aristotle chose to arrange all living beings into a single graded scala naturae according to their degree of ‘perfection’. Aristotle’s philosophy is plainly teleological and is concerned with development as the realisation of ends. Aristotle conceived the universe as a cosmic complex of organisms, each striving to attain the end assigned to it by nature. Aristotle thus explained the nature of an organism in terms of its potential and its realisation.
This cosmic complex is hierarchical. In De Anima, this hierarchy is based on the ‘powers of the soul’ possessed by each being. With each order possessing all the powers of the order below it and peculiar to it, from the nutritive (plants) to the rational (man) (Aristotle De Anima, 414a 29-415a 13), those possessing less reason are intended to serve those with more:

Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man – domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools.

 Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for the sake of man.

Aristotle Politics Everyman p 10

The criticism that Aristotle bequeathed a dualism of reason and nature to Western civilisation is not strictly true. The reason that Aristotle – and Plato before him – proposed was entirely natural. Human beings possessed a rational nature. The true criticism pertains to the hierarchical and anthropocentric character of this rationalism and the way that this grew to become a dominant part of Western civilisation. In the Middle Ages, this hierarchical conception was portrayed as the ‘Great Chain of Being’, a chain composed of a countless number of links. Nature and its creatures were conceived in these terms until well into the eighteenth century (Lovejoy 1971:59-60).

The legacy of Plato and Aristotle is to be examined as proposing an ontological structure of domination.

This can be seen in the way that Aristotle distinguishes between those things that exist ‘by way of nature’ and those that exist ‘by art’. The ‘use’ of things is determined by the distinction between things that are capable of being controlled – ‘objects’ – and things that are capable of exercising control, the source of deliberation. Aristotle makes both the social and the natural realms the field of means for techne, for ‘artifice’. As with a knife or other implements to provide us with the ‘necessities of life’, Aristotle reasons, ‘in the arts’ the ‘servant too is a kind of instrument’ (Politics, 1253b 21-30). A thing ‘by nature’ has a very different logic of action, having ‘within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness’. However, things that are ‘products of art’, ‘a bed or a coat or anything else of that sort’, ‘have no innate impulse to change’. Aristotle’s conclusion is that: ‘nature is a source or cause of being moved and being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily in virtue of itself..’ (Physics, 192b). The distinction between things ‘by nature’ and ‘by art’ thus implies action as subjects acting on objects. This distinction suggests the possibility of human beings using their reason to separate themselves from nature. Herein lies the potentiality for the abstraction of political power and the spread of instrumental rationality. Political and scientific rationalism come to form a technology of power that dominates nature within and without.

There is another sense in which Aristotle’s philosophy could give rise to an ontology and epistemology of domination based upon a distinction between art and nature. There are many different purposes for those things by art, by technical artifice. ‘As there are many actions, arts and sciences, their ends are also many; the end of the medical arts is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity .. the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends..’ Aristotle therefore proposes a hierarchy of priorities and control of all the activities of human beings in all realms. At the top of this hierarchy as the ‘most authoritative art’ is politics. Aristotle defines politics as ‘most truly the master art’ (Nichomachean Ethics, 1094a).

Aristotle’s thought is to be examined for traces of an ‘epistemology of rule’ as domination based on a hierarchical conception of the rational. Bookchin argues that: ‘the “conflict” between nature and humanity, woman and man, body and reason .. permeates Western images of civilisation’ (Bookchin 1982). The question is to what extent is Aristotle – and Plato before him – responsible for this dualism. 

The first point to make is that Aristotle’s thought is less dualistic than hierarchical. For Aristotle, the world is structured hierarchically in its causality. 

This idea of a technology of instrumental power is worth examining further, for herein lies the worm in the apple. Aristotle’s conception of techne defines humanity’s relationship to nature and also political relations between human beings. Employing the metaphor of the ship, Aristotle describes the various sorts of instruments: ‘some are living, some are life-less; in the rudder, the pilot of the ship has a life-less, in the look-out man, a living instrument’. A hierarchical relationship structures action in political and technical management,– a ‘union of those who cannot exist without each other (Collingwood, 1960:3/4), particularly the ‘natural ruler and subject’, and ‘male and female’. The world of human production is better the more broad the division of labour, as is the case with nature’s fecundity. Nature ‘makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one use’ (Politics, 1252b).

There is a potential for domination in Aristotle’s definition of being, both in the human and the natural realms of resources (or those things accessible to art). This can be seen in the way that the ‘art’ of political rule, like all other intentionality, is conceptualised from within a hierarchical world of control, describing a dualism between rule and ruled. 

Domination therefore emerges in the distinction between art and nature and in the distinction between humans and other tools – talking tools, living tools - and silent tools. From such notions would arise the instrumental rationality through which human subjects would act upon nature as an object.

The natural teleology of ends into which Aristotle integrates art forms a hierarchy of values. Supreme in this hierarchy is thinking, purely transcendent, ruling mind – ‘god’ or theos. Techne is part of a hierarchy in which mental knowledge rules supreme. Aristotle argues that ‘Reason is divine’ and that the rational part of a man is ‘the most authoritative and better part of him’ (Nichomachean Ethics 1178s). The pinnacle of human virtue is mental knowledge detached from all natural action and needs. This is set within a cosmos, the structure of the world, presided over by pure mind thinking about itself, the necessity of the ‘prime mover’ upon which ‘depend the heavens and the world of nature’ (Metaphysics, 1072a, 5-15).

The various ‘technical’ virtues are located within a hierarchical realm of natural virtues. The technical art of ‘using’ a slave to the end of well-managed household economy is comparable to the technical art of using a knife, directed towards the end of cutting. 

Aristotle defines a cosmological doctrine of hierarchical rule which culminates in the rule of the universal mind over the multiplicity of material things. Aristotle’s metaphysics concludes with an inherently political quote from the Iliad which emphasises the rule of the one over the many: ‘The rule of the many is not good; one ruler let there be’. 

Aristotle conceives individual mental activity as imprisoned, enclosed in bodily experience and constructed by its necessary habitation inside a body. Aristotle could not contemplate combining such a formal rationality with the particulars of material life and so detaches universal mentality, reason in general, the ‘impersonal principle of humanness’ from material existence. On this basis, criticises Bloch, Aristotle ‘regarded the slave only as a kind of tool capable of speech, a being not touched by matters of the soul or of love’. The universality that Aristotle defined was not a generalizable attribute available to all human beings but an element of higher divine spirit. To Aristotle, all non-Greek peoples were slaves (Bloch 1977:36).

The evolution of capitalist modernity has been characterised by the extension of instrumental rationality into all spheres of life. Here rationality as domination has become all-encompassing. The teleological argument that the cosmos as a whole is directed towards some end has been supplanted by the view that Nature is a machine, wholly determined and modelled after a human artifice – the clock. The attraction of this scientific worldview lies in giving human beings the promise of unlimited capacity to master nature for human ends. Infused with the politics of domination, this worldview was made manifest in the modern centralised state as theorised by Thomas Hobbes. The modern state emerged as an absolutist state, not as a democracy. The determinate, law-ordered manner by which the king ruled this state forms a precise analogy to the way in which God created and ordered the cosmos. The mechanical cosmos is a controllable cosmos, what Hobbes called an ‘artificial animal’. In theorising the modern state, Hobbes drew out the political implications of mechanistic science. There is a clear relation between Hobbes’ political philosophy and the new science’s mechanical conception of the cosmos see also Thomas Spragens, The Politics of Motion Lexington, KY: Un. Press of Kentucky 1973) In place of Aristotle’s teleological idea that ‘art imitates nature’ in its quest for the good, nature came to be conceived as ‘artificial’, an artefact, crafted by human hands.

The anthropomorphic, cosmological attitude which Plato and Aristotle expressed towards nature dominated European thought throughout the Middle Ages. This can be seen in The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius, the most popular book of the this period. Boethius interprets Plato’s external order as Providence. In the anthropomorphic, cosmological approach, the world is considered to be composed of a totality of inter-related things, spirits, humankind and nature. The world is animate and nature itself is a living entity, permeated with spirit, or mind. There is a fundamental unity between humankind and nature, and between the individual and society. All living forms are encompassed in a spiritual order and have a place and purpose of their own in relation to the whole.

This essentialist naturalism held sway until the scientific revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The cosmological interpretation of nature dissolved through fundamental changes in human science, technology and social relations. The price of progress in knowledge was regress in the human relation to nature. In degrading nature outside, human beings depreciated it within.

The legacy that Plato and Aristotle bequeathed to Western civilisation is ambiguous. In large part, the philosophical work of Plato and Aristotle created and defined Western civilisation. Much depends upon how one views reason and how one reconstructs the rationalism of the thought of Plato and Aristotle. If one takes the view that knowledge is the serpent in the garden, then clearly the story becomes not one of progress at but regress. Pre-Socratic religion and philosophy was organic, with Nature being conceived as a living being. Plato and Aristotle incorporated this organicism into their own philosophies but went much further in their pursuit of knowledge. In accenting the rational nature of human beings and in accenting the intelligibility of the universe, Plato and Aristotle exalted and extended human knowledge and power. But it is one small step from raising reason in a natural hierarchy to separating reason from nature. At this point, hierarchical unity becomes a flagrant dualism which pitches reason against nature, mind against body, the world of reason against the world of senses. It seems incongruous to blame Plato and Aristotle for what came many centuries after. For this dualism was made manifest only in the early modern world and was expressed in the works of philosophers and scientists who were explicit in repudiating the essentialist, holistic and organic categories of Platonic and Aristotelian thought. The modern scientific paradigm was mechanical, atomistic and empiricist. Conceiving properties to be distinct from substances meant that the substance would remain the same even if properties were changed. This implied that the qualities of the earth could be changed without any fundamental change to its nature. it was quite possible to alter without fundamentally changing its nature. The destruction of nature within and without is located in this mechanical, atomist and empiricist worldview of the past three centuries. The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle were rationalist in an entirely contrary sense – essentialist, organicist and holistic.

One of the first thinkers to consider the moral interests of animals was Plutarch. This means more than valuing animals, respecting animals along with all living forms and beings within nature. Such views were common enough. The point here refers to the attempt to extend notions of justice developed in the civil state to animals. Plutarch made this leap. He argued that there is a connection between the mistreatment of animals and the mistreatment of human beings. It is but a small step from killing animals to killing people, the mentality is the same. Plutarch thus demands the kind treatment of animals on the grounds of universal benevolence:

The obligations of law and equity reach only to mankind, but kindness and benevolence should be extended to the creatures of every species, and these will flow from the breast of the true man, as streams that issue from the living fountain.

in Jon Wynne-Tyson, Food for a Future, Centaur Press 1979:138

Applied to all living beings, the doctrine of universal benevolence implied abstention from flesh-eating.

The great advances in technology which would enable the mastery of nature and the extension of instrumental rationality came centuries after the Greeks. There was no immediate connection between the rationalism of Greek thought and technological rationality. To Plato and Aristotle, science and philosophy were entwined. Their concern was to understand nature and increase knowledge of nature and not to change or master it. The Greeks sharpened their intellectual tools for the purpose of subjecting nature to observation, not domination.

Nevertheless, by distinguishing the human species on account of its capacity for reason and by raising reason to the top of the natural hierarchy, Greek thought invited the arrogant conception of human beings as the rightful master of nature. Early Greek religion and philosophy had cautioned against the hubris that the attempt to achieve mastery of the world involved. Should human beings attempt to vie with the gods, they would be suitably. Arrogant pride would come before the inevitable fall. Hubris would be followed by nemesis. Since nature is in some way divine, the attempt to exert mastery over nature amounts to an attempt to play god. Nature would have revenge.

This was understood by Aeschylus. In The Persians, he argues that the reason that Persian king Xerxes failed in his expedition against the Greeks in 480BC was that his imperialism was aimed against nature as well as Athens. In constructing a bridge across the Hellespont, Xerxes tried to enslave the sea as well as his fellow men and was punished for his arrogance.

The scientific and philosophical achievements of Plato and Aristotle in extending the scope of human knowledge were also potential weak spots if human beings extended knowledge beyond its limits. Impressed with increasing knowledge and power, it became easy for human beings to believe that their rational nature not only raised them to the top of nature’s hierarchy but separated them from nature. It became easier to reject the danger of hubris and forget about nemesis. From this point onwards it became easier to believe that the world had been created for humanity and that all that existed was for the benefit of human beings. 

The dominant Western tradition became wedded to a view of man as a rational and perfectible being, whose history can be seen in terms of linear progress. Despite the myth of Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods only to be condemned to eternal punishment for going beyond his proper place, Western man has come to believe that he can conquer nature and interfere with its processes with impunity’ (Marshall 79).

Aristotle’s claim that man is a zoon politikon requiring a politikos bios in order to be themselves involves the claim that society, community, the city, units of human consociation are natural. Translating this as man is a ‘political animal’ who requires a ‘public life’ fails to convey the richness of Aristotle’s meaning. Aristotle is referring to far more than the politics of politicians, parties and elections competing for office within the state identified with public life. A better rendering of the original meaning would be ‘social animal’ or ‘urban animal’. Aristotle means all of these things at the same time. Human beings are creatures whose nature requires a public life involving participation in common affairs, politics, cities. Does this justify the state as such as natural? Or just a political organisation of some kind? Does the city have priority over the village? Is the city natural in a basic and immediate sense or in the sense of a higher, more evolved and progressive form? Farms and villages predate cities by some 2-3 thousand years. Cities, however, have some six or seven thousand years of history. Aristotle was well aware that there were certain peoples who did not live in cities – the Scythians, the Sarmatians. He also knew that the Greeks themselves had once lived without cities, in forests and grasslands. Aristotle’s claim is based upon philosophical anthropology rather than history. His claim is that human beings in a pre-social, pre-urban, pre-public condition were not yet fully human. They could only realised their nature through the formation of and participation of a public life which involved city-states, a political organisation that ensured the good life for its members.

‘Political animal’ in the context of classical Greece implies something more expansive than the term politics conveys in the modern world. It means ‘the Social Animal’. The institutional separation of state and civil society in the modern world did not apply in classical Greece. Politics was co-extensive with everyday social life. As a public people the classical Greeks were urban and social animals. Discourse, games, art, politics could all be found in the city. And this socio-urban existence was solidly rooted in the rural environment. The idea of escaping from the urban environment or of going back to nature would have struck the Greeks as anomalous – they were already in nature. Since wide open fields and olive groves were within walking distance and in eyesight, the Greeks had no need to create private gardens or public parks. Artistically and architecturally creative, the Greeks did nothing with respect to parks and gardens, now considered essential to urban design. Parks and gardens represent in large part idealisations of and nostalgia for a nature that the urban environment has destroyed and built over. The Greeks’ had no need of this sentimental or romantic approach to nature since they were still living side by side with it (Eisenberg 1998: 180).

Cities started to be defined by walls in the third millennium BC. Walls are an ambiguous and necessary phenomenon. They are physical forces for both exclusion and inclusion. From one angle, they are narrow and parochial, being concerned to keep all alien things out (outsiders, nomads, wild animals, hostile armies); from another, they help the city maintain form and proportion by keeping things in. Walls establish limits in a clear physical sense, concentrating and organising essential functions inside and preventing them from spilling over into the surrounding area.

Even cities whose growth was largely organic and unplanned, like the medieval cities of Europe, appreciated the importance of walls as a design consideration. Walls lent form and density to cities. And walls could be extended to accommodate necessary growth. The city walls of Strasbourg were rebuilt four times between 1200 and 1450 (Eden 1998: 370).

The city has been in ‘crisis’ since it emerged. There has always been criticism of some aspect of city life. Yet the city survives. In the contemporary world, the affluent have been both fleeing the city but also been moving back in. Across the world as a whole, urbanisation is proceeding inexorably, with increasing numbers coming to move into the city, more than making up for the numbers leaving the city in the developed world. The twin processes of urbanization and industrialisation that began in England in the eighteenth century have spread out across the world and are now beginning to transform India, China and Asia generally, Africa, South America. The world’s population is increasingly concentrated in cities. Or anti-cities, depending upon ones perspective. Capitalist urbanisation is not a true urbanisation which creates and sustains cities but an expansionary dynamic that hollows out cities as it expands them. The overscale cities of Mexico City, Calcutta and Sao Paulo are very from the civilised, humanising environments which originally defined a city but comprise sprawling shanty-towns, snarled traffic, child prostitution, open sewers and air that is foul to the senses. Do these show new cities under the strain of rapid economic development? Or are they nightmare visions of new anti-cities abandoned to economics and self-interest?

Lewis Mumford argued that the city was the product of a union between two previous ‘stages’ of human living: the hunting-and-gathering band of the Paleolithic and the farming village of the Neolithic. By portraying this union as a marriage, Mumford’s point was that the female principle of home and nurture was wedded to the male principle of predation and control. But was this a genuine union in which there was mutual respect shown and given from both sides? Or was one side the dominant partner? The union suggests a balance that has remained an ideal rather than becoming real.

The truth is that both the city and the country are natural for human beings and respond to needs that are deep in human nature. There is no war between town and country, only specific social relations that set the two essential features of human self-realisation in antagonism. From this perspective, capitalist urbanisation generating megacities and concentrating the greater percentage of the global population represents not the victory of the city over the country but the destruction of both. Proposals for Garden Cities, for the union of town and country, urban and rural, recur throughout history as an enduring, essential human need that is frustrated by contemporary trends of development. Human beings have been fleeing back and forth, from town to country and vice versa, for centuries and will continue to do so until they find repose in a genuine union of city and country.

Greece Boundaries – the need for limits
Walls are physical, man-made boundaries that establish limits and give form. Design can also make use of natural boundaries. The Greeks respected ridges and ranges as natural barriers between the city-states, and used them as natural limits to cropland, and as natural wilderness preserves. The existence of these limits had a strong restraining effect upon the exploitation of the land and upon urban sprawl. The city-states used both physical and natural limits to ensure the proper relation between town and country.

The Greeks understood the extent to which the free city must be physically and geographically limited. The city walls define these limits. 

But the bounds that must be respected are not just geographical. The most important limits are those established by nature. Nature reigns inside and outside the city walls. The laws of ecology apply – resources are not free and unlimited and everything that the city makes use of must go somewhere. A city that fails to respect natural limits invites disaster for itself and for its environs.
 
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with walls. It all depends upon the functions they perform. Walls are necessary in defining boundaries and establishing limits, lending any structure shape and form. From an ecological perspective, walls are perfectly rational. A limitless flow of energy, matter and information would produce entropic conditions that would destroy life. An organism comprises a system of walls which enable all living things to define and regulate their internal environment. In this sense, walls delineate the contours of life and all living things.

Culture as a second nature can be conceived as a system of walls. Houses, cities, villages, and so on are all means by which human beings define their own nature against nature, wilderness, the unknown. 

From this perspective, Plato’s highlighting of the rational element of human nature is a major advance upon earlier Greek thought. Human beings can consciously define their nature in relation to external nature rather than accept a passive, unconscious dependence upon external flows and processes. The Deep Ecologists’ celebration of wild, untainted nature and denigration of all human activity towards nature as anthropocentrism is unnecessarily restrictive. 

All living systems require walls, limits or boundaries of some kind. There is a need for a degree of closure and a degree of openness to the outside world. As one ascends the hierarchy of living systems, the greater is the degree of closure. At the top is the biosphere as a whole, virtually a closed system as far as matter and information are concerned, though dependent on outside energy. At the bottom is the cell, constantly exchanging matter, energy and information with the outside world. 

‘A step down from the biosphere are large bioregions defined by oceans, mountain ranges, and other barriers. While these systems are less closed than the biosphere, they still need a good deal of closure, especially when it comes to genetic information. They need barriers of rock, water or sheer distance in order to keep their integrity. But move down another step, to the ecosystem level, and the need for closure is much less. For genetic diversity to be maintained, there must be a free flow of genetic information between organisms in local ecosystems.

 We have got things exactly backward. We are blocking local gene flow with barbed wire, asphalt, and concrete, while making it all too easy for species from one continent to invade another and drive out the natives. In other words, we are blocking the flow between organisms in local ecosystems, but increasing the flow between large bioregions. As we carve up ecosystems that evolved to be seamless wholes, we stitch together continents that evolved to be separate’ (Eden 1998: 103/4).


17 HELLENISM AND ROME

Having explained how the terms, institutions and principles originated and rose to prominence in ancient Greece, the argument of this book proceeds to show how the Greek political and philosophical achieved came to be universalised in the creation of an identifiable Western civilisation. The crucial agency of this development was the Roman world. 

The Hellenistic Period
The Greek city-states were already in decline at the time that Aristotle wrote. In the third century BC they collapsed completely. For those who like their history tinged with irony, it was Aristotle’s pupil, Alexander the Great, who moved history on to the next level by extending his city into an empire, thus placing the political unit on a vastly different scale to the one Aristotle defined as rational and just. The compact appropriately scaled character of the cities was lost and the core of Greek cultural life promptly withered and died. By the second century BC, Greece had become a Roman province and the political independence, for which the citizens of the city-states had fought and beaten the empire of Persia, was lost, not with a fight but with a whimper. From a distance of a couple of millennia, we like to celebrate Plato and Aristotle are the great philosophers who raised the political unit of the city-state to an exalted level of intellectual reflection. The fact is that they were writing of an institution with many centuries of history and experience and success behind it. No sooner had Aristotle died than the city-state had disappeared into history. Plato and Aristotle probably realised that they were writing an obituary. And with Plato and Aristotle ended speculation on the city-state as a viable political unit. With political channels closed, Greek intellectual life focused upon pure philosophy and religion. The three schools which dominated the Hellenistic world were Stoicism, Epicureanism and Cynicism.

The Hellenistic philosophies developed conceptions of nature within and without that were so radically different from previous ideas as to form a new moral and intellectual edifice entirely, which later speculators on politics and the state would use in elaborating their systems. 

18 ONE GOD AND ONE NATURE
The period as a whole expressed a certain tendency towards determinism. As Zeus came to be acknowledged as a supreme god above all other gods, the conviction arose that the universe was governed by a single law. The increased study of natural phenomena changed the conception of nature. A view of nature as capricious and unpredictable was replaced by a view that nature obeyed certain definite and ascertainable laws. 

The Character of Greco-Roman Historiography: Humanism
Hellenism in its general Greco-Roman form is humanist in its tendency to eliminate the gods in favour of human agency. This approach locates the origin of all historical events in the character of human agents, whether these are individual or corporate. The underlying philosophical idea is that of the human will freely choosing its ends and being limited in their pursuit only by its own power and by the power of the intellect which apprehends them and works out means to their achievement. The logical corollary of this position is that history is the product of human will.

Hellenistic thought expressed an anti-political ethos, abandoning the world in which the individual lived as irredeemably wicked and corrupt. The transformation from Hellenic to Hellenistic thought is a complete about turn. Where Hellenic thought looked outward with the individual realising his or her inherent potentialities in the public world, Hellenistic thought has retreated from the world as impossibly hostile and intractable and taken refuge within a self-consciousness preserved and protected from the outside. Hellenistic philosophy is in this sense defeatist. An irredeemably wicked world cannot be conquered and controlled and the good person should not even try to do so. The concern of the good person is not an outer one but an inner one – how to preserve himself unspoiled in a wicked world. Hellenistic thought therefore asserts an antithesis between the character of human beings and their social environment which completely contradicts ancient Greek thought and practice. This represents a drastic closing down and off of the range of human possibilities. If human beings need each other in order to be themselves, if subjectivity is an intersubjectivity, then human self-realisation requires that attention be paid to the environment and its forces as the collective framework for human self-realisation. As Socrates informed Glaucon, the individual character is merely an abstraction when conceived in isolation from its environment, not something which possesses a real existence. The thoughts and actions of a person depend only in part on the personal character of that person. The outer world cannot simply be rejected or ignored, its forces will always impinge upon the individual character, even if only in a negative sense. As against the defeatist philosophies of the Hellenists, reacting to the aftermath of the collapse of the city-states, the ancient Greeks understood that freedom as human self-realisation depended upon a unity of the inner and outer landscapes - either human beings conquer and control the world of their own creation or that world will come to conquer and control them.

The Hellenists abandoned the wicked as irredeemably lost to human will. There is an emphasis not so much to avoid the tragedies, which are our fate, as to bear them with fortitude when fortune brings them. As the idea of fortune expands, so the power of the individual to shape the world around them and to create a future diminishes. Human beings are no longer creative agents capable of mastering fate and necessity, in the sense of the success or failure of human aims being determined by human intelligence and action. Fate is the master of human beings rather than vice versa; the freedom of the will is expressed not in the attempt to control the forces of the outer world that impinge on human life but in coming to control the inner temper with which to withstand these events. For both Stoicism and Epicureanism, the biggest moral problem was not to subject the forces of the outer world to conscious control, as the moralists of ancient Greece had taught, but to preserve a purely inner integrity and balance of mind against the outer world. The self-consciousness which the ancient Greeks identified as a power to change and, indeed, to create a human world which was capable of being brought under human control, became in Hellenistic thought an inner citadel offering a safe haven from a world now perceived to be hostile and unalterable.

Hellenistic humanism is premised on the conception of the human being as in essence a rational animal; every human being is an animal possessing the capacity of reason on account of his or her essential humanity. The human being lives a successful and full life to the extent that he or she develops that capacity and becomes actually, rather than simply potentially, reasonable: s/h becomes a force in political life and a maker of history. Sheltered inside this rationality, the individual is capable of living wisely in a corrupt and wicked world. 

There are a number of problems with this idea. The characters of individuals are formed by their actions and experiences, changing and developing with activities undertaken and achieved. This action is not purely rational in that, in large part, people act without having a clear idea of their ends. The extent of rationality in human action is easily exaggerated. To a large extent, human action is experimental, directed not by a knowledge of the ends that will be achieved but by a desire to know what will be achieved. Ends take shape as actions proceed rather than existing in complete form at the beginning of the action. Hellenistic ethical thought over-emphasises rationality as the deliberate plan or policy of the agent, paying too little attention to the unity of theory and practice on the terrain of actuality.

Diverted from political channels, thought and speculation inevitably came to place a greater emphasis upon personal freedom and correspondingly diminish the importance of civil freedom. This was certainly true of Cynicism, which expressed a total commitment to the ideal and the practice of complete personal freedom, on both the outer and the inner levels. Cynicism expressed personal freedom in its most extreme form (Patterson 1991: 184), so much so that the human made world of convention, culture, politics simply ceased to exist in its conception of freedom.

Plato and Aristotle loom large in intellectual accounts of classical Greece. They are philosophers of the first rank who covered all the main issues at stake from politics to science. They are also ‘establishment’ thinkers, intellectual conservatives whose views reflected those of socially dominant groups within the state. An alternate view was presented by the Cynics, whose explicitly anarchist and ecological arguments and practices put them at odds with those political philosophers concerned to lay down the rational and just terms of the civil state. Where Plato and Aristotle philosophised politics for the few, the Cynics extended their teaching to all humankind. The Cynics express a clear preference for the natural as against the civil condition and recognise the authority of nature as opposed to that of the state. The Cynics looked to nature rather than civil society. It was in nature where they sought the world of universals.

The Cynics radically transformed fundamental concepts of Greek thought. Where Aristotle sought to reconcile physis (nature) and nomos (custom) by imposing law on the natural occurrence of things, the Cynics of the third century BC rejected nomos in favour of physis. Their aim was to reject the artificial encumbrances of civilisation so as to be able to live solely ‘according to nature’. The Cynics earned their name by living like dogs, the Greek word kunikos meaning ‘canine’. Living an itinerant lifestyle, roaming with a knapsack and staff, the Cynics openly flouted conventional standards of decency. They travelled and lived lightly advocated the simple life in harmony with nature. The most well-known Cynic was Diogenes, who professed brotherhood with all living beings, human and animal. A vegetarian, Diogenes argued that: ‘We might as well eat the flesh of men as the flesh of other animals’. Rejecting the civil state as a corruption of nature, Diogenes was, of course, incorruptible. Visiting Diogenes in Corinth, Alexander the Great, the most powerful man in the world, offered Diogenes anything he wished. Diogenes replied: ‘You can stand out of the sunlight!’ Alexander had nothing with which to tempt Diogenes. All that Diogenes wanted, all that any living being could want, could be found in nature.





Of the three schools of Hellenistic thought, the one which was to exert the greatest influence was Stoicism. Confronted with the disintegration of the familiar political units around them, the Greek Stoics diverted their energies away from politics in the direction of something that promised them a bulwark against the uncertainty of the outer world. In locating their philosophy in nature, the Hellenists sought certainty in the stability of natural laws as against the volatility and insecurity of human institutions. Traditional ethics had located norms in the timeless and eternal truths of god, before the Sophists had made morality human made and Plato and Aristotle had restated the objective foundation in human anthropology. The Stoics made Nature their objective foundation, their god, the source of all their activities and the object of all their aspirations. 
Founded by Zeno of Citium (335-263 B C), and modified by Panaetius (185-109 B C) and Posidonius (135-50 B C), who popularised it among Roman aristocracy, Stoicism expressed a complete philosophical system. As both a technical moral philosophy and a personal ethic, the influence of Stoicism endured throughout Rome’s development from polis to empire, republic to monarchy.

The founder of Stoicism was Zeno of Citium. In defining the human being as a rational, political animal, Zeno is profoundly influenced by Aristotle, but develops this fundamentally Aristotelian conception in a new direction. To ‘live harmoniously’, to adopt Zeno’s phrase, means to live in accord with the structure of righteousness that God has positioned in nature, following wisdom, temperance, fortitude, and justice. This involves being virtuous in action, choosing and acting in accordance with the rational understanding of what is right. Identifying God with Nature, which is the most excellent of all things, Zeno argued that the wise person will adjust his will in correspondence with the occurrence of natural processes. Crucially, Zeno teaches that to live in agreement with nature is also to live according to reason:

The end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R.D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, 1925, II, 195).

The realisation of the rational nature of human beings implies harmony between individuals in society and between society and nature. The rational natural condition has no need of the state, law, bureaucracy, property or all the other institutions which order existence in a civilised state. Reason comes from within and its realisation means that human beings will no longer require institutional substitutes. The reason encased in external legal-institutional forms is internalised and expressed in the relations between each and all and between all and nature. In this condition, people live in unity. Such a society has abolished private interests arising from family and property, has eliminated distinctions of rank or race, and has no need of money or courts of law. Leaving people free, they will spontaneously fulfil their natures. There will be no need for the state and law forcing people to be free, that is, institutional means for connecting people with their true rational natures. Harmony in social relationships will ensure that individuals are free to realise their natures in relation to rather than against each other. Such a society has abolished coercion in all its forms, legal, physical, moral. The Stoic vision was one of a stateless society spread across the whole world. The important point to establish here is that this harmonious condition exists only for the rational. Human beings achieve this end only by realising their rational nature.

The Greek Stoics’ insisted that all phenomena, human and non-human, were orderly rather than capricious. Affirming the conception of natural law as a rational system governing humanity and nature connected even the most insignificant of human activities with the grand scheme of the universe. Far from diminishing the importance of human beings and their activities, human action became all the more profound in being placed in a just proportion to the rest of nature. 

The Stoics identified the supreme object of the human being as to become one with nature. The belief that a unifying spirit infused all matter, organic and inorganic, led Stoics to argue that the nature of human beings was identical with the nature of the universe. On this reasoning, human beings are not distinctive parts, superior to nature, but form one part of the whole. Whatever character human beings possess is also possessed by nature as a whole. Therefore, since human beings possess will, nature also must possess will; since human beings possess reason, nature must also possess reason. Since human beings everywhere are accustomed to subordinating means to an end, so nature subordinated means to an end and. The Stoics therefore concluded that nature and the laws emanating from nature must be rational. 

The ethical and indeed social philosophy of the Stoics derived from its physics, this rational and holistic approach to nature. Since God is in an important sense everything, all human beings possesses some part, a spark, of the divine fire. The Stoics identified this spark is the rationality which is in each and all and through which human beings become aware of their place and function in an organic universe. The Stoics are still concerned with the best life but define it very differently to the ancient Greeks. For the Stoics, to live the best life, human beings must be at one with nature. There is no place here for the polis as a natural entity or institution enabling human beings to realise their social and rational nature. The Stoics built upon the Greek idea that virtue depended on knowledge; whilst ignorance was vice and must inevitably result in vice, knowledge was virtue. The Stoics applied this conception of knowledge in a very distinctive way. Knowledge of nature and its laws, adjusting human behaviour correspondingly, was the primary and essential condition of the best life. On the basis of a physical explanation of the universe, Stoicism developed a philosophy of conduct that emphasised rationality in terms of living and acting in accordance with nature.

Since knowledge involved the use of reason, morality was inherently rational. The law by which human beings sought to live and to which they conformed their beings was a rational law. The Stoics therefore condemned all show of love, hatred, sorrow or joy as irrational impulses resulting from emotions and which ought to be suppressed rigorously. “Banish joys, banish fear, put hope also to flight, and let not grief be present”. Fear above all was to be eradicated. The highest virtue was self-control.

With human emotion as such apparently suppressed as irrational, there seems to be no room for a human or a social life whatever in Stoicism. The individual lives at a distance from other individuals and seems unable to make any response to others. The Stoic position therefore does without political life entirely. There is no room here for the politikos bios which the ancient Greeks argued was natural and essential to the social and rational nature of human beings. The Stoics explicitly separated ethics and politics and made ethics as against politics the force which regulates relations and affairs between individuals. The emphasis was upon the individual living in accordance with natural law. In so far as the individual does this, there will be no need to refer to external pressure in the form of other human beings, whether in the form of politics or community or social relations. The Stoics made ethics the concern of the individual as against the group. This was a clear repudiation of the ancient Greek view of man as a zoon politikon, a natural being capable of individuation only in a social, community or collective context. The idea of subjectivity as an inter-subjectivity disappears from the Stoic view. The Stoic position betrays a complete lack of confidence in the outer, social world. They reject that world as irredeemably wicked and corrupt and fail to see how it could be made rational and natural, a fitting context for the realisation of the rational and social aspects of the human ontology.

It would be wrong, however, to claim that Stoicism is anti-social, justifying a complete rejection of and withdrawal from the corrupt and wicked world. The Stoic position is that since society exists, the Stoic must participate in it; and since society manifests the divine, the Stoic must be concerned for its well-being. Thus Diogenes Laertius informs us that the wise man will mature in human society and ‘take part in politics if nothing hinders him’. As ‘naturally sociable and active’, the wise man will reject ‘solitude’ and will ‘undergo training and discipline in order to increase his power of physical endurance’, increasing his effectiveness in the various forms of public service. Diogenes Laertius concludes that ‘it is also one of their tenets that the exercise of virtue is a continuous activity .. the good man is always occupied in the exercise of the power of a soul which is always perfect’.

The Stoic concentration on ethics and the devaluation of politics effected a clear separation between ethics and politics that would have made little sense in ancient in Greek thought. The Stoics defined the supreme ideal for the individual in terms of an ethical standard which was apart and distinct from any ideal established by society. In arguing this way, the Stoics established the view that in terms of ethics the life and character of the individual transcends the limits established by the political community. The precedent for this line of reason was Aristotle’s distinction between the good person and the good citizen. Aristotle acknowledges here that the good person could be superior to the good citizen. The implication of this distinction is that the political community or the state is not the only – or even the best - means by which individuals could attain to the best life. The Stoics explored this view and took it to its logical conclusion. Individual human beings belonged to the general species of humanity, and in obeying the law of nature which governs this humanity, found themselves not in this or that state or particular political organisation but in the greater society of humanity. Stoicism therefore affirmed a cosmopolitanism, a cultural and moral unity, that embraced all humankind, affirming the kinship between all individuals regardless of nation or race. Each individual was, to employ the Stoic phrase, a ‘citizen of the world’.

These views have profound implications. The conviction that all human beings were governed by the same fundamental law of nature developed easily into the principle that all individuals, joined together in the search for the single natural law in order to conform themselves to its uniform pattern, were equal. Against the Platonic and Aristotelian view of the natural inequality of men, the Stoics made the fundamental equality of all human beings a basic tenet of their faith.

Natural law united all human beings together not in this or that city or state but in one great community. Human beings as citizens of the world were united as equals in the one great city of world. In this great community all human beings were brothers and sisters and equals seeking to harmonize their lives with the one sustaining law of nature. This natural law was transcendent above men’s desires. And it was immutable, as incapable of human alteration as the course of the stars. The Greek Stoics expounded the law of nature controlling human action as an immutable rational law pervading the whole universe.

The notion of each and all human beings being citizens of the world, implying a world brotherhood, could be interpreted as an ideal of a universal citizenship applicable within a world state. This is to misinterpret the Hellenistic meaning. The Stoic concern was ethical rather than political or social and they did not develop this ethic in terms of revolutionising social conditions and rearranging the political order. Upholding a strict separation between ethics and politics, the Stoics could argue that each human being possesses some tiny portion of a world spark or soul, and is brother to each and all under the sun without having to explore the political implications of this natural equality as a political and social equality radically subversive of the hierarchical and compartmentalized institutions in actually existing society. The Stoics affirmed the ultimate moral equality of all human beings but stopped far short of advocating political or social renovation in the actual world. 

Whatever its limitations with respect to social and political affairs, as an ethical position Stoicism exerted a profound influence upon the two major historical developments that followed – Rome and Christianity.





The Romans never produced a philosopher of the stature of ancient Greece. Instead, Latin scholarship absorbed and modified the achievements of the Greeks, infusing the original works with new, often significantly different meanings. In the process, the original Greek terms and concepts and institutions were often enriched, enlarged, sometimes distorted, but through all endured. In the reconfiguration that followed there was continuity and discontinuity; absorption, diffusion and modification. As Rome came to dominate the western world, the concepts and institutions that it took from Greece, in however selective a manner, came to be extended all across that world, existing and celebrated by elite and mass in different versions.

Cicero’s ideas have come to us through two main sources. The first is the system of Roman law and administration, upon which a substantial part of the legal and institutional structure of Western civilisation is based. The second is Christianity, which incorporated much of the Hellenistic philosophy within itself, particularly Stoicism. That Cicero is known through the extent his writings were absorbed into the norms and principles of Rome and Christianity serves to emphasise the importance of his influence.

Cicero (106-43 BC) was not an original or a great philosopher. Most of the ideas he presents are directly inspired by philosophers who had preceded him, particularly Plato and Aristotle, or are based on notions and issues current at the time he wrote. That said, Cicero is extremely important for a number of reasons. Cicero wrote some of the finest moral literature ever written and his influence in spreading the norms and principles of reason, citizenship etc is impossible to exaggerate. The fact that his main influence was amongst current and future ruling classes further underlines Cicero’s importance. Cicero effectively summed up and put in digestible form the moral and political ideas of ancient Greece and the Roman republic and put them in the service of the people whose political activity was and would go on to shape the world. And it wasn’t only pagans who were influenced by Cicero’s writings. Early Christian thinkers and medieval Christian civic leaders read and absorbed the lessons of his On Moral Obligations, On the Republic and other moral and educational works.

Cicero’s activity coincided with the final years of the Roman Republic. He opposed the rise of Caesar to supreme power and the transformation of Rome into an Empire. In a series of speeches known as the Philippics, Cicero condemned Mark Antony, an action which cost Cicero his life. 

Only a small number of Cicero’s works are extant. The three principal ones are all based on and elaborate upon the Stoic position: De Republica (On the Commonwealth); De Legibus (On Laws); De Officiis (On Duties). Cicero argued lucidly and persuasively on the rational capacity of human beings and on the role of reason in human affairs. Cicero covered this rational human nature in a number of interrelated respects: the notion of law as supreme reason, the existence of reason in both human beings and in God, the possession of right reason in common, the equality of all human beings, since the possession of right reason by all meant that all were capable of possessing virtue. In this way Cicero developed the idea of natural law which applied to all, which all were capable of apprehending and conforming to as rational beings and which governed the universe. Conceiving a people as a group associated by consent and a natural gregariousness, Cicero placed the emphasis upon the bonds that united individuals. On this reasoning, Cicero defined government as a trust dedicated to the welfare of citizens.

Cicero defines the human being as a moral and rational animal but also as a social animal since the divine spark that burns in the individual human being burns in every other individual as well. On this conception Cicero exhorts human beings to a life of public service. Cicero is well aware of the way in which Rome’s system of public and private rewards operates; his defence of public service, however, is firmly grounded in the psychology, physics, and cosmology of the Stoic schools. The possession of reason also entails that the human being is compelled to make use of it, ideally to the benefit of his fellow men.

Cicero took over and adapted the Stoic idea of natural law. Whereas the Stoics conceived the natural law as a universal law governing all matter, Cicero presented it as a system of morals applicable only to human society. In this delimited form, natural law constituted a standard of justice that applied to society; law and justice were therefore synonymous. This had radical implications which were soon made clear. This principle allowed Cicero to deduce that some institutions and practices which were prevalent in society were contradictory to the law of nature and hence unjust. Since the law of nature decreed that all human beings are equal, it follows that the subordination of human being to another was unnatural and unjust. Cicero placed slavery in this category. The principle applies generally to all relations of domination and exploitation and implies the end of all relations of superordination and subordination in human affairs. Cicero’s Stoicism affirmed that all human beings were born equal and sought the same end in life: conformation to the law of nature.

Although not an original philosopher, Cicero is important in giving clear and cogent expression to the new doctrine of natural law, or Law of Nature. By this is meant the idea that the entire universe is governed by a single law or system of laws, to which all natural things have an obligation to conform. Inanimate things are bound to obedience by natural necessity; animals conform blindly through their instincts; human beings are obliged only by reason. The possession of reason means that human beings are capable of apprehending the natural law, and of bringing conduct into conformity with it. 

Cicero is arguing in a different sense than modern science here. In the modern scientific sense, a natural law is equally binding upon reasonable creatures and inanimate matter. Human beings and stones are equally subject to the law of gravity. And whilst such laws are discoverable by man’s reason, human beings are not obliged only by reason to obey them. Natural laws in the sense of the law of gravity are imposed by a natural necessity and do not require the cooperation of reason.

The law of nature to which Cicero refers is not compulsory in this sense upon rational creatures. Cicero’s meaning is that the law of nature orders human conduct only to the extent that human beings apprehend it by their reason and thereby impose it on their conduct by their will. Whilst no human being need obey the natural law, they can and ought to on account of their possession of reason.

“We are so constituted by Nature as to share the sense of Justice with one another and to pass it on to all men.. what I shall call Nature is [that which is implanted in us by Nature]” (On the Commonwealth, Book III xi xii).

“For those creatures who have received the gift of reason from Nature have also received right reason, and therefore they have also received the gift of Law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. And if they have received Law, they have received Justice also. Now all men have received reason; therefore all men have received Justice. Consequently Socrates was right when he cursed .. the man who first separated utility from Justice; for this separation, he complained, is the source of all mischief”. (On the Commonwealth, Book III xi xii).

“For justice is one; it binds all human society, and is based on one Law, which is right reason applied to command prohibition. Whoever knows not this Law, whether it has been recorded in writing anywhere or not, is without Justice” (On the Commonwealth, Book III xi xii).

“There is in fact a true law – namely, right reason – which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions always influence good men, but are without effect upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human legislation is never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its operation, and to annul it wholly is impossible. Neither the senate nor the people can absolve us from our obligation to obey this law.. But there will be one law, eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, as it were, one common master and ruler of men, namely God, who is the author of this law, its interpreter and sponsor. The man who will not obey it will abandon his better self, and, in denying the true nature of a man, will thereby suffer the severest of penalties, though he has escaped all the other consequences which men call punishment” (On the Commonwealth, Book III, xxii).

With respect to human nature and the relation of human beings to the state, Cicero bases his argument on Aristotle’s dictum that human beings are naturally sociable but argues the case differently. Whilst Aristotle emphasised the differences between human beings and insisted on their variety, Cicero minimised the differences and emphasised their similarities by adding that human beings were naturally inclined to love one another. 

Cicero is in fundamental agreement with Aristotle’s conception of citizenship as the right to share in the government of the state.

However, the state to which Cicero referred was quite different to the city-states of ancient Greece. As Rome grew in size, ultimately becoming an empire, the distinction arose between the state and the city. Cicero distinguished city politics from the affairs of the greater community which lay outside the territorial limits of any one municipality. Cicero defined the state as the greater community united by a common law for the common well-being of its members. A state is “a commonwealth is the property of a people. But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The first cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man. For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even under conditions of great prosperity of every sort (is he willing to be isolated from his fellow men).. (Republic I,xxv,39).

Thus whilst Cicero agrees with Aristotle that citizenship does not connote freedom from restraint but freedom within political bonds, Cicero’s concept of libertas was quite different from the Aristotelian right of citizenship.

For Cicero, the reason and speech which all human beings possess serve as the effective mechanism by which to stir people to political and moral action. Human beings must use their reason and speech to identify the truth, which exists in the moral as well as the physical universe. Ideally, each human being should put his or her life and accomplishments at the service of others, since all human beings ‘born for each other’ and ‘to exchange acts of kindness’. Only human beings have a sense for the right kind of existence, a feeling for ‘order, propriety and moderation’.

“We ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man..
 Reason and speech constitute the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man to be maintained.

And it is no mean manifestation of Nature and Reason that man is the only animal that has a feeling for order, for propriety, for moderation in word and deed’ (Laws I v vi & II iv v). 

Cicero argues that there is an Eternal Law which is prior to all positive laws enacted by the state. From this Eternal Law derives ‘the rational principles on which our laws must be based’. “Law is not a product of human thought, nor is it any enactment of peoples, but something eternal which rules the whole universe by its wisdom in command and prohibition. Thus they have been accustomed to say that Law is the primal and ultimate mind of God, whose reason directs all things either by compulsion or restraint” (Laws I v vi & II iv v). 

(Laws II, iv, 8-II, vi,15; I,vi,18-I,vii,23; I,x,28-I,xiii,35; Republic III,xxii,33)

“For reason did exist, derived from the Nature of the universe, urging men to right conduct and diverting them from wrongdoing, and this reason did not first become Law when it was written down, but when it first came into existence; and it came into existence simultaneously with the divine mind”; “what is right and true is also eternal, and does not begin or end with written statutes”.

“It is agreed, of course, that laws were invented for the safety of citizens , the preservation of States and the tranquillity and happiness of human life, and that those who first put statutes of this kind in force convinced their people that it was their intention to write down and put into effect such rules as, once accepted and adopted, would make possible for them an honourable and happy life… It may thus be clear that in the very definition of the term ‘law’ there inheres the idea and principle of choosing what is just and true” (Laws I v vi & II iv v). 

Cicero argued for the legitimacy of private property to the good of the state and insisted that the wise man is ‘justified in caring for his private interests’ (2-32). However, Cicero is concerned to ensure that private interest is morally regulated within a conception of the public good. The civic communitarian orientation of Cicero’s argument is clear in his concern that this search for private gain be made consonant with the ‘morality, law and established institutions’ of society. Cicero’s concern is motivated by an awareness that nothing dissolves virtue more than the excessive pursuit of wealth and power. Cicero is a moralist and places great store in intention; the pursuit of wealth and power should not be personal enjoyment alone but must serve the interests of ‘our children, relatives, friends, and, above all, our country’.

The rational powers that human beings possess constitute a form of responsibility, setting a high standard to live up to in public service and life. “Law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. This reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind, is Law. And so they believe that Law is intelligence, whose natural function is to command right conduct and forbid wrongdoing”. Individuals who choose to pursue the private interest over the public are ‘traitors to social life’. Whilst a life of retirement is preferable from the perspective of ease and comfort, Cicero argues for the moral superiority of the active life, which ‘is more profitable to mankind’. Cicero insists that individuals of ability should ‘enter the race for public office and take a hand in directing the government’.

An important aspect of the doctrine of the law of nature pertains to the nature of the bonds uniting human beings. Being subject to an identical law within a political society constitutes human beings as fellow-citizens. Romans are made fellow-citizens not through bonds of race or geography, but by a unity formed in their common partnership in the Roman law. The same reasoning applies to all other states. The existence of the law of nature, extending equally to all individuals on account of their humanity entails that all individuals are on account of this natural law fellow-members with one another in a society which is co-extensive with humanity and which transcends the differences of particular states. The reason and rationality of natural law implies the unity and equality of all human beings in the largest community of all, the entire universe as a single commonwealth embracing all human beings as fellow-members.

“But what is more divine, I will not say in man only but in all heaven and earth, than reason? And reason when it is full grown and perfected is rightly called wisdom. Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and since it exists both in man and God, the first common possession of man and God is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is Law, we must believe that men have Law also in common with the gods. Further, those who share Law must also share Justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth… Hence we must now conceive of this whole universe as one commonwealth of which both gods and men are members” (On Duties I iv vii xvi).

No matter the extent to which the differences of particular states divide human beings from one another, all human beings are ‘by nature’ members of a universal commonwealth. This argument radically expands the Aristotelian notion that man is a zoon politikon, ‘by nature’ a member of a state to show that ‘by nature’ individuals are not merely fellow-citizens of one another in the state but with each in the commonwealth of all humankind. As a member of a state, the individual is a fellow-citizen only with that limited number of individuals who are members of that limited political society, not the humankind composing the wider society outside.

“we were born for Justice, and right is based, not upon men’s opinions, but upon Nature. This fact will immediately be plain if you once get a clear conception of man’s fellowship and union with his fellow men. For no single thing is so like another, so exactly its counterpart, as all of us are to one another. Nay, if bad habits and false beliefs did not twist the weaker minds and turn them in whatever direction they are inclined, no one would be so like his own self as all men would be like all others. And so, however we may define man, a single definition will apply to all. This is sufficient proof that there is no difference in kind between man and man … and indeed reason, which … enables us to draw inferences, to prove and disprove, to discuss and solve problems, and to come to conclusions, is certainly common to us all, and, though varying in what it learns, at least in the capacity to learn it is invariable”.

“Inasmuch as these considerations prove to us that the whole human race is bound together in unity, it follows, finally, that knowledge of the principles of right living is what makes men better” (On the Commonwealth, Book III xi xii).

Cicero does not argue membership of the larger society of humankind over against membership of a particular political society. On the contrary, he firmly argues that membership of a state is in accordance with the law of nature. The laws of particular states claim obedience from the citizens of those states. He argues further, however, that the obligation to the ‘closed’ [particular-political] society derives from membership of the ‘open’ [universal] society. It follows from this that the individual is obliged to perform what the state demands not because the state demands it, but because the law of nature commands its performance. If the laws of the state conform to the law of nature then the citizen ought to obey them, not on account of being the laws of the state but on account of their conformity to the law of nature.

The conception of the law of nature therefore has the important implication that the allegiance which the citizen owes to the laws of the state is conditional rather than absolute. Whilst the citizen may be compelled by superior force to obey laws which do not conform to the laws of nature, the citizen is under no moral obligation to do so. They then “no more deserve to be called laws than the rules a band of robbers might pass in their assembly”. 

“What of the many deadly, the many pestilential statutes which nations put in force? These no more deserve to be called laws than the rules of a band of robbers might pass in their assembly. For ignorant and unskilled men have prescribed deadly poisons instead of healing drugs, these cannot possibly be called physicians’ prescriptions; neither in a nation can a statute of any sort be called a law, even though the nation, in spite of its being a ruinous regulation, has accepted it. Therefore Law is the distinction between things just and unjust, made in agreement with that primal and most ancient of all things, Nature; and in conformity to Nature’s standard are framed those human laws which inflict punishment upon the wicked but defend and protect the good” (Laws I v vi & II iv v). 

What Cicero is arguing here concerning the superiority of the natural law over the law of states reads as a radically extended form of Plato’s argument that the superior wisdom of the philosopher entitled him to sit in judgement on the laws of the state. For Plato, only the very few were fitted by nature to attain philosophical knowledge and hence attain this independence. According to the doctrine of natural law, however, all human beings were endowed with reason, implying that all human beings were at least capable of becoming philosophers and hence attaining Plato’s liberty vis the state. For Cicero, every human being is endowed with reason and hence possesses the capacity to discern the natural law.

Thus Cicero develops the doctrine of the law of nature as an explicit statement of the natural equality of all human beings. ‘No single thing is so like another .. as all of us are to one another .. And so, however we may define man, a single definition will apply to all. This is a sufficient proof that there is no difference in kind between man and man; for if there were, one definition could not be applicable to all men; and indeed reason, which alone raises us above the level of the beasts .. is certainly common to us all and, though varying in what it learns, at least in the capacity to learn it is invariable’.

Cicero’s conception enriches the Greek foundations of his thought with two doctrines post-dating Plato and Aristotle - natural law and the equality of man. These are doctrines of which there are hints and suggestions in the work of Plato and Aristotle, but which express ideas which were only developed further and more explicitly long after. There is, for instance, a doctrine of natural law expounded in Aristotle’s writings.





This is an important passage which shows that Aristotle clearly anticipated the later doctrine of the natural law. It also indicates that Aristotle’s philosophy is capable of being extended in such a way as to embrace later developments. The Aristotelian roots of the natural law tradition, then, amount to much more than a starting point or base to which the later doctrine was added. The doctrine exists in both an implicit and explicit sense in Aristotle. There is, therefore, no great distinction to be made between Aristotle and those working in the natural law tradition. This point is made clear when Thomas Aquinas bases his fully developed doctrine of natural law upon this very passage of Aristotle.

There are, however, significant differences. Aristotle conceives states in the same way as he conceives a biological specimen. States are a type of organisms which exhibit a structure of laws and institutions in the same way that animal organisms exhibit a structure of bones and muscles. This method makes it possible evaluate states according to the extent to which they conform to or deviate from the natural plan. As with all natural things, there is a norm for states which is prescribed by nature. The application of this norm makes it possible to distinguish the respects in which a given constitution is ‘by nature’ and in which it is only conventional. States are better or worse to the extent that they conform to or deviate from the norm, that is, according to the way that they correspond more or less nearly to the natural plan.

Cicero’s reasoning is different. As against both Plato and Aristotle, Cicero insists first and foremost upon the natural equality of all human beings. All human individuals are equal on account of their reason and hence their capacity to discern the natural law. Significantly, what human beings discern through their reason is not an ideal model of what law ought to be, and of what it might be if a wise legislator, Plato’s Lycurgus, were to give the laws to their community. On the contrary, what rational human beings discern is an actual law, the law of a community which now exists, not as this or that particular, political, community, but the community of the universe, of which all as rational beings are members. Cicero’s doctrine does not present human beings, as merely potentially rational beings, with the ideal of a law which might one day exist should rationality prevail, but with an imperative claiming their immediate obedience on account of their actual, inherent, rationality. This approach undercuts the tendency to a theoretico-elitist model of government and politics in the rational tradition of freedom. In this model, whilst all human beings are potentially rational, only the wise and knowledgeable few are capable of transcending the irrationality of prevailing circumstances to develop their rationality to the full. These few establish the laws, the institutions, the parties etc. for the non- but potentially rational mass.

Cicero’s citizen is an actual member of two societies, and is therefore subject to two systems of law, one positive and one eternal. Aristotle’s citizen is a member of just the one society and is therefore subject only to the law of the city-state. In a sense, what Cicero writes bears some relation to Aristotle’s distinction between the good person and the good citizen. Aristotle was well aware that the good citizen, acting in conformity with the laws of the city-state, could nevertheless be a bad human being, depending upon the character of that city-state. Cicero formulates this distinction in terms of the natural law. When the positive and eternal systems of law contradict each other, the individual has the duty of rejecting the former. Further, since the eternal is always perfect, the individual bears the responsibility for all imperfections that may be expressed in personal conduct.

The impact of Cicero is difficult to assess. His ideas concerning public morality fitted the Roman Republic more than the Empire, Cicero’s last few years coinciding with the fall of the former and the rise of the latter. Whilst Cicero’s public morality exalted the patria, the precise meaning of this became somewhat obfuscated when applied to the Empire. Imperial publicists certainly attempted to identify the patria with Rome, but most residents of the Empire continued to identify their own native town or city as their true fatherland. The concept and reality of a universal Rome was far too remote and abstract to function as the patria. Problems of quantity, distance, numbers and scale ensured that Rome could never engender a model for citizen activity that transcended local and regional loyalties and ties of the people. The Empire created the cultural programmes that ensured admission to Rome’s ruling class, but could never generate the corresponding emotional intensity.

In this period, lasting centuries, a “dense” civic culture existed in which individuals were placed, by means of the census, in a complex matrix of positions which determined their military, financial, and political activities. The manner in which this took place ensured that for most crucial life events this matrix was not experienced as oppressive. In its conception, the system functioned to the benefit of freely contracting individuals pursuing their own best interests. Whether this was the way the system actually operated depended upon time and place. Most people were not affected by the repressive aspects of the political system – since the people who mattered enough to be repressed were members of the exclusive ruling class. This should not be taken to mean that the ordinary citizen lacked was not politically engaged, for he most certainly was. The main point is that, even allowing for the extent to which reality departed from the idealised conception, the legal system did give the individual an extraordinary measure of protection against arbitrary action in most areas of life. This ‘dense’ civic culture established the rich institutional matrix which articulated freedom, both as an ideal and in practice. (Patterson 1991: 218).

The notion of a civic bond makes sense only where those individuals can identify the bond through the possession of a sense of community. Relations of exploitation and domination, particularly as expressed in the production of material life, denies the existence of such a bond by dividing communities from within, thus undercutting the impulse toward a participatory civic order.
In terms of scale, Roman Italy has more in common with the modern world than the ancient. Rome emerged as a Mediterranean power during the late republican era and soon became a large state, especially large in comparison with ancient city-states. This had implications for democracy and civic freedom. Without mass communication and highly developed systems of transportation, democracy exists in inverse proportion to scale. And the scale of Rome made democracy and civic freedom impossible. The machinery of politics was concentrated in Rome, and the ruling class were determined to ensure that this remained the case. Distance ensured that the exercise of civic freedom was an impossibility as far as the vast majority of Romans were concerned (13-5).

Caracalla’s edict of universal citizenship did not help the situation. The Constitutio Antoniniana of 212 A D made all free men citizens at the price of making more provincials subject to the growing tax demands of Rome. The edict failed to stimulate a greater affection for the emperor or the Empire. The most important effect was to hasten the process of Romanization in the areas of law and administration that had been underway for centuries. The local familiarity and increasingly adoption of Roman-law principles and procedures had been underway for centuries as a result of the numbers of individuals with the legal status of Roman citizens, demanding that they be tried in accordance with their privileged status. The edict accelerated this process, increasing the numbers who could be judged under Roman law. Legal and administrative activity became Romanized throughout the Empire.

This development was more harmful than beneficial. If the health and viability of a whole is understand as a balance between the vitality of the centre and that of the diverse localities, then the absorption of heterogeneous local talent and identity into the homogeneity of the vast imperial world could be expected to have undermined local civil and commercial life. The well-being of the ancient world, wherein lay the origin of Western civilisation, depended upon the energy and vitality of innumerable little places, their health and activity being measured in a wide range of accomplishments in religion, art, politics, and literature. From this perspective, the power and wealth of the Roman Empire was more apparent than real, a hollow shell that survived through parasitic exploitation of the parts, draining local vigor and energy until the whole bloated corpse collapsed in on its own emptiness. What the Empire gained in an institutional and administrative universalism it lost in the particularism that is the true source of health and well-being.

The Empire was aiming for a universalism that was not a genuine summation of the parts, merely an overextended particularism focused on Rome. There was no harmony, balance or vitality in the parts, only parasitism and domination. Ultimately, this inflation of self-identity expanded to the level that Rome developed a theory that identified its civilisation with the universe. But the foundations of this universalism were thin and therefore Rome failed to command universal allegiance. Epictetus (55-135 AD) conceives Rome as the world, a union of rational creatures. ‘You are a citizen of the universe and a part thereof’, he declared. ‘This universe is one city (polis)’. In this global community of rational creatures, the good man is to ‘take no thought for his own private interest .. but to act as a hand or foot would act if they had reason, and never to think and plan as an isolated unit’. In asking ‘What is a man?’ Epictetus re-affirms the classical emphasis on the human need for participation within an organic community. Placing a high value upon social activity, Epictetus emphasises the vitality of creative community life: ‘What is a man? A part of a civic community (polis); indeed, of two communities, first the community of Gods and men, and then the [civic] community, which we describe as the nearest possible approach to it – the community which is a small copy of the community of the Universe’ (2-37).

As an ideal aspiration, such notions were lofty, elevating individuals above and beyond their particular concerns and loyalties. But the ideal lacked reality in terms of ground, place and being. The abstraction of the ideal left it without supporting ties and loyalties. As a moral ideal, the idea was not strong enough to induce individuals to place obligations to some abstract humankind above those to family members, neighbours and compatriots, people they could see and whose ground they shared. On the more material plane, only those whose careers in the army and the bureaucracy progressed found the rewards sufficient to embrace the ideal. Such individuals had long since severed their connections with the local world as a condition of promoting their interests on the imperial level. 

And there the most ambitious attempt at universalism that the world had yet seen stalled and faded away. That the Roman attempt at universalism ended in failure, that its experience had been an object lesson in the perils of overscale and giantism, that its power and wealth had been based on conquest and parasitism and that another thousand or more charges against the Empire ought to be taken into consideration should not blind us to the substantial and enduring achievements of this period. 

Here, the very practical and institutional genius of the Roman mind can tend to undermine the scale of the Roman achievement. Rome produced no great philosopher and is blessed with no grand concept or theory or principle celebrating its achievement. There is the power and wealth of the Empire – derivative and acquired by force which proved unable at the time to command the loyalty and allegiance of its many subject peoples. If the idea of the Empire was insufficient to inspire emotional attachment at the time, then it is less able to do so at this distance. Ancient Greece bequeathed the ideal of a participatory democracy based upon an active citizenship. That this ideal conflates several actual ideas and that the reality of ancient Greece departed in many ways from what we take the Hellenic model to be doesn’t matter in terms of the ideal. What Rome bequeathed to history is much more difficult to assess. The Rome of the Republic is very different from the Rome of the Empire. Further, given the history of war, conquest, destruction of cities and often outright annihilation of peoples makes it impossible to overlook Roman practice for the sake of the validity of its ideal principles.

Switching the focus from the ideal to the real, one discovers the enduring importance and achievement of Rome at the level of practice. Rome left not an ideal model of a perfectly rational future society but an actual institutional reality of a civilisation that functioned effectively for many centuries on the basis of a law of citizenship. Rome founded its Empire on citizenship. This may not have been the conception of active citizenship that one finds in Aristotle’s ideal. Roman citizenship was less concerned with political and anthropological notions of human self-realisation than with rewarding allegiance and service. But the institutional and legal legacy proved to be of enduring significance. Roman conceptions and regulations were written into the Corpus Iuris Civilis, which in turn came to shape the statutes of medieval city-states and, later still, the laws and values of the monarchies of northern Europe (56).

If Rome used citizenship as a mechanism focused upon political and material rewards, as a mechanism directly related to institutional power, it also proved open to more ethical conceptions. As the Empire grew, so the category of citizenship expanded in scope. In the end, Rome was at the centre of an Empire which was governed on the basis of a universal citizenship of free men and which affirmed the Stoic principle of the universal brotherhood of all humankind. This is no small point. It was Rome that universalised the conception of citizenship and affirmed the notion of a citizenship embracing all humankind, not Greece. Lacking a Plato or an Aristotle to give this conception its true philosophical stature, Rome is left to confront the elevated heights of Greek principle with an ambitious but flawed practice and institutional reality. 

Under the Roman Empire individual citizens, in effect, suffered from a bifurcated citizen identity. They were citizens of two cities, Rome and their native place. But there was no genuine balance or harmony between the two, no division of labour that ensured the satisfaction of human needs at their appropriate level or in their appropriate place. Rome squeezed the life and vitality out of local places and found that the grand legal promises that it made in return could not compensate for the loss of emotional ties. Individuals wanted more than a managed share of the wealth and power accumulated by an Empire; they wanted a real rather than an illusory universalism. In constantly elevating its gaze from city to empire to universe, Rome had shown the way. It was but a small step from the idea of Rome as a union of rational citizens of the universe to an other-worldly community of rational beings. As the earthly universalism of Rome decayed and fell, its place was taken by the other-worldly universalism of Christianity. The practical and intellectual work of the church fathers created a new system of loyalties and obligations, one based on a new conception of man and a completely new system of rewards. In the process, Christianity created a new conception of citizenship and spawned several new models for social and political life. As centuries passed, there would be a growing attempt to accentuate the enduring importance of pagan ideas and principles. This can be seen with the growing Aristotelianism of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But for a long time, Christianity developed a theory and practice that amounted to a plain repudiation of a millennia of classical life and culture and civilisation.

By evolving to embrace the notion of a universal citizenship of free men and the ethic of the universal brotherhood of all humankind, the Roman attempt to achieve universalism established the moral and institutional foundations for the great transformation of citizenship values that occurs with the rise and ascendancy and institutionalisation of Christianity. Christianity as the universal church was also the Roman Church.

 It was imperial Rome, too, that the third great development in the history of freedom took place: the rise of Christianity. The same class of people who dominated the Roman economy and popular culture and made of freedom a secular mass value were the ones who transformed the rustic Jewish sect into a world religion [universal state and universal church = middle ages]. In the process, they refashioned the original religion of Jesus into their own image, making it the first, and only, world religion that placed freedom – spiritual freedom, redemption – at the very center of its theology. In this way, freedom was to be enshrined on the consciousness of all Western peoples; wherever Christianity took root, it garnered converts not only to salvation in Christ but to the ideal of freedom. As long as Christianity survived so, at least in spiritual form, would the deep Western commitment to the ideal of freedom. In this respect the significance of the Middle Ages lies in the fact that it was dominated not only by the religion of freedom but by the spread of serfdom [personal freedom as the struggle against slavery – ancient slavery – serfdom & ties of personal dependence – wage slavery & ties of objective dependency]









The City of the Middle Ages
The city’s mistakes, as well as its successes, shaped western civilisation and, from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, started to rapidly reshape the entire world. The principal agency of this global transformation has been industrial capitalism. This globalisation has, however, always been implicit in the impulse to universalisation built into the moral, intellectual and institutional fabric of western civilisation. The key factors here are the Roman Empire and Christianity. The particular character of Christianity is important. Christianity based itself on the most Mesopotamian of the Hebrew Bible’s many ideas about humans and nature, and incorporated some crucial Hellenic and Roman elements. The most important of these elements was universalism. This was the belief that there is only the one religion, one culture, one urban plan, one landscape grid, one system of roads and aqueducts etc. Christianity builds upon the belief expressed by the Hebrews and the Stoics that behind the diversity of nature lies a deep unity of all things but, influenced by Hellenic and particularly Roman universalism, takes the next step of devising its own picture of this unity and proceeding to impose it on every land and people. The roads of Rome paved over the Rivers of Eden and continue to do so to this day, as Christianity’s universalism took the form of capitalist globalisation, transforming the world and its resources into a single market, a single system, with a single law, culture, money, commodities, trade and so on all fall within the imperatives of the same capital system. Behind the progression from Rome to Christianity to capitalism lies the same tendency to impose universalism in a particular image, an artificial ideological attempt to express the unity within nature on the basis of existing institutional power and cultural hegemony.

Church and state – goodness and justice
The flaw in the attempt to establish the universal state is easy to identify: universalist theories and programmes have tried to impose beliefs, practices and identities from above and from the outside, from the centre outwards and downwards, which can only be achieved on an enduring basis by consent. They pay insufficient attention to the need to identify the conditions and relations facilitating the individual grasp of the universal via discursive interaction.

In terms of lofty ideals, Christianity as the Universal Church had much better intentions than Rome. It lasted longer than Rome but failed nevertheless to achieve a genuine universalism. In both instances, though the ideals may have been good – a universal citizenship implying a global union of rational beings, a common brotherhood - the institutional and ideological means employed were not. Since means and ends are interdependent, with every means being also an end in the process of becoming, the true and the good are indivisible.

Most universal movements begin by exploiting a movement already underway, oversimplifying the ideas and feelings that motivate it, analysing and defining its norms and values in order to re-impose them in altered institutional form through a policy of law and order. The Catholic political thinkers produced some of the greatest works of moral and philosophical speculation in history. The problems arose as soon as these ideas came to be rigidly and forcibly applied through institutions claiming to be the embodiment of the universal. With the emphasis upon a rational ‘truth’ as opposed to a ‘goodness’ derived from human nature, they were brought into conflict with the real of people and became a tyrannical invasion of the rights of individual human beings. By failing to identify the conditions and terms of a genuine universalism, Christianity failed to realise its potential. The organic growth of Europe proceeded on the temporal rather than the spiritual side of the divide. Political rulers within nation states commanded allegiance by providing the people with universal justice and protecting them from disorder and turmoil.

The reasons why Christianity could never achieve a genuine universalism are to be found in the Christian attitude to nature, both within and without. For all of its success, Christianity was building on faulty foundations. Christianity reinforced and extended the anthropocentricism of the Graeco-Roman world, not only reproducing the separation of human beings and nature but establishing through the Fall of Man a bifurcation within a human nature between a higher and a lower self. 

The Fall of man is associated with the subsequent corruption of nature - ‘cursed be the ground for thy sake’(3:17). A slightly different translation yields a vastly different meaning – ‘cursed be the ground for thy walking upon it’. The corruption lies not in nature without but in the practical manifestation of the human nature within. Before the Fall, Adam and Eve seem to have been fruitarian gatherers in the Garden of Eden. After the Fall, they are condemned to live by the sweat of their brow, engaged in farming. They also become flesh-eaters… Banishment from Eden is followed by the domestication of plants (Cain), the domestication of animals (Abel) and to war within the human race (Cain versus Abel).

The account in Genesis shows how civilisation is built upon the awry foundations of the Fall and the corruption of nature, within and without. Cain is not only the inventor of agriculture but also built the first city. The two developments are connected. Agriculture requires a settled existence and fixed dwellings. The descendants of Cain – the sons of Lamech – invent both ‘artifices in brass and iron’ – technology - and musical instruments - art. From this moment, war between human beings has been endemic to civilisation and has been extended by technology, invention and politics, all of which are connected within a cycle which can be traced back to the Fall and which has yet to be broken (Sagan 1986:98/9)..

The implications of this account are profound. Anthropologists have established the connection between an interventionist and manipulative conception of nature, as evinced in the management of herds and domestic animals, and an authoritarian conception of political life. In order to herd animals, a pastoralist must impose his will on them. The domestication of animals therefore requires an authoritarian attitude, which in turn tends to become a model of political and social order. In contrast, societies which live by vegetable gardening, such as in Polynesia, seem to have no role for rulers and ruling. Vegetable gardening has little need for intervention. Human beings cannot impose their will on plants but must cooperate with the rhythms of nature in order to ensure their growth. Such societies foster a laissez-faire mentality towards nature. Leaving nature free to take its natural course is also associated with the presumption that human beings can organise their affairs without the need for regulation (Haudricourt 1962).

The only way to break this cycle of death and disorder is to reject notions of a corrupt nature – within and without – and recover conceptions of a beneficent natural order to which human beings ought to live in conformity with. This means rejecting the Christian dualism between humanity and nature. St Thomas Aquinas in his vast Summa Theologica expresses this dualism clearly:

There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect .. things, like plants which merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man. Wherefore it is not unlawful if men use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] states [Politics, I,3].

This reveals the fatal flaw in Christian universalism. Christianity, like Judaism, is rigidly monotheistic. There is only the one God, not many gods, spirits or idols. This God is a transcendent deity, a creator separated from the Creation. This separation serves to distance the one God from the pantheistic cults which had seen many gods operating within a living nature. This may have exalted the power of God as this transcendent creator but the consequences for nature, or the Creation, were catastrophic. By banishing the gods or spirits from nature, by raising the Creator above the Creation, nature was stripped of the sanctity it once had under pagan animism. Desanctified and inanimate, no longer sacred and stripped of protection by a guardian, nature was vulnerable to attack and exploitation. With the Fall of man, nature became corrupt, symbolising the lack of God’s grace. The Christian approach to wilderness was one of subjugation, conquest and control. Nature is considered worthless until it is ‘humanised’. Such a mentality developed easily into the idea of nature as a commodity to be exploited. By separating God the Creator from the Creation, Christianity had stripped nature of its sacred character. Worthless until humanised, the moral and ideological and psychological ground for taking nature to market had been prepared by Christianity long before the rise of capitalism.

How Christianity will react to the growth of the ecological movement is going to be curious to observe. The Pope has argued the entirely logical point that worshipping God the Creator implies a respect and a reverence for the Creation. But there are problems which will be exposed the more Christianity takes this route. How does one square this papal injunction with the notion of a corrupt nature. Genesis is explicit that the ground that human beings walk upon is cursed and that human beings can obtain their living only in the teeth of opposition to nature. For centuries, Genesis was interpreted as giving ‘man’ dominion over nature and all the plants and animals within nature. All of nature was made for human beings to use as they saw fit. There is debate over the precise terms and, no doubt, a misreading and a misinterpretation will be revealed. Even allowing for notions of stewardships, with humanity as custodians working in alliance with nature, one should be prepared for a rerun of the old Christian collision with paganism, which is where the story began. In 1973 the Catholic archbishop Robert Dwyer attacked in Los Angeles responded to the emergence of the ecological consciousness by restating the traditional Christian attitude to corrupt nature. He condemned the ‘worship of the Environment’ as the ‘new cult of Nature Unspoiled’ and as ‘anti-human’. Nature is conceived as the enemy of humanity and is frequently portrayed as the wilderness outside of the cities, existing as a constant threat to a civilisation carved out of nature. Far from embracing the ecological perspective, Christians should consider ‘Nature as Enemy, the alien force, to be conquered and broken to man’s will’ (Robert Dwyer, ‘Worship of the Environment is the New Religion’, Los Angeles Times 10 August 1973:27).

The vicious, authoritarian, repressive bent of these commands is made clear once one considers that nature within and without form a unity, that human beings are a part of nature and what happens to the one necessarily happens to the other. The nature being ‘conquered’ and ‘broken’ to an external will is human nature itself.

Christianity conceives nature, in its wild state, untransformed by human beings, to be a continuous threat to civilisation. Not nature wild and untamed but nature measured, fenced and controlled in gardens is the Christian ideal. The bliss that Adam and Eve found was in the Garden of Eden before they were expelled to live an arduous, painful existence in nature. Gardens crop up throughout the life of Jesus. The Bible presents the image of the Promised Land in terms of a well-tended garden. The garden is the ideal of a nature perfected by human will and dominion. Wilderness, in contrast, is a cursed land, ‘the antipode of paradise’. 

This is the dominant theme of the Old and New Testaments. And it ran as a dominant theme throughout the civilisation that the Judaeo-Christian religion inspired.

The hegemonic conception of pre-modern Europe was the concept of universitas. This concept implied a divine order in which living individuals were merely parts. Humanitas expressed the natural status of a person and was associated with flesh and carnality. The conception of universitas recognised not the individual as such but as ‘submerged in society’ (Ullman 1966). The emergence of the human being as an individual was associated with the fragmentation of this universitas or sacramental paradigm (Louis Dumont 14). Dumont identifies the nominalist William of Occam and Thomas Aquinas as the key figures. Occam is considered the founding father of positivism whilst Aquinas restructured the universitas doctrine by combining Christian revelation with Aristotelian concepts.

There are two important developments. In the first place there is a ‘double ordering’ of reality. This entails the conceptual division between spiritual and temporal powers, something which made naturalistic interpretations possible. In the second place there arose the belief that each person was a private individual in direct relation to god, obliged to obey only the conscience and not superiors in earthly and priestly hierarchies.

Both these developments became increasingly important in the evolution of modernity. The Protestant doctrine that individuals were equal before god fed directly into the rise of individualism. Here, the key figure was Martin Luther. The impact of this individualism alongside the separation between the church and state upon political theory can be seen in the increasing importance of social contract theories (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau are the most significant figures). In time, therefore, society (or specifically the state) was no longer conceived as a divine manifestation but as an association of contracting individuals pursuing self-interest in obedience to the dictates of natural law. Ideas whose origins can be traced to religion and religious controversy culminated in the dissolution of the sacramental viewpoint, with God being ejected from the universe. Universitas was supplanted by Societas but the old dualism and individualism remained. Society was constituted by the notion of a natural individual abstracted from any social context and was now in dualistic relation not with the divinity but its replacement - the modern centralised state. The two great abstractions of capitalist modernity, the state and the individual, were posited as an antithetical pair in liberal theory, though their dualistic relation revealed the one to be dependent on the other (Williams 1961). The dualism between spiritual and temporal powers fostered the growth of the idea that there is a natural order of things, independent of the spirit, which in turn encouraged the rise of the natural sciences. Once more, however, the old separation in which this development was rooted passed over into scientific advance and took the form of the dualism of humanity and nature. (Morris 12/3).

22 THE MEDIEVAL CORPORATE COMMUNITY

Medieval Christian Citizenship
The Foundations: the Roman and Biblical Background

The institutional and conceptual foundations of government in Europe were laid in the late Roman period from the fourth to the fifth century. What is significant about this period is that these foundations were purely Roman, unadulterated by any Germanic elements. This Roman influence is true with respect to both of the key architects of the governmental framework of Christian society, the Church of Rome and the empire of Constantinople.

The Roman Empire may have been lumbering slowly to its demise, but the fact remained that it was still equipped with an administrative apparatus that was of the highest standard and largely intact. This apparatus articulated, in all essentials, the sophisticated and extensive constitutional and legal system which characterised Roman government and which had evolved as a result of a long historical process.

In its evolution, Christianity had incorporated a good deal of Hellenism, oriental law and ancient philosophy, notably Platonism, into its ethical position. With respect to institutional forms, however, Rome was the shaping influence. This was no surprise since the nascent Christian organisation emerged from within Roman civilisation. Of the many institutional forms and ideas which Christianity absorbed from Rome, the most important was the concept of law. (Ullmann 1975: 32).

In the second and third centuries AD, the process of assimilating the pagan Roman law to Christian conceptions was begun by the purely private efforts of private writers. This process culminated in the language, substance and method of Roman law being infused into Christian theory and practice.

The background to these developments was the supplanting of the ascending theme of power by the descending theme during the period of the principate in ancient Rome. The character and complexion of society from the early fourth century onwards was set by the way that this descending theme came to be clothed in Christian garb. 

There are a number of important factors in this project of shaping the emerging Christian doctrine according to the instrument of Roman law. The point to emphasise is that Christian doctrine had come to be clothed in the language of the law long before the papacy emerged as a governmental institution. The Roman jurist Tertullian (150-230) explicitly sought to recast the religious idea through their presentation in legal forms. Such views were to prove highly influential in political terms, particularly the way that he reconceptualised the relations between God and human beings as legal relations, conceived in terms of rights and duties. (Ullmann 1975: 33). 
 
The most important event in the development of governmental ideas and institutional practice was the imperial decree of 380 which established Christianity as the religion of the empire. The decree of the emperors Valentinian II, Gratian, and Theodosius I was an event of universal historical significance. This decree focalised the papacy (the Church of Rome) as a governmental institution. From this moment on, Christianity was the only religion which enjoyed the sanction of the governmental machinery of the Empire. The development was to have unforeseen consequences in that the faith prescribed in the decree was that ‘which the apostle Peter had given to the Romans’. This meant, as the decree furthermore stipulated, that the subjects of the empire were to live according to ‘apostolic discipline and evangelical doctrine’. (Ullmann 1975: 20). The most immediate effect was to encourage the development of monocratic thinking in government and politics. As the religious and the political joined in monocratic form in the service of the unity of the empire the point was made there is only the one God, one religion, and one state. 

The effect of these developments was to raise the law as an emanation of ruling power to the highest possible status. From the perspective of Christian doctrine, the late Roman emperor was, as a person like any other human being. However, the power that the emperor possessed over his subjects in his ruling capacity was of divine rather than of human origin. The equality implied by the Christian ethic was overlaid by the hierarchical thinking of government and politics. Since the power of the emperor embodied divinity, the law had to be obeyed. (Ullmann 1975: 36).

This conception, buttressed by religious and theological considerations, gave precision to the descending theme of power as the emerging governmental ethos. At the same time that Christians attacked the emperor, they also insisted on the divine origins and character of his power. Christian apologists could depict the late Roman emperor exercising this divine power as the ‘minister of God’ in the language of St Paul. In this sense one can understand the extent to which such ideas would support the descending theme of power within a monarchical form of government.

As the Universal Church, Christianity emerged as the Roman Church. Christianity was recreated in Roman form as the relations between God and human beings came to be understood as legal relations, conceived in the framework of rights and duties and moulded into a Roman jurisprudential scheme. The translation of Christian doctrine into legal form meant that in time Europe was given its faith in the shape of the law. The fusion of Christian doctrine with Roman law had long term consequences with respect to politics and government. Christian publicists and the Roman constitutional jurists prepared the ground for the widespread adoption of the monarchical form of government. The monotheism of the Christian religion encouraged fostered a mentality which could take to monarchical ideas in government and explains the wholesale adoption of the monarchical form by the Christians nations. The monarchical forms of government practised by the late Roman emperors perfectly expressed the idea of a divine monarchy and in this way facilitated the settlement by which Constantine released Christianity from its condition of bondage and prescription. (Ullmann 1975: 34/5).

Roman law was the greatest influence upon governmental theory and practice and was instrumental in creating the legal systems of medieval Europe. There are a number of reasons for this, not least for its experience and efficiency in imposing law and order upon society. With this practice came habit, experience and custom. As the instrument forging everyday social relations and practices, Roman law shaped mentalities, expectations and habits and engendered modes of thought, action and organisation which were unique to European civilisation. Most important was the influence that Roman law had through the medium of the Bible.

In ideological and governmental respects, European civilisation was in large part shaped by the Roman law in its Justinianean codification. (Ullmann 1975: 54).

Controversy over the location of the law-creative organ placed the concept of jurisdiction in the foreground in medieval Europe. Since it denoted the authoritative fixation of right or wrong, the exercise of jurisdiction amounted to law-creative power. Jurisdiction, however, is only a part of the wider and generic concept of imperium which conferred enforceability on the law. The problem is that since the princeps (emperor) embodied all power in the late Roman Empire, jurists were concerned to identify the basis of the emperor’s power and authority. One of the greatest classical jurists, Ulpian (d 228 AD), makes reference here to the lex regia, which states that the Roman people had renounced its power in handing them over to the Ruler. This means that the ascending theme of government and law was operational in the republican period and was supplanted by the descending theme when the Roman people voluntarily transferred its own powers to the prince. The power originally possessed by the Roman people was the imperium. This imperium has no relation to empire but refers to the sum total of jurisdictional power which serves to fix and formulate binding rules in the form of the law. (Ullmann 1975: 56).

The point to be focused upon is the clear distinction and opposition between the descending and ascending themes of government and law. In technical terms, usages and practices were endowed with legal character through the will of the people (the voluntas populi in contrast to the voluntas principis). The effectiveness of the ascending theme was demonstrated by customary law, which implied that the law of the Ruler could be nullified by the will of the people. 

Justinian’s Code clearly envisaged that the law of the Ruler could be nullified by customary law. The Code understood ‘positive’ or enacted law as a grant from the Ruler, it was given and understood as the Ruler’s concession. In contrast, customary law was made by the people and took form and existed through repeated performances and practices; it was infused with the will of the people. (Ullmann 1975: 62/3).
These points need to be understood in order to grasp the process of imitation by the Western emperors. The completion of Justinian’s codificatory work of 534 was just the end of one phase in a continuous legislative development. The overall effect of continuous legislative measures extending and entrenching Roman law was to accelerate the secularisation of the principles and practices of governmental institutions as the progressive shedding of religious encumbrances. In losing its spiritual support, rationalisation did not reacquaint itself with its long lost anthropological and ontological dimension but, instead, proceeded along narrowly legal and institutional lines. The morality of happiness and the good world had been consigned to a religious ethics that was slowly being excluded from government and politics. (Ullmann 1975: 85).

The historical and doctrinal development of this period was encapsulated in the claim made by Pope Leo 1 (440-61) that he was the juristic successor to the powers and functions given by Christ to St Peter. Using his mastery of Roman law and technique, Leo presented a forthright elucidation of the monarchic function of the Pope which has proved enduring, at least with respect to the Roman Church. (Ullmann 1975: 25). It took the realism of Pope Gregory to ensure that papal government became the reality in the Middle Ages. Western Europe as a cultural entity emerged infused with Roman features through the policies of Gregory, earning him the title ‘Father of Europe’. Sending out his missionaries, Gregory presided over the Christianising of Northern and Central Europe – and all of this on Roman terms. 

On account of popular illiteracy, the spread of ideas was facilitated by the adoption of Roman liturgy. Liturgy was the means by which often complex ideas could be presented in comprehensible form by ritual gestures, actions, and so on, each expressing a symbolic meaning that all could understand. In this respect, liturgy displaced literary expression, explaining the widespread adoption of Roman principles and practices in government. (Ullmann 1975: 52).

The influence of the Latinized Bible was even more important in spreading the ethos of the theocratic-descending thesis of government. The Latin Bible may have been the most important factor in ensuring that the West became Roman and in facilitating the expansion and influence of the principles enshrined in Roman law. The Vulgate prepared the ground and the people for the reception of purely Roman ideas. The reasons are obvious. The Bible was the book with which every literate person was thoroughly familiar. Further, the dissemination of the Latin Bible proceeded in the regions of Western Europe most susceptible to Roman influence. This is particularly the case with respect to the chancery personnel of the rulers who, although not having absorbed learned treatises on governmental ideology, would nevertheless apply a definite system of government in their chancery work (Ullmann 1975: 52). The preoccupation with principles and practices thoroughly suffused with theocratic and Roman-Latin elements served to form the minds of those men who were entrusted with the responsibility of governing. 

When Leo III crowned Charlemagne on Christmas Day, he did not just create an emperor, but the ‘Emperor of the Romans’. In terms of the ancient Roman emperorship this designation meant the supreme governorship of the world. However, Charlemagne had not agreed to this kind of emperorship and so made his objections. The governmental idea that Charlemagne had in mind was that of becoming the ‘Rector of Europe’. Europe, for Charlemagne, meant Latin Christendom, and it was on these terms that Europe as a concept became effective. Charlemagne governed the ‘Kingdom of Europe’ - extending from the Pyranees to the Elbe – as a. Charlemagne was a realist who, lacking understanding of the intricate ideology of Roman emperorship, governed his kingdom as divinely appointed Frankish monarch, in a way in which accented the Christian element in its Roman complexion. 

The creation of the Frankish monarch as an Emperor of the Romans had far reaching implications in Europe in the centuries that followed. There are a number of crucial aspects in this influence. Charlemagne asserted the identity of Europe and Church as the corporate union of all Latin Christians. It was this aspect that Alcuin, Charlemagne’s principal adviser in such matters, described as the practical manifestation of St Augustine’s City of God. In this way, Charlemagne established the ‘kingdom of Europe’ on the theocratic-descending model, establishing the template for European monarchical government. He was the vicegerent of God on earth, the vicar of Christ whose decisions were those of God. Charlemagne’s mode of governing gave a practical demonstration of theocratic monarchy, with legislative activity on various liturgical, religious, sacramental, monastic matters; the appointment of bishops and clerics; the convocation of ecclesiastical councils, whose powers were merely consultative since their decrees required his approval to become law; and so on… Charlemagne acknowledged the components of the Christian faith as deriving from Rome. (Ullmann 1975: 69).

The Hierocratic Doctrine in its Maturity
Attempts to delineate the relationship between priesthood and laity adopted the allegorical form of the soul and the body. The animus-corpus allegory was employed continuously in support of hierarchical relations of superordination and subordination. The superiority of the soul to the body meant that the soul should rule the body. This demonstrated not only the superiority of the clergy and the inferiority of the laity, but proved that the clergy should rule the laity.

The allegorical use of animus-corpus articulated the way that faith and law were connected to each other in the relation of cause and effect. The reasoning here was that since faith in Christ constituted the unifying bond of the whole Church and the exposition of the faith was the business of the clergy, the law, as the external regulator of society, was to be founded upon the faith. Ullmann 101

Stated simply, the animus-corpus thesis expressed the idea of governing the body public and the body corporate by means of the law. However, since law embodied the idea of justice, and since justice was an integral part of the Christian faith, the ‘soul’ element created a distinctively Christian idea of justice. The ‘soul’ in the animus-corpus allegory depicted the Christian idea of justice which infused the medieval conception of the ‘rule of law’. This asserted that the body of the faithful could be held in unity only by the law based on (Christian) justice, both externalising the faith and expressing the teleological thesis. This was because the law was the soul which ruled the Christian body corporate. Herein lies the basis of the hierocratic form of government and the legalism of the Middle Ages. It was frequently asserted that a public body could live, develop and achieve its end only through the law.’ (Ullmann 1975: 101/2). The implication of the hierocratic thesis was that the king was subject to sacerdotal rulings in not being qualified to give the law in questions which were connected with the essential fabric of Christian society. 

In this interpretation, to resist the papal law is to resist the divine power itself – an application of St Paul (Romans xiii,4). The logical conclusion of this position is that to achieve salvation required that every human creature was subject to the Roman pontiff. (Ullmann 1975: 115).

In developing new theories, the church fathers elaborated new models for living, models which were to be taken up and extended throughout western civilisation. The creation of a Christian ritual system served to provide an institutional framework which made it possible to articulate, challenge and reformulate values over and again.

Well before these developments, many Christians and Jews voices had protested the unworthiness of Rome and condemned its materialist culture.

For the Jews, the law of Moses was to rule, for the Christians, the Gospels. Where one age turned to Rome for leadership, another turned first to Jerusalem and then looked within or above in search of the city of god. None of these quests for universality are based upon a reasonable commonality, a genuine union of humankind grounded on natural law and achieved through the cultivation and unfolding of reason. On the contrary, these ideals appeal to and presuppose a community of the faithful, those bound to each other by ties of love, mutual necessity, and belief in a transcendent truth as promulgated by a transcendent leader. However one defines it, it is not reason that prevails in this mode of life but prejudice, emotion, passion, belief. Split between body and soul, heaven and earth, sacred and temporal, the pursuit of reason is diverted through the identification of the ideal with the spiritual, detached from the material and real, and set in the direction of the heavenly.

23 THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY – AUGUSTINE
The rational conception of freedom took theological form following the dissolution of Graeco-Roman civilisation. At first, the influence of Plato prevailed but, with Aquinas, there emerged a Christian Aristotelianism that, directly and indirectly, influenced the democratisation of society via cities and urban communities. By the time of Augustine (d 430), the fourth and fifth centuries, Christianity had developed a moral, institutional and social framework which had overlaid and in many respects supplanted the pagan pattern of life that had prevailed for over a millennium. 

The Christian doctrine considers all human beings to be equal in the sight of God. This attitude is universal in that there is no chosen people, no one community that is privileged over others on account of race or class, no one group of people whose lives are more important than the lives of other groups. All individuals and all of humanity, however it is divided up, are involved in the working out of God’s purpose. The Christian approach tends to universalism rather than to a partial or particularistic privileging of some places and peoples over others. The Christian ethic applies to all humankind and identifies the unfolding of its purposes as the general development of God’s purposes for human life. But in transcending the particularism of Greco-Roman civilisation, which connected the realisation of an immanent human nature to the ties and loyalties and responsibilities of place, the Christian approach also abandoned the humanism, the essentialism and the substantialism of Greco-Roman theory and practice, the very forces which make a viable universalism possible. The Christian ethic could assert universalism in form but could never fill this form with content. For all of the claims to universalism and to the common brotherhood embracing all humankind, Christianity advocated the narrow loyalty of the self to the brotherhood one had entered through baptism and communion. This formed a complete contrast to the ancient and classical emphasis on the loyalty that each together owed as public beings to the community, or the public service to the state.

This assault upon the politics of ancient and classical civilisation is rooted in metaphysics. The Christian doctrine of Creation repudiated the metaphysical doctrine of substance in Greco-Roman philosophy. In the Christian conception, only God is eternal, nothing more. Everything has been created by God and what God has created He can modify by reorientating its nature towards fresh ends. This orientation generated a new attitude towards human action, society and history. Whereas, in the ancient Greek conception, politics and the historical process is the creative unfolding of rational human nature as a self-realisation, in the Christian doctrine this evolution is the working out of God’s purposes rather than humanity’s. God’s purpose is a purpose for human beings, to be embodied in human life and executed through the activity of human wills, God’s role in this unfolding lies in predetermining the end and in determining periodically the objects which human beings desire. (Collingwood 48).

Christianity was explicitly anti-rational in the way that it was predicated upon a necessary human blindness in action, a blindness that was not attributable to a failure of insight but was something immanent in action itself. The Christian ethos asserts the inevitability of human beings acting in the dark without knowing the consequences of the action undertaken. The failure to achieve ends is regarded as a permanent element in human nature, inherent in the human condition as human, rather than being accidental and remediable. This follows from the doctrine of the Fall, the original sin which St Augustine emphasised to a great extent and which he identified with natural desire. On this reasoning, action is not the product of human design in pursuit of ends preconceived by the intellect but is undertaken a tergo by immediate, instinctive and blind desire. These strictures apply not only the uninstructed vulgar, with the rational being exempt, but to all human beings on account of their human nature. There is no distinction here between the rational human being who is able to chart a reasonable course of action and those whom Plato and Aristotle condemned for pursuing liberty as licence in terms of doing what they like. The natural desire targeted by St Augustine is not the tamed horse of Plato’s metaphor, but is a runaway horse inherent in human nature and incorrigible by reason. The ‘sin’ into which desire leads human beings is not committed by deliberate choice but is an inherent and original sin proper to human nature. The logical corollary of this is that human achievements are not attributable to the proper forces of human will and intellect, but to an extraneous force which causes human beings to desire the ends which are worth pursuing. Whilst it may appear, in this way, that human beings are the rational architects of their own fortune, the fact is that the reason exhibited in this action does not belong to human beings but to God. It is by the grace of God alone that the natural desires of human beings come to be canalised into worthy ends. Hence the plans which are achieved through human action succeed not because human beings have conceived them, determined their goodness, and devised the proper means by which to implement them, but because human beings, in acting in certain ways at various moments, have executed the purposes of God. This conception of grace is the logical corollary of the conception of original sin.

Augustine is the last great ancient thinker, using all of his pagan education and training for powerful and cogent statement of Christian thought. Augustine “provided the medieval consciousness, amid an entirely different sociological and political reality, with its foundation and spiritual weapons”. Karl Jaspers certainly underestimates the contributions of thinkers before Augustine, but his appraisal of Augustine’s achievement isn’t far from the truth: “No philosopher before Augustine had concerned himself with the uncertainty of freedom, the ground of its possibility or the question of its actual meaning. But Augustine, thanks to his understanding of St Paul, considered these matters with an enduring force of conviction” (Jaspers 1962: 95). Of course, the Christian fathers before Augustine had also considered the problem of freedom. As Etienne Gilson argued, “What first claims our attention is the emphatic way in which the Fathers of the Church insisted on the importance of the concept of freedom, and the very special nature of the terms in which they did it” (Gilson 1936), 304). “including free will, freedom from demonic powers, freedom from social and sexual obligations, freedom from tyrannical government and from fate; and self-mastery as the source of freedom” (Pagels 1988: xxv). All of these conceptions of freedom can be found before Christianity, in Cynicism, Epicureanism, Stoicism and Platonism. And they can be found in Christian writings before Augustine. But Augustine powerfully states the new Christian conception as distinct from its antecedents.

Augustine wrote the City of God as a response to those pagans who were blaming the sack of Rome upon the making of Christianity as the official religion of the Empire. In the months that followed the sack in August 410, Hippo filled with refugees from Rome, who demanded to know why the world's greatest city had fallen to a barbarian army? Even some of the Christians among the refugees speculated that the outlawing of pagan rituals by the emperor Theodosius some two decades earlier had brought about the fall of Rome. Augustine met the charges head on and threw them back in the faces of the accusers. Rome fell because it deserved to fall. Augustine wrote a devastating assault upon the myth and mystique of Rome, even more destructive than the physical assault that Alaric and the Visigoths had just unleashed, producing nothing less than a Christian counter-history that exposed the decadence, avarice, materialism, and cruelty behind the supposed glory that was Rome. Rome fell, Augustine argued, because it deserved to fall. This was more than the bland assertion that civilisations and cities rise and fall. Rome was rotten in its foundations. Augustine attacked the very ideals of Rome, systematically dismantling Rome in all of its pretensions to power. And Augustine’s point applied generally to all the great cities and civilizations. These ‘cities of men’ were 'earthly cities' were therefore doomed to decline and fall. The work of corrupt mankind cannot but falter and fail.
The basis of St Augustine’s The City of God (civitas dei) is the distinction between the earthly city and the heavenly city; these form two distinctive communities, one of the ungodly and the other of the godly: ‘there are no more than two kinds of human society, which we may justly call two cities .. The one consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit’ (Augustine in Curtis 1961:141). Augustine targets individualism in defining a Christian version of ‘rational freedom’. The root of the evil in the earthly city is selfishness. In Augustine’s view, individuals are restless, seeking to dominate each other and make each other means to private ends. Human life is thus an endless quest for power and self-gratification (Thompson 1994:46). Individuals in the earthly city ‘have sought for profit to their own bodies or souls’ (Augustine in Curtis 1961:142). As a result of this vice, the earthly city is afflicted by a number of grievances issuing in misery. ‘If home, the natural refuge from the ills of life, is itself not safe, what shall we say of the city, which, as it is larger, is so much the more filled with lawsuits civil and criminal, and is never free from the fear, if sometimes from the actual outbreak, of disturbing and bloody insurrections and civil wars? (Augustine in Curtis 1961:142). In Augustine’s conception, the state is necessary, not to make individuals good or virtuous but to restrain them from doing evil. Augustine’s argument is that whilst government and society are natural for human beings, they are also irredeemably coercive. The state is not a positive instrument for promoting the good life – the ‘rational’ conception - but a neutral instrument for imposing the civil peace – the liberal protective or instrumental view. For this reason, Augustine does not belong in the tradition of ‘rational freedom’.

Augustine’s argument does, however, affirm a direct connection between reason and the good. The earthly city has its good in this world. ‘But as this is not a good which can discharge its devotees of all distresses, this city is often divided against itself by litigations, wars, quarrels, and such victories as are either life-destroying or short-lived’ (Augustine in Curtis 1961:142). The imperial city imposes unity by wars, producing ‘wars of a more obnoxious description – social and civil wars’ (Augustine in Curtis 1961:143). The earthly political association is more an instrument of division, force and rapacity than of reason in Augustine’s conception.

Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed on.

Augustine in Curtis 1961:147

But a city or state without justice ceases to be a city or a state in the classical conception. Marxists will agree that the state is founded on force; Max Weber agreed with Trotsky’s definition to this effect. But there is a need to re-introduce the principle of justice. 

Augustine’s argument for God, for life eternal, is essentially an argument for a justice achieved by subordinating self-interested desires to reason. ‘The righteousness of a man consists in submitting himself to God, his body to his soul, and his vices, even when they rebel, to his reason, which either defeats or at least resists them’ (Augustine in Curtis 1961:146).

Human beings need to rise above their irrational animal side and attain their higher rational self: ‘as man has a rational soul, he subordinates all this which he has in common with the beasts to the peace of his rational soul, that his intellect may have free play and may regulate his actions, and that he may thus enjoy the well-ordered harmony of knowledge and action which constitutes .. the peace of the rational soul’ (Augustine in Curtis 1961:144).

Augustine cites Cicero’s argument that the republic is defined in terms of the weal of the people. But since the people’s weal was never attained among the Romans there never was a Roman republic. Augustine argues in favour of the definition of a people as ‘an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement’; ‘it will be a superior people in proportion as it is bound together by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it is bound together by lower’ (Augustine in Curtis 1961:148). As a statement of the dialogic democratic community that is the end of ‘rational freedom’, this principle could not be bettered and is of a piece with Rousseau’s social contract, Kant’s realm of ends and Habermas’ communication community. All human beings, as rational natural beings, may participate in this assemblage devoted to the common good. And this communication community can be achieved on earth.


The problem is that Augustine’s ‘City of God’ relocated the perfectly rational society of rational beings from the earthly city to heaven. The attempt to portray heaven as a holy city is firmly rooted in the Bible. St Paul had counselled ‘For we have not here a lasting city, but we seek one that is to come’. The Psalms are also full of references to the holy city to come: ‘Glorious things are spoken of thee, O city of God’, and ‘There is a river whose streams make glad the city of God, the holy dwelling places of the Most High’.

Augustine was deeply influenced by ancient Greek thought, but as an antagonist rather than as a sympathiser. Augustine would use and misuse Greek sources according to the point he wished to establish, showing a flagrant disregard for the actual and original meaning of the arguments he cited. Augustine had greater licence in this respect since earlier times were more familiar with the original Greek works than when Augustine wrote, and it was a licence that Augustine took to the limit. Most important to the thought of Augustine is the Adam and Eve myth, particular in respect of his concern to conceive freedom as absolute obedience to God. This freedom as slavery or bondage, a conception which shaped the formulation of outer, political freedom. 

Augustine was certainly influenced by the Neoplatonism of the previous centuries, which placed the emphasis on the spiritual and identified the ideal as the real. Neoplatonists had for centuries been discussing the relationship of this world to some higher, purer one and in the process had developed a language and terminology with which to depict this other realm. In describing Jerusalem as a holy city, the Hebrew scholar, Philo of Alexandria argued that this city is in the world ‘only in one sense’. ‘In another sense it is in the wise man’s soul’. Such a notion implies that the holy city is immanent in human nature, in the soul as the rational element of human nature. This was not a route that Augustine, placing the emphasis upon original sin and corrupt human nature could take. 

Within the conceptual and terminological framework of Christian supernaturalism developed by Neoplatonism, Augustine set about developing a number of dualisms – body and soul, natural and supernatural, matter and spirit – which were to be stitched into the fabric of Western civilisation, morality, government and politics, culture and thought. It is no exaggeration to claim that Augustine established western civilisation on an entirely new foundation, detaching the moral and institutional fabric from classical roots and placing them on a different, more dualistic, foundation. Like Plato and Aristotle, Augustine was a holistic thinker, he thought not in terms of individual problems and issues as discrete entities but integrated all such particular factors within a complete system. This system, like that of the Greek thinkers his conceptions replaced, could command greater authority on account of its completeness, and, in this completeness, established the foundation for an entirely new worldview – the medieval. It would be some seven or eight centuries before Aristotle’s politics would start to exert an influence again within the western civilisation that the ancient Greeks had founded.

The dominant theme of Augustine’s work concerns the emptiness of personal freedom. To the extent that Augustine emphasises the limited nature of personal freedom, insisting that a genuine freedom requires a larger moral framework, Augustine is firmly within the rational tradition of freedom. But the way that he states the rational case is very distinctive. As a critic of the limitations of individualism and individual liberty, Augustine is perceptive. It is when it comes to conceptualising the greater freedom that Augustine’s work is problematic.

In his writing Augustine frequently describes himself as a disillusioned freedman. Although he has freedom to wander from place to place and freedom to choose, this freedom has not given him peace and joy. On the contrary, he is still engaged in a search for a better, higher, freedom than personal freedom makes possible. Augustine describes himself as a disillusioned freedman because, like the freedman, he is free to move and yet is the eternal resident alien. This is because the freedman has been emancipated into an alien place - the city of man. Human beings will only be free when reconciled to his true home, becoming a citizen not in the city of Man but in the city of God. Augustine’s argument here is borrowed in all essentials from Paul.

Augustine’s contrast between the city of Man and the city of God express, in essence, the two versions of freedom made possible by the negation of death. From this perspective, the freedom of the city of Man is to be condemned not simply on account of being false but also as evil. It is the Pelagian heresy – the arrogance of self-determination. Self-determination is not a genuine freedom but is impure, antisocial, and destructive of the common good. Genuine freedom is the goodness which God alone gives and which man passively receives by the grace of Christ (Augustine, The City of God, trans. Gerald Walsh et al., 14.28.). What we have here is an explicit restatement of the aristocratic conception of freedom set within the theocratic-descending theme of power. In Augustine’s thought freedom is a gift or a grant from the totally free master. Only the master is totally freedom. The mass of humanity cannot actively achieve this freedom but must receive it passively from above and outside their nature.

In the final chapter of The City of God, Augustine presents his vision of the nature of eternal bliss in the heavenly city. In this concluding chapter Augustine discusses the nature of freedom and conceives the heavenly city as a thoroughly hierarchical and organic world in which glory and honour prevail: ‘In heaven, all glory will be true glory, since no one could ever err in praising too little or too much. True honor will never be denied where due, never be given where undeserved, and since none but the worthy are permitted there, no one will unworthily ambition glory’. In all of this, Augustine’s vision savours more than a little of an idealistic reconstruction of the Augustan state. God reigns as ‘the very Giver of virtue Himself … the source of every satisfaction .. the object of our unending vision, of our unlessening love, of our unwearying praise’ in this state of ‘perfect peace’ (Augustine, City of God, 22.30). This heavenly society is not a reasonable community or union of equal beings but a thoroughly hierarchical and organic world composed on ranks upon ranks of rewarded saints, graded, no doubt, according to the extent to which they merit honour and glory.

Perfect freedom in the eternal bliss of heaven is immune from the temptation of sin. This perfect freedom as the higher freedom contrasts with earthly freedom. Earthly freedom is the first freedom, given to Adam as a gift from God since, in allowing for the possibility of choosing sin, it ‘made merit possible’. In choosing sin, and so suffering death and a living misery, humankind had wasted this first possibility for freedom. Only by the greater grace of Christ will humankind be led back ‘to that larger liberty which frees us from the power of sin’. Since God is the essence of freedom, human beings will experience perfect freedom only by sharing in the divine nature of God. Again, this view is a complete contrast to the Hellenic conception that argued that human beings attain real freedom by actualising potentials immanent in their own, rational, nature. For Augustine, perfect freedom is the ultimate gift from God, one that human beings are incapable of obtaining by their own efforts within their own nature. To experience perfect freedom requires not that human beings actualise their own rational nature but share in the divine nature of God, and hence not that human beings realise their immanent potentiality but are remade and perfected by God as the great giver of freedom.

The conclusion is that, in the everlasting City, there will remain in each and all of us an inalienable freedom of the will, emancipating us from every evil and filling us with every good .. unclouded by the memory of any sin or of sanction suffered, yet with no forgetfulness of our redemption nor any loss of gratitude for our Redeemer.

Augustine, City of God, 22.30

The City of God stood as a metaphor for goodness and spirituality in history, expressing that aspect of human nature which is forever turned toward God. In contrast, the City of Man represents humanity’s evil tendencies and for the human absorption in material concerns. In simple terms, the City of God may be thought of as heaven and identified with Jerusalem; the City of Man may be thought of as this world and identified with Babylon. The former establishes an ideal, a goal, aspiration, or exhortation; the latter is actuality, the real world of immediacy and precarious apprehensive existence. 





From a historical perspective, the concept of the two cities originates in the story of Cain and Abel. Cain was the founder of the City of Man. Whilst Abel did not create the City of God, he was of it, as indeed are all those who strive to follow the commandments of God.

Augustine was no abstract, ivory tower scholar, remote from the world. As a bishop and activist polemicist, he was a worldly man who was well aware that there are many people who are good citizens of this world, people who continually strive to make the best of a bad situation. From Augustine’s perspective, such people are peregrini, resident aliens who ache for a return to their true homeland. By this, Augustine does not conceive “peregrinus” as “pilgrim”, as though the peregrini are searching for home as a physical place. Rather, the stress of the word emphasises homelessness as ontological rather than physical, as anguish, despair as separation. Peregrini are citizens of the City of God who are having to pass through the City of Man. In this temporary stay they must accept the conventions of society – the state, laws, and other institutions established through the concern for justice – and are to do good within these forms. Augustine’s theory could become so historically influential precisely because its contours fitted social reality. Augustine was not defining and imposing impossibly abstract ideals but grounded his ideal in the complexities of real life. He explicitly sought to define right conduct in terms of social reality. In his theory as well as in his Episcopal office, Augustine dealt with real people in real life situations, recognising them as decent, loving Christians continually striving in their earthly pilgrimage (peregrinatio). And in this, Augustine emphasises the reciprocity at the heart of rational freedom, a reciprocity that derives from the solidary exchange, intercourse and interaction between people in society. It needs to be made clear that Augustine’s statement of this rational conception has a particularly religious purpose, insisting on the point that human beings need each other as the objects of acts of goodness in this life.

The good Christian subject of the state not only works within the laws and institutions of the state, insofar as these embody the concern for justice, but lives life in continuous spiritual development, modelling their lives on Christ and the Apostles. In this way does the good citizen of the City of Man become the good citizen of the City of God. The City of God is therefore the sum of the acts each citizen makes in the City of Man as well as their residence in the afterlife. Activity in the service of the City of Man no longer counts. What takes priority is membership in the elect group. This group is not identified with a particular physical place or congregated within the walls of a city-state. Geographically dispersed, this elect is united by a common faith, its practices and sacraments, and by conventional good conduct. 

The meaning and value of human action was therefore determined in relation not to place- and time-bound ends but in relation to a hierarchy that led from the City of Man to the City of God. Augustine was clever enough to acknowledge the importance – and the familiarity and naturalness – of a good number of pagan traits like obedience, filial piety, law, abidingness, and modesty. These he canalised within a conception of not one but two cities, one higher than the other. The pagan values were invested with a purpose higher than service to the earthly city and placed in a hierarchy that reached to heaven. Human acts receive their justification not from service to the earthly city or from worldly reward, but from the Decalogue and the Gospels leading to eternal rewards. The pagan values were supplanted or diminished in favour of the Christian concepts as caritas, agape, fraternitas, and justitia. 

In this way, Augustine established the pattern of life for centuries to come. It is important to understand the realism of Augustine’s perspective, explaining the extent to which his views could become so prevalent for so long. Augustine did not conceive the Christian Church, the monastery, or any religious institution as the City of God. They were all part of the City of Man. The City of God could not be bounded by time or place and no earthly institution, religious or otherwise, could be equated to it. Sharply detaching his ideal from the real, Augustine was free to be remarkably worldly in his thought, even as he condemned the concerns and obsessions of the material world in the fiercest terms. In this respect, Augustine originates the conceptual and institutional dualism of the state from civil society, defining both as coercive orders reflecting the sinful nature of human beings. Augustine justifies both civil society, as manifested in the Roman Empire, and the state as God’s coercive instrument necessary for imposing the civil peace and for reforming and educating a sinful humanity. The good Christian accepts this social and political reality as a coercive order, obeys the laws and respects the constituted authority, creating no unrest in pursuit of a perfect freedom that is beyond the City of Man. The good Christian obeys, works, suffers and prays within and in acceptance of the earthly authorities. The point is important in terms of its social and political implications. Although Augustine is clear that all power and virtue ultimately rested in God, and that true justice and freedom was to be found in subjection to God and given by grace of God, his view did not legitimise an assault upon existing secular authorities, evaluating them and holding them to account by reference to a higher moral standard. And Augustine’s concept of the two cities did not imply the subordination of those secular authorities to the religious authorities. Augustine’s view makes it perfectly possible for a king to be one of the elect and a pope to be destined for hell. Furthermore, the heavenly city will require the earthly city until the day of judgement, since those who will one day become citizens of the City of God will have lived in temporary, alien residence in the City of Man.

So, too, the earthly city which does not live by faith seeks only an earthly peace, and limits the goal of its peace, of its harmony of authority and obedience among its citizens, to the voluntary and collective attainment of objectives necessary to mortal existence. The heavenly city, meanwhile, must use this earthly peace; so long as her life in the earthly city is that of a captive and an alien, she has no hesitation about keeping in step with the civil law which governs matters pertaining to our existence here below.

Augustine, City of God, 19.17

This conception fitted the contours of Christian Europe well and proved to have an enduring influence. This is particularly the case with respect to the symbiotic relationship that was established between church and state from the end of the Roman Empire and had become a permanent fixture by the end of the tenth century. In this period ‘kings had been considered semi-religious personages and had extensive influence on church affairs’, whilst ‘leading churchmen .. played an important role in secular affairs, as advisers to kings, as administrators, as rulers of ecclesiastical principalities’ (Strayer 1970: 21-22. On the development of royal theocracy and the proprietary churches see Tellenbach, 1979 chap. 3).

	The neat symbiosis of church and state was shattered by the investiture crisis of the eleventh century, and deconstruction was followed by reconstitution in which the relationship between church and state took other forms. In general, however, European governmental and political thought from the end of the Western Roman Empire to the end of the seventeenth century was undertaken within an Augustinian intellectual and institutional framework. The two key questions which continued to grow in importance related to establishing the proper relationship between the religious and the secular authorities and the location and nature of power and the individual’s place in a constituted sphere of existence. (Patterson 1991: 382).

Whatever the uneasy relation between the church and the state, the influence of the church upon secular thought and practice was profound and enduring. The total interpenetration of church and state lasted to the end of the ninth century. Even in challenging the church’s claim to papal plenitude of power, critics used the language and intellectual paradigms of Christianity. The main claim of heretics is that they represented a truer, purer Christianity. The language employed was Christian. Even strictly secular thought, expressing a concern with secular matters, also employed the language and mind set of Christianity. Long after Marsiglio and the secular turn, European political thought remained ‘Crypto-theological’, well into the seventeenth century (Blumenthal 1988 esp. chaps. 3-5; and on the polemical literature of the contest see Robinson 1978). Strayer makes a case for the political impact of the conflict. Harold J. Berman argues that the reforms had even stronger legal, and as a result, economic and social consequences. See his Law and Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983)). This is significant. European political thought never quite shook off its origins as pure political theology “hedged in by the general framework of liturgical language and theological thought”, remaining heavily indebted in its later secular phase to the metaphors and concepts of the church. In the transition to a secular politics, political theology gave way to a theocratic theory of politics. The more the state claimed an independence of the theological and religious sphere, the more it mirrored the accoutrements and thought processes of the church. In achieving the emancipation of politics from religion, the absolute state acquired the character of the church it sought to dominate and replace. This was part of a cultural and structural cross-fertilization in which the church itself came to assume the trappings of an absolutist state (Kantorowicz 1957:193/4). On top of this are the purely sociological effects of the generative civilisational conflict between church and state, something which shaped the very idea of the modern European state and its distinctive attributes (Strayer 1970). This point, however, was long anticipated by Troeltsch in The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, 1: 325).

Augustine’s two cities idea involved the conceptualisation of a new Christian citizenship. This view proved influential for a number of reasons. It was realistic and fitted the realities of existing society. Augustine’s ideas gave the emerging society a useable definition of the good life at a time when old Roman code of values was decaying and possessed less and less relevance with the passing of each generation. The classical civil order based upon the polis and civitas was drawing to a close, its last vestiges disappearing by the end of the fourth century. The terms and concepts employed by Aristotle and Cicero to describe a functioning and viable public life were gradually losing their practical purchase with the disappearance of the physical base and social environment that once gave them content and reality. The citizenship conceived by Aristotle and Cicero presupposed what no longer existed - city-states with an organised public life and extensive public spaces, competitive senior families, ample finances, and a supportive, dependent countryside. These forces had long been in decline within the Empire itself. The public institutions of Greece and Rome prospered on the basis of individual participation. These had largely been suppressed and supplanted by centralised imperial authority. The concentration of power at the centre had the effect of depriving the localities and the parts of their vital life forces. With the emphasis upon spectacle, the awesome demonstrations of power and upon elite rule, the large, relatively well-educated citizenry disappeared into the narrow existence of private affairs. In the ancient Greek terms, individuals ceased to polites and instead became idiotes. Individuals took less part in government and instead focused upon private life. This privatism did not necessarily imply an individualised existence. On the contrary, it fostered a civic communitarianism which accented ties and loyalties between family, neighbours, and religious leaders within the local community. This social sphere was tailor-made for the cultivation of a private (Christian) citizenship as distinct from a pagan virtue focused upon the civic or public order. In a small-scale society based upon restricted relationships between parents and children, neighbours, lords, masters and servants, Christian morality made sense in a way that the old pagan virtue concerning public life did not. In fine, Augustine’s conception proved influential on account of its ability to function equally well within the crumbling cities of the Empire and the resurgent countryside. 

Political power drained from the city to the great estate as the world became increasingly rural. This did not destroy citizenship as such as a conception and an institution, only the classical understanding of it. Citizenship survived into the new era, not as it had been in the ancient past, a mechanism controlling access to and participation in public life, but as a means of forming identity out of the mutual great needs of individuals and organised society. And churchmen were soon busy devising new conceptions in order to establish this Christian citizenship in the place of decaying and disappearing pagan notions. 

The classical conception of citizenship largely disappeared as a functioning institution during the early Middle Ages, surviving in the few of places that remained viable cities. As a concept, in a transformed form that fitted the contours of the new society, citizenship served to extend connections and bring a degree of continuity to the new world by making Christian citizens out of pagan Romans and Germans. 

For all of the power and insight of the essentialism and organicism of Hellenic thought, for all of the intellectual power of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, it is this Augustinian conception of freedom that dominated the intellectual, moral and institutional life of the Middle Ages, up to and including the high Reformation period, embracing both the religious and the secular. The conception of freedom is inextricably bound up with this process throughout the Middle Ages and early modern Europe. Given the centrality of freedom to Christian doctrine it is inevitable that the all-pervasive influence of the church embedded the value of freedom in European thought and politics. It is no exaggeration to argue that medieval and early modern political thought is an incessant, ongoing reinterpretation and, ultimately, secularisation of the thought of Paul, as filtered through the synthetic genius first of Augustine, then of Aquinas. Even those concerned to criticise the power of the church and to oppose the principle of papal supremacy would employ this conception of theocratic-descending freedom grounded in an hierarchically organic view of society. Only in heretical thought did any real challenge to the new orthodoxy emerge.

Augustine’s The City of God rests on a negative, even bleak, assessment of temporal human power. The moral points to the ultimate futility of city- and civilization-building as ends in themselves. For Augustine, ultimate purpose can be found only in the City of God, the heavenly city beyond the ‘City of Man’, the earthly city. The good and the righteous are just ‘passing through’ the earthly city and should therefore act like a 'pilgrim' in a fallen world. The peace and security afforded by civilization are certainly to be valued, but civilisation is transitory rather than substantial or enduring. The great political, cultural and technical achievements of humankind through civilisation are not ‘progress’ as an end in itself but stepping stones on the way to the City of God.





Augustine or Pelagius? Which side of the political divide one is on is largely determined by the response to this question. 

Pelagius, a Welsh lay monk of the fifth century, was condemned as a heretic for refusing to accept the notion of original sin. Pelagian perfectibility directly repudiates the Christian human nature theory as set out by Augustine and is the most subversive challenge ever raised within the faith. For if sin is not innate, something which requires divine grace, then it must be a habit which can be defeated by will; human self-improvement, indeed self-perfection, becomes conceivable. For all the enduring intellectual and psychological power of the Augustinian conception, the image of sinless, perfectible humanity has never gone away. The Pelagian heresy put the prospect of utopia on to the agenda of social and political action. The ancient notion of politics as human self-realisation could be recovered on the modern terrain. The Christians were quite right to declare Pelagian thought heretical. If human beings are capable of perfecting themselves, then there is no need of God’s grace. It is a short step from here to the claim that the human character is largely the product of circumstances and upbringing, and from there to the notion of the likes of Vico and Marx that these circumstances are human creations and therefore, to a large extent, human beings make themselves. 

It is in this sense that one can understand Nietzsche’s life affirming project. Nietzsche evinced a great concern with problems which he considered fundamental in Western culture and society, problems which are deep-seated but which he believed to be becoming increasingly acute. Nietzsche saw the demise of metaphysics as the death of God. Nietzsche affirmed the untenability of the ‘God-hypothesis' and the religious interpretations of the world associated with the belief in God, but he also acknowledged the inability of science to yield anything like absolute knowledge to fill the gap. Science and technology are mere means and are insufficient to fill the gap left by God. Any pursuit of human perfectibility limited to science and technology will misfire and rebound. Nietzsche foresaw an age of nihilism but the prospect worried him. The death of God means that human beings must in some way live up to being gods, and that requires much more than the worship of science and technology. For Nietzsche, the fundamental problem of modern philosophy is to deal with the implications of the death of God, something which required that human beings come to reinterpret themselves and their world along more tenable lines, lines which would be more conducive to human flourishing and affirmation of life. The ‘advent of nihilism' following in the wake of the ‘death of god’ therefore gives humanity the potential for a new lease on life. For Nietzsche, traditional forms of religious and philosophical thought are not only inadequate to the task, but are part of the problem. So he undertook a radical alternative that offered a solution. In many ways following in the footsteps of Vico and Marx, Nietzsche developed the idea that it is humanly possible to comprehend something that has been humanly constituted. The notion has profound implications when it comes to human perfectibility through the possibility of knowledge. For what Nietzsche called 'the world that concerns us' is in large part a self-made world which includes the human creators as well as the human creations. This world is composed of phenomena that are in very real and manifold respects 'our doing'.

Liberated from the stultifying belief that human beings are born sinners, there is no reason to dismiss human fellowship any longer as a utopian proposition.

The idea that politics is integral to a truly human life may be described as ‘ancient’ or 'classical' owing to its origins in Aristotelian political philosophy and in Athenian public life. The historical to this ‘pagan’ conception is the 'Christian' view, as given its most vigorous and cogent formulation by St Augustine in the fourth century. There is a dividing line here because the Augustinian view holding the fallen nature of human beings has reappeared in a variety of secular guises since the seventeenth century. One can locate the protective liberal conception of politics, of limited government and negative liberty within the Augustinian statement. Whereas in the Aristotelian conception, politics is integral to the realisation of the social and rational essence of human beings, in the Augustinian conception, politics is merely one of many necessary evils visited upon humanity as a result of Original Sin. Politics is necessary not for human self-realisation but for imposing the civil peace, 'the peace of Babylon'. Politics constrains human beings and limits the destruction that human beings would otherwise bring upon themselves. Left alone, human beings would engage in Hobbes's 'war of all against all'. Politics serves to prevent this state of mutual destruction, but it remains a necessary evil, an affliction, all the same. 

Whereas Aristotle makes politics integral to human self-realisation, Augustine identifies humanity's destiny with the salvation of the elect and the damnation of the reprobate. This distinction between the saved and the damned beyond earthly time is a distinction of the City of God from the City of Man. Through sin, human beings have distanced themselves from God, the source of Being, and are therefore radically incapable of salvation through human endeavours. No human activity, and certainly no political activity, can alter human destinies. Salvation is only possible through unmerited grace. The secular, liberal theorists, from Hobbes and Locke onwards, betray the Augustinian stamp; they are Augustine's secular descendants. Certainly, these liberal theorists are more optimistic, even Hobbes, who has a sense of human depravity to rival Augustine. Liberal philosophers think salvation is possible through commerce, a non-political civil society outside the state. Liberal thinkers continue to portray politics as a necessary evil, one of the curses of Adam, to be constrained and minimised as much as possible in the name of liberty. Consider Barnes’ view of Aristotle’s connection of liberty and the state.

Of course, the liberal conception recognises the necessity of politics. Liberal critics condemn Marx, for instance, as a utopian thinker who seeks the ‘end of politics’ (Polan 1984). Politics cannot be abolished and is necessary if human affairs are to be conducted well. Thus liberalism characteristically concedes governance to a caste of professional politicians who pursue politics as a career, structured along lines that reflect other vocations and motivated by incentives which prevail in the society that politics administers. Like their theological forebears, Hobbes and his secular successors, often assigned extraordinary prerogatives — even absolute power — to the state. Nevertheless, government remained a necessary evil of no greater ethical and anthropological significance other than imposing civil order, an ineluctable and artificial burden upon all concerned.

This liberal conception is in the line of descent from the Augustinian conception. In the conflict between church and state, the state gradually emancipated itself from theological and religious concerns. But in its independence, the absolute state mimicked the greatest claims for power made by the church.

But the Augustinian view was not unchallenged. Which comes back to the question, Augustine or Pelagius? Pelagius argued that human beings are capable of perfecting themselves. To Christians, this was heretical, since there is no need for God’s grace. And there is a link from Pelagius to the liberalism of some twelve centuries later. Locke’s argument that the human character is largely the product of upbringing led directly to the Enlightenment conception that human beings were the products of circumstances. It follows that it is circumstances and not human beings that are corrupt, and that to change people it is necessary simply to change circumstances. Enlightenment thinkers discovered that human beings are not irrevocably divided between the saved and the damned but that human behaviour is essentially plastic. Freed from the stultifying belief that human beings are born sinners, there is no reason to consider human fellowship, Aristotle’s social nature, public life and self-realisation, as a utopian proposition. Following Vico’s observation that the condition of knowing the truth of something is to have made it, one comes to Marx. If human beings are the products of circumstances, then they are also the active producers of those circumstances. In changing circumstances, human beings change themselves. The old Pelagian perfectibility is therefore back on the agenda.

Or is it? The Judeo-Christian tradition is grounded in a theory of an innately fallen human nature, the rejection of which constitutes a utopian heresy. From this perspective, liberal thinkers upholding the need for a limited government as a necessary evil keeping the peace are Augustine’s secular descendants. In the same vein, marxism appears to be a Christian heresy. If the Pelagians are right, and human nature is endlessly mutable and dynamic, then Marx’s thought ceases to be utopian and instead becomes a realisable vision of how humans could live, materially. Central to the plausibility of Marx’s vision, then, is the question of how far human beings are able to go in re-fashioning social existence. What, if any, are the limits of human nature? From this perspective, Marx is seeking the end of one kind of politics – politics as a necessary evil and limited government – in order to realise a more expansive conception of politics, politics as the public context of human self-realisation. This places Marx on the side of Pelagius against Augustine.

 If human beings in the Utopian-Pelagian conception are essentially content in their oneness with nature or the Platonic One, then in the Judeo-Christian conception they are fundamentally miserable given their innate estrangement from God. For the Judeo-Christians, post-Lapsarian human nature is rooted in sin; the flawed nature of human beings is part of their fallen condition. Sin is that innate condition of human beings which results from the disjunction from God’s immaculate perfection. Being sinners as a matter of inborn condition, human beings must abandon all hope of perfectibility and instead seek God’s grace and forgiveness. This may redeem human beings from the worst of fates, but it can never extinguish the stain of sin which all must necessarily inherit as some metaphysical human disease. This is an extremely wretched notion of human nature, the complete antithesis to the boundless vision of Pelagian perfectibility. It begs the question as to why the Augustinian view won out against the Pelagian and why it retained its plausibility in secular form in the negative and limited liberal conceptions of liberty and politics.

Augustine is the most powerful thinker in the formation of the Christian conception of human nature. Writing of original sin, Augustine argues that ‘God, the Author of all natures, but not of their defects, created man good, but man, corrupt by choice and condemned by justice, has produced a progeny that is both corrupt and condemned’. From this ‘depraved source’ human beings are confronted with a living ‘death which has no end, from which they are alone are exempt who are freed by the grace of God’ (City of God, bk XIII, cp 14 1958:278/9). Much that happened in the social and political life of the times confirmed Augustine’s pessimistic assessment of the City of Man. The shadow of fallen human nature hung over the thinking of medieval society, narrowing horizons and suppressing hopes of human self-improvement. Some of the Renaissance Catholics, Platonists like Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, and later Bruno, began to contemplate ideas of human beings as capable of aspiring to divine perfection. But The Reformation was a powerful restatement of the original Judeo-Christian view of the fallen nature of human beings. Martin Luther, whose 95 Theses made him the father of the Protestant Reformation, was profoundly influenced by the writings of Augustine, particularly Augustine’s repudiation of the heresy of Pelagius. If one traces the Protestant emphasis on liberty of the individual conscience and the work ethic to the modern state and capitalism, one sees how Augustine’s cloak becomes Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of capitalist modernity, both inimical to human self-realisation, both creating orders which contradict the human ontology, with politics reduced to the instrumental necessity of imposing the civil peace by organised force.

Pelagius had contended that human beings could perfect themselves. Renaissance Aristotelians and Platonists working within Catholicism were beginning to explore these very notions. However, the rise of Protestantism disposed of such utopian heresies, the Augustine inspired Lutheran Reformation driving human nature back even further into the fixed mould of original sin. For Luther, human beings must reject all thought of self-perfectibility; whatever happiness human beings may achieve is possible only through Divine Grace. Calvin neatly summarised the protestant position: ‘our will is not only destitute and idle of good, but so fruitful and fertile of sin that it cannot be idle’. Indeed, ‘there is more worth in all the vermin of the world than there is in Man, for he is a creature in whom the image of God has been effaced’ (Calvin Institutes of the Christian Religion, Vol I 1961:255).

The origins of non-utopian political and social thought lie in this Judeo-Christian conception of Fallen Man. In arguing for the fear-inducing absolute State, Thomas Hobbes argues that ‘Men from their very birth, and naturally, scramble for everything they covet, and would have all the world, if they could, to fear and obey them’ (The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol VII 1839:73). This concern that the natural inclinations of human beings are self-destructive crops up in a whole range of writings. The origins, indeed, lie in Plato and Aristotle before the Judeo-Christian tradition. Which is why, for all of the fire concentrated upon Augustine for his pessimistic assessment of human nature, one needs to be careful about too uncritical an embrace of Pelagian perfectibility. If the claim is that untrammelled natural inclinations will lead human beings to peace, freedom and happiness beyond the constraints of law and institutions, then this is plainly naïve. A Benthamite world of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is certainly possible if human beings remain at the basic, immediate level of egoistic desire and want – natural inclinations. One sees here how an uncritical acceptance of Pelagian perfectibility can lead human beings to falling far short of their potentialities. 

The idea that the natural inclinations of human beings need to be controlled and repressed can be found in Hobbes, the defender of the absolute state, but also in Edmund Burke, defender of the ‘little platoons’. Burke considered it as imperative that ‘the passions of individuals should be subjected’ and ‘the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted .. by a power out of themselves; and not, in the exercise of its functions, subject to that will and to those passions which it is in office to bridle and subdue’. In fine, human beings require a power which is extraneous, outside of human control, so as to protect against the deep-rooted passions which fester within human nature. One sees here the idea of the modern absolute state as the hidden god. This idea of man the sinner has taken secular form, however corrupted, the Freudian (Man the Egotist) and the Social Darwininan (Man the Predator). Whatever the form, the pessimistic ontology is preserved: the human being is an inherently egoistic, uncooperative, aggressive animal. So ingrained is this disposition that there is an innate suspicion of any politics which envisages extensive human co-operation and happiness. To what extent does this suspicion reflect experience or a self-fulfilling prophecy?

25 HUMANISM
When the war and disorder of the Germanic invasions had finally passed, and more or less civil conditions were restored to everyday life, the old problems of government and politics returned. The crucial questions here concerned how best to preserve public order and peace, how best to regulate public life, and what was the best way to arrange the affairs of common concern to all members of society. 

From a chronological perspective, the earliest conception of government and law was the ascending theory. 


The most salient characteristic of this period in history is the extent to which politics and religion are fused together in a series of relationships, from the highest level of pope and emperor all the way down to the level of local leadership. Where once public life, activity and identity was based upon an independent urban realm, now neither trade, nor government, nor cultural life supported a viable, autonomous urban life any more. In these circumstances the attachment to the city was secondary. From behind its protective walls, the activity of the city’s bishop, saint, and relics offered another protection, sanctuary within a world in which genuine public space had collapsed. Loyalty to the city was mediated through its bishop and saint, whilst parish loyalties culminated in the cathedral. This was no longer an urban identity but, rather, a civic identity which derived in large part from Episcopal leadership, which itself was constructed around the fusion of religious and political authority.

In this way, Christian morality reconstituted the pagan conception of citizenship as a new localism based fundamentally upon religion. The new Christian city married Roman and Germanic elements by extending beyond the old classical civilisation to incorporate Europe north of the Alps.

Whilst in Gaul, the city was dominated by the Church, especially the bishops, and formed the principal educational institution, which impacted on the Germans, here and there, pockets of the old urban life sustaining pagan conceptions of citizenship survived. In Italy, where civic institutions continued to survive, the city itself was the educational institution. This was particularly the case in the plain of the Po and the coastal regions, where Byzantine influences were still effective long after political connections had ceased. A Germanic Italy emerged as a result of the Germanic conquerors learning how to make the city work for them. However little of the cultural significance of the city they understood, the Germanic conquerors quickly grasped its financial, military, administrative and political possibilities. They re-established the city as a place for public mobilisation through the activities of its important members. Urban assemblies, administrative hierarchies, and courts all functioned under Gothic officials known as Comes Gothorum. These operated in a highly sophisticated way, deciding suits between Germans and Romans within their unified jurisdiction and supervising locally elected officials of Roman background in discharging their responsibilities for taxation, guarding and maintaining the city walls, and for the provisioning of Gothic armies. From the fifth century on, the rulers of Germanic Italy bound the magistrate to his bench and the resident to his quarter so as to ensure that essential functions, in justice, defence, and other areas, were maintained.

In all of this there was a mutual influence exercised. At first, the German invaders must have simply approached the city as a thing to possess and exploit. This simplistic approach seems more plausible when one considers that, in modern terms, these cities were small, with populations of just a few thousand at most. However, as cities, their operation was intricate and required an understanding of function. To gain maximise benefit from the city, the barbarians had to learn how it worked. In thus coming to make use of the city and its population, the authorities acquired an awareness of how a complex society functioned through the interaction of its constituent working parts. In the process, the invaders ceased to be barbarians and came to be civilised by the very thing which they sought to possess.

Between 1050 and 1150 one urban age drew to a close and another one began. The new era emerged out of developments in Italy which gradually spread over most of the central and northern regions of Europe, and from there into Eastern Europe, by the end of the twelfth century.

What sustained this process was mutual need. The city and citizen were wedded together at this moment by desperate necessity, and there was conscious recognition of the efficacy of the vocabulary of Roman law in articulating the responsibilities and benefits of the city and citizenship. To continue to exist as a viable, functioning entity, the city required the performance of services, the payment of taxes and a civic ethic that promotes active participation in common affairs; from the other side, the individual need to know precisely what the benefits were from the new context of economic competition and the protection of a place whose political and economic power was acknowledged by other places.

An important factor in this mutuality was the economic revival of Europe from the late eleventh century. It is arguable that citizenship came to acquire something of its old vigour and dynamism as a functioning institution in the Middle Ages only with the upsurge of economic activity attained a certain level. This level presupposes the existence of a city of a certain size and scale and a degree of sophistication in terms of the regular use of money in trade, the emergence of banking and finance, a division of labour, and a degree of craft or industrial activity. Citizenship became both a viable and a valuable institution only when medieval society developed to such a degree that there was something to tax and defend and hence some governing authority to grant sought after privileges.

The legal and social complexity of the medieval city has tended to be underestimated, a point which certainly applies to the more significant Mediterranean cities during their periods of civic splendour. The medieval city congregated people from a variety of backgrounds possessing different legal conditions: native-born merchants and artisans who possessed the full legal and political capacity of citizenship; people drawn from the countryside, in Italy the contado, who had some legal and political capacity as specified in a treaty or peace agreement; immigrants somewhere in the process of being naturalised; aliens, perhaps merchants from another city, or pilgrims under the protection of the canon law intending to return home rather than become citizens, even though they may have lived abroad for years; Jews living in their own community according to their own laws; Moslems too, particularly in Mediterranean areas, flourishing in a specialised occupation as they lived by their own laws. The members of all of these groups possessed some distinctive combination of legal and political powers, without even referring to issues of social class, de facto political importance, and such like.

In arguing for complexity and sophistication in these terms is to draw a parallel between the rich ports of medieval society, such as Venice, and a great cosmopolis of the ancient world like Alexandria, and to highlight the similar nature of specific forms and structures of social organisation in the two eras, even going so far as to identify actual continuity from the ancient into the medieval worlds in the case of a few Italian cities. This is to identify the city as an entity which is composed of a number of subentities or corporations, each of which has distinctive interests, identities and needs which do not necessarily coincide in every respect with those of the city as a whole. Since there was no way that a wide disparity of groups and communities could be homogenized into a single city identity, the existence of non-native communities was accepted. In return for granting freedoms and protections, the city expected a general cooperation. The corporate character of the way that the city organised freedom is significant. It recognised and resolved issues of scale and quantity by organising layers and levels of competencies. Given the impossibility of governing large numbers of individuals efficiently, the city gave the guilds the power to monitor the activities of their members. From this perspective, the larger, more complex medieval cities comprising a differentiated membership were made up of several citizenships in the same way as the large cities of the ancient world had been. In both cases, the city offered a citizenship which conferred identity and status, which in turn conferred legal and political rights, powers, and responsibilities, and which was placed on a moral foundation – the highest ideal being a commitment of service to the community. A conscious awareness of high moral purpose is indicated by the fact that both the city and the group possessed educational institutions with which to ensure the proper education of their members.

Much of the moral and institutional framework of modern politics is quite clearly of medieval origin. Moreover, public institutions, such as the monarchy, parliament, the law, courts of justice, exhibit not merely ancestry, but also the issues and concepts and controversies which brought them into being. These are still very much vital questions today. The fact that questions concerning power, sovereignty, freedom, democracy, political authority, political obligation, the duty of obedience, lawful command, and justice have their origins in the Middle Ages means that they will never be fully understood and realised in the present unless their full meaning is grasped in relation to their original content and meaning.

One should remember that the Middle Ages lacked a political philosophy of the state. Much of what we now take for granted as constituting the subject-matter of political philosophy was actually in the process of being developed in this period. The political thought of the period is to be found not in learned treatises and texts, but in media of communication which ostensibly have little relation to political theory: the royal coronation orders for example. The law also is to be interpreted in terms of being applied political doctrine. It is possible to construct the political thought of the Middle Ages from a range of sources of information given the extent to which the period is much more integrated than that of the modern world. This means that political ideas manifested themselves in a variety of ways which at first sight seem to be unconnected to politics. Seen from this perspective, modern political philosophy is the distilled essence of the many diverse agencies which fed into medieval political theory and practice.

The emergence of a new urban environment and civic culture, pointing in the direction of a new political and social order beyond the institutional forms of the church-state dualism, at least at the level of ideals rather than reality, started to be signalled in the literature in the eleventh century. This literature expressed the embryonic emergence of a rational public, an informed, literate public willing and capable to engage in discursive communication on the nature of power, authority and the nature of the social order. This was an explicitly ‘political’ literature in that it represented a deliberate attempt to construct, mould and influence public opinion as a creative factor in public life. By such means, contending parties presented a systematic body of ideas on a public platform in order to appeal to sections of the population. This creation of a ‘political’ literature aimed at a mass public was an original and enduring development in European political history. This literature, consisting of pamphlets, tracts and monographs, is ‘publicistic’; its intention is to create and shape a public opinion by means of an informed and critical analysis of governmental matters aimed at broad sections of the public. This publicistic literature drew upon earlier literature, the Bible and the law and was scholarly in that every statement and claim had to be supported by an ‘authority’, with no facile or simplified expositions of partisan viewpoints. The development encouraged the tendency for contemporary Europeans to search deeper and deeper into their intellectual, political and cultural roots since the greater weight was accorded to the more ancient ‘authority’.

That this literature was written in Latin and employed the whole arsenal of theological, patristic, Roman, canonical and historical arguments seems to undermine the claim that this was publicistic literature. The target audience could not have been broad sections of the populace at all, only that exclusive minority who had sufficient education to understand the language, the terminology and the concepts. The fact is, however, that the controversies surrounding the Investiture Contest had put certain issues and problems in the public domain in a way that had never been done before. Various concealed and unquestioned assumptions upon which government and society were founded had been made public and had come to form the content of public scrutiny and debate. (Ullmann 1975: 245/6).

Slowly but surely, a greater share of information and knowledge was spread among ever wider circles of the populace, who in turn initiated and sustained the debating of controversial issues. The output of literary productions increased to meet the demand for them, growing and shaping public opinion to such an extent that no government could afford to ignore them. Extending the historical lens slightly, this marks the point from which the public itself started to enter the arena of ‘political’ discussion. The implication that, once made the subject of political deliberation and scrutiny, such questions could become subject to political intervention and alteration – by the broad mass of the public. The upshot of this is that the foundations of the descending theme of government and law were slowly being subverted in proportion to the gains made in the ascending theme. (Ullmann 1975: 246).

The creation and dissemination of publicist literature formed a strand in the gradual emergence of ‘humanism’. Humanism is characterised by the extension of the area of human knowledge and activity and the corresponding diminution, and even abolition, of the role of the supernatural in human explanation and organisation. The principal agency in this process is scientific knowledge, the completion of which amounts to the creation of a single coherent rational view of the universe, human nature within as well as nature without. The interesting point is that in terms of this definition the Middle Ages appears explicitly anti-humanist. The growth of the natural sciences and the gradual expansion of naturalistic explanation continually contradicted the norms and values of the established order and provoked a number of conflicts with the religious authorities. The dominant worldview of the Middle Ages affirmed the primacy of theology among all the disciplines and emphasised the supernatural end of man as against the natural. Government and society were characterised by a clerical culture and hierarchical organisation under a universal papal authority. Stated thus, the Middle Ages and humanism were entirely antithetical.

There is another conception of ‘humanism’, one that looks backwards rather than forwards and is literary rather than scientific. This conception is identified with the Renaissance and the recovery of ancient Latin and Greek texts. This literature is considered primarily humane in contradistinction to the formal and systematic studies of the Middle Ages. The powerful and concentrated rationalism demonstrated in scholastic theology, canon law and logic was criticised from the ‘literary’ perspective of the Renaissance for its having emphasised form over content, separating scholarly concerns from the practical affairs of human society, excluding humanity and destroying style. Putting the point this way underlines an important point – the great ‘rebirth’ of the Renaissance from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is also an anti-rationalism, a point to be born in mind when considering the chaos and turmoil into which large parts of Europe collapsed from the sixteenth century onward.

The point is that conventionally there is presumed to be a clear opposition between ‘humanism’ and the Middle Ages. What is lacking is a sense of history as process. ‘Humanism’ emerged out of the Middle Ages. Further, the Middle Ages cannot be simply considered in terms of a single undifferentiated period of a thousand years, all summed up by the neat definition of hierarchical organisation under supernatural ends and authorities. Within this period there are clear periods and movements which contain innovations and developments which can only be described under the headings of ‘Renaissance’ and ‘humanism’. Pre-dating the Renaissance by two centuries or more, there are examples of classical literature being recovered and valued, elegant Latin prose and poetry being written, scientific advances and technological innovations in the Middle Ages which point not to continuity rather than discontinuity from the medieval to the Renaissance period. When one starts to examine the details of the medieval influences of the Renaissance, these are so many and varied that the only thing that can be done is to re-date the Renaissance further and further back into medieval times.

There could have been no Renaissance humanism from the fourteenth century without the developments and innovations of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Europe. A stronger way of putting the point is to argue that the ‘humanism’ of the period between 1100 and 1150 came to fruition in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.

Humanism is characterised by a number of features:
Humanism takes a strong view of the dignity of human nature. In the Christian conception the human being is a fallen creature who has lost the immediate knowledge of God. This conception sets instincts and reason against each other. As a result the human being is radically disorganised and disorientated. So dominant is the Christian worldview in this period that there will be no explicit denial of these claims. The point applies also to the later Renaissance period. Humanism will be couched in Christian terms. Thus one can expect the natural dignity of human beings to be expressed by claims that man is the noblest of God’s creatures, a nobility that continues even in the fallen condition. Humanism will take this further by asserting that this nobility is capable of development in this world and that the end of human endeavour to perfect the instruments by which nobility can be developed.

The affirmation of the dignity of human nature is associated with a recognition of the dignity of nature itself, the one being a consequence of the other. Since humanity is noble by nature then the natural order itself, of which humanity is a part, must also be noble. Human nature within and nature without are interlinked through a myriad of indissoluble and indivisible ties. Humanity is ennobled by assuming its proper place within nature. Human society is to be conceived as a part of the grand complex of the natural order which is bound together by laws like those which tie all things into one. It follows from this that to exalt the grandeur and splendour of the natural universe is to exalt the grandeur and splendour of humankind. 

The unity of human nature and nature revolves around reason and the notion of rational nature. Given the unity of human nature and nature it follows that the whole universe is intelligible and accessible to human reason. Nature is conceived as an orderly system. By coming to understand the laws of nature humanity can come to understand itself as a part of nature, the main part in respect of the Christian cosmology. The view expresses supreme confidence in human powers.

Humanism therefore is defined by the dignity of nature within and without, the idea of natural order and system, reason and intelligibility. On all of these points, humanism originates in the Middle Ages and carries over into the scientific advances of the later ages. This aspect is quite distinct from the tendency to identify the Renaissance with the recovery of ancient and classical literature, a tendency which has served to minimise the significance of other, and prior, developments. There has been an overemphasis upon the literary aspect of the Renaissance. In a sense, this Renaissance is as much a project of recovery as of renewal, looking backwards as much as forwards. In this aspect, the Renaissance took the form of imitation, evaluating work according to the extent to which it conformed to the style of ancient authors. This has been accorded a significance which far exceeds its actual worth, at the expense of developments which preceded it and which proved to have lasting significance. By proceeding from the concepts of the nobility of human nature and of nature itself, the unity of humanity and nature, rationality and intelligibility within the natural order, it becomes possible to ground the philosophical and scientific advances made in the centuries after the Renaissance in the intellectual and highly rational work of the medieval period before the Renaissance. The whole question starts to assume a different character.

In the early Middle Ages the dignity and order of the natural universe was dependent upon supernatural power. Christianity supplied a moral and institutional framework gave humanity order and dignity in a real world that seemed to deny both. By connecting humanity with the supernatural, the symbolism and ritual, the worship and sacrament of the Christian religion created order out of chaos and gave human beings a dignity that their real lives lacked. This sacramental understanding of humanity’s place in the universe made more sense at a time when events seemed to prove the reality of powerlessness and indignity in a chaotic environment. The mediated connection with the supernatural gave humanity some sense of the order and dignity immanent in the natural. As time passed, and human beings succeeded in winning social and political order out of chaos, there is a growing emphasis upon order and dignity as natural rather than supernatural. This process began in earnest in the latter half of the eleventh century. And it is this transition from the supernatural to the natural within the Middle Ages that the discussion focuses upon. The order and dignity which once were identified with and made conditional upon the supernatural now came to be located within nature itself, human nature and the natural world. In the process, God came to be humanised. The God which once was this terrifying Ruler distant from the Universe, was made familiar in human terms. And it was only one small step from the humanisation of God to the humanisation of the universe. The world and its laws and processes etc. all became intelligible in human terms, accessible to human reason and hence, in time, subject to human intervention, manipulation and alteration. This essential characteristic of the modern scientific paradigm has its origins, in embryonic form certainly, in the work of the scholars of the Middle Ages, particularly the way in which they sought to accentuate the natural within the shell of the supernatural. From the late eleventh century onwards, secular schools started to proliferate. The combined work of these schools served to enlarge the sphere of order and intelligibility in the world and did so in a systematic way, enabling the extension of rationality in moral and institutional terms.

The new intellectual outlook soon impacted upon government and politics. The most important development was the gradual subversion of the theocratic-descending theme of power and rule and the growing significance of the ascending theme. In the eleventh century, the dominant conception held that the source of power was supernatural and came from God. The anointed king who received divine sanction at his religious institution and held and exercised authority as the vicar of Christ. The ruler, therefore, was in no way a representative of the people, since power came from God above rather than from within the body politic. It made no difference that the actual practical authority and power of the king could be exceedingly limited. The fact remained that the king represented in his visible and symbolic adornments the majesty of God on earth. Whilst this conferred dignity upon human government and politics, this dignity was of divine rather than human origin.

This theocratic-descending conception started to dissolve rapidly in the twelfth century, even if this did not necessarily entail the full or even the substantial triumph of the ascending theme. At the same time that kings grew in real power, the figure of the monarch was reduced to human dimensions. As supernatural sanctions in government dissolved, the path was opened towards the development of purely human institutions and concepts. Government by ritual was supplanted by government by administration whilst terms like ‘the common good’, the ‘political community’, and ‘the majority opinion’ registered the re-emergence of the body politic as a political force. These developments came to the centrestage of European government and politics in the thirteenth century. The English Magna Carta of 1215 is a good illustration of this point. The ideas permeating this document contradict the notion of a semi-sacerdotal kingship at every point and, by expressing to all those things which free men may demand in the language of common rights, common law, and resistance under law, the document shows the world standing at the threshold of a philosophy of the state and, from there, of a theory of popular sovereignty and government by the consent of the governed. The transition from the supernatural to the natural in government and politics was general and can also be seen in law. Before the twelfth century the legal process entailed an appeal to a supernatural judgement. All of this was soon to change. The foundations were being laid for a completely natural theory of government and politics based upon human rather than divine power. On this foundation, the source of the ruler’s powers will be located in the community, in the people, with democratic implications which are still being worked out.


The emancipating role of the monasteries and the medieval schools.
In the Christian conception based upon the Fall, the dignity of man and of nature had been lost through sin, and could now only be restored by supernatural means. This view dominated until the twelfth century. From this moment, however, secular scholars began to develop the liberal arts as natural remedies to sinful human frailties. No more was nature considered to be inexorably corrupt.

This optimistic view of human nature and of the future for humanity was founded upon humanity’s rational nature and hence the seemingly unlimited capacity for knowledge. This optimism was given a scientific basis by the scholars of the secular schools that soon began to multiply. These scholars argued that humanity’s affinity with every part of nature confers upon human beings the power to understand the laws, processes, etc of nature; their investigations showed that the elements and humours of human beings, the influences playing upon the birth and development of human beings, constitute the stuff of the entire universe. This being so, human beings are designed to understand the universe. Despite the Fall, human nature is not irremediably corrupt and sinful but is capable intellectually of tracing the original perfection of the creation, thus working with God in its restoration.

Scholars identified reason as the crucial instrument of this regeneration of nature in collaboration with God. As they began to pioneer and develop the liberal arts the secular masters gave expression to such thoughts as: ‘The dignity of our mind is its capacity to know all things’; ‘We who have been endowed by nature with genius must seek through philosophy the stature of our primeval nature’; ‘In the solitude of this life the chief solace of our minds is the study of wisdom’; ‘We have joined together science and letters, that from this marriage there may come forth a free nation of philosophers’ (these phrases are taken from the revised version of William of Conches’s Philosophia Mundi, ed C Ottaviano pp 19/20; from Thierry of Chartres, Prologus in Eptatheucon, Ed E Jeauneau in Medieval Studies 1954 xvi 171/5).

If Renaissance really does mean and stand for ‘rebirth’, then one can date its beginning in this period when, for the first time since long before the end of the Roman Empire, humanity once more found a confidence in future possibilities from within their own nature and from their own reason – humanity’s rational natural capacity meant that nature was accessible and intelligible to human thought and that ends could be achieved by human action.

Of the vast number of masters who played substantial roles in the intellectual revival, a significant proportion of them had died or retired in the decade before 1150 - Abelard, High of St Victor, William of Conches, Thierry, Bernard Silvestris. The principles of enquiry and the main currents of their work however continued to be carried forward. These masters had laid the foundation and had sketched a spine or a skeleton. It remained for others to put the flesh on the bone by extending the forces of natural reason more deeply into the domain of revelation. The extent to which this came to happen in the next century or so can be gleaned by a comparison of the two most important books at either ends of this period. The chief theological work of the mid-century was Peter Lombard’s Sentences. There is little to suggest in this book that the next century would be characterised by the later union of secular and sacred sciences in a single systematic exploration of the universe. The book contains many thousands of quotations from the Church Fathers, but only three from secular philosophy, all of which were lifted from St Ambrose or St Augustine. One hundred years later, the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas contains well over three thousand quotations from Aristotle, of which some 1,500 come from the Nichomachean Ethics and another 800 from the Meteorology or Metaphysics. Neither of these works had been known a century earlier. Only one hundred years lies between these books but, in intellectual terms, the ground covered is far greater. And the development had come within theology rather than against it in some simple antithesis. The subject-matter of theology was transformed from within, theological considerations acting as a spur to further investigation. By engaging in naturalistic explanations within the supernatural shell, scholars developed the rational nature of human beings into an all-embracing intelligibility.

The transition from supernatural to natural modes of thought and explanation and the practical manifestation of this transition in government and politics prepared the ground for the emergence of a philosophy of the state that was based upon the consent of the governed and popular sovereignty. This philosophy would be naturalistic in that it located power in the people rather than in the divinity. The domination of theological considerations and ecclesiastical priorities served to block the emergence of this philosophy in anything but piecemeal and inchoate form. The full articulation of this philosophy as a science of government and politics required a force and an authority that was capable of challenging the Bible and Christianity in a holistic fashion. Aristotle had defined the key principles and themes of city-state politics at the very moment that they were passing into history. Now, in another time and another place, Aristotle’s thought was about to exert an influence which was far greater than any he had exercised in the Athenian polis of his day. (Ullmann 1975: 247).

The period evinces a close connection between political science and jurisprudence, the science of the law. Throughout the Middle Ages the ‘political’ was articulated within the terms of the law. Government, politics and law were inextricably connected since governments issued laws in an attempt to translate social ends into public policy. Whilst the period lacked an elaborate philosophy of the state, to a large extent medieval law was applied political doctrine. The purposes and priorities of government and politics were enshrined in, and applied by, the law. An underlying political theory can be obtained from the legal records of the Middle Ages. From another perspective, the law represents an attempt to translate the idea of justice into reality, and this is where the issue becomes distinctly political rather than legal. For precisely what constituted justice depended on the political colour of the government. The politics of the Middle Ages is to be found in the struggles over the definitions and contents of justice. Law embodied the idea of justice. The struggle over the location of original power between descending and ascending themes is crucial from this perspective, since the resolution of this issue is necessary in determining whether or not a government was entitled to issue the law. (Ullmann 1975: 16).

One reason why the medieval period lacked a philosophy of the state, certainly in the modern sense, was the fact that the period before the thirteenth century lacked a conceptual and institutional experience and understanding of the State. The concept of the state as an independent, self-sufficient, autonomous body of citizens living on its own substance and on its own laws emerged in the thirteenth century as a result of practical developments allied to the assimilation of the thought of Aristotle. Before this, kingdoms and empires were not individual, self-sufficient, autonomous, sovereign bodies but functioned as and were considered to be parts of a larger unit, of the whole body of Christians. It is significant that ‘political’ as a term was absent from the vocabulary of governments and writers before the thirteenth century. Its emergence occurred with the simultaneous emergence of the concept of the State. Before then the term ‘government’ (gubernatio or gubernaculums or gubernator) had been used instead of ‘State’ and ‘political’, and was linked with the Roman term of jus dicere (jurisdiction) concerning laying down the law. The question of who had the right to lay down the law was inextricably related to the question of where original power was located.

In fine, ‘political’ thought concerned the question of the ultimate authority of the government to lay down the law to and hence set the path to be followed by society. This ultimately was the problem of sovereignty.

The dialogue between Aristotle and the Bible conducted within the confines of the Christian Church utterly transformed the theory and practice of Europe between 1150 and 1350. The Bible as mediated by Christianity was the political and theoretical spur, posing the most pertinent questions and setting the most important problems on all the crucial issues. Whilst the emphasis is upon divine as against human nature and whilst there is little value placed in the capacity of human reason to overcome sinful human frailties, Christianity and theology established the intellectual matrix within which secular thinkers could address the crucial questions. The significance of the Bible and Christianity lie precisely in neglecting the rational nature of human beings and the capacity of human reason to remedy ills. This set up a real rather than a straw-man conflict, provoking those who believed in secular thought and the liberal arts to prove the case for human reason. Human beings learn and advance by being challenged and the challenge to the human reason and the rational nature was one which generated an original synthesis of Aristotle and Christianity in the work of Thomas Aquinas. ‘Aristotle standing alone had no power to excite thought: at best, like alcohol, he first stimulated and then stupefied. What he said was so complete, so incontrovertible, so far beyond the range of conflicting authorities, that he hammered reason into submission. Curiously enough, therefore, the paradoxes of the Bible did more for rational argument by stimulating discussion than all the reasons of Aristotle which were swallowed whole’ (Southern 1970: 47/8).

The ground for the recovery of Aristotle had been prepared not only in an intellectual sense but in the social sense. The social infrastructure of Europe had come to be knitted together by a vast number of free towns and cities, composed of corporate or guild organisations. The whole terrain made the assimilation of Aristotelian thought perfectly natural.

The modern presumption that freedom as a value had only limited significance in the Middle Ages derives from a tendency to identify the notion of freedom as personal liberty, the core value of liberal modernity, with freedom as such. It is the same prejudice that criticises the social or corporate liberalism of a Hegel as a form of medievalism, as somehow rooted in pre-modern solidarities and institutions. Since it was a hierarchical organic or aristocratic freedom that was prevalent in medieval life, there has been a tendency to read this period as having little relevance to the history of freedom. Hegel has been celebrated as one of very few modern political philosophers who recognised the importance of freedom to pre-modern institutions, attempting to incorporate something of its aspects into his own conception.

There has been a failure to appreciate the significance of the concern with free status in the Middle Ages from the perspective of the value of freedom. Yet the fact is that freedom as value, as recent research has made clear, emerged from the serf’s yearning and frequently active struggle for free status. Once one adds the extent to which the lord identified status with honor and virtue, it becomes clear that medieval society valorised and idealised freedom to a significant extent, and did so in relation to free status. (Patterson 1991: 363).

26 FREEDOM IN MEDIEVAL LAW
As Georges Duby has argued, in order to ‘lift the ideological veil’ and hence understand what was important in ‘the tangible aspects of existence’ in medieval times it is necessary to examine the charters and deeds of traditional legal agreements. These documents constitute a ‘retrospective sociography’ through which it is possible to scrutinize what was of real value to people and ‘what was going on in village, castle and family’ (Duby 1980: 147. See also Reynolds 1984: 1-11. Reynolds' discussion of the tradition of associative experience in terms of different levels of organization—guilds, parishes, villages, towns, provinces, and the broadest association of realm or kingdom—is useful. However, she greatly underestimates the role of individual agency, especially that of lordship, in medieval society.). Doing precisely this, Alan Harding has shown the extent to which political freedom was valued in this period (Harding 1980: 423-43). Harding emphasises the fact that liberty ‘is everywhere in medieval charters and legal records’, going further to demonstrate that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, these records involve a political conception of freedom. Medieval legal charters articulate a conception of freedom as ‘the power to act in the affairs of the community and to exert influence on one’s fellows, free from the interference of the sovereign government’ (Harding 1980): 423). In this conception, freedom was a privilege, a power, which was granted to persons, usually landowners. The freedom granted in the charters was a privilege granted by a higher authority and, with the exception of the lordly immunist, it was granted not so much to individuals as to communities such as fraternities and guilds. Whilst these communities were concerned to ensure the monopolization of occupations, they were equally concerned with conviviality and defense against the encroachments of others on their limited liberties (Reynolds 1984 ch. 3). They earned a reputation for ‘independence and uncontrollability and not surprisingly were regarded with suspicion by the clergy. Guilds as a whole participated in the medieval goal of organic-corporate freedom, both in the limited immunities they had and in the power they had over against those who lacked the right to practice the monopolized crafts. The strong bond of solidarity they exhibited was modelled on the family and monastic community, and, with the collective jurisdiction they exercised over their members, the guilds were the institutions par excellence of a socially grounded medieval civic freedom. The guilds have been criticised for being personally restrictive, for having little sense of personal freedom. The control that the guilds exercised over their members could occasionally be coercive, particularly in relation to junior members. However, this reading is based upon a profound misunderstanding, as though guild members were only and exclusively guild members when in fact they could also assume other identities: townsmen, villagers, subversives, and sometimes outright rebels.

Throughout medieval society, at parish and village levels, it is possible to find diverse elements of civic freedom embedded within the corporate framework of organic freedom (Reynolds 1984 ch 4 5). Parish and village units overlapped, and both, whether together or apart, were at the centre of the lives of the people who formed the bulk of the population: the peasants and the serfs. Ostensibly members of ecclesiastical units, which had been spreading all over western Europe since the early ninth century, parishioners also undertook a range of secular tasks, from repairing roads repairs to draining swamps. Incredibly, peasants frequently purchased charters of liberties for the right to elect their own clergy. Medieval society exhibits a continuous struggle on the part of peasants to secure minimal ‘customs’ and privileges or liberties. These ‘more or less defined rents, dues and rights of inheritance; exemptions from more burdensome legal procedures; and sometimes the right to elect their own officials’ (Reynolds 1984:131/2). The payments that peasants made for these liberties were exorbitant and constituted a major source of revenue for the lordly classes. The peasants always understood these ‘good customs’ as freedom and being able to share them collectively to be the mark of free status. One should guard against generalising the particular here. Such rural franchises were particular to time and place in medieval Europe. By the thirteenth century, ‘franchisal communities were like clearings in a thickening jungle of seigneurial violence and exploitation’; even when a community did receive a charter, the peasants ‘were hardly more than interested spectators of a struggle between the count-prince and the lay magnates’ (Bisson, "The Crisis of the Catalonian Franchises (1150-1200)," in Jaume Portella i Comas, ed., La formacio i expansio del feudalisme Catala (Barcelona: Collegi Universitari de Girona, 1986), 168 172).

The urban communities were the mainstays and citadels of medieval freedom. The urban communities secured their charters of liberties within the framework of lordly organic freedom and these functioned as the institutional bases of the burghers, the free citizens of the towns. For Pirenne, the origins of these towns lay in long-distance trade and the wandering merchants. Whilst historians have been concerned to challenge this claim, Pirenne’s work remains valid (Nicholas 1969) 107-14).

Freedom became the legal status of the bourgeoisie, so much so that it was no longer a personal privilege only, but a territorial one, inherent in urban soil just as serfdom was in manorial soil. In order to obtain it, it was enough to have resided for a year and a day within the walls of the town. “City air makes a man free” …, says the German proverb (Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, trans. I. E. Clegg (New York: Harcourt Brace/Harvest Book, 1937), 51. The argument is explored at much greater length for the Low Countries in his Early Democracy in the Low Countries: Urban Society and Political Conflict in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, trans. J. V. Saunders (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).).

Pirenne was well aware of the limits of these urban freedoms, particularly in the way that the magnates of the cities understood them:

Without liberty, that is to say, without the power to come and go, to do business, to sell goods, a power not enjoyed by serfdom, trade would be impossible. Thus they claimed it, simply for the advantages which it conferred, and nothing was further from the mind of the bourgeoisie than any idea of freedom as a natural right; in their eyes it was merely a useful one.

Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, 50

How much city autonomy was secured and how far these freedoms extended in the general city population, not to mention the surrounding countryside, varied within fairly wide parameters across Europe. At one end are the free cities of Italy and Germany, sophisticated, rich entities which eventually grew into autonomous states. This book has been concerned to challenge the interpretation of the Renaissance as the ‘rebirth’ of European civilisation after a ‘dark’ age. Leaving that to one side, the exaggeration of the importance of the Renaissance at least means that the world is very familiar with the splendour of late medieval and Renaissance Florence, where the Renaissance is understood to have begun. What can be argued with certainty is that freedom first re-emerged as a supreme political value in Florence, particularly after 1343. According to Giovanni da Prato, Florence was the ‘fountain-head of freedom’; in the early fifteenth century, Leonardo Bruni was making claims that could be placed quite easily in the mouths of a 21st century politician: ‘One of the democratic characteristics of our constitution is that we worship freedom more than anything else, as the end and goal of our commonwealth’ (Cited in Rubinstein, 1952: 21-22).

The strong communal movement in the city-states of northern Italy is significant in keeping alive the ancient concept of the citizen and citizenship. The city-statutes assume the thesis of citizenship, the concept of the citizen (civis) which was integral to the ascending-populist theory of power. The concept of the citizen is an operational instrument of these statutes. The city-states of northern Italy had never lost the familiarity and this greatly facilitated the assimilation of the concept of the citizen, of the person who was autonomous and independent in clear contradistinction to the subject (the sub/dictus), the person who was a mere passive recipient of the laws given to him. Here in northern Italy, the popolo, as the collective body of the citizens, had been successful in giving its sovereignty and its expression an institutional form. However, at the same time, large parts of Europe also affirmed the concept of citizen. Indeed, the inhabitants of the major cities were called cives, to whom the royal charters were addressed. The ubiquity of the term, ‘the citizen’, greatly facilitated the process by which a profoundly new political theory could emerge: the assumed usage of a term thus became an important bridge between the common and indifferent medieval meaning of the citizen as the recipient of favours and the later politically charged substance of the citizen as the bearer of rights.

Although the Italian city-states led the way, the German towns and villages did not trail far behind. Development here was helped by the chronic competition and particularism amongst the lords. In filling the resulting power vacuum, the peasants formed village and valley communities and judicial and mountain communes characterised by a strong sense of corporate identity and self-government, and which integrated both collective and individual freedom. The principal cause of the Peasants Revolt of 1525 was the systematic and quite ruthless move by the lords to deprive the peasants of these liberties; only this was no mere revolt, it was a revolution in defence of a principle of communal autonomy that has lost nothing of its value and relevance (Blickle 1981, esp. chap. 4). In other places, there was much less of a tendency to self-government. In England and Scotland especially, the ‘plantation’ of new towns was principally the result of activity on the part of the lords and kings (On England and Wales see, Beresford 1988, esp. chap. 7). 

There are a number of significant points to be made about this expansion of urban freedom. There is no doubt that the tendency of medieval constitutional historians to focus, almost exclusively, upon the kingdom, as the highest community of the realm, has given us a highly elitist and profoundly biased view of the era. This focus neglects the most important developments taking place at the various levels of communal organisation in medieval society, developments which reveal social actors other than the rulers and elites.

Further, although the degree of freedom achieved varied, the charters make it clear that, amongst the many things that the town provided, the most important to all urban dwellers was personal freedom. These townsfolk sought above all else to escape from the oppression of the manor and throw off the slavish duties and status of the villein. A change of status, ‘an increase in personal liberty and human dignity’ and ‘the minimum freedom to organise one’s life as an urban specialist’ were the rewards of burgage tenure (Beresford 1988:212/20).

Urban elites were acutely aware of the extent to which urban dwellers were significant communal agents, capable of exercising self-government and exercising communal autonomy. These elites would frequently attempt to monopolize the rights granted and, whenever they could, even try to apply these powers against the townsfolk. This was particularly the case when times turned bad in the later Middle Ages. Town magnates displayed a pronounced tendency toward judicial corruption and outright fiscal exploitation (See Rigby in Thomson, ed. 1988: 62-86).

Historically illiterate political myth-making can identify the liberties won during the thirteenth century with freedom and democracy, as though the barons who forced the Magna Carta upon King John were concerned with the universal rights of the whole people rather than just a tiny minority. In truth, these liberties constituted the sovereignal freedom of the aristocracy. This had nothing to do with either the civil or personal freedom of the public as a whole but amounted to a recognition, in principle, by the king to consult the aristocracy before imposing new taxes and immunity for the aristocracy from the restraining hand of the king in exercising power in their domains. These same people imposing the charter upon the King were decidedly hostile to the notion of a more general freedom which was applicable to other sections of the community. (Patterson 1991:369).

To connect a document like the Magna Carta with some inherent tendency to parliamentary democracy in England is plain fantasy. Research makes it abundantly clear that far from there being an ‘aura of inevitability’ in the development of parliamentary democracy in England, this development came about more by chance than design (Holt in Davies and Denton, eds 1981), 3.). For the largest part of the later Middle Ages, the Parliament functioned as a means of communication and effective administration, informing the King ‘on how liberty or privilege, once conceded, was working’ (Holt in Davies and Denton, eds 1981), 24). Whilst these administrative functions were merely a convenience for the King and were suffered as a burden rather than treated as an honour by the representatives, their growth was the foundation of the eventual supremacy of Parliament (Maddicott in Davies and Denton, eds., 1981: 73). The self-interested, essentially rapacious, and exploitative assertion of liberties by the aristocracy had nothing whatsoever to do with freedom in a general sense and no connection with democracy. ‘In time, administrative convenience won’ (Holt, "Prehistory of Parliament," 28.)

Although medieval history focusing upon rulers and elites make it appear otherwise, there is clear evidence that the concern with freedom was alive amongst all classes of medieval society, all of whom were struggling to expand liberty for themselves. The barons at Runnymede expanded liberty in only the most narrow and limited of senses. Other groups had the potential to fight for a more general conception of freedom. Peasant revolts can be traced back to as early as the late ninth and tenth centuries. The evidence shows that most of these were provoked by attempts by the lords to extend servile demands from rents to labor obligations or by disputes over access to the commons (Hilton 1973 ch 2). The peasants, usually led by the most prosperous free peasants, clearly identified these moves as a threat to their freedom and were prepared to fight in its defence. That they were beaten allows constitutional historians to impose the view from the top, activities and events amongst the elites and rulers proceeding inexorably to freedom and democracy. Had these other groups within medieval society succeeded, freedom and democracy would have been achieved far quicker, with more substantive content, in a universal sense and with a large self-governing component organised around communal autonomy. But that is a history that remains to be written with respect to the future urban democratic public.

From the early thirteenth century, these points came out into the open as European society was rent by a successive wave of mass struggles and movements originating in all segments of the lower classes. This continued up to the Peasant war in Germany in 1525, quite possibly the greatest and most important of all the peasant wars. There is a terrible tendency to build an inevitabilist scenario into history, applying a kind of retroactive determinism in which events which were contingent at the time they occurred come to appear necessary and unavoidable in retrospect. It seems, given the rise of capitalism, unlikely that the peasants could ever have succeeded. But not impossible. And imagine the form freedom and democracy could have taken in the kind of society in which peasants, joined by the freedmen asserting the autonomy of the cities, had secured their liberties. Once more, sociologists and historians have drawn attention to the close relationship between religion and the rise of capitalism. But which religion? The peasant movements in nearly all these instances embraced a radical interpretation of Christianity which explicitly repudiated the Augustinian organic model in favour of a conception of humanity as equal and free, the most clearly stated conception available in the Bible (Graus in Bak, ed. 1976: 2.; Fourquin 1978), 2.). Such would be the case again with the Anabaptists in the sixteenth century. The point is that the activities and struggles of these movements within medieval society point to alternative forms of sociality within the social order, all of which made a different outcome possible to the one that eventually came about, largely by force. 

All classes of medieval society possessed and pursued a conception of civic freedom. The peasant rebels were asking for no more than what they had seen the burghers and more prosperous peasants achieve through their purchase of charters of freedom - the right to elect their own secular and spiritual leaders. The right to participate in the most significant civic community, where governmental functions were performed, in the village, parish and towns, was the ideal that was valued by all classes. And in this identifies the democratic impulse making for the democracy that never was, a genuine democracy applicable to all sections that would have formed the alternative to the parliamentary government in which power was carved up between rulers and aristocratic elites. This makes the point that democracy is rooted in the practices and institutions of the demos, the actual people, and is not to be identified with the nation-state. Democracy involves participation in the election and operation of the unit of collective authority concerning the everyday affairs of common concern. In medieval society, this unit of collective authority was located at the parish and urban levels, and it was here that democratic mentalities and impulses and practices flourished. These units could have formed the basis for reorganising the organic framework of medieval society on non-hierarchical lines.

Whilst different classes and groups tended to stress liberty in different ways, there is no doubt that personal and civil freedom were integral to the history of the Middle Ages. In the hierarchically organic society that prevailed in the Middle Ages, the aristocratic conception was the one that dominated. But there was never a time when this conception was uncontested. The interesting question concerns how this very particular conception of freedom could, through immunist and positive liberties for some, come to be conflated with personal and civil freedom, making it appear that narrow elitist assertions of rights and liberties were part of a struggle for freedom in a general sense and even democracy when they were precisely the opposite. (Patterson 1991: 374).

Citizenship in the North
The experience was not homogenous or general, but is differentiated according to time and place. Geographically, the most significant areas were Italy, the northern shore of the western Mediterranean and, with some differences, the Lowland and Rhineland regions of northern Europe. The size and social complexity of the particular city, as well as the degree of independence it had in its political life, conditioned development. The feudal and monarchical regions of twelfth century Europe lacked the social, institutional, and literary-moral preconditions for citizenship. When they did develop, however, they were similar enough to the institutions of antiquity to justify the period being designated as ‘the first age of citizenship’.

Italy boasted all the essential conditions for the ‘true’ citizenship of Aristotle’s definition. The Italian city-states were independent entities which contained working political institutions in which citizen activity was not only possible but absolutely necessary to the performance of governmental functions. The city-states had developed a public language through which a public life could be conducted, building upon the public consciousness deriving from its moral and political history. Here, antiquity supplied a model for the present. Italy used its cultural possession of citizenship in theory to ensure that it achieved and retained citizenship in fact. Italian civic history therefore possesses an intellectual and political clarity which contrasts markedly with the experience of other places in medieval Europe.

Whilst great cities emerged in northern Europe, in Flanders, France, England, and the Rhineland, they were never independent cities in the way that the Italian city-states were. In terms of size, wealth, political power and architectural accomplishment, these cities could rival the Italian cities. But they were parts of the feudal order and lacking in autonomy. In consequence, citizenship is not a vivid institution in northern Europe. Citizenship existed, certainly. But feudal society was held together not by citizenship, but by the bond of vassalage. Where citizenship implies a civic republicanism or communitarianism establishing a political unity to a public life, feudal society was ordered around a formal contract between two men of the ruling class. Political roles were determined by personal relationships. The important political entities were kingdoms, duchies, counties, and smaller fiefs and the important men were kings, dukes, counts, and barons. Cities and towns functioned not as independent political units but as constitutional and social units performing specific governmental functions at the behest of their legitimate lords.

Defined in Aristotelian terms of some form of active participation in the political process and/or performance in some administrative capacity out of a perceived sense of public duty, citizenship did not exist at the level of the kingdom and feudal state in northern Europe. However, citizenship did exist within the cities of northern Europe. Whilst this could not match the rich experience of Italy and elsewhere in the Mediterranean, which drew upon the civic legacy of Rome, the institution did exist and with a few unique flourishes particular to the north. In time, the city life of northern Europe created a distinctive civic life of its own, a richness of local civic statements, both religious and secular, expressing through culture, architecture, and pageantry the entrepreneurial success and economic power that lay behind it. In all of this, the city life of northern Europe loses nothing in comparison with Italy. But political and economic activity as such does not equate with citizenship. The merchant-citizens who dominated within the walls of the northern city lacked the institutional machinery and total competence which made for a complete citizenship. Within a feudal order, the cities lacked autonomy and their citizens lacked real, genuine, and purposeful freedom of action. They also lacked what the city-states of Italy and the Mediterranean had - contact with the Greco-Roman tradition that launched the institution of citizenship.

In London and the other English cities, with the town corporation falling under the control of the guilds, guild membership became a prerequisite for citizenship. The upshot was that by the middle of the thirteenth century citizenship had become a political issue. However, the constant preoccupation of the merchants and artisans of the towns had much less to do with classical notions of exercising political rights, and thereby realising one’s essential human nature, than with the enjoyment of the legal and economic benefits that citizenship yielded. In this, the English experience mirrored that of Italy. Citizenship was valued for its material benefit to the individuals who possessed citizen status, not for political and anthropological reasons. Such a notion is based upon the subordination of the public to the private interest, the public identity being seen as securing the more important private interests of individuals. Indeed, these citizens came to experience political activity as increasingly burdensome the more expensive and more costly it became. As issues at national and local levels multiplied, the number of political assemblies increased in proportion. In addition to the cost of this growth, actively taking part in the activities of the town assemblies, as well as parliament, meant less time to devote to money-making activities. Public commitment was already being given a price tag, evaluated according to its economic advantages as against its economic disadvantages. It was because citizenship entailed material benefit that it was something to be valued, restricted and protected – and it was in this sense that it was politicised.
With England and France engaged in war, economic as well as military, and with the turmoil that followed in the wake of the Black Death, it should come as no surprise to learn that guild members were keenly concerned to protect the privileges of citizenship by guarding against dilution through the extension of citizenship to others.

Citizenship became a political issue on account of material interests in relation to particular groups. Citizenship was valued less for its capacity to give individuals the right to participate in the political process than for its economic advantages in promoting private self-interest. For instance, achieving equality in the competitive business world required citizen status. Only citizens could open retail shops to deal with the many noncitizens in the London market; only citizens could displace foreign merchants by pricing their goods in certain special ways. In this way citizenship was the means by which individuals could achieve wealth and higher social status. And individuals appreciated this all the more given the way in which those already possessing citizen status were increasingly hard-pressed economically, and the way that bureaucrats were using their legal training to discover more and more ways to enforce the laws. Europe had become increasingly administered, ordered, and regulated. A burgeoning officialdom was presiding over the increasing bureaucratisation of life, demanding written records and documentation, demanding that individuals give proof of status. By the end of the thirteenth century, the features of modern government and business practice could be clearly discerned, most clearly in Italy but also in a number of regions in northern Europe. And in all these places the clamour for citizenship derived from its being seen as the means to political and economic power.

At the level of practice, citizenship existed in northern Europe, even if the theory departed markedly from the classical tradition that infused its meaning in Italy and the Mediterranean.

The New Civic Urbanism of the 14th C
These developments chart the emergence of a new civic urbanism and consciousness. For virtually the whole millennia since Constantine, the idea that citizens owed allegiance to the state had been modified and altered by the Christian conception that emphasised allegiance to the Heavenly City. Sometime during the twelfth century, a new civic urbanism and consciousness emerged in Italy. The innovation of new structures and institutions fostered the development of a new civic spirit and these continued to spur development through exerting a mutual influence. The practices of new institutional and legal structures in governments, universities, large banking and trading firms stimulated a revival of urbanism in a way that was consonant with the social milieu of the public life of antiquity. For this new civic spirit was nothing less than the re-emergence of a public morality, a secular patriotism, which formed an ethical counterpoint in theory and practice to the religious considerations and imperatives that had prevailed for centuries. As it unfolded, this civic spirit and urbanism generated a distinctly secular civilisation constituted by a new body of symbols and architecture. The principal human agent in this process was the merchant, whose very worldly commercial and business activities slowly but surely contradicted the otherworldly ethics of Christian society. The economic success of the merchant brought the wealth that could pay for the new civic urbanism. In political life, the citizen emerged with a much more expansive identity, transcending economics in favour of a greater public awareness. This citizen did not experience public activity as a costly burden but actually responded with enthusiasm when called upon to expend time and property in public activity. Since this activity could involve not simply public service in the community, but also the risk of life and limb, it is clear that something of the classical conception of citizenship as commitment to the purposeful public life was in the process of being recovered.

To argue that the new civic urbanism undermined religious modes of thought and action does not mean that it lacked an ethics. On the contrary, civic urbanism expressed the ideal of public life as a reasonable commonality, the reciprocal union of rational beings. City life required peaceful cooperation, mutuality and thoughtful, discursive behaviour on the part of its members. The end of social harmony was the same as that of religion, only its means were natural rather than supernatural, human rather than divine.

These developments exhibit a revaluation of values, with a pronounced emphasis upon willing and doing that harks back to ancient and classical naturalism and essentialism as against the contemplative and supernatural approach of Christianity. The civic values emerging in new practices and activities came to be expressed in terms which provoked conflict with Christian notions of right and wrong on a number of key points. Whereas Christianity had been on the ‘good man’ side of the Aristotelian distinction, all being equal and achieving goodness in relation to God, the new civic urbanism restored Aristotle’s ‘good citizen’ identity. Allegiance to the city entailed obedience to an ethical code particular to that city. From the perspective of a universal ethics, such notions were limited. The influential jurist of the fourteenth century, Baldus (1327-1400), condemned citizenship to slavery. The individual was now compelled to subject his or her will to that of his city. The Aristotelian response would be that such obedience or obligation was not slavery but ‘salvation’ or ‘self-preservation’, providing the public life that human beings require in order to realise their essential humanity (P 1981:332; P Barker 1958:1310a). But much depends upon the correlation of realised human beings and the realised political community. Were the cities of the new civic urbanism the realised public communities entailed by Aristotle’s theory? There were grounds for thinking not. A civic master could compel a citizen do all those things which are conventionally associated with citizenship, pay taxes, build a house, or even move. But there were other, more contentious, things involved which gave some credence to the view of political identity as a slavery. The city could demand that the travelling merchant spy upon the military forces of neighbouring cities and states. Legitimised as a special form of ambassadorial service, such activity was demanded not only of laymen, but also of friars.

Citizenship is a dynamic, heterogeneous institution that operated differently and frequently altered with respect to time and place and in accordance with the skill and sophistication of those who made use of it. It emerged first in the city-states of Italy and the Mediterranean and, through the work of its university scholars, many of them Italian born or trained, it was here that it obtained its most sophistication elaboration and expression. In time, however, citizenship spread throughout northern Europe through the development of city life developed. Feudal and monarchical governments proceeded to appropriate the concepts associated with citizenship in partial form for their own larger territorial use. The gradual spread of the technical Roman law vocabulary from the south into the north which this presupposes continued throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance.

The Middle Ages appropriated and absorbed the institution and vocabulary of ancient citizenship in a way that fitted its own ends. This medieval citizenship was never the subject of the intense political controversy that had marked the institution in ancient Greece. Certainly, it was used, as it had been in the Greco-Roman world, to honour persons deemed of use and value to the community. And immigration and naturalization were accepted and institutionalised. Yet citizenship was never used as an instrument of foreign policy as it had been in Rome. The strong sense of popular activism, which valued civic service, did not pass over into the Middle Ages from antiquity. Instead, Christianity set the tone by devaluing pagan virtue in favour of the contemplative life focused on the next world as against the active life concerned to achieve one’s ends in this world. The revaluation and reconstitution of ancient public activism developed out of social practices and imperatives, taking popular and civic forms which had to struggle for the absence of theoretical defence and formal approval in the period.

The localism and particularism of feudal society ensured that the basic pattern and character of medieval citizenship was limited and local. Citizenship was confined to cities in northern Europe, Spain, southern France, and, in Italy, to the larger city-states like Florence, Milan, and Venice. Citizenship never existed at the level of kingship in the national monarchies. Only at the municipal level did citizenship exist in the national monarchies that started to grow across Europe.

It therefore makes no sense to refer to citizenship in terms of some general concept. Citizenship was no homogeneous entity. It is impossible to make a general statement as to what constituted a citizen in this period. Citizenship was unevenly distributed between time and place. Even within the cities there was a hierarchy of citizens of varying capacity in addition to any number of persons of other legal and political status - immigrants in the process of naturalization, the native-born who were too poor to be inscribed on a roster of taxpaying citizens, resident aliens who continued to identify with their place of origin rather than their place of residence, minimising their emotional and fiscal ties to the latter. The social mix of any decent sized town was varied, including solid merchants, artisans, and professional men, as well as menial workers, drifters, and criminals.

Such a diversity in the social composition of the city means that there is a need to refer to citizenships rather than to Citizenship as such. There is a continuum or hierarchy of citizenships. Maximum citizenship entailed the fullest possible exercise of civil powers, in litigation and political powers, in the creation of civic policy through voting and candidacy eligibility for the whole range of political office. The powers of citizenship were grounded in status, itself a function of birth (both locale and parentage) and social class. Status was not a simple, unitary, static abstraction but consisted of a collection of powers to be activated when required. This could be for legal competence against a foreigner; for economic power in a boycott; for political power in acquiring political office to secure one’s self, family and dependents.

The difference between political citizenship and minimum citizenship is often explicit. In Imola legal benefits could be received after a year of residence, but the right to serve in any office only after ten. This was also the case in Bologna, as revealed in the constitution of 1250, until the condition was raised to twenty years in 1288. In Siena, any citizen who had lived abroad a considerable time had to go through the same ten year probationary period as a foreign-born citizen. The conclusion is that city concern varied according to the sensitivity of the political function involved.


City constitutions reflected social realities. In Florence, those seeking to serve the republic required not only citizenship, but also membership in the Parte Guelfa.

These circumstances are very different to the conception of citizenship advanced in ancient Greece, which offered a clear definition in moral and political terms. The classical world of Rome perpetuated the ethic of a participatory citizenship in the many cities, large and small, that dotted the Empire. The Greco-Romanic conception of citizenship is almost completely free of the concern with economic benefit. A record of ancient legal cases displaying an overwhelming concern with material gain does not exist. Citizenship is an end in itself in this world, not the mere instrumental means to a material end that it had now become. Of course, one should avoid idealising the past. The fact is that the ancient and classical world was not as developed or as sophisticated economically as the medieval age. One would expect economic issues to impinge upon politics given the heightened commercialism of medieval urban life. An expanding economy was accompanied by an increasingly sophisticated legal science so that citizenship came to be bound up with a concern for status in legal and economic affairs that explains why the moral and political concerns that dominated the citizenship literature of antiquity are almost entirely absent.

The Intellectuals’ View of the City
Medieval thinkers were well aware of the distinctiveness of the city. The extent to which its particular commitments distinguished it from other medieval social institutions required an explanation and, from the thirteenth century, intellectuals set to work to provide it. The city was distinctive. In terms of purpose and function, it was nothing like a manor. City dwellers did things in their everyday life that others, peasants or knights, did not do. They made and sold things and exchanged and made money. City politics was very different from the hierarchical feudal world, being organised around participation and judgement in processes of election which presumed political and legal equality. There were also marked differences in the social environment. The diversity and flux characterising the large Italian or Flemish municipality formed a complete contrast with the stability and slow pace of change of the village. Furthermore, the materialism and competitiveness of urban life contradicted the emphasis upon harmony, charity, and cooperation which characterised the Christian view of social life. It is significant that the indisputable fact of urban spread and growth provoked an animated reaction from the theologians during the late Middle Ages.

The jurists drew a sharp distinction between urban and rural life. Baldus asserted the superiority of the city over the countryside. He writes about the city as an abstraction, as though all cities possessed a common nature. Further, the habits and qualities that derive naturally from living in the city are unavailable through rural life. This awareness of the distinctiveness of urban life was shared by Bartolus. Bartolus builds his theory upon an analysis of contemporary thought, institutions, and legislation, and other such differentiae. For Bartolus, above and beyond the physical signs of walls and buildings, the city is qualitatively special, with a distinctive culture and implying a superior quality of existence. Bartolus emphasises the city’s tutela, a notion which denotes a caretaking responsibility toward its citizens and the reciprocal respect these citizens have for the city. He refers to the city as both mother and father. And he also employs the metaphor of the body politic, arguing that the citizens form part of the body. In the work of the theologians this metaphor is tied to the notion of the corpus mysticum. For Ptolemy of Lucca, the city is a “unio in corpore animato”; he compares the “amor suorum civium” of a city to the ties of charity and love that bind together Christian society. That a theologian should come to positively evaluate a city in this way is important since, in the previous couple of centuries, the Church had been suspicious of and often downright hostile towards cities and their values. And for good reason. The cities had been the source of any number of heresies in Italy and France and the most important theologians of the thirteenth century had been busy in combating their impact and influence.

Other than this, theologians had paid little attention to citizenship. Their concerns and predilections were focused upon the institutions of monarchy and feudalism and their preferences were for the institutions and society of the Old and New Testaments. An important consideration is that, in the thirteenth century, the audience for political thought was a royal, noble, and ecclesiastical one. There was also the point that cities and citizens mattered most in Italy, where there was not really a great concentration of social and political philosophers. In contrast, Paris, where there was such a concentration, was a royal city. In comparison with the citizens of the large Italian cities, the people of Paris did not have an active role in governing of their community.

Which brings the discussion to Aristotle and the recovery of his thought. This recovery was more than intellectual. With a terminology deriving from a different social and political reality, Aristotle’s Politics would not have been immediately comprehensible in the mid-thirteenth century. The terrain for the reception of Aristotle had been prepared through the expansion of a civic urbanism and the spread of city values and it is these that made the intellectual appreciation and political influence of Aristotle, at the level of political theory and practice, possible. During this period, scholars began the work of attempting to critically appropriate the Politics and establish its concepts on the contemporary terrain.

27 THE REVIVAL OF ARISTOTLE AND ITS BACKGROUND
Practical Manifestations of the Ascending Thesis
It is no exaggeration to claim that the influence exerted by the works of Aristotle during the second half of the thirteenth century fashioned a transformation in thought so profound as to amount to a conceptual revolution that marked the end of the Middle Ages and the birth of the modern age. (Ullmann 159).

There are a number of reasons why intellectuals and even, in part, governmental and religious authorities, so easily took to the ideas of Aristotle, reasons which have their roots in the changing social, cultural and political terrain of medieval life. The ground had been prepared for the reception of Aristotelian ideas. The thought of Aristotle became so influential on account of the emergence of a civic urbanism and of other manifestations of a practical medieval populism that gave his values and concepts a social relevance and validity. Without those developments, it would have been impossible for ancient texts to cause the conceptual revolution in social and political thought that came to pass.

Whilst the theocratic-descending theory of government was the dominant conception of the period of the early Middle Ages, this was very much a view of politics ‘from above’. In the real society in which the bulk of the population lived their lives, the ascending theme of power was much more in evidence. The Rulers had little direct contact with the population and so paid little attention to the view ‘from below’. Historians too can neglect what was going on within this everyday social reality and instead concentrate on the higher level where the records are overwhelmingly concentrated. There are few records pertaining to the practices and activities of the people living their lives inside the official picture presented by the governmental and religious authorities. These records give evidence of a natural way of conducting affairs according to the ascending theme. Whilst these practices and activities did not attract the attention of the intellectuals at the time, and have consistently ignored by historians who choose to focus upon the ‘higher’ levels of government, from a universal-rational standpoint, concerned with freedom, happiness and democracy as integral to human self-realisation, the ascending themes affirmed at the populist level, is clearly more relevant to the concerns of the people than the highly complex and abstractly rational descending theory of government. And more natural too, in that it is focused upon activity and participation as connected with the growth, development and exercise of essential human powers. The modes by which the lower strata of society sought to control their common affairs is historically significant in connecting properly medieval ideas of government with modern political theory. In the modes of action and organisation, and the ideas and concepts that these entail, it is possible to discern actual precursors of the themes and practices of modernity. For all of the assertions of the theocratic-descending theme of power in those places where feudal government was practised, mentally and socially the ground was being prepared for a radical new orientation.

These developments reveal a kind of popular, practical Aristotelianism. Which, if Aristotle was right, is precisely what one ought to have expected. If human beings are zoon politikons, socio-political animals who naturally socialised with each and formed communities, then that is precisely what one would expect human beings to, whether or not they had read or understood a word of Aristotle. And, sure enough, that is precisely what one finds in the lower regions, a natural sociability articulated through associational activity proceeding according to the ascending theme of power. This popular associationalism was not the result of having read Aristotle or any other philosopher, or of any theoretical dispute and controversy over competing theories of government. As can be argued on Aristotelian lines, these countless associations, unions, fraternities, communities, colleges, and so on, formed and maintained by the people expressed the natural urge of human beings to socialise and combine themselves in larger units, to form communities within larger communities. The aims of these popular organs were defensive, self-preservation and mutual insurances, but also concerned the promotion of sectional interests. The important point, however, is that in organisation and structure these associations were organised around the ascending theory of government: they were the spontaneous creations of their members and it was they who managed them. The associations represented populist enclaves within a kingdom governed according to the theocratic-descending conception. To show how these associations made it possible for people to manage their own affairs without direction from ‘higher’ authorities one can give the example of the village communities. These fixed the times of ploughing, harvesting, and fallowing and arranged for the policing of the fields. A whole number of areas were made subject to regulations determined by the community - water supply, the use of the commons, the use made of rivers, wells, brooks, etc., compensation for damage to crops by cattle or fire, for damage to woods by unlicensed timbering, and so on. This fixing of regulations also applied to quarries, smithies, tileries, potteries. The communities fixed working conditions. The methods by which the ‘officers’ of the village community were chosen reveal an increasing impulse to social self-government on the part of ‘ordinary’ people. Along with all other ‘functionaries’, the highest office of the mayor was elected by a community which was small enough in numbers to make direct democracy, as against representation, a reality.

Further evidence for the ineradicable urge of the people to govern themselves is to be found in the government of towns. Here ascending and descending themes had a paradoxical co-existence. To achieve ‘free’ status, a town had to have a royal charter; and yet town government was conducted entirely according to the ascending theme. This was certainly the case with respect to the existence and operation of a town council. Further, the period witnessed leagues of towns coming to combine to achieve specific aims, especially in northern Italy.

The multiplication of guilds and fraternities in the towns was further evidence of the tendency to self-government. Whether these organisations were composed of artisans, merchants or journeymen, the important point to note is that these were autonomous bodies which practised the idea of consent. Whilst all of this went without intellectual discussion and theoretical elaboration, these were nothing less than practical demonstrations of themes which would come to form the core of modern political philosophy. 

Examining the evidence concerning social practices and activities within orders governed by the descending theory of government reveals that, contrary to the overarching thesis that power comes from above and is conferred downward, the ‘people’ were an essential part of its implementation. Government can only endure and achieve its aims over the long run with the cooperation of the governed, and this cooperation presupposes a degree of popular consent and agreement. The existence and prevalence of customary law is to be understood in this context, not only as proof of the assertiveness of the popular will but for the way in which it was understood as a tacit consent which expressed itself in myriad practices and usages. (Ullmann 162).

Assertions of the popular will were frequent. The popular uprisings, local upheavals, and peasant revolts, as well as the activities of heretical sects were expressions of a spirit of populism prevalent in medieval society. In such actions, the people were challenging the descending thesis from below. The heretical sects were particularly interesting in explicitly disobeying those who, according to the theocratic-descending theme, were their superiors. The heretics charged the ecclesiastical hierarchy with failing to live up to their Christian beliefs and demanded a return to the fundamental tenets of primitive Christianity, lived according to apostolic poverty. This was further evidence of the inherent human urge to form an independent judgement and develop the capacity to act upon it, a view that had been stigmatised under the theocratic-descending. Such views sought to replace hierarchical Authority with a democratic authority formed by the independent judgement of the people themselves. The ‘heresy’ here was as political as it was religious, challenging the descending modes upon which government was based. The practical organisation and conduct of these sects exhibited distinctly populist elements, all of which reveal the social origins of the democratic revolution. They assembled in ‘conventicles’, elected their officers, and through itinerant preaching made direct appeals to the masses. The ‘establishment’ hated being forced to dispute in public, preferring not having to justify their power and authority. Theocratic governments took the most extreme and vicious measures to stamp the heretics and their religious and political ideas out. That this spirit of autonomy was expressed in religious terms should not lead one to underestimate the political significance of these events. Moreover, the heretics were all the more dangerous in doing this by targeting the basic moral tenets of the theocratic-descending system. The whole system was based upon religious terms, an authority which the heretics revealed to be false in the eyes of the governed.

The Church fully understood the threat and the papacy under Innocent III was quick to organise the response. The fact that Innocent felt it necessary to grant recognition of itinerant preachers indicates the extent to which the multitude had constituted itself as a force to be reckoned with. There was an attempt to draw the sting. The Friars – the Dominicans and Franciscans – adopted precisely the same methods as the heretics, roaming wide in tattered clothing, provoking public disputations, and generally behaving exactly as the heretics had done. The only difference was that the Friars were preaching not heresy but orthodoxy.

28 INCIPIENT HUMANISM AND NATURAL SCIENCE
For a fuller appreciation of the reception of Aristotle some other background features, not directly political, are relevant. In addition to political, urban, and social developments, the intellectual and cultural developments are important. By the middle of the thirteenth century virtually the whole body of ancient Greek science had been made available to the west. Scholars were beginning to identify, interpret and expound the principal concepts. All the key ideas of the ancient masters were exposed – the dignity of human beings, the nobility of nature, the intelligibility of the universe – and were being embedded in the intellectual structures of the thirteenth century as fundamental concepts. The truth of these concepts was assumed, so ingrained were they, and could be introduced routinely into the most technical discussions on all manner of subjects. Compare two works about the Incarnation, one written by Anselm in 1100, the other by the first great Oxford master, Robert Grosseteste in about 1230 (De cessatione legalium, ed D J Unger, Franciscan Studies, 1956, xvi, 1-36). In terms of literary style Anselm is infinitely superior. But Grosseteste’s work evinces a much deeper humanism. Anselm argues that the Incarnation was necessary since man had sinned and redemption was impossible by any other means. God necessarily became man, not on account of any quality in man, but because of his otherwise total ruin. Grosseteste completely alters the argument in a way that shows the impact of scientific humanism in the century since Anselm. Grosseteste also argued that God’s Incarnation is necessary for man’s salvation. But it was not for reason of man’s sin that it was necessary but for the completion of man’s nature. On this reasoning the Incarnation would still have happened even if man had never sinned. On Grosseteste’s reasoning, the Incarnation was not the final attempt by God to redeem an almost irredeemable situation but was the final act in the unfolding story of creation. Incarnation made Man and Nature complete, binding the whole created universe, humanity and nature together, in union with God.

Grosseteste’s argument articulates a conception of the dignity and nobility of humanity and nature, each in themselves as well as in unity, that is so exalted that God could not stop short of Incarnation, and a conception of a natural order so sublime that it called for completion God-perfected humanity. Such arguments are theological and scientific at the same time, setting supernatural accounts on natural foundations and exhibiting an explicitly naturalist faith in humanity and nature. Long before the Renaissance, the Age of Reason, and the Enlightenment, the greatest claims for the inherent rationality and nobility of human nature, the unity of humanity and nature, the possibility of naturalistic investigation and explanation had been made. The views were still as theological as they were scientific. But in expressing the divine ordering of the universe in such a way as to make the entire complex of humanity, nature and God open to human investigation and intelligible to human reason, the path had been opened to naturalistic explanation. From this moment on, the sinful, corrupt Christian man was in retreat in face of the rise of the natural man. This was very much a resurrection, for Christianity was supposed to have buried this natural man. The visual arts registered the sea change. Attention came to concentrate upon man as he was in nature and in reality rather than upon the ‘the new creature’, the Christian view of sinful man. Christianity’s ‘new creature’, the sinful man, started to be supplanted by the portrayal of a human personality in all its substantial individuality and realistic concreteness.

It is against this backdrop of diverse and manifold expressions of the natural human spirit (civic urbanism and social movements and practices, religious controversies, literature, poetry, the arts, natural science, etc.) that it becomes possible to understand how the concepts and terminology of an ancient philosopher, Aristotle, could come to exert such a profound and lasting influence. If Aristotle had never existed, the thirteenth century would have had to invent him. The political, social and intellectual terrain was replete with a natural, spontaneous Aristotelianism. Aristotelian ideas were already being practised and applied, certainly in the subterranean world of civil society, where the ascending theme prevailed. It was only a matter of time before this latent Aristotelianism reached the level of public government. In a fundamental sense Aristotle supplied the theory for what had long been observable in practice – as he had done many centuries earlier. The difference is that this time, all that Aristotle had valued and celebrated had already been achieved and was already in the process of passing. Now his thought was to exercise a shaping influence upon the future. (Ullmann 167).


29 THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS
The conceptual revolution wrought by the assimilation of Aristotle in the 13th century had its greatest impact in the sphere of government and politics. This applied at the level of both theory and practice. Many centuries earlier, Aristotle, along with Plato, had given the world political philosophy. The recovery of his thought supplied secular governments, writers, jurists, polemicists with the concepts, terminology and even the spur it needed to generate its own political philosophy. Theory and speculation on politics now explicitly focused upon government as a natural unit which grows wholly in accordance with the laws of nature, independent of divine intervention and grace and of any theological or speculative considerations. Aristotle’s philosophy encouraged the development of the idea of the state as a ‘body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life’. This definition, like much in Aristotle, is deceptively simple. Yet it introduced naturalistic dimensions into thought concerning society and its government which sustained concepts which were quite radical in their implications. The concept of the secular state, which contemporary writers had been groping towards, was not only developed but was accompanied by the concept of citizenship reborn and raised to substantial proportions within a radical new orientation. The concepts of the State and the citizen were to prove core elements of modern political philosophy. Before this, in the course of the next two or three hundred years, as these concepts were debated, promoted, resisted and fought for, the structure of medieval Christian society and government was dissolved and supplanted. 

The recovery of the naturalist perspective is crucial in this. Hence the assimilation of Aristotelian concepts generated the scientia naturalis, and its counterpart in the political field of scientia politica. The recovery of Aristotelian thought challenged all of the main premises upon which public and social life was based. The seemingly benign Aristotelian axiom that man is a zoon politikon was in truth an incendiary notion that contained the potential to turn the existing political and social order upside down. It signalled the return of the Pauline ‘natural man’, the being that baptismal waters were supposed to have washed away. Natural man, as no longer sinful, had no need of external intervention, remedial action by a supernatural organ. Power was of human rather than divine origin; it was within rather than without.

Some understanding of the extent of the change that occurred through the introduction of Aristotelian thought can be obtained with reference to the concept of natural law before and after the recovery of Aristotle. In traditional understanding, the idea of nature and of natural law were both speculative theories within a Christian cosmology. Gratian defined the common doctrine of natural law concisely in the view that ‘the natural law was that law which was contained in the Old and New Testaments, according to which everyone was enjoined not to do to others what he did not wish to be done to himself’. According to this conception, natural law stands in close proximity to divine law. Gratian therefore considered that natural law ‘began with the creation of the rational creature’ by God. In this understanding, natural law was not the law of nature but the law of God. The natural law had little connection with observable phenomena; humanity was the creation of God, not nature. Within this system, natural and ecclesiastical laws were understood as flowing from the divine will; on the basis of the view that humanity were divine creations rested the claim of the papacy to rule non-Christians.

The twelfth century conception of the natural law was distilled from the doctrine of St Augustine. Augustine’s idea of creation culminated in the purely abstract conception of ‘nature’ as signifying the original and uncontaminated state of a thing as a result of its divine creation. Any evil that a thing came to have had nothing to do with its nature, and was contrary to this nature. Since ‘nature’ contained nothing evil, evil was a perversion of the natural order. The true nature of man was corrupted by the Fall. From this moment, the nature of man became perverted. Only with divine grace could humanity’s true nature be restored. With this, mortality, misery, sin and evil would occur no more. On these premises Augustine affirmed the equality of all human beings, brotherly love, the community of property, and other such notions suggesting a primitive Christian communism. Whatever the premises suggested, however, Augustine’s conception of nature and natural law was such a pure abstraction, detached from what could be considered nature and natural in real life, that it had little application at the level of theory and practice.

The ground for the reception of Aristotle’s thought in the thirteenth-century was further eased by the study of Roman law, containing classical jurist Ulpian’s definition of natural law as that law which nature taught not only humankind but all animals. Ulpian’s explication of the term natura as deriving from nasci, meaning to be born or framed by nature, was an importer pointer in connecting the concept of nature with growth and evolution, challenging the rigid and static Augustinian conception. This naturalist conception also spread into the work of non-jurists like John of Salisbury.

Before going further, it is worthwhile identifying the main tenets of Aristotle’s philosophy which came to have the greatest influence upon the thirteenth century Aristotelianism. Aristotle’s political philosophy culminates in the conception of the state as the supreme community of citizens, formed out of a number of other communities. The state is not formed by agreement, contract, or convention, or any act of foundation but is a product of nature, formed through the operation of the laws of nature. The laws of nature which issued in the State were germane to human beings on account of their own nature. These laws of nature determined human beings to live in self-sufficient, autonomous communities within the supreme community, the State. Only beasts and gods can live without the state, human beings cannot. Further, it is only within the state that human beings can attain their perfection. Man was by nature a zoon politikon, a political animal who needs other human beings in order to realise one’s own essential humanity. The State is the consummation of all the other unions and associations natural to human beings, the family, the village, the town, etc. Aristotle’s philosophy underlines the natural growth of the State from below. The naturalism of the state as the supreme community is shown by the way it is constituted by all the other smaller communities.

Aristotle’s philosophy is pervaded by a teleological conception of nature as the source of all power, the demiurge: statements such as ‘Nature does nothing superfluous’, or ‘Nature behaves as if it foresaw the future’, or ‘Nature does nothing in vain’ are the recurring themes of Aristotle’s philosophy. But Aristotelian teleology is no blind unfolding of natural ends but, allied to reason as the distinctive trait of the human species, is a conscious, moral process and praxis: the laws of nature determined the human thinking and reasoning capacity. Whereas animals are characterised by their blind obedience to their natural proclivities, the distinguishing feature of the human species is the employment of will and reason. It is by the exercise of will and reason that the laws of nature are expressed in human action. The state is therefore the embodiment and realisation of the reasoned transformation of the laws of nature into a common will. The human insight into and understanding of natural laws and their unfolding determined conceptions of right and wrong. The rational will of humanity is therefore inextricably connected to nature, human nature within and the law of nature without. The determination of right and wrong and the ordering of life by moral codes is the product of humanity’s reasoning power. And, given the sociable nature of human beings, this implied the union of each and all within a reasonable commonality. Through the creative agency of human will and reasoning, nature pursued and achieved its ends. This not only issued in the State, but determined its course. From the premise that nature wills ‘the good’ and the definition of the state as the supreme community, the culmination of all human associations, it follows, Aristotle reasoned, that the State aims at the higher good.

Law is the instrument by which this aim is attained; law is the articulated will of nature pronounced by citizens as rational beings. Aristotle’s claim that ‘the principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best could be satisfactorily proved’ is probably the most significant Aristotelian theme relating to government and politics (Oncken, Pohlenz, Knauss, E. Meyer). All else, in terms of citizenship, democracy, participation, popular sovereignty, follow from this. From this it follows that the popular assembly is the ‘sovereign’ body (‘supreme’ to employ Aristotle’s term) aiming and hence promoting the common good. Human beings as citizens, exercising their reasoned will, possessed the natural right to participate in administration and the government of the State as their own political community. Aristotle emphasised the extent to which the State is the community of citizens realising their natures: 

He who has power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of the State is said by us to be a citizen of the State, and generally speaking a State is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.

The naturalism of these conceptions explains why Aristotle came to be the key intellectual figure in the dissolution of medieval Christian government and society. This pre-eminence of Aristotle is to be explained by the naturalism of his philosophy. This presented a direct challenge to the supernaturalism of the prevailing medieval conceptions and, what is more, were in tune with the spontaneous thoughts and modes of conduct within real society. The Aristotelian revolution was premised on the return of the figure that Christianity had sought to banish; the natural man. This was the man of flesh, the man who, according to St Paul, was successfully washed away by baptismal water. The natural man was a corrupt, sinful man who needed to be cleansed and infused divine grace. Baptism turned this man into a new creature. This was the dominant conception in government and society in the Christian Middle Ages and it buttressed the theocratic-descending theme which located power in divine origins, to be conferred downwards in hierarchical fashion. Now the natural man returned to his earlier autonomous position, contradicting the Christian worldview at every point. If power is of human origin, arising within the potentials and exercised through the capacities of human beings themselves, then naturalism clearly implied government by active as well as tacit consent, democracy as empowerment, and participatory conceptions of citizenship as human self-realisation. Even in the 21st century these notions are radical and are still far from being realised. Imagine the impact of Aristotelian naturalism at the time that government and politics was dominated by hierarchical notions of power as residing above. (Ullmann LP 1975:270).


Aristotle’s philosophy was quite well tuned to this split between the Christian man and the natural man. Aristotle had pioneered the distinction between politics and ethics, subverting Platonic wholeness by arguing that the good citizen need not be a good man and vice versa. Aristotle asserted a conceptual difference between man and the citizen: ‘It is evident that the good citizen need not necessarily possess the virtue which makes him a good man’. The implication of this statement is that man and citizen corresponded to two different categories of thought and hence that different norms prevailed with regard to each category. Whilst morality established the conditions of a good person, the political-legal code formulated the standards to be met by the good citizen. The citizen acted according to principles which belonged to the political and legal order, whilst the person acted according to norms pertaining to ethics. It follows from this distinction that the good citizen was one who lives according to the constitution and so fulfils the demands made by the political order; the good person lives in accordance with the precepts of a moral code. In public service within a bad state, the individual could be a good citizen but a bad person. In living by a moral code that contradicted the demands of the state, a saint could be a good person but a bad citizen. Establishing the concepts of man and citizen in contradistinction to each other anticipated the abstracting out of human activities in the modern world, breaking down the holistic perspective. Conceiving the human character from two angles, the political and the moral, began the process whereby human activities came to be separated out into other distinctive categories, social, economic, religious, cultural etc., each with their own set of principles and all autonomous from each other. Ultimately, this was nothing less than the parcelling out of human activities, of the human personality itself, the principal characteristic of modern rationalisation as analysed by Max Weber. It should be pointed out here that, for Aristotle, wholeness is the end, since in the ideal community ethics and politics would be united and the good person and the good citizen would be identical. In the ideal state the good citizen would necessarily be a good person. And the ideal is the end of nature.

Aristotle’s anthropocentric themes and the prevailing christocentric themes were antithetical on all of the key points and clearly threatened to dissolve the Christian order in government and politics. The Aristotelian State expanded and put into operation the principles of natural evolution by incorporating the multifariousness, many-sidedness and diversity of progressive human-natural unfolding. With respect to government, the conflict between christocentric and Aristotelian anthropocentric theses can be expressed thus: the former asserts the one governmental system, the descending, deriving its substance from a norm laid down by a supernatural power, imposing unity and uniformity from above; the latter asserts an ascending theme, proceeding the multiformity of natural manifestations and powering the whole from the base upwards. Where the christocentric system looks to the other world for the realisation of its ends, considering life in this world to be merely preparatory, the Aristotelian conception is focused upon this world and identifies and pursues its ends within this world.





The substantial and seemingly impossible task of assimilating naturalistic Aristotelian thought within a supernaturalist Christian framework was undertaken and successfully accomplished by Thomas Aquinas. His two Summae are the high water mark of medieval humanism, the great Dominican scholar, Thomas Aquinas exhibiting a mastery of the intricate Aristotelian corpus to create an intellectually satisfying edifice affirming the unity of reason and nature.

Thomas Aquinas is more optimistic that Augustine and is to be credited with restoring the idea of the state as a positive instrument. Through his assimilation of Aristotle, Aquinas recovers the notion of the political community as a natural institution based upon human reason and as an integral part of the good life. Aquinas’ achievement entailed ‘an infinity of nice distinctions in accommodating a pagan philosophy to Christian cosmology’ (McIllwain in Ullmann 1965:174). Thomism was a Christian Aristotelianism, a Christian superstructure built on an Aristotelian substructure.

Aquinas made the crucial distinction between humanitas and christianitas and theorised the double ordering of things. The greatest innovation in his thought, however, was in establishing the concept of nature as a central current running through his programme. Aquinas conceived nature to be a divine creation, and hence granted it autonomous standing. However, to fully realise his ends, man was in need of faith and grace. ‘Grace does not do away with nature but perfects it’ (Ullmann LP 1975:272).

Aquinas’ sophisticated and elaborate attempt to synthesise Christian and Aristotelian elements, especially the ideas of justice, culminated in the comprehensive Summa Theologiae. It was here that the fullest and most mature statement of Thomist principles was presented.

Aquinas drew upon Aristotle’s fundamental themes of the evolutionary concept of nature, physical reality, or actual being as distinct from an idealised postulate. Aquinas consistently accented the element of growth in nature, explaining it as Ulpian had done, with Thomas arguing for the idea of physical generation of the living organism, and hence of physical birth. Aquinas’ concept of nature was Aristotle’s, designating birth, growth, decay. Staying close to Aristotle, Aquinas argued that the idea of motion is inherent in nature and is observable in moving bodies, since they must have an ‘intrinsic beginning’ in themselves. Adopting Aristotle’s ‘naturalistic’ mode of thought, Aquinas’s work registered a new departure in purely philosophical thought. Conceiving the idea of nature as an element containing its own force and its own principles of operation created a critical tool of evaluation which makes it possible to affirm or deny that a particular phenomenon is ‘according to nature’, ‘above nature’, ‘contrary to nature’ etc. This was certainly how the idea of nature operated in Aquinas’s own system. Proceeding from Aristotelian premises, Aquinas applied the idea of nature to society and its government. Aristotle’s teleological conception of the operation of nature and his idea of the political community as a product of nature reappeared in Aquinas’s system. Aquinas reproduced Aristotle’s definition of man as a ‘political animal’, clarifying its meaning further by designating man also as a social animal. Aquinas’s resulting definition of man as ‘a political and social animal’ makes clear the ‘social’ component that is implicit in Aristotle’s original conception. This definition of man as a political animal marked the entrance of the ‘political’ into contemporary vocabulary and modes of thought.

Aquinas affirmed the view of man and Christian as conceptually distinct. Man was a product of nature and it was such that man ought to be apprehended. The hallmark of man was his naturalness. As members of human society, human beings are social animals. From this emphasis on the naturalness of human beings, the focus on the homo, issued the Thomist conception of humanitas. This Aquinas argued to be the essential being of man as such (Ullmann 1965:175).

Aquinas’ greatest achievement is to have rediscovered Aristotle and thereby to have helped reshape the Middle Ages according to ‘rational’ themes. Particularly important in this respect is the idea of political community as the essential framework for the good life of human beings. Aquinas developed Aristotle’s teleological argument that the state is the product of nature, arguing further that the human being is not just a ‘political animal’ but a ‘political and social animal’. Aquinas insisted that the human being is a rational animal, too. The fact that human beings operate not merely by instinct but above all by reason makes social organisation indispensable. Aquinas thus affirmed the interconnection of reason and sociability. Human beings were political beings who could acquire the necessities of life only by cooperating under the direction of reason (Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:viii). As part of this rational process, there is a need to cooperate and specialise.

It is not possible for one man to arrive at a knowledge of all these things by his own individual reason. It is therefore necessary for man to live in a multitude so that each one may assist his fellows, and different men may be occupied in seeking, by their reason, to make different discoveries – one, for example, in medicine, one in this and another in that.

Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:viii

The rational process is a social process that involves the collaboration of all individuals. The naturally ordained division of labour means that ‘one man works for many, and many work for one’ (Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:ix). The proper functioning of the political community depends upon individuals fulfilling the tasks for which they are naturally endowed, whether as artisans, farmers or statesmen etc. The necessary diversification of capacities within social collaboration is a product of nature (Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:ix).


Aquinas predicates progress upon reason and implies the end of a dialogical or discursive community: ‘It seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect .. Discursive rationality implies progress’ (Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:viii). The fact that human beings have been endowed with the capacity to speak indicates that human beings are intended to collaborate rationally. Words are the external manifestation of concepts, the products of a conceiving reason (Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:ix).

The instinct for social life cannot be satisfied at the level of home, estate or village. To attain knowledge and virtue beyond subsistence requires that the smaller communities be integrated within the larger community of the state, the ‘perfect community’. This is the city-state (polis), the civitas, the provincia, the best of all kingdoms (Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:x). The purpose of the state is to promote the appropriate conditions of the good life in both the material and the cultural sphere. The state secures the common good and is the highest worldly end of human beings. The state regulates individual motivations and actions according to a common purpose that ensures the good of all. Reason indicates what the necessary functions for this end are and authority ensures that they are undertaken. As a result of achieving order, multiplicity is converted into unity directed towards the common end. ‘Society is obviously nothing else than the unification of men for the purpose of perfecting some one thing in common’ (Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:x/xi).

To identify freedom with the self-interested and self-motivated actions of the multiplicity of individuals would issue only in a self-cancelling universal constraint that denies freedom to all. Aquinas makes the ‘rational’ argument for individuals to be brought together and so arranged that their united efforts achieve a common end for all that enhances the good of each. This requires a principle of governing authority. ‘In every multitude there must be some governing power’. Aquinas justifies the state on these grounds:

For where there are many men together and each one is looking after his own interest, the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there were also an agency to take care of what appertains to the common weal ..

Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:xii

For Aquinas, the citizen was no longer the subject, the sub-dictus, who had to obey authority. Rather, Aquinas affirmed Aristotle’s definition of the citizen as one who took an active part in government, sharing in government and in the making of the law to which the citizen was subject. Aquinas had recovered something that had been absent in the Middle Ages, the Aristotelian idea of the ‘state’ as the product of the natural instinct of human beings, as conforming to laws of nature, as the pinnacle of organised human society. Natural human reason created human association in its ascending forms and since ‘nature leaves nothing imperfect’, the state was ‘the most perfect human association’.

The citizen was the complement of man in organised society, man writ large. As such, the citizen is no longer the subject, the sub/dictus, compelled to obey superior authority. Aristotle’s definition of the citizen as one who actively participated in government facilitated the emancipation of the subject from authority, subverting relations of inferiority and superiority. As subject to (superior) authority, the individual had no share in government nor in the making of the law.

In arguing that a ruler must govern in accordance with laws and that laws must be derived from natural law, Aquinas proclaims that legality is conditioned by morality and that moral conduct is action regulated by reason, a reason that God has implanted in the human soul. Natural law is the source of the norms of moral virtue and has a particular significance for one of the virtues. This is justice, the social virtue par excellence whose precepts form the civil codes of the state (Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975: xxiii/xxiv). A government is good when it concerns itself with the common good and bad when it is most concerned with private advantage.

 Aquinas’s achievement lay in reacquainting western civilisation with its constituent concepts. If the Renaissance really does mean ‘re-birth’, then the most important ‘re-birth’ of all was that of the citizen, allowing the recovery of the public sphere as a domain infused with popular power, discourse, norms. The re-emergence of the concept of citizen was to prove of enormous historical significance, raising issues of participation, freedom, democracy which continue to resonate to this day and which will continue to do so for so long as human beings remain human and hence exhibit an inherent concern with their own self-realisation. Given the way that the ground had been prepared socially, culturally and intellectually, the rapid spread and deep penetration of the concept should come as no surprise. Given the fertile terrain, one is entitled to argue that had not Aquinas recovered Aristotle’s conception of active citizenship, it would have had to have been invented.

Aquinas adopted many other elements of Aristotle’s thought. He repeated the important distinction made by Aristotle between the man and the citizen:

It sometimes happens (he said) that someone is a good citizen who has not the quality according to which someone is also a good man, from which follows that the quality according to whether someone is a good man or a good citizen is not the same.

The importance of this distinction lies in the denial of the totalitarian point of view, signalling a new, and decidedly modern, perspective. From this point on, the atomisation of human activities into distinct and autonomous spheres started to be discernible and, with it, the subjection of the individual to different sets of norms and postulates (political, religious, moral, economic etc).

Whether Aquinas’ system can be described as the re-birth of political philosophy or the creation of modern political philosophy depends upon how original one considers his appropriation of Aristotle to be. In many ways, Aquinas was returning the west to its intellectual roots. But there are added elements, for instance the institution of the state, which are novel and which make it possible to date the emergence of a science of government and politics from this moment. Aquinas conceived scientia politica as knowledge concerning the government of the State, which he referred to as civitas or civilitas. These concepts are inextricably connected for Aquinas. To Aquinas, political science is the science of government as related to the state as a natural product. It is therefore concerned not with speculation but is a science concerned with practical matters, operativa, the putting of theories into practice, the actual doing of things. The foundation of this ‘operative science’ is the natural-human reason with which humanity is endowed by nature. This formed the fundamental point in the Thomist system. Human reason received its direction and orientation from the world of experience which, Aquinas argued, is especially noticeable ‘in the natural things’ as well as ‘in moral matters’. Furthermore, political science was no dependent upon an outside agency but contained its working principles within itself. Thus Aquinas described political science as the most practical as well as the most fundamental and ‘architectonic’ of all the sciences, ‘aiming as it did at the perfect good in human affairs’. The conception of political science in these terms accented the human and practical dimension: what matters is human experience as expressed through its natural-human elements, given that political science is part of the human sciences and is therefore ‘aimed at imitating nature’. The new science proceeds from reality as it is, judging society by standards immanent in its own practices rather than according to some impossibly abstract ideal. (Ullmann 1965:177).

From his premises, Aquinas defined a concept of the ‘political government’ (regimen politicum) in contradistinction to ‘regal government’ (regimen regale). The ‘regal government’ rests upon the theocratic-descending theme of power and is characterized by the unaccountability of governmental actions and the possession of ‘full powers’ by the king. Against this traditional medieval of kingship, Aquinas defined ‘political government’, with the powers of the ruler ‘restricted by positive law’. The idea of a ruler whose powers are circumscribed by the laws of the State is quite distinct from the idea of the theocratic Ruler. Aquinas’ thought clearly adumbrates the ascending theme of government and law as a populist conception. This is made explicit when he wrote of the status popularis in connexion with democracy and ‘the will of the people’. Later ages had little to add to Aquinas’s definition of democracy as based upon the operation of the will of the people: ‘from the members of the people the leaders can be elected and their election belongs to the people’. This definition implied a principle of representation in which the ruler ‘personifies’ the State, with the meaning that ‘what the Ruler of the State does, the State itself is said to do’. As important as the actual terms and concepts of the political science created by Aquinas are, even more significant are their implications. The concept of ‘political government’ implies a whole range of principles of political theory and practice with respect to sovereignty, democracy, citizenship, obligation and so on, the very stuff of modern political philosophy. (Ullmann 1965:178).
Affirming that ‘the rule of one man is more useful than the rule of many’, Aquinas argues in favour of monarchy. His justification, however, is accompanied by qualifications that point in the directions of a mixed government. The unity of the state is established by order which requires diversities, diversities which monarchy may inhibit since ‘men living under a king strive more sluggishly for the common good, inasmuch as they consider that what they devote to the common good, they do not confer upon themselves but upon another… when they see that the common good is not under the power of one man, they do not attend to it as if it belongs to another, but each one attends to it as if it were his own’ (Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:xxvii). Aquinas makes a crucial point here – there is a need to engender a social identity that connects personal striving and self-interest with the public good. Where the public good is abstract or externally imposed by an institution perceived and experienced as remote, the individual fails to identify the personal good with the common good. In making the good of each and the good of all mutual, the ‘rational’ tradition of philosophy creates a social identity that connects private and public good. 

Aquinas’ thought connects private and public good by tending towards the ascending theme of power as flowing upwards, organising this power according to a functional distribution of tasks which ensures that each contributes naturally and spontaneously to the overall good of all.

Experience thus teaches that one city administered by rulers changing annually is sometimes able to do more than some kings having, perchance, two or three cities; and small services exacted by kings weigh more heavily than great burdens imposed by the community of citizens.

Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:xxvii/xxx

Aquinas sought a form of government in which the powers of the monarch would be limited and the desire of the people to participate in public affairs be fulfilled. This he found in the ‘mixed regime’. The key principle that Aquinas establishes here is that in the just state, the people have a stake in the public good.

 In the earthly states .. the variety and the abundance of public functions and roles helps to preserve the unity, because through them a great number of people are enabled to take part in public activities.

Aquinas in Bigongiari 1975:xxix

Aquinas makes a powerful contributions to the legacy that medieval political thought bequeathed to the democratic revolution of modernity. Aquinas contrasts two competing theories of government and law. Regal government (regimen regale) refers to the theocratic form of government and law. This is characterised by the monarch possessing ‘full powers’ and being unaccountable for actions taken. Against this conception of the traditional medieval king, Aquinas offered ‘political government’ (regimen politicum). ‘Political government’ pertains to a situation in which the powers of the ruler are circumscribed according to the laws of the state. Aquinas’ argument that a mixture of political government and regal government would be the most effective is full of democratic potential, highlighting a conflict between ascending and descending themes of government. 

The ascending theme of government and law holds that the law creating power is located in the people: ‘the populace at large is considered to be the bearer of the power that creates law either in a popular assembly or diet, or, more usually, in a council or other organ which contains the representatives chosen by the people. The main ingredient of this ascending theme is that because original power is located in the people, the latter always remain in charge of the direction of its own society. Consent on the part of the populace is a structural element of the theme’ (Ullmann 1975:30). Original power is located in the people, in the community. And since original power derives from the people, leaders are to be elected by and accountable to popular assemblies. The ruler is the representative of the people and is responsible to the people (Ullmann 1965:12).

The descending theme locates original power not in the broad base of the people but in the supreme being. In Christian thought, of course, this is God. God distributes the laws downwards to humankind through the medium of monarchs. The holders of power are not representatives of the people but delegates of a supreme Ruler (Ullmann 1965:13).

It should come as no surprise that Aquinas should derive power from God, limiting his direct contribution to the democratic revolution. From the standpoint of the future democratic revolution, powered by the principle of self-assumed obligation, the idea that people can be bound only by laws which they themselves have participated in making, there are clear limitations to the descending theme of power: ‘it transcends human ingenuity to devise a constitutional scheme by which the subjects could put fetters on the exercise of the monarch-sovereign will of the Ruler’ (Ullmann 1965:145/6). However, the recovery of Aristotle’s distinction between the good man and the good citizen destroyed the unipolarity or totality of the individual as a Christian, with far reaching consequences. The ground was prepared for the emancipation of politics from Christian ethics. The individual came to be conceived as a citizen in the political sphere, endowed with full autonomous powers in determining his own fate by politizare. This natural concept of the individual as citizen was distinguished from the supernatural concept of the individual as a Christian as applicable to another order autonomous from the public life of this world. ‘The citizen was to replace the sub/dictus, the individual as a subject of higher authority. Once the citizen took part in the shaping of his own community, the State, by creating the law, the ascending theme of government and law made its reappearance after centuries of hibernation’ (Ullmann 1975:271).

The conceptual revolution that followed the recovery of Aristotle reoriented social and political life in such a way as to transform public life in democratic directions. Although the theocratic-descending theme of government was proclaimed as the only form of government compatible with Christianity, society itself carried on its affairs according to an ascending theme of power, ‘what can only be termed as a natural way of conducting affairs’ (Ullmann 1965:159). The populace ‘acted very much on the ascending principles of government’. The way in which ordinary people managed their everyday affairs forms a ‘vital bridge between properly medieval ideas of government and the more modern political theory’ (Ullmann 1965:160). This natural associative activity as the true source of power may have been neglected by the rulers of the age but it was essential to Aristotle’s conception of the state as the supreme association composed of smaller associations: ‘these numberless associations, unions, fraternities, communities, colleges, and so on, appeared as the answer to a natural urge of men to combine themselves into larger units .. it was they, the members themselves, who managed their own affairs. The unions were populist enclaves within a theocratically governed kingdom’ (Ullmann 1965:160). Communities regulated their own affairs, developing a system of self- or functional representation as against an abstract representation through the central state and power relayed downwards from God.

There is an important point to make about Aquinas’s concept of the State. On Aristotelian premises, Aquinas argued the state, or organised human society, is the product of humanity’s ‘natural instinct’. The State is a product of nature and corresponds to the laws of nature. The working of the State requires no divine or supra-natural elements. Since it is ‘natural reason which urges’ human association, the state has all the laws of its own operation within itself. Since ‘nature leaves nothing imperfect’, the State a perfect community and also ‘the most perfect human association’. In founding government upon nature, Aquinas established the foundation of modern political theory. In the process, Aquinas had opened up a conceptual gulf between the State, as a natural product, and the Church, as a supra-natural product, founded or instituted by divinity. The intellectual foundations of the theocratic-descending theory of government and law were shattered; human beings were now free to explore the ascending theme as rational, active citizens capable of giving the law to themselves, capable of ruling themselves. (Ullmann 179).

Aquinas’s conception that ‘the State is nothing but the congregation of men’ is distinct from the Church as ‘the congregation of the faithful’. This contrast between naturalist and supra-naturalist organisations exhibits the dichotomy between the human being and the faithful Christian. The State was a matter for the human being as citizen only; in origin and operation, it has nothing to do with ecclesiastical authority. The state is a natural entity, pursuing and promoting aims which were inherent in its natural essence, in particular the well-being of its members. This aim could be secured only if the State was autonomous and self-sufficient. The State that Aquinas theorised in this way was an independent, living organism, and had yet to become the mechanical institutional abstraction that it would become in the modern world. Aquinas’ conception of the state as a corpus politicum et morale has a corporate, organic and social dimension which distinguishes it from the abstraction of the modern state. The concept of corpus politicum et morale entails a body politic with moral ends defined in relation to the social habits and customs its citizens. By this conception, the thirteenth century world was re-acquainted with the roots of its civilisation in the ancient concept of the political community. The state is a natural entity and growth, a living organism rooted in the human body politic, whose health and well-being is intertwined with the health and the well-being of its citizens. In contrast, the Church is a mystical body (corpus mysticum).

Again, Aquinas’ originality lies not in the terminology – the term civitas was familiar – but in investing familiar terms and concepts with a new meaning that made them consonant with contemporary times. Employing familiar terminology to convey new ideas is a way of ensuring the effectiveness of a theory or philosophy. 

This conception also informed Aquinas’s legal theory. Since the State is a product of nature, it follows that its laws must also be derived from nature. The natural law finds articulate expression through the laws of the State. To be an enforceable rule, the enacted law, what Aquinas designated ‘positive law’, must be derived from natural law. The force of the human positive law depended upon its correspondence with natural law, and Aquinas frequently states that positive law is determined by natural law. Aquinas is careful to connect this naturalistic conception with Christianity – for such was his brief. Aquinas therefore states human positive law, based on natural reason, is connected with divine law. For Aquinas, all law was ‘the rule and measure of human actions’ and the ultimate source of all law was the eternal law of God, which was not so much a divine law as the divine reason and intellect which governs the universe. Every living creature has ‘the impression of the divine light’. Since this is so it follows that every living creature can fulfil its natural ends by using its inner light to identify with the divine reason and intellect at the heart of the universe – whether one wishes to identify this as God or Nature. Clearly, Aquinas is no pantheist or immanentist. However, depending upon the extent to which one highlights the Aristotelian naturalism at the core of the Thomist synthesis, something like Spinoza’s philosophy is a clear possibility. That is quite a jump from Aquinas, but, as will be shown, there is a subterranean radical Aristotelian-Christian current which culminates in a full blown pantheism in which reason rules the world. Whether one chooses to continue to call this Nature God is less important than realising the extent to which the realisation of the rational natural capacity of humanity with respect to an appreciation of natural law comes to be identified as the true definition of freedom. Citizenship as active participation in the governing of common affairs becomes an expansive ecological notion and is redefined as self-realisation through participation in the unfolding of natural laws. (Ullmann 1965:180).

Reason and rational nature is the key, whether one argues in the Spinozist sense of freedom as the recognition of natural necessity or in the Hegelian sense of the growth of consciousness to freedom. Aquinas’s system pertains directly to this question of freedom. Aquinas distinguishes the rational creature from the irrational creature according to the ability to reason and therefore to perceive the eternal law of God, which is the divine ordering of all things in the universe. Change this eternal law of God to the law of nature and identify God with Nature, and one is not far from Spinozist rational freedom. Aquinas’s reasoning is that the human being, through natural law, shares in the eternal law of God and was therefore, as a consequence of making use of his or her natural reasoning faculties, in a position to know both good and evil. The natural law that is implanted in each and all is propelled by ‘the impression of the divine light in us’ and enables the human being ‘to be in possession of the natural principles of his actions’. Aquinas argues that ‘natural law was nothing less than the participation of the rational creature in the eternal law’. This is why Aquinas insisted that human law should not be at variance with natural law, lest human law be a corruption of the very idea of law as a means of ordering life. When it comes to the enforceability of a law, Aquinas is clear that this consists of the power to compel: ‘The ability to compel is possessed by the multitude (people) or by a public person who has the right to inflict penalties (in case of non-observance), and for this reason he alone can make laws’. The lengthy attention that Aquinas paid the theory of law indicates the significant function he assigned to the laws as the means by which society achieves its aims. And the emphasis is upon reason rather than coercion, a reason which may triumph in being implanted in the nature of each and all. Aquinas therefore defines law as ‘an ordinance of human reason for the common good, and the right to ordain anything for the common good belongs either to the whole community or to someone who acts in the place of the people; therefore, the authority to establish a law pertains either to the whole multitude or to a public person who has the care of the multitude’. This definition reveals Aquinas’ view of what the purpose of law was, and the way it is stated is applicable to both the populist-ascending and theocratic-descending themes of government.

Within the towering Christian edifice that had done so much to devalue human nature, Aquinas has recovered the integrity and vitality of the national faculties. Aquinas shows how reason and nature could one day inherit the world. At every key point in his system, Aquinas expounds upon the supremacy of reason and nature. Explicitly repudiating the traditional Christian depiction of the body as the ruined habitation of the soul, Aquinas recovers the Aristotelian conception of the body as the basis of the soul’s being. Throughout his system, Aquinas affirms the natural perfection of man, the natural rights of humanity (and all living things), and the power of humanity’s natural reason. Aquinas raises the dignity of human nature to the status of philosophical principle and necessary truth. Appreciating the reason within nature, humanity takes its place in a well-ordered and intelligible universe. Realising its rational nature, humanity becomes conscious of itself as the link between the created universe and the divine intelligence. Through its rational natural faculties, humanity is capable of understanding the law of nature as the nature of God. Through reason, humanity is capable of using and perfecting nature in accordance with the will of God. In this way, humanity achieves it full nobility. (Southern 1970: 50).

Ending discussion here makes it appear that Aquinas is the link in the chain between Aristotle and Spinoza. In one sense this is true, particularly if one traces his naturalism as it unfolds in the thoughts and activities of certain movements and individuals who form a left-Aristotelian current in the wake of Aquinas. But this Thomist synthesis is, at least, as Christian as it is Aristotelian and incorporates naturalist elements within the overarching supra-natural framework. Aquinas’ brief from the Pope, it should be re-stated, was to accommodate the accumulation of Aristotelian ideas within the Christian structure. He was charged with making Aristotle safe for Christianity, not lead the Aristotelian challenge to Christianity. Aquinas achieved this by bridging the traditional gulf between nature and grace. Aquinas affirmed that nature and the natural law could operate effectively by following their own inherent laws without revelation or grace or divine assistance. Thus far Aquinas is in accordance with, and no further than, the ancient Greeks. Aquinas’ big innovation was to use this understanding to supplant the sharp contrast between nature and grace in the traditional Christian doctrine with a hierarchy of different orders. Nature and grace are no longer considered antithetical but two differently placed orders within the same hierarchy. Hence, so far from being in opposition to each other as the natural and the supernatural, Aquinas established nature and grace in complementary relation. As Aquinas stated, ‘grace does not do away with nature but perfects it’ [compare to John of Salisbury in his Metalogicus ‘Grace brings nature to fruition’] (Ullman 1965:182). The rigid antithesis between nature and grace was replaced by an elastic and realistic dualism, a dualism which could take radical or conservative, ascending or descending directions depending upon whether the accent was placed on nature or super-nature. (Ullmann 1965:183).

The counterpart in the public sphere of man (homo as such) in the individual sphere was the citizen, each belonging to the natural order of things. The State is the congregation of the citizens, and is a product of nature. The counterpart of the state in the supra-natural sphere is the Church, the congregation of the faithful. The State is the natural expression of the divine ordering of things, the Church the supernatural. Theorising the State as a natural body and the Church as a supernatural body as a dualism within the divine ordering of things involved Aquinas in a profound restructuring of thought. In the process of assimilating Aristotelian thought to the Christian cosmology, Aquinas produced arguments and ideas which caused those wedded to the traditional monolithic ways of thought to shudder and even to tremble. Aquinas made Aristotle safe not for Christianity as such but for a particular kind of Christianity. Thus Aquinas challenged the (old Isidorian) justification of secular power as a consequence of the Fall of man, i.e. the State as a coercive instrument to repress evil. For Aquinas, the State was a product of nature and argued that, as such, is embedded in the divine order of things. In his book The End of the State, Andrew Levine argues for Marx’s view against the Augustine view of the state as a coercive instrument which is designed to impose the civil peace. This conception of the state has been dominant throughout history. It became even more dominant under a capitalist society which established the civil sphere as the asocial sphere of universal antagonism. However, already in the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas is beyond that conception. That it remained the dominant conception owes more to the social relations that have prevailed since, not its philosophical merit.

Aquinas also refused to condemn the States established and governed by infidels or pagans. Their states are as much a product of nature as those of Christians, and so they exercised their authority legitimately insofar as they were in accordance with the law of nature. 

The essential point to grasp is that Aquinas affirmed the conceptual existence of a human body politic, the State, as a product of nature, thus reviving a notion that had been in hibernation for many centuries. The chasm that had opened up in the intellectual history of the West had suddenly been spanned. Aquinas re-acquainted Western civilisation with its moral, intellectual, political and cultural foundations and, as a result, the contemporary world realised that its own Christian edifice rested on uncertain ground. The monopoly of the theocratic-descending theory of government and law was shattered and its domination now challenged at the conceptual level. How dangerous the situation was becomes clear when one considers the incipient Aristotelianism that existed at the level of social practice and activity, within the everyday concerns and organisations of the people. 

The theocratic-ascending theme was shattered on the conceptual level. The way was open for the ascending theme to fill the spaces through the agency of the people themselves.

Aquinas’ dualism enabled him to synthesise Aristotelian naturalism and Christian supernaturalism within a consistent system that, in the short term at least, could support the tottering edifice of the institutional order. Aquinas developed the thesis of divine working manifesting itself in nature and in revelation. This made possible the coexistence of the natural and the supernatural. But it also contained the possibility of the natural coming to supplant the supernatural. For it was no longer argued that Christ’s statement to Peter was the sole source of power; power was also located in the natural community, the State. The cosmic nature of Aquinas’ system made it applicable to non-Christian societies. And it could also, for the same reason, be applicable to once Christian societies. The state is a product of nature and that is how government and law are to be judged – the extent to which they are in accordance with natural law.

Aquinas’ arguments were potentially explosive. His system defined the ascending theme of government and power that had, for many years now, been asserted and practised in its most populist form in the countless communities, guilds, colleges, associations, etc. of society. Aquinas was preaching as a matter of doctrine what the multitudes had been practising as a matter of everyday interaction and exchange. The populist-ascending theory was already up and running at the level of social practice and organisation and the idea was spreading throughout diverse branches of intellectual and creative activities, however autonomously –natural sciences and the arts had nothing in common; the naturalism of the vernacular literature had no relation to surgery and anatomy, and so on. But naturalism was on the rise, directly challenging supernaturalism. Aquinas now supplied a system and mapped a field which was to become central to the human struggle to realise freedom, happiness and security - the political field proper. Aquinas created political science, and called it architectonic. (Ullmann 1965:184).


In his synthesis of Aristotelian and Christian thought, Aquinas supplied all the conceptual and terminological requirements required for a full scale assault upon the intellectual and institutional foundations of traditional government and society. Of course, this contradicts Aquinas’ brief of making the Christian order safe from the burgeoning Aristotelianism and, indeed, contradicts what Aquinas himself had thought he had done. Aquinas insisted on the view of God as the author and creator of nature, but the naturalism of his argument made it conceivable that this connection could be severed. Aquinas had given solid Aristotelian reasons for believing that nature operating according to its own immanent laws. It was but one small step from here to asserting a complete break between God and nature and this was soon taken. The basis of this break was the argument was the view that the natural law was reasonable in itself and hence was persuasive in its own operation as to not require any recourse to divinity, simply because the natural law was reasonable in itself. Aquinas had invited this possibility by the way he argued. Whilst he cites an array of biblical and patristic texts, his arguments and the conclusions he draws are wholly secular and could be made according to pure natural reason, supported wholly by references to Aristotle.

Against the brief he had been given and contrary to his own intentions, Thomas Aquinas opened the gates to the forces of populist Aristotelianism that had been spreading throughout a society ostensibly governed by the theocratic- descending conception. The attacks came first on the papacy and, from there, extended into a general assault on the descending theory of government as such. The sum total of these attacks was the modern political order as we know it. (Ullmann 1965:185).

The immediate reaction to Aquinas’ system was given in the decree Unam sanctam (1302). This directly targeted the ‘natural man’ as the central category of the Aristotelian-Thomist movement, presenting a strong restatement of homo spiritualis as the measure and judge of all things. The decree was the first indication that the attempt to produce an Aristotelian-Christian synthesis which supported the intellectual and institutional foundations of traditional government had failed. The purpose of the decree was to alert people to the dangers of ‘pernicious’ naturalist ideas which contained the potential to subvert the entire foundation of the Christian framework. (Ullmann LP 1975:276).

The Thomist system stands poised between two worlds, between the old and the new, the theocratic-descending conception and the populist-ascending conception, between supernaturalism and naturalism. His work needs to be set in the historical and social context of continuous affirmation of the claims of human dignity and of attempts to press these claims in the political order. Nothing in Aquinas’ synthesis interrupted this progress. On the contrary, Aquinas’ work encouraged these populist-ascending developments. The intellectual enquiries of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries rendered God, humanity and nature coherent and intelligible to reason; the sphere of the natural world was enlarged and the sphere of the supernatural correspondingly diminished. In the process, the pressure of the unknown which had weighed heavily on the medieval psyche was relieved and human beings began to explore their own powers. (Southern 1970: 50).

Not that the progress of reason and rationalisation is simple and uni-linear in the development of human freedom and happiness. 

Society does not become more free and happy by becoming more human in its foundations. The conflict between freedom and oppression which is organised around the simple antithesis between God and humanity, divine and human nature, takes more nuanced form as a bifurcation within humanity and its social relations. If the source of power is human rather than divine, it remains that human society is structured around asymmetrical relations of power and an unequal distribution of resources. Prevailing social relations of superordination and subordination ensure that oppression expands apace with the growth of freedom. Replacing divine nature with human nature made it possible to detached human activities and practices from divine foundations and to pronounce them legitimate in their own terms. Within exploitative and hierarchical social relations, however, the consequence of this development is to supply the rich and powerful with reasons to justify their wealth and power and hence to legitimise areas of activity; those concerning with the narrow interest of expanding or protecting their power can speak more convincingly about the justice of their cause, even as they promote or defend that cause by military force, legal and institutional coercion and exploitation. The norms and values of public life as the good life, particularly freedom and, in time, democracy, come to be appropriated in order to clothe the self-seeking activities of the dominant class in the garb of lofty moral purpose. These are the inevitable consequences of humanism. It cannot be otherwise when choosing between an order founded on divine power and an order founded on the natural power of humanity. In the divine order, the world is a highly restrictive place in which individuals live in fear of following almost any kind of human impulse, a world in which they regulate their behaviour in subjection to divine sanctions levied by ecclesiastical authorities. In the human order, humanity is free to express its demands and pursues its purposes within the constraints of prevailing social relations. These are the relations by which human beings organise its interaction and exchange with each other. The problem is that these relations are not necessarily, or even mainly, symmetrical but throughout history have been alienative and exploitative. The extent to which the norms and values of the good life are achieved or denied – freedom, happiness, citizenship, democracy etc. – depend upon the extent to which prevailing relations expand or inhibit the human ontology, pursue universal ends or are designed to serve and protect particular interests. Short of achieving a genuine universalism which concerns human self-realisation in general, any human order will express the disparities and inequalities of power and resources within humanity. This means that the immediate consequence of replacing the divine order with the human order can, paradoxically can be that the view of the nobility and dignity of human beings in general can appear a less exalted and less just than it had been under the divine order. The human order frees social relations from divine regulation and sanction, giving preponderance to those interests and classes which are dominant within those relations. The human order can therefore be a place where the powerful are not only active in promoting their interests but confident asserting these interests as the general interest of society as such. Such universalism is no less illusory than that of the divine order that has been supplanted. The dominant interest can even deprive the poor and the oppressed of the satisfaction of being right and just. The universal ethics of Christianity may only have otherworldly and abstract in its application to all equally, but it gave all morality and justice. Now justice really does become the interest of the strongest. And in an ever expanding world, the solutions to the ever emerging evils never suffice to keep pace with needs of the oppressed. Throughout the twentieth century successive popes have continued to warn of the perils of the moral capacities of humankind continuing to lag behind its technological capacities. That is not a problem of the modern world, however, but is the problem which defines the human order that replaced the divine order. Ultimately, it is a problem of human beings coming to live up to their powers, coming to assume conscious common control of the world they have created by their praxis. God is no longer the Creator in charge of the Creation. Humanity is the creative agent and must therefore come to identify itself with the processes and laws and institutions of all that its praxis has engendered. This modern problem of facilitating growth whilst at the same time regulating it can be traced back to this period in the twelfth century when the divine restraints and prohibitions began their long retreat in face of the assertions of natural human power.

To take a couple of examples. There is no question that a coherent and viable view of property is a precondition of a fully developed society. If there is no restriction on the rights of the individual, there will be oppression and injustice caused by overmighty power; but if there is too much restriction of the individual’s rights, then there will be a restriction of personal life. And if theory and practice diverge widely, the theory is simply ignored in favour of the reality. With regard to the question of property, this period of the Middle Ages is most interesting, standing between traditional and commercial orders, justifying a changing reality by means of a religious ethic.

Up until the twelfth century, the theory of property was derived from the Bible and the Fathers and asserted two fundamental principles: that humanity should have a great indifference to property, and that all property should be held in common. The account of the life of the early Christians in the Acts of the Apostles pointed clearly to an ideal communism: ‘No one said that anything he possessed was his own, but they had all things in common’. The conclusion that the early Middle Ages and established as a universal ethic was that all private property had the nature of sin. There would be no private property in the perfect state. According to the traditional wisdom, economics is, primarily, a social act based on reciprocity. Economics is a means to the end of strengthening the bonds of community and of stewarding God’s creation in anticipation of the coming of the kingdom. In his Rule, St Benedict included the provision that all things were to be held in common. This was an ideal for all society, not just for a religious society. And it remained the ideal until the mid-point of the twelfth century. 

As the twelfth century unfolded, society became increasingly commercial and sophisticated. The ideal of early Christian communism as given by biblical descriptions started to lose its appeal to those increasing in power, wealth and status. The ethic which insisted that everything in the world was for the common use of all began to experienced as a restraint upon their private interest. What is more, this ethic seemed less and less to bear any relation to the reality it claimed to regulate. The lawyers started to work on the texts, exploiting ambiguities and making distinctions in order to produce an ideal that fitted the real. And, sure enough, they found that private ownership was legitimate in tandem with common use; that the common use of the early Christian ideal was intended simply to serve relatively poor societies in an emergency as a residual safeguard for human survival; and that private ownership had the virtue of guaranteeing security and stability as well as orderly administration. The appeal of these ingenious and nifty arguments to an increasingly wealthy commercial society concerned with growth is obvious. With a little tweaking, the best legal minds of the age succeeded in inverting the Christian ethic from within. Texts and terms which to non-obscurantist minds clearly indicated common ownership were now polished to mean precisely the opposite. All without having to repudiate the overarching institutional and moral framework of the Christian world.

The introduction of concepts and terms drawn from the newly discovered Ethics and Politics of Aristotle served to reinforce the distinctions drawn by lawyers. Aristotle, of course, had defended private property against Plato, arguing that the institution is the very bulwark of the well-ordered community. The work of the lawyers had already prepared the ground for the reception of Aristotle’s conception that private property is naturally good and is necessary for the good life. The authority of Aristotle greatly facilitated the process of clearing private property of the last taint of sin. 

It was at this point that Thomas Aquinas began his great work of synthesis, drawing all available elements together to rejuvenate the moral and intellectual foundations of the Christian order. Part of this work involved a comprehensive defence of private property. In Aristotelian terms, Aquinas elaborated upon the natural necessity and virtues of property. Aquinas was careful to attach Christian safeguards to the practical use of private property, defining the legitimate motives for the pursuit of temporal gain and establishing the boundaries of legitimate appropriation. The ideal of Christian communism which had prevailed for centuries lost its elevated high moral status and was instead reduced to a counsel of despair: ‘he who suffers from extreme need can take what he needs from another’s goods if no one will give to him’ (Summa Theol 2, 2 q.32, art. 7, ad 3. The fullest statement of the case for private property is in Summa Theol. 2, 2, q. 66, art. 1,2, and 7. In its main outline this statement follows Aristotle, Politics, ii, 5, 8). The ethic of communism which had once been fundamental to Christianity was now defined as theft, pardoned weakly by reference to mitigating circumstances. As a legal defence, taking what one needs because no-one will give it is far from sure-proof.

Aquinas had produced a compromise which subjected burgeoning economic activity to the mildest of restraints. Nature is the driver and religion provides the embellishments. This being so, the Christian ethic was made secondary and subject to prior social development. Once it had been accepted that growth and expansion in society was in itself connected with the good, then it became clear that the restraints of religious considerations and sanctions would continually be renegotiated to fit new circumstances. Arguing that private property was grounded in nature whilst its common use was founded in divine command split the world into two orders and conceded the victory to the real over the ideal. Once the ideal was detached from the real, it lost its critical purchase over and relevance to society. Private property was at the controls and the laws and processes of its development would continue to diminish the sphere of religiously sanctioned common use. In time, the ethic of use for the common good would become redundant. So central to society had the institution of private property become that it was simply assumed that the promotion of its interests was the same thing as the common good. One need only regard the deleterious consequences for society following any inhibition of private property. The fact that the category of nature was capable of indefinite elaboration meant that the religious ethic was in permanent retreat from society. The more that questions were addressed in naturalistic terms, the more the natural basis of human activities grew in size and solidity. Not only had the natural and the supernatural been sharply distinguished, but the former had been clearly placed in control at the expense of the latter. Ejected from society and its natural foundation, the Christian ideal had no option but to drift further and further into the clouds. Christianity had lost its ability to frame rules and sanctions for practical application that reflected its own ethic rather than the imperatives and needs of society.

There were many who attempted to hold fast to the traditional Christian ethic. To them this was Christianity as such, and to deviate or depart from it in any way would amount to abandoning the faith. But the defence of the ideal of a propertyless perfection was confronted not only by the increasing worldliness of Christianity but by the commercial forces increasingly dominant within society, with whom the Church was seeking to negotiate peace terms. The tide was against the Christian communists. In condemning the Franciscan Order in 1323, Pope John XXII declared that the doctrine of the complete poverty of Christ and his disciples to be heretical. From this moment on, the traditional ideal of apostolic poverty, which had once formed the fundamental ethic of Christianity, was kept alive only by ‘heretical’ sects and movements, often expressing the thirst for justice and freedom on the part of the poor, the oppressed and the powerless. (Moorman 1968:307-19). These movements and events are extremely important in the history of social doctrines and practices, highly influential in such periods of the English Revolution of the seventeenth century. The abandonment of propertyless perfection and ideal communism and the embrace of a formerly sinful private property was not achieved without struggle, turmoil and often episodes and incidents of extreme violence and repression. Though the ‘heretics’ were usually suppressed and beaten, in many significant respects their ideals fed into secular politics and were a rich seam to be mined in the modern liberal democratic revolution. Turning Christianity completely on its head, so that what was once its ideal became its heresy, was an inevitable consequence of tailoring the religious ethic to the natural man and his natural urges for ownership.

Many other social values were subject to legal reinterpretation along the same lines as private property. Again, in the mid-twelfth century, the old biblical texts and interpretations were still being quoted in defence of the view that trade is no fit occupation for a Christian. A non-obscurantist reading of the texts made it clear that it is wrong to buy an article in order to sell it unchanged at a higher price, that it is a sin to use money in order to make money, that profit as such is sinful, that it is wrong to vary prices according to demand. And yet again the lawyers set to work to render the biblical precepts consistent with contemporary practice. The lawyers trod more carefully here than they had done with property. This was not simply because the merchants were an unpopular group in society but because the great authority of Aristotle could not be cited in defence. On the contrary, Aristotle is in agreement with the biblical commentators in arguing that trade is inconsistent with virtue (e.g. Aristotle Politics, vi, 4; vii 9. Aquinas makes a meagre provision for merchants in his De Regimine Principum, ii, 3, but makes more allowance for commercial practice in Summa Theol. 2, 2. q.77).

However, the lawyers prevailed in the end. In determining the elements of a just price, they established the foundations of economics. In examining the profit motive, they established the extent to which profit was morally justified. They examined the taking of interest, and sought distinguish usury, as a sin, from risk-bearing investment, which is perfectly legitimate. And they succeeded in assigning merchants a legitimate place in society, recognising them to be necessary instruments of social well-being (Noonan, 1957; Southern 1970: 54/5).

Although Aristotle’s predilections for aristocratic and agrarian society made him a barrier to the development of new thought in the particular instance of trade, in the main Aristotelian influence was decisive in developing the social theories which supplanted Christianity, from within and without the Christian edifice. The period as a whole, culminating in the towering Thomist system, represents the emergence of a comprehensive body of social and political thought in western Europe to which the norms, principles and concepts of modern Europe can be directly traced. The key was the recovery of nature and the ‘natural man’ and the corresponding displacement of Christian supernaturalism. Human power replaced divine power, creating new possibilities but also raising new problems. Nature brought freedom from divine sanction, but such freedom did not necessarily bring justice. With this freedom the strong grew stronger and the rich grew richer. The justification of private ownership in terms of its production of the common good deprived the poor and the powerless of their appeal to right and justice. It was clear that the moral and institutional terms of the human order, based upon the assertion of human power, needed much further elaboration and articulation, lest the social order collapse under the weight of its own asymmetries. The assertion of human power did not necessarily involve the celebration of the dignity and nobility of human nature. There was a need for a universal ethic. ‘Just as no thief escaped the gallows by pleading the apostolic privilege of the common purse, so the ‘just price’ was more effective in keeping down the price of labour after the Plague, than in restricting the rising price of corn after a drought. This was part of the price of humanism’ (Southern 1970: 56).

Building upon the growing assertion of the ascending theory of government, the Thomist synthesis of Christian and Aristotelian thought opened the gates to democratic assaults, first on the papacy and then on the descending theory of government wherever it applied, bring about a society that ‘had many of the appurtenances we like to call modern’ (Ullmann 1965:185). Once canon law came to be replaced by consent as the source of principles of government, the descending theme of government gave way to the ascending theme (Ullmann 1975:159). The people began to enter the arena of political discussion.

The Middle Ages witnessed an important struggle over the interpretation of citizenship and sovereignty in which Aristotelian and Christian concepts were brought into conflict and, eventually, into a tension-filled, portentous synthesis. Catholic thought developed the idea of the ‘city’ as a haven from coercive and immoral forces in the external world. The utopian character of this idea of the city as a refuge from earthly powers fed notions of the city as a New Jerusalem, orienting perspectives towards the building of Heaven on Earth. The concern for the afterlife, for life eternal, becomes a future oriented ideal that motivates efforts to improve the present life. If the classical ideal gave a philosophical, anthropological dimension to the notion of the good city, the eschatological dimension which comes from Christianity connects the city with emancipation from the earthly constraints of the flesh, raising a future oriented vision of a new order free from conflict and coercion.

Citizenship thus continued to evolve during the Middle Ages and was at the centre of political controversy and debate concerning the locus of power. In time, through trade, medieval cities became centres of commerce, culture and community, acquiring autonomy from the central political power. Increasing in power and wealth, the medieval towns established islands of freedom within a sea of feudal obligation.

The Renaissance was not merely a reaction against the Middle Ages. More than this the period was a time of transition in which new ideas emerged out of the struggle to throw off old orthodoxies. Crucial elements of Thomism were discarded in the process - the views that each individual had a fixed station in life, that economic life was not an end in itself, that money was unfruitful, and that to use money to make more money – usury – was a sin (Antal 1948:38/9; Baron 1939:436). Moral obstacles to and restraints upon capitalism were demolished along with social and institutional obstacles and restraints. Optimists argue that this was a good thing, yielding unprecedented prosperity for greater numbers. Pessimists argue that capitalism has succeeded only on the basis of the moral and institutional capital that the pre-modern age had built over centuries, capital which has been dissipated at an alarming rate without being replenished or replaced. Can capitalism supply its own moral and institutional order when it has so aggressively promoted private self-seeking and money making as an end in itself?

The new humanism challenged the divine order with a rational order deriving not from first principles but from observable practical experience, whether in the natural sciences of Leonardo, Paracelscus, Kepler or in the statecraft of Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Bodin. As revealed in the works of philosophers like Descartes, the world came to be conceived in mathematical terms, impersonal, abstract, interchangeable, and measurable quantities. Ethics were freed from supernatural explanation and were instead grounded in personal virtues, earned by individual effort (Hall 1998:110).

With the erosion of the divine explanation of life, the centralised national state filled the vacuum left by the Church. As Marx argued, the abstraction of the modern state was created by capitalism. From the Italian free cities emerged the state as a calculated, conscious creation. And driving the creation was money, capital, and trade. The city-states of northern and central Italy were heavily urbanised and wealthy. Trade generated demands and resources that facilitated the development of industry and fostered a commercial revolution in banking and finance.

A significant point is the extent to which the dynamos and drivers of change have been global cities. ‘Like Athens Florence was the global city of its day’ (Hall 1998:112). ‘They were cities in transition .. but it was a transition forward, into new and unexpected modes of organisation. They were all great trading cities .. the true global cities of their time. And out of trade came new ways of economic organisation, and out of those came new forms of production’ (p284).

Reference may be made here to the urban communes of the propertied in the early Middle Ages. These developed classical notions of active citizenship and self-government, fostering a socially embodied functional conception of commune democracy rooted in private property. By the late medieval, early modern age these notions had been developed to a remarkably sophisticated level. The cities of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries across Europe display balance, scale, extensive street layout and civic design within well-defined walls and stand as a confident assertion of urban self-consciousness on the part of the city dweller. The walls served to defend a politically and socially autonomous territory. Behind the defensive walls, the guilds organised socio-economic life whilst the Church ministered to spiritual needs. In fine, a framework for collective unity existed. The medieval institutional fabric was rich and varied, embracing Cathedrals, churches, guildhouses, universities, market, and charitable institutions. Such cities had achieved the social architecture of active citizenship.


Like the classical polis, the medieval town expresses balance in its modest dimension scaled to human proportion. The medieval town also rested upon directly democratic structures. The biggest difference was that whereas the polis was structured around the agora as public square, as arena for civic intercourse, the medieval town centred on a domestic economy in which business was conducted in the market place.











31 CHRISTIAN ARISTOTELIANISM – THE RADICAL CURRENT

Towards an Essentialist Cosmology

Aristotle’s philosophy is expressed within a teleological framework which grounds the ethical world in nature and interprets nature in terms of telos or ultimate end. This essentialist, ‘enchanted’ view of the cosmos, natural causality, and development was destroyed as a consequence of the rise of industrial capitalism and mechanistic science. The task is to recover this enchantment, re-animating Nature in order to defend it against the mechanicists who reduce Nature to something dead, inanimate and worthless in itself. A disenchanted world, stripped of its sacred nature, suffers the decay of the spirit. The surface may be aesthetically pleasing to look at, but this is ephemeral. Natural beauty on these terms is a cultural experience, itself commodifiable, and subject to alteration. The disenchanted world is condemned to exist as a valueless, lifeless thing inviting conquest, a mere object to be quantified, possessed, exploited. Thus devitalised, Nature ceases to have a soul.

Tracing the issue through the subterranean current of left Aristotelianism reveals religion and science in the modern western world to be allies rather than antagonists. The conventional histories repeat the heroic tales of scientists like Galileo having to risk religious censure and persecution in order to push back the frontiers of human knowledge. Even with respect to Galileo this is false. The science versus religion clash in ‘the Age of Reason’ tells a very partial story. That religion and science were very far from being sworn enemies is clear from the extent to which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly in Protestant regions, science proceeded smoothly alongside the prevailing religious authorities. It is frequently pointed out, as if this should be a cause for surprise, that a great number of the men of science were also devout believers. The true ‘heretics’ are those who fell foul of both sides of this supposed clash between science and religion – a long line of animists and pantheists from Bruno to Spinoza. 


Bloch points to the existence of residual enchanted elements as making possible a radical or leftist version of the Aristotelian natural ethic and teleological conception. This runs as a subterranean strand, a counter-alternative to the dominant mechanical worldview. Bloch’s formulation encourages a positive response to the problems generated by the domination of cosmos or mind. Understanding the interchange between theories of the ‘nature of things’ and social relations, Bloch identified in certain strains of Aristotelianism an alternative to the hegemonic block formed at the level of cosmology and natural philosophy. Bloch thus divides the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages into ‘left’ and ‘right’ tendencies. Rejecting the Christian Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas along with scholastic orthodoxy, Bloch identifies the ‘left’ wing with Giordano Bruno and his followers (Bloch 1977:38). This ‘left’ tendency rejects the notion of a rigid separation between God or mind (the Greek nous) and matter but instead gives matter precedence as the source of development in a single united process – as ‘continuous movement in itself’ and as universally valid. Bloch’s left Aristotelians neither leads to nor from Thomas Aquinas, but has its roots in the Arabic philosophers Avicenna or Averroes, who explicitly argued that ‘a god-nous from outside or from above is no longer necessary’. A left Aristotelian reading of Aquinas is possible if one accentuates his naturalist elements and discards his Christian cosmology. Since Aquinas reasons from naturalist premises this is possible, and so it becomes possible to trace left Aristotelian currents from the Thomist synthesis from the likes of Bruno through to the pantheism of Spinoza. But there is no real need to take such a convoluted path. It is perfectly possible to go direct from the Arabic philosophers to Spinoza. Aquinas is important for historical reasons in that his system synthesised conflicting elements that were in danger of renting the Christian intellectual and institutional fabric asunder. The Thomist system won a temporary peace, but the left Aristotelian elements in his synthesis were even stronger outside it. And it is this strain that threatened to pull the whole edifice down. 

The Renaissance philosopher Giordano Bruno, affirming matter as a ‘fertilized-fertilizing living-whole’, is a key figure in the turn from a deistic understanding towards a pantheistic materialism. Left Aristotelianism ‘transforms (aufheben) any god-dispensed potency into the active potentiality of matter’ (Bloch 1977:32-3). As with God, this matter is infinite; there is, however, no afterlife. 

This role accorded to matter forms a radically subversive element with respect to the ontological bases of political domination within the Aristotelian cosmology. In repudiating the dualistic structure of mind over matter, the Giordanian approach subverts the position of the technical ruler wielding power instrumentally over the technically ruled. The idea of a complete, totally determined, infinite, and all-knowing supernatural realm is decisively rejected by the recognition of matter as the source of activity, of the plurality of things as ‘being-in-possibility’. In the left-Aristotelian current, heaven is replaced by a notion of hope or utopian imagination. Teleology thus becomes open and infinite in being based on the idea of a co-relationship within the kinds and levels of animated material being. Bloch identifies an inherently libertarian option in the Aristotelian doctrine of matter (Bloch 1977:32/3). The final cause is no longer a perfect, timeless, mental activity or an ultimate god, but rather idealism in the sense of ‘real anticipation’, without which ‘matter’s horizon is not comprehensible’. The ontological basis of rule as domination is removed once the ruling element is no longer conceived as directing its matter, as the ‘mind’ directs the body, or as the captain of the ship directs his rudder, look-out and crew. Following Aristotle’s definition of nature as that ‘has its source of activity within itself’, it is possible to conceive self-organizing material beings pursuing the actualisation of ends. Left Aristotelianism therefore is an actively democratic conception which, adopting a non-hierarchical perspective in which form no longer determines matter, implies self-management. Matter ‘decides for itself’ and, through its self-organizing activity, produces its own spectrum of possibilities for development without some external ruling ‘idea’. The cosmos loses its government since its organising principle is not purely internal.

The logical outcome of this left-Aristotelian strain is a radical pantheism in which all matter is ensouled and active. This animated materialism excludes the notion of a transcendent or transcendental ruling element. It could even go further. Teilhard de Chardin, after being initially attracted, came ultimately to reject pantheism for its godless implications. Teilhard came to understand how small the step from believing that God is in all of Nature to believing that God is nowhere and that Nature alone exists. Pantheism, the idea that god is in everything, can be replaced by animism, the god-less idea that Nature as such is alive, inspirited, animate.

The fact that the basic notions of left Aristotelianism strike a chord with the natural needs and urges of human beings entail the periodic reemergence of heresies and sects throughout history. This left Aristotelianism is a subterranean current, often disorganised and inchoate, but as a collective experience is extensive enough to merit attention as a serious alternative paradigm to dominant conceptions. This left Aristotelianism is a serious intellectual and social strain by the time of the early Renaissance. Reading history this way, the real hero of the story is not Galileo, or Copernicus or Kepler or any other such scientist persecuted by the Church, but Giordano Bruno. The founders of the mechanical worldview may or may not have been atheists. Most succeeded in squaring their science with religion. But how many of them were genuinely heretical? How many of them chose, as a matter of course, the heretical standpoint as opposed to simply being accused of heresy? Bruno was a heretic and his pantheistic views were far more of a danger to the Christian order than those who founded the mechanical worldview as Galileo, Descartes, Bacon and Hobbes. Further, Bruno challenges that mechanical worldview itself; he challenges both sides in this science-religion showdown. Bruno was part of a current of emergent pantheism that ran through the Renaissance. Joining ‘mystics’ and heretics were the likes of philosopher-scientist Paracelscus and the vitalist Cornelius Agrippa. That Paracelscus used to incite the peasants to revolt in his spare time and Cornelius Agrippa asserted the equality of the sexes, practised natural magic and condemned mining as harmful to the internal ‘flesh’ of living nature indicates the extent to which organic science spread out into some very dangerous areas. Intellectual and political radicalism went hand in hand together. The alternative paradigm united alchemists and the Anabaptists against the hierarchical doctrines of church and state, and found little difficulty in moving from an animate picture of the world to the understanding of the earth as a common realm which ought not be parcelled up into quantifiable properties for commercial exploitation.

The great showdown between Galileo and the Church is always misinterpreted as a struggle for scientific truth against religious superstition. There is, however, no reason to accept science’s self-image uncritically. The most important aspect of this clash between science and religion was not the assault upon the Christian faith. For Christianity is a faith, the province of belief and nothing to do with science. The triumph of science does not imply the destruction of religion, and Christianity carried on largely unaltered long after the scientific revolution. The real target in this struggle was not the Christian religion but the naturalism with which it had been invested through the infusion of Aristotelian concepts. Aristotle presented nature as a living organism, as alive and infused with purpose, an enchanted nature replete with sensuous qualities. Of course, Aristotle’s naturalism was a rationalisation and intellectualisation of the animated nature known in pagan worship, a nature that contained divinity in all of its laws and processes. These elements of a pagan naturalism had found their way into Christianity via the Thomist synthesis and it was these, rather than Christian supernaturalism, that were the real targets and the real victims of the science versus religion conflict from the sixteenth century onwards.

Since nature is plainly active, replete with motion, growth, and orderly change, Aristotle’s essentialist materialism focusing upon purpose, potentiality and its realisation, seems plausible. The new scientists sought to explain this activity not by any animism that identified nature as a living organism but by describing nature as a machine. A machine exists to perform a function; nature serves a purpose. Purpose is immanent and self-propelling, an affirmation of spiritual autonomy and an expression of conscious wilfulness. It was this aspect of Aristotelian naturalism that mechanical science had to destroy to secure its own claim to knowledge. Nature as a living organism comes to be replaced by the image of the clockwork universe. As a result, the artificial environment progressively suppresses the animism of nature. A machine, being inanimate, cannot have a purpose; instead it has a function imposed upon it externally by whoever is its maker or user. It follows that a mechanistic nature lacks vital intention. Nature as a machine becomes a tool in need of a function. This function may be supplied by God as the maker of the machine but in practice mostly by its user, God’s earthly steward, man, the only animate natural agent endowed with purpose. Nature as machine is a lifeless, purposeless entity waiting to be invested with meaning by being to use as humanity sees fit. This conception of mechanical science that grew to dominance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries expresses in all essentials the same mentality as that of the earliest Judaeo-Christian view of nature, as plainly set forth in Genesis. There is correspondence rather than contradiction here between science and religion. The conception that this scientific paradigm contradicts in all essential respects is that of Aristotelian naturalism.

The mechanical science was not in opposition to religion for the very reason that they operate on entirely different terrains. As came to pass, mechanistic science and religion could live in peaceful co-existence. What mechanistic science could not tolerate was the Aristotelian naturalism within Christianity. And here Christianity was more than happy to purge itself of its pagan infusion. From the perspective of those for whom the true religion is that of the one transcendent god, the animistic worshipping of the objects of nature, a tree, a rock, the sun and the moon, amounts to the degradation of the divine as a result of being reduced to the level of an object of nature. To Christianity, the idea of nature as animate and alive is the purest idolatory. If nature was a lifeless machine to the mechanical scientists, it was a worthless, corrupted, wasteland to the Christians. The mechanical scientists and the Christians were actually allies in disenchanting and degrading nature, desacrelising it, rendering it once more lifeless, valueless and worthless in itself. Mechanistic science is a flawed consciousness based upon a false ontology that mistakes an artificially constructed reality for the true reality. Yet if nature is re-animated, this degradation is to be transformed into an exaltation that sees the life principle, purpose, in all things. Nature needs to be re-enchanted and resacrelised. The mediating term is reason.


32 THE EMERGENCE OF THE PEOPLE AS SOVEREIGN
For all of its comprehensiveness, Aquinas’s synthesis was not the final word but, rather, the first systematic attempt to critically appropriate ancient concepts and vocabulary and reconcile them to the contemporary world. There are many sins of omission and commission. Whilst Aquinas emphasises the conception of the state as the supreme community formed out of the many smaller communities, he fails to refer to the medieval free cities, the communes, the guilds and occupational societies or any of the other social organisations which formed the dense infrastructure of medieval society. Aquinas was well aware of the existence of these Aristotelian ‘smaller communities’ and ought to have understood the extent to which his theory would be of relevance to them. He certainly knew the little cities that populated the Italian landscape, and he knew the lawyers who worked in these towns. He may argue, in the abstract, on the nature of citizenship, but he does not elaborate upon the practical dimensions of the principle. Of course, this analytical approach characterises Aquinas’ approach to the Aristotelian texts in general. But his sharp separation of theory from practice would appear to stem from a deliberate concern to pull his punches, to establish the principles so clearly and so comprehensively that the conclusions to be drawn from them by the practising Aristotelians in society would be obvious.

Alternative Conceptions of Freedom
Whilst elitist-superior-selective freedom formed the dominant conception of christocentric civilisation, Christian theory and practice, stemming from the fundamental equality of human beings, could give expression to both personal and civil freedom. (Patterson 1991: 387).

By the time that Aquinas came to undertake his great task, the theocratic-descending and populist-ascending conceptions of the source of sovereignty were heading for inevitable collision. The former conception affirmed the omnipotence of divinely constituted rule; the latter held that the community, the will of the people, was the ultimate source of sovereignty. The populist-ascending conception was still very much a minority position, at least the higher up the hierarchical social order one went. But it was popular within everyday society and its popularity was growing. This conception was the harbinger of things to come and clearly there was a need to ensure that the tottering thrones of church and states be secured by recognising a role for the consent of the governed. Between these two extreme positions Aquinas occupied the middle ground. For all of his Aristotelian naturalism, Aquinas was quite content to shackle the implications of principle for the sake of political practice. Arguing that the ruler was at once absolute and limited, Aquinas attempted to have his cake and eat it. The fact that it seemed to square the circle appealed to many scholars and Aquinas’ via media became the majority view. At least in high politics and high thought. Aquinas had managed to define a form of civic freedom out of the vigorous and vital social practices undertaken at the urban and rural communal levels. He had deradicalised the notion and rendered it subordinate within the old elitist view. But it was a recognition for the first of the legitimacy of the claims of the people for a rightful participation in political affairs. Aquinas must surely have understood how precarious and temporary his middle way solution would prove to be in the long run. (Patterson 1991: 388).

So vast and complete in itself is Aquinas’ system that there would seem that there was little more to add to the subject. If the Church authorities had hoped to bring an end to dangerous speculation, then Aquinas’ work had the opposite effect. Far from being the last word on the subject, the discussion of politics, freedom and citizenship on the part of increasing numbers in society increased in the years after Aquinas’s death in 1274. In systematising all the myriad strands of contemporary thought, Aquinas established an intellectually coherent and cogent body of work upon which to base further investigation and discussion. What had been written as the last word, rendering Aristotle safe for Christianity, actually proved to be a first effort inspiring a vast range of intellectual and political enquiry. 

The growth of scepticism, the embrace of knowledge by enquiry rather than by faith, the repudiation of the premises and the methods of thought of the schoolmen, the recovery of ancient Greek conceptions, came precisely at the time when the emergence of the secular state demanded that authority and law be supplied with a non-theological justification. (Doyle 1963: 90).

Aquinas had adopted the old approach to knowledge by faith rather than by inquiry, adapting his naturalist sources to a pre-determined end. But that naturalism implied the attainment of knowledge as a result of natural investigation and observation, and this was precisely one of the issues raised by Aquinas’ system that was explored further. Although primarily a theologian, Sigier of Brabant joined Roger Bacon in premising the search for knowledge upon the desirability and necessity of trusting to experiment rather than accepted formulae, Sigier in philosophy and logic, Bacon in physics and other sciences. Experimental in their technique, both men replaced faith with scepticism.





Dante’s De Monarchia is a transitional work between the imperialists of the thirteenth century and the emerging secularists of the fourteenth. In approach and content it represents the culmination of the imperial-papal controversy rather than joins with the intellectual and political currents emerging as a secular opposition to the pope. But much of what Dante writes anticipates or is in agreement with that opposition.
 
Dante’s principal concern was to identify the basis for achieving unity and peace between the fractious city-states of northern Italy. In addressing this problem of how to discern the common good in a context of particularism, Dante drew upon Aristotle to a substantial degree, but also upon the many systems of thought which had been developed since. The result is an original melange of Greek, Roman and Christian conceptions adapted to serve the needs of a fourteenth century Italy divided between city-states engaged in faction fights and asserting their independence. Dante’s extensive sources were drawn together in support of an overriding objective - the postulation of a world state.

Written around 1310-13, Dante’s De Monarchia was concerned to use exclusively political categories in order to form the fragmentation and atomisation of the contemporary world into a consistent and united whole. Dante’s central concept of civilitas entailed the corporate union of all humankind, not just Christians, but also Jews, pagans and infidels, in fine all who qualified as citizens. The basic objective of the work is to demonstrate the need for and to urge the acceptance of a single monarchy, a kind of secular universitas, for all Europe. In furtherance of this objective, Dante sought to relieve the pope of all temporal power and petty states of their right to independence. All such notions were detrimental to the common peace and prosperity of the whole. Although he closely followed Thomas Aquinas, Dante went much further in refusing to assign jurisdictional powers to ecclesiastical institutions. 

To check the incipient decomposition of Europe and ensure unity, Dante advocated a world-state. This world state would not be some monolithic or totalitarian entity but would be preserve particularism and independence at their appropriate levels. Guaranteeing individual States and nations freedom of deployment within the unified whole, the world state would be Aristotle’s ‘supreme community’ write large’. Dante described the freedom of the citizen to be ‘the greatest gift conferred by God on man’ (Ullmann 1975: 278). From this premise he built upwards. Just as the citizen is free to develop his or her natural faculties and abilities within the state, so individual states and nations are free to develop their proclivities within the world state. The larger framework enables the self-realisation of the parts, thus contributing to the self-realisation of the whole. 

Dante identified the hallmark of human beings in their intellectual powers. The guide and rule of all human matters, these intellectual powers presumed the exercise of free will, conditioned by the liberty of man. Dante argued that this liberty is ‘the greatest gift God conferred on human nature’ since liberty alone was the guarantee that humanity could achieve felicity on this earth, liberty meaning free in terms of existing for its own sake rather than for the sake of something or somebody else. The central theme running through Dante’s work is the pursuit of humanity for its own sake rather than for the sake of an other-worldly aim, meaning that the pursuit of human ends is premised on the natural insight of humanity itself. Dante employed the term politizare to designate the human activity through which these human ends were pursued. Politizare means acting in a political manner with the aim of achieving human happiness. It was this unspeculative, non-theoretical political activity that mattered above all to Dante – ‘our present matter is not primarily concerned with thinking, but with doing’ – since it was doing that ensured the practical realisation of all the potentialities of human beings and of humanity in general. Dante insisted that ‘the function of any right government is to see that men exist for their own sakes’. This involved the definition of the government as ‘the minister (servant) of all (minister omnium)’. This designation of government as service to the people is the complete antithesis of the traditional assertion of the ruler as ‘a minister of God’. Dante’s thesis culminated in the emancipation of humanity from Christian incrustations so that humankind could once more take its place as the pivot of civic life, being recognised once more as capable of achieving citizen status and hence being able to shape and master its own fate. (Ullmann 1965:195).

The premises of Dante’s political thought are grounded in his general philosophy. Dante rejected the schoolmen’s view of the human being as an isolated individual primarily concerned with his own salvation, for which he was dependent on God alone. Instead he premised his argument upon Aristotle’s definition of man as a sociable being, leading to a principle of material sociability: ‘No man was able to obtain felicity by himself without the aid of many, inasmuch as he needs many things which no one is able to provide alone’. In order to fulfil their common destiny, human beings needed to co-operate with each other. Dante defined the ‘felicity’ for which individuals came to work together for as ‘the virtuous exercise of our rational faculties in the active and (so far as may be on earth) in the contemplative life’. Cooperation therefore created a civilisation whose goal was the realization of the whole potentiality of human intellect. Human beings could not achieve this end working as individuals or in small groups. The whole of humankind must combine together and proceed in a harmonious effort aiming at the complete fulfilment of the whole potentiality of the human intellect. Only the sustained cooperation uniting each and all could achieve this end. Since the realisation of the ideal is blocked by the defection of even a few members, all humankind needed to be formed into the one body politic, presided over by a single authority. The world state would provide the peace and security that human beings require in order to pursue and achieve the development of their intellectual powers. Dante thus rendered Aquinas’s suggestion of tranquilitas as the basis of the state the central theme of his De Monarchia and proceeded to delineate the best means for its attainment. (Doyle 1963: 92).


For many, Dante was attempting a solution to a modern problem fashioned on a medieval ideal. Bertrand Russell is dismissive in his History of Western Philosophy, and gives Dante, the peerless poet-philosopher, a mere couple of passages.

Dante (1265-1321), though as a poet he was a great innovator, was, as a thinker, somewhat behind the times. His book De Monarchia is somewhat Ghibelline in outlook, and would have been more timely a hundred years earlier. He regards Emperor and Pope as independent, and both divinely appointed. In the Divine Comedy, his Satan has three mouths, in which he eternally chews Judas Iscariot, Brutus, and Cassius, who are all three equally traitors, the first against Christ, the other two against Caesar. Dante's thought is interesting, not only in itself, but as that of a layman; but it was not influential, and was hopelessly out of date.

Russell 1946 ch HWP 45

It is interesting that as Russell penned these lines, Dante’s De Monarchia was to prove timely indeed. In Dante Lights the Way, Ruth Mary Fox states that ‘it is not generally known that this political treatise and the Constitution of the United States of America were the chief documents used in drawing up the constitution of the United Nations.’ (Fox 1958: xiii). In a lecture which he gave at the Milwaukee State Teachers College, May 24 1949, Dr G. A. Borgese, Professor of Humanities at the University of Chicago, stated: ‘The two basic sources I used in the drafting of The Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution were the American Constitution and Dante’s political treatise, De monarchia. At the time, Borgese was secretary of the Committee to Frame a World Constitution. And, indeed, De Monarchia concerns a problem of how to achieve universal order and good out of a diversity and rivalry of particular interests, the basic problem of politics. To that extent, Dante’s principles will remain timely, however much the precise institutional features may change. Had Russell been prepared to look more closely, and maybe put his secular prejudices to one side, he may well have found much in Dante’s principles congenial to his own concerns for world government and political peace.

The theme which most preoccupied Dante was that of justice as wielded by the universal monarch. Only such a monarch could achieve the universalism upon which justice depended. For Dante, universal monarchy was the best form of government for checking the destructive friction between states and ensuring the peace and tranquillity for all. Dante argued that the peculiar position of a universal monarch enabled to override the forces of dissension and decomposition currently destroying peace in Europe.

Dante’s reasoning for the universal monarchy is Aristotelian. Aristotle had shown that a bad state is distinguished by the interests of one of its parts coming to be pursued before the welfare of the whole. This reasoning precluded the small state, on account of the inherent selfishness of the petty sovereign. Rulers of small states exhibited a covetousness for greater possessions and power, something which produced enmity and rivalry and undermined the good of the whole. Dante defined liberty as the freedom attain the ultimate goal of humanity through performing the will of God. A state in which subjects are compelled to assist in the achievement of the selfish aims of the ruler precludes liberty in this sense. And since justice depended on liberty, justice was also contravened. Laws were ‘the image of natural justice .. and the observance of them is not only proved not to be slavery, but is plainly seen to be itself the highest liberty’. Dante emphasises the extent to which, left to their own devices and serving their own interests independently of the whole, small states endanger the welfare of the community, liberty, justice and the progress of civilisation. Without a universal framework, institutional and ethical, enmity breaks out and continues between self-seeking rulers. Such dissension prevents peace and hence blocks the attainment of the full potentiality of the human intellect.

Liberty can only flourish in a state which enables citizens to pursue and achieve their own prescribed end. And such a state is governed by the universal monarch. Power rivalries would be inconceivable since the universal monarch would possess all power. Possessing all power, all ambitions satiated, the universal monarch would be free of all petty ambitions and would therefore be able to concentrate upon achieving the welfare of the community as a whole. Only an impartial and benign monarch could be entrusted with such power, enunciating and executing laws which, in their justice, would be acceptable to all humankind in accordance with their ultimate aim, the development of their intellect. The universal monarch would be free of all personal ambitions and would therefore be free to pursue and to serve the interests of the whole community. ‘It is clear that although the consul, or the king, be masters of the rest as regards the way, yet as regards the end they are servants; and the Monarch most of all, for he must assuredly be regarded as the servant of all’.

The universal monarch, as omnipotent, is raised above all the conflicting selfish interests and would enable liberty, as the freedom to do right, to flourish. Humankind would be free to pursue its ultimate end and the monarch would be in a position to enforce the law by which this might be achieved. Dante emphasised the power of law as a factor binding individuals together in a state devoted to the common good. He therefore portrayed the state as a system of universal law which is recognized as being binding on all individuals as a condition of attaining their final goal. 

Dante therefore concluded with the defence of one monarch as the sole executor of the one law. One wonders whether Dante had solved the political problem by evading it, piecing together strands of strong rule as they were to be found in European tradition, in the image of the divine monarchy, in religious conviction, and in the traditions of the Roman Empire. Although he drew upon Aristotle, Dante did not ascend in naturalistic fashion to achieve unity and wholeness from the base upwards, so that the common ideal emerged out of the particular and legitimate ends of the partial communities comprising the whole, but set up an ideal universal monarchy imposed law and justice as an ideal abstracted from the conditions of its attainment. Lacking a critical purchase upon and practical social and institutional relevance to reality, Dante’s universal monarchy established an ideal of peace and unity with little hope of realisation. Atomisation, fragmentation and dissension continued unabated. Dante’s aim of creating a common government based upon a universal ethic stood in need of a more socially informed institutional analysis. Only then could the peace Dante sought be attained and civilisation be allowed to flourish in terms of the realisation of the whole potentiality of the human intellect. As stated, Dante’s universal monarchy leaves us in the same position as with Plato’s Guardians: the ideals are perfect, but the means for their realisation are deficient.

The notion of the universal monarch as omnipotent clearly impinges upon the affairs of the Church. Clearly, on such reasoning, there could be no room in secular politics for any power other than the universal monarch; should any other power be able to claim the right to dictate to the monarch, then that monarch would no longer be omnipotent and could no longer fulfil the functions of the universal monarchy. Such dictation by any other power or powers would destroy the authority of the monarch and thus lead to renewed conflict between rivals for power. 

In delineating the delicate relations between church and state, Dante resorted to the separation of the temporal and spiritual spheres on account of the dual end in life: ‘Providence has set two ends before man to be aimed at by him: the blessedness of this life which consists in the exercise of his proper power and is represented by the Earthly Paradise; and the blessedness of eternal life… Now to these two ends man must attain by different means, for to the first we attain by the teachings of Philosophy, provided we follow them by acting in accordance with the moral and intellectual virtues; to the second, by spiritual teachings which transcend human reason, provided we follow them by acting according to the theological virtues – to wit, faith, hope and charity’ (Doyle 1963: 94/5). ‘Wherefore’, Dante concludes, ‘man needed a twofold directive power, according to his twofold end – to wit, the Supreme Pontiff, to lead the human race, in accordance with the things revealed to eternal life; and the Emperor, to direct the human race to temporal felicity, in accordance with the teachings of Philosophy’.

Dante separated the two powers according to their diverse ends and functions. Dante rejected the schoolmen’s assumption that man had a single end and instead revived the conception of dual ends, with one goal limited to this world and the other confined to heaven. For this reason, the temporal and the spiritual powers could never conflict. There was therefore no grounds for the intervention of the spiritual power into earthly affairs. In this way, Dante opened an effective breach in the theology of the schoolmen. As against the schoolmen, Dante did not identify morality as an offshoot of theology; instead he followed the new school of Paris in classing ethics with philosophy and therefore affirming that ethics could exist independently of religion. On these premises, Dante could affirm the possibility of the moral rational state pursuing its end independently of any interference from the spiritual power. (Doyle 1963: 95).

In setting up the discussion in terms of a dualism of naturalism and supernaturalism there is a need to be clear that few medieval thinkers were atheists. In expanding the sphere of the natural and correspondingly diminishing the sphere of the supernatural, medieval thinkers were concerned to establish things in their correct spheres as opposed to abolishing the supernatural altogether. As has been seen with respect to Aquinas, the existence of the supernatural was conceived to be necessary for the completion of nature. This means that when all natural things had realised their ends so as to achieve the perfection of the natural order, there was still a need for the unifying principle that could only be supplied by the union of Man and God. At the level of the dominant institutional and intellectual order it was not the antithesis of the natural and the supernatural, still less the opposition of the natural to the supernatural that characterised medieval humanism but the union of the natural and the supernatural. 

And in the closing pages of De Monarchia, Dante gave this union its noblest expression:

Man is a mean between the corruptible and the incorruptible. Just as every mean partakes of both extremes, so man has a dual nature. And since every nature is ordained for a definite end, it follows that man has two ends – on the one hand the happiness of this life, which consists in the exercise of his human power and is symbolised by the terrestrial paradise which we attain through the teachings of philosophy and the practice of the moral and intellectual virtues; and on the other, the happiness of eternal life which consists in the enjoyment of the vision of God, to which man cannot attain except by God’s help.

De Monarchia, iii, 16

The most valuable achievement of medieval humanism is not the destruction of the supernatural order but the independence of the natural order, and it is this principle which Dante states with such eloquence in this passage. The natural world is the province of reason. Reason renders the universe intelligible and thus makes humanity free. But the reach of reason does not end here for Dante. Reason also induces humanity to seek eternal satisfaction in something beyond reason. Reason makes it possible to understand the autonomy of nature and the need for something which is above nature. Medieval humanism, then, is based upon the dualism of the natural and the supernatural, being concerned to put each in its appropriate realm. Medieval humanism, as expressed by Dante, did not expand the realm of the natural with the intention of discarding the supernatural but sought their union. The question, however, is how long could it be before humanists took the next step and focused upon the perfection of the natural order at the expense of the supernatural order. 


34 THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE
Popular Basis of the Ruler’s Power

It wouldn’t be long before Dante’s eloquent statement of the unity of the natural and the supernatural was superseded. A whole number of works appeared which went much further than Dante. The French lawyer Pierre Dubois was one who took the issues a step forward. The most important point here is that Dubois decisively rejected the notion that humanity is dominated in this life by the divine will, a notion which Dante rigidly adhered to. 

Dubois used the pretence of a crusade in order to set out the ideal of a Europe-wide state. Just as the object of a crusade is to accrue wealth (that of the east), so the supreme object of the body politic should be the accumulation of wealth. To achieve this end requires that the currently divided states of Europe agree to co-operate. Dubois writes of a crusade but actually means the European state. Just as cooperation between the states of Europe is required to achieve the conquest of the east, so the states of Europe must reform themselves into a single united state so as to achieve the object of accumulating wealth. The attainment of the supreme object of the body politic required peace between the European nations.
 
Dubois is an important figure less for his influence at the time than for the way his work establishes a link between the imperialists like Dante and the pure secularists like Marsilius who lay at the end of the line. The international ideal which Dubois, in a long line of medieval thinkers searching for the universalism upon which peace (security), freedom and justice rested, was later exposed as a chimera in Marsilius’ works. Similarly, whilst Dubois affirmed the necessity for the church, Marsilius could find no rational justification for the institution. 

John Quidort (John of Paris) (d. 1306), a Dominican who lectured at the University of Paris, is highly important for the influence he had in continuing the exploration of Aristotle in the wake of Aquinas’ great work of synthesis. Written in the first years of the fourteenth century, John’s De potestate regia et papali critically adapts crucial elements of the Thomist system to a realistic viewpoint that distinguishes itself from the traditional hierocratic viewpoint. John was concerned to replace the traditional doctrine with a political doctrine based on naturalism. John employed Thomist principles to define the autonomous character of the kingdom. Following Aquinas, John discussed man in the state and advocated an elective kinship in which the king could be deposed by the people. For John, the ascending theme of power applied to both the secular State and the Church. This tract marked the introduction of the concept of the State as an autonomous entity into the realm of political thought.

The tract proceeds from an analysis of the origins of organised society, an analysis that was based on Thomist conceptions of nature and natural law, and immediately addresses the critical issue. ‘By a natural instinct, which comes from God’, he argued, ‘they [men] are inclined to live politically, and in a society, and so, in order to live well together, they choose rulers, and choose different ones according to the difference in communities’. Following Aquinas, John defined man as a ‘political and social animal’.

John pointed to the necessity of the division of labour and affirms the importance of private property in supporting political organisation. In order to protect his property, which is the product of his industry, the individual has a natural right to institute government. The rightfulness of exercising this right derives in the first instance from the individual’s existence as a moral personality and then in the second instance from the individual’s existence as a political being obliged to choose. In choosing, individuals act ‘out of their own power to shape the destiny of their own State’. This action is legislation and reflects the rationality of human beings in coming to appreciate their best interest. (163/4).

In locating humanity and the source of the government of the kingdom in natural law, John departed little from Aquinas. Where he did differ was in juxtaposing the Church to his concept of the kingdom. 

Since the temporal world could be equated with the natural, it follows that it is autonomous in the sense of living according to its own laws, which are those of nature, and in pursuing its own end. Whereas formerly, the temporal was merely an appendage of secondary significance to the spiritual, in John’s conception it becomes autonomous and significant in its own right. This conception alters the relationship between church and state. The state was of natural origin and therefore pursued purely natural ends; the state had no business interfering with the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Although nature was of god, the state was not qualified to lead the faithful to the supra-natural end. The function of the king’s government was limited to earthly affairs in providing the means essential for the realisation of the ends germane to the State. The other side of this doctrine was that the Church, as a purely mystical body, could not legitimately intervene in the lives of the citizens or give orders to rulers. The ministers of the Church possessed purely sacramental functions. In all of this, Dubois considered himself to be spelling out the Thomist theses.

In arguing that the king’s power derived from God through the election by the people, John was attempting to deny the link between the Church and the State. On John’s reasoning, the government in the State, a natural product, was ultimately traceable to God, since God had created nature in its entirety. But government was most immediately traceable to the people. John articulated the populist-ascending thesis as an explicit doctrine of popular sovereignty, arguing that the king came to power ‘by the will of the people’ (rex est a populi voluntate). And John depicted the king’s function in terms of providing the conditions essential for a good civic life for the members of the state, the people, preserving the social order and improving living conditions within the kingdom. 

Although John took his cue from Thomist principles, it is clear that in many important areas of political thought he advances far beyond Aquinas. That John believed himself to be arguing on Thomist lines shows clearly the extent to which Aquinas had bequeathed not a finished statement but a creative synthesis capable of further development, depending upon the questions asked and the emphases placed. Aristotelian naturalism was very much a creative force at work within the Christian edifice, a rich seam to be mined much deeper than Aquinas had or the church authorities had allowed. John’s thesis, in the very least, approximates the ascending-populist conception of government; it explicitly cuts the ground from under the traditional descending theory of government. Significantly, John does not limit the ascending theme to the temporal realm of the state but also applies it to the Church, whose prelates receive their power ‘from the electing or consulting people’. The inherent radicalism of John’s perspective becomes clear when the practical implications of the conception are considered. Since the consent of the faithful formed the material ingredient in the pope’s power, the people are entitled to relieve the pope of all governmental powers for reasons of ineptitude, insanity, uselessness, in fact for any reason deemed relevant by the people. John’s fundamental thesis is that power can be gained and exercised only with the consent of the governed. And any consent that is given can also be withdrawn. If the king’s power depends upon election by the people, so that power remains subject to the sovereignty of the people. The king obtains power from the people but could also be deprived of this power by the people. Both the election and the deposition of the king was a matter for the people. It would take centuries for the full implications of this radical statement of popular sovereignty to be even addressed and articulated, let alone achieved. The contemporary world is still wrestling with issues of political representation and socialisation, systems and institutions which can be considered appropriate means for translating the popular will into public policy. (Ullmann 1965:204).

An important work in this regard was the Liber Sextus, which contained an important thesis in the section on ‘The maxims of law’: ‘What touches all must be approved by all’, a maxim which was culled from classical Roman law. This gave Durantis the key principle with which to construct the general council on representative lines, thus creating the opening through which the range of Aristotelian themes could pour, all serving to promote and extend the idea of representation throughout society and its institutions. The general council as the representative organ of all Christians was based on the premise of original power in the Church being located in the totality of all Christians. Matters of faith are the concern of all and therefore must be decided by all. Whilst this breach in the papal fortifications was theoretical, and hence of no immediate effect, it had practical implications and applications which in time could be explored to the detrimental of the earthly institutional power of the Church. It would take only a couple of generations for this move from theory to practice to be undertaken.

A work which demonstrates an awareness of the radical, and hence dangerous, potentialities of the Thomist synthesis is De regimine christiano by James of Viterbo. James is aware of the latency of the Aristotelian current of thought and is concerned with its implications for the traditional descending theme of government. James fully understood the threat that the Thomist doctrine of bipolarity posed to the dominant christocentric scheme and was concerned to guard against the fragmentation and atomisation of what had hitherto been a consistent whole. (Ullmann LP 1975:280).

James sought to unfold the implications and applications of the Thomist system within the confines of an ecclesiastical project, thus taming their more radical potentialities. James therefore appropriated the key themes of the new political theory and used them to support the descending theme of government. The Augustinian ‘City of God’ was to be rejuvenated by an infusion of Aristotelian ideas. James thus constructed a universal State in the shape of the Church, with the Church presented as the one and only universal State. This concept was a complement to Unam sanctum which attempted the same end. (Ullmann LP 1975:281).

With the exceptions of John of Paris and, later, Marsilius of Padua, the scholastics struggled to develop the radical potentialities of the theory of citizenship. Their expanding body of commentary upon Aristotle had the merit of giving citizenship a prominence that it had not had for some time, but they struggled with the disparity between the Aristotelian concepts and the changed medieval terrain. Therefore they were compelled to translate polis as civitas but could not conceive this civitas as a regnum. This means that they could not conceive the citizen in Aristotelian terms as a member of a small scale political community in which the which citizens obeyed were the ones they had themselves made. The overwhelming majority conceived the citizen as bourgeois, regarding the individual in terms of economic function rather than public life and activity. That this was true of as perceptive a thinker as Nicholas Oresme (1323-82) demonstrates how substantial a block this was. Peter of Auvergne (d. 1304) completely neglected the political functions in a sovereign community proper to the Aristotelian conception and instead focused upon differentiating the citizen body according to lawyerlike distinctions, delineating the powers appropriate to specific status. Whether they were shy of exploring the radical implications of the political conception of citizenship or whether they simply could not understand these implications is not clear. Living under monarchies, with all of the legal and constitutional constraints that this implies, would support either reading. Either way, they failed to press the latent Aristotelianism further to effect a breach in the medieval worldview. 


Given the tendency to equate citizenship with economic rather than political function, it should come as no surprise to learn that about the only Aristotelian concept they did understand was the importance of private property to social and political organisation. Regarding citizenship in terms of economic rather than political function, citizen status came to rest upon property. It was on the basis of property that Peter of Auvergne distinguished between those citizens who could and could not be elected to some form of magistracy. 

Such notions led to a hierarchical conception of citizenship determined by property, a view explicitly maintained by Oresme. The theory of Peter was to become the conventional doctrine. Peter affirmed the existence of two groups (multitudo) within the political community: property equips one group with the wisdom and virtue which makes it fit to rule; the lack of property predisposes the other group to ‘animal and materialistic activities’, and they are therefore to have no voice in government. Yet even the members of this latter group are citizens. As Godfrey of Fontaines (d. 1306) maintained, they could, in certain, extreme, circumstances, rebel against their lawful ruler, if that ruler has become, or threatens to become, tyrannical. 

The overriding concern with property as the precondition of political participation meant the complete neglect of Aristotle’s insistence upon personal excellence, some moral superiority, as the basis for citizen status. Also neglected was the extent of political power which issued from the right of participation that Aristotle assigned the citizen. In consequence, the citizen came to be defined in terms compatible with current medieval realities – as the free subject of a lawful king. Thus began the historical conflation of two entirely contradictory notions, the subject and the citizen. Such conflation served to protect the status quo and its descending conceptions of government from the radical assault that would follow a full appreciation of the category of citizenship. Conservative thinkers would write of the citizen and of citizenship when plainly referring to the subject of the crown and the state. Members of the state could have in principle what was denied to them in reality. Clarifying the distinction would mean unleashing the radical implications of citizenship. From this point on in history, there is a pronounced tendency to conflate the categories of citizen and subject. This is less intellectual confusion than ideological intent, rendering existing institutions and power relations safe from democratic encroachment. In this period, the only times the distinction is made is when a writer wishes to distinguish between civis as pertaining to the Greco-Roman city-state and civis as pertaining to any free man living in a monarchy in town or on the countryside. Such a distinction has no radical implications and merely underlines the fact that during the Middle Ages citizenship was considered to be compatible with monarchical government, whether one refers to the city-states of Italy, that were still legally and constitutionally subject to the HRE and which later fell to some ‘prince’, or to the kingdoms such as France. (Ullman 1965:164/5).


35 MARSIGLIO - THE PEOPLE AS SOVEREIGN LEGISLATOR
The church-state controversy continued after the death of Boniface VIII, with Pope John XXII repeating his predecessor’s claims against the Emperor of Germany. As the conflict became increasingly bitter, both sides engaged controversialists to make good their competing claims. This was the background to the Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun. This work was written in 1327 on behalf of the claims of the secular power (Ullman 1965:205).

Marsiglio of Padua (1275?-after 1343) was a student at Padua University – where Aristotelian teachings were rife. He read medicine, studied ‘nature’ and was firmly rooted in the city traditions and life of the Italian city-states. He came to study at the University of Paris, where Thomas Aquinas and John of Paris wrote their works, and was well qualified to expose the underlying principles of the Aristotelianism rampant in the Paris of the day. Marsilius identified the core Aristotelian meaning of civis in a way that was quite unique for the Middle Ages. Becoming rector of the University of Paris in course of time, it was here that Marsilius wrote The Defender of the Peace. The book was finished on 24 June 1324 and opened up a new phase of development. The book was soon the subject of inquisitorial proceedings, with Marsiglio and his assistant John of Jandun being declared heretics by the pope at Avignon in 1327. Heretical or not, the book contained the most radical theory of civic freedom that Europe had yet seen, indeed would not see until the ideas and intellectual aftermath of the seventeenth century English Revolution.

It is hard to determine just how influential Marsiglio was. He was no Rousseau in that no massive explosion or rebellion followed in the wake of his political ideas. His ideas were not popular in the highest circles, and one would not have expected them to be. The idea of the people as sovereign legislator cannot be expected to be popular amongst rulers and representatives detached from the people. And given the extent to which the people were excluded from political institutions, and hence ignored by history, one cannot expect much evidence of popularity in these quarters. Consequently, Marsilius had nothing like the influence or impact of Thomas Aquinas, whose own christocentric version of Aristotle found its way into the sermons of Dominican preachers and the curricula of their schools all over Europe. Marsilius had no institutions behind him and left no institutions behind. Still less did he have any large inner-city churches through which his views could be expounded to the active and influential members of society, the business and governmental class. Yet the works of Marsilius, expressing the more of the real meaning of Aristotle, were read, were preserved and continued to be read, occasionally cropping up over the next few hundred years. That would suggest a degree of influence and popularity far in excess of what the historical record shows. Marsilius’ ideas were so radical as to be beyond the pale and hence off the record. Marsilius was no abstract philosopher theorising high principles for the institutions of society; his theorising was socially and politically committed and directly relevant to the popular interests of his time and place. That is enough to explain why his work was largely ignored at the time. Marsilius was not primarily writing on, for or about the political and theological issues of concern to the existing powers but was more interested in power and the people, government and representation. These would become the burning issues of politics centuries later. At the time, such radical notions were to be marginalized and suppressed, hidden away amongst the vast body of ecclesiastical and secular political writing that emerged on the specific issues raised during the Conciliar Controversy, the Renaissance, and the Reformation. Only in time would the full importance of Marsilius become clear and an enormous secondary literature has been produced to celebrate the modernity of his conceptions: ‘He has been hailed as the great prophet of modern times and the precursor of nearly every significant modern political theorist, doctrine and development’. For the time, Marsilius is distinguished for his ability to penetrate to the real meaning of the Aristotelian undercurrent, in Paris and elsewhere, and from there to apply the Aristotelian concepts and vocabulary to analyse and legitimise the limited popular governments that populated Mediterranean Europe in the late Middle Ages. (Riesenberg 1992:166).

Marsilius offers the great alternative to the Thomist synthesis, offering the democratic reading of Aristotle against the Christocentric interpretation of Aquinas. It is interesting to speculate upon how differently Europe could have looked had it embarked upon the Marsilian as opposed to the Thomist path. Marsilius’ thoroughgoing Aristotelianism attacked the Thomist synthesis at its vulnerable point. Aquinas’ connection of natural law with divinity made clerical intervention a permanent possibility. The full autonomy of the citizen and the state could never emerge so long as nature and the natural law were conceived, as in the Thomist system, to be manifestations of divinity. And one reason why Thomism became so influential is because it easily fitted the existing institutional order. To this extent, Aquinas fulfilled his brief of making Aristotle safe for Christianity: the citizen and the faithful Christian began a peaceful co-existence as two sides of the same coin.

Marsilius was a social philosopher and political activist and this gives his work a very different character and quality to that of Aquinas and the scholastics, who focused upon problems of definition and of formal relationships. Marsiglio’s concerns were practical and not mainly intellectual. He had had first hand experience of the factional disputes that rent the fabric of the Italian city-states, undermining the ideals of civic harmony and brotherhood and destroying the conditions for commercial success. Marsiglio was concerned to identify the institutions which could restore the urban peace and thus facilitate the emergence of civic health. Marsiglio set about establishing the conditions for – and removing the obstacles in the way of – the full autonomy of the citizen and the State. Here the church-state controversy reached its denouement. Marsiglio attacked the authority of the Church at its foundations. Marsiglio was convinced that papal power was responsible for the ruination of the power and autonomy of the Italian city-states and the dissolution of the European peace. 

From the perspective of the central thesis of this book, the most important aspect of Marsiglio’s theory is its foundation in naturalism – Marsiglio explicitly derives the populist-ascending theme from nature. Marsiglio employs Aristotelian naturalism to recast the traditional conception of the ruler as the ‘living law’ (lex animata) so as to characterise the State as ‘living nature’ (natura animata). 

Marsiglio had learned from Aristotle that it was the promptings of nature that created the State. The state is therefore a natural body. And it is the will of the citizens which brings this natural body to life. By designating the State as ‘living nature’, Marsiglio emphasised the essential naturalist basis of the State – of government, law, citizenship. Marsiglio’s work is full of natural metaphors. He describes the law as ‘an eye composed of many eyes’ (oculus ex multis oculis) in order to convey its meaning as a measure which is willed by the many who are reasonable and mature enough to see the measures which contributed to the well-being of their State. Marsiglio offered the clearest and most sophisticated statement of the populist-ascending theme of government against the traditional theocratic-descending theme. Whereas in the traditional conception, the law was called ‘a gift of God’, it was now designated as ‘an eye made up of many eyes’.

The purpose of the work is indicated by its title - The Defender of the Peace. Marsiglio sought to establish the conditions for the attainment of ‘peace and tranquility’. In many ways the book is a logical development out of Thomism. The strength and the weakness of the Thomist system lay in the claim that God is the author of nature; for Marsiglio the link between nature and God is not capable of rational proof but is an axiom of faith and hence belongs outside the realm of political science. The hallmark of political science was rationalism; its obverse, irrationalism, lay outside its realm and properly belonged to the sphere of religion. Marsiglio thus neatly separated the natural and the supernatural, confining each within their own proper spheres. By severing the link between God and nature, Marsiglio sought to establish nature on its own basis. In the affairs of the state only natural things counted. The only valid and determinative norms were those of human jurisdiction and human law. The enforceability of law derived from the fact that it embodied the will of the citizens. Rejecting all hierarchical notions, Marsiglio proceeds to define the State as the corporation of all citizens (universitas civium) who had full autonomy. 

With a deceptive humility, Marsiglio argued that political science has only modest aims, focused upon empirical and observable nature as it affected human government. Marsiglio was concerned only with those natural things capable of rational explanation, asserting that the correct understanding of the physical laws pertaining to human society and its government was obstructed by speculations about nature. Marsiglio asserted the full autonomy of the natural and the supra-natural and that the supernatural had no relevance whatsoever to the issues of civil government. To Marsiglio, the only thing that was relevant was the natural body politic pure and simple. Marsiglio could therefore state boldly that there was no evidence that God had instituted a human government. The supernatural had no business in the affairs of the natural. (Ullmann 1965:206).

Conceiving the state and politics in these terms, Marsiglio’s system marks the emergence of an autonomous political science that operated according to norms and axioms drawn from political experience as well as being based upon the insight and judgment of the citizens. The arguments of the book offered new modes of thought and government with which to challenge the Thomist synthesis. The practical influence that Marsiglio’s doctrine would exercise upon the conciliar movement and in England can be explained by the existence of a terrain susceptible to Marsilian ideals by antecedent doctrines and practices. (Ullmann LP 1975:283).

Marsiglio set out to establish that, firstly, the state by its very nature precluded the institution of the church on account of its nature, and that, secondly, the papacy was not divinely appointed. 

In discussing the nature of the state, Marsiglio presents Aristotelian arguments enriched by Italian experience. The similarity of the Italy of the city-states to the Athenian background serves to bring the borrowings from Aristotle to life with renewed energy and emphasis. The novel elements, necessitating a divergence from strict Aristotelian precepts, were, of course, the centrality of the Church and the distinctive political machinery of the Italian city-states. 
 
Marsilius, a doctor of medicine, conceives the state as a body based on natural propensities rather than ideal ends (Marsilius of Padua, The Defensor Pads, 1. chaps. 4-5. See Gewirth's commentary in his Marsilius of Padua, 55). Marsiglio thus focuses solely upon the natural body politic pure and simple. The state was healthy when all its organs were functioning freely and unhealthy when this free action was obstructed. (Doyle 101). Marsiglio analysed the constituent elements of the city-state with a view to assigning to each its proper function in the making of peace. 

Since ‘the people’ was one of these elements, and since the people was composed of citizens, Marsiglio addressed the concept of citizenship. Marsiglio affirms that it is natural for human beings to exercise will and to want the sufficient life. Marsiglio propounded the view of a popular regime, properly constructed, as the right regime for ensuring the peace, reconciling civic antagonisms in the interests of the common civil good of all.

Marsiglio states the case clearly for popular sovereignty. Laws will be made for the common good only when the people legislate. In arguing that self-legislation is an end in itself Marsiglio argues the case for civil freedom. Bad laws are the consequence of the absence of civil freedom and lead to ‘unbearable slavery, oppression, and misery of the citizens’ and to the demise of the state. ‘The citizens become slaves when the laws under which they live are beyond their control, and this because of both the nature of freedom and the consequence of its loss’ (Marsilius of Padua, The Defensor Pads, 1. chaps. 4-5. See Gewirth's commentary in his Marsilius of Padua, 223).


Marsiglio argued for majoritarian rule as a value in itself, an expression of the natural urge to exercise one’s will and to share in the determination of matters of common concern, not simply for its utilitarian value. What defines a state as free is not simply the possession of just laws which have the consent of the people but when people have participated in framing these laws. Marsiglio is clear that popular participation in the making of laws is preferable even if it entails less efficient laws: ‘every citizen must be free and not undergo another’s despotism. But this would be the case if one or a few of the citizens by their own authority made the law over the whole body of citizens’ (Marsilius of Padua, The Defensor Pads, 1.12). It is significant that as Marsiglio articulated these principles, there was a real struggle for urban and rural self-government proceeding within European society, struggles which value this chartered freedom as an end in itself rather than as being merely a means to secure more practical liberties (Reynolds 1984:183.).

Marsiglio argued that the state is an end in itself and is incapable of being ‘improved’ in the Thomists sense of bringing divine grace to bear upon it. The congregation of the faithful (universitas fidelium) is now supplanted by the ‘congregation of the citizens’ (the universitas civium), the state as a fully autonomous public body that lived by its own laws according to its own inner substance. Marsiglio turned Aquinas on his head using his own terminology, arguing that, as a self-sufficient body, the state is a ‘perfect congregation’. The constitutive element of the state was the citizen body pure and simple, not different categories. It was of no relevance whether these citizens were Christians. Marsiglio’s thesis of the citizens as constituent members of the State invested the familiar terms of citizen and congregation with new meaning in their combination. The concept of the faithful Christian had hitherto embraced both layman and cleric, and both together constituted the Church. The cleric, however, was privileged on account of his special qualification. With Marsiglio, the concept of the citizen also embraced both the cleric and the layman, but since there was no difference in their function as citizen, lay and cleric were of equal standing. And since each and every citizens had the same value, with no distinction in quality, it was inevitable that the qualitative principle should come to be supplanted by the principle and practice of a numerical or quantitative majority. (Ullmann 1965:207).

In discussing the origin of the state, Marsiglio followed Aristotle’s account of the growth of communities leading up to the ‘supreme community’ of the state. Marsiglio defines the state in Aristotelian terms as ‘the perfect self-sufficing community aiming at the good life’. The purpose of the state is therefore to supply all that is necessary for the good life. This entailed much more than the providing the bare necessities. The manifold needs inherent in human nature requires the existence of diverse types of men for their fulfilment: husbandmen, artificers, soldiers and others.

Marsiglio defined the nature of law in such a way as to invest the community with unlimited sovereign power. Law is the expression of human will; it must be coercive to be effective; and it was limited to each community since law-making power is only located within the natural organism of the body politic. Law for Marsiglio is a legal system built by the community, expressing the will of the group to fulfil its needs and achieve the vita sufficiens. Law in this Marsilian sense had nothing to do with divine law; law is not a principle of justice which extends beyond the confines of a given community, co-ordination between communities being ensured by some external – divine – standard. Marsiglio asserted the absolute and unlimited power of the community is terms which recall the old Roman conception of imperium.

Since law is the force by which human beings ordered and regulated their lives in the State, it was axiomatic for Marsiglio that it is human beings themselves, as citizens, who invested the rules of conduct with an enforceable quality. The enforceable quality of the laws derives from the will of the people. The law is not given to the people by some expert officer, but is made by the people, who then apply it to themselves. There is no requirement here for some external, all-wise, legislator, whether this be the mythical figure of Lycurgus or some more mundane group drawn from the trained ranks of the state bureaucracy. Marsiglio applies the concept of the ‘human legislator’ to denote the totality of all the citizens, distinguishing this concept from the notion of the divine law-giver. In identifying the material ingredient of the law to be the will of the human legislator, Marsiglio announced the entry of the citizen in the true sense of the word into political discourse. For Marsiglio was referring to much more than the consent of the citizens, accentuating the full autonomy and maturity of the citizen as law-maker. Here, Marsiglio establishes a principle of self-assumed obligation whose radical implications in terms of self-rule as social self-government, i.e. the end of abstract systems of representation and even the dissolution of the state have still to be worked out. The continuing critical relevance of Marsiglio can be appreciated when one considers the extent to which he clearly and sharply distinguished the concepts of the subject and the citizen, making clear the extent to which the two concepts imply and apply to two wholly different systems of government. The tendency at that time, which has increased since, had been to conflate the two concepts in order to rationalise political institutions which claimed to have granted citizen status to the people whilst nevertheless being ground in the continuing subjection of the body politic. More than four centuries later, Rousseau would be considered radical, even revolutionary, for drawing out the implications of the citizen-subject distinction in terms of sovereignty, representation and law as self-legislation. And to this day these concerns of Rousseau have yet to be fully addressed. (Ullmann 1965:208).

In delineating the form and powers of the state, Marsiglio was clearly influenced by the experience of the political institutions of the Italian city-states. The sovereign body of the state was constituted by the ‘human legislator’, the assembly of all male adult citizens. Laws were made and amended by majority will. The citizen body, the human legislator, was concerned to order its own life autonomously through laws that it makes for and gives to itself. Whilst life in the next world may important, it was of no concern to the citizens as citizens. The function of the laws is to provide ‘good living’ in this world, not the next, and this is something that citizens are equipped to achieve. From the fact that the purpose of the laws is to promote and achieve the human well-being of all the citizens it follows, Marsiglio reasons, that those best qualified to make the laws are the citizens themselves, since it is the citizens themselves who know best what it is they need to ensure this well-being.

Marsiglio emphasises the point that the people are supreme and that there is no power above the people. Marsiglio calls the people as the citizen body or human legislator ‘superior’; the people are sovereign and there is no authority above or outside the people. The citizen body was its own ‘superior’, its own sovereign. Marsiglio went further to argue that plenitude of power belonged to the people. In fine, the principle function of the citizen body or legislator was to make the law, since the law was the means by which the end of the citizens’ society could be achieved.

From arguing that the citizens could make laws on any matter they wished, Marsiglio proceeded to argue that they could also institute any kind of government according to their preference. Marsiglio was more concerned that original power is retained in the citizen body than with the specific kind this government, be it monarchical, republican etc. Apart from expressing a dislike of hereditary succession or an elective monarchy, Marsiglio is agnostic as to the precise form of the executive, no doubt leaving it for the people as political agents themselves to decide. He turned traditional terminology inside out here to argue that the human legislator conceded power to the government. (Ullmann 1965:209).

The principal function of the state was to subject the executive (or pars principans) chosen to carry out the will of the legislator to continuous criticism and control. The executive was to perform such duties as drafting the laws to be presented to the legislator, supervising the military and ecclesiastical departments but above all to administer and control all jurisdiction within the state. The latter was the supreme task, for which it was accorded a unique authority, with all other executive and judicial bodies being made subordinate to it. Only the legislator, as its creator and superior, is superior to the executive or pars principans, and no group other than the legislator had the right to oppose it or interfere with its power over the entire jurisdiction exercised within the state. The pars principans was subordinate only to the sovereign people expressing their commands or criticism in the legislator.

In order to fulfil its executive tasks, the pars principans must be allowed and enabled to function freely. Backed by armed force, it wields supreme authority within its prescribed sphere to establish and maintain peace, eliminating disorder and faction fights in order to ensure the health of the body politic and making it possible to attain the supreme goal of the community. 

The government is the instrument of the people’s will puts into practice what the people would do if acting as a citizen body; the government is the institutional execution of the collective will of the citizens. The government, as the ‘principal part of the State’, ensures that the day-to-day routine governmental work is undertaken and completed and that the necessary laws and decrees and ordinances are issued and enforced. 

The government could never become divorced from the people, from whom its power derives, but is always responsible to the people, as the location of original power. Marsiglio explicitly provides for the removal of the government by the people should it transgress the constitutional law under which it took office.

The importance of the Marsilian standpoint is that it implies the realisation of the populist-ascending theme as a conception of citizen democracy. Marsiglio explicitly repudiates the theocratic-descending conception in which the power of the ruler derives from some divine source above and comes to be located in an office as removed from the people as heaven is from earth. This notion of divine power buttressed unrepresentative rule from above and was used to deny people the ability to become citizens and electors capable of modifying or altering the substance of the office of rule. In Marsiglio’s populist-ascending conception, however, power derives from and is always located in the people. The office is created by the sovereign people; it is the citizen body which defines the office, laying down the extent and scope of the office in the constitutional law. And those who had conferred the office could conceivably take it away, since they retain their original power. The descending thesis of power, which allows no form or principle of representation, is completely uprooted.

It is hardly surprising that Marsiglio had little influence and popularity in government circles in his day. He presented the purest and most forthright statement of the ascending-populist theory of government and law. Marsiglio placed government and law on a thorough-going populist foundation. His principles were incendiary and could have brought down the whole institutional edifice of descending government as it tried to stage a managed retreat. (Ullmann 1965:208).

In the process, Marsiglio succeeded in severing the connection between politics and ethics, something that had been implied in Aristotle’s distinction between the good person and the good citizen. Marsiglio’s point was that to the extent that it was not willed by the citizen body, morality lacked an enforceable character, and that to the extent that it was willed by the citizens, morality ceased to be a moral precept and became law. This neat argument was Marsiglio’s attempt to free human law from divine law and hence from the interference of ecclesiastical authorities in the worldly affairs of politics and government. Human law in itself had no moral implications, it did not embody eternal truths and it was not a means to the achievement of salvation. Law was the means by which citizens could come together and determine public order and life in such a way as to fulfil their needs.

Marsiglio affirmed the natural capacity of human beings to constitute themselves into a citizen body so as to order and organise their own affairs in their own state. There was no need to have recourse to divinity, whose own representatives had, in their quarrels, supplied sufficient evidence for questioning. With Marsiglio, the individual emerges as a citizen, not just the member of the State but its creator too. As such a citizen, the individual was elevated to his proper standing, completely freed from the tutelage of a religious and kingly dispensation. The people as the citizen body constituting the state was sovereign, ‘superior’. There was no superior above this state as the body of the citizens. And for the same reason, there was no superior set above the Church understood as the body of the faithful.

Marsiglio barely needed to spell out the obvious implication of his reasoning – the Church, as a disruptive force claiming independent jurisdiction, had no place whatsoever in this conception of government. Although the priesthood was one of many professions to be found in states, Marsiglio poses the question of what need it supplies, what function it performs? Marsiglio’s speculation betrays a nice cynicism on his part with respect to religion. Rulers had in the past found it efficacious to invent a God with which to overawe recalcitrant men; Marsiglio speculates, with false innocence, the priesthood were required to help maintain this fiction. (Doyle 1963: 101/2).

Marsiglio stripped the clergy of its special powers in the political system; in this world, no group has any powers beyond those of the citizens. To Marsiglio, the clergy performed a function as healers of souls and pure administrators of the sacraments, but this gave them no extra power in the affairs of this world. The clergy could threaten and intimidate sinners with the horrors that will befall them in the next world, but they had no special power over sinners in this world.

Marsiglio effected a strict separation between this world and the next in order to diminish the role played by religious authorities in worldly politics. Although he was concerned to confine religion to the affairs of the next world, he was not content to leave the priesthood unaffected by his principles. On the contrary, Marsiglio was concerned that his populist-ascending theory of government be applied to the Church. For if the Church really is the body of the faithful, it follows that the faithful should become the real bearers of original power. The practical device by which Marsiglio sought to implement his vision would soon become significant. Marsiglio argued that the proper representation of the whole of Christendom could only be ensured by the existence of a general council. Paradoxically enough, the ideas of Marsiglio were to have the greatest immediate impact not in the political affairs of human society, which were of most concern to him, but in the affairs of Church government, which Marsiglio had sought to show as being of secondary importance. For the next century plus, conciliarism was a dominant force in religious government, organisation and action. It would be many centuries more before anything akin to Marsilian socio-political conciliarism would impact on the government of society at its highest levels. Always, conciliarism in this sense exists as a latent Aristotelian undercurrent, a permanently existing naturalism in human intercourse, exchange and interaction, a natural mode of social self-organisation containing the promise of self-government against an abstracted state politics divorced from the people. (Ullmann 1965:212).

The extent to which many of the issues raised and principles defined by Marsiglio retain a contemporary significance, nearly seven centuries on, should give some indication of the extent of the challenge Marsiglio made to the institutional and intellectual fabric of his own time. As well as indicating just how advanced Mariglio was in his thinking, one should also consider that Marsiglio did not generate theory ex nihilo. Marsiglio’s populist-ascending conceptions did not come from nowhere. The practical experience of the city-states informed much of what Marsiglio wrote. Most important of all, however, was Aristotle. Aristotle had taught Marsiglio about the natural foundation of the state and politics, how the constituent elements of the supreme political community were the smaller communities and, ultimately, the people themselves forming themselves into and acting as a citizen body. This they did quite naturally, as part of the process by which they realise their own natures. Politics, then, concerned collective action for the purpose of promoting human well-being and good. And since this was the primary concern of the people as citizens, then the people as citizens are charged with ‘superior’ or sovereign power. Marsiglio demonstrated just how far Aristotelian themes could go. Barely a generation had passed since Thomas Aquinas was supposed to have rendered Aristotle safe for the Church. No matter how vast the Thomist system was, it was vulnerable to challenge on its interpretation of Aristotle. Aquinas, in a sense, consistently cut Aristotle off in his prime, curtailing the potentialities and implications of naturalism within the supernatural ethic. By demonstrating the irrelevance of the supernatural in natural affairs, Marsiglio performed a surgical operation on the Thomist synthesis, stripping it off its Christian elements in order to let Aristotelian naturalism flourish and come to their true fruition.

It is important to qualify many of these points, lest the impression be given that Marsiglio was arguing for popular government as understood as contemporary liberal democracy. Marsiglio is highly advanced for his time, but in many respects frames his argument in terms of existing principles and institutions. Thus Marsilius does not argue the modern case for citizenship as the automatic birthright of every person. Instead, he defines the citizen as ‘one who participates in the civil community in the government or the deliberative or judicial function according to his rank. By this definition, children, slaves, aliens and women are distinguished from citizens, although in different ways’. Further, the voice of each citizen is not of equal weight. Marsilius employs the concept of the ‘weightier part’ in its standard medieval sense of reckoning voting on the basis of inequality at every level throughout the secular and ecclesiastical worlds. The assumption of such a conception is that persons of rank, age, learning, and other marks of obvious distinction and authority are entitled to more of a voice than others. In searching for ways to express his principles, Marsilius was careful to rely on many accepted institutions. Thus he declared his recognition of distinctions within the citizen body to be ‘in accordance with the honorable custom of politics’.

Following Aristotle closely, Marsiglio argues for the active conception of citizenship, which is simultaneously an educative conception. The individual becomes a citizen by acting as a citizen. The citizen is one who may serve in the executive, legislative, or judicial offices of government, who, in serving, increases in wisdom to become one of ‘those men from whom alone the best laws can emerge’. Founded on wide experience, these laws ensure the ‘common utility’ since ‘no one knowingly harms himself’. Further, Marsiglio affirms the unity of lawmaking and law enforcing through a principle of self-assumed obligation. Individuals are most willing to be governed by the laws that they themselves have helped to make. Laws will be better observed when they are made by an enlightened majority of the citizens, the people who constitute the most influential part of the community.

Much of what Marsiglio writes follows Aristotle closely and issues in a politics which is fit for small scale communities, akin to the ancient Greek city-states. However much of an advance over previous interpretations of Aristotle, including Aquinas, in many important respects even Marsiglio falls short of a full appreciation of Aristotle. This emerges in the strict separation Marsiglio imposes between politics and ethics. Marsiglio lacks an ethics that is grounded in a philosophical anthropology; he is agnostic about human nature, about the connection between politics and the human ontology, in a way that Aristotle never was. He fails to connect ethics and ontology within politics as Aristotle did. One will not find in Marsiglio, as one does in Aristotle, an exhortation that individuals act in order to perfect themselves. This lack of a philosophical anthropology is highly significant, changing the point and focus of politics. Marsiglio delineates and justifies a system of offices, councils, and procedures, and delineates the individual’s actions within that system, but this alone does not amount to polis democracy in the Aristotelian sense. Whereas Aristotle evaluates success according to an individual’s progress toward self-realisation and virtue, the lack of a philosophical anthropology means that Marsiglio’s justification is presented in terms of the system’s success. (Riesenberg 1992:167).

Marsiglio’s political doctrine can be profitably read alongside a theory advanced by his contemporary, Bartolus of Sassoferrato. Arguably the greatest of the medieval lawyers who expounded Roman law, distilling the ascending thesis of government and law from elements drawn from Roman law texts. The most important of these elements were the concept of the citizen, the concept of customary law, and the lex regia. Bartolus combined these three elements to present a doctrine of the sovereignty of the people adapted to existing conditions. His civitas sibi princeps was therefore the juristic demonstration of sovereignty expressed in the jurisprudential and governmental terms of the day. The conclusions that Marsiglio had drawn on philosophic grounds, Bartolus reached on purely juristic grounds, and his work signals the entry of the ascending theme into juristic precincts in the affirmation of the law-creative capability of the people. Ullmann LP 109). 

Bartolus is important for the way that he focuses upon consent. The consent of the people is the crucial element which infuses practices and usages with a legal character. Customary law was created by the tacit consent of the people. Bartolus extended this reasoning by arguing that what the people could do by tacit consent, they could also do by explicit consent. The difference between customary law and statute law was the way in which popular consent was expressed. Customary law is created by tacit consent, statute law by explicit consent. Bartolus had thus extended the tacit consent that formed the basis of customary law into an assertion of the law-making capacity of the people as such, explicit consent creating written law, statute law. Bartolus concludes that only that people which makes its own laws can be considered ‘a free people’. This ‘free people’ has a status comparable to the Roman people which, according to the lex regia, originally had power. (Ullmann 1965:

The ‘free people’ was its own sovereign and was subordinate to no superior above it; consequently, it created and controlled its own government, a government which belonged to the people. Bartolus designated this government as regimen ad populum. With government in the hands of the people, Bartolus could describe the state as the civitas. The idea of representation is an important theme in the Bartolist conception. 

For Bartolus, the Council, the governing body, is elected by the people in the popular assembly and represents the whole citizenhood, the State. The Council represents ‘the mind of the people’ (Concilium representat mentem populi). The power of the Council was entirely subject to the power of the people and could be circumscribed or restricted as the people saw fit. The issue of whether the government should be elected for a specific time was also one for the people to decide. The people could confer as much authority on the Council as it desired, since authority derived from the people rather than from a ‘superior’ authority. The government was charged with the function of issuing laws which served the public interest (utilitas publica) and were conducive to the public good. The descending theme was supplanted by the ascending theme. Rather than the interests of the people being determined by the superior insight of the Ruler, the people itself was acknowledged as having the capacity to determine its own interests. Possessing powers of judgement, the people retained control of the Council at all times. The Council operated on the principle of simple numerical majority and elected the judicial, administrative, and financial officers of the State. These chief officers of the state were responsible to the government, which in turn was always responsible to the State itself. Since these offices emanated from the people, their character was determined by the citizens, who could prescribe and alter its contents. Such a framework makes it possible to conceive elections in their proper meaning.

Bartolus presented in juristic terms what Marsiglio had presented in political-philosophical terms. Both took it as axiomatic that the people were sovereign and that there was no power above the people. ‘A free people is not subjected to anyone’, Bartolus had declared. And, as with Marsiglio, so the concept of the subject is supplanted by the concept of the citizen. A ‘free people’ is composed of citizens, not subjects.

Marsiglio and Bartolus do differ in some respects. The ‘real’ democracy implied by Bartolus’s legal system could only function in small communities. Bartolus’s conception was therefore applicable to small states. Marsiglio’s philosophic system is of more general application, and could be applied to any community, large or small. This in itself is a minor difference, since Marsiglio’s Aristotelianism is clearly more applicable to the small-scale political community; it just doesn’t preclude a larger state in the way that Bartolist system does.

There was also some difference between the two concerning the composition of citizenship.

Marsiglio and Bartolus were in agreement that a citizen was one who participated in the government of the State. On Aristotelian premises Marsiglio excluded from citizenship slaves, foreigners, women, and children. Bartolus also excluded these groups on account of being incapable of giving legally relevant consent. Bartolus, however, went further in also excluding clerics on account of laity and clergy forming two separate sections, with whatever being decreed in the one being of no relevance to the other. 

On the basis of the creative synthesis of Aristotelian and Christian element in the vast Thomist synthesis, political theory made spectacular progress in the direction of the populist-ascending theme of power in the opening decades of the fourteenth century. The rights of the citizen were no longer basically defensive and negative; the people had been shown to be capable of making a positive and constructive contribution to the government of the state. Marsiglio’s philosophical conception of popular sovereignty soon found its legal counterpart in Bartolus’ system, presenting ideas so far in advance of their time that there was little more for political theorists to add for the next century plus. The only cause for complaint is the differentiated conceotion of citizenship which both Marsiglio and Bartolus advocated in line with their times. Whilst this restricted concept of citizenship chimed with the times, it constitutes a deficiency from the standpoint of future development. (Ullmann 1965:218/9).

In fine, Marsiglio of Padua, later of Paris, succeeded in rationalising the political experience and articulating the practice of the Italian city-states in terms of Aristotle’s descriptions of the state as a natural product, enriching and embellishing this perspective by concepts critically appropriated from subsequent schemes of thought and experiences, Roman, Christian and contemporary politics. Bartolus drew upon Roman law to produce a system which agreed in all fundamentals with Marsiglio. Together they expressed on the contemporary terrain something of the ancient Greek citizen enthusiasm for the state as a political structure made by and for the people. More generally, Marsiglio and Bartolus rendered the practice and experience engendering the new secular states of France, England and the Italian cities cogent and coherent in terms of principle. And they stated the principles of the new secular politics with a vigour and an accuracy that could only serve to galvanise the efforts of those determined to throw off the yoke of papal authority.

It is interesting to speculate how different Europe might have looked had Marsiglio’s conciliarism spread as extensively in theory and practice of secular politics as it did in religious affairs. After all, it was the secular realm of human society that Marsiglio was overwhelmingly concerned with. As it was, it was his conciliarist suggestions for the governance of the Church that caught the imagination of his contemporaries. One can turn to the history of the conciliar movement and experiment and speculate on the impact the ideas and struggles and practices that issued in relation to the Church could have had if, as Marsiglio had intended, this fevered activity had taken place within the secular realm of politics. When one considers that the Defensor Pacis was condemned as heretical and formally burned by the church, it is ironic that it came to be at the heart of the principal controversies and issues which pre-occupied the Church in the following period. It is all the more ironic since Marsiglio was a sceptic who was not interested in the Church and religion and sought to confine supernatural issues to an irrational sphere of no relevance to the rational political sphere. Marsiglio had a clear practical purpose with regard to the political sphere, seeking to extend and embed the powers of the people as the citizens composing the state. The ideas were to have a practical impact in the near future – but in the Church rather than the State. In the aftermath of Marsiglio’s work, the question of reforming the church began to pursued in earnest by people who were clearly aware of and influenced by Marsiglio’s conceptions. Thus one finds Marsilian assertions of the populist-ascending theory in arguments for a general council which is superior to the authority of the pope, the supplanting of monarchical forms of government by a federal form and so on. Marsiglio’s conciliarist politics had the practical impact he sought – in the Church rather than in politics. The conciliar experiment took place in religion rather than politics.

Marsiglio was the true intellectual ancestor of the Reformation, given the direct influence he came to exercise over the supporters of Henry VIII of England and, maybe, even Luther, as well as over secular thinkers like Hooker and, presumably, Hobbes and Machiavelli. His indirect influence in framing and posing the crucial questions of government and politics is even more immense (Gewirth, 1951 chap. 8). The problem of church-state relations is discussed by Marsilius in the second "discourse" of his The Defensor Pads, trans. Alan Gewirth (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951).). In this respect it is a source of regret that his ideas had more immediate impact upon ecclesiastical government rather than secular affairs.

36 THE CONCILIAR EXPERIMENT: DISINTEGRATION OF UNITED CHRISTENDOM
The second half of the fourteenth century was one of great institutional experimentation and activity with respect to secular and religious organisation. As the centralisation of authority continued within the secular states, political institutions became more sophisticated and more complicated. The royal power at the centre came under increasing challenge, and not only from the feudal magnates. The competition for power intensified with the entry of a non-aristocratic element of society into politics as the result of the increase in the size of towns and their increasing political importance. There followed a period of constant antagonism and struggle for political control over sovereign power in the state. This conflict revolved around attempts to redistribute political authority within the state.

The doctrine of the two swords was favoured by those thinkers who, whether advocates of the religious or the secular position, sought a compromise. In this dualistic view, the fact that church and state were separate spheres entailed that the secular and spiritual authorities were supreme in their own domain. Advocates of this position could be found as early as the eleventh century and it was a compromise view that was to triumph.

Proceeding from the Decretum of Gratian (ca. 1140), the Decretists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries sought a compromise on dualistic terms. This search culminated in Thomist synthesis, which reinterpreted Augustine through the rediscovered works of Aristotle. Aquinas’ theory of the separation of spheres was to influence all subsequent Catholic doctrine. Even the more radical theorists who were to follow, like William of Ockham, maintained this dualistic view.

Then there were the advocates of the supremacy of the state over the church. Dating back to well before Henry IV, there is a long line of German kings who, along with their legal supporters, are the most consistent and insistent advocates of this supremacy of the state. The most philosophically sophisticated statement of this view came from Marsiglio of Padua. 

The development of political institutions within the state was further promoted by the growing sense of national identity and consciousness across various parts of Europe. This was particularly the case in England, France, and Italy, where the emergence of national literatures fostered a sense of national pride. As political institutions corresponding to particular needs and interests started to develop in the secular states, Europe started to disintegrate into separate entities, each possessing a proud consciousness of its distinctive identity. The old ideal of a universal Europe-wide state and monarchy faded from view – and with it went the tranquillity and peace which that ideal had promised. The universal had never seemed so far away.

The one institution which held on to the universal ideal was, of course, the Church. And it was here that the most interesting issues were raised and battles fought. From 1378 the Church came to be embroiled in the same problems of political authority being faced by the secular states, but with additional difficulties owing to the distinctive nature of spiritual power. There was a crucial difference between the secular states that were beginning to emerge on national lines and the institution of the church. Unlike these secular states, the Church was concerned with the universal and sought to achieve the right form of government for the one perfect society. In facing the same set of circumstances and in addressing the same questions, the Church was under far greater pressure than the state. The church was a universal institution, the universal church upholding the ideal of a united Christendom. ‘The state’ had none of these concerns but comprised a number of particular states, any of which could survive the collapse of the universal ethic. The church, like any particular state, had to consider its internal condition, but it had to do much more than this. For if the Church failed to recover and retain unity within its institutions, the ideal of a united Christendom would dissolve, and with the destruction of political unity surely the faith itself would follow. The Church sought to check the escalating forces of nationalism by re-emphasising integration to secure the welfare of all Christendom. The welfare of all required universalism; nationalism to the Church threatened disintegration and, in consequence, the destruction of welfare. With much more to lose than ‘the state’, the Church was spurred into a period of ambitious change and experimentation. And it is significant that conciliarism was seriously considered as a possible solution to the problems besetting the Church in the new age. The conciliar movement stands as an ambitious attempt to achieve universality out of particularity, integrating the ideals of constitutional government and a united Christendom in such a way as to conceive universal institutions as powered from the base upwards according to the ascending theme of power. That the conciliar movement ultimately failed can be attributed to a number of reasons, not the least of which is the illusory nature of the religious ideal in the first place. The more relevant reasons concern the lack of a social content to the conciliar ideal, the lack of a social power and agency to give the form real substance. Leading the movement were lawyers, bureaucrats of power, not revolutionaries concerned to really change things, lead, take over. The conciliar ideal itself remains largely intact after the collapse of the conciliar movement. (Doyle 1963: 110).

The historical background to the conciliar movement is the schism of the late fourteenth century. By 1393 it was clear that drastic measures were called for and the likes of Gerson and Pierre D’Ailly at the University of Paris sought to achieve a reconciliation. Significantly, they were steeped in the works of Marsiglio as well as the early Fathers, so there attempts to recover something of the early traditions of the church was informed by the new Marsilian thinking. They called a general council to settle the issues. As it happened, the Council of Pisa in 1409 only served to make things worse, electing a new pope without being able to induce the two rivals to resign. The universal Church now had three heads. The University of Paris persevered and called another council. The Council of Constance in 1414 succeeded in closing the schism. More important than the bare facts, however, are the methods and measures adopted by the Council to achieve reconciliation. The debates and discussions of various issues and alternatives encompass a wide range of problems with respect to government and its legitimacy. The principal questions concerned the precise position of sovereign power in the state, and the extent and limits of political authority. The Council of Constance almost exclusively focused upon the nature of political sovereignty.

After Marsiglio and Bartolus, the populist-ascending theme would seem to have been poised to supersede the remnants of the theocratic-descending power within the political order. The irony is that when the revolution came it came not in the political realm of the state but in the Church – the very institution which Marsiglio and Bartolus had sought to exclude from the more important political affairs and which one would have thought completely impervious to the ascending them. The populist-ascending thesis gained this theoretical prominence in the Church on account of the nature of the crisis into which Christendom had fallen and the fact that Marsiglio’s and Batolus’ work was being discussed and propagated by churchmen in the highest possible positions.

Conciliarism was the application of the ascending theme to ecclesiastical government in an attempt to overhaul the deficient constitution of the Church that had led to and proved incapable of remedying the Great Schism. In particular, the unfettered sovereign monarchy of the pope was seen to be responsible for all of the problems besetting the Church and there was therefore a concern that it be checked and replaced. It was at this point in time that the Marsilian and Bartolist conceptions came into their own. The ascending thesis defined by Marsiglio and Bartolus took the form of conciliarism and was to be ruthlessly applied to the government of the Church in an attempt to control the pope’s monarchy. Conciliarism rested on the assumption that sovereign power rested with the congregation of the faithful and was expressed in their representative organ, the general council. The general council of the Church was declared ‘superior’ to the pope, who, in this system became a member of the Church and its officer.

The conciliarism practised by the large councils of the fifteenth century reflected the triumph of the populist-ascending theme of government over the papal-descending theme. The Councils (Constance; Ferrara-Basle-Florence) articulated the essential theses of conciliarism in their decrees. Conciliarism synthesised three strands of thought: the political sovereignty of the people drawn from Marsiglio; the legislative sovereignty of the people drawn from Bartolus; and the canonistic corporation theory of the canon lawyers’ which held that the bishop and his chapter formed a corporation, that the bishop was bound by the decision of the chapter, and could not act without the consent of the consent in any important matter. (Ullmann 1965:220).

The crucial decrees of these Councils expressed the essential spirit of conciliarism, proceeding from the premises that totality of power rested in the Church universal which acted through its ‘representative’ general council. From this, it followed that the power of all officers in the Church, up to and including the pope, derived from the council. Sovereignty, which on Marsilian lines was designated ‘superiority’, belonged to the whole body of Christians, and not to the pope. The crucial Matthean verses applied to the Christian people as a whole, lay as well as clerics. The principle of representation embodied in the general council gave expression to these notions. Accordingly, all were responsible to the council as the representative body of the whole Church or, on the Bartolist model, ‘the general council represents the whole catholic church’. (Ullmann 1965:221).

In its discussion and decrees the Council of Constance articulated a political philosophy which chimed with the incipient humanism and naturalism of the age, Christian, yes, but more inclined to locate power in the people, even if indirectly from God. The questions debated were the crucial ones of establishing the exact limits of papal authority and establishing when it was right to refuse obedience to any ruler?

With the closing of the Great Schism, the main business of the Council of Constance was over. Its members proceeded to extend its reforming purpose by proposing reform in ‘head and members’. In the theocratic-descending conception, the pope stood at the apex of a system which received power from God and distributed it downwards as a conferment to lower-placed officers; now the pope was to receive power from below. Whereas once papal doctrine had justified the directing function of the pope in allegorical terms of the ‘head and members’, the head directing the body, conciliar doctrine employed the same allegory to delineate the pope’s ‘incorporation’ in the Church, making the point that the head belongs to the body. The disagreements were so violent on the issue that nothing could be resolved.


To end the schism, the council had to assert and obtain recognition of its right to subordinate the actions of the popes to its authority. Its Frequens decree was a declaration of supremacy over the papacy, stating that sovereignty in the church lay in the council as the representative organ of the people. Thus the Council of Constance was composed of lay and cleric representatives assembled in council with the pope. The rule of the church should be centred in the full council. The defection of John XXIII forced the members of the Council of Constance to take a step further in its assertion of the superiority of the body of the church over its papal head on earth. Arguing that sovereignty resides amongst the members only, and no longer in the full council of pope and members, the council thus declared itself capable of deposing the pope. Demonstrating a preference for aristocratic rather than monarchical government, the council suggested replacing the absolute sovereignty claimed by the pope with a limited or constitutional monarchy. The deposition of Richard II in England in 1399 followed along these lines.

The pope was determined to hang on to his authority against such claims, insisting upon the traditional view that his authority was divine in coming directly from God through the agency of St Peter. The council countered by arguing that the authority of the people whom it represented came indirectly from God. The council could not, however, argue on Marsilian lines that the authority of the people forms an integral part of their equipment as a community. Marsilius’s theory of the origin of political authority rested on the Roman conception of imperium and was therefore human rather than divine. Making a claim of divine right, this line of reasoning was denied the members of the Council of Constance. (Doyle 1963: 112/3).

A demand for reform, however, continued to be heard, both from princes and the people. Eventually, the pressure grew to such a level that the pope was impelled to convene the Council of Basle in 1431. Cesarini was president. The council did nothing but reveal its ineffectiveness to deal with the issues it sought to resolve. The causes of the problems which stimulated the demands for reform were of such scale and magnitude as to be beyond the scope of the ecclesiastical reformers. Europe required a reform that was institutionally impossible. The needs of the individual states had begun to vary greatly, dividing Europe on national lines and rendering the necessary uniformity impossible. National identity and consciousness had grown to such a level that states were increasingly reluctant to submit to control from a central authority, however much that control embodied a universality that was in the general interest. Christian universalism had broken down, the consequences taking centuries to work themselves out.

The failure of the council achieved signified the end of the hope that Europe might act as a single organism; the old ideal of a Europe-wide peace and tranquillity faded from view. The inability of the Church to impose and order a universal Christendom represented the collapse of all pretensions to international harmony in Europe. The universal was lost, in religion and in politics.

Despite its lack of practical achievement, the Council of Basle is important for its association with the philosophical statement of conciliarism presented by Nicolas of Cusa, who attended the council as secretary to Cardinal Orsini. 

The De Concordantia Catholica of Nicolas of Cusa was written especially for the Council of Basle and gave philosophic expression to the aims and aspirations of the councils and, indeed, of all the constitutionalists, whether priest or member of parliament in England or France. Though Nicolas would later defect to the papalist reaction, this work is a clear, principled statement of the constitutionalism which the church sought but failed to achieve, indeed which the nation states themselves were striving to bring about, whether one refers to the Lancastrian experiment in England, the estates in France and the electors in Germany. Nicolas generalised from these particulars, identified ideal principles with real experience, and articulated them philosophically as a theory of constitutional government.

Cusanus’ discussions proceeded from the most pressing issues facing the reformers, were the proper relation of a general council to the pope and the reorganisation of the church to ensure its effective operation. Arguing that the authority of general councils was superior to the authority of the pope, Cusanus set out to justify the actions of the Council of Constance in deposing the current pope and appointing a successor. The arguments he employed in support of this justification involved him in an intricate analysis of the composition of general councils and of the true origin of their sovereign power. In general, Cusanus was concerned to identify the forces which gave unity to the body politic within an integrated whole, proceeding from there to discuss the form of government best suited to organised society. 

Cusanus examined the truth of the statement that general councils ideally should reflect the image of the whole church, proceeding to determine how this could be achieved. Cusanus argued that general councils could not be considered to be autonomous bodies which are separated or removed from the general body of the whole church. The church is an intimate and dynamic whole, ascending on a pyramidal structure and woven together by the principle of election. At the base of the pyramid are the faithful, at the apex is Christ. The whole is woven together by the principle of election. The faithful elect the curates; with the consent of the faithful and the metropolitans, the curates elect the bishops; the bishops, who rule principally in provincial councils, elect the metropolitans; the metropolitans elect the cardinals; the cardinals choose the pope. ‘The provincial councils composed of bishops and metropolitans should send delegates to the pope who must make them into cardinals. These should form a permanent general council. The nature of the general council determined its supremacy over the pope’ (Doyle 1963: 117).

Cusanus identified a number of grounds upon which a general council was justified in ignoring the pope’s defection. General councils had received their authority direct from God and were therefore representative of the universal church. The authority of the pope, however, was fallible in being derived from a mixed source, certain privileges from St Peter and the Apostles, but the human origin of the canons and secular rulers. To Cusanus, the pope was no more and no less a member of the church like any other member; the office of pope is merely the executive of the ecclesiastical organisation. In reducing the supremacy of the pope within the limits of a constitutional monarchy, Cusanus’ presented a conception of the position of sovereignty in the state which was influenced by his conception of the fallibility of all human knowledge. Cusanus thus pointed out that the pope, as a man, was capable of sin. He argued further that the judgement formed from the combined intelligences of many individuals, as in the gathering of the bishops and cardinals in a general council, is likely to contain more of the truth than that of a single man, the pope. The discoveries of several individuals are, when aggregated, less open to error than those of the one. This argument in terms of propensity to truth and error would be one that Machiavelli would use in defence of popular government as against the rule of the prince.

The principal functions of the general council were to decide matters of faith and supervise the papal office. It was entitled to do this in representing the whole church. Provincial or patriarchal councils were formed to conduct the day-to-day administration of the church. Acknowledging the force of nationalism, these councils coincided with national boundaries and were to exercise the entire control in their districts. The reform of abuses, which was the main demand everywhere, was to be the responsibility of provincial or national councils presided over by local patriarchs. To further diminish the power of the central body, Cusanus proposed replacing the compulsory taxation of local groups for papal revenue by voluntary offerings. Such a measure would reduce the power of the papacy and check the striving of bishops ambitious for the riches of the papal office, which would be substantially reduced. Cusanus sought to make use of the new force of the national group to reorganise the ecclesiastical administration, checking the power of the pope and incorporating the power of nationalism. Far from regarding nationalism as a force blocking the harmonious functioning of the ecclesiastical machinery, the permanent general council for Cusanus was a supreme federal council composed of permanent delegates from the independent national groups designated as provincial councils. Such an arrangement would subvert the centralised councils controlled by the papacy, thus making it possible to undertake genuine reform. In Cusanus’ view, districts with direct knowledge of and concern with their particular problems are better placed to undertake the reform of morals than by a central body having to impose uniformity at from a distance. In an age of nation states, the universal Church was losing its grip upon reality. Cusanus hoped that organisation in national groups the influence of the secular princes would prove more potent.

One has to recognise the extent to which Cusanus rejected the absolutism implied by a centralised monarchy on account of the mysticism and humanism inherent in his political philosophy. Cusanus thus conceived the church to be dynamic not static, a living unity, ‘the union of souls with Christ in a sweet harmony’. The spirit of brotherhood was the living flow of eternal spirit forming the bond of society, knitting together and infusing the children of God. With love as the driving force, peace was the end of the church.

This conception of a living society took practical shape in Cusanus’ suggestions for the reorganisation of the church and the empire. In delineating the terms of this reorganisation, Cusanus enunciated the principle of representation on mystical lines, holding that the investing of any authority in the church to be sacramental in a way that is akin to a marriage. Since the elected immediately represented the electors in their totality, the voters and the representative became fused in a peculiar union. Thus Cusanus conceived the entire church to be composed of the general council elected by a closely knit system of representation in which the people through their representatives ruled, and were capable of ruling. Cusanus’ optimistic view of human nature convinced him of humanity’s capacity to order the greater matters of church and state. Cusanus in effect drew ascending conclusions from the descending conception in that, for him, the whole populace rather than its particular rulers was inspired by God. This implied that the entire community had indirectly a divine right to govern. The emerging forces of humanism and nationalism merged in Cusanus’.

An interesting aspect of Cusanus’ conception is the way that it precludes disobedience to the commands of authority. Harmony is built into the system. Political questions of conflict resolution, how to resolve disagreements between ruler and ruled, do not arise. One of the crucial questions concerning representation is how to ensure that representatives remain in close and continuous contact with the voters who elected them and who they represent. Cusanus gives no account of this central problem of political philosophy, evidently considering it a non-question since, in his system, there is no separation at all between representatives and represented. So Cusanus was silent on the question of how representatives could continuously reflect the changing opinions of the whole body of the faithful. Once elected, the general council was permanent. So strong was Cusanus’ belief that the actions of humanity were directed within the bond of love subjected to the power of the spirit of God that he evidently did not feel the need to establish the institutional machinery required to ensure harmony between the rulers and the ruled – that harmony would be generated necessarily and spontaneously from the unity between the bond of love and the power of God’s spirit infusing humanity. The political problem ceases to exist.

The end of this society of a dynamic and living unity was peace and harmony, the fruit of love. The church is infused with the unity and harmony from the Holy Spirit which dwells within, compelling it to seek peace and brotherly love as a supreme good. All who work for peace are ipso facto inspired by God and therefore justified. By closing the schism and re-establishing peace, the decrees of the Council of Constance were almost sacrosanct. 
Cusanus advocated the elective representative system for its ability to guarantee the establishment of peace in Europe. In being the expression of the desire of human beings to work together as brothers, the representative system induced harmony and therefore achieved peace. For this reason, Cusanus sought the extension of the elective representative system throughout every human form and organisation within society. The system was capable of general application. Thus Cusanus went into detail on how the system of popular control through representatives could apply to the Empire. His suggestion involved the division of the Empire into twelve districts or circles, each concerned with the reform and administration of justice, and representing the three estates of the nobles, the ecclesiastics and the populace. The whole empire, with its electors, judges and cities, would be represented by the central annual diet.

Central to Cusanus’ living, dynamic society, then, is the principle of elective representation which gives expression to the views of the whole body of Christian brothers. So immediate and direct is the relation or bond between representatives and represented that Cusanus assumed that elective representatives would always articulate the opinions of the represented. Cusanus argues that the best form of government to achieve this ideal is a constitutional monarchy, with representatives of the national or provincial councils assuming a controlling function to check attempts at arbitrary absolutism. The whole political order is made to work not on account of its legal compulsion and institutional machinery but through the unity of faith which infused the whole. The political problem simply no longer existed when all adhered to the one faith and hence felt themselves to be the children of the one God and brothers in Christ. Unity in this ideal society was ensured by adherence to an unquestioned body of doctrine. Given the disagreements that had broken out within the Church, given the fact that the very problems that the councils were addressing stemmed from the breakdown of universalism within Christendon, Cusanus’s assumption that the bond of faith could be revived in this strength seems remarkably misplaced. As it was, such an ideal had little chance against the emerging forces of nationalism sweeping Europe.

How little was soon made apparent when each attempt at reform at Basle served only to rouse latent national antagonisms. With members of the council being unable to reconcile their differences, repudiated by the pope, the council petered out. The quarrels and disagreements of a handful of bishops seemed of no relevance whatsoever. Cusanus’ idealism in ultimately resting the principle of elective representation upon the unity of faith had been destroyed. Disillusioned by the proceedings of the Council of Basle, Cusanus went from one extreme to the other; he apostatised into an ardent supporter of papal absolutism as the only remaining hope for maintaining the unity of Christendom.

At the same time that the representative system was failing in the church, the constitutional experiments that had been underway in a number of states were also hitting the buffers. Both France and England had fallen into civil war in the wake of attempts to rule by the representatives of the communes. The city-states of Italy had long since plunged into enmity and conflict, abandoning attempts to manage relations by means of inter-civic agreement. In Germany the cities had never had sufficient political control in themselves and unity between themselves to be involved in any spectacular downfall. All over Europe unity was disintegrating, both between and within nations. The individual states of Europe were dissolving into antagonistic factions. The only way to restore order seemed to be by strong national dictatorship – the centralised nation state. The ideal of a constitutional form of government which Cusanus had put before Europe in 1432 was no longer available, not to any church or state. The failure of the councils was also a failure of the ideals of the conciliar movement and administered a significant check upon the advances that had been made in the belief in the power of the people to organise their own political life and effectively control their own political institutions. The failure of conciliarism seemed to discredit the ideal of democracy, at least in the eyes of those seeking practical forms of government to maintain political order and manage existing relations, conceding as little change in power as possible. To such people, the only way forward was absolute monarchy concentrated within the nation state.

Europe had learned another lesson too as a consequence of the downfall of the conciliar movement. Cusanus’ emphasis upon the importance of the unity of faith was seriously misplaced, presupposing the very thing that was at issue – unity and its absence within the universal church. Cusanus presumed the possibility of the very thing that had not been achieved under centuries of universal Christendom. He presented the commonwealth of Christendom as ‘ruled by the principle of harmony, rather than that of uniformity, in which one polity shall still embrace both civil and spiritual activities, and brotherhood, the supreme principle of Christianity, shall become the inspiration of a delicately articulated society, the source of a varied and developing activity’ (Figgis). Whatever one may think of the attractiveness of such an ideal, it was utterly detached from realities and could find little in existing reality that could serve as conditions for its realisation. The councils gave a practical demonstration that Cusanus’ unity of faith was a chimera. Whatever unity there had been had gone and gone for good. And with it went the concern with and attempt to achieve the universalism required for human well-being and good. Soon, people began to question the faith. Christians share the one faith and yet all around is disagreement rather than harmony. Christianity teaches that the bond of society is the brotherhood of man, but were men really brother when all around were quarrels between people who put their identities as Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans and Italians first? [and of different status, rank and class?] (Doyle 1963: 124).

The failure of the conciliar movement demonstrated conclusively how feeble the unity of faith was in face of the new reality of national differences. It was a harsh verdict that seemed to discredit almost all of the great advances made in political theory in the period since Aquinas. The theories had, it seemed, been tested and found badly wanting. Where was the congregation of the faithful when it was needed? What had happened to the mystical corporate life of the whole? The universality of the church was being parcelled out between separate organisations roughly corresponding to national divisions, strongly nationalistic and resentful of outside interference and control. In such circumstances the unity of faith could only be achieved by the co-operative effort of these national groups. These were the groups that Cusanus had identified as provincial groups. But as the individual states of Europe became increasingly self-conscious of their national identity, the whole basis of political theory imploded. The ideal of a universal peace and tranquillity disappeared from view.

There are many reasons for being cautious in reading the failure of the conciliar movement as a failure of the democratic ideal of popular government. If this was the ideal of the conciliar movement, then it suffered from a singular lack of a popular movement behind it. In terms of real people actually running their affairs and organising their politics, there was no such thing as the conciliar experiment: it didn’t happen. Instead, there were debates in the highest circles of church and state involving well-placed, well-educated individuals, bishops, lawyers, etc, influened by Marsilian and Bartolist theses. ‘The conciliar movement as the practical application of the ascending theme of government to the ecclesiastical body may have been extremely anti-monarchical in essence, but it was primarily an academic movement and never a popular movement. As such, it generated an important range of governmental and constitutional principles, exercising an influence over the centuries to come. But conciliarism was a classic example of theory divorced from practice. Marsiglio was fundamentally concerned with political activity and intended his theory to be put into practice. Yet the exponents of the conciliarist theory did precious little to implement their principles. This cannot be explained by the hostility of political or ecclesiastical authorities. The climate was wholly favourable to them, both politically and intellectually. The old theocratic-descending theme of government was in crisis and even the rulers were open to solutions that could restore unity and maintain order. Further, there had been a significant expansion in the educated audience for conciliarist theories. There had been in the early fifteenth century a spread of University education to the lower clergy and, above all, to the laity; an expansion facilitated by the founding of new schools and colleges. All of which meant an increase in academically trained people open to ascending theories of government and power. Themes central to conciliarism were appropriate subjects to be taught and lectured upon: they had arrived at the level of learned debate and teaching. At the same time, the hold that the institutionalised faith once held over politics in the high Middle Ages was fading rapidly, losing ground to an intellectual radicalism that seemed to offer unlimited possibilities. The time, it seemed, was ripe for conciliarism, for the complete overthrow of the theocratic-descending model and its replacement by the populist-ascending model, based upon elective representation in church and state. Incredibly, with hardly anything that merits the word struggle, the pope had regained all his old authority and more, decrees and laws all expressing the old papal monarchy and plenitude of power from before the conciliarist experiment.

Without any fight or protest, the conciliarists abandoned conciliarism for the traditional papal-monarchic point of view. What on earth had happened? Where did the conciliarist challenge go? Part of the answer to these questions is to be found in the fact that, despite affirming the principle that original power was located in the Christian people, which included of course the laymen, and that government should be representative in order to reflect that fact, the conciliarists did remarkably little to actually alter the constitution of the Church. Far from the passive role of the layman being exchanged for an active role, the layman remained in the receptive role assigned by traditional doctrine. The failure on the part of the conciliarists to challenge this relegation of the laymen to the role of mere spectators is significant in explaining the failure of the conciliar movement; for all of their insistence upon conciliarist principles, the conciliarists themselves did nothing in practice to ensure the promotion and implementation of their theory. They could win debates at the intellectual level, but achieve little at the organisational level. The conciliarists challenged the theocratic-descending standpoint on the theoretical level, yet did little to change it at the political and institutional level. The debates and the demands and the decrees all proceeded within the old theme. The principle of active and elective representation was reiterated time and again, but it is difficult to see where even the attempt to apply it took place, let alone actually practised. ‘What touches all must be approved by all’ was a persuasive theoretical slogan, one which resonates throughout the centuries. But where actually where the ‘all’ in all of this? If the principle was absent in conciliarist practice, so too were the people. The truth is that a populist-ascending thesis without the people runs the serious risk of becoming the prisoner of the very descending theme it seeks to replace, working within the institutions it seeks to replace. Its theoretic elitism forms the rational counterpart of the theocratic elitism of the descending thesis, rule being determined by the special insight of the few wise rather than the practical knowledge of the people themselves. The conciliarists could not take the necessary step of introducing the people into their reforming agenda, for the very reason that they were as frightened of the amorphous masses as were their opponents. Fear of the possible intervention of the multitude – the laity - first caused the conciliarists to tone down their populist-ascending principles and then induced them, slowly but surely, to abandon their positions for the old papal-monarchic security. Once the laity started to join the criticism of the ‘Establishment’, adding its voice to the demands for reform, the conciliarists abandoned their positions and joined the ‘Establishment’, seeking security in the old papal-monarchic structure against the increasing swell of popular pressure.

The lower clergy and the educated layman knocked at the gates of power but lacked not only the structural capacity to force them open but the will to develop the numerical capacity. The ideas of the conciliarists would exercise a powerful influence upon the reforming activity of the next century, and the lower clergy and educated laymen would again play central roles. In the early fourteenth century, these classes failed to have the courage of their convictions and did precious little to translate their theory into practice. 

The conciliarists were as aware and as afraid of the radical potential of the populist-ascending theme every bit as much as the secular and ecclesiastical rulers. How dangerous this theme was was soon made clear in the form of the doctrines of Wyclif, who asserted plainly that the lords were responsible to the people (populares), addressing these very ideas to the people themselves. The Bohemian John Hus would later expound the same view. Political and ecclesiastical authorities had a common purpose in coming together to sink such views. With the effective help of the emperor, their condemnation was decreed at Constance. By definition, the populist-ascending theory of government was the very antithesis of the papal-monarchical rule and contained the promise and the potential to restructure power along democratic lines. The conciliarists knew this. Wanting reform rather than revolution, they pressed the populist-ascending theme at the theoretical level, hoping to persuade the ruling elites to concede to certain demands. But they refused to connect the theory to practice with the weight of the people behind them. The governments of the theocratic-descending institutional retained effective power in all of this reforming activity. Fear of the multitude meant that the conciliarists could never employ their real power against the establishment, and the movement faded.

The conciliarist movement was a portent of the shape of things to come. The struggles had demonstrated the forces which could be marshalled and canalised both for and against attempts to act upon the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The strength of the populist-ascending thesis is, by definition, the numerical strength it is able to muster behind its theories. As such, to succeed, it has to overcome the passivity to which the descending theme of government has relegated the people. There is no doubt that a combination of inertia, torpor, and traditionalism amongst the masses can impede the growth of the ascending theme. This is before popular activity even runs into the range of conserving and preserving agencies which serve to prevent the untrammelled unfolding of the ascending theme. 

The reforming activity of the fifteenth century reveal a significant broadening of horizons, with intellectual developments increasingly being explored for their practical implications with respect to government and politics. As the understanding of Aristotle and other ancient authors deepened, humanistic theses concerning active citizenship and the full participation of citizens in public government developed. All the time, the third estate was emerging, ready and willing to assume citizen identity and take its rightful place in government. Whatever was happening in the high office and institutions of church and state, all over Europe the third estate was emerging as a political agent, as seen in the municipal statutes and other legislative devices in the Italian city-states and the towns across the Alps in France and Germany.

The ideas and activities of the conciliarists were not confined to ecclesiastical affairs but was part of a general populist-ascending theme of government whose exponents were overwhelmingly concerned with politics. The emergence of the laity, the prosperous and educated bourgeoisie third estate in politics formed a clear threat to the power and position of the established forces. The secular rulers, particularly theocratic kings, watched with alarm the spread of ideas which were the intellectual expression of the rising power of the ‘third estate’. The conciliarists may not have developed their ideas in this way, the rulers clearly perceived the growing popular threat to their own rule. There followed a period of counter-reaction characterised by a series of alliances between the papacy and the kingdoms. Significantly, after centuries of church-state enmity, the fifteenth century saw popes and kings conclude a large number of Concordats. Issues which had once been incendiary and which had provoked conflict between church and state now came to be settled and arranged ‘amicably’. Once enemies, popes and kings joined forces against the common threat to their power – the ascent of the third estate to political participation and even, potentially, power. Pointing to the Council of Basle, popes and kings warned of the disaster and chaos that would follow the entry of the third estate into government and politics. At first, such prophecies of doom were sufficient to induce those as fearful of the people as the rulers to abandon ascending concepts for the security promised by absolutist monarchy in church and state.
The emergence of political science went hand in hand with the emergence of the state as an autonomous institution, self-contained in drawing its ends from its own premises. With social norms dependent upon the autonomous state, theology and ecclesiastical considerations came to be relegated to a place of secondary importance, with no claim to determine social norms and no claim to translate their tenets into law. It was at this time that attributes formerly assigned to the church came to be assigned to the state. The emergence of political science was accompanied by the increasing assertion of the individual’s own assessment of a situation against the acceptance of the collectivist standpoint. The question thus arose of the individual’s consent to the law. Law and politics presupposed the existence of a collective entity concerning the public life of individuals, but collective considerations were no longer determined by the Church but the state as the citizens’ own body. Exploring the political implications of that switch could only serve to promote populist-ascending themes.

37 THE SECULAR REACTION
A strong reaction against the church’s claims to omnipotence had been growing since the start of the fourteenth century. Increasing numbers of educated and influential people were concerned to subject the absolute sovereignty of the papacy to notions of popular government. And such views were also expressed in the secular realm with reference to monarchical forms of government. Conciliarism and constitutionalism were rising forces in church and state politics. Demands for change were accompanied with the development of a secular concept of society functioning according to a populist-ascending theme. Attention came to focus upon the state rather than the church. Eventually, a concept of the state was developed which was entirely free of any dependence on the church. The exaltation of the secular power of the state and the associated growth of anti-clerical feeling was the culmination of a process that had begun with the rediscovery of Aristotle and the attempt to embed Aristotelian naturalism within the supernaturalism of Christianity. The intellectual development of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were characterised by a steady drift away from supernaturalism and the theological concepts of the medieval schoolmen towards naturalist explanation. A number of developments served to bring the pre-occupation with theology in previous ages to an end, opening up new realms of exploration and speculation. The rediscovery of Greek thought continued, with new angles emerging through the medium of Arabic translation. The study of Roman law was joined by new subjects, leading to new discoveries. Philosophy, ethics, politics, medicine, were all treated as worthy of investigation in themselves, rather than being made to fit an overarching Christocentric standpoint. The school of Paris succeeded in breaking the identity of God and Truth, establishing the distinction between philosophy and theology so as to divorce the pursuit of truth from the thirst for righteousness. Intellectual life had been emancipated from the constraints of theological doctrines, something which encouraged the spread of scepticism and secular approaches to the world and its affairs.

The emergence of strong kingdoms and increasing national consciousness and identity took the struggle between church and state into a new phase. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, the church was plainly faltering, its universalism imploding as a result of internal disagreements. Against the church, the rulers and advocates of the secular state focused upon the mundane but important questions of how the worldly affairs of mortals are to be regulating, how guardianship of person and property is to be effected. Imbued with concepts and theories drawn from Roman law, they identified the king as the supreme lawgiver in the kingdom of this world.

At the height of the controversy between the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy, the imperialists had based their argument on the theory of the two swords. On the basis of the distinction between spiritual and temporal matters, the imperialists held that the emperor had complete and independent control over temporal matters in the visible empire and that the spiritual power had no right to interfere in temporal matters. Firmly within the Roman tradition of imperial sovereignty, the emperor was invested with absolute powers. The neat distinction of the two powers could not ensure peaceful co-existence for the very reason in claiming identical powers over the same type of body politic, the pope and the emperor were virtually rivals for the same post.

The fact that there were many kings in Europe meant that the supporters of the secular power in the conflict between Boniface VIII and Philip IV had to justify the position and authority of a king of a single kingdom in terms that were applicable to all other kings of secular kingdoms against the spiritual power. The advocates of the secular standpoint understood that by upholding the rights of the secular state as such there was every prospect of complete political disintegration in Europe. Only by elevating kings to the position of an emperor would it be possible to avoid the chaos of a disunited Europe composed of sovereign independent kingdoms, each recognising no authority superior to its own. For all of their forward thinking, even the advocates of the secular state clung to the medieval belief in a universal ethic and order. It would take a couple of centuries of war and rivalry on national grounds for the old ideal of a European state to die. From this perspective, conciliarism and the conciliar movement represents the final attempt to revivify universalism and set it on new lines consonant with the emerging world. The failure of the conciliar experiment delivered the fatal blow to the ideal of internationalism. At the same time, the particular circumstances of the start of the fourteenth century compelled the secular apologists to backtrack in the claims they had made for kings of secular kingdoms resting on imperial authority. For any king to claim imperial power whilst still unelected to the empire was certain to cause friction with the actual holder of that office. The advocates of secular kingdoms could not argue from imperial tradition and so had to find other arguments. The controversy had developed from being a rivalry between pope and emperor for supreme control over the one organisation, Christendom, into a conflict between the papacy, increasingly regarded in nationalistic terms as an Italian or French power, and the separate powers of newly emerging kingdoms. Abandoning justification in terms of imperial tradition, the secular state came to be presented and justified on the basis of its own autonomous power, divorced from the overarching framework of Christian theology.

The history of Europe over the next few centuries served to emphasise the truth of the ideal of internationalism and universalism as a condition of peace and tranquillity. The advocates of the old ideal may have been swimming against the rising tide of nationalism, but they were proved right in prophesying chaos and anarchy. In counterfactual terms, the truth of the ideal as an ethic was proved. The conflict between the Italian city-states was soon joined by larger conflicts between nations, especially France and England. As notions of Christian brotherhood were shattered in conflicts involving people as members of nations, the necessity for peace had never been greater. Theorists of the calibre of Dante, Pierre Dubois and Marsilius of Padua had all taken their cue from Thomas Aquinas in founding their writings on Tranquilitas, the end Aquinas assigned the state as the necessary means to achieving the highest life. In the hands of the theorists who followed Aquinas, all the way up to the most forward thinking of them all, Marsiglio, tranquilitas was the supreme necessity and the primary goal of the state, the condition of human well-being. But tranquilitas could not be obtained in a Europe lacking a universal ethic and dividing on national lines. 

The rise in the identification of the people with its own national secular state and the decline in the belief in the need for a universal church was further encouraged by the growing popular resentment induced by the increasing wealth of the church. Theorists like Marsiglio had shared this resentment. He was ‘sceptical’ of theology and of the interference of the church in the affairs of the state. He, along with the other theorists of this period, regarded the church was regarded as the destroyer rather than as the promoter of peace. The awareness of the extent to which the church had failed to maintain peace destroyed its credibility as an institution capable of implementing the ideals of universalism and internationalism. Marsiglio identified peace rather than salvation to be the new end of human organisation. But if the universal church could not serve as the institutional vehicle of this ideal, there was no secular equivalent. The political order was increasingly characterised by independent secular kingdoms responsible only to themselves.

The legalists and the Aristotelians made great intellectual and theoretical advances with respect to the concepts of secular government but failed to promote the populist-ascending thesis to anything like its full extent. They failed to win wide currency owing to the difficulty of translating the different categories of people known to ancient society into clearly defined and understood medieval equivalents. The differences between ancient and medieval society too great for such precision. Whether one refers to scholastic’s or the secularists, Aquinas or Marsiglio, the linguistic and conceptual framework of the medieval age was incapable of adequately expressing the precise meaning and the moral and metaphysical goals of Aristotle - the complete and creative self-realisation of the individual through social and political involvement in public life.

For these reasons, the recovery of Aristotelian naturalism and its emergence in conciliarism could neither revivify the old Christian universalism nor engender its secular counterpart as an alternative to take its place. The flaw in the idea of the universal state may be defined as the attempt to impose an ideal which, for all of its intellectual merits, lacks the consent of those to whom the ideal is applied. The only enduring basis of universalism is consent. The likes of Marsiglio had shown how such consent could be active and continuous, how popular government resting on the sovereignty of the people could be achieved. But the idea needs to be buttressed by institutional innovation enabling its practice. The consent implied by universalism achieving in secular politics presupposes the existence of conditions and relations facilitating the individual grasp of the universal via discursive interaction. And these were lacking.

In terms of its lofty idealism, the Universal Church had the highest motives and as an institution endured the longest. But its universalism distintegrated nonetheless. The lesson is that whilst the ends may be good, the means employed in their realisation are deficient to their purpose. Since means and ends are indivisible, with every means being also the end in the process of becoming, the universal cannot be separated from the particular or imposed from outside of the conditions of its realisation. The universal has to be engendered from within the human nature and its expression in social processes and practices and institutions leading up to the political community. The old ideal of internationalism, achieving peace and tranquillity, was not deficient in its ethics but in its abstraction from realities, the conditions and agencies of its existence and operation. 

Most universal ideals become abstracted from their original conditions, taking the ideas and feelings inspiring the original movement, analysing and intellectualising them in order to institute a policy of law and order. Natural processes come to be simplified and distorted. The ideals of the universal church were excellent but, systematised by the schoolmen and implemented by the Church as an institution of absolutist papal monarchy, they became a tyrannical invasion of the freedom of individuals. The ideal was not wrong but was misplaced, bringing it into conflict with the real needs of the people. The organic growth of Europe proceeded to develop in terms of national states, the universal ideal being nationalised and restricted within the confines of the nation state; in the confines of secular kingdoms, the people turned to their kings for universal justice and peace.
It was a short step from the question of the relations between church and state over whether the spiritual or the secular sphere of power should dominate to the more profound question of the nature of power and the sources of its authority. The controversy between church and state thus contained another set of problems which would have both direct and radical implications for the conception of freedom. ‘One of the most important results of the dispute was to encourage the growth of doctrines justifying resistance by subjects to unjust rulers’ (Tierney 1964, 86. See also Robinson 1978, esp. 114-135.). The focus upon this issue opened a trail of thought from which emerged the modern conception of freedom. 

An ideal retains its power to inspire effort if it sets clearly achievable goals which offer the likelihood of success in their attainment. Interest fades when the end either seems to have been attained or simply to be unattainable. By the early fourteenth century, in the wake of the great work of synthesis accomplished by Aquinas, it seemed that all that needed to be done in support of the old institutions had been done, so that all that that was left was the defence of established positions, or that the elements of the synthesis were still so alive and full of potential that it was possible to project a wide range of possibilities. In contrast to the stability of the previous two centuries, the early fourteenth century was a hotbed of intellectual and institutional innovation and experimentation.


The contrasting positions of the theocratic-descending themes and the populist-ascending themes has sought to clarify complex developments by means of neatly defined concepts. These categories do not always work. The conciliarists asserted the populist-ascending thesis of government but made no space for the people. But if conciliarism was a populist-ascending thesis of power which lacked the people, there were alternative conceptions from within the religious field which were more in tune with the views and needs of the poor and downtrodden. For R.I. Moore ‘heresy and the disposition towards it are an integral part of the European inheritance, not an optimal extra’ (Moore 1977: 7). Heresy formed the main form of ‘social opposition’ in the Middle Ages (Herlihy, 1971 10. See also his "Alienation in Medieval Culture and Society," in Frank Johnson, ed., Alienation: Concept, Term and Meaning (New York: Seminar Press, 1971), 125-40. On this see also Duby 1980). The heretics showed how a belief in God was compatible with social and political radicalism that incited the people to activity (Moore 1977). 

‘Heresy’ covered a wide variety of views, but what is apparent is the extent to which the heretics wanted less the reform of the existing church or even a new church and a new theology than a return to the apostolic purity of the early church. The heretics of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, for instance, were inspired by the official call for reform which was made by the church itself; the heretics proceeded to demand that the church live up to the high ideals expressed in its early formation. In that sense, heresy was nostalgic, looking back to a lost church rather than forward to the new.

That said, the actions and views of some of the heretics were portentous in expressing a commitment to values of personal freedom and equality. This is particularly the case in the late Middle Ages. The fact that the more prominent and successful heretics were either implicitly or explicitly Pelagian is significant. Like the Cathars would follow a century later, Henry of Lausanne rejected infant baptism for the same reasons as did Pelagius. The twelfth century heresiarch Arnold of Brescia ‘was to unite in his person the two greatest revolutionary forces of his age, religious dissent and the spirit of the commune’ (Moore 1977: 136.).

Religious and secular thought were closely connected during the Middle Ages, with some heretics holding radical social and political views. This may have only been a minority, but it was a significant minority which came to exercise an influence out of proportion to its immediate impact (Moore 1977: 268, criticizes earlier scholars for too readily assuming such an association). The case of the Oxford religious radical Wyclif in the fourteenth century is instructive. Wyclif subverted the privileged position of the ecclesiastical authorities by translating the Bible into English and distributing it directly to believers, thus undercutting the need for priestly intermediaries. Subscribing to a doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, he ‘became a near anarchist’ in religious matters. And yet Wyclif was so ‘profoundly conservative’ in secular politics that he condemned the peasants’ revolt in the most violent terms (Lambert 1977), 178:229).

Entirely different in Meister Eckhart. The orderly hierarchical society of the century before Eckhart had made possible the presentation of arguments by orderly and systematic thought. But times were changing which the old modes found difficult to control. The rise of the towns was generating a new way of life and a new way of thinking all over Europe, especially in northern Italy, western Germany, and the Netherlands. The towns had struggled to emerge and establish their free identity and in many respects were experienced as an unruly intrusion into the old orderly hierarchical society. Town life encourages different, more assertive, restive and articulate modes of thought and action. Many of the best thinkers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries revealed their social conservatism in expressing their dislike of the rebellious nature of the town character. But the towns continued to grow, and their inhabitants continued to give expression to new attitudes of mind, demands and so on.

This was the historical background to Meister Eckhart, pointing up the way in which his sermons mark a new beginning. Eckhart was the voice of the people from the northern towns. Eckhart was no lawyer or academic and did not address the learned. Eckhart addressed the people directly from his pulpit. Here he delivered his sermons in vernacular language, not in Latin. He made no pretence of addressing the learned but sought the ordinary men and women. Eckhart founded no religious order, drew up no rule, and left no institutions behind him to propagate his doctrine. His name was never spoken in the highest circles of society and soon disappeared from the pages of history. But if in this sense Eckhart was nowhere, he was in fact everywhere: what he had said and the way he said them spread so far and penetrated so deep as to become part of the general stock of religious ideas in the heterogeneous populations of the great towns throughout northern Europe.

The dominant theme of Eckhart’s sermons is the immediate presence of God in the individual soul. Eckhart was concerned with the questions of how to prepare the soul for this presence of God, how to recognise it, how to express it. Whilst an orthodox interpretation of Eckhart’s words is perfectly possible, his way of presenting them implicitly challenged established ecclesiastical society. 

“I have often said that there is a power in the soul which neither time nor the world can touch”. (Sermon no 2).
“Base your whole life on this inner foundation; seek no other ground of action, neither heaven, nor God, nor your eternal salvation”
“He who seeks God in some external routine will find the routine and lose God.
But he who seeks Him without external routine will obtain him as He is” (Sermon no 5b).

“The just man is so devoted to justice that if God were not just he would not care a bean for God or for the pains of hell or the joys of heaven”.
“People who do good deeds to the glory of God such as fasting, watching, praying and the like – and yet do these things so that the Lord will give them something they want in exchange – these people are the money-changers whom Jesus cast out of the temple”
“In the same way the just soul is equal with God, neither above nor below” (Sermon no 6) (R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart: a modern translation (Harper Torchbooks, 1957).

Not surprisingly, Eckhart’s doctrines were condemned by Pope John XXII in 1329. 

Ideas and values like “The spark in the soul”, “the fortress of the soul”, “God in the soul”, “the equality of man with God” were received by the men and women of the bustling, crowded new towns and cities as a liberation. It told them that the kingdom of god is within rather than without and struck them as all the more real given their distance in their practical lives from the orderly institutional society of the Church. The impact of Eckhart’s words can be understood when these values which addresses the kingdom of god within the person’s soul are considered alongside the towering impersonal edifice of the thirteenth century Church, and the way that this church would impose its institutional power on the lives of the people, ignoring and stifling the inarticulate desire for greater liberty from the people. Intellectually and institutionally, the thirteenth century Church is a towering achieving, giving the world a moral code and an order; however, as a disciplinary system applicable to a hierarchical society, the poor and the underprivileged must have experienced it as an infringement of liberty. And these were the groups that Eckhart addressed in their own language, in their own terms. Eckhart’s words dissolved the intricate and carefully articulated institutional fabric of the Catholic church: he depreciated external practices, rules, disciplines and vows, and he insisted that the soul’s joys could be fulfilled in the world and in the market-place as much as in church or in the cloister. (Southern 1970: 25).


38 CITIZENSHIP IN THE RENAISSANCE
The rediscovery of Aristotelian perspectives was a powerful stimulus to new thinking on public life and citizenship. Medieval Aristotelianism revalued the human body in all its worldly involvements, indeed revalued the entire natural order. From the fifteenth century on, a number of humanist writers inspired not only by Aristotle but also by Cicero, Polybius, and Plato, brought new perspectives to bear upon politics. This was important after centuries during which Christianity had downgraded such notions. Aristotelianism emphasised the value of activity in the service of the secular political world as an end in itself and identified the community as the ideal sphere of human activity. Aristotle had plenty to offer. But the new world had to supply its ideals from within its own practices. Aristotle had written more than a millennia earlier for the Athenian polis. Much of what he wrote did not have precise medieval equivalents. The new world had to supply its own standpoint, vocabulary, its own clearly articulated programme that spoke directly to the educated, active citizen trouble. The values and terms of medieval Aristotelianism were too deeply implanted in the world of the traditional university, too closely adapted to fit the controversies between the great religious orders, especially the Franciscans and Dominicans. The world required a new statement about human nature and the possibility of its realisation which was less identified with the old concerns of law, theology, and philosophy. Marsiglio with his determination to stick to Aristotelian naturalism, regardless of the extent to which this may come to contradict the Christian worldview, got quite far, but in many respects his determination to stay close to Aristotle curtailed his novelty; Bruni and later humanists got further. (Riesenberg 1992:168).

Long before the civic humanist movement which flourished in Florence in the early fifteenth century, Christian moralists and jurists were attempting to justify a new kind of Christian life in terms which corresponded to the new urban realities. The civil lawyers were more predisposed toward the city than the theologians. Their views savoured a great deal of the Latin Aristotelians and anticipated the civic humanists in many respects. As against those Christians who regarded the city with a degree of suspicion, they accepted the city as a social ambience, affirming the possibility that the Christian could do good in the city. Lucas da Penna thus denies that isolated monasteries are the only places where man can be good. He points to the example of Lot, who was upright in the city but a sinner on the lonely mountain. Solitude may be preferable to life among the wicked, but not to life among decent folk. Against the weight of traditional Christian opinion, Lucas argues that the good Christian life may be led in town. Moses may have ascended the mountain to experience the glory of God, but he could only provide for the needs of the people by coming down and living amongst them (Lucas, Commentaria (1583), Proem, and to C. 10.31.26). 

All forms of civic activism in the new urban communities was now so prevalent and so rewarding, spiritually as well as financially, that the old Christian hostility towards town life had to be modified and the new experience legitimised. The activities of the mendicant preachers, who roamed far and wide to remind individuals of the meaninglessness and futility of this life, were less and less persuasive when in towns and cities money was being made, fine buildings were being erected and city rulers were giving practical visible demonstrations of the reality of earthly power. The evidence of earthly accomplishments was too great and too spectacular to be dismissed as of no consequence. Much more plausible was to take the line of that followed Aristotle and Aquinas to regard the social accomplishments of human beings as natural and, therefore, good. 

The jurists were clear about having to accommodate to the complicated urban society emerging and spreading all about them. In their examination of contemporary political life they sought to justify the new, activist way of life as compatible with traditional Christian authority. According the ‘public welfare’ its full social significance, made it possible to view those who spent their time on earth tending as good.
The purpose of this work was to establish the legitimacy of the city as an institution with a role to play in Christian society. Once this legitimacy had been established, the question arose as to the leadership and authority appropriate to the performance of its functions. Issues of efficiency joined those of morality in an expanding literature on civic management as various men of worldly experience, judges, notaries, and others expounded upon the conditions for the success of municipal government. The cities obtained legitimate authority from the lawyers. Of crucial importance here was the Peace of Constance of 1189, giving de facto independence to imperial towns in central and northern Italy. In the end, each city obtained its own sovereign authority so that its rulers exercised the powers of the emperor within its own borders. Baldus’ assertion that a town may make and unmake citizens emphasises the way that the city, in its legal omnipotence, in endowing individuals with every civil capacity they possessed, created its own citizens. 

And the power of municipal legislation to create and destroy entire legal personalities was also a power to control them. This control over citizens was set within a framework of authority and powers constructed by lawyers and which permitted municipal governments to tax, erect public buildings, and undertake a variety of actions to promote and secure the public welfare. There is an abundance of legal literature in the fourteenth century containing attempts to define, clarify and make relevant to contemporary government late-classical theory and the terminology of taxation. (A succinct statement of issues may be found in the comment of Jacobus Rebuffi, Lectura, to C. 10.62.1; also Bartolus, Opera (1602), to D. 3.4.1.) (Riesenberg 1992:172).

The old medieval model of static parts fixed in place was giving way to a new, dynamic view predicated upon the civic activities of individuals within communities as citizens (Albericus de Rosate, in his De statutis, q. 119, pars. 1, discusses whether a town may break its promise to a citizen poor when granted a tax exemption, but now rich. The jurist says that the pact must stand since die town must observe its obligations to its citizens).

Without exception, the jurists demanded a general commitment from newcomers to the city as precondition of acceptance into the community. And from the citizen by birth, jurists demanded loyalty in terms of military service and payment of taxes. Whilst the emphasis was upon this display of loyalty an act of personal will, it was assumed that the individual would demonstrate the expected commitment. Nevertheless, the possibility for refusal was allowed. This emphasis on the citizen’s will tapped into the Christian emphasis on the individual’s free will, power of choice but turned it to civic ends. The individual gains in stature as this power of free will granted by the state joins with the power of rationality accorded by the medieval Aristotelians. The human being as an individual, rather than as the member of a corporation, who exercises choice, decides how to vote, serves and who steps forward to act in the performance of some public duty. (Riesenberg 1992:173).

The individual emerges with an identity and a consciousness that is independent of his corporation, stepping forward as an individual to accept and exercise rights as a unique human being. This is not to deny that citizens continued to bear, well into the eighteenth century, many obligations performed with his collegiate fellows, in a guild, for example. Still less is it to deny the legitimacy of such corporatism when confronted with the individualist liberal value of autonomy. It is simply to underline the fact that the citizen now acted as an individual in choosing to pay taxes, undertake public duties, obey the call to arms. The new citizen engaged in public activity in a very personal way. This growth of personal identity was characterised by the expansion of individual freedom through personal participation in, and responsibility to, a plethora of social and political groups. This development was accompanied by the emergence of Europe as a corporate society, a development that only reached its apex in the early modern period. 

Citizenship was discussed by the greatest authors, including Dante, Petrarch, Baldus and Aquinas, Marsiglio and Bartolus, Salutati. From the smallest rural commune to the greatest city-states of Venice and Florence, citizenship was legislated upon. The question was so important since the concept of citizenship raised issues that impacted upon every great concern of government and society. This was so because of the changes taking place in the material life of the cities and city-states required the existence of a system that accepted and facilitated movement of peoples according to emerging economic necessities: of peasants from country into town, of merchants and artisans between cities and even continents, from Europe to Asia, of professors, legists, and other learned specialists between different employments in different places. All of this activity was required by the new commercial economy and could only proceed if the human right to move and the willingness of a community to receive a new person was recognised at the level of city life. (Riesenberg 1992:175).
The city offered plenty of benefits to those citizens or naturalizing immigrants expressing a willing conformity to its law, cult and culture. Within a quasi-feudal pattern of responsibilities, the city guarded life and property and kept the faith. Guardianship of life and property involved, for example, application of the law of reprisals, negotiation and ransom in case of commercial difficulty or capture. Keeping the faith involved a recognition of the individual citizen’s rights in property and at law. The city therefore secured the material interests of the citizen, permitting involvement in the trading ventures of the community through treatises arranged with neighbouring cities and protected by native merchants. (Riesenberg 1992:174).

There is no room for idealism here. Most individuals interested in citizenship not for the anthropological benefits that were associated with the exercise of political rights but for the very material benefits that could accrue from charters or privileges granted by some ruler or negotiated with some town, or even higher, from the government of their city, republican or, in some form, princely. The truth is that individuals in the cities saw citizenship as a device which could offer them privileges with which to overcome the difficulties they faced. Many were hard pressed by competition from foreigners in markets or by litigation brought by foreign creditors in their own courts. Many sought exclusive access to government or to guild positions or to the work that government bureaus created. The ethics of citizenship and access to political rights was discussed, but the main concern was material rather than political, individual rather than collective (Riesenberg 1992:175-76).Individuals were concerned to achieve citizenship for the specific benefits associated with it and which may strengthen their legal or business position. 

Citizenship is so commonly associated with the idea of active participation in government by individuals that there is a tendency to assume that it implies a democratic polity. The activity of participation is democratic as far as the particular citizen is concerned, but as a device citizenship is quite compatible with different forms of government. Citizenship is just as compatible with tyranny as it is with democracy, as the example of Florence shows. What makes Machiavelli such a stimulating thinker is his central concern with citizenship seems forever poised between the prince and the people. What matters is function. The designation of citizenship as the active participation of all members of society in the democratic self-government of the political community, realising human nature and human rationality through extensive spaces of citizen interaction and discourse, is an ideal that has never existed and has still to be achieved. Specific elements of this characterisation can be found in different places at different times, little bits of the ideal within the real. But throughout history, citizenship has been used as a mechanism of control through discrimination and reward, and, as such, has been compatible with all forms of government from tyranny to democracy.

Citizenship was crucial to gaining both office and results, giving access to the benefits of politics, all of which were denied to the outsider, one who, reciprocally, offered nothing spiritual or material to his political society. Every town was governed by a statute book which made the details of reciprocation clear. The duties of the citizen were specified, along with procedures for assimilation. The prologues indicate why new men were sought and the grounds on which they were granted privilege (Riesenberg 1992:177).

As cities fought for markets and territory, they constantly required new men as merchants, or weavers, and both the expansionist city-state and the defensive minor commune needed soldiers. And with plague and famine frequently striking, new men were required as husbands. Florentine records indicate the town’s willingness to grant early citizenship to the wealthy who would buy shares in the public debt to, thereby advancing the military cause of the commune. This simply indicates the extent to which Italian municipal policy expressed the same imperatives that engendered ‘public welfare’ and ‘need of state’ legislation at the same time in England and France. That the performance of public duties prevailed over quality of birth as a criterion for full citizenship exhibits a harsh realism born of the hard life and choices of the time.

‘In sum, the situation is quite complex: idealistic patriotism and matter-of-fact realism coexist, and in many cases we may assume that material motives prevailed. And what facilitated movement was the existence of adequate institutions of acculturation whose mechanisms were not too complex. Indeed, any immigrant to Bologna from Florence or Padua had already passed through the school of religious festivals, civic assemblies, and folk history that passed for medieval civics… Late medieval Italy was not an open society of easy physical and social mobility, yet movement from class to class, city to city, was both possible and not unusual. The colonisation of the city is one of the great facts of Italian, if not Mediterranean, history’ (Riesenberg 1992:178).
‘In fine, as a concept, practice and institution, citizenship entered into the Italian consciousness at this time to a significant extent. But if classical notions of citizenship had a powerful influence in shaping the relationship between city and citizen, the fundamental values of feudal society also made a strong contribution. The cities developed within a feudal milieu in which demands and rewards for service were not new were some hundreds of years old. Feudal practices received their earliest formal codification in the cities of Italy and the Mediterranean, recognising a feudal experience of long standing. In other words, this demand for citizen service in the city states of Italy represents the application of a traditional theory in a new social environment. In the past, service was something that the vassal owed to his lord in return for fief and protection, or to the pope and Christ or crusade in return for spiritual (and legal) benefit carefully pronounced. In the developing social context, service was to the city and to one’s self as a member of the commune, its army, government, trading population. Reciprocity in this context involves much more than physical protection. In return for service and in addition to physical protection, there is the legal privilege and the higher culture which have moral and anthropological benefits for the citizen, shaping a finer character and personality beyond expectations of immediate, tangible gain. It fosters an other regarding sense, an ability to locate oneself in a greater whole of broader purpose.

Sophisticated and intricate secular and ecclesiastical institutions emerged which served to foster local patriotism and commitment to public service. However, so common was transfer of allegiance that a legal procedure was required to facilitate that purpose. Whilst formal statements of civic values and duties can be found in historical and legal documents, even in poetry and literature, there was a clear reluctance on the part of citizens to pay taxes and serve the state as the theory said they ought. Whilst the security of the city was a common concern on the part of all citizens, many still had to be forced into the ranks and would happily shift responsibility for security to foreigners. 

In fine, whilst each urban creation evinced a great deal of individuality, taken together these units formed part of a system, each basically alike in the fundamentals of their laws and society.

This was not the old idealistic citizenship reborn but its reworking to fit a new age of republican government. The new citizenship was a two edged sword. For the new financial opportunities from which citizens sought to benefit was accompanied by the growth of princely power. As citizens felt their power or possibility of power to be increasing, the prince was extending his power over individuals, turning the new citizens into subjects. The main drivers in this development are political and military. In city states like Verona, Bologna, Florence, and Milan and others, some dynast or other, helped by family, friends, and dependents, succeeded in establishing his authority to the detriment of republican institutions. Whilst less visible, the administrative and legal side of this transition is decisive in driving and consolidating the transition. The prince’s actions proceeded and city and country were integrated through the specific acts and judgements of lawyers and bureaucrats.

Thus, the conception of a public citizenship, which depended upon birth or definite act of will of the individual citizen, was undermined by mutually reinforcing developments. The pursuit of material, legal and political benefit on the part of individuals involved citizens in a greater reliance upon the prince. At the same time, the prince was establishing the principle that he, by his act of will alone, could make or break the relationship between the citizen and the community. The relation of citizen to community, therefore, was not the product of citizen action and discourse but of the will of the prince. Not collective control but the individual will of the prince could create or destroy this relation between citizen and community. As individuals identified citizenship with individual benefits, the principle of princely power was being extended over wider and wider territories. Far from the new citizenship creating republican institutions, these developments were building the legal omnicompetence of the modern state which centralised power. The conception of sovereignty that one sees in Jean Bodin in the sixteenth century has therefore to be located in a long developing process of princely aggrandisement, created, confirmed and sustained by jurists and bureaucrats all over Europe. When Bodin in the sixteenth century and later Hobbes and others in the seventeenth century sought to justify absolute state power, royal or otherwise, the literature they needed was readily available.

Citizenship in the Renaissance period and its aftermath becomes much more difficult to identify and delineate than in the previous period when cities and city-states existed which bore some correlation with the ancient Mediterranean world in which citizenship first emerged and flourished. This world was in the process of disappearing. What little self-government continued in support of a civic ethic was conducted by a small section of the population, invariably male and propertied, and existed within an overwhelmingly princely and hierarchical political culture. The populist-ascending thesis had been advancing for centuries but never came close to fully realising its democratic logic at the level of state and politics. Centuries after the theocratic-descending thesis that located power above in God had been intellectually discredited, political authority was still conceived as flowing downwards from the state and the church was still buttressed by religious values. It is evident that where the populist-ascending thesis had made advances, the closer it came to real power, the more its terms were renegotiated to fit descending conceptions. One tell-tale sign of this is the tendency for the categories of citizen and subject to be conflated the more advance is made towards popular forms of government. Hence the existence of republican governments which were barely distinguishable from monarchies. Increasing scale in government and politics led to a weakening of definitions and categories so that their precise meanings could be blurred and confused.

In fact, if not in theory, citizens became subjects, any scope for independent political activity and participation being squeezed out under the weight of the bureaucracies of the national monarchies within the centralizing state. Citizenship as a concept survived not in real politics but in the work of lawyers and historians, who clarified and expanded its meaning, preparing the intellectual ground for its reincorporation into political practice. This would come in the age of democratic revolutions, by which time the political terrain had undergone a complete change. The most significant development here was the emergence of the large nation state. The concept of citizenship was now discussed not in relation to its appropriate terrain of the city or city-state but in relation to a form of government to which it seems singularly ill-suited – the large centralised nation state. Whether monarchical or republican, such a form is more bureaucratic than democratic in being quite remote from the people it purports to represent. The people may be called citizens, but they cannot act as citizens. And the government treats them as subjects. 

Civic Humanism
The ‘civic humanism’ of early fifteenth century Italy stands between the old city-states of the past and the nation states of the future. The ideas developed here kept alive the link between republicanism and citizenship which, although not of immediate influence, would become influential when the problems of scale and quantity confronting political identity were finally addressed. Civic humanism emerged at a time when the emergence of the nation state and the rule of the prince was altering the conception of citizenship. Civic humanism was, according to Hans Baron, a moral theory which fused ancient ethical philosophy and historical examples which the Florentine ruling classes developed around the beginning of the fifteenth century. Feeling that the representative principles and institutions and the model of the citizen-soldier committed to the country of their republican regime under threat, Florentine businessmen, notaries, lawyers, and other intellectuals set about recasting their history in such a way as to highlight their links to the classical tradition of the Roman Republic. Out of a range of historical examples they created a civic model celebrating heroic resistance, personal valour, and martial virtue. Cicero was the model of the active citizen, a peerless moral writer who died defending his republican principles. The age of the monk was over as civic publicists such as Gregorio Dati (1362-1435), Leonardo Bruni (1361-1444), and others promoted civic liberty and civic activism.

This theorisation of civic humanism followed long experience of the active life and its formal defense by lawyers. Civic humanism celebrated ‘the civic ethics of the vita activa-politica, the new realistic study of history and politics, and the vindication of the Volgare’, which marks the entry of the vernacular in serious discourse. (189/90).

Civic humanism was an attempt to come to terms with the emergence of a complex social, political, and commercial urban life in which both political activity and money making brought honour and power to people in a way that the old Christian ethic struggled to rationalise.

The medieval way of life was built upon the committed participation of many classes and professions of society, working with one’s fellows in the community. In an insecure urban world, civic love and friendship functioned in a similar vein to feudal military comradeship and monastic friendship. The point is that the active medieval life was lived in the open, in the marketplace, which could also function as the public assembly. 

Government and politics were crucial to effectiveness in the real world, impacting on every aspect making for a successful life. The political culture of the medieval city was one of subject-participant, a culture in which citizens had a sense of and identified with the health and function of the whole and acted upon this. Citizens made demands upon the community in order to ensure their well-being and joined with others in the attainment of common goals. As in ancient civilisation, a substantial part of the population was involved in the political culture. Such is the context for the emergence of the new civic humanist ideas.

39 MARTIN LUTHER 
In tracing the evolution of the modern nation state, the modern liberty of conscience, modern toleration, many turn to the Protestant Reformation. Superficially, it seems certain that there is some connection between Protestantism in the sixteenth century and the rise of liberalism and capitalism, the work ethic and the modern state. Well, maybe in historical experience. Those who seriously examine the work and words of Martin Luther will find little of the modern state and the capital economy. Rather, Luther’s purpose is to recover a lost Christian past. Luther looks not forwards but backwards, to Augustine. Some who seek a political theory in Luther are bound to be disappointed. Concerned with a true Christianity, Luther’s view of politics is of a piece with Augustine’s condemnation and repudiation of the ‘city of man’. But Luther is still politically interesting, as much as for his effects and unintended consequences.
It would seem certain that Luther must have upheld the liberty of conscience, given his affirmation of the priesthood of all believers, his insistence that every Christian is able to interpret God’s Word for himself, and that faith alone is sufficient for salvation. Apparently liberal, even radical, stated against the perceived authoritarianism of the Catholic Church, Luther himself lived to realise that ‘God’s word’ is not so easily understood, with implications which Luther himself recoiled in horror. 

Luther certainly took his stand on liberty of conscience, defying authority in order to do right by his conscience. In October 1518, at the start of his challenge to Rome, Luther wrote to Cardinal Cajetan: “I know that neither the command nor the advice nor the influence of anyone ought to make me do anything against conscience or can do so. For the arguments of Aquinas and others are not convincing to me, although I have read them over .. and have thoroughly understood them… The only thing left is to overcome me with better reasons’. In the tract on The Liberty of a Christian Man, published in November 1520, Luther asserted that faith alone suffices: “One thing only is needed in a good life and Christian liberty, the gospel of Christ … the Word is not to be grasped but by faith only’. Luther is explicitly repudiating force and compulsion, thereby challenging the authority and institutional power of the church. In a sermon at Wittenberg in March 1522 he declared: “Compel or force anyone with power I will not, for faith must be gentle and unforced. Take example by me. I opposed indulgences and all the papists, but not with force: I only wrote, preached, used God’s Word, and nothing else.”

The question is often put whether faith is spread by reason or force. The question is ill put. Faith is faith and requires neither. The view has radical implications with respect to the institutional framework of the church. It is easily understandable how, on these premises, Protestantism immediately fragmented into a myriad of sects, each interpreting ‘God’s word’ differently, each imposing its own interpretation as a new orthodoxy. Luther made these statements within five years of his first defiance of Rome, that is, before the poor peasants and Anabaptists interpreted ‘God’s word’ their own way, by clear light of conscience. At this point, Luther suddenly appreciated dangers of the ‘Christian liberty’ he proclaimed.

In Luther’s view, all Christians are priests, which means that every Christian is able to understand the gospel. This seems clear enough until the finer distinctions are made. Not every person who reads the gospel and understands or claims to understand it counts as a Christian. An atheist, a pagan, anyone can do read and understand God’s word. Luther insists that the Christian must have faith and must follow the gospel, if understanding is genuine. To argue for the priesthood of all believers should not therefore be taken to mean that anyone who rejects the gospel has the right to do so.

J.W. Allen writes that ‘Luther has been spoken of as a great political thinker: I cannot myself find that he was in any strict sense a political thinker at all’ (Allen 1960). This is surely correct, and not something to which Luther himself would have objected. Luther is a religious thinker. Inspired by Augustine, his concern is with the spiritual rather than the secular, the city of God rather than the city of man. The world of politics is of merely secondary and transitory significance. Luther’s views concerning the relation between Church and State pertain to an old subject of political theory but barely count as political theory at all. They are observations, remarks, assume too much, argue too little and leave much of substance out. Yet this does not make Luther a crude worshipper of princely power, a precursor of what the Anglo-American world sees as the German liberty as freedom to obey the state (as Russell tendentiously summarises Hegel). If anything, Luther is a political naïf. In asserting the liberty of his own conscience (and others’), Luther made powerful enemies. If he came to depend on the German princes, it was because he lacked any other kind of politics to depend on, not because he worshipped power. Luther, in fine, discovered that whilst the city of man is secondary and ephemeral compared to the city of God, it still mattered. It mattered in this world, the physical world. Politics mattered, laws mattered, the civil peace mattered. And Luther came to find this out the hard way. Augustine spent some thirteen years to finish his masterpiece, The City of God. In this work Augustine emphasises the futility of city building. Only the City of God in the eternal sphere beyond the earthly city give purpose and meaning. In the city of man, the righteous should act like a 'pilgrim' in a fallen world. The problem is that Augustine wrote these words in response to the fall of Rome. Luther’s denigration of politics seemed to invite a similar cataclysm in the Europe of the sixteenth century. Certainly, Augustine valued peace and security. His point was that no city or civilization is substantial or enduring. The righteous were just 'passing through' on the way to the greater glory in the City of God. Except that Rome continued to matter, even to Augustine. Augustine didn’t just write letters, sermons and treatises to defeat the Donatists and other Christian rivals but relied on imperial legislation to shut down churches, ban priests and fine congregations. Augustine and his fellow African bishops worked hard politically, in the city of man, to ensure victory over the Donatists and others. This involved lobbying imperial officials and also, it was alleged, greasing a few palms. So the city of man mattered and continued to matter. It perhaps counts for something that when Augustine imagined heaven, he envisaged it as an earthly city.

Luther soon had every reason to value peace and security within the city of man. Faith must be gentle and unforced, Luther argued. He seemed to presume that each interpreting God’s word by the light of individual conscience would create a universal priesthood. Instead, it unleashed a cacophony of voices, dissension and disagreement, rancour and conflict breaking out. The more individuals interpreted God’s word as they saw fit, the less peace and security there was in the city of man. Luther had to seek the protection of princes. He had nowhere else to run. He was horrified when others followed his example in ways he did not approve. Increasing numbers were prepared to carry the principles of conscience much further than he had done. They acted as though the temporal world, the world of man and man’s laws and institutions could be governed by conscience alone. The problem was that God’s word meant different things to different people. In the city of man the word of God proved inscrutable. Some of the implications were plainly alarming. If God’s Word is contained entire in the Scriptures, which every faithful Christian can read, understand and interpret for himself or herself, then there is no need for organised Church at all. Indeed, what is the Biblical basis for an organised church? There is no basis in Scriptures for the Marian cult. The church, a force for civilisation throughout the centuries, was at the point of imploding. There seemed to be no basis whatsoever for any discipline in matters of faith. All orthodoxy seemed to be merely historical, accidental, a matter of organisation and power. Whilst the Church is conceived as the community of the faithful, it has no authority since only God is able to know who the truly faithful are. This meant that the only true Church is the invisible Church; the visible Church is merely a human organisation. Even the less extreme questions and criticisms threatened the social order and civic peace. These also denied the need for a Church, as Luther understood it. The controversy over the sacraments seemed endless. Two sacraments which Luther was concerned to hold on to, Baptism and the Eucharist, became the source of particularly bitter conflict. And the city of man nearly went up in flames when phrases concerning raising the humble and vexing the mighty were translated into social and political terms. Surely, the gospel advocated communism? Basic institutions such as private property and marriage were rejected. Many declared the illegitimacy of any kind of authority of man over man, spiritual and temporal. These people, who formed not one sect but many, were called Anabaptists, because many of them believed in adult baptism. The term ‘antinomian’ derives from the Latin ‘anti’ and the Greek nomos or law. Under the gospel dispensation of grace the moral law is of no use or obligation since faith alone is sufficient for salvation. The antinomians were therefore affirming nothing less than what Luther had preached. And Luther recoiled in horror. 

Luther now came to appreciate the danger of allowing anyone to preach whatever doctrines he pleased. Had this not been the understanding of the Catholic reformers. No one had criticised Rome more than Erasmus, yet Erasmus had wisely anticipated the dangers of too precipitous a reformation. Luther’s defiance of Rome had inspired many with whom Luther profoundly disagreed. Certainly, the Anabaptists now used Luther’s own arguments and principles to draw what seemed to them to be obvious conclusions, but which to Luther were abominable. In the temporal world, Luther was a conservative. The people he inspired were not. And they were not inclined to make the fine distinctions about gentle and uncoerced faith. And they were not inclined to just pass through the city of man. In the city of man, it is man’s laws and man’s institutions that rule, not God’s word. In Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons, Thomas More challenges the Protestant Roper, who accuses him of giving the devil the protection of law. More says that he would. The country is planted top to bottom with man’s law, not God’s. In taking down every law to get to the devil, where could one run when the devil turns? Which law could one cite in one’s defence? The devil is given the protection of law for one’s own protection. 

In denigrating and devaluing human rule, the Lutheran Reformation unleashed a maelstrom in which it was increasingly difficult to stand. The civil peace and security were threatened as each sought to interpret God’s word according to conscience. Luther fell back on the princes not because he worshipped power, but because he finally came to appreciate that, without peace and security, the ensuing violence, confusion and disorder distract men from God. It seemed not to matter to Luther what kind of law and order there is in this world, only that there is enough of both to ensure the peace and security that enables men to turn their thoughts to God. One can clear Luther of the charges of his detractors. Luther is a man of deep religious faith. The case against him is not that he was a worshipper of power. Luther worshipped God, that much is clear. The case against Luther is that he allowed his worship to encroach into human affairs, setting impossibly high ideals for a fallen world, upsetting the fragile and delicate skin that is civilisation. Luther vented his anger against the disturbers of the peace and encouraged the princes to slay with impunity. But the biggest disturber of the peace of all had been Luther. Luther lacked patience but most of all he lacked judgement, and such people are a menace in politics. 

 Luther did not see the Anabaptists as his children, however much they cited his authority. And in Luther’s defence, he was largely correct in this. The Anabaptists were worldly in a way that Luther was not. For Luther, questions of the material world, of politics and power, riches and poverty, were ephemeral and secondary. But to the poor, the marginal, the disgruntled these were central issues. The world was not simply ungodly, it was unjust. Luther was not concerned with the distribution of worldly power and wealth and in this he is surely on sound Christian grounds. It profits a man nothing to give his soul for the whole world. In the wilderness, the devil tempted Jesus with the world and Jesus refused it. But the world still mattered. Luther came to appreciate the value of worldly discipline for the sake of spiritual freedom, and could not understand how the radical transformation of the social and political order could strengthen this worldly order. This had been the understanding of those advocating caution in reform all along. Luther lacked a political sense. He had nothing to say concerning the organisation of human affairs, how the relations of Church and State should be organised to ensure the peace and security conducive to faith. He expressed a burning desire for Christian liberty through faith but, lacking a sense of how this freedom could be embodied in the temporal world, unleashed a maelstrom and justified the most violent and murderous exercise of princely power over the ‘hordes’ of peasants. The Anabaptists scared Luther. He attempted negotiation and mediation but the appeal to reason failed, as it tends to do when passions are inflamed. And so, the unworldly, unpolitical Luther saw no option but to support the most extreme assertion of the exercise of temporal power. He supported the princes in their brutal crushing of the rebellion. Some 100,000 peasants are thought to have died as a result. For Luther, the Christian has only one right against established Power, the right meekly to suffer unjust punishment, bearing witness to the truth as Christ did not on the cross. It hasn’t gone unnoticed that Christians arguing against politics as a secondary, temporal sphere are highly political in choosing to ally with established power. Either politics matters or it doesn’t. If it doesn’t, it is no business of the Christian to take one side or the other. If it matters, then the basis for support rests with where the balance of Christian principle lies. 

As Allen states, ‘Luther has been spoken of as a great political thinker: I cannot myself find that he was in any strict sense a political thinker at all’. And if he wasn’t a political thinker and never presented himself as such, it would be unfair to criticise his political failings. The political disasters which followed his quarrel with Rome have more to do with the difficulty of relating the city of God and the city of man, of living a life of Christian liberty, of separating the spiritual and the temporal, of actually living a righteous life as though one really is ‘passing through’ on the way to the city of God. To argue for ‘worldly discipline’ as a condition for concentrating on spiritual concerns surely begs the question. To turn obedience to existing power into an absolute, a statement of political quiescence, invites irrelevance. The city of man matters, it certainly matters to its inhabitants, and a religion to whom it ceases to matter itself renders itself irrelevant.

Many find it difficult to separate Luther’s religion from his politics, but this has to be done. For it is not at all clear that Luther has a politics other than quiescence to established power. To many, this means that Luther ended up sacrificing his deepest religious convictions for practical politics, the ‘peace of Babylon’. 

This charge cannot be sustained. Luther did not change his views in light of the social and political revolt he inspired. Luther consistently taught the duty of obedience to constituted authorities, before the Peasants’ Revolt of 1525 as much as after. The change was one of emphasis rather than of kind, Luther placing a much greater stress on the rights of Christian rulers, and much less on Christian liberty. In coming to understand the value of order, Luther was led to make less reference to the priesthood of man. 

Whilst the word of God is all sufficient, Luther came clearly to appreciate the extent to which the social order, and with it every one’s security, would be threatened should people understand this to entail the right forcibly to resist constituted authority. As Luther wrote to the Elector of Saxony, if it should be admitted that men have a right to resist rulers when rulers do wrong, ‘there would remain neither authority nor obedience anywhere in the world’ (Letter of March 6, 1530). There is real, bitter irony in Luther’s condemnation of the peasants’ and his support for their violent quashing. For Luther’s deepest conviction told him that force and violence could never be a real solution to anything. He said precisely this in arguing that faith should be gentle and uncoerced and he repeated the view consistently. Deeply conservative, Luther condemns rebellion not only for being in defiance of God’s express commandment but for being foolish, futile and self-destructive. The great mass of people are not and have never been Christians in any real sense, and the breakdown of order through rebellion merely creates further opportunities for the wicked to flourish.

Luther’s argument seems to be a simple statement of political acquiescence. It is neither simple nor quiescent. Luther did not advocate a doctrine of unmitigated non-resistance. Those who see his position as leading to the establishment of complete absolutism in the State are surely mistaking historical experience for inherent, necessary logic. If, if, Lutheranism led in the direction of absolute power, then this must surely be attributed to gaps in the political doctrine rather than positive theoretical purpose.

Before 1525 and the Peasants’ Revolt, Luther certainly insisted on the wickedness and futility of active, resistance. At the same time, however, he also spoke about the duty of passive resistance.

Whilst Luther insisted that evil must not be forcibly resisted, he nevertheless declared that ‘one must not serve nor follow nor obey it, with one foot or one finger’. If the Prince commands this belief or other, or that Bibles be put away ‘you shall answer that it becometh not Lucifer to sit next to God. Dear Lord (you shall say), I owe you obedience in body and goods; command me in the measure of the earthly authority, and I will obey. But if you would take away my belief and my Scriptures, then will I not obey .. And if, for that, he take away your goods and punish your disobedience, be happy and thank God that you are worthy to suffer for His Word’s sake. Let him rage, the fool! He will find his judge’ (Von Weltlicher Uberkeyt).

It could be argued that this argument is little more than an assertion of a principle of liberty in religion which, it is argued, Luther himself later abandoned. However this would be mistaken. This passage does not claim that there is a right which allows anyone to disobey authority in order to defend any religious belief. Luther is stating more precisely that one must hold and defend the truth at all costs. And from this position Luther never deviated. The question of how far erroneous beliefs should be tolerated or actively resisted is another question entirely. Whilst one can argue that this fine distinction was ultimately untenable, to Luther it was absolute.

However, the point goes much further. In Luther’s view, the principle that we must obey God rather than man accounted for a wide array of cases and occasions. In this conception the Christian conscience is restricted not only to belief and forms of worship but is the ultimate judge of the validity of law, since in it the law of God is apprehended. This is a much wider notion and cannot be categorised as politically quiescent. In Luther’s view, the limitations of rightful authority derive from the nature of law.
That Luther lacked a political theory becomes apparent when one considers that for him, human law and government were only needed since human beings, however they perceived themselves, were not Christians. As he wrote: ‘The greater number of men are and always will be unchristian, whether they be baptised or not’ (Von Weltlicher Uberkeyt). If people were true Christians living a truly Christian life, then there would be no need of temporal power to rule them. It is, Luther claims, the temporal power that needs Christians.

Far from pointing forwards to the modern state and the modern world, Luther’s argument is basically medieval. And this forms the basis of Luther’s thought on government. Luther doesn’t have an original political theory at all. In the execution of his proper function, the magistrate is owed absolute obedience, and active resistance is forbidden in every case. However, Luther argues that refusal to obey is justified in the case of an order which contravenes the law of God, which includes the lex naturalis. And this law of nature has its voice in the human conscience. Here Luther looks forward to modern notions of rights of resistance. 

Luther admitted that law-making power existed in a secondary sense. Law consists in the Scriptures and in the conscience of man. However, the precepts and the principles alike of natural and of scriptural law need to be continuously adjusted to a complex of circumstance. For this reason there arises the need of a lex positiva. Whilst Luther was in agreement with Aquinas here, his recognition was nevertheless grudging. Luther was sceptical of all man-made law, and this applies as much to the Corpus Juris Civilis as to the Canon Law. Luther admits the necessity of law but he was of the view that there was too much of it. For Luther, the mass of man-made law, with its definitions, its subtleties and technicalities, was useless at best. Luther argued that good judges are much better than laws, however good. ‘Love needs no law’ (Babylonish Captivity). All that was need for the right judging of disputes among men was love, reason and a good conscience. If a judge has nothing but the letter of the law to rely on he ‘will further nothing but evil’ (Von Weltlicher Uberkeyt). If a Christian Prince has to depend upon lawyers and law books, it will likely go ill with his people. The prince should pray for an understanding heart. “Without love and natural justice (Naturrecht) you can never be in accord with the will of God, though you have devoured the Jurists and all their works. The more you ponder them, the more will you err. A good judgment must not, and never can come out of books, but can only come from a free mind, as though no books were. Such a free judgment is given by love and natural law, that is full of all reason” (Von Weltlicher Uberkeyt). (Allen 1960:21/2).


Luther, it is evident, didn’t have a political theory and, for his purposes, didn’t require one. Not only did Luther lack a theory of the state, it is only in a very secondary and limited sense that he recognised the institution of the state at all. There is no conception at all of the legitimate power and right of the state or of the sovereign law-making power. In Luther’s view, the state is merely the accidental result of God’s command to obey magistrates. Since the jurisdictions of magistrates were territorial, the territorial State was created according to this command. Whilst the state exists for the sake of peace and order, it is not man’s felt need of order that has created it. Rather, the state is constituted simply by God’s command and this command was given simply because men were wicked. This is not a political theory at all. The duty of the subject is not really owed to the magistrate at all, but to God.

The less man-made law we have the better, as far as Luther is concerned. Human beings know right from wrong and where conscience fails, the Scriptures will guide. “Love needs no law” and, if everyone were true Christians, there would be need for neither law nor Prince. Whatever else this is, it is not a theory of state and politics, it is certainly not a doctrine of power worship and it patently isn’t evidence of some Germanic ‘religion of the State’. Frankly, one cannot help but compare it to Marx’s negative assessment of politics. In Marx’s view, the power of the state is secondary and derivative in relation to civil society. Political power is social power in alien form. Whereas Marx too has been criticised for proposing a ‘state socialism’, his thought goes entirely in the other direction, envisaging the dissolution of state power, political institutions and laws in favour of a self-governing society in which reason rules. Leaving aside the issue of the cogency or otherwise of such a conception, Marx himself has been criticised for lacking a political theory and for envisaging the ‘end of politics’ (Polan, Schwartz). The comparison with Luther is instructive in that Marx has been analysed in terms of a ‘hidden God’ or of marxism as a concealed or disguised religion.

Between 1520 and 1525, Luther consistently spoke in favour of freedom. It could be argued here that Luther was doing more than claim the right of private judgment for himself but was claiming it for all. In Von Weltlicher Uberkeyt in 1523, Luther strongly asserted that religious belief is an entirely personal matter and that it would be unjust and absurd to make it a subject of legal prohibitions and penalties.

In a circular of 1524 addressed to the Saxon princes, Luther made a forthright statement that all, even Anabaptists, should be free to preach without molestation. “All should preach freely and stoutly as they are able and against whom they please.. Let the spirits fall upon one another and fight it out” (Ed Erlanger, 53, p 265).

In 1533 Luther asserted as a general principle that the magistrate has a duty to use his sword for the destruction of false doctrine and false worship. This was Luther’s consistent position for the rest of his life. He seems to have believed that pure religion could only be protected and maintained only by the use of the civil sword against heretics and blasphemers.

But this does not mean that Luther believed that it was for the secular sovereign to decide whether to tolerate heresy or not. Luther seems caught between considering persecution to be an error or a sheer duty. He knew it was either one or the other but could never quite decide. Luther could not accept the view that the question should be decided as a matter of practical politics and expediency. Any question of the public peace for Luther was secondary to the question of Christian worship, a consideration which contradicts any attempt to view Luther as an exponent of the absolutism of the State. There is no logical or philosophical basis for the idea of absolutism in the State in Luther’s writings, only the indirect sense of the law of unintended consequences.

It is clear, then, that Luther’s thought was essentially apolitical. If any ideal of the State exists in Luther, then it was a theocratic ideal rather than a modern one. However, it seems more certain to argue that Luther simply lacked a political theory. In some vague, even innocent, form Luther entertained a vision of a State ruled by the Word of God and by love and reason and natural law. Philosophers like Fichte could give a systematic presentation of some such notion, whilst Kant, Hegel, Marx could imagine some such future when reason would be in control. But as a structured process. The case against Luther is that his political naivety brings about consequences in politics that he himself would have found abhorrent. An anti-political or apolitical stance invites the assertion of politics with a vengeance. Kant criticised Fichte for the ‘lawless use of reason’, meaning that an overly rational approach to life, pushing reason far beyond the limitations codified by law and regulated by government leads not to reason but to its opposite. And this is the connection of Luther with political absolutism. He didn’t intend it and didn’t argue it, but political naivety brings it about.

Luther expresses in inchoate and incoherently form the many divergent tendencies in early Protestantism, all of which were to find theoretical and practical expression in the coming years. Luther was a precursor of Zwingli and Bucer, of Calvin and Knox, of Castellion and the Arminians and, yes, the Anabaptists and the Mennonites, of liberty of conscience theories and right of resistance theories. Calvin’s ideal city state itself represented the theocratic ideal which Luther held in the vaguest terms. Knox embodied that revolt at the godlessness of rulers which Luther expressed, much to Mary Stuart’s chagrin. The Anabaptists acted on Luther’s persistent yearning for a perfectly Christian community of true Christians. Such a community would not require the state and law, as Luther had stated many times. Tolstoy argued precisely the same thing. Far from being the theorist of the absolute state, Luther resembles most of all a Tolstoyan Christian anarchist.
Luther points in two directions at once, both for and against the civil authority. Luther, it is true, justified submission and obedience to worldly authority as a condition of free worship. But his words about true Christianity not requiring the state and law must have led many in a completely opposite direction. And there is plenty in Luther which justified the Anabaptist claim to be merely following where Luther led – the insistence on the duty of resistance in obedience to God, on the natural priesthood of believers, on Christian liberty, and in his consistent belief that a truly Christian community would require neither law nor magistrate. Strictly speaking, to the exact letter of what he said, Luther is correct when he denied responsibility for the violent revolution which claimed his inspiration. Luther is clear that political affairs, the distribution of worldly goods and powers, are secondary to spiritual matters. But the distinction can be very fine indeed. So fine that even Luther seems not to realise how close he was to the Anabaptists. Luther’s words from 1520 expressed the Anabaptist view perfectly: “I believe that there is on earth, wide as the world, but one holy, common Christian Church, which is no other than the community of the saints.. I believe that in this community or Christendom all things are in common and each man’s goods are the other’s and nothing is simply a man’s own” (Works, ed Erlanger, 22, p20).

These points suggest a distinction between Luther and Lutheranism. The only connection that Luther’s teaching has with the systems of government that the Princes’ established in Germany is his name. The State-ridden churches went under the sign of Lutheranism but had little of Luther’s spirit. Luther’s spirit, though, could be found in some very radical places, places that would have horrified Luther himself.

The Anabaptist Protest
The Anabaptist camp was not all of a piece. From the beginning there was a clear split between those Anabaptists who sought to set up the kingdom of the Spirit by means of the sword of the elect and those who preached a complete pacifism. The latter were always a majority and hence more representative of the Anabaptist position. And the pacifist tradition was the one which proved the most enduring. But the active minority had the biggest immediate impact. From 1530 the belief spread along the lower Rhine and in the Netherlands that the day of the Lord was at hand. This movement came to a dramatic and violent end at Munster in 1533, where the physical force party attempted to build the New Jerusalem. Historically, this episode was an aberration. Anabaptism was essentially pacifist and relied upon moral force. The recapture of Munster by the forces of its outraged Bishop in June, 1535, put an end to the delusion that miraculous intervention and the sword could bring about heaven on earth. The violence and the chaos was principally the result of ignorant and uneducated minds coming into direct contact of with the Scriptures and interpreting ‘God’s word’ in a way that made sense in terms of popular experience and understanding. However, the various opinions expressed were not derived simply from their own unaided reading of the Bible. Rather, many of the ideas had a long lineage and could be traced back to various medieval heretical sects. The mixture of politics and religion was explosive in times of inequality and poverty. To read ‘he will raise the humble and vex the mighty’ encouraged those poor in spirit to think that God was on their side. At the level of ideas the connection is clear. Anabaptist objections to oath taking and office holding and to infant baptism and the idea that Christ did not take flesh from His mother, are all of medieval origin.


The doctrine of the inner light effectively permitted free play to every personal view. ‘God’s word’ as revealed to the individual conscience could cover every eccentricity, peculiarity and idiosyncrasy, and would account for the unconventional behaviour and history of the sects that followed the Reformation. Whatever else God’s word was, it wasn’t as universal as the old Catholic church continued to hold.

The most interesting aspect of this question does not concern the Anabaptists who sought to found the New Zion by force. Those arguing for physical force were the exception rather than the norm. Both before and after Munster, Anabaptism was principally and essentially pacifist. It was not so much a positive revolt against the existing order so much as a negative resistance or reaction. It sought escape rather than change.

The strict Anabaptists denied the validity of infant baptism and were ‘rebaptised’ as adults. Infant baptism implied that admission into the Church to become a member of Christ’s Body was possible without faith or knowledge. This in turn implied that membership of the church involved neither faith nor knowledge. The Anabaptists denied that the Church of God could be such a thing. For the Anabaptists, the Church consists of those who have faith and have been ‘reborn’.

The visible Church, for the Anabaptists, was a group of elect, illuminated persons, a community of saints. Adult baptism was the sign of admission to this Church. However, most of all, the Anabaptist Church can be defined as a congregation of faithful people consciously guided and ruled by the inner light. This conception of the inner light rests on the view that God speaks in the hearts of all men.

As such views spread, the belief in State Churches and Church States was undermined, strengthening the tendency towards religious toleration. Indeed, for those responding to the inner light of conscience, the State barely existed at all. The state isn’t so much condemned as evil as completely ignored. This does in fact differ from the views of the Anabaptists, who considered all coercive government to be definitely evil. However, these mystics lacked bitterness. Instead of being gripped by a sense of disinheritance and oppression, they looked forward to a community ruled by the inner light and by that alone.

Luther, Zwingli and Calvin together sought to establish inclusive churches supported by the civil power, making admission a matter of form and law and even enforcing membership. To the Anabaptist, such a Church was just as bad as the Roman Church in being essentially the same nature. The Anabaptists protested vehemently against any association of the Church with coercive civil power. Thus they either conceived the state as a hostile or an evil thing or simply ignored it altogether. Many Anabaptists, of course, were not in a position to ignore the state. They suffered a sense of injustice in the whole social order and were maddened by the treatment meted out to them within that order. They therefore tended to see the State as they experienced it, as not simply hostile but as evil.

The true Christian, they argued, obeys Christ’s command and resists not evil. The use of force is ruled out for any cause and in any direction. It follows that all government and law sanctioned by force is evil. Far from being a lieutenant of God, the magistrate is actually the most persistent offender against God’s law. Not only if the magistrate’s right to coerce people into religious conformity denied, so too is his right to exist. There is no justification for coercive government and law. These are the views of Tolstoyan anarchists, as expressed in Tolstoy’s My Religion. Their consistent view is to avoid contact with and service in human government. They refuse civil office, they neither go to law nor to war. They do not pay taxes and do not bear arms. Sheep cannot wear wolves’ clothing. Consciously righteous in a godless world they condemned the whole fabric of society in both thought and deed.

Of course, their denial of rightful jurisdiction in the magistrate made them a target of persecution. Indeed, even the normally mild Melancthon recommended their suppression by force on these grounds. What made them dangerous was not their heresy but their anarchism. But the fact that their position was one of religious anarchism made them a problem case for Protestant governments inclined to toleration.

What most alarmed Melancthon and all other respectable people was the ‘impious dogma’ that Christians should hold their goods in common. Such a view had always been essential to Christianity but was practised less and less as the centuries went by. It seems that there were Moravian communities of Anabaptists which had a common store of goods, with an elected official presiding over distribution. However, the Anabaptists were too small and scattered to have practised any organised or systematic communism and there is no case for arguing that they developed any conception of a communist State.

Much of this represents a return to apostolic poverty, an attempt to return to the example of the earliest Christians as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. There is no evidence of a communism enforced by government and law. This is not a political communism. Storch preached that there will be perfect equality among the elect and all goods will be held in common when the day of the Lord shall have come and the ungodly have disappeared. But, again, this is not political; Storch also preached that in those happy days, government and law will cease to exist. What Storch was plainly referring to was a universal willingness to share not a politically sanctioned and enforced distribution. In contrast, Muntzer sought to establish a communistic system by force. But Muntzer was waging war rather than building peace.

The Anabaptists lacked a political conception of a new state, communistic or other. Any ‘state’ that appears in their views is more akin to a ‘church’, a Christian brotherhood of the elect and illuminated.

The Anabaptists escaped from a sordid suffering in the social and political world to a suffering for God and for truth. They had been dispossessed and oppressed: they had been made outcasts, proscribed, enemies of society; and ultimately they are exalted. The Anabaptists are sheep among wolves, the innocent and harmless. Government and the social order as such is evil, the world of the devil. Property is also evil, in that it entails a legal right to do with one’s own whatever human law does not forbid. Ranks and distinctions separating individuals from one another are also evil: God recognises no rank.

After the crushing of the regime at Munster, physical force lost all its appeal and Anabaptism returned to its normal quietism. In the Netherlands the former RC priest Menno Simons (1492-1559) became influential, in time inspiring what came to be known as Mennonism. The views of the Mennonites concerning government, law and the state are little different from those of the mainstream Anabaptists. However, Menno was quite clear, as distinct from the Anabaptists, that the commands of the Magistrate must be obeyed if not contrary to the commands of God and that there is no case in which the Magistrate might be resisted by force. The commands of God forbade the taking of oaths, the taking of civil office and the taking of life in any circumstances. It followed that capital punishment and war were alike condemned absolutely.

Whilst the Mennonites were clear that the Scriptures forbade the taking of oaths and of life. Had they been able to generalise from these principles they would have seen that in paying the poll-tax, they were effectively paying others to kill and be killed, on their behalf as tax payers. Had they been able to appreciate this and change their behaviour accordingly, they would have found themselves in an intractable position. It mattered little to any government whether the Mennonites personally served in war or not; but no government would compromise on the question of payment of taxes. The Mennonites were effectively consenting to coercive government whether they realised it or not.

The Anabaptists seem to have developed a theory of pacifist anarchism in relation to the State. They argued, somewhat incoherently, that all forcible coercive action was evil in its nature. In arguing this they rendered government inoperative and ineffective and denied that the State has any right to exist. But this rejection of state and politics works only at a remove from the real world. In neither theory nor practice is it a plausible position without a conception of another kind of order taking the place of the state. The Anabaptists failed to develop this alternative. The Anabaptist principle tolerated not only heresy, but also theft and murder. To argue, as did Schwenckfeld, that one day, with redemption, a new humanity will have neither thieves nor murderers, and all will live in brotherly love, is an appealing vision of the future to come but has nothing of practice relevance to current problems. Nor does such wishful thinking offer any good reason that present discontents or disorders can be remedied. There has to be a rational ground for hope. Wishful thinking seldom turns out well in politics and is more often than not a blight and a menace. Cohn’s Pursuit of the Millennium details the human cost – the persecutions, murders, superstition etc – of indulging hopes, dreams and fantasies in politics.

It cannot be argued that the Anabaptists proclaimed any principle of religious toleration, other than indirectly. True, they denied the right of the Magistrate to punish heretics; but this was part their denying of his right to punish anyone. Each Anabaptist sect tended to consider itself to be the true Church, refusing all communion with others. So much for the priesthood of all believers, so much for universalism. They say, states Franck, that God has stopped the ears of all who do not agree with them. For all of the proclamation of the brotherhood of man, all erring brothers were excommunicated, expelled. “There is a daily purging of members among them’, recorded Kessler, of those of St Gall. What would such expulsion for heresy mean in an Anabaptist society? Maybe not fire or gallows, but starvation. On balance, the commonwealth of Anabaptists does not appear to involve much real toleration for the heretic.







40 MACHIAVELLI AND THE CITIZEN IDEAL
Leonardo Bruni lauded the material and aesthetic virtues of the city. In extolling a life devoted to the public welfare, his De militia particularly emphasises the spirit generated by service in a citizen army as the best defence of a city’s liberty. Bruni weaves together Aristotle’s study of the social conditions for such an army, Livy’s principles of the early Roman constitution, and Cicero’s ideas of moral obligation. But it was not Bruni’s formulation of civic humanism that would prove to be the most influential in sixteenth century Europe. That honour would go to Niccolo Machiavelli, who work is a curious and ever fertile mix of the classical and the modern, pointing backwards and forwards, often at the same time with the same concept. Machiavelli’s ideas are most well-known through the Prince, an overemphasis upon which is responsible for Machiavelli’s dubious reputation. His much more substantial work is the much longer Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius. Other political and literary works must also be considered in giving a rounded and more accurate view of Machiavelli, rescuing him from both adherents and critics whose almost exclusive focus upon the Prince – and often a misreading of the Prince – gives a false impression.

Machiavelli’s political theory is highly significant in that it involves a reformulation of the concept of citizenship in relation to liberty and popular/republican government in ways which would profound implications for its later development. Machiavelli took the distinct concepts of liberty, citizenship, and republicanism as they had been developed autonomously of each other in previous generations, and proceeded to show how the realisation of the one is possible only by being linked to the realisation of the others. With Machiavelli, citizenship, liberty and republicanism form a body of interconnected principles implying popular government. The interesting thing about Machiavelli is that, although he explicitly rules out a philosophical anthropology, so that his politics is shorn of an ethical framework, there is an implicit anthropology in his constant reference to power, not just institutional power, the power of things, but the power that all human beings have. That Machiavelli considers the realisation and exercise of power on the part of human beings a good thing is evident. The controversial point is that Machiavelli considers this to be a good thing in itself and not something that stands in need of an extra ethical overlaying to direct the exertion of human power to the right ends. Does Machiavelli consider that human nature, allowed to flourish by the right institutional and social conditions, is naturally predisposed to the good?

Machiavelli has frequently been called the first modern political thinker, although the precise nature of his modernity is less easy to grasp. Most of the ideas and concepts contained in Machiavelli’s writing can be dated back to the classical origins of politics and had been current in modern Europe since the rediscovery of ancient texts and authors in the thirteenth century. Machiavelli’s modernity lies in the way that he adapted and applied these ideas and concepts to the problems of the sixteenth century. One even has to be careful in referring to Machiavelli as a thinker at all. He is a greater writer, a stylist, but he is no philosopher. His purposes are too firmly focused on immediate political concerns to allow for the generation of an original theory. Machiavelli discusses old concepts and ideas much more realistically than had been done in the Middle Ages, but not in the systematic sense of previous thinkers. Machiavelli is focused firmly upon the real world in front of his eyes rather than its definition and conceptualisation. Machiavelli offers a consistent way of approaching the problems of humanity in society, but not a new theory that is systematic in the sense of being based on clearly defined categories and principles. Machiavelli is a great stylist, but in many respects the style glosses over a great deal of unsystematic thought (Anglo 1971:72/3).

Machiavelli’s two most important books are The Prince and the Discourses. The Prince is the more famous – and notorious – book. Written between 1514 and 1519, Machiavelli wrote this book with a view to regaining high public office in the Florentine state. In The Prince Machiavelli concentrates upon the specific problem of how to acquire enduring and absolute power with the least effort.

The Discourses is a commentary which consists of a series of reflections suggested by the reading of the first decad of Livy’s History of Rome. The book has a much broader purpose than the Prince, discussing how states are founded and governments are organised and how states are enlarged by conquest and by other means. 

If the Prince was the book that was the most influential, and which remains by far and away the most well-known of Machiavelli’s works, the Discourses upon the First Decade of Titus Livius is the much weightier work. There is little of importance in the Prince that is not found in more elaborate form in the Discourses. In the course of its three books, Machiavelli delivers a series of provocative aphorisms and general theorems in appraisal of events both ancient and modern. Although he is considered the first modern political thinker, in many respects Machiavelli is much more nostalgic than his predecessors. Whereas thinkers from Aquinas to Marsiglio faced the future with confidence as they armed themselves with the ancient texts and authors, Machiavelli’s work is an impassioned appeal for political regeneration which attempts to salvage classical examples of civic virtue from out of the ruins of modern degradation. 
 
The ‘Machiavellian’ interpretation of Machiavelli as an unscrupulous schemer can make no sense of the Machiavelli’s fervent appeal to Italian nationalism in the last chapter of The Prince. Indeed, this chapter reveals Machiavelli to be less the realist and to be every much of an idealist as, for instance, those medieval theorists who sought a Europe-wide state. Machiavelli’s realism must have told him that the union of Italy was impossible in his day, but he still concluded his book with a demand for an Italian nation. The strong republicanism of the greater part of the Discourses is rendered completely unintelligible when considered in terms of a ‘Machiavellian’ Machiavelli. Rousseau read Machiavelli as an ardent republican whose Prince laid bare the wicked designs of tyrants. ‘Machiavelli pretended to instruct kings, but it was the people he really taught. His Prince is the book of republicans’ (Contract, III.6,409). What Rousseau means by this is that the people themselves could transform Machiavelli’s recipes for tyranny into weapons of popular emancipation. Whether or not this was Machiavelli’s intention, there are strong grounds for believing that this is what he would have wanted – in the very least one can claim that Machiavelli would not have objected to the popular inversion of the prince as an anti-tyrannical tract.

In terms of practical politics, the ‘Machiavellian’ Machiavelli, seducing tyrants and using disreputable means to the end of power, was a spectacular failure. Not only did he not gain position with the Medici, in 1527, when Florence rebelled against the Medici and instituted a republican government, Machiavelli, republican to the marrow, had so compromised himself with appeals to the Medici and the Pope in pursuit of power, that his expectations of an offer a post were dashed. Machiavelli died a few days after learning that his old post of secretary had been given to someone else. There may well be a moral about the ‘realism’ of power politics in the tale.

Although Savonarola was overthrown and executed in 1498, the democracy he had restored lasted until 1512. The state service that Machiavelli entered two months after Savonarola’s death was democratic. Machiavelli has gone down in history as the man who wrote the handbook for tyrants; the truth is that he was the servant of a democratic politics. This ended in 1512, when the Spaniards took Florence and restored the Medici to power. Whilst Machiavelli did everything he could to win the favour of the Medici, there is no evidence that he was a supporter of their methods of government. His writings support the view that Machiavelli consistently advocated free or popular government as superior to monarchy or princely rule in the appropriate conditions. The Medici never believed the sincerity of Machiavelli’s appeals to them and they excluded him from office for the duration of their power.

This is not to argue that The Prince is a manifestly insincere book, written merely to gain employment. The arguments that Machiavelli presents in The Prince can either be found in more elaborate form in the Discourses, or at least consistent with the larger work. Nothing in The Prince contradicts the Discourses, where Machiavelli emerges as a strong advocate of popular government. There is nothing of importance in The Prince that cannot be found in the Discourses. The Prince is a distillation of Machiavelli’s political thought, quite in harmony with the whole. The misinterpretation of Machiavelli stems from consideration of The Prince as a whole in itself. This misinterpretation reads Machiavelli as asserting the superiority of princely rule over popular government whereas in truth Machiavelli is simply discussing how princely rule can be best established and preserved in the prevailing conditions of contemporary Italy.

This chapter identifies the central theme of Machiavelli’s political thought as that of making public peace and order a function of civic ability and active participation. This is to argue that there cannot be a Machiavellian politics constituted by the interaction of Machiavellian individual actors without some way of integrating these individuals into a political community. This chapter demonstrates how Machiavelli achieves such integration through the concept of citizenship, creating extensive public spaces which enable reasoning, discursive interaction. The modern character of Machiavelli’s citizenship emerges in contradistinction to Aristotelian notions. The virtu that Machiavelli defines is not the phronesis of Aristotle or, indeed, any other Aristotelian virtue. Machiavelli is concerned to establish practical stability and intellectual flexibility which avoids rigidity without becoming an amorality. He clearly approaches society, government and the law very differently from the way that the ancient and medieval writers approached them. But this doesn’t mean that Machiavelli lacks a moral position. Machiavelli’s problem had been one present in European thought and politics since Christianity sought to incorporate Aristotelian naturalism within its supernatural cosmology. The incipient naturalism worked to deny the Christian imposition of an objective moral order which was capable of defining the right relations of individuals to each other. But did such naturalism deny the possibility of an objective moral order as such? Or only of a moral order that set ideal standards abstracted from human nature and its realisation?

Machiavelli’s thought is entirely secular and this is what gives his arguments their peculiar flavour. Since the ancient Greeks did not distinguish the divine from the human, the sacred from the profane, their idea of humanity forms part of a conception in which the unfolding purposes of the universe are more than human. Christianity did distinguish between the divine and the human to argue the secondary importance of the affairs of this world compared to the next world. Machiavelli’s thought is completely lacking in this extra-human or supra-natural purpose, focusing exclusively upon the human and the profane. This identifies his thought as secular. Its moral status is uncertain. Machiavelli has a moral position; it’s just not a morality that makes sense in terms of ideal orders abstracted from human nature.

One should be careful of overstating Machiavelli’s realism by way of a contrast with the supposed idealism of ancient and medieval thinkers. Too sharp a contrast makes it appear that the ‘idealists’ were hopelessly ideal, utterly naïve, political innocents unaware of the dark side of human nature. The truth is that ‘Machiavellian’ discussions of politics can be found in all of the great philosophers. Thus Aquinas acknowledged that political morality might be different from private morality even as he urged that the prince must have the moral virtues and be a good man. Aquinas cites Aristotle’s argument in the third book of the Politics that makes it clear that there could be a distinction between a good man and a good citizen. “For there are certain political organisations, not properly organised, in which one could be a good citizen without being a good man; but in the best political organisation, one is not a good citizen who is not a good man” (cited in Gilbert Forerunners). The big problem for those like Aquinas, who affirmed the ideal end, is that the best polities are the exception rather than the rule.

What makes Machiavelli appear amoral is not only the fact that he plainly takes his leave of Christianity but also the extent to which his thought departs from the civic humanism of the previous period. This civic humanism is characterised by a number of strands: a new sense of the dignity of man and of the nobility of Nature; an assertion of individualism over limitations of birth and rank so that the only bounds upon advancement were limits set by personal capacities and ambitions; an expansion of a rationality that proceeds empirically from the facts to see humanity and society as they really are, undistorted by theological considerations; an emerging nationalism in identity and consciousness which holds that the individual’s destiny is best realised in a political unit that is greater than a city; a humanism in which man as he is and not as he ought to be according to impossibly high, other-worldly, ideal forms the standard of conduct and of manners.

But the way in which the Renaissance translated these developments into practice soon revealed a downside to this humanism. The individualism of the period could, in art and culture, be associated with the dignity and nobility of human nature, but at the level of everyday society it was expressed in terms of a rampant egoism, the pursuit of power and wealth against the claims of others to equality, and which ultimately saw force rather than reason to be the arbiter of fate.

Machiavelli is a man of the Renaissance in both its good and bad sides. Machiavelli rejects the idea of an objective moral order which is determined by God, in accordance with whose prescriptions individuals live the ‘best’ life. Machiavelli is clear that the ‘best’ life is the one that brings fame, distinction, honours, and reputation in this world. And power is the means to these ends. Power enables individuals to attain and maintain a position of prominence in the community. For the self-assertion it enables and for the satisfaction it brings, the possession and exercise of power is a good in itself for Machiavelli. Further, the capacity of such power is determined in relation to the power of others, something which presupposes a collective environment, relations between individuals set within a political and institutional context. Like Aristotle and like the thinkers in the Catholic Middle Ages who drew on Aristotle, Machiavelli defines the state as a natural entity. The state arises from and evolves the interaction of natural forces. The ruler must understand and make use of these forces if the state power is to survive. There is little here that differs from the ancient Greek definition of man as a zoon politikon, except to note that Machiavelli fuses ethics and politics differently to the Greeks. The frequent assertion that Machiavelli is amoral and lacks an ethical position is quite erroneous. Virtually everything that Machiavelli wrote on politics is connected with ethical questions. Certainly, Machiavelli writes little on the central themes of political philosophy such as the duty of obedience and the limits of authority, but this does not mean that he is an agnostic when it comes to morality. On the contrary, Machiavelli’s convictions and preferences as expressed in his political writings reveal very strong principles. The truth is that Machiavelli’s ethical standards, his definition of the good life, are implicit in his work rather than explicit. His idealism is always embedded in his realism. But it exists.

This chapter will discuss Machiavelli’s political thought in terms of a number of a categories: Machiavelli’s Denial of Divine Law and Denial of Natural Law implying a lack of morality; his views on religion and his emphasis on morality as a social force; his interest in the Art of Ruling; Virtue and Fortune and the extent to which human beings are masters of their environment; the view of human nature; the discussion of Republics and Princedoms and Machiavelli’s arguments for the superiority of Free States.

Machiavelli’s Denial of Divine Law
Machiavelli repudiates the fundamental tenet of Christian doctrine, the view that human beings are destined to a supernatural end. Aquinas had argued that since human beings are destined to two ends, there was a need for two laws. However, since human beings lack a supernatural end, there is no need for Divine Law, leading Machiavelli to deny any claim to superiority and even independence on the part of the church in relation to the state. The values which Machiavelli affirms are entirely earthly - greatness, power, and fame over and above material well-being.

This does not mean that Machiavelli would abolish religion. On the contrary, Machiavelli gives religion an important place within the state, just not above or alongside it. Machiavelli’s attitude to religion is pagan rather than Christian. To Machiavelli, all founders of religions are worthy of honour to the extent that the religions they found support the kind of morality are politically and socially useful. Whereas Machiavelli plainly values certain qualities - honesty, justice, courage and patriotism – as ends in themselves in addition to making human beings and their states strong, his attitude to religion is entirely instrumental. Religion is valuable only for what it brings to the political and social order. It is that earthly order that matters to Machiavelli, the relations of human beings to each other in this world rather than to God.

Machiavelli was interested in religion as a system of beliefs and ceremonies capable of influencing political and social behaviour. In the Discourses he writes of ‘the importance of giving religion a prominent influence in a state’ (D I:xii). What Machiavelli means by this is that religion is important not as end in itself but as instrumental to the ends of the state. He does not abolish the Church but makes it an organ of the state. In other words, Machiavelli values religion only in its pagan form, shedding it of all Christian principle (D I,xi). Thus Machiavelli approved of the religion of the Romans for its usefulness to the republic, promoting virtues and creating ties which bound citizens closer together, generating additional loyalties which served to strengthen patriotism. It was on these grounds that Machiavelli could argue that the Romans were the most religious of all, their devotion to the state making them the least easily corrupted. Machiavelli did not value piety for its own sake. Roman piety was useful to the republic, directing the passions to useful ends, strengthening social ties and emphasising the duties individuals owe to their families, their neighbours, and the community. The kind of piety that Machiavelli valued was this Roman kind. He had no time for Christian piety. Respect for the sacred myths and collective forms of one’s own people counted for more than reverence for a Being infinitely greater than human beings and lying outside of their world. Machiavelli’s position is irreligious maybe, unchristian certainly, but not immoral.

Machiavelli’s approach to religion and morality makes it interesting to speculate on what his attitude would have been to the Reformation. Whilst Machiavelli rejected the way that Savonarola’s beliefs took the form of a political fanaticism, he nevertheless agreed with his condemnation of corrupt priests and would no doubt have agreed with Luther’s denunciation of papal and ecclesiastical abuses. But Machiavelli’s reasoning has nothing to with restoring the purity of the church and the Christian ideal and everything to do with a religion having to be seen to be virtuous in order to be useful to the state, thus strengthening social ties and encouraging virtues by commanding allegiance and respect. This respect will not be forthcoming if exposed to popular condemnation of abuses. From this perspective, Machiavelli would have agreed with Luther’s condemnation of abuses whilst criticising him for the way that his challenge to the old religion had the potential to spread disputes which would weaken the state. Luther was right in Christian terms but wrong in pagan terms. Religion to Machiavelli should draw individuals together in the state, not divide them. Machiavelli evidently cared little as to the content of this religion. Indeed, if a non-religious way could have been found of uniting individuals in a common devotion to their state, with the peaceful co-existence of a variety of religious beliefs or even none at all, Machiavelli would have been satisfied.

The main tradition of European political philosophy, from the medieval writers on government and society to the great thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is firmly grounded in theology. Machiavelli stands apart from this tradition and it is in this sense that Machiavelli lacks not only a morality but also a philosophical anthropology which alone makes the big questions concerning the essential nature of human beings meaningful. Machiavelli seems to repudiate not only Christian supernaturalism but also the classical naturalism. Political philosophers since the Greeks had debated the nature of man in terms of his end or destiny; what is the essential purpose of human beings? This applies to both the naturalists and the supernaturalists, the Aristotelians as well as the Christians. Marsiglio of Padua is remarkable for his extremely untheological naturalism, yet even he asks these questions of essential human nature on the assumption that political institutions, laws, moral codes and rules can be derived from this essence. This approach reached the highest point of systematic rational articulation in the work of the schoolmen, culminating in the Thomist system, but as a method it characterised the work of non-theologians as well as theologians.

There are none of the traditional arguments concerning the implications of essential human nature for government and politics in Machiavelli for the simple reason that he does not ask the traditional questions. At a stroke, Machiavelli closes off speculation as to what human beings could be or ought to be as determined by the potentialities of their own nature. He focuses firmly upon that nature as expressed in how human beings actually are, in the society of the here and now. The narrowing of horizons and closing off of possibilities is a severe limitation in any political thought, running the risk of a politics that is unable to see further than the limits of its own nose. There is nothing in Machiavelli of the ends of individuals as rational beings, ends that they are obliged to pursue as a condition of their own self-realisation. Instead, Machiavelli assumes that human beings desire strong government, and limits his theorising to showing how this can be obtained and maintained.

The easiest thing to say here is that Machiavelli’s approach marks him out as radical and modern, more ‘realistic’ than his predecessors. The problem is that the underlying philosophical anthropology in the great works of political philosophy, from the Greeks up to the medieval thinkers, gave this tradition a much greater and richer psychological and anthropological insight than that displayed by Machiavelli. Continually in Machiavelli’s writing he struggles to convey the true meaning of what he has in mind owing to deficiencies in his understanding of human nature. Even compared to the great religious thinkers like Aquinas, let alone compared to Aristotle, Machiavelli’s understanding of human nature is plainly deficient, and, even, highly unrealistic in failing to correspond to the facts of human nature and society as presented by all those working in Aristotle’s ‘social animal’ tradition. Machiavelli pays scant attention to the social and political nature of human beings, the patterns of intercourse that draw human beings together, the foundation of the political community as natural, questions of rule, law and political obligation. Instead, he focuses narrowly on the basis of strong government, the conditions of freedom in the state, how to gain and retain power in the state. What Machiavelli does argue is important enough, but the idea of Machiavelli as having made a major advance upon all previous political philosophy cannot be supported.

Machiavelli employs classical terms with new meanings. His idea of virtue is correlative to his peculiar understanding of the human end. The term virtu recurs throughout Machiavelli’s writings and comprises those qualities which fit individuals to achieve their ends in this world - success, power and fame. As such, the idea savours a great deal of the ‘natural virtue’ that can be found expressed in the Sophists of ancient Greece and which Callicles thought should be freed from subjection to the restraints of law and conventional morality. Put this way, Machiavelli’s modernity appears as a product of his repudiation of the dominant ‘rational’ strain of western civilisation since Plato and Aristotle. A central tenet of western civilisation is that human beings attain goodness through subjection to law as an expression of the essential rational human nature. This is the principle which both Plato and Aristotle assert against the Sophists, identifying restraint of desire, instinct and impulse and the cultivation of reason to be the essential condition of virtue. This ‘rational’ principle runs as a main current throughout Stoic and Christian doctrines of Natural Law. And it is a principle that Machiavelli repudiates.

The doctrine of Natural Law asserts the possibility of identifying certain eternal canons of right conduct from human nature. Virtue leading to goodness is attained through conduct which conforms to these canons. Machiavelli’s position is entirely different, measuring virtue in terms of the ability of an individual to achieve success, power and fame. Natural Law theorists prescribe rules for the exercise of virtue and show how men could be if they would conform their conduct to the laws of right and wrong. Machiavelli also has rules for the exercise of virtue as he conceives it and he also instructs individuals as to how best direct their action to achieve the ends of greatness and power. The Prince if replete with such rules and counsels: ‘there are two ways of contending, one in accordance with the laws, the other by force; the first of which is proper to men, the second to beasts. But since the first method is often ineffectual, it becomes necessary to resort to the second’ (P xviii). The Prince must ‘be a fox to discern toils, and a lion to drive off wolves’ (P xviii). ‘It is necessary, indeed, to put a good colour on this nature, and to be skilful in feigning and dissembling. But men are so simple, and governed so absolutely by their present needs, that he who wishes to deceive will never fail in finding willing dupes’ (P xviii). ‘a Prince .. cannot observe all those rules of conduct in respect whereof men are accounted good, being often forced, in order to preserve his Princedom, to act in opposition to good faith, charity, humanity, and religion’ (P xviii). ‘Moreover, in the actions of all men, and most of all of Princes, where there is no tribunal to which we can appeal, we look to results. Wherefore if a Prince succeeds in establishing and maintaining his authority, the means will always be judged honourable and be approved by every one’ (P xviii).

Since the bulk of The Prince is focused on the art of gaining and retaining power, Machiavelli has come to be considered as the tutor of tyrants. He is concerned with the art of ruling as such, without regard to the end of this ruling. Power seems an end in itself to Machiavelli. But if things were this simple, then Machiavelli would be indifferent to the question of different forms of government. Yet Machiavelli expresses a clear preference for free or popular government. That Machiavelli is concerned with much more than power is made in his emphatic condemnation of the ‘false good’ and ‘false glory’ of tyrannies; in establishing a tyranny rather than a republic or a kingdom, tyrants incur ‘infamy, disgrace, blame, danger, and disquietude’ (D I 10).

Even a cursory reading of The Prince reveals that Machiavelli, far from lacking a moral position, had a deeply rooted morality. Machiavelli predicates the politics of the tyrant upon the existence of human vices. The Prince portrays human beings as fickle, selfish, bad, easily deceived by appearances, and, what is more, willing to be deceived, only doing good if compelled to do so under constraint, to be governed more by fear than by love. The catalogue seems endless but all these vices reduce to themselves to the ambition at the core of human nature. Machiavelli’s conception of human nature is not generous as he claims that human beings are more prone to evil than good by nature. Machiavelli condemns individuals as ambitious and suspicious, blinded to limits and dangers by their greed; enslaved to insatiable appetites; discontented with what they have and desirous of what they can’t have. So overpowering is their ambitions that human beings are permanently restless, never satisfied, no sooner satisfying one desire than moving immediately to the next, dimming their rationality to such an extent that they are unable to foresee the future evils that their behaviour inevitably brings about (D I,9,29,40 D II, Pref, 20).

What reads as a ‘realistic’, amoral conception of human nature from one perspective is also a strong moral condemnation from another. Machiavelli’s observations clearly imply that this vice ridden behaviour on the part of human beings is precisely how they ought not behave if they wish to be genuinely free beings. In other words, the failure of human beings to realise their higher nature and govern their affairs by their rational capacities makes the rule of the princely tyrant possible, necessary and desirable. 

This interpretation is justified by the admiration that Machiavelli expresses for the German states. The German states indicated to Machiavelli that there were grounds for hope in the morally decadent and politically decrepit contemporary age. By singling out the German states for praise Machiavelli made clear the value he gave to a people being able to lead secure lives, governing their own affairs free from internal disturbance and from external threat; sustaining cooperative communities based on respect for religion and the keeping of oaths and exhibiting an unselfish regard for the welfare of the community as a whole; valuing people who are productive for society whilst resting content with a moderate sufficiency. The experience of the German states allowed Machiavelli to show how the qualities he considered to be virtues could apply in the real world. Of course, the German states were an exception in a world that Machiavelli knew to be corrupt. And once conditions are corrupt, such qualities could only be achieved – if at all – by force. Machiavelli’s point is that since successful political action must be relevant to time and place, the corrupt societies of modern Europe require an active politics that could not be considered as moral in the conventional or traditional sense.

The sphere of practical politics has always treacherous for morality. The medieval legalistic doctrine, ‘necessity has no law’, was devised in response to intractable difficulties facing the moralist in politics. A clear distinction emerged from the work of jurists, decretalists, and canonists from the twelfth century. A ruler who acted in arbitrary fashion from motives of personal gain or whim rather than from necessity is a tyrant. A ruler is not a tyrant when they are compelled, under pressure of circumstances, to resort to extraordinary courses of action. Failure to so act or a tendency delay for consultation in these circumstances would imperil the state. Again, the ‘modern’ Machiavelli argues within an older tradition, condemning the tyrant and confirming the traditional view that nearly all tyrants meet miserable ends (D III,6).
The fact is that, regardless of moral virtues, a ruler who wishes to protect the state is frequently forced by necessity to commit deeds which are, by all conventional standards, not moral. Therefore, ‘putting on one side imaginary things’, Machiavelli draws the conclusion that political morality must be divorced from private morality. The prince must be prepared to act according to the imperatives of real situations no matter what conventional ethical considerations may indicate. In acting in this manner, the prince ‘should not even concern himself about incurring infamy for those vices without which he could, with difficulty, save the state: because, if one considers everything well, it will be found that something which seems virtu, being followed, will bring about his ruin; and something else, which seems vice, being followed will bring security and his well-being’.

Armed with this new conception of new political morality, Machiavelli proceeds to turn the conventional morality inside out.

The Art of Ruling
Machiavelli’s advice for would-be tyrants always seems to have a double meaning. Take, for instance, the argument that the only ‘sure method’ of holding a free city is by despoiling it: ‘whoever becomes the ruler of a free city and does not destroy it can expect to be destroyed by it, for it can always find a motive for rebellion in the name of liberty and of its ancient usages’ (P 5,8). This clearly means that a free city has no need of tyranny and that the free will always rebel against tyrants in the cause of liberty. 

The prudent prince cannot, however, maintain power by force alone. Force alone is an expensive and inefficient instrument of government, impossible to sustain in the long run. It is much easier to rule a reasonably contented population in the long run that to keep a people in order by force. Machiavelli therefore advocates a combination of force and fraud. There exist a number of ‘propaganda’ techniques by which the people may be pacified and quieted without being given any real concessions. Machiavelli refers in this connection to the way that Roman rulers would exploit the religious feelings of the people in order to promote their policies (D I, 11-14).

One should be wary of overpraising Machiavelli’s modernity. Examples of a ‘machiavellian’ politics centuries before Plato and Aristotle are easy to find in ancient Athens. Political affairs have never been the province of idealists focusing upon the public good, devoid of personal ambition. The terms in which Machiavelli describes political affairs can be found in Plato’s denunciations of democracy. Throughout the centuries, up to and including the More’s Utopia and Erasmus’ Praise of Folly, there was no shortage of criticism of practical men, politicians and statesmen, stumbling blindly from one expedient to another; constantly overtaken by foreseeable but nevertheless unforeseen events; their energies absorbed not in the service of the public good but in trying to outwit each other for the spoils of public office; obtaining office by making promises they know they cannot keep; deceiving the very people whom they are supposed to represent; and confining their political activity to the service of no other end than the retention of their power. Smears, lies, duplicity, self-serving moralising, backbiting, defamation and ruthlessness were the most salient characteristics of politics. They were before Machiavelli and they have been since. All that one can say is that Machiavelli seems more sanguine than, say, Plato in cataloguing the vices of politics.

One reason for rejecting the ‘machiavellian’ interpretation of Machiavelli is that if human nature really is as hopelessly and irredeemably vice-ridden as he portrays it then Machiavelli’s own vision, based on a realistic appraisal of the political affairs of his day, is hobbled by ideas incapable of realisation. Machiavelli’s ‘realistic’ view of political affairs must contain a moral concern with the absence of civic spirit and rational insight on the part of the political actors since, reading Machiavelli’s view of humankind as pessimistic, there are no grounds for regretting the constant blindness and disasters of political affairs. And it would make no sense of Machiavelli’s expressed preference for free or popular government. That Machiavelli cites historical and contemporary examples of states characterised by civic rectitude and public spirit indicates that his pessimistic view of human nature is actually moral criticism. He knows that human nature contains greater possibilities, pointing to the German cities in the present and Sparta and the Roman republic in the past. Could these be considered mere exceptions which confirm rather than contradict the pessimistic view of human nature? Against the weight of the contemporary evidence he cites, Machiavelli declares in favour of the government of the populace as against the rule of the few nobles or the single prince. The people are more prudent and stable, and are better judges of men’s suitability for office. The question is is Machiavelli guilty of inconsistency here, contradicting the way he theorises his practical experience and historical understanding in terms of the limited abilities of the people? This is certainly one way of reading Machiavelli (Angelo 1971:189). And it is no effort at all to supply texts where Machiavelli gives reasons not for but against free or popular government. In the Discourses Machiavelli states clearly that a multitude is useless without a head, implying that the people decide nothing without being ordered and directed (D I, 44, 57).

The complexities of Machiavelli’s position take some teasing out. And one should bear in mind here the ambiguities and loose-ends that arise from the fact that Machiavelli is not a systematic political philosopher who clearly defines and consistently employs his terms. There is always the dangers that one can find in Machiavelli precisely what one wishes to find. One thing is certain, Machiavelli proceeds from the assumption that strong government is desirable, and that the strong government the people want is not always or even mainly a popular government. The question he poses in The Prince concerns the qualities a ruler in the singular must have and the methods this singular ruler must use to establish a strong government. For this reason The Prince is read as a technical treatise for would-be tyrants and not a revolutionary manifesto for popular movements looking to institute the free state. Machiavelli’s notion of virtue adds another dimension which seems to justify strong government by the fact of its own existence. Machiavelli denies that virtue is defined by conformity to the Natural Law. On the contrary, the attainment and retention of power is sufficient proof of virtue; Machiavelli admits no other standard by which to judge virtue. The Prince’s counsels are therefore not simply technical rules but are also rules for the exercise of virtue; this equivalence amounts to a complete inversion of moral values (D III,30)

Fortuna and Virtu
As noted, Machiavelli is not a systematic thinker; he is a great stylist but leaves a lot to be desired as a philosopher. Machiavelli struggles to express his ideas and concepts by way of historical examples and analogies, allegories and metaphors, antitheses and polarities. One has to examine these for consistency of use and purpose. Of his many antitheses and polarities, two are central to his thought and recur throughout his work - fortuna and virtu, corruption and virtu. For Machiavelli, these two polarities comprise the totality of human experience and govern the lives of human beings. Machiavelli argues that Fortune is the arbiter of one half of human actions, leaving humanity to direct ‘the other half, or thereabouts’. (Angelo 1971:195).

With Machiavelli, one has to contrast the old and new meanings of fortuna, implying old and new relations between fortune and virtu. The traditional meaning of fortune is that of an external cause outside of human control; in the new meaning fortune becomes a matter for the prince’s form, depending on the art of innovation. (Garver 1987:44).

For Machiavelli, ‘virtu’ is indispensable to the citizen and the state. By ‘virtu’ Machiavelli understands strength, vitality, energy, power, courage, efficiency with respect to specific purposes, good and bad, in specific circumstances, without regard to objects. ‘Virtu’ in this sense does not imply goodness in the conventional sense of honesty, justice, devotion to duty, loyalty. One can therefore define machiavellian virtu as the exceptional capacity – moral or immoral, good or bad – vital for success in achieving particular purposes in particular circumstances; as such, it is a quality is apposite to public affairs rather than private relationships. (Angelo 1971:211).

Machiavelli’s emphasis on the role of Fortune in human affairs makes it clear that he denies the existence of a divine order of things designed by God in accordance and implying a pre-ordained plan for humanity and the universe. Thus the instability and uncertainty of things to which Machiavelli constantly refers asserts the existence of an amoral, non-human causality in the world that is anything but divine. Machiavelli asserts that it is ‘an incontrovertible truth, proved by all history, that men may second Fortune, but cannot oppose her; they may develop her designs, but cannot defeat them’ (D II 29). 

These issues reveal Machiavelli the non-philosopher at his most frustrating. Machiavelli’s deficiencies as a political philosopher are a serious limitation here. Very much a man of the Renaissance, his writing is bid on style but somewhat lacking in analytical rigour and clarity. There is an ever present danger of circularity in Machiavelli’s reasoning concerning virtu and Fortune if one attempts to press further than generalities. So Machiavelli argues that Rome’s greatness must be attributed to virtu not Fortune, since its military and civil organisation was such as to make success likely. Necessity leads to virtu, virtu generates favourable Fortune; favourable Fortune creates opportunities; Necessity requires that these opportunities be seized as they are only fleeting; seizing opportunities requires virtu; success is obtained when an opportunity is taken; Fortune may alter circumstances unfavourably at any time. 

Machiavelli’s general meaning is clear enough. He understands that humanity ‘cannot oppose’ Fortune involves a determinism that makes the attempt to discover rules for conduct meaningless and impossible; if true, this determinism means that everything is subject to the arbitrary, irresistible whim of Fortune. Machiavelli is therefore forced to confront the inherent problem of determinism in order to uphold the validity of human action within a seemingly predetermined or, at least, conditioned pattern. So Machiavelli shifts his position. Fortune is a capricious, incalculable power influencing human destinies from the outside that is often irresistible. For, Machiavelli now argues, human beings are not merely puppets of external forces. Whilst human beings cannot oppose Fortune, they can confirm her. Without knowing exactly how things may turn out, human beings press on in hope, accepting whatever Fortune brings (D II,29).

Machiavelli gropes towards his own peculiar version of the thesis of freedom as the appreciation of necessity. He assigns human beings an active role in this appreciation, making Fortune susceptible to human influence and persuasion. Machiavelli therefore affirms that human beings can wrestle with Fortune and, in so doing, can exercise some control over their destiny. And the power which enables this struggle for control is virtu; the more virtue a person has, the more capacity they have to exercise mastery over their lives. Only someone in whom virtue is completely absent is totally passive in the hands of Fortune. The existence of virtu thus ensures that a complete determinism is avoided.

This is the exact meaning of one of the most famous passages in The Prince. In the same way that the effects of flood can be mitigated by the preparation of defences, barriers, canals, during fair weather, so Fortune exhibits power as a complete determinism where virtu has not been exercised to check her by means of embankments and dykes.

What Fortune can effect in human affairs, and how she may be withstood. I am not ignorant that many have been and are of the opinion that human affairs are so governed by Fortune and by God, that men cannot alter them by any prudence of theirs… Nevertheless .. I think it may be the case that Fortune is the mistress of one half of our actions, and yet leaves the control of the other half, or a little less, to ourselves. And I would liken her to one of those wild torrents which, when angry, overflow the plains, sweep away trees and houses .. Every one flees before them, and yields to their fury without the least power to resist. And yet, though this be their nature, it does not follow that in seasons of fair weather, men cannot, by constructing weirs and moles, make such provision as will cause them when again in flood to pass off by some artificial channel, or at least prevent their course from being so uncontrolled and destructive. And so it is with Fortune, who displays her might where there is no ordered virtue to resist her. 




One should notice how Machiavelli here equates Fortune with God in order to designate a power above humanity which control’s the human destiny and with whom humanity must contest in order to realise his ends. Machiavelli affirms the capacity of human agency to change and order a world that is, in part, self-made. The Fortuna-virtue dualism savours a good deal of Marx’s statement that men make their own history but not in conditions of their own choosing – but since circumstances are – increasingly – self-made, the role of virtue as creative human agency increases over Fortune/necessity. The natural power of Fortune dominates or determines human beings, ‘and her reign is always violent if some yet greater virtu does not quell her’ (Capitolo di Fortuna). That greater virtu is the countervailing power of human agency. 

The argument that Fortune can, to a degree, be controlled reveals another sense in which Machiavelli conceives virtu – involving the ability to adapt to changing circumstances and to prepare, in times of peace, for sudden change. This implies that the events that human beings understand and experience as Fortune, as events that are beyond their comprehension and control, can simply be a result of the failure of human agents to ensure that their actions are apposite to the circumstances. The uncontrolled is not necessarily uncontrollable.

Machiavelli cautions that whilst times change, people often do not, and therefore become passive victims of their circumstances: ‘that man is fortunate who harmonizes his procedure with his time, but on the contrary he is not fortunate who in his actions is out of harmony with his time and with the type of its affairs’. Should individuals be sufficiently wise to adapt themselves to changing circumstances, they would be able to ensure continuing success. To the extent that they do not exercise such foresight, they are at the mercy of Fortune. In The Prince Machiavelli leaves open the possibility of a ruler with sufficient virtu to dominate Fortune. (Angelo 1971:77).
 
The polarities of corruption and fortune are connected through the relative activity or passivity of virtu. The greater activity of ‘virtu’ may react favourably on the state. A healthy state will exhibit a corporate virtu, and will foster this quality amongst its citizens. In consequence, the state and its citizens may be favoured by Fortune.
 
As social creatures and as citizens, human beings are not subject to extra-human or supernatural purposes; the only purposes that matter to Machiavelli are those of human beings themselves, arising from attempting to live one’s life among other similarly disposed individuals. It follows that institutions human contrivances built and designed for the attainment of human ends. What concerns Machiavelli is the human world of human institutions, arrangements, laws etc; and what human beings have made to meet their own ends, they can also unmake, reorder and rearrange in order to meet new ends. Human beings cannot fulfil their purposes without self- and social knowledge, examining human nature within and how it is expressed in the social world. Politics, to Machiavelli, is about understanding possibilities and limitations. Human beings cannot act effectively, to the height of their powers, unless they know what is possible, what is not, and the difference between the two. Failure to respect limitations is foolish, but no more than failure to realise the possible.

Human beings create their own institutions, but they cannot act as they please within their constraints. The character of these institutions determine the range of human possibility and limitation. Human beings can only act within an inherited culture, custom, institutional order etc., but this does not mean that they are required to reproduce what they inherit unchanged. They can reorder and refashion their context, change or build upon its foundation Machiavelli identifies a sphere in politics where human effort can be effective. Human beings may work towards a preconceived end, and may even attain it circumstances do not change completely. They may still attain that end if they change their behaviour to changed circumstances, or they may define a new end entirely rather than pursue the old one. By such reasoning, Machiavelli affirms virtu as a positive factor in human affairs.
 
From this perspective, Fortune refers to that part of human affairs where human effort has not been forthcoming or has been proved inadequate to events and circumstances. Chance or circumstances may always upset the most carefully laid plans. This does not mean that the world is given over to unfathomable chaos beyond control and comprehension. Human affairs display sufficient consistency that it is reasonable to foresee circumstances unfolding along certain lines of development rather than others and adjusting behaviour accordingly. The world is not the sphere of complete accident. There is sufficient constancy in worldly affairs to make planful human behaviour meaningful and worthwhile to undertake.

Machiavelli affirms the constant flux of human affairs, so that the polity is never at peace, either internally or externally. Since one polity will always impinge on another in pursuit of its interests, the only sure form of self-defence will be conquest. Machiavelli here anticipates the Hobbesian notion of power only being preserved by being expanded. Machiavelli’s understanding of the state in terms of human lusts and appetites is accompanied by an insistence that the ruler must learn to control these forces in order to preserve the power of the state.
 
In the contemporary age, individuals have degenerated morally so far as to make republics impossible. Where they are attempted on the basis of this moral degeneration, republics are disastrous. Whereas in classical civilisation, individuals were able to rule themselves, govern their own affairs, the only feasible government in the contemporary age is a princedom, ruled by a single individual. Indeed, Machiavelli goes further in arguing that a despotism is the only effective government for contemporary society: ‘The only way to establish any kind of order .. is to found a monarchical government; for where the body of the people is so thoroughly corrupt that the laws are powerless for restraint, it becomes necessary to establish some superior power which, with a royal hand, and with full and absolute powers, may put a curb upon the excessive ambition and corruption of the powerful’ (D I 55).

In addressing the question as to how a model state could sink into corruption, Machiavelli focuses upon human ambition. Human beings are so constituted by nature that they desire all things. However, such desires can never be completely satisfied. From this arises the restless character of human society, full of enmities, war, the ruination or the rise of provinces. Individuals desire more than they have and are fearful in case they lose what they have.

Machiavelli is fully aware that if individuals exercised their rational capacity, they would see how the promotion of the public good would serve to promote their own private good. Rather than pursuing some immediate interest, individuals would better serve their interests by undertaking a careful, objective, and dispassionate consideration of the best course of action. A rational evaluation of the given circumstances would enable individuals to discern the course of action which best promotes their own private good in relation to the public good and in the long run. ‘Before deciding upon any course, .. men should well consider the objections and the dangers which it presents; and if its perils exceed its advantages they should avoid it…’ (D I, 52).

The problem is that, in the main, human beings do not exercise reason in determining their own best interest. Machiavelli’s pessimistic view of human nature emerges again when he condemns most individuals for being stupid and irrational.





Indeed, Machiavelli opines, even the smart and the astute find it difficult to undertake a hedonic calculation, since human affairs are ‘in a state of perpetual movement, always either ascending or declining’ (D II, Intro). Individuals must alter their behaviour to suit the changing times, adapting to new circumstances: ‘He errs least and will be most favoured by fortune who suits his proceedings to the times … and always follows the impulses of his nature’ (D III, 9).

And in many cases, the behaviour of human beings is not always rational from a selfish point of view. Individuals frequently allow their emotions to determine their behaviour, inducing courses of action which can be harmful to their interests. Human conduct is determined by a number of motives: a love of novelty and a love of change (D III,21), a love of wealth (D I 27), fear, envy and ambition (D I 37). A highly important motive is the desire for liberty: human beings desire to be independent of others (D I 16). Human beings desire to be free to lead their lives as they see fit, pursuing their own inclinations and finding their own good free from restriction by others. Such an individualist conception of liberty makes a rational approach to managing individual relations according to notions of reciprocity impossible. In the absence of relations of reciprocity, Machiavelli draws the obvious conclusion – the only certain way for individuals to ensure their own dependence is to make all others dependent. This implies a will to dominate on the part of individuals. This is forced upon all individuals as a necessity. Those who fail to strive to dominate are at permanent risk of being dominated. Even individuals who have no ambition other than living their lives must necessarily seek dominion over others, if only to ensure that they do not fall under the dominion of others. In this anticipation of Hobbes’ ‘war of all against all’, Machiavelli asserts the inescapability of the permanent strife between individuals and between states: ‘Men rise from one ambition to another: first they seek to secure themselves against attack, and then they attack others… As human desires are insatiable (because their nature is to have and to do everything, whilst fortune limits their possessions and capacity of enjoyment) this gives rise to a constant discontent in the human mind and a weariness of the things they possess’ (D I,5 I.46 II Intr).

The Prince by no means contains the whole of his theory and should not be read as such. Machiavelli himself makes this clear in his opening chapters: ‘Of Republics I shall not now speak, having elsewhere spoken of them at length. Here I shall treat exclusively of Princedoms’ (P I, ii).

Republics and Princedoms
At the beginning of the Discourses, Machiavelli employs another of his fundamental antitheses – human beings work through choice or necessity; the less choice, the greater virtu (D I,1). This is another instance of Machiavelli’s peculiar version of freedom as the appreciation of necessity. For Machiavelli, necessity is the principal motivating force driving human activity: only through necessity do people do good, obey the laws and work together. Only out of necessity do princes observe treaties; they also may have to break them out of necessity.

Taking account of previous views connecting property and patriotism, military service and liberty, religion and civic virtue, Machiavelli set about defining liberty and establishing the conditions of how it might best be achieved and preserved (The literature on Machiavelli is vast and ever expanding. One may start with Gilbert, Machiavelli, and Skinner, Machiavelli and Foundations. More recent contributions include de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell; Mansfield, Taming the Prince; and Bock, Skinner, and Viroli, Machiavelli and Republicanism, a collection of essays by American, English, and Continental scholars which examines aspects of Machiavelli's career and his influence into the eighteenth century). Machiavelli conceives liberty as independence, or self-rule, and freedom from the aggression that could destroy that independence.

That Machiavelli adopts a moral position that involves more than the pessimistic view of human nature is made clear by what he writes about the links between liberty, citizenship and the state. If Machiavelli really did subscribe to no more than a view of human nature as irredeemably selfish, short-sighted and blinkered, then he would not have displayed such interest in the moral causes of political strength and weakness. Amongst contemporary peoples, he singles out the Swiss for especial praise; the Swiss are free and strong on account of their high sense of duty to their neighbours as well as to their country. It was the loss of this sense of duty that corrupted the morals and made bad citizens of the Romans, causing them to lose their liberty. 

With an eye upon the health and strength of the Florentine state, Machiavelli is concerned to identify the rules and institutions and their underlying spirit that made Rome great (The following discussion is based on the Discourses. I refer to the Penguin edition translated by Walker and edited by Crick. Machiavelli introduces his methodology on pp. 93-94 and 97-99. These are the letters to Buondelmonti and Rucellai and the Preface to Book 1, respectively). In the Discourses Machiavelli continually returns to the juxtaposition of modern degeneracy and ancient virtue and probity, and to the argument that desperate measures may often be required at certain times: ‘It will be seen that Rome was from the first free and independent .. and they maintained there more virtues than have ever been seen in any other republic… It is wonderful to think of the greatness which Athens attained within the space of a hundred years after having freed herself from the tyranny of Pisistratus; and still more wonderful is it to reflect upon the greatness which Rome achieved after she was rid of her kings… Only those cities and countries that are free can achieve greatness’ (D I, I).

In a successful republic, leadership comes from the people exhibiting a collective virtu. This virtu is that force or spirit that is able to command fortuna in decisive action. The question that Machiavelli poses is how can this collective virtu be made virtuous and forceful? Machiavelli identifies a number of factors enhancing the republic’s capacity for greatness.

Machiavelli attributes the enduring success and strength of Republican Rome more to virtu and less to Fortune. Fortune plays a role in providing a founder; the republic’s potential for greatness depends upon the quality of its founder. But virtu is more important. He singles out a number of elements to this virtu, sound military organisation, particularly its dependence on national troops; intelligently planned expansion, relying more on colonisation than conquest; respect for religion; good laws, and institutions of political and social justice that satisfy the needs of the civic body. Machiavelli accords particular significance to ‘liberty’ in the sense of self-government benefiting the state as a whole rather than merely a small group. 

It is important to highlight an important area where what Machiavelli writes on virtue departs significantly from the ancient Greeks. Machiavelli considers the empire acquired by Rome in the days of the Republic to be the product of Roman virtue: ‘for if no other republic has ever been known to make such conquests, it is admitted that none other was so well organised for that purpose as Rome. It was the virtue of her armies that achieved those conquests, and it was the wisdom of her conduct and the nature of her institutions .. that enabled her to preserve these acquisitions’ (D II,1). The argument is a complete contrast with the ancient Greek emphasis upon limitation as a condition of the health of the state. Plato and Aristotle criticised the overscale empire of Persia as unhealthy. To the Greeks, the impulse to expansion is a symptom of disease; the healthy state recognises limits and is self-contained. Machiavelli totally inverts the ancient Greek wisdom and makes aggrandisement the symptom and inevitable product of health in a state. He may have considered how Rome under the Empire traduced and lost the liberties it once had as a Republic, how aggrandisement corrupted the body politic, made the citizen body corpulent and apathetic, and turned Roman institutions into a hollow shell.

In the course of arguing for the merits of a balanced constitution as another element of virtu, Machiavelli expresses the view that republics are superior to princely states. His argument here is derived from Aristotle’s conception of the ultimate superiority of the judgement of the majority of citizens. Machiavelli declares the superiority of a large council, the governo largo, over the small council as the highest governing body of the state. Machiavelli draws this lesson for Florence: a republic that wishes to grow must be based upon the participation of citizens from all classes. It is for this reason that Machiavelli expresses a preference for the citizen-soldier, manifesting courage and prudence, over the mercenary.

Machiavelli singles out the German states for the uncorrupted nature of their political life. In explaining Germany’s virtu, Machiavelli highlights the fact the cities maintained perfect equality. The German states did not tolerate the existence of ‘gentlemen’, the parasites who were currently plaguing Italy, producing nothing for the community and living on the revenues of estates. However, the principal factor behind German virtu was the very thing that had once sustained Roman society in a healthy condition for so long: ‘goodness and respect for religion’. What Machiavelli means by goodness Machiavelli is moral probity, particularly in public affairs. (Angelo 1971:98).

Machiavelli’s republicanism shows evidence of having been influenced by the experience of the medieval Italian communes. As medieval political thinkers had done before him, Machiavelli emphasised that the functioning of republican institutions required a political independence based upon a rule of law. His knowledge of history as well as his practical political experience had given Machiavelli an understanding that the weak citizenship of the fifteenth century would no longer suffice in the tough political sphere of his day. What emerged was a forceful notion of citizenship which gave greater weight to action and violence. Machiavelli is key in redefining politics as a technology of power. The Prince, the Discourses, and the Art of War define a technology of power and concern the effective use of violence and the military in the art of government.

Machiavelli bases his conception of citizenship upon the active exercise of virtu. Only this conception ensures that the state will survive, flourish and grow. Machiavelli identifies ‘respect for religion’ as an important to the functioning of the expansionist state. But Machiavelli values not religious as such, for its own merits, but religion for its social function, contributing to the power of the state.

Machiavelli is a pagan and distinguishes himself from the qualities associated with Christianity. He is totally against Christian passivity. Machiavelli disapproves of humility, asceticism, and patience under injustice but prefers individuals to have a proper sense of their own dignity and hence to resent an insult. An injury suffered becomes the parent of many others, Christian meekness inviting injustice. Christian morals are bad qualities for a citizen. Against Christian other-worldliness is rejected in favour of ambition and a passion for worldly fame. The vitality of the state requires citizens, strong individuals.

For centuries, the Church had advocated peace as the condition of the good society, and Christian thinkers had developed organic conceptions of society based upon the harmonious function of many parts. Even secular thinkers like Dubois and Marsiglio had identified peace as the end of the good society. Machiavelli takes his leave of this politics of peace and extols the creative function of tumult in politics. He rejects the Christian message of peace and, with it, the bland citizenship with which it was associated. 

Machiavelli accuses Christianity of weakening citizens and hence of weakening the state. ‘Our religion has glorified the humble and contemplative men more than the active. It has placed the highest good in humility, abjection, and in contempt for human things; theirs placed it in greatness of spirit, in bodily strength, and in all the other things fitted to make men most powerful’ (D ii,20). Christianity requires that its adherents display the fortitude to bear suffering, but to Machiavelli this simply makes further suffering inevitable, weakening people and ensuring that they fall prey to the wicked who are concerned to pursue their aims aggressively. The Christians, seeking paradise in the next world, bear their injuries in this world whereas, for Machiavelli, they should be active in avenging them. In weakening the citizens, Christianity weakens the state. Against this, Machiavelli justifies a religion that will arouse the citizens’ appetite for worldly success.
 
In constructing the new actionist conception of citizenship, Machiavelli’s worldliness represents a clean break from medieval and Christian morality. He is a pagan who expresses the greatest admiration for the ancient Romans, particularly their strong sense of public duty and their willingness to make great sacrifices for the republic. These qualities stem not from Christian notions of eternal bliss but from motives of honour and patriotism. Machiavelli has no time for the person who is preoccupied with the condition of his own soul but neglects his neighbours and his country. The Roman considered that he owed it to himself and to others to live with courage and dignity; when the Roman sought fame, he obtained it in service to the country rather than seeking it for personal gain. 

Where the private interest triumphs over the public interest, corruption issues. The moral leader is therefore charged with the task of ensuring that the public interest has priority.

Whilst Machiavelli most admired those qualities in individuals that contributed positively to the strength of the political community, this does not mean that he valued qualities only for their political effects. He admired courage, intelligence, tenacity of purpose and other such qualities as such and praised them wherever he found them, regardless of the political community. Machiavelli admired individuals who have the strength of their convictions, who live their lives in a way that seems good to them, true to the passions they really feel and free from convention and the opinion of others. He argues that the virtues of Roman citizens made Rome strong. But this does mean that he had a high regard for such virtues only because they made Rome strong. To argue otherwise is akin to arguing that Christians place great store in the virtues they admire only because they ensure the reward of eternal bliss in heaven. Machiavelli admires both the virtues of the Romans and the greatness of Rome, both in themselves and also for what the one contributes to the other. The virtues produce political strength and political strength foster the virtues.

Machiavelli’s stress on power and its exercise entails a harsh morality quite at variance with Christian meekness. There was no pity in his heart for those individuals who fail because they are poor in spirit, not because they fail but because they lack spirit. Although he has been understood as the man for whom the end justified the means, Machiavelli’s position is never so crude as to believe that success is its own justification. He famously condemned Caesar for taking power for himself at the expense of the freedom of the state. Machiavelli did not worship success as such, but paid attention to how it was obtained. Machiavelli did have sympathy for those who failed, if failure was not the result of cowardice or stupidity. Above all, he admired singleness of purpose, and the courage, subtlety and resourcefulness that could frequently ensure triumph in conditions which, to those lacking spirit, seem hopeless. Machiavelli had no interest in the eternal or universal morality of the Christian but valued most of all those moral qualities that make individuals enterprising, bold and public-minded, contributing to the freedom and strength of the political community.

Superiority of Free States
Although Machiavelli has been castigated for his supposed immorality and cynicism and even though the pessimistic assessment of human nature runs throughout his political writings, Machiavelli still expressed a strong preference for popular or free government. The Roman examples he cites frequently in support of his principles are all drawn from the days of the Republic, not the Empire. Machiavelli was of the democratic party in politics, insofar as democracy was understood in the contemporary context. 

In the Discourses, Machiavelli distinguishes republics as free states from princedoms as unfree, and asserts the superiority of republics in their essential nature and in their advantages over other forms. However, the republic is a form of constitution which individuals are qualified to bear only to the extent that they possess the high degree of virtue required to sustain it. Whilst Machiavelli did not go so far as to advocate the participation in government of every adult male in Florence, he did want the artisans and small traders to take their places alongside the great merchants and the nobles. The free state, for Machiavelli, implies self-government in the particular sense of the active participation in the political community by the citizen body. This is to distinguish Machiavelli’s conception from later notions of representative democracy. Free or popular government means government responsible to the whole body of citizens rather than to all adults within the state. The citizen body comprised only a minority of the people, principally the native-born men who could be expected to take a patriotic and independent interest in public affairs in possessing a stake of their own in the country. Most native Florentines carrying on an independent business would be included. Excluded would be native women and children, as well as foreigners, servants and other dependents.

Whilst citizenship in this sense is not universal but, as in ancient Greece, is a mechanism of discrimination and exclusion, the important point to emphasise is that this concept of citizenship is appropriate to the end of self-government. To the extent that they lack virtue, a people becomes ‘corrupt’; and a corrupt people is incapable of governing itself in a free state but must be governed by a prince or by a tyrant. That Machiavelli delineates the conditions for virtue and criticises corruption, it follows that he is a supporter of republic government and free-city states and a critic of the tyranny of princes. Independence is a key principle of this citizenship as proof of the capacity of the individuals as citizens to govern themselves. The principles of self-government is crucial – individuals need to demonstrate sufficient virtue to govern their affairs. The implication is that the abolition of relations of subordination and superordination would end dependence in human affairs, universalising virtue and making free popular government based on a universal active citizenship possible. Machiavelli had a high regard for personal dignity and independence and wished to see such qualities generalised. That such qualities were not universal in empirical conditions justifies limiting the citizenship. But such qualities were capable of being universalised. Thus Machiavelli expresses great admiration for the Swiss and German states for their freedom and lack of corruption. This he attributes to their self-respect, independence of spirit and strong sense of duty to each other and to their country. (Plamenatz 1979:36/7).
 
Instead of achieving political strength and success by parcelling up spheres of virtue within a discriminatory and exclusive citizenship, the core of Machiavelli’s project is identified with developing virtue amongst all the people so as to make virtuous action within the polity universal rather than particular. In expanding rather than restricting the power of action belonging to both the ruling agents and the subjects and citizens acted upon, the relations between rulers and ruled are transformed, any separation between them being progressively dissolved so that self-rule becomes a universal fact. The power of the prince is therefore self-abolishing. The prince makes the state strong by making his subjects stronger; but in becoming stronger the subjects become capable of citizenship, the existence of republican virtue making it possible to dispense with the rule of the prince (Garver 1987:129).

Machiavelli leaves us with the problem of how to turn a princedom into a free popular state by treating people as material for action. Machiavelli defines the political problem as that of deriving the power of the state from the people without that derivation detracting from the people’s power. This is to define the state not as an abstract body based upon the alienation of the sovereign power of the people but as its embodiment which simultaneously uses and strengthen the power of the people. Free popular government is possible only by altering the relation between the prince and the people by subjects transforming themselves into citizens, the sovereign people giving itself political form appropriate to its sovereign power, making itself a political community. The success of the Machiavellian project for realising popular government depends on the ability to formulate such relations of rule on the basis of an active conception of sovereignty so that the community as a whole, beyond the prince, strengthens its ability to act. Reading The Prince in light of the Discourses, Machiavelli’s politics involves a search for the conditions – in the human character as well as in external circumstances - for transforming individual action concerned with private interest into community action concerned with the public interest. The Discourses on Livy is premised on a gap between the corrupt ‘is’ and the uncorruped ‘ought-to-be’ in being dedicated to people who deserve to rule as citizens but who cannot in conditions that deny citizenship.

The viability of free as popular self-government varies with the character of the people and the nature of the conditions. Much of Machiavelli’s justification and advocacy of government by the prince reads as lamentation that virtue is so lacking that comprehension and control of circumstances is not yet adequate for the people to be able to govern themselves, and thus, temporarily, they have to rely on rule by the prince. Further reflection implies an architectonic political framework that makes the harder course to freedom and reason more and more practically, not just hypothetically, attractive. Therefore, whilst republics are much more difficult to found and maintain than traditional monarchies, in that it is more difficult to foster the requisite independence of spirit amongst the people far easier to operate on the people as passive, inert mass, the more difficult political prospect is the superior: ‘The diversity of the genius of her citizens enables the republic better to accommodate herself to the changes of the times than can be done by a prince’ (D 3.9). As individuals grow into citizenship, the individual, correspondingly, ceases to be a political spectator observing the prince exercise political choice, and instead becomes a participant in the political community increasingly empowered to address the key problems of politics. 

Machiavelli makes many bold statements for free or popular government, statements which are quite at variance with the catalogue of human vices that one can find in his writings. In the second chapter of Book Two of the Discourses he asserts that ‘experience shows that no state ever extended its dominion or increased its revenues, any longer than it continued free’ (Plamenatz 1979:38). Machiavelli affirms the superiority of free states over princedoms.

It is the citizens’ concrete preference for the public good over private advantage that makes a state strong, resourceful and successful, and this preference is most likely in a republic, where the will of the majority must always prevail.

Without the restraint of law, the people are capable of errors, but no more than are princes. And the people are better judges of men than are princes, who often prefer servility to independence of judgement. ‘But as regards prudence and stability … the people are more prudent and stable, and have better judgement than a prince; and it is not without good reason that it is said, “The voice of the people is the voice of God”; for we see popular opinion prognosticate events in such a wonderful manner that it would almost seem as if the people had some occult virtue, which enables them to foresee the good and the evil’ (D I 58).

Prone to be misled when hearing only one side of a question, the people are good judges able to decide in favour of the better of alternative proposals presented to them by orators of equal talents. This ‘proves their ability to discern the truth of what they hear’.

We also see that in the election of their magistrates they make far better choice than princes; and no people will ever be persuaded to elect a man of infamous character and corrupt habits to any post of dignity, to which a prince is easily influenced in a thousand different ways… We furthermore see cities where the people are masters make the greatest progress in the least possible time, and much greater than such as have always been governed by princes .. the governments of the people are better than those of princes.., for if we compare the faults of a people with those of princes, as well as their respective good qualities, we shall find the people vastly superior in all that is good and glorious. And if princes show themselves superior in the making of laws, and in the forming of civil institutions and new statutes and ordinances, the people are superior in maintaining those institutions, laws and ordinances, which certainly places them on a par with those who established them.





Machiavelli describes free popular government as the form of government best suited to a vigorous and healthy people and is more noble, generous, and enterprising than monarchy or oligarchy. To the extent that the purpose of politics is the health and well-being of the community, its realisation is also a general human self-realisation implying free or popular government.

Machiavelli did not condemn monarchy as such. The appropriateness of the form of govern varies in proportion with the calibre of the people; political forms are a barometer of corruption in the people. Where people are corrupt, a single powerful ruler is necessary. A corrupt people is incapable of freedom, but must still have order. In the conditions, a people must submit to the rule of a single ruler for their own good. Machiavelli opted for absolute over feudal monarchy on account of the reasoning that it is better that the people have one master rather than many. Machiavelli’s hostility towards the feudal nobility may be explained by his Florentine background, Florence being a great mercantile city and financial centre. He supported the attempts made by the kings of France to reduce the power of the nobles, but this does not mean that Machiavelli was an apologist of absolute monarchy. On the contrary, he emphasised the limitation of the royal power through the role of the supreme courts of law in France, the parlements, which Machiavelli favoured over the States-General. Although the French parlements were hereditary corporations of lawyers whilst the States-General were the closest institution France had which was representative of the whole nation, Machiavelli’s preference has a rationale. The parlements, though limiting the power of monarchy, sympathised with the efforts of the monarchy to make France a united, strong, and law-abiding nation; in contrast, the States-General were dominated by the nobles and the priests concerned with the promotion of their privileges at the expense of the good of the state. (Plamenatz 1979:40).

Freedom of a State
Machiavelli above all values ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’ in a state. The example he frequently draws upon is that of the Roman Republic. Rome possessed this quality of ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’ when it was a Republic but not when it was an Empire. Although Julius Caesar would seemed to have possessed all the machiavellian qualities of virtu, Machiavelli nevertheless condemns Caesar as being amongst the worst tyrants. The reason is that Caesar destroyed Roman liberty when he could have saved it. Liberty was lost when Julius Caesar overthrew the republican constitution and concentrated political power in his own hands. As with Rome under the emperors, the Italian cities ruled by tyrants were independent states, but not free ones.

Machiavelli admires the leader who uses power, obtained by whatever means, to bring strength to a weak and corrupt state. But he condemns the leader who weakens or corrupts a state, in the way that power is obtained or used.

Machiavelli has been vilified down the ages as the theorist who proposed that the end justifies the means. There a couple of points that need to be born in mind here. Such a doctrine is as good or as bad as the end being pursued. And apart from anything else it is not at all clear that Machiavelli argued anything so crude as ‘any act that serves to preserve and expand the state’s power is justified’. For Machiavelli, the only end that justifies any means to it is the establishment or preservation or enlargement of the power of the state. Machiavelli makes this the first condition of order, and also, in propitious circumstances, of freedom. This begs the question as to what the precise nature of the state’s power is. If one equates state power with, for instance, military capacity and its exercise, then the doctrine is evidently bad. This perspective changes completely if the power of the state is made identical with the powers of all of its people. Much depends upon the definition of the state.

Apart from possibly Marsiglio of Padua, no thinker outlined the features of the modern state before its full emergence more than Machiavelli. Karl Marx refers to the abstraction of the modern state, meaning not only the fact of the large, centralised, bureaucratic nation state but its appearance of having a life of its own, independent of its members. This is the state that Machiavelli describes, an all-embracing and supreme authority comprising a compressed, centralized body, commanding such a strong hold on the people’s loyalties as to have an existential significance of its own.

Machiavelli’s concept of the state is the same as Marx’s concept of the abstraction of the modern state – which Marx, of course, identified as a political alienation. Machiavelli does not regard the state as a hierarchy of magistrates resting upon customary authority and relations, but as a compact and all-controlling single structure whose parts are governed from the centre. The state is not co-extensive with the Church but is self-contained, incorporating within itself all the authority there is within its territory. There is no authority superior to the state and no authority which can question the state. More than a century would pass before this conception of the state would receive a fuller philosophical statement by Thomas Hobbes. Machiavelli does not give philosophical expression to the Hobbesian notion of sovereignty, only a conception of the state which implies some such notion. But Machiavelli’s conception is not absolutist in Hobbes’ sense but is quite capable of accommodating the federal principle. As distinct from the absolutist state, the federal state distributes a whole mass of power among bodies, defining their functions and relations by law. The state is all-embracing in that all authority is exercised by the state or with the permission of the state.

In contrast to the classical ideal of the political community as concerned with the promotion and realisation of the good life, the Machiavellian conception of the state is morally neutral. Again, it is the modern state which imposes the civil peace and order whilst leaving autonomous individuals, atomised in the absence of a public life, free to pursue (personal) liberty as they see fit. The state is denormalised, denuded of ethical significance, merely an organised mass of power used instrumentally by those who control it for the pursuit of specific ends. This state is quite distinct from the way that Plato and Aristotle conceived the polis, as promoting a positive conception of liberty, educating individuals into citizenship, developing public-mindedness in the process of moral improvement, as the public life which enables human beings to realise, develop and exercise their faculties harmoniously in relation to each other. Machiavelli does not lack a conception of public morality and demonstrated an acute concern with the moral stock of the people. He was adamant that the state can only be weak if the citizens are pusillanimous and dishonest. But Machiavelli was Roman rather than Greek; he never took the Greek step of explaining or justifying the political community in terms of creative human self-realisation, even though that would seem to be the logical conclusion of predicating the strength of the state on the moral powers of the citizens. A Greek interpretation of Machiavelli would argue that the state is the condition of the improvement and perfection of the citizen body, the very thing that Machiavelli seeks. Machiavelli simply assumed that everyone wants to be members of a powerful and respected political community. From there, Machiavelli analyses the stability and strength of the state in terms of its structure, paying little attention to the connection of the state power with the abilities of its members. 

Virtue in a People Necessary to Freedom
Like medieval thinkers, Machiavelli conceives the state in analogy to a living organic body. Just as the body is made an organism by a certain structure in its parts, so the state comprises a certain structure of organisation, the laws and institutions by which the people are governed. The degree to which a state is free or unfree depends upon the extent to which citizens conform to these laws and institutions spontaneously or by compulsion. The more human beings govern their affairs according to reason, the less coercion will be required, the more they will be free. By internalising the morality ensuring the general good which is implicit in the laws and institutions, individuals become capable of conducting their affairs according to reason. Individuals cease to require a legal-institutional coercion compelling them to the good that they now spontaneously and naturally apprehend. The unfree state requires coercive laws and institutions in the same way as an unhealthy body requires the ministrations of a doctor to restore its organs to health so that they may perform their functions within the system. The free state is like the healthy body in which the parts are in order and function naturally, without having to be brought to order by means of external remedial regulation.

For a body to be healthy in independence of a doctor, a certain internal vigour is required. With a decline in vitality, the organs cease to function naturally in their respective parts and remedial action comes to be required. A state requires the same inherent vigour in its people if it is to be independent of a prince or an absolute ruler, and hence be free. The concept of virtu describes this quality of vigour in a people; the more virtue a people possess, the more free is the state. Where virtue is deficient, the people and its state are corrupt. Only the drastic regime of a prince can restore the people and the state to order.

Machiavelli expressed a clear preference for popular government. He nevertheless considered it to be the most difficult form of government to establish as well as being virtually impossible to restore once it had been destroyed by corruption. Popular government is the best and strongest of all forms of government, but as such it is the exception not the rule. Most empirical states are, at best, approximations of this ideal type. And where a people have become corrupt, freedom will not be recovered by the restoration of the conditions they had when they were free, since a corrupted people will misuse the institutions of freedom. (Plamenatz 1979:39).

Machiavelli therefore writes: ‘To endeavour to make a people free that are servile in their nature is as hard a matter as to keep them in servitude who are disposed to be free’ (D III,8). ‘From these combined causes arises the difficulty or impossibility of maintaining liberty in a republic that has become corrupt, or to establish it there anew. And if it has to be introduced and maintained then it will be necessary to reduce the state to a monarchical, rather than a republican form of government; for men whose turbulence could not be controlled by the simple force of law can be controlled in a measure only by an almost regal power’.

The same argument emerges in Machiavelli’s condemnation of certain feudal abuses: ‘And to explain more clearly what is meant by the term gentleman, I say that those are called gentlemen who live idly upon the proceeds of their extensive possessions, without devoting themselves to agriculture or any other useful pursuit to gain a living. Such men are pernicious to any country or republic; but more pernicious even than these are such as have, besides their other possessions, castles which they command, and subjects who obey them… that class of men are everywhere enemies of all civil government’ (D I, 55).

Firmly focused upon the functioning of the state, Machiavelli was interested only in political solutions to political problems. His criticism of the feudal nobles was focused not upon their wealth or their elevated social status above other classes, but upon the way that they weakened the state. Machiavelli criticised the nobles not as a privileged class who held too much wealth and power inside the state but as a privileged class whose power and wealth detracted from the state. With rights of private jurisdiction and private war, the nobles had arrogated to themselves some of the prerogatives of the state, thus preventing the emergence of a complete state power. Machiavelli was a firm believer in the absolute power of the state and had no conception whatsoever of the feudal rights of the nobles as quasi-governmental rights which a corporate community could exercise as a form of state power. They were merely the privatisation of prerogative and purposes that properly belonged to the state and as such should be abolished. Machiavelli would have removed these rights from the feudal nobility, but would have left their wealth and power untouched insofar as they do not pertain to the state power.
 
Machiavelli is not a royalist or monarchist, but affirms that, all things being equal, the people as a whole rule better than a single individual:





In the concluding chapter of The Prince and throughout the Discourses, Machiavelli attempts to outline a policy that the prince may undertake in the service of promoting the good of the people as a whole. Whilst the restoration of once vigorous conditions requires the energetic and determined action of a single individual in the first instance, the success of the policy in so invigorating the people means that there will be no need to continue to rule despotically in the long run (D I,9). 

Just as the vigour of a healthy body is exhibited in its growth, so a people shows itself to have the virtue to be free in the impulse to expand its power. ‘All free governments (have) two principal ends, one of which is to enlarge their dominions, and the other to preserve their liberties’ (D I, 29). 





There are no grounds for expecting the people as a whole to benefit from princely rule. The prince maintains order and thus protects against internal and external disturbance – but does no more than this for the mass of people. The people cannot expect security in the more expansive sense of freedom to realise their human ends and fulfil their purposes, as in the classical definition of politics.
 
Machiavelli lacks a philosophical anthropology in the sense that he does not examine the potentialities of human nature outside of empirical society. This seriously constricts the range of the achievable within what has already been achieved. Machiavelli lacks a conception of human beings as they could be with which to challenge the evidence of what human beings are. And nor does Machiavelli argue in Aristotelian fashion that human nature and its realisation is connected with the state, that it is in the state that human beings become in the actual what they are in the potential. That whole Aristotelian dimension of politics as creative self-realisation is absent. For all of his words on virtue, Machiavelli doesn’t rest his argument on the Aristotelian conception that humanity is true to its essential nature only in society and the state. Machiavelli is not interested in such questions of philosophical anthropology, only in political man in the narrowest sense of citizen, soldier, prince and public official. He is concerned most of all with political behaviour within the state. Machiavelli’s horizons are limited here to the point of being blinkered, paying scant attention to the fact that politics in this narrow sense is connected in myriad ways to much bigger questions of ontology, morality, psychology. Myopically focused upon the good citizen and the political effects of citizenship upon the strength of the state, Machiavelli is blind to the human roots and qualities that enrich politics and infuse politics with meaning and purpose. The result is a narrow, thin, even anaemic conception of politics. The result is that Machiavelli fails to make good hi preference for free or popular government. The overall impression he leaves is of individuals as greedy, aggressive, unreasonable creatures pursuing purely private aims against other individuals and at the expense of the public good, imposing their will on other individuals. Machiavelli has thinned out Aristotle’s conception of zoon politikon. Aristotle’s conception of the political embraced the whole gamut of human society, so much so that one could flesh out the designation with ‘social’, ‘urban’, ‘cultural’, ‘rational’, ‘moral’. The expansive nature of Aristotle’s conception conveys the meaning that human beings are capable of realising their potentialities only in a public life that connects each with all other individuals; human beings need each other in order to be themselves. 

Not so with Machiavelli. The political being that Machiavelli celebrates is the individual who is in antagonistic relation to all other individuals. Machiavelli’s political man is a seeker of fame and fortune, a lover of power and honour, self-interested and self-assertive, striving to achieve purely personal ends against others, even seeking to dominate and control others in their attainment. It is in these terms that Machiavelli measures political greatness, not the realisation of human potentialities.

Once more, Machiavelli anticipates Hobbes’ claim that the natural condition of humanity is the ‘war of all against all’. Discussing the origins of states in the second chapter of the first book of the Discourses, Machiavelli argues that justice and honesty only arose after human beings chose to live together under chiefs for their common protection. The argument, which is repeated elsewhere, implies that morality is the product of society and that human beings, by nature, lack morality. The implication is that human beings, unchecked by the legal and institutional constraints of society, are naturally predisposed to satisfy their appetites selfishly in any which way they can, with fear being the only restraint. Creatures of desire and passion, human beings need to be disciplined by law and government to make them just and honest. Machiavelli thus gives expression to the liberal legal fetishism that makes the law a condition of social order. Law supplies what human beings cannot give to themselves. Remove the constraint of law and government, and human beings quickly fall into their natural state of selfishness, dishonesty, and injustice.

By reading ancient history in light of modern events, Machiavelli sought to engender a politics of the public sphere based upon the vita activa and vita civile. What ultimately undermines Machiavelli in the pursuit of this public ideal is his lack of philosophical anthropology. Machiavelli identifies the vigour, the power of enduring, the capacity of growth as the marks of virtue which distinguish free states from monarchical states. This virtuous quality of the free state must in some way be derived from some quality inherent in the characters of its citizens. Machiavelli calls this quality in the individual virtue. However, he fails to understand that this virtue, prerequisite in the citizen of the free state, cannot be the same thing as the virtue he also describes in terms of self-assertion in pursuit of selfish ends. A strong and stable state cannot be built when its citizens express virtue not in terms of service to the common good but the assertion and promotion of individual pre-eminence. The assertion of egoistic virtue that Machiavelli elsewhere adumbrates would be the continuation of the war against all within the state. A state that rests on this basis would lack a bond of coherence. For a state to be vigorous, this egoistic virtue needs to be incorporated within the public virtues that Machiavelli also celebrates – public mindedness, respect for others and for the political community, concern with the common good, a willingness to subordinate private interest to the public good. Machiavelli’s lack of a philosophical anthropology is telling here. Without an overarching public framework connecting the freedom of each with the freedom of all, Machiavelli is left only with a narrow, short-sighted egoism, the worst aspects of human nature, and no hope for enduring success in the political sphere. In order to facilitate the transition from government by the prince to government by the people, Machiavelli stood in need of a revival of the classical principle of patriotism. But this was the very thing that the equation of virtue with individual pre-eminence and political success with the gaining of office, honour, personal advantage precluded. The lack of a philosophical anthropology meant that Machiavelli was left with no way of transcending greedy, aggressive, domineering human nature other than by embracing the kind of lofty idealism he despised.

In attempting to draw out the contours of the Machiavellian public sphere there is another crucial issue to discuss – city-state or nation state? When Machiavelli writes favourably of free states and republics, he is thinking of the city-states of the ancient world, Rome and Athens, or of the contemporary world, Venice and Florence. But Machiavelli wrote at a time when the city-state as an autonomous public sphere was in decline all over Europe. In its place was emerging the nation state ruled by the dynastic monarchy. Caught between a world in decline and a world on the rise, Machiavelli seems forced into an idealism which embraces city-states as they pass into history or an Italian nation state before the conditions of its emergence exist. (In defining the paradigm of The Machiavellian Moment Pocock carries the influence of Machiavelli’s thinking through to the English and American revolutions’ (Riesenberg 1992:197).

For the most striking part of The Prince is the concluding chapter in which Machiavelli makes a remarkable jump. Where once he identified the ideal public with the autonomous city-state, now he comes to argue for the nation state. Machiavelli sought Italian unity not only to give Italians order but also that they might use that stability to make Italy great. Machiavelli sought national greatness for its own sake and for its good effects. By fusing the ancient tradition of public spirit with the contemporary shift towards national unity, Machiavelli anticipates the age of nationalism and the rise of the modern nation state. (P xxvi). Machiavelli was the first great political theorist to identify and expound the ideal of national greatness as a characteristic of the modern world which distinguishes it from the medieval world.


Whilst Machiavelli’s position lacks a clear philosophical presentation, he is working towards a conception of popular sovereignty as applied to the national territorial state that was in the process of emerging. Machiavelli totally repudiates the feudal conception of a complex hierarchy of relatively autonomous entities. Machiavelli is modern in the liberal individualist sense in that he has no appreciation at all for the organic or corporate social government of medieval times. To Machiavelli, these are private enclaves of power taking power from the state. Machiavelli is an explicit exponent of the state as an all-powerful central authority, supreme over all institutions within its compass.
 
The big problem is that whilst it is quite easily to reconcile Machiavelli’s principles with a public sphere modelled on autonomous city-states, on the big questions of governing a large state Machiavelli is silent. This is what makes the concluding chapter of The Prince so striking. There seems to be a recognition from Machiavelli that the large nation state was to be the dominant political form of the future, and yet Machiavelli’s principles are apposite to smaller entities. The only large state that Machiavelli had much knowledge of was that of France, but once has to piece together the few comments on France that are strewn throughout his writings. There is no systematic treatment of the institutions required to govern a large state. 

A well-read man of experience, a historian and a statesman, Machiavelli must have known that the kind of free or popular government he expressed a preference for had only and could only exist in small republics or city-states. It is telling that whilst Machiavelli expounds at length on the superiority of popular government over other forms, he makes no attempt at all to demonstrate the feasibility of popular government in the large nation state through the representative principle. Which begs the question of whether Machiavelli’s heart was truly in the politics of the nation state. Since Machiavelli favoured popular government and loved freedom, it is significant that the only free, popular institutions he examined and discussed at length were those that are practical on the small scale. Machiavelli is well aware that the small states were being eclipsed by the large states. There is no claim in his writings that small states are superior to large states. And yet nearly all of the principles that Machiavelli advocates strongly imply that free, popular government is possible only in small (city) states. In no place does Machiavelli even hint at the difficulties of maintaining public spiritedness, service to the community, respect for others etc. in the large state. As scale expands the very public bonds and community ties that Machiavelli identifies as crucial to citizen virtue slacken and weaken. That Machiavelli did not address the problem, did not address the question of representation, surely indicates that, in the main, his ideal public sphere is the autonomous city-state, not the nation state.
 
For all of the anomalies in Machiavelli’s thought, one can extract an ideal of the civil public from his advocacy of free, popular government and civic virtue. Overcoming egoistic virtue with a public virtue that unites each and all in the common good, Machiavellian politics emerges as the activity of citizens struggling with and against each other to achieve common agreement. Ultimately, with the attainment of virtue, citizens assume conscious control of the historical processes they engender, diminishing the way that fortuna has hitherto determined their lives in hidden ways. 

This search for agreement by political activity is not the rule of pure reason, as though citizens are a collection of autonomous intellects. Machiavelli wants to open up public spaces for genuinely political activity, with genuine conflict between competing platforms, in which real needs and interests are at stake, not mere rational dialogue. Machiavelli wants a politics of passion and struggle, for this is how people learn how to identify, express, promote and defend liberty. But whilst Machiavellian politics is conflictual it is nevertheless also rational and involves principled appeals to what is reasonable and just. Machiavelli is concerned with constraining political conflict to the public good through establishing a sophisticated framework of public and civil limits. Politic conflict is not a civil war that rents the state within but the contestation of rival platforms that promote real needs and interests, canalising them positively to the good of the political community as a whole. Fair rules and right principles are instituted to ensure that citizens are able to articulate their needs and interests equally, so that all have a shared stake in the public policy that issues. The rules and principles institute fair exchange and create a healthy politics which connects each and all in a public life that is grounded in a vivere civile. Instilling this rational capacity for reciprocity within conflict, unity within difference is a critical element of Machiavelli’s attempt to engender a public life which educates self-assertive individuals to public-spiritedness of citizenship (Pitkin 1984:301). Competing individuals and parties have their struggles domesticated, channelled to the strength of the public realm. It is important that this strength is not the same thing as conflicts being sublimated into some rational liberal consensus. Machiavelli is interested in public peace and order, but this is achieved not through a willingness to compromise but through all being able to press their views in open conflict and competition. What all agree on is the framing of political disputes in terms of civil, open, and negotiable language; citizens are able to engage as participants in a political conflict. The end is not compromise but clear judgment and decision.
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41 FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY TO THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

In ancient times, citizenship emerged from within cities that were the product of warrior peasants. Such an environment valued the active life above all. In the Middle Ages, citizenship flourished in the growing merchant cities, where for social and economic success the individual stood in need of legal and political recognition and a range of auspices. From the start of the sixteenth century, however, citizenship rapidly started to lose its former centrality in the lives of people, something which lasted in Europe for the next two to three hundred years. The Italian city-states, which had continued to assign importance to citizen status and had ensured continuity with classical Rome, started to lose their vitality and importance. With the rise of the nation state, the national monarchies, to whom citizenship had been of little importance other than at the local level, new issues came to dominate. Where once the category of the ‘citizen’ started to supplant the ‘subject’, the predominance of the national monarchies returned the pre-eminence of the subject over the citizen. The category of ‘subject’ lent itself more easily to the kings, queens and courtiers than did the idea of the citizen, fitting a new politics based upon the centralisation of political power. People were now ruled from capital cities which were many miles away from their everyday lives. The facts of central rule in the new politics scaled to national dimensions did not square with citizenship.

The category of ‘citizen’ nevertheless survived, much of what it entailed was too ingrained into European practice and culture, its general conception being connected to a variety of subconcepts. However, the notion that was carried over into the politics of the monarchies placed the heavy emphasis upon the service to the state dimension of citizenship, the idea that citizenship equates with an active life given over to the service of the community. Excluded from this understanding of citizenship was any implication or hint of populist-ascending theses of government and law. There was no attempt to establish the connection of citizenship with the doctrine of popular sovereignty, developing the idea that political authority derives from the people into a notion of an active citizenship based on participation in the political community.

This partial reading of citizenship involved no drastic reinterpretation. It checked the historical trend towards a democratic understanding of citizenship in connection with notions of the sovereignty of the people. This democratic statement of citizenship had not broken through extensively at the level of political practice. The fact is that citizenship had always been associated with hierarchical conceptions of political rule and had served as a mechanism of discrimination and exclusion since its birth in ancient Greece. Citizenship could continue to function as a means of differentiating between people of worth to the state and people of less worth in an age in which numerous social asymmetries were arranged according to grades, titles, and privileges.

Citizenship survived also for its potential to supply an increasingly ascendant commercial society with an overall public ethos. As success came increasingly came to be identified with private gain and measured in monetary terms, society seemed set to be rent within through the rampant materialism and acquisitive aspirations of individuals. As freedom and happiness were relocated from the public to the private realm and as individuals sought these formerly public ends in purely individualistic terms on the market, citizenship survived almost as a nostalgia, a yearning for the old virtues of civic activism, political participation, and military service. It had become apparent that an atomised market society of self-satisfying egoistic individuals stood in need of an overarching ethos and rationale so as to direct human conduct towards larger public ends that ensured the health and stability of the community.

The notion of citizenship that is applied in the Age of Absolutism is not democratic or republican. The familiar terms associated with citizenship appear in writing about politics, law, and administration, but the meaning of these terms is not to demand the active participation of the people in political processes but to promote the purposeful service of the subject to the monarch.

Previous chapters have shown how the recovery of Aristotle in the Middle Ages fostered the development of a naturalistic conception of government and politics associated with a change in the representation of the human body (Ullmann, 1966:115-17). During the Christian Middle Ages, when an other-worldly existence was considered paramount, human beings could not think of success wholly in terms of earthly existence. Only after the Renaissance, was it possible to relate citizenship to a holistic conception of the human being, the civis as something more than a holder of a collection of statuses and rights but a complex psychological being capable of making complex choices in an environment that was in some way subject to human comprehension and control. Such thinking enabled the recovery of the ancient conception in which politics is inextricably linked to the essential nature of human beings.

One can see this in the work of Hobbes and Locke, who pushed much further than the narrow, legal conception of citizenship to examine human beings as thinking, moral beings, located in a social environment and responding to social imperatives and requirements out of their essential nature and their inherited culture. These were the first steps in the development of the modern concept of citizenship, one which infused legal and political definitions concerning status and rights with a conception of the human personality, a more generalised and fundamental conception based upon the realisation of the essential human nature of each and all. This offered the potential to realise a democratic conception that goes beyond hierarchically differentiated notions to ground universality in the human nature common to all.

Natural Law Theory
It was in this environment that natural law theory could be recovered, shorn of the theological considerations that inhibited its full development for the best part of a millennium. The natural law theorists examined human nature and the way it was expressed in order to establish the basis of human conduct in terms of temporal and logical priority. In terms that date back to Cicero, right reason was their key concept as they proceed to posit a congruence between the structure of right reason and nature itself. In consideration of the times in which they worked, the natural law theorists acknowledged that this arrangement was God’s work. They nevertheless ejected God in denying divine responsibility for the human consequences. Thus Grotius (1583-1645) argued in On the Law of War and Peace: ‘The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God’ (Grotius, War and Peace, 1, 1, 10, i. In his commentary on this passage, Sabine asserts that the "command of God . . . added nothing to the definition ... for the law of nature would enjoin exactly the same if... there were no God." History, p. 424).

The Church (and religion) lost the pre-eminent status they once had by being subsumed within a natural law explanation which subjected all human institutions to study in terms of their growth in inter-relationship to each other. Natural law is asserted to be ‘based on pure ratio’ and is therefore to be freed from Roman law and scripture. Originating in the work of jurists and professors, natural law theory exercised a profound influence upon many writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whose ideas created the fertile intellectual and cultural terrain that facilitated the spread of revolutionary ideas in politics (Sabine, George H. A History of Political Theory. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937 chap. 21; and Barker in Gierke, Natural Law, pp. xli-xliii; Gierke, Otto von. The Development of Political Theory. New York: Norton, 1939. Gierke Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800. Cambridge: University Press, 1934; Gierke Political Theories of the Middle Age. Cambridge: University Press, 1900).

Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) was one of the first and most influential of the natural law jurists, one of the most important constitutionalist thinkers of the age. Writing from a historical, legal, small-town, and Calvinist background, Althusius took a decisive step in the direction of connecting active citizenship with popular sovereignty.

The principal feature of Althusius’ thought is its associationalism. Althusius deduced the principles of human aggregation from a theory of associations. Conceiving the ‘State as the community organised for cooperation toward the attainment of common purposes’ (Althusius, Politica, p. Ixv; Althusius, Johannes. Politico. Methodice Dioesta. Edited by C. J. Friedrich. Cam​bridge: Harvard University Press, 1932. Althusius, The Politics of Johannes Althusius. Translated with an introduction by F. S. Carney. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964), Althusius argued that every association within the state – the family, the city – had a place and role in the larger grouping. Althusius identified this study of this associationalism, the organisation of groups within the larger grouping as politics.

Althusius highlights the importance of the individual within such associationalism, placing the emphasis upon the active as against the contemplative life. In the process, Althusius portrays the community as comprising contributing, caring neighbours who come together to pursue and attain their own and the community’s interests as integrally related. Althusius locates the individual in a social and political word, a world in which social interaction educates the individual into citizenship through participation in the processes of organised life. By moving beyond the personal world of purely familial relations into society and hence contact with other individuals, the individual learns how to treat and respect others. By a process of natural growth, the social leads to the political as the individual takes an interest in super-familial affairs in order to facilitate the needs of both the family and his collegium, his unit of more than three persons. Althusius presents politics as being based upon the existence of many collegia, coming together in the higher symbiosis of the community, the civitas. The individual is educated into becoming a member of the community by working within its laws and culture, and having thus received a civic identity from the community, the individual proceeds to make a positive contribution to its flourishing.

The citizen is distinguished by membership in and service to the community. The foreigner, the alien, and the slave ‘must adapt themselves .. to the customs of the place and the city where they live in order that they may not be a scandal to others’ (Althusius, Politics (Carney edition), p. 35). The citizen is defined by full membership in the political order (politeuma) and, on condition of recognising the laws and government of the city, the enjoyment of all of the rights and benefits of the city. The citizens take an oath pledging their support for the political order; the leader is elected by the citizens and rules with their consent. The citizens are therefore the constituent elements of the state and are the true repository of its sovereignty. With its schedule of corporations, citizens, leaders, and political forms, the state (civitas) ‘is said to be immortal’ in that it can survive the loss of its individual members (For a detailed discussion one must consult Politica (Friedrich edition), chap. 5, pp. 39-42).

Althusius’ achievement is to have incorporated with natural law the key elements of the concept of citizenship as it has been defined throughout history to produce a conception which rests on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. In complete contrast to Jean Bodin, who had produced a theory which identified the monarch as the bearer of sovereignty, Althusius makes the active consent and participation of the people as citizens the irreducible element in a politics concerned with the public good.

Whilst Grotius and Pufendorf (1632-94) did not go so far as Althusius in assigning the people so much of an active sovereignty or stake in government, they did develop a conception of civic activism and duty that corresponded to Althusius’s conception of civic performance. Pufendorf defines his concept of citizenship in the chapters ‘On the impelling cause for the establishment of a state’ and ‘On the duties of citizens’ (Pufendorf, Duty of Man and Citizen, 1:8, 2:5, 2:18; Pufendorf, Samuel von. De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem libri duo. Translated by F. G. Moore. Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1928.).

Pufendorf is concerned to go beyond the technical, definitional aspect of citizenship to address the moral dimension. The individual is able to satisfy the most immediate needs in ‘those little first societies, but must establish one of those ‘great societies which go by the names of states’ to act as ‘a truly political animal’ and achieve true justice and protection. Within the state, the citizen is torn between self-interest and those ‘general duties .. of respect, loyalty, and obedience’, for whose ‘welfare and safety’ he will ‘offer his life, property, and fortunes freely’. Alongside these general duties, every citizen has particular duties. Pufendorf mentions in this respect the teacher, jurist, soldier, fiscal official, the honest performance of which occupations makes a positive contribution to the public welfare.

Pufendorf is aware of the extent to which the categories of subject and citizen are conflated in the literature of his day; he also understands that not every citizen is a good citizen. He is most concerned with the notion of the good citizen since it is as such that the individual realises the human imperative to be a ‘truly political animal’. An individual becomes truly human when he ‘promptly obeys … strives with all his might for the public good, and willingly subordinates thereto his private good’ (Pufendorf, Duty of Man and Citizen, 2:5, 2:18.). The step has been taken here from the narrow, legalistic and definitional conceptions of citizenship to a conception that is more attune to the ontological and social roots that feed politics. The investigation of citizenship now takes an interest in human behaviour, ultimate behaviour which is grounded in an understanding of human nature.

A new politics emerges which is interested in much more than legalistic definitions of specific rights and citizenship which had characteristic the previous age. Drawing upon the virtue tradition of ancient civilisation, the emphasis is now placed firmly upon the human being as such, as pure, without cultural implication, an approach made possible by the increasing knowledge of the existence of a plurality of cultures outside of the world of Christian Europe. The freedom from Christian and European bound conceptions enables the theorist to focus on the natural being as independent of social, cultural, historical encrustation, as human being pure and simple, the being who stood at the dawn of history with no more than basic faculties and wants, before developing society, community etc to further these needs. This is the human being without history who proceeded to develop nationality, language, religion, law, governing institutions, and all those human qualities, good and bad, which have formed the stuff of ethics and politics ever since. This approach penetrated all the secondary debates and concepts and institutions to go straight to the human nature at the heart of them.

The new natural law school, then, transcended the narrow legalistic considerations of civil and public law to examine the human nature that lay at their heart. Whilst in the old Europe of small cities and city-states citizenship continued to be defined in terms of discrimination and exclusion, privileging some over others in economic and political affairs, in the world of large states and their relations citizenship delineates the role and contribution of the individual to the process of state formation. Citizenship now comes to acquire an ontological dimension, concerning anthropology and psychology, involving speculation about “tabula rasa, interest, amor proper” (Barker in Gierke, Natural Law, pp. 62-63; and Keohane, Philosophy and the
State; Keohane, Nannerl O. Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.).

Citizenship fit both the individualist and corporatist developments of the early modern state. Citizenship could be conceived in individualistic terms as a specific right or as one of a collection of privileges that belonged to some but not to others. Such a notion is based on differentiation. In stressing a respect for the community to which the individual owes his identity as a citizen - language, religion, history - citizenship enhances the corporate body of the community. 

The English Revolution
The English Revolution brought forth a whole range of radical ideas from the likes of Winstanley and the Diggers, the Levellers, numerous religious dissidents in town and country. Of these, the most politically relevant are the Levellers. Confusingly, the true levellers were the Diggers. Unlike the Diggers, the Levellers did not call for social and economic levelling. Their political and social demands were nevertheless radical, reviving notions of Christian justice in economic affairs that were once orthodoxy in the early Middle Ages but which now radically contradicted fundamental principles and institutions of the emerging capitalist economy. From 1646 to 1649, the Levellers spelled out a democratic programme in the precisely worded demands and petitions they addressed to Parliament. The most important political demand was for Parliament to replace royal and aristocratic authority and for the popular election of a parliament of three hundred based on a reasonable reapportionment of the entire country, and for the replacement of royal and aristocratic authority with that of Parliament. In making these demands, the concept of the citizen was used alongside more socially precise categories such as ‘free-commoners’, ‘the people’ and ‘poor tradesmen’, making clear the extent to which the Levellers infused the conception of citizenship with a social dimension and, indeed, the moral dimension pertaining to social justice ("An Agreement of the People," in Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes. p. 300; Wolfe, Don M., ed. Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan Revolution. New York: Humanities Press, 1967.). Beaten and suppressed at the time, the Levellers anticipated the demands and principles which would later emerge in the American and French Revolutions nearly one hundred and fifty years later. The Levellers demanded an end of privilege, targeting legal privilege in particular, which served to give the nobility or rich city merchants an unfair economic advantage. (Riesenberg 1992:243).

The publications of the Levellers display a peculiar mix of old and new, religion and politics, implying an inherent republicanism that never quite emerges as an explicit statement of the principles of a republican form of government. The Levellers less an independent political movement with clear ideas of how to replace the current regime and reconstitute power in a specific form government than a protest movement who were concerned to press demands and reforms so as to force change to a more responsible Parliament, a restricted aristocracy. This emerges in their opposition to a tyrannical king being expressed not in the replacement of monarchy with another form of government but in the demand for a responsible king. Of course, the ‘tens of thousands’ who flocked to their banner may have been less inclined to make such fine distinctions (Hirst 1986: 273), and certainly the propertied classes identified them plainly as social and political radicals. Assertions of individual rights and popular sovereignty are embedded in biblical language and concepts, anticipating future demands for social and economic justice in language which recalled the Christian world from before the rise of commercial society. The language in which the Levellers couched their demands thus stands outside of the tradition of citizenship theory, thus it is difficult to place the Levellers arguments in the tradition of ‘republican liberty’. The exceptions here the words of Colonel Nathaniel Rich, and later of Marchamount Needham, the journalist and pamphleteer who created ‘the first sustained English exposition of republican democracy in classical and Machiavellian terms’ (Pocock 1975:381-82). In fine, the English Revolution through up political issues and questions which generated a number of political theories, many of which contained some definition of citizenship.

42 HOBBES AND LOCKE
This chapter concerning ‘man’s propensity for enslaving himself and others’ goes a long way to explaining how the emancipatory potential for reason comes to be realised in repressive form. 

In terms of political philosophy, the most important figure of this period is Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), whose reputation as an apologist of monarchy, the defender of the absolute power of the state, and the arch enemy of the school of Aristotle and Cicero is, whilst not undeserved, underestimates his real worth.

Hobbes was born in 1588, the year of the Spanish Armada. He would later observe that ‘my mother bore twins, myself and fear’. Hobbes’ entire political philosophy rests on an ontology and ecology of fear. His concept of the state emerges as an attempt to ensure peace and security in a nightmarish world of permanent war. To Hobbes, the principal concern of politics was not freedom, happiness, justice or any such classical notion concerning the realisation of human potentials but security overcoming fear. Whilst Hobbes attempted to create a political philosophy which rested upon rules of reason drawn from science and materialism, his rational intent is betrayed continually by his obsession with escaping fear by embracing the strong state imposed civil peace, order and security. Such a motivation cannot but colour the way that Hobbes’ end of commodious living is achieved.

Hobbes describes individuals as being moved by appetites and aversions which determine their voluntary actions; willing is merely the last appetite or aversion. In consequence, individuals desire ‘felicity’, a ‘continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another’ (Leviathan ed. C.B. Macpherson Harmondsworth:Penguin 1976:160).

Individuals continually seek the power over others and over nature which they must have in order to satisfy their desires. Hobbes therefore theorises the competitive struggle for power to be universal and unlimited. ‘I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire after power, that ceaseth onely in Death’ (Hobbes 1976:161). The internal drive for power involves each and all in a universal war which must end in mutual ruination unless individuals come to some agreement. Fear of death induces individuals to make contracts with each other and obey an all-powerful sovereign.

One should note how great a departure Hobbes’ account of the emergence of the state is from the mainstream philosophical tradition since Plato and Aristotle. No more is the origin of the state explained in terms of the associative and social natures of humanity. Instead, Hobbes portrays human beings as egoistic, competitive, aggressive, their interpersonal behaviour being nothing more than a universal antagonism that must ensure collective and individual destruction unless some kind of peace treaty or pact is concluded. This is the state as founded on fear. The concepts for which Hobbes is famous – the state of nature, the right of nature and the social contract – all betray this mean view of human nature. For Hobbes, in a state of nature, unrestrained by law, individuals are permanently vulnerable to the aggressive invasion of person and property on the part of others. In the state of nature there is:





What Hobbes writes is more applicable to the social relations of the emerging capitalist society, rendering civil society a sphere of universal egoism, antagonism and competition. A market society founded on capitalist relations dissolves the social ties and organic bonds which makes a viable society possible, turning individuals against each other as competitors for scarce resources. Hobbes, however, is adamant that his conception of nature is historical rather than hypothetical. He claims that the ‘savage people in many places in America’ lived in such a brutish manner, in a condition of ‘warre, as is of every man, against every man’. There is no historical or anthropological evidence to support Hobbes’ assertion. It is the product of his own pathological dread in the times of turmoil and change he lived. As a critique of atomistic, market society within asocial capitalist relations, it is plausible enough, though any understanding of the social nature of human beings, as expressing in associational activities, community service, relations to others, reciprocity etc is completely lacking in Hobbes.

For Hobbes, the right of nature is the liberty each has to use his power to preserve his own life. It follows that the law of nature is ‘a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life’. But Hobbes goes further to deduce a second law of nature for reasonable men. Here individuals put aside their right to all things and agree to limit their freedom for the sake of peace on the condition that all do the same. Since ‘covenants, without the Sword, are but Words’ (1976:189 224), this agreement would have to take the form of a contract in which individuals transfer their rights to a person or body who would have the power to make their agreement stick. So long as the sovereign possesses sufficient coercive power to protect the citizens, this obligation to the laws of the state endures. The sovereign that Hobbes thus designates is a self-perpetuating and absolute ruler who can only be changed by rebellion. 

The narrowness of Hobbes’ contractarianism is revealed when he rules out any notion that humanity can have any obligations with regard to animals; Hobbes asserts the impossibility of making covenants with ‘brute beasts’. There is no other way of delineating relations in Hobbes’ philosophy. All is war until human beings conclude a peace treaty with each other as reasonable beings. The war within society can end, but the war with nature clearly continues. 

Applied to nature, what Hobbes writes is a libel, totally unhistorical and unanthropological. Applied to the emerging market society set within capitalist relations, Hobbes’ writings are illuminating. His description of the individual endlessly – in both senses of the word – striving to increase power reads as the egoistic individual engaged in competition for scarce resources, forever seeking increased wealth and status in order to keep ahead. One accumulates or is accumulated. This is revealed in Hobbes’ insistence that ‘the Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power’ (1976:151). 

It is highly misleading to identify Hobbes as an advocate of absolute monarchy, for this was not the absolutism he was justifying at all. He actually states that in losing power, Charles Stuart lost the right to exercise that power. His materialist account of power removes the ground from underneath any notion of the divine right of kings. A political conservative he may have been, Hobbes’s materialist reasoning locates him in the revolutionary party, particularly with his notions of equal obligation and natural right. These arguments cause Hobbes to recognise the equal ability, equal right and equal obligation of all citizens, all of which entail much more democratic notions of citizenship. 

Certainly, the sovereign that Hobbes delineates rests upon an unassailable foundation. Nevertheless, the individuals who grant authority and hence place themselves under the executive authority of the sovereign retain important rights. Subjects of the sovereign, individuals retain the right to life, control over property, over family, over all areas which are essential if the individual is to function as a human being. These constitute ‘a sphere of natural law or Fundamental law of mankind outside the public sphere or sphere of positive law’ (Jaume, Hobbes, pp. 142-53). Hobbes does not, then, justify an absolute sovereign in terms which extinguish personal liberty but demarcates areas where the individual is free to function free from the subjection of the sovereign. This, however, raises a much more serious point. For this idea that the areas essential to the realisation of the humanity of each and all are outside of the realm of the state and politics turns ancient and classical notions on their head. From the Greeks on, the public realm has been crucial to the realisation of human nature, human beings unfolding and developing their essential capacities in relation to each other in a politikos bios. Hobbes, however, is not interested in this classical notion of the moral development of the essential nature of human beings through public service. He is aware of the existence of assemblies but pays scant attention to the implications of political activity for the development of personality. Rather, he is concerned to demarcate the spheres of jurisdiction appropriate to ruler and ruled so as to ensure the attainment of the overriding objective - protection consistent with the safety of person and property. Hobbes describes this defensive pact as making possible a ‘delightful life’; it is clear that this life is obtained in the private realm identified with property, not the public domain.
The charge against Hobbes is not that he extinguishes individual freedom but that he re-locates freedom – and happiness – from the public to the private realm. The state is denuded of all ethical significance with respect to human self-realisation and instead becomes a protective shell. Hobbes is concerned to define the state as a precondition for individual survival and personal success measured in terms of the accumulation of wealth and status. The state as sovereign provides not freedom but security, leaving the ‘civil Person’ free to pursue freedom as s/he sees fit in the private realm, in the market society of competitive, egoistic atoms all chasing limited resources.

The criticisms that may be directed against Hobbes are actually better directed against the modern liberal capitalist society he so accurately describes. Yes, Hobbes relocates freedom and happiness from the public domain of the state and politics to the private domain of property and consumption, but this is precisely what has happened in capitalist modernity, with the assertion of the primacy of economics over politics in conditions of an institutional separation of the state from civil society. 

In the final analysis, however, Hobbes’ infuses Galileo’s and Bacon’s mechanical science with a pathology of fear to create a disastrous politics. Hobbes doesn’t so much describe a state, Aristotle’s supreme community of communities, as a prison or a bunker. One can be critical of Hobbes’ highly atomistic view of society consisting of egoistic individuals calculating their self-interest against the interests of others. His materialism is a step in the right direction, but betrays an extremely mechanical conception of humanity and nature. His nightmarish portrayal of the war of all against all as the natural condition, rather than the social product of specific relations also needs to be sharply qualified. His celebration of power and the will to domination as the basis of the absolute state rests on a clear contradiction. If human beings really are as Hobbes portrays them in a state of nature, they could never be rational enough to come together and agree to a contract to form a government that ensures commodious living; or, if human beings are rational enough to regulate their interpersonal affairs peaceably, they would not naturally engage in a war of all against all but would associate naturally, as Aristotle had argued all along. Hobbes only makes sense as a critique of the atomistic society emerging under capitalist relations. 
 
The criticism that Hobbes relocates the distinctively political values of freedom and happiness from the public to the private realm, stripping them of their political character in relation to essential human nature and making them a function of private property and its private enjoyment, applies even more to John Locke. Locke may be celebrated as the great political philosopher of personal freedom but his thought is redolent of nothing so much as the anti-politics of those who equate human freedom and happiness with private property. Locke stands completely outside of the tradition that sees human beings realising their natures in relation to each other in a public life. There is no political conception of citizenship in his work, democratic or republican, only politics and government as concerned with the protection of private property.

As against Hobbes’ ‘war of all against all’, Locke describes a benign ‘state of nature’; individuals are naturally in ‘a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they see fit, within the bounds of the law of nature’. The state of nature is a state of liberty, not, as with Hobbes, licence. Locke credits human beings with sufficient reason to be able to follow the law of nature; this teaches human beings that since all are naturally free, equal and independent, ‘no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possession’. In contrast to a state of war, where force without right is invested in a person, in a state of nature individuals live together ‘according to reason without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them’ (Two Treatises of Civil Government Dent 1936:118 119 126).

Whilst Locke’s ‘state of nature’ superficially appears to be superior to the coercive and unequal governmental society that arose on its foundations, Locke identified a number of inconveniences in the state of nature which compelled individuals to abandon the natural for the civil state. Here, Locke pays particular attention to the problem of each person attempting to punish the transgressions of others. To be able to enjoy their natural rights to life, liberty and property in peace and security, individuals consent to set up a government with known and settled laws. Locke thus gave the classical liberal defence of government in terms of the natural right to property which, in all of its simplicity, narrowness and crudity, couldn’t be bettered. Politics = government = private property. For Locke the principal end of government is the protection of the private ownership of property.

Locke identifies the purpose of government with the protection of the natural rights to life, liberty and property. These rights could all be reduced to the notion of ‘estate’ since an individual can be said to ‘own’ all three rights. In arguing that human beings possessed a ‘natural right’ to property, Locke provides the crucial justification for the division of the earth – and the life upon it – into privately owned parcels of land. Locke identifies labour as the key factor: human beings create their own property by mixing their labour with nature. 

Locke quotes the Bible, ‘God has given us all things richly’ (Timaeus 7:12) but argues that the voice of reason teaches us that there is a limit to our enjoyment of such natural abundance. Locke here identifies perishability as a limit to this right of property: individuals may ‘engross as much as he will’ before it spoils. The problem is that this, the only limit Locke establishes, has been rendered obsolete by technological advance. Locke is the great architect of the individualist conception of freedom, identifying personal liberty as freedom as such, a view which allows those subscribing to the same philosophy to denigrate those who subscribe to positive conceptions of freedom identified with the state and politics as somehow not genuine lovers of freedom, even ‘enemies’. Locke’s anti-politics denuded the state of ethical and political significance in relation to the realisation of human nature. Worse, freedom and happiness ceased to be political values implying a public life that recognised a common humanity and instead became functions of private property, pursued in an atomistic market society under the sway of an acquisitive and possessive individualism.
 
Locke defined the relation between government and property which has dominated the western world for the past three centuries. What is striking is the assertion of the primacy of the economic over the political in the context of the institutional separation of the state from civil society. The Aristotelian conception of the zoon politikon held that human beings require a politikos bios or a public life in order to realise their essential natures. The state-civil society dualism which characterises capitalist modernity splits human society between public and private realms. Real power is located in the private realm of property relations. The power of the state is secondary and derivative in relation to this realm. Locke’s individualist liberalism supplies the political philosophy for this fundamentally anti-political world. There is no public sphere in this world. The values which were once the preserve of the public realm have been uprooted and replanted in the private world of egoistic individuals – identified not with collective notions of citizenship and democracy and law-making and public service but with private property and its enjoyment.

Citizenship has never been purely an ethico-political concept. In the Middle Ages, citizenship had involved individuals exchanging taxes and services for the protection of the state. The infusion of Aristotelian ideas during this period added a moral dimension which emphasised the connection between involvement in the public community with personal growth. For all of his celebrated modernity, Machiavelli was concerned with the connection of citizenship with virtue, not the potential for private gain that citizen status brought. In this, Machiavelli was no different from other writers during the Renaissance. Locke’s thought is a complete break with this citizenship tradition. This break is not simply indicated in what Locke writes but in relating Locke’s principles to the emerging liberal capitalist society. Locke may have sought to establish a relation between government and property, hence between public and private, his overriding concerns must necessarily privilege the economic over the political, the private over the public. Thus Locke argues that the purpose of government is the protection of private property and predicates political participation and leadership upon private property.

43 VICO AND THE NEW SCIENCE

The scientific atomism inaugurated by Descartes became the dominant worldview of the modern age. For all of its ethical and intellectual flaws, the Cartesian theory of knowledge fitted the alienated landscape of industrial capitalism. But the Cartesian view was not unchallenged even in its own time. One of the strongest challenges came from Vico. Vico’s target was not mathematical knowledge, but the Cartesian claim that there was no other secure basis of knowledge. Vico criticises Descartes’ claim to rest truth upon the clear and distinct ideas as being no more than a subjective or psychological criterion, i.e. it proves that the person holding certain clear and distinct believes them to be true, not that they are true. Any idea convinces by its apparent self-evidence, even though they may well be groundless fictions produced by sophistical argument. Vico therefore set out to establish the necessary limits to human knowledge by discovering a principle which would enable him to distinguish what can be known from what cannot be known. 

Of course, the empiricism of John Locke, in which all true knowledge is based on experience, had already launched an assault upon Cartesianism. Vico’s approach, however, is very different. Vico’s philosophy is based upon the principle that verum et factum convertuntur. This asserts that the condition of being able to have true knowledge of anything is to have made it. This asserts the identity of the known and the knower through the act of creation. To know something truly implied that the knower should have made it. This is to truly understand something rather than merely to perceive it. Mindful of the times in which he lived, Vico argues that nature is intelligible only to God, the Creation being the province of the Creator. However, since the objects of mathematical thought are hypotheses, or fictions, constructed by the mathematician it follows that mathematics is intelligible to humanity. The triangle is the mathematician’s factum, created by act of will, and, as such can be known truly by the mathematician. What Vico is arguing here is distinct from German idealism. To know things is not to create them. The existence of the triangle is not dependent on its being known by the mathematician; rather, to be known a thing needs already to have been created. Vico’s point is that the possibility depends upon how a thing has been created.

Vico’s verum-factum principle holds that a condition of knowing something is to have made it. From this it follows that everything that human beings have created throughout history - systems of language, custom, law, government – are the product of human mind and therefore are capable of being known by human beings. On the basis of this principle Vico conceives history in terms of the creation and development of human societies and their institutions. In so doing, Vico has no room for God or a supra-natural plan. The actions of human beings throughout the historical process does not stand in need of rationalisation by reference to a divine plan. However rationalisation is required in the sense that human beings, from the first, do not necessarily foresee the outcomes of the developments initiating. Thus, whilst the historical process is a human rather than a divine plan, it does not exist as an ideal plan which human beings proceed to implement as a transition from unrealised intention to realised ideal. What Vico does argue is that human beings are creators, creating the fabric of human society ex nihilo, with the result that every aspect of this fabric is a human factum, capable of being known to the human mind.

Vico does not understand the verum-factum principle in the atomistic sense that individual human beings are capable of knowing only those things which they themselves have personally created. Such a world would quickly disappear into solipsism, with no basis for communicating or accumulating or extending knowledge. The possibility for achieving knowledge in a general sense is the common human nature that each and all human agents possess.




The Enlightenment asserted the triumph of civilisation over nature through the development of reason and science. Affirming the idea of humanity as the creator of its own destiny, the development of reason and science produces progress. The principal Enlightenment thinkers argued that human beings are potentially rational and will become wise, virtuous and free through education and enlightenment. It was an optimistic creed which asserted freedom through reason. However, the way that it divorced reason from external nature had serious consequences for nature within and without. Means and ends were divorced, with reason being identified with the former and not the latter. In seeking to conquer external nature by science and reason, human beings subjected their own natures to an instrumental rationality. 

For Hegel, the Enlightenment marked an important and necessary stage in the growth of spirit to consciousness in human history. The Enlightenment embodied ‘the Harmony of Being in its purest essence, challenging the external world to exhibit the same Reason which Subject [the Ego] possesses. Spirit perceives that Nature – the World – must also be an embodiment of Reason, for God created it on principles of Reason.’

But there is a great difference between the Reason to which Hegel referred, in which means and ends were intertwined in the unfolding of human freedom, and the instrumental rationality of the Enlightenment and its aftermath. Amongst the first to understand this was Rousseau, who asserted that ‘Iron and corn first civilised man, and ruined humanity’ (Rousseau). Instrumental rationality, focused exclusively upon means divorced from human ends, issued in Bentham’s principle of utility, upon which he erected the Panopticon, the ‘model’ prison designed according to rational principles. With perpetual surveillance of prisoners by the guards, the Panopticon is a forewarning of how reason, stripped of its normative-emancipatory character in relation to human nature, takes repressive form in the totalitarian society.

There was no shortage of views which dissented from the more simple Enlightenment equations of reason with freedom. The dissenters didn’t repudiate reason so much as its scientistic and mechanical foundations of ‘civilisation’. Scepticism was encouraged by the increasing knowledge of non-European societies. This led to a growing interest in human nature in its purest form, its most ‘primitive’. This nature seemed in danger of being totally submerged under the relentlessly rational processes of civilisation. A good deal of writing made these points by inverting the values of civilisation, stripping society of its trappings of civilisation to reveal the simple life lived in accordance with nature to be the best life. Voltaire’s remark that Rousseau wished to see humanity back living on all fours totally misreads Rousseau, but fits the character of several works of the period which were concerned to check the Promethean urge in favour of the simplicity of the primitive life. 

One of the earliest of these works was Les Aventures de Jacques Sadeur dans la decouverte de la Terre Australe (1676) by Gabriel de Foigny. Foigny’s Australians are hermaphrodite deists who have resolved the battle between the sexes and live in perfect freedom and equality. The Australians are born free, are reasonable and good by nature, and worship by meditation rather than prayer. Foigny describes an ecotopia in which there are no written laws, no rulers and no private property. Daily activities are divided into three: school, gardening, public exercise. Since the Australians are fruitarians, they have no need for agriculture beyond gardening; since they wear no clothes and have little furniture; they have little need for industry.

The principle that Foigny is concerned to establish is that liberty is the essence of the human being and that to be free is to follow nature: ‘It was the Nature of Man to be born free, and live free, and that therefore he could not be subjected without being despoiled of his nature.. The subjection of one man in another was a subjection of human Nature, and making man a sort of slave of himself, which slavery implied such a contradiction and violence as was impossible to conceive’ (Les Aventures de Jacques Sadeur dans la decouverte de la Terre Australe 1676 in Marie Louise Berneri, Journey through Utopia (Freedom Press, 1982:198). Freedom in following nature means that humanity lives by the light of their own reason within; they follow nature within and without. The Australians are all the more rational for living naturally, doing what their inner reason tells rather than obeying reason as the external command of governmental institutions and law. Which doesn’t mean that the Australians live in complete spontaneity. Government is self-government in which all participate in the local assemblies of each district or neighbourhood to decide the important decisions which affect their lives. The social order which prevails is natural, rational and free – it is the order which is created if human beings trust to nature within and without.

Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels creates a utopian land whose features show the main characteristics of contemporary civilisation in poor relief. Lilliput has all of the rigid social divisions and ridiculous political practices of the nation states of Europe. Brobdingnag is a land of hard-working people who live a life of simple virtue with their wants kept to a minimum which is capable of being easily satisfied. The most interesting part of the book, however, is Book IV, where Swift targets the laws, governmental institutions, commerce and war of contemporary European states. The Europeans are the Yahoos, hairy creatures in human form who destroy the rational society of the peace-loving Houyhnhnms. The Yahoos are greedy, cunning and destructive, uniting in packs to wage war and fight with each other over food and shining stones. In complete contrast, the Houyhnhms are dignified horses, rational creatures who maintain that ‘Nature and Reason were sufficient Guides for a reasonable Animal, as we pretended to be, in shewing us what we ought to do, and what to avoid’ (Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels and Other Writings, ed Ricardo Quintana (New York: Modern Library 1958:202). The Houyhnhms practise universal benevolence and perfect sincerity. Wants are kept to a minimum, making the point that nature is more than capable of satisfying real needs. To organize their common affairs, the Houyhnhms participate in periodic councils, in which they seek to achieve unanimity. They rule not by laws but by moral exhortation, appealing to the reason that all possess within. 

Swift’s portrayal of the ‘state of nature’ as a form of peaceful reciprocity in which each abet all is the complete antithesis of Hobbes’s nightmarish vision of the war of all against all. In historical and anthropological terms, Swift’s spontaneous social order is more accurate than Hobbes’ account. By making horses the heroes and humans the villains, Swift reveals that Hobbes has inverted the truth. It is not nature that practices the war of all against all but contemporary capitalist civilisation. On returning to England, Gulliver shuns the continuation of this war on the part of the greedy, grasping humans and instead chooses to live in a stable with the horses.

One should be careful not to caricature the arguments of Enlightenment thinkers. Few of them were so crude as to assert the inevitable and unproblematic connection of reason with freedom and progress. Highly significant in this respect is the article on the ‘Passions’ that Diderot wrote for the Encyclopedie. 
Here Diderot states plainly that human happiness and perfection is achieved as a result of following our nature. Although people speak different languages, they just need to listen to and act upon the voice of nature that each has within and they would be virtuous. Corruption is therefore the result not of the passions, but of false judgement:
‘The passions always inspire us rightly, since they inspire us only with the desire for happiness; it is the mind which leads us astray, and which makes us follow false paths to its achievements. Thus we are criminals only because we judge wrongly; and it is reason and not nature which deceives us’ (Diderot, ‘Passions’, Encyclopedie, in Charles Vereker, Eighteenth-Century Optimism (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1967:167).

As with Foigny and Swift, Diderot uses the device of utopia to define a healthy and natural alternative to the repressive religion and warring states of western civilisation. In following the ‘pure instincts of nature’, Diderot’s Tahitians expose the hypocrisy and meanness of Christian civilisation. They are noble and generous, recognise no distinction between ‘mine’ and ‘thine’, and enjoy free love. Rejecting ‘artificial needs’, the Tahitians live the simple life which requires the satisfaction of the few basic needs. By living in harmony with nature, the Tahitians exhibit none of the selfishness and bellicosity that characterises European civilisation. In this anarchist society, civil law is merely the expression of the law of nature and the only moral rule is the ‘general good’ and ‘particular utility’. 

Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) is interesting in the way that he rejected British empiricism and utilitarianism for German idealist philosophy. Coleridge was particularly attracted by the way that the German philosophers conceived the mind to be fundamentally active and organic rather than mechanical and atomistic. ‘The pith of my system is to make the senses out of the mind – not the mind out of the senses, as Locke did’ (Coleridge, Table Talk (1835), 25 July 1832). Boehme, Giardano Bruno and Spinoza also influenced Coleridge’s viewpoint.

Coleridge’s approach to the world is organic and holistic, seeing the world as intrinsically active and as developing through the interplay of opposite forces. Coleridge thus rejected the atomistic philosophy of Newton and Locke for the way that it excluded the creative imagination in reducing the diverse form of activity in nature to the motions and collisions of inert particles. Newton is thus a ‘mere materialist’ in that mind in his system is ‘a lazy Looker-on on an external World’, passive rather than inherently creative (Coleridge to Thomas Poole 23 March 1801). 

From having welcomed the French Revolution, Coleridge became a harsh critic, locating its degeneration in the mechanical and instrumental character of its underlying rationalism. Here he focused upon ‘the extreme overrating of the knowledge and power given to the improvements of the arts and sciences, especially those of astronomy, mechanics, and wonder-working chemistry’ (The Statesman’s Manual, in Lively, The Enlightenment p85)…


In the real world of politics, the big questions concerning the nature of popular consent and sovereignty in an era of large territorial states were starting to be addressed. The big public issues were the terms of constitutional government and the precise distribution of powers between monarchs and parliaments and estates. In the seventeenth century, political thought began to catch up with political practice as thinkers like Montesquieu, Rousseau, and others started to address the problem of political representation and loyalty within large scale political institutions. This does not mean that seventeenth century political philosophers created principles of citizenship and representation fitted to the large centralised nation state. Rousseau may well have inspired the French Revolution. But on no point do Rousseau’s writings justify the centralised republican state that followed the Revolution, quite the contrary. Despite the obvious trend towards large nation states, the thinkers of this period still thought in terms of the city-state when using concepts of citizenship and democracy. Despite a vast range of published work on politics, there was actually little theoretical preparation for the centralised republic that followed the Revolution. True, the Revolution invoked citizenship virtues which political theorists had critically recovered from the ancient world and mediated through the presentation of the Italian experience by the likes of Machiavelli. But the values which the philosophers celebrated bore little relation to practice under the republican state.

By the time of the French Revolution, citoyen was a term that had become all-pervasive. As a form of address it soon became a proclamation of loyalty to the Revolution and the new French nation that followed in its wake. But this citoyen bears little relation, other than the idealist appeal to virtue, to the concept discussed in the previous half century, up to and including Rousseau. It is important to establish that it is a clear error to assert a direct, uni-linear relationship between seventeenth century political philosophy on the one hand and the French Revolution and the centralised republican state on the other hand. Diderot had discussed the citizen completely in terms of the ancient city-state. Now we must ask: why this perpetuation of the traditional view in the age’s most up-to-date compendium of scientific knowledge? And why did citizenship emerge so suddenly and completely as one of the central words of the Revolution?
The most significant social and political thinkers of the Enlightenment defined their ideal polity along the contours of an intimate geography, not a large territory (9-1). Writing on citizenship in the Encyclopedie in the early 1750’s, Diderot was clearly thinking of the ancient city-state. Similarly, Rousseau modelled the ethico-political community which emerges from his writings upon an idealised understanding of his native city-state of Geneva. This is not to criticise the pre-Revolutionary thinkers as backward looking. On the contrary, the point is that their focus upon a more intimate scale in politics conveys the essential point that citizenship, democracy and civic virtue as the active public life is possible only in an appropriately scaled politics. The most intelligent and foresighted political thinkers tied citizenship and its practice to a people and territory scaled to polis dimensions. They ruled out anything larger as precluding citizenship in any meaningful sense. That the century that followed was characterised by the emergence and the strengthening of centralised, bureaucratised nation states, followed by another century focused upon attempts to realise democracy through the extension of the franchise does not in itself mean that these thinkers were wrong or myopic. If they were right on the principle and practice of citizenship and democracy requiring appropriate scale, one is entitled to ask serious questions about the character of the citizen democracy claimed under the liberal representative state.

No theorist combined eloquence and passion the way that Rousseau did in defining the concept of citizenship in terms of civics, heroism, sacrifice for the common good and equality. But would Rousseau have recognised any of these virtues in the state built in the aftermath of the Revolution he was supposed to have inspired? Or in the liberal states that were built up all over Europe in the next couple of centuries?

The term citoyen had become fashionable in the political vocabulary by the mid-seventeenth century, well before Rousseau. The term denoted an activist conception of citizenship, carrying on the republican strain to which the civic humanists of the Renaissance had given eloquent expression. As ever, what attracted theorists to the concept of citizen was its history and implication of classic virtue and its familiarity within European institutions as a legal term. 

Gabriel de Mably (1709-1785) poses the question as to whether the individual’s quality as a citizen destroys his dignity as a man? Living in a society subject to rules and magistrates which govern existence, the citizen must be a political activist. If either rules or magistrates or both are evil, the citizen must act politically to change rules and rulers. There is a moral obligation arising from human nature to act politically. ‘Should the laws man has created for his own assistance render him a slave?’ The rationality which human beings possess on account of their nature is the instrument by which the laws and the human condition may be improved. Whereas liberal contractarians like Locke had defined the right to revolution in legal terms, as the subjects’ response to the ruler’s breach of contract, Mably conceives it in moral and political terms derived from human nature (9-7).

45 WILLIAM GODWIN 
THE LIBERTARIAN CONCEPTION OF RATIONAL FREEDOM 

From an English libertarian direction, William Godwin presents his own peculiar version of rational freedom, making some of the largest claims for the reason common to the nature of all human beings, emphasising the reciprocity of the freedom of each and all. Godwin affirms the ‘moral equality of humankind’: ‘We are partakers of a common nature, and the same causes that contribute to the benefit of one will contribute to the benefit of another. Our senses and faculties are of the same denomination. Our pleasures and pains will therefore be alike. We are all of us endowed with reason, able to compare, to judge and to infer. The improvement therefore which is to be desired for one is to be desired for another’ (Godwin 1976:183).

‘to attempt the tracing out that application of the laws of general justice which may best conduce to the gradual improvement of mankind.




In William Godwin, anarchism received its most elaborate philosophical statement. In the Enquiry concerning Political Justice (1793), Godwin argued that whilst the purpose of government was stated to be peace and justice, in reality it had only served to perpetuate and aggravate conflict and injustice. Godwin agreed with Thomas Paine that society was a blessing, but whereas Paine argued for government as a necessary evil, Godwin criticised it as harmful and unnecessary.

William Godwin argued that society is a naturally developing phenomenon which is capable of acting autonomously without the need for government. This does not mean that Godwin simply argued the virtues of the untutored people, who simply had to follow nature. Godwin was a man of the Enlightenment to the extent that he believed that spontaneous instincts needed to be educated if the people were to achieve emancipation. Godwin made some of the highest claims for the power of reason and his proposals for change are characterised by an insistence of education over politics. Education was the key to making human beings develop and exercise their reason; without education, Godwin suspected that man’s ‘ungoverned passions will often not stop at equality but incite them to grasp at power’.

Godwin states that ‘the moral characters of men are the result of their perceptions’. Human beings are born neither good nor bad. From this it follows that any evil tendencies in the characters of human beings can be remedied by the elimination of harmful factors in their environments. But Godwin does not simply state the crude environmental view that people are to be changed by changing their circumstances. Such a view privileges circumstances as the change agent whereas Godwin seeks to awaken the moral dimension of the human character. Godwin argues the need to induce people to use their minds, since voluntary actions are acts of reason which originate in judgements of goodness or desirability. The determining influence of environment can be modified by the proper education of opinion; circumstances and people are subject to modification by rational persuasion.

Unlike many other radicals, Godwin did not abandon any of his key principles as the French Revolution degenerated into violence and dictatorship; he did not have to, given his sceptical attitude to politics in the first place. The experience of the Revolution confirmed Godwin’s original insight that political changes are worthless without a prior change in moral attitudes. Without a change in underlying morality, political changes repeat the old attitudes of government in different form. It did not surprise Godwin that a revolution focused upon politics simply reconstituted the state power.

Godwin argued for the independence of the social system from any government. In place of government, characterised by complexity of function and centralisation, Godwin presented the model of a simplified and decentralized society in which authority has been reduced to an ever decreasing minimum. Godwin’s society would practice the voluntary sharing of material goods.

Godwin’s libertarian rationalism can only be understood if one understands the idea of Necessity which underpins the argument. ‘The doctrine of necessity teaches us that all things in the universe are connected together’ (Godwin 1976:398). Godwin’s argument is premised upon Necessity as the immutable and impersonal moving force of the universe, expressing itself through natural laws and determining the actions of human beings. Godwin appreciated the apparent incompatibility of freedom and determinism, and was forced to answer difficult questions of how libertarian conclusions could be drawn from necessitarian premises. If there is such a thing as Necessity, with a law of nature that embraces all living things, how is it that human beings have subjected themselves to artificial systems of authoritarian government rather than simply and spontaneously producing natural, decentralised social organisations?

Everyone is subjected to natural determination in the physical sense; human beings grow old and die. Human beings should accept physical limitation, and hence find freedom in recognition of the unavoidable. This attitude comes with the corollary that it is only in the realm of the avoidable, the artificial human society, that human beings can throw off their slavery to false or artificial limitations. The institutions of human society are subject to human intervention and alteration; it is in this sphere, where human will can be effective, that freedom is possible. Whilst human beings must recognise and accept their physical determination as unalterable, they can exercise their will to throw off their bondage to human institutions and to other human beings.

The argument of Godwin’s Political Justice is constructed around this relationship of freedom and necessity, human will being evaluated according to its effectiveness in realising natural laws. At the heart of Godwin’s argument is his principle of human perfectibility. ‘Perfectibility is one of the most unequivocal characteristics of the human species, so that the political as well as the intellectual state of man may be presumed to be in a course of progressive improvement’. Godwin’s optimistic view of human nature is fundamentally moral; the condition of natural justice, from which human beings have been diverted by political institutions, will be achieved by an inner change.





Godwin’s conception of human perfectability is in line with Enlightenment thinking. Human beings are not innately sinful but are products of circumstances. However, these circumstances are not unalterable. Since human beings have reason, we are able to choose the motives for our actions and thereby change our circumstances. Since our voluntary actions originate in our opinions, by changing opinions through education and enlightenment it is possible to change human actions. Godwin presented this argument in the form of five propositions:

Sound reasoning and truth, when adequately communicated, must always be victorious over error: Sound reasoning and truth are capable of being so communicated: Truth is omnipotent: The vices and moral weaknesses of man are not invincible: Man is perfectible, or in other words susceptible of perpetual improvement.

The Anarchist Writings of William Godwin, ed introd. Peter Marshall Freedom Press 1986:61

Human beings are therefore potentially rational beings. As they become more reasonable through education and enlightenment, the need for external authority and government will fall away. Godwin envisaged a time which he called ‘the auspicious period’ which was characterised by ‘the dissolution of political government, of that brute engine which has been the only perennial cause of the vices of mankind, and which .. has mischiefs of various sorts incorporated with its substances, and not otherwise removable than by its utter annihilation!’ Whilst Marx and Engels were disparaging of the ‘utopian socialists’ the vision of ‘the withering away of the state’ became an integral part of ‘scientific socialism’. Leaving aside the question of its practicability as a political goal, the popularity of the abolition of the state was such that Marx had to extract essential principles of self-government from the Paris Commune, even though Marx realised that the actual Commune was doomed to failure. Later, political realists like Lenin had also to subscribe to the withering away of the state, his State and Revolution being a statement of commune democracy that bore no relation to Bolshevik principle and practice. Today, the idea survives as an objective of social ecology. 

Godwin’s Political Justice proceeds from the argument that ‘the happiness of the human species is the most desirable object for human science to pursue’, the most worthy form of happiness being the ‘intellectual and moral’. Godwin identifies ‘erroneous and corrupt government’ as the most powerful enemy of this goal of happiness. Godwin therefore states that whilst his book is an inquiry into the political functioning of society, it also functions as ‘an advantageous vehicle of moral improvement .. from the perusal of which no man should rise without being strengthened in habits of sincerity, fortitude and justice’. For Godwin, the record of government is a ‘history of crimes’, from constant war, to endemic poverty and periodical repression, with no end in sight. ‘War has hitherto been found the inseparable ally of political institution’ (Godwin 1976:84). And the state is associated with war at home as well as with war abroad, between classes as well as between nations. 





He offered his book in the faint hope that government could be replaced by a society of ‘true freedom and perfect equity’.





In Political Justice Godwin elaborated upon the key principles that he had already adumbrated in earlier works. Godwin’s key notions divide into two: the replacement of an artificial governmental society with a natural, egalitarian society; and the importance of education and the power of thought since the human character is determined by environment rather than heredity, the faults of human society being remediable by good education.
 
‘The state of society is incontestably artificial; the power of one man over another must be always derived from convention or from conquest; by nature we are equal. The necessary consequence is, that government must always depend upon the opinion of the governed. Let the most oppressed people under heaven once change their mode of thinking, and they are free… Government is very limited in its power of making men either virtuous or happy; it is only in the infancy of society that it can do any thing considerable; in its maturity it can only direct a few of our outward actions. But our moral dispositions and character depend very much, perhaps entirely, upon education’ (An Account of the Seminary).

Godwin’s commitment to a free rational society stems from his demand for ‘the dissolution of political government’:





Godwin’s four propositions form the basis of the fundamental principles of society through being integrated according to a conception of Justice. Arguing that the origins of society are to be found in the human consciousness of the need for mutual assistance, Godwin identified Justice, a moral principle, as its moving principle. Godwin defines Justice as a ‘rule of conduct originating in the connexion of one percipient being with another’. Justice requires that individuals do everything they can to assist others according to their need and worth. ‘I am bound to employ my talents, my understanding, my strength and my time for the production of the greatest quantity of general good’. Justice identifies our persons and our property as things which are held in trust for good of humankind as a whole. This does not mean that Godwin erected some abstract notion of ‘humanity’, ‘society’ or the general good over and outside real individuals. On the contrary, Godwin’s argument is premised upon actual individuals as the only true reality. Godwin states that ‘society is nothing more than an aggregation of individuals. Its claims and duties must be the aggregate of their claims and duties, the one no more precarious and arbitrary than the other’ (Godwin 1976:176). ‘The universe is no more than a collection of individuals’ (Godwin 1976:221). From this it follows that the good of society is no more and no less than the good of the individuals composing it. The only purpose that ‘society’ as a supra-individual notion has is to do for its members ‘everything that can contribute to their welfare. But the nature of their welfare is defined by the nature of mind. That will most contribute to it which enlarges the understanding, supplies incitements to virtue, fills us with a generous conscience of our independence and carefully removes whatever can impede our exertions’.

The Attack on the Liberal Tradition and Political Authority

The first part of Godwin’s argument involves a critical repudiation of the liberal tradition. The assault is mainly concentrated on English liberalism and is heavily influenced by Rousseau, even when Godwin distances himself from Rousseau. Godwin refers to political institution and law as described in the liberal contract theory as ‘the established methods for protecting mankind against the caprices of each other’ and asks whether these ‘are the best that can be devised’.





Godwin proceeds to develop the liberal values of private judgement and individuality into an attack on liberal conceptions of law and political authority.

Political enquiry may be distributed under two heads: first, what are the regulations which will conduce to the well-being of man in society; and, secondly, what is the authority which is competent to prescribe regulations.

Godwin argues that there are two ways of considering the regulations to which the conduct of human beings living in society ought to conform, as ‘moral laws which are enjoined upon by the dictates of enlightened reason’ and as principles a deviation from which need to be repressed by ‘sanctions and punishment’ (Godwin 1976:165).






Godwin engages in a systematic repudiation of the Lockean natural rights tradition for its focus on the right of the individual to do as he wills. This egoistic standpoint discards duty, justice, and concern for the common good. ‘Hundreds of victims are annually sacrificed at the shrine of positive law and political institution’ (Godwin 1976:87).

The egoistic character of the Lockean liberal tradition emerges in its concentration on the question of the just political authority or most eligible form of government whilst ‘consigning to others the delineation of right principles of conduct and equitable regulations’ (Godwin 1976:166). This line of reasoning as ‘preposterous’. ‘One form of government is preferable to another in exact proportion to the security it affords that nothing shall be done in the name of the community as a which is not conducive to the welfare as a whole. The question, therefore, What it is which is thus conducive, is upon every account entitled to the first place in our disquisitions’ (Godwin 1976:166).

The ‘distorted view of the science of politics’ which the Lockean tradition expresses has consequences which have a deleterious impact upon politics. The idea ‘that a community .. has a right to lay down whatever rules it may think proper for its own observance’ involves the separation of politics from morality so that ‘government itself has no longer been compared with its true criterion’.





Liberals in the Lockean tradition are therefore to be criticised for their failure to enquire into the form of government which is the most conducive to public welfare. Godwin thus rejects the idea of a social contract as based on an original promise and draws on the arguments of Hume to deny that compacts are the foundation of morality (212 216/7 234). For Godwin, morality is the foundation of justice:





Godwin’s justification savours more than a little of the communicative ethic of Jurgen Habermas:





Godwin poses the question as to why promises should be observed: ‘The only rational answer that can be made is because it tends to the welfare of intelligent beings. But this answer is equally cogent if applied to any other branch of morality. It is therefore absurd to rest the foundation of morality thus circuitously upon promises, when it may with equal propriety be rested upon that from which promises themselves derive their obligation’ (Godwin 1976:217/8).

Godwin criticises the ‘pernicious consequences’ that the fundamental liberal notion of rights has in public and political affairs: ‘There cannot be a more absurd proposition than that which affirms the right of doing wrong’ (Godwin 1976:196).





Godwin denies that the individual has a permissive grant to do as he or she wishes since all of the rights of man are ‘superseded and rendered null by the superior claims of justice’ (Godwin 1976:197). In arguing that ‘justice is reciprocal’ (Godwin 1976:175), Godwin emphasises that the duty of the individual is to ensure that his or her every act is ‘bound to … the general weal, that is, for the benefit of the individuals of whom the whole is composed’ (175 87/8). All individuals are bound by this reciprocal notion of justice to employ their talents, understanding, strength and time in the service of the common good. 

Such views reveal the anti-atomistic, inter-subjective character of Godwin’s individualism:

The system of disinterested benevolence proves to us that it is possible to be virtuous, and not merely to talk of virtue; that all which has been said by philosophers and moralists respecting impartial justice is not an unmeaning rant; and that, when we call upon mankind to divest themselves of selfish and personal considerations, we call upon them for something they are able to practise. An idea like this reconciles us to our species; teaches us to regard, with enlightened admiration, the men who have appeared to lose the feeling of their personal existence, in the pursuit of general advantage; and gives us reason to expect that, as men collectively advance in science and useful institution, they will proceed more and more to consolidate their private judgement, and their individual will, with abstract justice, and the unmixed approbation of general happiness….
The true politician … should be careful not to add vigour to the selfish passions. He should gradually wean men from contemplating their own benefit in all that they do, and induce them to view with complacence the advantage that is to result to others. Great mischief. In this respect, has probably been done by those moralists who think only of stimulating men to good deeds by considerations of frigid prudence and mercenary self-interest, and never apply themselves to excite one generous and magnanimous sentiment of our natures. This has been too much the case with the teachers of religion…




Godwin’s thought is in fundamental agreement with the views of the Enlightenment philosophers concerning right reason, truth and justice. One can anticipate Godwin proceeding to repudiate liberal government for its assertion of the negative conception of liberty over against its positive conception, leading to the absence of a commitment to promote virtue, the good life or the general good in even the weakest sense. Godwin’s thought takes a different path to the enlightened despot proposed by philosophes like Helvetius and Voltaire or Rousseau’s democratic authority which combines duty and right reason in the general will. Godwin mistrusts government as such and so cannot allow any kind of government as part of his solution. He denies that governments have a duty to watch over the manners of the people. He asks whether government ought it to superintend the sentiments of the people and ‘encourage such as are favourable to virtue, and to check in the bud such as may lead to disorder and corruption?’ Godwin’s sarcasm betrays his anti-government stance: ‘since government can produce so much positive mischief, surely government can do some positive good’ (Godwin 1976:556). Godwin denies that it can. Godwin therefore rejects the case for government, any government.

Government is, in all cases, an evil; it ought to be introduced as sparingly as possible. Man is a species of being whose excellence depends on his individuality; and who can be neither great nor wise, but in proportion as he is independent. 
556

Godwin premises his case for political justice upon a principled rejection of government:





Godwin identifies government as the most powerful of all the means ‘operating upon mind’. Godwin believes that the human mind, when left alone, naturally tends to detect and reject error and so progressively approach to the truth. Error survives so long in the world only through the power of ‘positive institutions’. 

Injustice therefore by its very nature is little fitted for a durable existence. But government ‘lays its hand upon the spring that is in society and puts a stop to its motion’. It gives substance and permanence to our errors. It reverses the genuine propensities of mind, and instead of suffering us to look forward, teaches us to look backward for perfection. It prompts us to seek the public welfare, not in innovation and improvement, but in a timid reverence for the decisions of our ancestors, as if it were the nature of mind always to degenerate and never to advance.

The end that Godwin has in view is that of an ideal society in which friends and neighbours lead individuals to truth and virtue, not government. Godwin thus proceeds to repudiate law and political authority in favour of private judgement and individuality. 

Godwin makes self-determination and independence intrinsic to the nature of human beings. The free individual trusts his or her rational faculties in searching for truth and right, will exercise judgement and will conscientiously conform to his or her own ideas of propriety. The free person ‘stands by himself, and rests upon his own understanding’. Conviction deriving from individual understanding is the only principle can legitimately imposes any specific conduct upon the individual (Godwin 1976:198). This concern to rest everything on rational individual judgement leads Godwin to a libertarian assault upon government, law and political authority.

The purpose of society is to assist individuals to become moral beings. However, Godwin makes a distinction between the horizontal relationship of individuals to society as a pattern of magnified connexions between individuals and the vertical relationship of individuals to morality:

Morality is, if anything can be, fixed and immutable; and there must surely be some strange deception that should induce us to give an action eternally and unchangeably wrong the epithets of rectitude, duty and virtue.

The problem is to conceive how human beings, within the limits of perception, can establish the vertical relationship with those absolute truths that constitute ideal morality. Duty can only demand that individuals serve the general good according to their capacities. Yet an unjust act cannot obtain the quality of justice through incapacity or ignorance. Thus, while individuals cannot be expected to be absolutely virtuous, they ought to endeavour to form ‘virtuous dispositions’. Such dispositions must be cultivated by each individual within themselves rather than be imposed from the outside. It ‘is principally generated by the uncontrolled exercise of private judgement and the rigid conformity of every man to the dictates of his conscience’.

It is only individuals, not society or government, that have claims or rights. Society and government exist for the convenience of individuals. On this reasoning Godwin clarifies the distinction between justice, which rests on immutable moral truths, and human law, which is based on the fallible decisions of political institutions. In recognising what is right, individuals must use their own understanding and be influenced by evidence rather than authority. Government has no right to command obedience. The independent exercise of reason in the discovery of justice is the only true guide to conduct. All individuals listening to the voice of reason would issue in a society of unrestrained concord.

‘Reason therefore and conviction still appear to be the proper instrument, and the sufficient instrument for regulating the actions of mankind’ (Godwin 1976:128). 

Imperfect conditions imply imperfection in human judgement, precluding the exercise of reason. Constraint, though unnatural, and even punishment, though unjust, may be necessary. Godwin argues that human beings are what they on account of the environment that has shaped them. It follows from this that the social conditions that make constraint and punishment necessary must be abolished. ‘He that would reconcile a perfect freedom in this respect with the interest of the whole, ought to propose at the same time the means of extirpating selfishness and vice’.

Godwin rejects the convention of the social contract as the foundation for political justice. In binding one generation by the promises of another, the social contract denies the obligation that each has to exercise private judgement in determining what is right. The social contract rests on the fallacy that morality consists in keeping promises made whereas in truth human beings should perform acts because they are just, not because they have made promises.

The obligation of private judgement that falls upon all individuals does not preclude common action, since measures for the common good must be deliberated in common. Godwin argues the close connection between the exercise of private judgement and common deliberations properly carried out since both are ‘means of discovering right and wrong, and of comparing particular propositions with the standards of eternal truth’. However, not the individual or any deliberative body, only the law of Reason is the just law: ‘Her decrees are irrevocable and uniform. The functions of society extend, not to the making, but to the interpreting of law; it cannot decree, it can only declare that which the nature of things has already decreed…’ The authority of the community is therefore strictly executive in being confined to ‘the public support of justice’. Where justice is assured, it is the duty of every reasonable person to obey; where justice is not supported, every reasonable person is obliged to resist.

For Godwin there are three forms of authority. The first form of authority is reason, the individual obeying himself or herself. This form signifies the replacement of political government by self-government. The second form of authority is confidence in and deference to the known sentiment and decision of another. This ‘is the strictest and most precise meaning of the word authority’ (Godwin 1976:243). The third form of authority is government, in which compliance is based upon force and power rather than esteem and respect. This purely political form is unnatural. 

Godwin’s ideal is self-government as the absence of government in which people obey only their own reason. Godwin offered the first extensive philosophical statement of this principle of the self-governing society. In Godwin’s vision the current reality of centralised nation-states would give way to a federation of face-to-face communities. These communities would govern themselves through popular assemblies at the local level of the parish, creating national assemblies wherever problems of coordination, complexity and conflict necessitated political action at a higher than parish level. These national assemblies would not form a permanent centre of authority and any officials would be unpaid and supported voluntarily.

Since voting results in an unnatural uniformity which entails the tyranny of the majority, Godwin favoured decision making by the formation of consensus. Popular juries concerned to re-establish social harmony would replace courts and the judiciary more concerned with meting out punishment. When it came to reforming wrongdoers, public opinion would take the place of law. Godwin must surely have realised that public opinion could actually be more vicious and vengeful than a law based on the principle of proportionality, which is why he insists that it would not be harsh and would recognize each person’s sphere of discretion. Whether he could guarantee this recognition without law depends on whether one shares Godwin’s faith in reason. Since the end of education is to develop the mind and the imagination, then Godwin can envisage a time when reason is in control. Liberty is thus schooled by reason into harmony and consensus, the common good is apprehended spontaneously if human beings are allowed to learn through desire.





Government is therefore the converse of self-government in resting not on the reason of the people but their ignorance. Godwin argues that ‘the empire of government is built in opinion’. With the increase in knowledge and virtue, individuals discover that there is ‘no mystery in government which uninitiated mortals must not presume to penetrate’. The continuum from government to self-government is therefore a measure of the ignorance or the reason of the people.









This is ‘the true euthanasia of government’.





Some such notion of self-government can be discerned in the principle of self-assumed legislation. In the Esprit des Lois Montesquieu argues that ‘in a free state, every man will be his own legislator’. This implies the self-administration of the active citizens.

Godwin argues that individuals are legitimately moved to action only by private judgement; anything beyond this is by definition force or coercion. Government is an institutionalised form of coercion in the sense of establishing the views of some as determinants of the actions of individuals. As such, ‘government is nothing but regulated force; force is its appropriate claim upon your attention. It is the business of individuals to persuade; the tendency of concentrated strength is only to give consistency and permanence to an influence more compendious than persuasion’ (Godwin 1976:242). 

The best that an analysis of the various forms of government – monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy – can achieve is to identify which form produces not the greatest good but the least evil. 

Godwin objects to the idea of the ‘elective monarchy’













The most interesting part of Godwin’s analysis is his discussion of democracy. Of all the forms of government, democracy is the one which offers the best means of progressing to the end of the rational society that Godwin envisages. Democracy is ‘a system of government according to which every member of society is considered as a man and nothing else. So far as positive regulation is concerned, if indeed that can with any propriety be termed regulation which is the mere recognition of the simplest of all principles, every man is regarded as equal’. Throughout history, the best polities of human beings have only approximated this ideal. However imperfect, though, the achievements of democracies have far outstripped those of monarchies and aristocracies.

Democracy restores to man a consciousness of his value, teaches him by the removal of authority and oppression to listen only to the dictates of reason, gives him confidence to treat other men as his fellow beings, and induces him to regard them no longer as enemies against whom to be upon his guard, but as brethren whom it becomes him to assist.

The ideal of democracy has yet to be realised; on the level of experience, democracy has yet to attain the condition of true social justice. The failure to develop a due sense of the power of truth and the value of sincerity leaves democracies having to rely on institutional forms doing what a rational people should do. A true democracy would be strong enough in its foundations in a rational people to dispense with its institutional crutches; for ‘the contest between truth and falsehood is of itself too unequal for the former to stand in need of support from any political ally’. Strengthening truth and sincerity would also make it possible to finally extinguish religious fictions, political myths, and all collective and collectivising myths which have been used to misrule people and prevent them from being able to rule themselves. Godwin explicitly repudiates the division of government and society between an enlightened elite and an ignorant mass. Godwin rejects the dualism of rulers and ruled which is implied by this division, arguing that the rational capacity is immanent in all human beings, therefore making self-rule possible.

Why divide men into two classes [he asks], one of which is to think and reason for the whole, and the other to take the conclusions of their superiors on trust? This distinction is not founded in the nature of things; there is no such inherent difference between man and man as it thinks proper to suppose. The reasons that should convince us that virtue is better than vice are neither complicated nor abstruse; and the less they be tampered with by the injudicious interference of political institutions, the more they will come home to the understanding and approve themselves to the judgement of every man.

Having attacked government, Godwin proceeded to criticise law. Godwin’s main charge is that law, in its generalisation and abstraction, detracts from the diversity of human experience. Further, although it is supposed to clear and certain, law is cloaked in ambiguity. Law is experienced as arbitrary and few are clear as to how the law will treat them. Moreover, the law ‘fixes the human mind in a stagnant condition, and to substitute a principle of permanence in the room of that unceasing progress which is the only salubrious element of mind’ (Godwin 1976:688). 





For all of these reasons Godwin argues for the abolition of law and its replacement by situational wisdom. This involves reason being applied according to the uniqueness of each incident, according to the different factors involved. Only such an approach is befitting of a rational people.

Godwin turn finally to punishment. Godwin rejects punishment as a recourse to force which lacks the intrinsic capacity to convince (Godwin 1976:633). As such, punishment is to be rejected as of a piece with all other forms of political coercion. ‘It is no argument … it begins with violently alienating the mind from the truth with which we wish to be impressed’. Godwin’s faith in reason is absolute. He argues that with the clear and fair presentation of the evidence, no individual will reject the truth for falsehood (572 563).

‘Each man should be wise enough to govern himself, without the intervention of any compulsory restraint’. Individuals who are capable of exercising their own reason and consulting their own private judgement are also capable of dispensing with government, law and coercion. These rational individuals are autonomous. 





Affirming individual autonomy through reason, Godwin rejects law for its reduction of the individual to a ‘clockwork uniformity’ (Godwin 1976:758). Godwin’s statement of the principle of individual autonomy is so strong as to extinguish all forms of cooperation. ‘Everything that is usually understood by the term co-operation is in some degree an evil’ (Godwin 1976:758). The argument leads to the rejection of all forms of co-operation which inhibits a person’s individuality and capacity for independent thought. Godwin therefore repudiates marriage as an infringement on personal independence (759/62).





The problem is that such self-determined, independent beings are also non-co-operative and non-cooperating. So much so that they seem incapable of anything more than a monadic freedom. Stated thus, Godwin is committed not to a rejection of Lockean liberalism as to an extreme individualist form. But Godwin also gives strong arguments for co-operation which enhances a person’s individuality and capacity for independent thought. Godwin goes further to affirm a positive conception of liberty, a view which possesses a more social and communitarian dimension. In this aspect, Godwin’s thought gives more attention to values of community, cooperation and solidarity, as generated spontaneously from within the relations of virtuous and duty-seeking neighbours. Godwin therefore argues that the new society will enshrine cooperation, but not cooperation as it is ‘usually understood’.

‘Political Simplicity’ : Utopian Anarchism in Political Justice
There are three components to Godwin’s anarchist society: ‘political simplicity’, ‘public inspection’ and ‘positive sincerity’. The practice of sincerity and the performance of public inspection require political simplicity. This simplicity is achieved through the geopolitical reorganisation of society. 





Godwin argues for the simplification and the decentralisation of all forms of administration. Great, complex centralised states should be dissolved into localised forms, reducing the scope for political machination and ambition. ‘Sobriety and equity are the obvious characteristics of a limited circle’. Godwin’s vision implies an enlightened localism rather than a narrow parochialism since the localities would be outward-looking in federating with each other within a single great republic; individuals would be free to move without the impediment of national barriers.
The simplification of the social order is designed to destroy the complexity that puts systems and structure beyond the control and comprehension of the people. Simplification restores the world to human scale and proportions, making it possible for individuals to identify with the world around them. Simplification would be achieved by dissolving national assembles in favour of a localism and federalism (Godwin 1976:547/52). Nations would be broken down into autonomous units which are scaled so as to enable individuals to control their own affairs, thus eliminating the myriad errors committed by central government.





Godwin’s ideal of a libertarian society was constituted by a network of independent parishes, with a minimum of authority, federated upwards with delegates rather than rulers. Godwin identifies ‘parishes’ as the political units of his rational localism. These ‘parishes’ are ancestors of the city-states, medieval communes and guilds and are forerunners of the communes, councils and soviets of anarchist and socialist politics. They are, in other words, not pressure or interest groups but counter-publics which are capable of becoming popular organs and units of political control. The whole of the community would participate in parish administration, and what few officials would be required fulfil the limited to practical details and providing information. There would be little need for legislation. The only form of permanent organisation that the parish would require is some form of a jury system to deal with offences against justice and to arbitrate in disputes.

Parishes organised on a local and federal basis would enable all individuals to be involved in governing their own affairs. Dissolving large political units into smaller entities abolishes the tyranny associated with government:





Godwin accepts that certain issues may be so complex as to exceed the competence of the parishes, making it necessary to call a general assembly. The parishes would convene a general assembly only when necessary. A general assembly is therefore a rare and extraordinary event, meeting possibly just once a year to adjust differences. The assembly would also be employed sparingly according to necessity, instituted ‘for the joint purpose of adjusting the differences between district and district’ (Godwin 1976:551).

Godwin is sceptical of such general bodies for the distance that they put between political power and decision-making and the people. Committed to the development of reason and a concern for truth amongst all, Godwin is concerned to guard against the tendency of general assemblies to expound and impose a fictitious unanimity achieved by majority decision. He fears real unanimity even more for its evidence of the lack of individual thought. This results when delegates form themselves into parties and subordinate their individual judgement to the party line. Godwin also criticises the practice of voting, describing ‘the deciding upon truth by the casting up of numbers’ as an ‘intolerable insult upon all reason and justice’. Godwin thus concludes that general assemblies should be used only when necessary and even then only ‘as sparingly as the case will admit’. No laws would be passed and no votes would be taken; for ‘the deciding upon truth by the casting out of numbers’ (551) is an affront to reason and justice.

The parish requires no political institutions. The few disputes that arise would be settled by calling a jury. Lacking coercive power, the juries would only invite, reason and persuade rather than dictate. The parish would therefore replace political authority with public persuasion. The whole system works by the power ‘of public inspection’. Within the simplicity of appropriately scaled units the ‘observant eye of public judgement’ would serve to prompt all individuals to pursue the common good. For Godwin the face-to-face contacts of simpler and more local surroundings made individuals more moral and virtuous, the converse being true in the anonymity of mass society. Large political units require coercion and force whereas smaller units make it possible for human relations to be subject to the watchful and censuring eye of public opinion. Law and government dissolve when the disapproval of one’s neighbours is sufficient to deter people from vice (559).





Free from the constraints of governmental coercion, the autonomous individuals freely exercising their private judgements in the parishes will not leave each other alone. Godwin acknowledges the merits of Rousseau’s view in Émile that the great duty of man is to do no injury to his neighbour as a negative sincerity. Godwin’s positive sincerity goes much further than this to affirm that ‘the highest and most indispensable business of man, to study and promote his neighbour’s welfare’ (Godwin 1976:320/1). Here Godwin firmly abandons the privatised notion of liberal personal freedom. The private judgement which Godwin so values as a condition of individual autonomy will be exercised by each individual in the service of all others. 

‘It will pursue a higher will, a higher realm of truth. This pursuit will take the form not of legislative enactment of a general will but rather of positive, constructive, and sincere neighbourly advice and criticism’.





In arguing that ‘there is but one perfection to man’, Godwin is concerned to deny the view that human nature and the good life are relative terms; there is no plurality of ideals. Godwin believes that ‘there is but one best mode of social existence’ and that this single ideal can be deduced from the principles of human nature. ‘We have a common nature, and that common nature ought to be consulted. There is one thing, or series of things, that constitutes the true perfection of man’ (Godwin 1976:392). Godwin identifies the single and overriding ideal as ‘benevolence’ or ‘disinterested transport’. The goal of individuals’ in their social existence is ‘to make others free, virtuous and wise’. The single, uniform code of truth imposes reciprocal duties (249 302) so that each individual is obliged to ensure that others live up to the code which teaches benevolence and public spirit. 

By reducing institutions to the necessary minimum, individuals will be free to advance to the enlightened condition in which the appeal to reason will suffice to persuade them to desist from acting in ways harmful to others. As rational beings, individuals will be able to perceive the good naturally and will not need to be legally and institutionally constrained to the good. Ultimately, the rational society shall be attained in which the communication of truth will no longer require the intervention of any institution but will proceed naturally and spontaneously through the everyday practices of individuals. This is the rational society of moral beings living in just relations.

‘It is not true that our youth ought to be instructed to venerate the commonwealth, however excellent; they should be instructed to venerate truth, and the constitution only so far as it corresponded with their independent deductions of truth’.

Godwin’s simple, face-to-face, non-political society could not function without sincerity (288). The association in which ‘unreserved communication’ is practised between individuals ‘awakened to the pursuit of truth’ is made possible only by sincerity (Godwin 1976:288). In this society of political simplicity laws would not be required; the members of the parish would be rational enough to be able to judge each case by its particular circumstances and demands. The ‘spontaneous justice’ of the parish would represent a genuine reason and would therefore dispense with the written axioms of the irrational law. Godwin even envisages the time when even this would become unnecessary, public disapproval ensuring the honesty of all and crime therefore disappearing. The ‘legal’ crime and murder of governments would also cease within small scale political units that have no ambitions for extensive territory, empire, glory or martial greatness (611 693 598 659).

Godwin condemns government as being as bad in practice as it is in principle. As evidence, Godwin cites the enormous disparities of wealth in contemporary society and the fact that legislation and the laws favour the rich against the rest of society. Here, Godwin draws attention to the connection between the institution of private property in the civil sphere and the use of the public power through the state sphere. Rousseau had already made this point in criticising the liberal separation of the state from civil society as illusory. Asymmetries of wealth and power in the civil state will necessarily be expressed and entrenched in the laws of government. As Godwin argues, it is in the nature of political institutions, by giving power and privilege to individuals, ‘greatly to enhance the imagined excellence of wealth’. 

Crime will be abolished with the abolition of the social conditions that generate crime. The economic inequality which was the strongest cause of crime would be abolished. Godwin argues that the rich are ‘in all countries directly or indirectly the legislators of the state’ and are ‘perpetually reducing oppression into a system, and depriving the poor of that little commonage of nature which might otherwise still have remained to them’ (Godwin 1976:92). ‘Legislation is in almost every country grossly the favourer of the rich against the poor’ (Godwin 1976:93). Godwin draws attention to the fundamental inequity of the law which allows the rich to freely associate for monopoly and gain whilst at the same time preventing workers from combining in unions. Godwin goes on to show the disastrous consequences of inequality upon the poor, destroying the potential for distinction and intellectual achievement. To be born poor ‘may be said under another name to be born a slave’. Godwin refers to the ‘present ordering of society’ as ‘the great slaughter-house of genius and of mind’ (Godwin The Enquirer: Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature (London, 1797) p 162; 17),.





Many of the arguments that Godwin uses here are those which Rousseau used to show that the problems of government were not intrinsic to government but to the kinds of society that particular governments must protect. Godwin failed to grasp Rousseau’s point that that it would be possible to conceive of a government which embodied the sovereignty of the people with the creation of appropriate social conditions, in particular equality. Godwin’s argument that removing the social causes of crime would remove crime also applies to the argument he takes from Rousseau – remove the social inequality that leads to government dominated by the rich and powerful, and government for and by the people could be possible.
 
Godwin identifies modern technology as instrumental in the oppression and brutalisation of the poor. Godwin valued the progressive potential of technology but condemned its use with prevailing relations. These relations condemned workers to the factory system, estranging individuals from their selves and reducing them to the level of a machine.

A mechanic becomes a sort of machine; his limbs and articulations are converted, as it were, into wood and wires. Tamed, lowered, torpified into this character, he may be said perhaps to be content.

Godwin Fleetwood (London 1805), I 277

Economic inequality led to government and law by the rich, forcing the poor into crime, which served as a rationale for government and in turn attracted punishment by laws the rich had made in their own defence. The exploitation by the rich in society and its legalisation at the level of the state led the poor permanently to seek reprisals. For Godwin, the poor experienced ‘the state of society as a state of war’.

Political injustice and economic inequality were therefore inextricably connected and would therefore be abolished in Godwin’s simple parish society. Relations of exploitation and domination, the misuse of technology, the factory system, class oppression and legislation, crime and punishment would dissolve in the self-governing society. The dissolution of large scale political units, and with it the army of government functionaries, clerks, collectors, etc as well as the ending of foreign wars, would render taxation unnecessary. 

In economic arrangements, Godwin favoured a voluntary communism. Godwin argued that the fruits of the earth were a common stock and that human beings should act as stewards to use this wealth to the best advantage of all. For Godwin, each person should enjoy the fruit of his or her own labours. However, once their basic needs are satisfied, any surplus should be distributed to the most needy. Godwin thus favours a voluntary, spontaneous communism; a free society had no place for a ‘clockwork uniformity’ of common labour, stores or meals. Individuals would cooperate if they saw a reason to, but they would not be obliged to do so: ‘Every man ought to feel his independence, that he can assert the principles of justice and truth without being obliged treacherously to adapt them to the peculiarities of the situation and the errors of others’. Of course, ever the rationalist, Godwin assumed that everyone would be persuaded to contribute to cooperate, since the common good of all would be understood as enhancing the good of each cooperator.

Since leisure enabled individuals to develop their full potential, it was, for Godwin, the most important social good. Godwin therefore advocated the appropriate use of technology in order to alleviate unpleasant toil and reduce necessary labour-time. Godwin envisaged a time when it would be possible to work for only half an hour a day.

Godwin advocated cooperation over against a selfish individualism but rejected forced cooperation as contradicting autonomy and individuality. In a free society, the practice of direct democracy would engender a feeling of solidarity: ‘Each man would be united to his neighbour, in love and mutual kindness, a thousand times more than now: but each man would think and judge for himself’ (1986:173). Godwin is therefore attempting to affirm the social and the individual aspects of human nature, recognising human individuals as social beings. By emphasising the social and cooperative aspect of human nature, Godwin is attempting to affirm individuality as a richer and more expansive conception than individualism. Godwin therefore defines the ideal of communal autonomy.

In a way which savours a great deal of Taoism, Godwin affirms the existence of a natural order and harmony when stating that ‘there is a principle in the nature of human society by means of which everything seems to tend to its level, and to proceed in the most auspicious way, when least interfered with by the mode of regulation’ (1986:136). By intervening in this order, human beings can disrupt or subvert the harmonious balance that will prevail in nature and in society over the long term.

It is also a view which is reminiscent of Aristotle. ‘We should consider what is natural not in things which arc depraved but in those which are rightly ordered according to nature’. (Politics, Bk. i, ch. 2.) This was the quote that Rousseau used in introducing his What is the origin of inequality among men’.

Godwin opposes the qualitative enrichment of life to the domination of society by ‘accumulated property’ and the economic inequality it generates and which ‘treads the powers of thought in the dust, extinguishes the sparks of genius, and reduces the great mass of mankind to be immersed in sordid cares’.

Godwin examines the institution of private property in the final book of Political Justice. Here, Godwin argues that the abolition of accumulated property would remove the main causes of crime, particularly ‘one man’s possessing in abundance that of which another man is destitute’. Envy and selfishness, anxiety and insecurity, all those things which force human beings into egoistic competition for scarce resources would all disappear; so too would corruption, enmity and the incentives to war at home and abroad. ‘Each man would be united to his neighbour in love and mutual kindness a thousand times more than now; but each man would think and judge for himself’.

Condemning the moral evils of ‘accumulated property’, Godwin argued that the social system should be based on a community of goods which are shared according to need. This is not quite a welfare conception. Godwin doesn’t argue that the poor have the right to be supported by those who are better off but that the latter have a positive duty to support the poor.

Godwin’s argument is premised on the view that the abolition of ‘the system of coercion and punishment is intimately connected with the circumstance of property’s being placed on an equitable basis’. Thus, each individual ‘is entitled, so far as the general stock will suffice, not only to the means of being, but of well-being’. However, with the right to an equitable share of the common property comes the duty to undertake the full share of the common tasks.

Justice directs that each man, unless perhaps he be employed more beneficially to the public, should contribute to the cultivation of the common harvest, of which each man consumes a share. This reciprocity .. is of the very essence of justice.

Godwin outlines the contours of a propertyless society at one with nature, with individuals working cooperatively in the fields to satisfy their just needs; these are determined by their own estimates, since people are rational, and do not require the mechanism of currency or exchange. Individuals draw what they need from the common barns and store-houses. Godwin’s ideal is the condition in which individuals have such ‘independence of mind, which makes us feel that our satisfactions are not at the mercy either of men or of fortune, and activity of mind, the cheerfulness that arises from industry properly employed about objects of which our judgement acknowledges the intrinsic value’.

Godwin nevertheless affirmed the continued legitimacy of the right to private property; private property was essential for independence and the exercise of private judgement. Godwin sees property as crucial to the independence and autonomy of anarchist man.





Again, Godwin’s arguments here savour a great deal of Rousseau, who described private property as a ‘sacred’ right. Rousseau sought not a flat, quantified equality but a situation in which none would be too rich as to be able to buy another and none too poor as to have to sell themselves. In similar fashion, Godwin argues against too great and too unequal an accumulation of property as an injustice. In the small and simple parish society the accumulation of property would be restrained within limits by ‘the good sense of the community, and the inspection of all exercised upon all’. In time, an equality of holdings would be achieved in the parish so that no one would have more than required for the satisfaction of needs. In such a society the economy would be dominated by simple manual industry and agriculture. With the abolition of relations of exploitation, it would be impossible to accumulate unearned property through the labour of others (625 710 694 744).

Of property there are three degrees.
The first and simplest degree is that of my permanent right in those things the use of which being attributed to me, a greater sum of benefit or pleasure will result than could have arisen from their being otherwise appropriated.

The second degree of property is the empire to which every man is entitled over the produce of his own industry, even that part of it the use of which ought not to be appropriated to himself. It has been repeatedly shown that all the rights of man which are of this description are passive. He has no right of option in the disposal of anything which may fall into his hands.

All men cannot be entitled to exercise compulsion on each other, for this would produce universal anarchy. All men cannot collectively be entitled to exercise unbounded compulsion, for this would produce universal slavery: the interference of government, however impartially vested, is, no doubt, only to be resorted to upon occasions of rare occurrence, and indispensable urgency.

The third degree of property is that which occupies the most vigilant attention in the civilised states of Europe. It is a system, in whatever manner established, by which one man enters into the faculty of disposing of the produce of another man’s industry. There is scarcely any species of wealth, expenditure or splendour, existing in any civilised country, that is not, in some way, produced by the express manual labour, and corporal industry, of the inhabitants of that country. The spontaneous productions of the earth are few, and contribute little to wealth, expenditure or splendour.

It is clear, therefore, that the third species of property is in direct contradiction to the second.
The most desirable state of human society would require that the quantity of manual labour and corporal industry to be exerted, and particularly that part of it which is not the uninfluenced choice of our own judgement, but is imposed upon each individual by the necessity of his affairs, should be reduced within as narrow limits as possible. For any man to enjoy the most trivial accommodation, while, at the same time, a similar accommodation is not accessible to every other member of the community, is, absolutely speaking, wrong. All refinements of luxury, all inventions that tend to give employment to a great number of labouring hands, are directly adverse to the propagation of happiness. Every additional tax that is laid on, every new channel that is opened for the expenditure of the public money, unless it be compensated (which is scarcely ever the case) by an equivalent deduction from the luxuries of the rich, is so much added to the general stock of ignorance, drudgery and hardship.





The amount of labour required from each in such a state of equality is ‘so light’ as to ‘assume the guise of agreeable relaxation and gentle exercise than of labour’.





The work to ensure that the community is supplied with the necessities of life would be distributed equally amongst all members of the community and would therefore occupy merely one-twentieth of the time of each. All members of the community would perform manual labour about half an hour a day. The remainder of the day is spent enjoying life, learning and nature in an idyllic rural existence (Godwin 1976:744/7).

The reader must .. be reminded that the equality for which we are pleading is an equality which would succeed to a state of great intellectual improvement. So bold a revolution cannot take place in human affairs till the general mind has been highly cultivated. Hasty and undigested tumults may be produced by a superficial idea of equalization; but it is only a clear and calm conviction of justice, of justice mutually to be rendered and received, of happiness to be produced by the desertion of our most rooted habits, that can introduce an invariable system of this sort.

Godwin 1976:744
Godwin’s model for his vision of a community free of law, free of coercion, free of institutions, free of power, indeed, free of politics. ‘A question suggests itself … respecting the propriety of associations among the people at large for the purpose of operating a change in their political institutions’ (Godwin 1976:282).

The radical ideal of anarchic political simplicity he was certain could never be brought about by radical political agitation or reform. Godwin repudiates political associations, parties and any form of co-operative political endeavour since they contradict the individual’s obligation to exercise his or her own reason in search of the truth. In a collective gathering, the forceful and the devious push aside the ‘prudent, the sober, the sceptical, and the contemplative’. Such meetings could never produce truth, which requires rigorous and laborious enquiry. Party emphasises unanimity in support of a single creed and therefore denies the obligation to think for oneself. Meetings give expression to the superficial convictions of committed partisans rather than produce truth. 





Party reduces a diversity of opinion to a common position. Party members have to subscribe to that single view. Enquiry is positively discouraged. Not truth but ‘harangue and declamation’ are the necessary products of political meeting: ‘A majority of the members of any numerous popular society will look to these harangues as the school in which they are to study, in order to become the reservoirs of practical truth to the rest of mankind. But harangues and declamation lead to passion, and not to knowledge’ (Godwin 1976:285). Political meetings generate not rational argument leading to truth, only the passion which reinforces existing prejudices. Party leaders and orators ‘render everything rapid’ and ‘work up the passions of his hearers’: ‘Truth can scarcely be acquired in crowded halls and amidst noisy debates. Where hope and fear, triumph and resentment, are perpetually afloat, the severer faculties of investigation are compelled to quit the field. Truth dwells with contemplation’ (Godwin 1976:285/6).

For Godwin, the spreading of truth is the most appropriate form of resistance, the ‘censuring in the most explicit manner every proceeding that I perceive to be adverse to the true interests of mankind’. The only effective, enduring revolution is the one that proceeds from the changing of opinions and dispositions in the people. The record of achieving change by political force is abysmal, revolution often bringing about a worse form of the government than the one replaced. Reason is much more effective in achieving ends, but must be direct and individual. Godwin is sceptical of political associations for their tendency to decide issues and opinions by force of numbers rather than by the truth. Godwin is prepared to admit associations to resist encroachments on freedom, but argues that even these should be dispersed as soon as they have outlived their original purpose. Godwin is wary of the tendency of associations to ossify into a permanent institutional structure. Education rather than politics prevails in Godwin’s approach. This is evident in his advocacy of the formation of loose discussion-groups of individuals alive to the pursuit of truth. In time, these could develop into a universal movement, functioning for the improvement of individuals and ‘the amelioration of political institutions’. However, any attempt to develop uniformity of thought should be resisted. ‘Human beings should meet together not to enforce but to inquire. Truth disclaims the alliance of marshalled numbers’. Godwin therefore envisages change as a gradual, even serene, process proceeding through the awakening of reason amongst the people. This does not imply that ‘the revolution is at an immeasurable distance’ but is an ongoing process taking place in the minds of the people. ‘The kingdom of truth comes not with ostentation’; revolution is a rational process undertaken by all as rational beings rather than a political event undertaken by rulers and parties.

Godwin’s individualism was so pronounced as to make him highly sceptical of any kind of cooperation that had the potential to ossify into institutional form. Godwin was acutely sensitive to the inertia of institutions. That said, Godwin’s individualism is not the atomism or egoism of the market liberals. Godwin is as far removed from the Hobbesian nightmare of mutual enmity and jealousy and is quite capable of conceiving individuals as joining together in collective endeavours. Thus, whilst Godwin rejects organised political parties and associations, he also advocates the creation of small, loosely formed groups coalescing naturally into a wider movement. Such groups would permit their members to function as rational, autonomous beings in a way that the mass politics of the state and the party prevent. Godwin’s highly critical rejection of organised political parties is one that is increasingly common as the democratic deficit at the heart of liberal representative systems grows bigger. More evidence of Godwinian cooperation is to be found in the argument for specialisation in the various crafts enabling individuals to follow the task for which they have the greatest aptitude. He also conceives individuals as distributing their surplus products to others according to just need, likewise receiving what they themselves need from the surplus of others. This proceeds on the basis of free distribution rather than exchange. The society that Godwin envisages is clearly based on the handicrafts and cultivation rather than industry and technology.

The intersubjective character of Godwin’s individualism emerges also in his view of his commitment to truth. Intercourse between individuals is necessary for the development of reason, the exchange of ideas and the communication of truth. Individuals build their rational character by means of free conversation. ‘It follows that the promoting the best interests of mankind eminently depends upon the freedom of social communication’ (Godwin 1976:289).

Godwin’s case for small self-governing political units based on simplicity and sincerity is timely in a world which is witnessing a growing interest in ecological politics. Ecological crisis will continue to spur innovation in political thought and organisation and, certainly, a rescaling of size and needs. Godwin’s parish society has plenty to offer here. Godwin roots out the causes of human conflict and competition and so can conceive of the abolition of state, government and laws. The selfish interest that once spurred competition and conflict disappears and, with it, the necessity of political authority and rules. The energies that were once dissipated in political and social war come to be redirected and can now be positively expressed through spontaneous harmony and joy. The parishes make possible the life of simplicity and sincerity crucial to the realisation of reason and freedom in the individual personality and in the relations of these truly autonomous beings with other autonomous beings. In this harmonious society of genuine communality, politics, coercion and government cease to exist. Politics is replaced, in Godwin’s parishes, by non-coercive/non-authoritarian mutual co-operation or in the language of Kropotkin mutual aid.








There are good reasons for beginning a close examination of the German philosophical contribution to the ‘rational’ project of locating individual freedom in a social context with the Swiss philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau was the first philosopher to wrestle with the problem of how the classical conception of freedom as a public process can be reappropriated and reconfigured on the modern terrain. Rousseau’s notion of the general will, of active sovereignty, his idea of resting the legitimacy of the state upon morality as against force proved most influential, taking the form of the universal law in Kant, the state as ethical agency in Hegel and true democracy in Marx. Aspects of Rousseau’s thought also savour a good deal of Habermas’s communicative ethic. 

By the time of the French Revolution Rousseau was the best, the most widely read and the most controversial writer in France. His many books discussed citizenship, moral education and political and social theory in a holistic way, as all relating to each other. The enormously popular Emile, the several Discourses, and the Nouvelle Heloise’ idealised the citoyen as the whole person (Spurlin, Rousseau in America,, and Miller, Rousseau, chap. 6; Spurlin, Paul M. Rousseau in America, 1760-1809. University: University of Alabama Press, 1969). It is significant, however, that the Social Contract was the least read of his works before the Revolution. For the principles that Rousseau developed in support of his ethico-political community bear precious little relation to the centralised republican state that followed the Revolution, quite the opposite. It has been argued that ‘the greatest and most constructive single idea of the French Revolution was the idea of citizenship .. over a wide area .. of free, rational, and responsible beings, not of mere nationals of a government’ (Palmer, "Man and Citizen," pp. 150-51; Palmer, R. R. "Man and Citizen: Applications of Individualism in the French Revolution." In Essays in Political Theory Presented to George H. Sabine, edited by M. R. Konvitz and A. E. Murphy, pp. 130-52. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948.). This was not Rousseau’s conception of citizenship. It reads more like Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit, the ethical life incorporating Rousseauan principles within the nation state. 

The terms, principles and concepts which Rousseau used were wrenched out of the context and pressed into the service of the new republican state. In the process, Rousseau went down in history as the hero or villain – depending on one’s politics – of citizen democracy or totalitarian democracy (to use Talmon’s phrase). Rousseau has been revered as the intellectual father of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the French Revolution. Yet Rousseau’s own political vision was firmly focused upon the small scale, autonomous city-state, the morally ordered, compact, organic societies which the French Revolution and the centralised republican states that followed in the century after destroyed. Rousseau himself conceived citizenship in terms which went all the way back to ancient Greece, a concept which was finally extinguished by the centralised state politics that followed his death.

 Although Rousseau is frequently classed as part of the Enlightenment, he is best categorised as being both in and against it. In criticising and reworking Enlightenment principles, Rousseau actually inspired the Romantic reaction against the Enlightenment. In addressing practical problems of politics, the state, consent and sovereignty, Rousseau understood that rulers could give their people nothing other than what the people themselves were prepared to accept. Voltaire’s conception of the enlightened despot presumed the existence of an enlightened people. Against the notion of a despotic will, imposing the good on a passive people, Rousseau developed the idea of a general will on the part of the people – the idea of a general interest of the people as a whole.

Whilst this involved an optimism in politics apparently little different from that of the likes of Condorcet, it had very different origins and motivations. Whereas Enlightenment thinkers rested their expectations on an appeal to enlightened rulers, Romantic thinkers rested theirs on the enlightenment of popular education yielding an enlightened people. 

Rousseau’s views on the general will, equality and good government are tied together and rendered consistent by an ideal of citizenship. In dealing with the problems of modern state and society, Rousseau in many ways recovered the Platonic political vision in ways that were relevant to contemporary European thought and practice. In Rousseau’s Platonism, the forms left the eternal and abstract world of being to become the basic organising concepts of the modern world. One hesitates here to refer to the ‘modern state’. Despite Rousseau’s reputation as a prophet of the modern centralised state, as ushered in by the French Revolution, closer examination reveals Rousseau to be arguing against the modern state and bourgeois civil society. His citizenship harks back to an older ideal and looks forward to an active, informed designation beyond large concentrations of power. Rousseau’s vision is that of a modern polis democracy, political units characterised by a small area, small and organically ordered population, based on a shared religion and political culture. Rousseau’s conception of the citizen, then, envisages an association of individuals whose status and identity is given by membership of and contribution to the community, as well as by personal and family ties. Rousseau here is in accord with ancient notions of the polis. In arguing that human beings are social beings Aristotle argued that ‘he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god ' (Politics). In the Preface to Inequality, Rousseau writes: ‘For how shall we know the source of inequality between men, if we do not begin by knowing mankind? And how shall man hope to see himself as nature made him, across all the changes which the succession of place and time must have produced in his original constitution? How can he distinguish what is fundamental in his nature from the changes and additions which his circumstances and the advances he has made have introduced to modify his primitive condition? Like the statue of Glaucus, which was so disfigured by time, seas, and tempests, that it looked more like a wild beast than a god, the human soul, altered in society by a thousand causes perpetually recurring, by the acquisition of a multitude of truths and errors, by the changes happening to the constitution of the body, and by the continual jarring of the passions, has, so to speak, changed in appearance, so as to be hardly recognizable. Instead of a being, acting constantly from fixed and invariable principles, instead of that celestial and majestic simplicity, impressed on it by its divine Author, we find it only the frightful contrast of passion mistaking itself for reason, and of understanding grown delirious.’
For Rousseau, a moral life outside of the polis is an impossibility. And Rousseau was not referring generally to the polis as such but specifically to one’s own polis, the polis of one’s own forebears and birth. In return for this gift of a cultural and moral identity, individuals as citizens owe obedience, service, devotion, and sacrifice to the polis. It is in considering this allegiance owed by citizens that it becomes important to emphasise that Rousseau was not referring to what Hegel and Marx later condemned as the ‘abstraction of the modern state’. Failure to make this distinction makes it very to portray Rousseau as advocating ‘totalitarian democracy’. Rousseau can plainly see the totalitarian temptation in both modern developments and Enlightenment thinking and is concerned to reject them. His world is one of agriculture. Rousseau is suspicious of commerce for the way it subverts the public realm and purpose. His awareness of the extent to which powerful groups could capture the general interest and organise the state around sectional interests led him to devalue the importance of particular associations in civil society. This absence of a welter of civic associations certainly opened the way to the centralised state, but Rousseau’s error was the result of an attempt to properly constitute the public power as the power of the unitary polis rather than the homogeneity of the state. In Rousseau’s polis, comfort and enough are valued over wealth and aggrandizement. Rousseau affirms the moral superiority of the farmer over the merchant for the further reason that agriculture makes the body strong, hence fit to serve the polis on the battlefield or at sea. 

Society comprises a range of educational institutions through which the citizen is socialised according to a value scheme and know his place within the whole - the temple, the agora, the ranks, the gymnasium, the streets, the courts.
Rousseau is best considered a Germanic thinker than a French thinker. Although he lived and wrote in France, his critical comments betray his Germanic origins. Rousseau spent his childhood and formative years in the city-state of Geneva, and this influence is evident in his perspectives. Indeed, Geneva is a paradigmatic example of a city state and small community which bore the enduring imprint of a powerful founder as both law-giver and moral guide. In Calvin, Geneva had a modern day Lycurgus. And whilst Calvinism can be condemned for its repressive, intolerant and narrow minded quality, it produced in Geneva a model of the well-run city state. Geneva gave Rousseau an enduring concern with communitarian moral force, something which he attempted to give general expression to in his political writings.

One can begin with the ‘dedication to the Republic of Geneva’ which opens Inequality. The dedication gives Rousseau the opportunity to pay homage to his home city. Rousseau writes as ‘a virtuous citizen’ who wishes to offer ‘public homage’ to Geneva. For Rousseau, Geneva’s statutes bring order and happiness to its inhabitants though their approximation to the principles of natural law. 
 ‘Having had the happiness to be born among you, how could I reflect on the equality which nature has ordained between men, and the inequality which they have introduced, without reflecting on the profound wisdom by which both are in this State happily combined and made to coincide, in the manner that is most in conformity with natural law, and most favourable to society, to the maintenance of public order and to the happiness of individuals? In my researches after the best rules common sense can lay down for the constitution of a government, I have been so struck at finding them all in actuality in your own, that even had I not been born within your walls I should have thought it indispensable for me to offer this picture of human society to that people, which of all others seems to be possessed of its greatest advantages, and to have best guarded against its abuses.’

The principles that Rousseau singles out for praise are important in that they endure throughout Rousseau’s work - smallness, the face-to-face nature of politics, the citizens’ love of the public good that translates into love of their compatriots. In these essential features of the Genevan city state Rousseau identifies a general interest uniting ruler and ruled, a general will that can flourish through actively democratic governmental system in which citizens are regularly elected to serve in a capacity commensurate with their abilities rule. In such a well constituted city state, the citizen prefers peace to war, comfort to wealth, law-abidingness to the resolute pursuit of self-interest. ‘If I had had to make choice of the place of my birth, I should have preferred a society which had an extent proportionate to the limits of the human faculties; that is, to the possibility of being well governed: in which every person being equal to his occupation, no one should be obliged to commit to others the functions with which he was entrusted: a State, in which all the individuals being well known to one another, neither the secret machinations of vice, nor the modesty of virtue should be able to escape the notice and judgment of the public; and in which the pleasant custom of seeing and knowing one another should make the love of country rather a love of the citizens than of its soil.’ 

The irony is that Rousseau has come to be considered an influence on the development of the large centralised nation states of capitalist modernity when, in fact, he criticised bigness in favour of the moral relationships and actively democratic rule that could be found in a city state of appropriate size and scale.

In elaborating his principles, Rousseau expresses the wish ‘to be born in a country in which the interest of the Sovereign and that of the people must be single and identical; to the end that all the movements of the machine might tend always to the general happiness.’ This can only be achieved if ‘the Sovereign and the people were one and the same person’, and this implies ‘a democratic government, wisely tempered’. This involves being subject to self-made laws, laws which the free citizen ‘should be able to cast off’. Freedom is therefore not licence but freedom under the self-assumed obligation of law: ‘no one within the State should be able to say he was above the law; and that no one without should be able to dictate so that the State should be obliged to recognize his authority. For, be the constitution of a government what it may, if there be within its jurisdiction a single man who is not subject to the law, all the rest are necessarily at his discretion. And if there be a national ruler within, and a foreign ruler without, however they may divide their authority, it is impossible that both should be duly obeyed, or that the State should be well governed.’

Rousseau rejects republics of ‘recent institution’ since these are framed according to the circumstances of the moment and run the risk of overthrow and destruction once disagreement and dissension over liberty breaks out. ‘For it is with liberty as it is with those solid and succulent foods, or with those generous wines which are well adapted to nourish and fortify robust constitutions that are used to them, but ruin and intoxicate weak and delicate constitutions to which they are not suited. Peoples once accustomed to masters are not in a condition to do without them. If they attempt to shake off the yoke they still more estrange themselves from freedom, as, by mistaking for it an unbridled licence to which it is diametrically opposed, they nearly always manage, by their revolutions, to hand themselves over to seducers, who only make their chains heavier than before’. Rousseau gives the example of the Roman people who, although considered a model for all free peoples, ‘was wholly incapable of governing itself when it escaped from the oppression of the Tarquins. Debased by slavery, and the ignominious tasks which had been imposed upon it, it was at first no better than a stupid mob, which it was necessary to control and govern with the greatest wisdom; in order that, being accustomed by degrees to breathe the health-giving air of liberty, minds which had been enervated or rather brutalized under tyranny, might gradually acquire that severity of morals and spirit of fortitude which made it at length the people of all most worthy of respect.’ Rousseau thus favours a ‘peaceful and happy Republic’ of ‘courage and patriotism’ ‘and whose citizens, long accustomed to a wise independence, were not only free, but worthy to be so.’

In such a city state ‘the right of legislation was vested in all the citizens; for who can judge better than they of the conditions under which they had best dwell together in the same society?’ He argues against plebiscita, and all such dangerous, self-interested, innovations such as bring about ruination. Instead the right to propose new laws ‘should belong exclusively to the magistrates; and that even they should use it with so much caution, the people, on its side, be so reserved in giving its consent to such laws, and the promulgation of them be attended with so much solemnity, that before the constitution could be upset by them, there might be time enough for all to be convinced, that it is above all the great antiquity of the laws which makes them sacred and venerable, that men soon learn to despise laws which they see daily altered, and that States, by accustoming themselves to neglect their ancient customs under the pretext of improvement, often introduce greater evils than those they endeavour to remove.’

For John Hoffman, Rousseau shared an abstract individualism with liberalism with the result that the state remains external to those individuals. Hoffman is mistaken. Rousseau’s actively democratic version of ‘rational freedom’ actually recasts the basis of liberal politics and philosophy, exposing the abstract egalitarian device of the ‘fraudulent liberal social contract’ (Pateman 1985:142/62). As a philosopher of popular sovereignty who establishes a reciprocal relation between rulers and ruled (Jennings 1994:115; Pateman 1970:22), Rousseau is a crucial figure in defining an associative and participatory conception of public life. Giving consent an active and continuous expression, Rousseau establishes the democratic means for constituting public authority. Rousseau’s public is founded on a democratic social contract in which obligated individuals are actively engaged in making the laws to which they are subjected. Living is ‘obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves’ (Rousseau 1973:178). This self-assumed obligation establishes ‘an actual foundation for a participatory political order of the future’ (Pateman 1985:150). Rousseau offers a view of direct, participatory democracy as practised through the government of the small town as against that of the big city. Rousseau addresses problems of quantity and scale, emphasising that an active citizen democracy requires social transparency.

Rousseau’s social contract, subjecting individuals to the general will, affirms that individuals are in relation to and dependent upon each other. Rousseau’s concern is to unite justice and utility in an administration that is both legitimate and effective (Rousseau 1973:165), replacing force in human affairs by a morality that is constituted by the will of individuals. The tacit consent of the individualist liberal John Locke is replaced with the active and continuous participation of individuals (Rousseau 1973:168). Rousseau’s philosophy identifies the ideal of the internal government of society, a moral coordination based upon an active conception of sovereignty. The state would disappear once reason was in control and individuals have transcended their natural selfish inclinations. 

One can appreciate the extent to which Rousseau, whilst arguing against the large scale modern state governed by a professional class of politicians and officials, is not an anarchist. His argument has a very different flavour to that of Godwin’s Political Justice. For Rousseau, ‘a Republic in which the people, imagining themselves in a position to do without magistrates …. should imprudently have kept for themselves the administration of civil affairs and the execution of their own laws’ is ‘necessarily ill-governed’. This follows, as Aristotle argued, from identifying liberty with licence. Rousseau could have been thinking of Hobbes’ ‘war of all against all’ when he criticises that this ‘must have been the rude constitution of primitive governments, directly emerging from a state of nature; and this was another of the vices that contributed to the downfall of the Republic of Athens’.

Rousseau is clear that freedom is a negotiated, cooperative endeavour in which individuals agree to join together under law. He expresses a preference for ‘a community in which the individuals, content with sanctioning their laws, and deciding the most important public affairs in general assembly and on the motion of the rulers, had established honoured tribunals, carefully distinguished the several departments, and elected year by year some of the most capable and upright of their fellow-citizens to administer justice and govern the State; a community, in short in which the virtue of the magistrates thus bearing witness to the wisdom of the people, each class reciprocally did the other honour. If in such a case any fatal misunderstandings arose to disturb the public peace, even these intervals of blindness and error would bear the marks of moderation, mutual esteem, and a common respect for the laws; which are sure signs and pledges of a reconciliation as lasting as sincere.’ Rousseau writes of the virtues of ‘this happy country’: ‘to live at peace in the sweet society of my fellow-citizens, and practising towards them, from their own example, the duties of friendship, humanity, and every other virtue, to leave behind me the honourable memory of a good man, and an upright and virtuous patriot.’

Rousseau writes of ‘moderation, of simplicity of manners, of respect for the laws, and of the most sincere harmony?’ ‘Place, therefore, without reserve, in such wise superiors, that salutary confidence which reason ever owes to virtue. Consider that they are your own choice, that they justify that choice, and that the honours due to those whom you have dignified are necessarily yours by reflection.’ 

As with Hobbes, what Rousseau refers to as ‘the state of nature’ does not refer to a specific time and place in history but is a philosopher’s device which makes it possible to analyse contemporary society and construct an ideal society by way of contrast. Leaving the state of nature for the civil state, individuals sought a greater freedom but also encountered problems. This is the question with which Rousseau deals. Whilst Rousseau praised the community under common self-made laws for forming virtuous citizens, this society also created conditions of social inequality. Rousseau had not identified a new problem here but something endemic in organised society. Plato had fixed the ideal number of citizens, each with an equal amount of property lest envy bring down the community. He refused to write a constitution for a city state on the reasoning that its inequalities would render it unworkable. Aristotle to favoured the ‘middle element’ in a polity, arguing that the richest in society should earn no more than three times the poorest, again lest envy and enmity bring down the whole. Rousseau too saw the dangers which the very existence of society brought to community and the common good.

Rousseau makes active sovereignty crucial to his position. For both anthropological and political reasons, sovereignty cannot be alienated and represented but must be exercised (Rousseau 1973:170 182 239/422; Jennings 1994:117 119). Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will and is crucial to self-realisation. The direct exercise of sovereignty is crucial to citizenship whilst citizenship is an active designation only in being asserted by individuals in assembly being involved in decision-making processes. From this perspective, represented sovereignty is an alienation that negates the demos as a citizen body and is also corrosive of self-hood. Representation denies the concept of ‘public sphere’ as constituted by the citizen body and it frustrates the process of individuation by which the individual becomes a social agent, a true citizen in the classical Athenian sense.

Rousseau’s participatory conception of the public community is premised on an ‘internal’, actively democratic conception of public authority and constraint as integral to freedom as self-determination. Individuals obtain a degree of control over their social existence through their participation in collective decision-making (Pateman 1970:26 27). Public authority is thus the common force of individuals exercising sovereignty in the cause of the common good.

The problem that confronted Rousseau was that this classical notion of citizenship presupposes a classical social identity in which public and private interest coincide. The problem is that the modern process of rationalisation has severed this coincidence. The atomisation of civil society and the subjection of individuals to the egoistic and antagonistic conditions of private property in the modern world have worked to destroy the coincidence between the ‘will of all’ as an aggregate of particular interests and the ‘general will’ as pertaining to the good of the whole. Rousseau argued that the ‘will of all’ could only will the ‘general will’ through a citizen assembly deliberating under rules of communicative rationality (Rousseau 1973:184/6 237 245 246 250), a view which savours a great deal of Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action. For Rousseau, the body politic only exists if it is embodied in a citizen assembly. It has existential significance only if an institutional structure is provided for citizens to make their presence felt. In this scenario, citizenship acquires meaning as a social movement aiming against the abstraction of power. This requires the provision of public fora so that the citizen body can assemble to deliberate and decide upon policies affecting social life.

Rousseau affirms a developmental and educative conception of politics in which the individual learns to take into account public issues; Rousseau’s public is thus a democratic community of active citizens (Plamenatz 1963:433/37; Colletti 1972:183/5). The way that Rousseau constructs his case for public authority is important in identifying an ideal of internal moral coordination operative within self-governing civil society. The constraint and authority to which each individual is subject for the common good need not be ‘external’ since, for Rousseau, the people are able to determine, in a popular assembly, whether a law is ‘in conformity with the general will, which is their will’ (Rousseau 1973:250).

Rousseau turned to education, education as a means to popular enlightenment, virtuous citizenship. Rousseau well understood that “you will have everything if you train citizens” and that “training citizens is not just a day’s work”. Liberty requires a complex and structured schooling to produce the necessary virtue. The youth must be instructed in the traditions and values of the community, thus forming the general will, and must be aroused to the passion which is the desideratum of good citizenship. It is this emotion and feeling more than duty and responsibility which constitutes the moral force that forges the association of citizens into a true community.

This education begins at “the first moment of life”. In assimilating the high vision of human relationships conveyed by the community’s schools, the individual is formed into the citizen. This assimilation is not merely passive but is given active force as membership of and participation in the political community, enacted through opportunities to perform the military and political functions that bring honour and esteem in the community (Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality (Ritter edition) 72; Rahe in "Primacy of Politics," p. 7; Rahe, Paul. "The Primacy of Politics in Classical Greece." American Historical Review 89 (1984): 265-93.). Obedience to the laws which one has had a role in making, a sense of the history and traditions of the community, the appetite for service to the community are all the product of a “public education .. in the bosom of equality”. Rousseau describes this education as the “most important business of the state” and is to be handled by citizens who have proved themselves to be morally trustworthy through holding a succession of increasingly demanding positions of public responsibility. Having been educated by the system and having proven their worth by experience, such morally responsible citizens are ideally suited to inculcate an awareness of the general will.

Rousseau is concerned to realise the unity of the freedom of each and all in an association that serves the common good. Rousseau is concerned to create a political association which ‘should defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate’, so that ‘each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before’ (Rousseau 1973:174). Contrary to Talmon’s charges, this does not imply subjecting the individual to a ‘totalitarian’ authority (Talmon 1986:ch3). The ‘slightest modification’ in the ‘clauses of this contract’ renders it ‘vain and ineffective’ and original rights are restored (Rousseau 1973:174). Rousseau achieves the consistency of the freedom of each and all through the conventional surrender of all to all (Rousseau 1973:174). Association is an increase in force that strengthens the liberty of all (Rousseau 1973:175). 

What emerges from this is a conception of a public sphere that embodies the good of all associating members. This public is no mere legal entity created by contracting parties for mutual protection and benefit but is a corporate and collective body that embodies communality. The individual is part of a public order that is conceived as an organism oriented towards the achievement of the free and full development of moral personality. The human potentialities of each individual are thus actualised only in association with other individuals, all participating in the common life.

Rousseau’s social and associative public envisages a conscious common control by which individuals are able to ensure that collective forces operate for the good of all. Rousseau argues that individuals must participate in the organisation and governance of the associations constituting the social order so as to create a ‘sum of forces’ great enough to overcome the ‘resistance’ of supra-individual social forces. This arrangement secures both the self-interest and the freedom of each individual whilst enabling individuals to ‘act in concert’ ‘by means of a single motive part’ (Rousseau 1973:173/4). 

The problem is that Rousseau’s scepticism towards partial associations in civil society, stemming from his belief that they would obstruct the universal interest through the assertion of private interest (Rousseau 1973:182/6), means that he is unable to give his claims a public or political form. Associationalism is a principle that, for Rousseau, applies solely to the state. A genuine public life requires that the principle of active sovereignty and citizenship obtains a more active relation to the civic sphere than Rousseau could achieve.

Rousseau made significant progress in this direction. The sovereign is not abstracted from the citizen and cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community’ (Rousseau 1973:186). Political obligation is obtained through the reciprocal act and relation upon which political order is based: ‘the undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves’. In consequence, ‘there is not a man who does not think of “each” as meaning him, and consider him in voting for all’ (Rousseau 1973:187). The ‘rational’ unity of each and all is thus achieved.

Rousseau thus defines a social identity that connects the public and private good. Whilst the imposition of universality on the part of all as abstract citizens possesses totalitarian and homogenising potential (Guttman Intro to Taylor 1992:6), this danger applies in conditions of the state-civil society dualism, with individuals being socially and politically disciplined by a state that is abstracted from their real existence. Rousseau’s approach integrates the claims of universality and particularity in the recognition that human identity is created reciprocally or dialogically through relations with others (Taylor 1992:7). Rousseau constitutes public authority through the emancipatory interaction and reciprocity of individuals, uniting ‘each with all and all with each’.





There is potential in this argument for an ideal public order that replaces coercion with morality. Rousseau’s public replaces force as an ‘act of necessity’ by morality as an act of will (Rousseau 1973:168). Rousseau concedes that the state as a coercive apparatus will remain necessary in the absence of an internally and morally coordinated society (Rousseau 1973:218). However, if individuals could regulate their mutual interaction according to reason, the state would no longer require a coercive basis to impose order externally (Rousseau 1973:218). A path is opened towards conceiving individuals as moral agents able to apprehend the common purpose directly, without the need for legal compulsion. Rousseau’s conception of human beings as inwardly governed moral beings, retaining and exercising sovereignty (Forsyth 1994:40), subverts all political institutions abstracted from real individuals and founds a genuine public on the basis of self-mediated forms practising an internal coordination (Levine 1987:137).

Rousseau’s ideal of citizenship is intended to address problems of sovereignty, freedom and government in the modern world but has a pronounced nostalgic character, although not anachronistic. Whilst he argues that patriotism is “the supreme virtue and source of all other virtues”, this patriotism is considered to flourish best in the small state. What Rousseau has in mind when he refers to the city state is essentially the polis. Rousseau recognises the problem of scale and quantity in the modern world but never really addresses it. This was to be the great achievement of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit. Other than general remarks affirming the importance of a moral education in any state of any size, Rousseau does not deal practically with the problem of how a highly charged civic emotionalism can be translated from the level of the small scale polis to that of the large territorial state, in the manner, say, of the contemporary federalists or advocates of mixed constituents did. Rousseau is extremely acute in stating the problem, what is at stake – how can the modern world create the virtuous citizen and the conditions within which virtuous citizenship may flourish, involving moral responsibility, willingness to participate, and a civic/national friendship which is capable of transcending the immediate horizon. The political and institutional solutions, of course, were presented in the Social Contract. The educational solutions making the “new moral man” came in Emile, published in 1762.

Rousseau displays nostalgia in another sense. His insistence upon the moral primacy of agriculture and the martial republic came at a time when commercial society was exploding all around him. Rousseau’s preference for the farmer and the soldier over the merchant and the money maker ties him to the past. In many respects, Rousseau had identified the extent to which morality as such was coming to be suspect in a modern commercial society. Almost inevitably, Rousseau had to make the point in nostalgic mode that morality is coming to be suspect now in a way that it was not in premodern societies. Certainly, one should be sceptical of narratives which are couched in terms of a fall from an earlier state of grace, idealising a lost past that never was whilst offering no path to a future beyond the present. Tales of decline are no more trustworthy than tales of progress; they are the same story told from different angles. Rousseau offered an intelligent, penetrating diagnosis of the moral failures of modernity, but there is further work to be done in overcoming his failures, extracting the rational essence of his proposals from within the nostalgic mode through which they are presented. Not that Rousseau is reactionary. There is no justification whatsoever for Voltaire’s snit that Rousseau desired to have human beings going back to nature crawling on all fours; there is certainly no trace of the ‘noble savage’ in The Social Contract. Rousseau is part of the Enlightenment to this extent, that he conceived human history as a single process of development. From savage origins in the state of nature, the destiny of the human race was to end in a perfectly rational and civilised society. It was this rational aspect of Rousseau that Kant identified and developed.

There are, however, problems. Rousseau’s formulation of ‘rational’ versus individualist freedom expresses the dualism of reason and nature in Rousseau’s philosophy. Rousseau’s philosophy is premised on the view that, in passing from the state of nature to the civil state, justice is substituted for instinct in human conduct, giving individual actions ‘the morality they had formerly lacked’. The ‘voice of duty’ ‘takes the place of physical impulses’; the individual comes ‘to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations’ (Rousseau 1973:177/8). Rousseau builds a richer, more expansive conception of freedom on shaky foundations. For this reason/nature dualism fractures the self by imposing a hierarchy of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ human activities which in turn generates the autonomy and externality of politics, law and morality in relation to real individuals. The task is to engender common purpose by respecting moral individuals as moral agents able to legislate the good for themselves through their everyday relationships. Since Rousseau maintains a split between reason and nature, he can never quite conceive that individuals could completely embrace the democratic-dialogic procedure.

Strangely, Rousseau’s idealism and optimism formed the counterpart to Hobbes’s realism and pessimism, each complementing the other to establish the philosophical foundations of the modern nation state. Both Hobbes and Rousseau conceived the state to be necessarily absolute in the authority it held over the citizens, justifying the extension of state power over increasing numbers of people. Such a notion can be traced back to Bodin (particularly Hobbes), who emphasised the importance of the sovereign in determining the identity and rights of subjects and citizens, and back to Plato (particularly Rousseau), who stressed the centrality of a state-led education as the foundation of the moral education that strengthened the citizen’s attachment to the political community.

The ideal of citizenship as developed from Machiavelli to Rousseau had a major and lasting impact on modern European political thought. Involving demands for equality, the end of privilege, representation, participation, political rights and, ultimately, social justice, the ideal absorbed the views of both ancient and modern writers, the ideal of citizenship was now at the forefront of political thought and action.

For a long time the figure of citoyen was highly controversial, its meaning uncertain. It was confused with sujet and bourgeois, and large stretches of Marx’s early writing are concerned with clarifying its political meaning and differentiating the political character from its social content. As the nineteenth century progressed, its revolutionary implications became more clear with reference to social content.

Much that Marx writes in distinguishing an active and passive suffrage is reminiscent of the distinction that Sieyes made in 1791 between active and passive citizenship, in a commentary on “. des Droits de l’Homme et du citoyen…” Whereas passive citizenship safeguarded the person, property, and liberty of all in general, active citizenship designated the adult male who would contribute to the welfare of the state with his body and property. Whilst Sieyes never elaborated the practical details of this distinction, it is evident that he did not envisage universal manhood suffrage for France. Sieyes’ citizenship favours those with the time and intelligence for politics, the relatively wealthy and well-educated as against the poor and the uneducated.

Therefore, whilst citizenship flourished as an ideal, its reality was constrained by the survival of structures and beliefs of the old regime into the new era. Which meant that into the nineteenth century, citizenship was an ideal with revolutionary meaning and potential. Politics remained largely the preserve of traditional elites and was out of the hands of the great mass of people. After the Revolution of 1789, the continued pursuit of citizenship as an ideal involved the incorporation of equality in the new public discourse. Whilst actual participation in politics was not an immediate result of the Revolution, it was a goal of politics in the next century and was gradually extended. Ultimately, the end to be realised was a new and greater dignity to be exercised in actual citizen activity.

Sieyes’s lukewarm conception of citizenship prevailed at first, but it was an insipid substitute for the ideal of true equality that inspired the Revolution. To this extent, for all of the drama and violence of the Revolution, France after 1789 followed a trajectory little different to that of the United States in its early years. Whilst both countries could boast a revolution on republican principles and slogans, the reality was of merely partial, modest, republican accomplishments. The corruption which the revolutionaries fought continued and the holders of private property continued to hold political power. The ultimate achievement of both revolutions was constitutional rather than social and political, the replacement of the institution of monarchy in favour of a regime based upon a system in which the executive and an elected representative body now shared power and legitimacy. Certainly, the suffrage was extended, particularly in America, and ordinary men had a greater possibility of attaining office. However, neither France nor America saw the creation of a truly citizen democracy which gave expression to the idea that political activity and military service on the part of the members of the political community would create better, morally responsible, human beings, citizens.

Neither France nor America broke with the past to create something genuinely new. Rather, citizenship continued as a limited and discriminatory institution throughout the nineteenth century, as revolutionaries, activists, poets, painters, historians, and politicians proceeded to present the ideal as a more inclusive alternative reality to current practice. The ideal was thus contrasted with the institution.

Rousseau's rejection of modernity is not absolute. The argument is not that Rousseau seeks to recover morality by resurrecting the elements of lost republican past. Rather, that Rousseau is on the right lines in emphasising freedom under law in the civil state but that there is more work to do on questions of scale and quantity. This is to take the ‘high road’ of modernity by valuing those elements immanent within the social structure and lines of development which point towards an alternative future. In fine, the path taken by Hegel and Marx.

In a world of rapid change, in which all the old certainties were being subverted, Rousseau gave an ancient, idealized model of citizenship a form appropriate to the new age which was unfolding. This model sought to show how it was possible to retain an organised commitment to the public good in a commercial era that celebrated private vice. However, the ideal presumed the existence of a social identity that directly connected the individual to the general good. This social identity did not exist. Instead, in the emerging market society, individuals were separated from each other and had to pursue their self-interest over against the general interest. For this reason, Rousseau’s ideal, connecting private and public good, could never appeal to the great majority. A major nation state like France could never became the great unified moral community that Rousseau’s philosophy implied. Simplifying greatly, it would not be far from the truth to argue that both Hegel and Marx presented alternate attempts to realise Rousseau’s vision of the moral community, Hegel seeking to realise moral community through the state, Marx seeking to embody it within society and social relations.

Rousseau’s model of citizen democracy proved an attractive, but elusive goal from the first. After the revolution of 1789 Rousseau’s ideas lived on in modified form in the thought of Kant, Hegel and Marx and it is through these thinkers that the issue is more profitably picked up. While the vision of citizen democracy grew in popularity, social, economic and technological developments consigned the life of the independent farmer soldier to the past. The horse, gun and plough have long since been swapped for the pen and the computer. Republican virtue has now to be won in much different way than in the past.

Actual democratic innovations were few to begin with and slow in being achieved throughout the nineteenth century. The vertical bonds and structures of a top-down hierarchical politics remained and proved remarkably resilient in face of demands for change. In the meantime, many found that the identity of bourgeois brought more tangible benefits than those offered by the public virtue of ruling and being ruled as a citoyen.
Historically, Rousseau’s public took the form of individuals being constrained to freedom by legal-institutional means in a more external sense than Rousseau implied. As a consequence of institutional separation, the public spaces characterised by democratic pluralism and citizen discourse are diminished in favour of obedience to the general will as an alienated collective conscience, the categorical imperative externalised (Heller 1989:86). As will be demonstrated, the reason for this was less to do with Rousseau’s conception of freedom than with the processes of alienative and exploitative social relations through which rational freedom had to be applied, turning an emancipatory reason into a repressive rationality. The same fate befell the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

47 THE GERMAN IDEA OF RATIONAL FREEDOM

The Germanic Concept Of Social Government
The Germanic discourse of the city has exerted a powerful influence upon urbanism and its evolution throughout history. The words ‘burg’, ‘burgh’ and ‘borough’ refer to a fortress or a place of shelter. Central terms of town life like burgher possess Germanic stems. The word ‘town’ is itself of German origin, pertaining to a walled place (Holton 1986:7). 
In the Germanic world of northern Europe, the phrase ‘town air makes free’ (Stadtluft macht frei) expresses the extent to which the city was identified with emancipation from external oppression. 

The German context is important for another reason. The Greek awareness that the individual needs to be set within a social matrix found expression in Germanic notions of the city. In the Germanic conception, the individual is part of a social constellation. Individual action is integrated within a series of social purposes.

Linguistically and philosophically, then, the Germanic conception of ‘rational’ urbanism offers an alternative to the capitalist rationalisation that has all but destroyed the old urban discourse. The Germanic conception is characterised by a ‘socialised’ form of government. Anthony Black describes the principle of functional representation as the achievement of medieval and early modern Europe, enabling individual participation through guild and associative organisation outside of the state power (Black 1984:29 67 ch6 116 ch16). The medieval legal charters upheld a conception of freedom as ‘the power to act in the affairs of the community and to exert influence on one’s fellows, free from the interference of the sovereign government’ (Harding 1980:423). These societies practised a form of democracy in that individuals participated in the election and running of the key units of political authority, the village, parish and town close to the daily existence of the individual (Patterson 1991:373/4).

In both theory and practice, liberalism and modernism in dominant English and French formulations have attacked the principle of functional representation (see Bockenforde 1977; Fischer 1964). The absence of a socialised conception of government has had the result of collectivism coming to be identified with the centralising unity of the state. Such collectivism is abstract, apart from real individuals, and is the counterpart of individualism, both forming two sides of the same coin.

This situation is the product of the institutional separation of the state from civil society, a separation which is the core liberal principle of the modern age. With civil society being stripped of its governmental functions and emptied of political significance, politics comes to be identified with the abstract sphere of the state. The central preoccupation of contemporary political thought is the winning and retaining of rule itself, a narrow vision that is rooted in the Weberian identification of the state with the monopoly of the means of violence (Patterson 1991:366). Modern politics is confined to the activity of career politicians concerned with the maximisation and prolongation of the power that is monopolised at the centre. 

The Germanic concept is important in seeking to adapt to liberal modernity whilst retaining something of the public value of the old corporate structures and communities. Hegel is one of the few philosophers to have ‘acknowledged that solidarity and exchange – the poles around which the values of guild and civil society, respectively, rotate – are not opposites but complementary and attempted to weave these together into a texture as tough and complex as that of urban society itself’ (Black 1984:202). Whilst the winning and retention of rule is the central preoccupation of modern liberal politics, the key characteristic of the German tradition is the conception of the state as composed of social groupings, investing these groups with moral-public significance with respect to the promotion of the common good. Thus Hegel’s state is rooted within the corporate bodies of society, not within its own potestas publica as is the case with the French Republic. The Germanic idea contains possibilities for redefining the scope and meaning of ‘the political’, of who count as legitimate political actors and what form public activity may take (Maier ed 1987), envisaging a new sociality and publicity in an alternative future. A critical appropriation of the German idea of freedom offers a way of rethinking public life, its constituent parts, participants, and spaces. This idea is highlighted here to buttress the case made for an urban public realm grounded in the associative space of civil society.

There is in this German conception a principle of the state as a ‘true moral association’ (Berki 1988:41). The key characteristic of the German tradition is the idea that freedom requires a comprehensive ethico-political framework that reconciles the freedom of each and the freedom of all within a genuine public order. The most appealing aspect of this reconstruction of German freedom lies in the way that the location of freedom within a structured system of ascending purposes makes it possible to emphasise the extent to which democracy rests upon plural identities and participation in common affairs. On this basis it is possible to envisage the replacement of force by citizen negotiation, association and discourse. This would achieve that ‘reasonable assemblage’ of individuals bound by common agreement and working for a common good identified by Augustine as a potential on account of the possession of a rational soul.

The classical argument that makes a politikos bios essential to human self-realisation is affirmed in German thought. By rooting the state in human reason, the state as moral community is based upon the rational law that human beings impose upon themselves in order to establish their natural freedom. Rational freedom, therefore, refers to the state as the ethical community constituted by individuals as moral agents and as rooted in the rational faculty of human beings.

The German ideal of freedom entails an ideal socialisation process based upon the internalisation of reason so that individuality emerges as a ‘reciprocal concept’ (Fichte in Wood 1990:82). The individual’s awareness of himself or herself as a rational being entails a conception of all individuals as rational beings. It follows from this that the sphere of freedom the individual claims for himself/herself must be ascribed to all others equally.

The great merit of the German tradition is to have socially grounded a distinctive conception of freedom as requiring a wider communal framework. From this it is possible to extract a theme of emancipatory interaction and reciprocity that allows the focus of public life and activity to shift from the abstract state and externally imposed law to individual relationships in the everyday social world. Even in its feudal expression, the German idea has actively democratic possibilities. Justus Moeser’s assertion of corporate liberties and organic unity reveals an aspect of community as an organic democracy in which individuals, acting in their corporate capacity, come to participate in a public order whose central functions in the state are minimised. The possibilities of a pluralist, social and democratic conception of freedom finds greater expression in liberal German thinkers (Krieger 1972:79/80). 

Repudiating the ‘atomistic’ conception of individualist liberalism, the German liberal tradition locates the rights of the individual in a social context. Pufendorf sought to incorporate the individualist and contractarian basis of modern organised society within a complex superstructure that makes society an organic link between individuals and government. Society as an aggregate of individuals is thus transformed into a hierarchical structure of ascending purposes presided over by the state (Krieger 1972:52/9). For Baron Karl von Stein, the mediation from the individual to the sovereign monarch was to be achieved through a flexibly structured society grounded in Estates as representative assemblies. 

List combines a recognition of equal individual rights with the corporate structure of the political community (Krieger 1972:239 240). List’s contention is that the individual, as an isolated being, is powerless, unable to rise above empirical existence, or is merely an abstraction. Such freedom lacks embodiment. ‘Since the force of the state is nothing but the force of the individual in the state and since each individual can develop his forces only in the degree that he enjoys rational freedom, the state must possess all the more force the more freedom of corporations helps the development of the forces of the individual’ (List in Krieger 1972). The German idea is strong in its emphasis on the social cement that keeps society together. The Germanic definition of rational freedom embodies a communal dimension that recognises that individuals exist in relationship to each other and that these relationships are ordered and structured via communal bodies and associations. The pinnacle of this idea is the Rechsstaat, the state of law as right (Krieger 1972:252). For Karl Theodor Welcker, the Rechsstaat is the ‘state of reason’: ‘The final goal of the state is: the greatest possible attainment of the virtue and the humanity and thus of the happiness of all, through and in the form of objective law’ (Welcker in Krieger 1972:255).





Where Hobbes postulated a direct relationship between rulers and ruled by making a society a function of government, Pufendorf, though accepting the individualist and contractarian basis of organised society, established a complex superstructure which made society an organic link between individuals and government. Society converts the natural rights of the individuals constituting society into the legal powers established by government. Society was to perform this conversion by virtue of the ‘moral person’. Through this concept, empirical individuals, with their natural rights, became the holders of stations. Society as an aggregate of individuals is thus transformed into an hierarchical structure of ascending purposes presided over the state. “A moral person is a person considered under that status which he has in common life”; while “otherwise .. a person is said to be that which possesses a civil condition, that is, personal liberty” (Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo 1931, II, 19).

What Pufendorf means by ‘moral’ is the attributes imposed by conscious, rational human beings upon physical or natural beings so as to create an overarching framework of ‘authority’, ‘rights’, ‘obligation’. Society thus acquires a legal order that raises individuals above their physical selves.

There is in this conception the important distinction between the physical/natural being, subordinated to natural inclination, and the moral being, able to pursue moral inclination or exercise moral choice. The physical being pursuing natural inclinations is raised above immediacy through being integrated in a moral and political framework that connects individuals with moral inclination.

The association of authority with freedom does raise a collective agency over individuals, societies as composite moral persons, achieve authority over the individuals who constitute society as simple moral persons. Society has ‘its special rights and goods which cannot be claimed by individuals as such’; moreover, the individual as a moral person becomes subject to a hierarchical and corporate organisation of relations in a communal life. Social station thus mediates between government and individuals.

What Pufendorf did was to reconcile individuals as the foundation of society with the organic structure of society. Society is thus not reduced to isolated individuals; instead constituent individuals are located in a structured system of social stations. The natural rights of individuals thus obtain a social definition through which they could be converted into attributes of sovereign rulership embodied in the state. “In general, liberty denotes the status of those who serve merely the state and not another fellow citizen in addition’. Pufendorf’s intention is to concentrate authority in the ruler and to identify this authority with freedom under law (Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo 1931, II, 14).

Pufendorf’s society thus achieves a relationship between authority and freedom. He founds his theory upon individual rights but insists that these rights need to be socially organised and represented through lawful freedom. The natural rights of individuals, therefore, need to be organised in civil society and completed in the state.

A state is a moral body which is understood to have one will. But since it is made up of many physical persons, each of whom has his own will and inclination, and since these wills cannot physically be compounded into one or combined in a perpetual harmony, it follows that the one will in a state is produced in the following fashion: all the persons in the state submit their will to that of one man, or of a Council, in whom the supreme sovereignty has been vested.

Pufendorf De Jure Naturae, II, 1010-1011

Pufendorf’s state as a moral body thus embodies and represents the natural rights of isolated, independent individuals. As a unitary sovereign, the state raises the individual from the physical to the moral plane. Civil society mediates between the state and empirical individuals through a structured system of corporate institutions and social stations. Civil society is an organised society that gives individual rights a social character. These rights are completed by the state as a moral body.

Pufendorf’s organised civil society performs two political functions. In the first place it channels individual natural rights into authority. For Pufendorf, this means that sovereignty in the state is unitary and indivisible, so that all individuals invest their sovereignty in one man or a council. The sovereign ruler comes to be above contradiction by human agency.
In the second place, the existence of an organised civil society distinct from the sovereign ruler, though it does not reach the perfection of the state and hence should not acquire autonomous political rights in the state, certainly attains sufficient significance as to be able to influence the nature of the governmental power.





Christian Thomasius, Prussian jurist and philosopher, took up these issues with a view to emphasising spiritual freedom, including academic freedom and freedom of conscience, and the relation of freedom and political obligation. Thomasius thus concentrated upon the natural rights of individuals as existing prior to the state and not reducible to the state. As to political obligation, Thomasius dealt with the question as to why the individual should obey the state.

Freedom is not the licence of unconstrained individualism; nor is it an individualistic, atomistic society policed by a ‘protective’ state. Freedom requires something that reconciles the claims of each and all within a broader political obligation and authority. The solution is to constitute the state on Aristotelian lines as the ‘natural’ association but, more than this, as the true moral association, so as to bring the ethic of human freedom of reason to political authority in a framework that ensures that individuals’ natural rights convert into a freedom which could be exercised through an organised social and political order.

The state is actually constituted by individuals so as to transcend their natural condition; individuals enter the state through their own volition. Human freedom is thus achieved through contracts of society and of rulership.

By rooting the state in human reason, the state as moral community is based upon the rational law that human beings impose upon themselves to establish their natural freedom. Rational freedom, therefore, does not refer simply to ‘the state’. It refers to the state as the ethical community constituted by individuals as moral agents and rooted in the rational faculty of human beings. Thus, if the individual comes to find his or her freedom in conformity with the state, rather than in opposition to the state, then this is because the rational law of the state is one that corresponds with human freedom; it is a law which human beings have imposed upon themselves and is integral to their freedom. Rational freedom is a lawful freedom. The state is the perfect organisation of the community and embodies and organises the natural rights of individuals in such a way as to realise the moral autonomy and dignity of each individual.

The Germanic concept of rational freedom incorporates modern individualism in such a way as to reconcile the natural rights that human beings possessed as individuals with the power and authority of the state. The stress upon rulership and its moral and lawful basis was thus reinforced by reference to the natural rights of individuals. The point is that individualism is not a strong enough basis for human freedom and, hence that a political framework that structures the exercise of these rights as freedom is required. The state is the perfect organisation of this structured community, not something mechanical, external to individuals. Conformity with the state is conformity with one’s own moral will. The basis of political obligation is thus rational.

Wolff
Before Kant, Christian Wolff is the most impressive German political philosopher developing the concept of rational freedom through reconciling modern individualism with political authority.

If Thomasius assigned liberty to the realm of spirit and political obligation to the realm of action, Wolff assigned individual rights to the realm of practical action and sovereign power to the realm of spirit. Wolff defended the rights of the individual as prior to the state and not conferred upon the state by contract. Wolff attempts to reconcile the individualism of natural rights doctrine and the authoritarianism of the monarchical state, overcoming the one sidedness of both.

Wolff extends the realm of politics and thus delimits that area in which the inviolability of rights outside of politics applies. Wolff applies that individuals constitute themselves into the state not simply to protect themselves against domestic and foreign violations of rights but to facilitate ‘the acquisition of whatever is required for life – that is, an abundance of the things which serve the necessities, the comforts, and the pleasures of life and an abundance of the means of felicity’ (Wolff, Institutions, II, 139). The point of the state, therefore, is not merely negative but positive. Each individual in civil society, and the sovereign itself, is bound not only to protect the rights of all but to positively ‘advance the common good as much as he can’ (Wolff Institutions II, 141). Under the ‘public safety’ of the state as the ‘supreme law’ a variety of material functions become legitimate spheres for the sovereign.

Wolff comes to conceive and articulate a social ethic which introduces a spiritual dimension to the idea of the common good, integrating individual and sovereign. This social ethic rests upon the foundation of individuals’ natural rights in their natural duties. Essential to the moral constitution of the individual are these natural duties – the individual needs ‘to do what tends to the perfection of himself and his condition’ and the rights of each individual are what give the individual the freedom essential to the fulfilment of those obligations pertaining to duties. Thus, ‘there would be no right if there were not obligation’ (Wolff Instititutions I, 20-25).

The natural duty to perfection and the derivation of natural liberty from this pertain in the first place to the original independence of the individual. However, given the natural insufficiencies of independent individuals, this natural duty and liberty comes to necessitate the obligation and right of each individual to work for the perfection of all individuals and of society as a whole as a condition of their own perfection. Wolff understands this in the threefold sense of the ‘perfection of the soul, the body, and external condition’ (Institutions, I, 24 ,33,52-3; II 88). A positive role is assigned thus to the sovereign, the obligation and right to work for the perfection of each and all falls upon the sovereign, with duties and liberties varying with social status (Institutions I 27; II 158, 179). The natural duty to perfection, internal and external, of individual and society, falls to each individual but also the state itself.

Wolff thus made ‘perfection’ a goal that unites spiritual and physical worlds, forming their individual and sovereign agents into one, all-embracing system. The state is thus constituted by individuals attempting to achieve their own perfection and becomes, in turn, a higher social individuality. The state thus is integral to the moral and material perfection of all individuals and collective society; but the state achieves this perfection only to the extent that it facilitates and enforces the internal and external perfection of the individuals who constitute the state.

There is, however, a limitation which prevents Wolff from reconciling individual and communal freedom so as to embody human freedom in general.

Wolff’s achievement is to have transcended the division between the spiritual and the worldly as pertaining to the individual and the state. But rather than to have abolished this division, Wolff turns it into a means-ends dualism. Thus, if the striving for perfection is the natural duty, the end, of individuals, the positive role of the state is to supply means to the achievement of perfection. The doctrine of the two swords reappears here as a division between the internal life of the individual and the external authority of the state. Certainly, Wolff overcomes the spiritual-worldly division and postulates a continuum connecting both realms.

Wolff transforms into a political ethic the concept of perfectibility with which Leibniz attempted to reconcile the Christian with the scientific world, the spiritual with the secular, Wolff explicitly appropriates this concept of perfection and uses it to define a philosophy of man and a political ethic. The concept of perfectibility is designed to realise unity and purpose in the universe so as to allow human freedom. Wolff assimilates this conception so as to elaborate the possibility of an organic society in which the natural rights of individuals dovetail neatly into sovereign power.

The German political tradition conceives of constitutional representation in organic terms. There is a stress upon existing corporate estates. The idea of representation as organic rather than abstract and insists upon assigning a role to corporate estates is conceived as a check upon political centralisation and restrains the unpolitical employment of political authority by the ruler. Within the realm of politics, this organic representation organises society so as to be a force for self-restraint by the sovereign power, the ruler.

Schloezer
August Ludwig von Schloezer was a natural law liberal who justified constitutional monarchy on the basis of the absorption of individuals in an organic and hierarchical structure of civil society. Thus Schloezer interposes between the natural conditions of individuals on the one hand and the state on the other an intermediate stage of ‘civil society’ in which a ‘natural nobility’ – property, inheritance, honour and service – had achieved permanent institutional form to regulate the social inequality of individuals (Schloezer, Allgemeines Statsrecht und Stats-Verfassungslehre 63-70, 74-5, 96, 100-1). Political rights do not inhere in individuals, Schloezer argues, but in corporate estates, both hereditary and electoral. For Schloezer, the right to resist oppression could neither be exercised by the individual nor by ‘the people as a mass’ but only by individuals’ constituted organs of organic representation (Schloezer 106-7). These representative corporate organs of the people are integrated as parts of the sovereign authority within the state.





Justus Moeser marks the transition from rational natural law to the historical approach which came to characterise German thought. Moeser sets himself against the doctrine of sovereignty and rejects modern individualism. What Moeser sought was the assertion of corporate liberties and organic unity in a national community. This community would be an organic democracy in which individuals, acting in their corporate capacity, come to participate in a state whose functions were to be minimised.

In defining the national community as an organic unity based upon the organisation and exercise of corporate capacities, Moeser anticipated Fichte. In articulating an organic democracy based upon a corporate representation that minimises the state, Moeser anticipates Marx’s functional representation versus abstract political representation and the abolition of the state.

Moeser however is plainly backward looking and his argument is based upon an idealisation of the original German constitution and national unity.

Von Stein
Baron Karl von Stein produced political theory that, similar to Hegel, attempts to combine modern individualism with traditional political authority. Individual freedom had to be something more than an abstraction but had to indicate a real social constellation behind its emancipation. For Stein, the mediation from the individual to the Sovereign monarch was to be achieved through a flexibly structured society in which modern individualism and traditional social hierarchy would be combined and embodied in representative assemblies as Estates. This society could perform a mediating function given that its character as an organised society is determined by its participation in the political order. For Stein, public opinion is not to be discovered in individuals or in associations but in the representative bodies of estates (Erich Botzenhart und Aufzeichnungen Berlin 1936, II, 222). Without a popular constitution the people ‘appear as a mere passive mass’ (1936, IV, 623).

There are three possible resolutions to the problems of the relation between the moral ideal and the political reality. There is that liberalism which effectively depoliticised the norm by subordinating it to the traditional authorities. There is that liberalism which doubted the possibility of reconciling the traditional political structure and the new aspirations of modern individualised society, thus demanding political reform. And there are those who grasped the radical implications of this problem and pursued the libertarian ideal absolutely and insisted its realisation of requiring the fundamental transformation of the social structure beyond the political sphere. To simplify greatly, liberalism had to compromise its ideal and sanction existing political reality or to liquidate itself in its realisation.

What perhaps distinguishes German liberalism in general is its social or organic character. This may appear a contradiction in terms, especially to those who argue that liberalism is predicated upon the autonomous and sovereign individual. It is this ‘atomistic’ conception that the Germanic liberal tradition repudiates as abstract. Thus, if one had to characterise German liberalism as abstract. Thus, if one had to characterise German liberalism one could argue that the liberals opposed political absolutism, social hierarchy based upon inheritance, and exclusive corporate privilege. More positively, the liberals attempted to combine natural law with historical law, thus locating the rights of the individual in a social context emerging through history. The attempt was made to combine a recognition of equal individual rights with the corporate structure of political society.

Just as the freedom of the individual is all the greater the more society leaves him to care for his private welfare, so does his freedom vary directly with the freedom of corporations.

List Ueber die Verfassung und Verwaltung der Korporationen in Erwin V Beckerath, Karl Goeser et al,. eds Friedrich List: Schriften, Reden, Briefe, 1932, I, 310

Similarly, the German liberals’ attempted to combine the principle of popular sovereignty with governmental power assigned to the ruler. Thus:





The influence of the ruler upon the government of the state remains unlimited so long as he wills the best and the rest.

List, Ueber die Verfassung und Verwaltung der Korporationen

There is a tendency amongst critics to ignore the clauses that German thinkers applied to their advocacy of the state power in the realisation of freedom. Hegel’s ethical state, for instance, is ethical in that it does incorporate the general will of the people. The power of the ruler in the state is justified only ‘so long as’ the best and the right is willed, a definition comprising popular sovereignty and the universal moral law. The argument is that the individual as an isolated being is impotent, unable to rise above empirical existence, or is merely an abstraction. Either way, the individual freedom lacks embodiment. This embodiment, in the principle of rational freedom, requires supra-individual institutions. Thus List argues for the freedom of the corporations, and especially for municipal freedom as the mediating link between the freedom of the individual and governmental power in the state.

Since the force of the state is nothing else but the force of the individual in the state and since each individual can develop his forces only in the degree that he enjoys rational freedom, the state must possess all the more force the more the freedom of corporations helps the development of the forces of the individual.

List Ueber die Verfassung und Verwaltung der Korporationen

It is the ‘organism’ of society, that is, the hierarchy of the free corporations based on the community and including the representative diet, which provides the means by which ‘all the individuals in the people’, who are ‘the source of power’ in a ‘naturally organised state’, have their rights embodied in ‘the supreme power in the hands of the ruler’. The ruler is ‘that point into which the force of all the individual parts flows together’ (List Ueber die Wuerttembergische Veftassung).

The dualism of the ideal and the real runs through political institutions and the law Marx and Hegel attempted to close this gap between the ideal or normative society and the existential political society.

Hegel’s political philosophy rests upon social forces and institutions which serve to mediate between the free individual and the governmental power, reconciling the claims of individual rights and the state and embodying the principle of rational freedom, securing the balance of the freedom of each and the freedom of all.

If one makes a distinction between the ‘natural’ and the ‘artificial’ in government, as does Rotteck, and if the natural power is the representative assembly whilst the artificial power is the personnel/personality exercising governmental power, then it is possible to conclude that democracy is the ‘most natural’ form of state and is the original and indeed legitimate form of state as the direct expression of the authoritative general will. Whilst conceding this point, and pointing to the radical implications of the principle of rational freedom, Rotteck nevertheless denied democracy for concentrating undivided power in the hands of a majority that is always temporary. Democracy thus leads either to anarchy or despotism. Thus Rotteck concludes:

But as unshakable and ineradicable as the legal claim of democracy is, equally undeniable is the political necessity .. of its limitation through some kind of artificial – monarchical or aristocratic or own mixed – form.

Rotteck, Lehrbuch des Vernunftrechts II 193

The principle of democracy as ‘natural’ is conceded only to be denied in practice, constrained under ‘artificial’ power. Rotteck concluded in favour of the liberal favourite, the mixed constitution as the ‘true republic’ (Lehrbuch II).





The most well-known attempt to apply the Germanic principle of rational freedom is in the idea of the state as the Rechtstaat, the state as law, the state as right. The idea could be conservative, liberal or radical in application, depending upon how the principle and the reality are reconciled. If Marx is the radical and Hegel is the liberal then Adam Mueller is the conservative. For Mueller, the state is ‘the totality of human affairs, their merger into a vital whole’ (Elemente der Staatskunst I). Law (Recht) is the principle of ‘unity’ (Einhest) in this totality (Elemente I 66).

Mueller’s purpose was to recover unity through authority in a fragmented reality. Mueller needed the historical process of individuation in order to reject natural law doctrine, but feared that this process would fracture society. To overcome his difficulty he created the Rechstaat as a dialectical conception which achieved a general control over particular objects whilst retaining an internal relation to their specificity and the requirements of their existence.





Karl Theodor Welcker gives a liberal interpretation of the Rechtsstaat, seeking consciously to include the inviolable freedom of the individual. Still this freedom of the individual cannot be unconstrained. Welcker’s concern is that the constraints upon each individual serve to realise the general freedom, the freedom of all individuals. The Rechtsstaat for Welcker is the ‘state of reason’, the state characterising the modern period in human history. Welcker’s stages of history are not divided into monarchy, aristocracy and democracy but into ‘despotism’, ‘theocracy’ and ‘Rechtsstaat’ as corresponding to the succession of sense, faith and reason in history. Welcker wrote of the purpose of the Rechtsstaat:

As .. the idea of the absolute good should be reflected in all of men’s actions should it even in their activity in the state and in the activity of the state itself.

Welcker Die letzte Gruende 99

The final good of the state is: the greatest possible attainment of the virtue and the humanity and thus of the happiness of all, through and in the form of objective law.





Marx’s anti-statist socialism actually incorporates the principle of the state as rational freedom, making individual and general freedom consistent with and dependent upon each other. Marx has, therefore, to be clearly distinguished from the anti-statism of such as Karl Follen. Follen’s purpose was to create a unitary democratic republic. To this end he was involved in converting part of the Student Union into a revolutionary society looking to realise an extreme natural rights democracy. There would appear to be parallels with Marx’s libertarianism but it is nevertheless clear that Follen and Marx are operating according to very different principles. For Follen is aggressively egoistic and his principles leading beyond politics are religious. Follen – and this criticism applies to his followers in the youth movement – is negative. His radicalism is based upon a rejection of political forms. It is an attitude of universal, and no doubt permanent criticism that is incapable of concrete engagement. It is characterised by an extreme hostility towards ‘the state’ and a celebration of the individual. ‘Man, apart from any and every State, can never and may never, as a rational being, deny the goal of the development of his spiritual powers which is prescribed to him by his very existence’ (Follen Politische Aufsetze aus dem Jahre 1819). But this entails the rejection of the political system as such. Incapable of political intervention and engagement, the adherents of such a principle are condemned to the negative, and ultimately sterile, politics of seeking freedom outside of and in opposition to politics, tyrannicide, mass emigration, dropping out. The conflation of all political forms in ‘the state’ severely curtails the scope for political mobilisation and leaves nothing short of a revolutionary extremism degenerating into nihilism, passivity or impotence. Follen himself realised this but sought the positive grounding of his politics in religion.

Marx’s socialism is anti-state in that it rests upon the absorption of the state power into society. But it is not anti-state in the sense of repudiating all that the state stands for. Rather, one needs to differentiate between coercion and reason as the basis of the state, distinguish a principle from a practice, an ideal from the real. Thus Marx attempts to take the ‘common will’ invested in the state as an ideal collective agency back into the society from which it originated. And this involves realising principle of the state as embodying the general freedom. Thus Marx belongs to the radical wing of the Germanic tradition of rational freedom, looking to realise the principle involved rather than simply to negate the political order.

The radical development of the principle of rational freedom proceeded from the consciousness of the gap between philosophical ideal and practical action. This gap could only be overcome in practice. The principle of reason was retained and was incorporated into the practical movement for getting to grips with the existing world. The philosophical idea and the unphilosophical reality are thus brought together, the former to be realised and the latter to be transformed. Thus, not only was the philosophical idea retained, the radicals demanded that it be realised. And this required the fundamental transformation of the existing reality so that it conformed with the demands of reason.

The ideal had to be applied in the real world, but not as some ‘Reason’ in the abstract, as with Ruge (Ruge to Fleischer, Nov 23, 1844 in P Nerrlich, ed, Ruges Briefwechsel, I, 377). Rather, Marx, following Hegel, comes to discern the ideal as unfolding in the real.





The influence of the political philosophy of J.G. Fichte upon Karl Marx has perhaps been underestimated. Perhaps the reluctance to compare the two stems from Fichte’s views on the German self-sufficiency and nationalism and their parallel with Nazism. The parallel is facile. Fichte’s nationalism, demonstrably, attempted to incorporate modern individualism and exhibits liberal tendencies that puts it at quite some remove from the crude mass psychology of Nazism. It could also be argued that Fichte’s nation exists as that moral association that Hegel pursued in the state and Marx in the associative community of realised individuals. What the nation offers individuals is precisely that community they need to individuate themselves, for empirical self to be put in touch with their higher self; in Hegel’s word, the nation is ‘the moral individual’. Certainly, there is no doubt that Marx had immersed himself in Fichte as well as Kant.

Fichte’s intellectual development shows a path from the individualism of the liberal thinker to a more nuanced conception of the individual that leaves liberalism behind. Fichte’s development in large part is to be explained as the attempt to reconcile modern individualism to the conditions of contemporary German political structures. It is striking that Fichte’s doctrine of the state is derived from an original radical individualism. Fichte’s theory proceeded from where Kant had ended. That is, Fichte began not only with the assertion of the free creativity of the individual in the temporal as well as the moral sphere, but also, in the political world, by addressing the problem of the just constitution and the realisation of human freedom in society. Thus Fichte explicitly associated his philosophy as a liberatory force with the French Revolution. ‘As that nation emancipated man from external chains, my system frees him from the bonds of the things in itself, of the external influence, and establishes him as an independent being’. Moreover, Fichte’s ‘great thought’ with which ‘ my soul is afire’ is that of resolving politically the problem of the just constitution bequeathed by Kant (letters of 1795 and 1793 quoted in E Anderson, Nationalism and the Cultural Crisis in Prussia 1806-1815).

Fichte’s first works were political writings. This task remains central in Fichte’s final formal political works, the System of Jurisprudence (1812) and Political Theory (1813).
Fichte thus proceeded from the liberal ideal of the just civil constitution realising the individual freedom of all human beings. But he soon departs from Kant’s liberalism. Fichte’s appreciation of state power and the ethical value he assigned to the nation retains the libertarian goal of individual emancipation but nevertheless has significantly altered the character of this individual emancipation.

Fichte conceives the present to be culminating point of lines of historical development. Proceeding from Kant’s idea of history as the unfolding of a plan, Fichte conceives every age to be the concrete embodiment of a single idea or concept, with successive ages forming a sequence which is also a logical sequence, a sequence of concepts in which one concept leads necessarily to the next.

Fichte, not Hegel or Marx, is the originator of the logical structure of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. To begin with, the concept is embodied in a pure or abstract form; it then generates its opposite and proceeds to realise itself in the shape of an antithesis between itself and this opposite; the negation of the opposite overcomes the antithesis. 

Fichte, following Kant, identifies rational freedom to be the fundamental concept of history and, as such, it has to develop through these necessary stages. Thus, in the first stage of history, rational freedom is expressed in the form of a simple or immediate freedom as blind instinct, freedom to do as one likes. This implies primitive society in a state of nature in which people pursue the good as they see fit, without government, authority, and law. This limited, low-level freedom develops into a richer freedom by generating its own opposite. This is the second stage, the antithesis, characterised by the individual freely submitting to the constraint of authority not of his/her own making but imposed by a ruler. In this period of authoritarian government, freedom has created its own opposite. Philosophers like Hobbes ended the process of the growth of freedom at this stage. For Fichte, however, this opposite of freedom is transcended by a revolutionary stage in which the human beings comes to take government into their own hands. Human beings become both subject and sovereign. They have abolished not authority but the authoritarianism which is implicit in the merely external relation of authority to those over whom authority is exercised. Revolution does not mean the end of government but its seizure of government by the subjects. The difference between governing and being governed still exists but no longer as a dualism since the same persons govern and are governed.

Fichte thus establishes the principles of the age of revolution. The revolutionary idea emerges in its initial, crude form as the conception of the individual as possessing within an authority over himself. This concept generates its opposite in the form of a self-existing body of truth which exists in objective reality as the criterion of thought and the guide of conduct. This is the scientific stage of development, where objective truth and right conduct is determined in conformity with scientific knowledge. Whilst this science is the opposite of the revolutionary idea, natural laws cannot be overcome in the same way that human laws can be. External governmental authority can be abolished but the facts of nature cannot be. What can and must be transcended, however, is the antagonism between mind and nature. This is to advance to a new kind of rational freedom, the freedom of art in which mind recognizes its own counterpart in nature and relates to it by sympathy and love rather than obedience. In rational freedom, then, mind and nature are brought into union. The highest degree of freedom is reached as the individual agent freely identifies himself/herself with an objective end which s/he comes to recognise as his/her own.

Fichte proceeded from a highly and radically individualistic position. Fichte displays the traditional German separation of the superior world of spirit from the inferior world of politics; this separation is associated with the contractarian liberalism of the doctrine of natural rights. Thus, at this stage (1793-4), Fichte’s political philosophy is concerned to delimit the scope of the state through a broad definition of the inviolable rights of man.

There is no doubt that this radical individualism, nevertheless, has an unmistakeable German flavour. Buttressing this individualism is the philosophical conception of an integral world of spirit which is the realm of the transcendental ego in its undifferentiated totality and, as such, provides the universal moral forms and values that are binding upon all individuals. Thus the destiny of real individuals is fundamentally moral. The individual approaches the world to work for his or her own ‘perfection’. Thus, in political terms, the ‘worthiness of freedom must come from below up, but liberalism can, without disorder, only come from above down’ (Fichte Beitraege zur Berirchtigung der Urtheile des Publicums in JG Fichte Saemtliche Werke VI 44). Freedom of thought, the ‘celestial palladium of humanity’ (Zurueckforderung in Saemmtliche Werke VI 7) is the primary right of man, to which all other rights could be sacrificed.

Fichte’s radical individualism meant that the conception of the transcendental ego, in its undifferentiated totality, was pushed into the background by the emphasis upon the necessity of its self-conscious realisation by the real individual egos. The undifferentiated transcendental ego was thus differentiated through real individuals in the sensible world. The supreme freedom of real individuals to work for their own moral perfection defined not only the world of spirit but also entailed ‘culture toward freedom’. This emphasised creative activity shaping the external world so as to bring it into conformity with the moral spirit (Beitraege zur Berirchtigung der Urtheile des Publicums in JG Fichte Saemmtliche Werke VI 86-9; Die Bestimmung der Gelehrten in Saemmtliche Werke VI 296-300). Fichte’s argument is that if the fundamental rights of man stem from the a priori unrestricted freedom to obey the moral law, then it is also true that this freedom grounded inalienable rights in the sensible as well as in the spiritual world. This also meant that alienable rights of men, comprising all other aspects of human activity, would remain subject to the ‘free choice’ (Willkuer) of individuals. Alienation, then, is partial and revocable, never total and irrevocable. Individuals thus never lose the capacity to apply alienable rights in the service of the inalienable rights, both being inextricably connected by Fichte (Beitraege in Saemmtliche Werke VI 160 170-4). Fichte thus extended the scope of the inalienable rights of man from the freedom of thought, necessary for the spiritual basis of moral perfection to unrestricted physical communication, private property, even to the extent of seceding from the civil polity. These natural rights are inviolable; Fichte has radically delimited the scope of the state. Fichte, indeed, criticises monarchical states as necessarily tending towards ‘unlimited and exclusive domination in internal policy and universal monarchy in foreign policy’ (Beitraege in Saemmtliche Werke VI 94). Fichte’s doctrine of natural rights, with its highly individualistic emphasis, is the philosophical basis of his anti-absolutism. Indeed, so profound is Fichte’s radical individualism, with its negative definition of freedom from, that the limited positive function of the state, the protection of the material rights of man, merits treatment only in passing.
There are, nevertheless, difficulties in Fichte’s argument. There is a basic dualism which, with little stress, is exposed in establishing a separation between the moral law, inviolable and in positing the primacy of the inviolable over the negotiable, Fichte provided the grounds preparing the acceptance of existing political institutions despite their contradiction by the moral law. Fichte’s political philosophical dualism thus preserved intact the traditional political structure of absolutism. Certainly Fichte significantly delimited the scope of the state power by his aggressive natural rights doctrine. Nevertheless, by grounding the traditional political structure upon individual consent, that is, upon empirical free choice, Fichte validated this structure and affirmed its compatibility with the moral law.

The discrepancies in the argument were concealed at first by the heavy stress upon the inalienable rights of men under the moral law. This assumed that real individuals have the capacity to so regulate their thought and activity as to create a world that would realise morality. Capable of doing this by their own efforts, individuals do not require the agency of the state. Indeed, Fichte’s argument in the 1790’s is extreme in its individualism. For Fichte, the individual cannot be given the culture realising freedom by other individuals or by the state: ‘no one is cultivated himself’. Thus Fichte concludes that ‘man can do what he should do; and if he says: I can not, he wills not to do it’ (Beitraege in Saemmtliche Werke VI 90 75).

It is arguable that even at this stage Fichte is attempting to connect the moral and the political aspects of his thought through his concept of society. And it is also arguable that this concept of society. And it is also arguable that this concept of society developed into his later concept of the nation. For Fichte, ‘society’ mediates between the individual resting upon free choice and the state resting upon compulsion.

Nevertheless, Fichte’s conception of society as the association of free individuals makes society the permanent end opposed to the state. The state, indeed, is subordinate to society as a mere means destined to wither away in time (Beitraege in Saemmtliche Werke VI 128/31; Die Bestimmung der Gelehrten in Saemmtliche Werke VI 306). The emphasis in society, then, is upon the sanctity of the individual’s pursuit of moral perfection. Nevertheless, this emphasis concealed rather than addressed the problem of freedom in relation to existing political authority. Fichte’s authority. Fichte’s theory provided a cloak for existing institutions. Fichte himself justified representation through functional estates and an undivided monarchical constitution.

This inherent dualism in Fichte’s thought was made manifest as he systematised his political views. In both the Foundations of Natural Law According to the Principles of Science (1796) and The Closed Commercial State (1800) Fichte restated his view of the inalienable rights of the individuals and liberal postulates of the individual’s empirical existence. At the same time, however, Fichte expanded the sphere of alienable rights so as to increase the scope for the strong state. Fichte had thus brought to light the internal inconsistency in hi political theory. The inviolable rights of the individual under the moral law had to be brought into line with the claims of the strong state – Fichte delimited the scope of the state on the one hand and extended its scope on the other.

In the Foundations of Natural Law, Fichte proceeded from the finite rational individual. This individual is free, not in the moral sense, but in possessing an original free choice (Willkuer). It is this free choice which gave the individual the capacity for self-determination of individual actions in the external world (Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre in Saemmtliche Werke III 17-23). But whereas Fichte had formerly delimited the scope of the state he now comes to assign a greater value to the political realm as he significantly curtails his earlier, aggressive individualism. Fichte’s argument now comes to assert the fundamental impossibility of society as an association of isolated individuals. Rather than the state withering away, Fichte now came to argue that the apolitical social life is insufficient in itself and hence that the individual requires the state as the primary unit organising individuals in the sensible world.

Fichte’s original argument grounded the freedom of the individual in the sensible world in the transcendental ego of the moral world. Now Fichte argued that in the sensible world the individual is unthinkable other than in society (Werke III 30-85).

 On the one hand Fichte attributes to individuals only ‘the fundamental right .. to be .. a cause in the sensory world’ and assigned to it a valid role in political theory. But, on the other hand, he argued that this right was merely a ‘fiction’ in political reality given that only the mutually limiting rights of men in society could be actual (Werke III 113-5). By making this distinction, Fichte was attempting to present a diluted, externalised version of his radical moral individualism the normative principle organising the sensory world whilst demonstrating at the same time that the operative principles in the sensory world, whilst being authorised by and being oriented towards the normative principle, are supra-individual and are based upon the involvement of the individual in relationships which are both necessary and problematic.

Fichte resolved the dualism on the side of the state rather than of individuals in their social relationships. Society now came to exist as a stage mediating between the individual and the state, where once it had been the permanent end of free individuals, with the state as a mere means. And rather than the state withering away, now it was society that virtually dissolved between an aggregate of individuals constituting it on the one hand and the state which it constituted on the other.

There is, nevertheless, another interpretation of Fichte that is available, one that turns against Fichte’s advocacy of the strong state and one that reinstates the vision of society as an association of free individuals. For Fichte continued to assign the fundamental principle of natural law, that each must limit their individual freedom so as to achieve the freedom of all, to the social relationship as a community of free, moral and rational individuals. One can extract this fundamental principle of natural law from Fichte and develop it as a principle of rational freedom requiring the ethical community of free individuals, individuals as moral agents. This principle, in Marx, would lead beyond the state as a formal institution apart from the real lives of individuals. In Fichte, however, it led to the strong state. Fichte describes the authority of the social relationship as merely ‘hypothetical’. By this Fichte meant that it could not be absolutely rooted in the nature of man (Werke III 88/9). For Fichte the authority of the law could not be based upon society but, rather, required the mutual trust and confidence of individuals in their reciprocal respect for freedom. This could only be achieved if the constituent individuals voluntarily alienated or transferred their right to enforce respect for freedom to the state as a third party above the individual and society (Werke III 94-110).

Thus, rather than society, as the free association of individuals, providing the foundation for the natural law governing political relations, for Fichte this law is ‘deduced from the concept of the individual’ (Werke III 52) and needed to be actualised by the state so as to realise the ‘hypothetical’ authority of the free society which was its own authority.

Fichte’s argument is predicated upon two kinds of rights. The fundamental right (Urrecht) applies to individuals only, whilst the compulsory right (Zwangsrecht) is transferred entirely to the state and refers to the enforcement of the observation of the individual right of each and all individuals. Society is reduced to securing the conditions for the legitimate activities of the individual and the state, mediating between them but having little in the way of a positive role to play (III 113-49).

The ‘common will’ of society could become an operative force only be being represented through the sovereign ruler in the state. The only rights outside of the scope of the state belonged to individuals: the ‘common will’ of society was entirely concentrated in and represented by the state. As Fichte argued with respect to the state: ‘Everything is included in it, but only partly’ (Werke III 204/5). Thus, Fichte’s argument is that the individual has rights apart from the state but anything that the individual assigns to the ‘common will’ of society must necessarily be transferred to the state. Thus Fichte repudiates democracy as the exercise of political power by society. That the ‘common will’ is originally social and becomes political only through alienation is a point that Marx was later to take up. For Fichte, however, the state was the primary unit of human organisation in the sensory world. And in developing this argument Fichte makes clear the extent to which the state is separated from its individualistic and social bases, presiding over them. Although Fichte had argued that the form of government depends upon empirical conditions rather than upon absolute criteria, the qualifications that he makes the basis of just government make apparent the exclusive and unified concentration of the governmental power in the sovereign ruler. This sovereign was independent of and raised above individuals and society.





Thus Fichte rejected the doctrine of the separation of powers and instead made the legislative and the juridical attributes of the overriding ‘executive power’ synonymous with the sovereign (Werke III 160-1). It is function rather than structure which limits the state power. Fichte’s definition of this limitation by function proceeds from the rights of man (III 109-110). The way that Fichte developed the argument, however, involved assigning to the state full powers over the sensory world of human existence. Thus the ‘protection’ of the rights of man entailed a positive guarantee of security on the part of the state (III 197-201) whilst ‘property’ came to refer to the state administering the absolutely inalienable ‘right to live’ (III 211-12).

Fichte, then, in the Foundations had already prepared the ground for the state power assuming social and economic competence. In The Closed Commercial State Fichte drew precisely this conclusion. Fichte begins by arguing that the right to live from one’s own labour is ‘the highest and general purpose of all free activity’. This right forms the essential condition for the existence of the person and of freedom. The right to live from one’s own labour is the individual’s real purpose in the conclusion of the civil contract. As a result, the state’s real purpose is the positive protection of this individual right. The state, it follows, ‘must set up institutions for it’ (III 212-3). In Fichte’s argument, it is the state which gives individuals their property and it is the state which protects the individuals’ property by licensing all economic activity and by subjecting the economy and the various social and functional groupings within it to control oriented towards ensuring the equal distribution of the means of subsistence to all individual citizens (Werke III 204/5; Der Geschlessene Handelsstaat in Werke III 397-403). As Fichte’s argument proceeds, so the idea of individual rights held independently of the state is abandoned. Rather Fichte incorporates individual rights into his definition of the state, the state securing the individual’s right to existence. What remains of the individuals rights independent of the state rests in the authority that individuals invest in the state as the protector of individual rights. It follows that if the state acts to contradict this definition, the individuals can withdraw their authority.

In Fichte’s political theory the state came to encompass external human relations in their entirety. Moreover, the state comes to expand in competence from the social and economic to the very border of the moral world. For Fichte, not only ‘does the state itself become the natural condition of man and its laws … realised natural law’ (Grundlage des Naturrechts in Werke III 149) but the abstract association of individuals in society is transformed in the state into ‘a real whole .. a totality’ that prepares individuals in the sensory world for participation in the absolute moral totality of humanity.

Reason is One, and its representation in the sensory world is also only one; humanity is a single organised and organising Whole of Reason. It was divided into several members of independent of one another; only the natural institution of the state abolishes this independence for the time being and merges individual quantities into a whole unit morality reorganises the whole species into one.

Fichte Grundlage des Naturrechts in Werke III 203

Individuals retain their freedom only in a sphere outside of the state and connected with morality.

What the individual does not contribute to the purpose of the state, in respect to this is he completely free; not woven into the whole of the state, he remains an individual, a free person dependent only upon himself. It is just this freedom which is assured to him by the state power and for which he entered into the civil contract. Humanity separates itself from its civil status in order to raise itself with absolute freedom to morality.

Fichte Grundlage des Naturrechts in Werke III 203

Fichte, effectively, produces a dualism between the material activities of individuals, subject to the all-encompassing state, and the spiritual activities of the arts and sciences, left to the individual, which actually undermined the attempt to integrate the external world into the moral life. Fichte, from radical individualism, bent back the stick too far. In asserting the value of the state and in justifying its supremacy, Fichte raised it above the individual and individual morality and left in abeyance the true relation between the two. Thus Fichte left himself open to the accusation of being an unqualified authoritarian, assigning an ethical significance to the state independent of the individuals constituting it. Fichte, perhaps vaguely, was aware of the tension. On one of the few occasions that he actually faced this problem he retreated from this position. Rather than being a real totality, the state was dismissed as ‘nothing but an abstract concept’. In truth, ‘only the citizens are real persons’ (Fichte Grundlage des Naturrechts in Werke III 371).

Fichte took up the whole problem of working out the relationship between the sensory world and the moral world between 1800 and 1807. And it is to achieve a genuine integration that induced Fichte to incorporate the idea of the nation into his political theory. Some aspects of Fichte’s nationalism are dubious from the perspective of individual freedom. An increasing religious influence strengthened the transcendental aspect. A more defensible aspect, one meriting greater examination here, relates to Fichte’s critique of contemporary society as a sphere of materialistic, selfish and anarchic individualism. For Fichte, this individualism represents a stage in which the individual’s concentration upon his or her exclusive individuality separates the individual from other individuals in a moral order that is now capable of realisation. This is the organising principle of Fichte’s Granzuege des gegenwaertigen Zeitalters (1804). Fichte comes to theorise a concept of the nation as the direct embodiment of moral totality. Fichte thus converts the arguments previously made for the individual and the state into a moral claim for the nation. The nation is the this-worldly embodiment of moral unity through supra-individual institutions, invested with authority to coerce individuals toward their moral freedom, in the name of moral freedom.

Fichte argues that, politically, individuals must be considered as essentially evil and that, in consequence, the principle of the rights of man, though they must be respected, are insufficient in the founding or the administering of the state (Ueber Macchiavelli als Schriftsteller in Nachgelassen Werke III 420 428). But neither did Fichte find the state’s claims to obedience to be sufficient in themselves. Indeed, Fichte now argues that the claims made by the state to an exclusive loyalty are ‘artificial’ given that the state could only supply the sphere of ‘efficacy’ in which the individual finds it possible to work for the fundamental values of the nation, hence for humanity (Der Patriotismus und Sein Segenteil in Nachgelassene Werke III 226-9). Thus Fichte argues that individuals and the state are reciprocally related and are bound to each other in their mutual participation in the supreme good embodied in the nation.

The peoples are indeed not a property of the prince.. The prince belongs to his nation as wholly and completely as it belongs to him.

Fichte Ueber Macchiavelli Werke III 426

In his Addresses to the German Nation (1807-08), Fichte completed his integration of the individual and the state in a conception of freedom embodied in the nation. For Fichte, the bonds uniting the individual and the state are not strong enough to keep them together and hence require the commitment of both to the national community which comprises both. Fichte defines the individual as ‘a member in the eternal chain of a general spiritual life, is under a higher social order’. The nation is:





The argument that this book makes for the urban public sphere defines justice as a social virtue and makes it central to the constitution of space as a human environment. The universal ethic required to buttress the conception of social justice is defined most eloquently by Immanuel Kant. Kant’s categorical imperative, the moral law as the ‘highest good’ possible through freedom as its end (Kant 1951:30), defines universal principles which secure the unity of each and of all and hence counter the polarities which are renting modern towns and cities from within.

Kant is committed to the realisation of the good. For Kant, human beings ‘are a priori determined by reason to promote with all our powers the summum bonum, which consists in the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition of the good itself, ‘a universal happiness conjoined with morality most accordant to law’ (Kant 1951:304). This end of a moral society in which individuals promote the happiness of each other implies a social ethics that regulates individual actions through a harmony of free and rational wills. ‘Moral goodness consists .. in the submission of our will to rulers whereby all our voluntary actions are brought into harmony which is universally valid’ (Kant 1980:17). This generates a conception of the highest good defined in terms of the colegislative community of free individuals treating each other as ends (Van Der Linden 1988:4/5).

The categorical imperative is a universal principle for all rational beings and supplies valid and necessary principles for every volition. Hence Kant’s Formula of Universal Law holds: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (Kant 1991:84). This obligation to obey the moral law charges humanity with the duty to promote the highest good for all. Individual agents create a moral community in which each person is reciprocally end and means by submitting their maxims to the test of universality (Kant 1951:222). The ‘rational nature’ of human beings means that the individual ‘exists as an end in himself, not merely a means for arbitrary use by this or that will’ (Kant 1991:90 91). Hence The Formula of the End Itself holds: ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’ (Kant 1991:91).

Kant’s morality is pertinent to the division between use value and exchange value, the former determined by human beings consciously regulating their affairs, the latter by ‘things’ invested with existential significance. Whilst the realm of means is equated with the world of ‘things’, the realm of ends is equated with the world of pure self-determined intelligences (Kant 1964:85 96/7). The Formula of Autonomy holds that ‘the will is .. not merely subject to the law but is so subject that it must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)’ (Kant 1991:93).

In acting out of respect for the moral law, the moral agent wills himself/herself and others as colegislators in moral order of universal cooperation (Kant 1991:98/9). To treat others as ends in themselves respects the demand that individual agents should create a society of legislators concerned to promote each other’s ends, ‘making universal law’ (Kant 1991:94). This is a ‘kingdom of ends’ as the ‘systematic union of different rational beings’ under ‘common objective laws’, laws that are ‘directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends and means’ (Kant 1991:95). This envisages an ideal realm in which individuals respect each other as legislators, subjecting themselves to laws that they themselves have made (Kant 1991:95). This realm is composed not of monadic legislators lacking relation and interaction but of colegislators interacting in a reciprocal community: ‘every rational being must so act as if he were through maxims always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends’ (Kant 1991:100). A reasonable assemblage of individuals working to attain the common good is achieved.

In the political sphere, this morality of ends takes the form of the republican state. This state is a legal order which renders individual freedom consistent with the freedom of all through a collectively universal will securing the common good (Kant 1965:B.779/80). The rules of Kant’s ‘architectonic’ of the lawful state are reciprocal in being equally and mutually obligatory for all (Kant 1965:B.860; Saner 1973:30/1 215). Kant is looking to achieve a ‘law governed social order’ so that ‘the greatest freedom’ of individuals ‘can coexist with the freedom of others’ (Kant 1991:44 45). Kant’s universal principle of morality, the categorical imperative, is thus applied to politics as the Universal Principle of Right: ‘Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to coexist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right’ (Kant 1991:133).

The realm of ends exists as an ideal human community composed of free and equal colegislators (Kant 1965:B.372), a goal of future society promising progress towards communal autonomy (Kant 1965:B.836f; 1956:121f). This conception defines the city as the sphere in which human beings realise their highest good as moral beings in mutual relation to each other. Referring to Plato’s idea of the perfect city, Kant defines a conception of the city of ends in terms of an ideal civil constitution: ‘A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom of each can co-exist with the freedom of all others’ (Kant 1965:B.373/374).

Arguing that imperfect institutions corrupting human nature ought to be transformed and placed on a moral basis, Kant raises the possibility that the ‘more legislation and government are brought into harmony with the above idea, the rarer would punishment become’. This makes it ‘quite rational to maintain .. that in a perfect state no punishment whatsoever would be required’ (Kant 1965:B.373/374). The city of ends is beyond division and coercion and has realised social justice in the perfect civil constitution. This perfect constitution is a ‘state’, a city-state grounded in civil society, which has replaced coercion with freedom (Kant 1965:B.374 394n7; 1956:3). 

Kant’s argument possesses radical implications. Autonomy – being governed rationally by self-legislated laws – remains a goal still to be achieved since heteronomy – determination by external laws (natural inclinations or the arbitrary will of others) – is the norm within existing political and social institutions (Van Der Linden 1988:32). The realisation of autonomy is the realisation of the city of ends in which free individuals determine the purposes of their living environment according to use value. This overcomes the heteronomy associated with the domination of this living environment by external forces, shaping the environment according to exchange value as the logic of ‘things’.

Kant envisages the external coordination of society by political force and economic necessity being superseded by an internal moral coordination through the process of culture. Kant’s plan of nature guides human inclinations to the rational end of a ‘just civil constitution’ as the final condition for the self-development of the natural faculties of human beings (Kant 1991:45). This brings about an internally and externally ‘perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely’ (Kant 1991:50). In achieving this rational natural end, the ‘pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole’ (Kant 1991:44/5). This entails a noumenological civil society which dissolves and replaces the coercive order of the state (Krieger 1972:102). A ‘perfect civil union’ is the fulfilment of the goal of human history (Kant 1991:42 50 52/3). The outstanding question concerns the social form that the perfect constitution in the context of the perfect civil union takes. This was the question that led Hegel to develop his system of the ethical life – Sittlichkeit. The rational unity of each and all that Kant defined on a moral basis came to be established on a social and associative basis by Hegel.

Herder
Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Menschengeschichte, written in four volumes published between 1784 and 1791, expressed a new attitude to the. Herder views human life as being closely related to its setting in the natural world. The natural world for Herder is an organism designed so as to develop within itself higher organisms. The physical universe is a matrix within which, at a specially favoured region which from this perspective may be regarded as its centre, a peculiar structure, the solar system, crystallises out. This is also a matrix, within which its own special conditions give rise to the earth, which is itself peculiar among the planets in being a fit theatre for life and, in this respect, the seat of the next stage in evolution, the centre of the solar system. Within the material fabric of the earth itself there arise special mineral formations, special geographical organisms (the continents), and so on. From its primitive vegetable form, life on earth is a further elaboration or crystallization of a highly complex kind, with animal life as a further specialisation of vegetable life, and human life as a further specialisation of animal life. In each case, the new specialisation exists in an environment consisting of the unspecialised matrix from which the inner nature of this matrix emerges into complete realisation. Thus man is the perfect or typical animal; animals are perfect plants, and so on.

Herder’s teleological conception of nature holds that each stage in evolution is designed by nature to prepare for the next stage. No stage is an end in itself. However, the process reaches a culmination with man, since man is an end in himself. In his rational and moral life, man justifies his own existence. Nature’s purpose in creating man is to create a rational being. It follows that human nature develops itself as a system of spiritual powers, the full development of which lies in the future. Humanity is therefore a link between the natural world from which it has grown and the spiritual world which exists eternally in the shape of spiritual laws, but which is nevertheless realising itself on the earth, coming into existence through humanity realising rational and moral end.
Conceived as a natural being, the human being is divided into the various races of humankind, each closely connected to its geographical environment and having its original physical and mental characteristics shaped by that environment. However, once formed, each race is a specific type of humanity, having permanent characteristics which depend not on the immediate relation to the environment but on its own inbred peculiarities. The sensuous and imaginative faculties of the various races are thus differentiated, with each race having its own conception of happiness and its own ideal of life and so on. This racially differentiated humanity is itself a matrix, in which there arises a higher type of human organism, the historical organism. Humanity therefore does not remain static but develops over time into higher and higher forms.

Herder acknowledged that human nature is not uniform but diversified according to time and place, that differences existed between different kinds of men. Thus, for instance, what makes Chinese civilisation what it is not the geography and climate of China but the peculiar nature of the Chinese. In other words, different kinds of men placed in the same environment will result in different kinds of civilisation since they will exploit the resources of that environment in different ways. The determining factor in history, therefore, is not the special peculiarities of man in general but of this kind of man in particular. Herder considered these special peculiarities to be racial peculiarities, the inherited psychological characteristics of the varieties of the human species. Herder’s conception is therefore anthropological in the sense that he distinguishes various physical types of human beings, and considers the manners and customs of these various types to be expressions of psychological peculiarities along with physical ones.

This view represented a significant development in the conception of human nature, since it acknowledged that human nature to be a problem rather than a given datum, something uniform. Human nature was something variable, whose special characteristics required separate investigation in special cases, not something to be discovered once and for all. Nevertheless, Herder’s conception is not a wholly historical one. He regarded the psychological characteristics of each race to be fixed and uniform. Against the Enlightenment’s conception of a single fixed human nature, Herder proposes a variety of fixed human natures. These are not regarded as historical products but as presuppositions of history. This is not a conception of a people’s historical experience; rather, the people’s historical experience is regarded as a mere product of its fixed character. One could argue in defence that Herder’s theory of racial differences does not in itself give any reasons for arguing the superiority of one race over another. At best, it implies that each type of man is to have its own form of life, its own conception of happiness, and its own rhythm of historical development. On this reasoning, the social institutions and political forms of different peoples can differ without one being regarded as being intrinsically better or worse than the others. The goodness of a particular political form is not an absolute goodness but only a goodness relative to the people that create it.

This defence, however, is not an accurate representation of Herder’s thought. Indeed, it is central to Herder’s standpoint that the differences between the social and political institutions of different races stem not from the historical experience of each race but from its innate psychological peculiarities’ (Collingwood 92).





The poet Schiller was Kant’s most direct follower, in the theory of history as well as in the theory of art.





Schelling developed the ideas of Kant and Fichte in a systematic way. Schelling’s thought is based on two principles. The first principle is the idea that whatever exists is knowable, that is, is an embodiment of rationality or, as Schelling put it, a manifestation of the Absolute. The second principle is the idea of a relation between two terms which, though opposites, are nevertheless embodiments of the Absolute; the Absolute is itself an identity in which the differences between the two terms are resolved.

For Schelling (System of Transcendental Idealism), there are two great realms of the knowable: Nature and History. Each, as intelligible, is a manifestation of the Absolute, but they embody the Absolute in opposite ways. Nature consists of things distributed in space, whose intelligibility is revealed in the way in which they are distributed, or in the regular and determinate relations between them. History consists of the thoughts and actions of minds, which are intelligible but also intelligent, intelligible to themselves, not simply to something other than themselves. Thus these thoughts and actions of minds are a more adequate embodiment of the Absolute since they are subject as well as object, thus containing in themselves both sides of the knowledge-relation. As objectively intelligible, the activity of mind in history is necessary; as subjectively intelligent, mind is free. The course of historical development is therefore the genesis of mind’s self-awareness as both free and under law, as morally and politically autonomous. In this argument, Schelling follows Kant. In arguing that the stages through which this historical development passes are determined by the logical structure of the concept itself, he follows Fichte. It is therefore in its largest features divisible into two, the first a phase in which man conceives the Absolute as nature, where reality is conceived as broken up and dispersed into separate realities (polytheism), and where political forms rise and fall in the manner of natural organisms, leaving nothing behind them; the second a phase in which the Absolute is conceived as history, a progressive development where humanity discerns the purposes of the Absolute, freely co-operating with providence in its plan for the development of human rationality. This, Schelling argues, is the modern age, where human life is governed by scientific, historical, and philosophical reason.

Schelling’s central argument is the conception that the Absolute itself is coming into full and complete existence through historical development. In so far as it has always been a manifestation of the Absolute, the material universe has always been intelligible. However, the Absolute cannot be identical with the barely intelligible, since mere intelligibility is a mere potentiality, which is actualised by becoming actually understood. Nature as intelligible requires a knower to understand it, and thus exhibits its full essence only through a mind that actually knows it. With an actual knower, nature qua intelligible becomes an actual known. With this, rationality, which is the Absolute, advances to a higher and more complete manifestation of itself. At this point a new kind of intelligibility arises, the intelligibility of mind. Mind itself is not only a knower of nature but a knowable in itself, and as a result the Absolute cannot be satisfied with a situation in which mind knows nature, instead there is a further stage in which mind knows itself. With each advance in the process of self-knowledge, the knowing mind is enriched by new stages in self-knowledge, each stage generating new things for the mind to know. Historical development is therefore a temporal process in which both knowledge and the knowable are progressively coming into existence. History is therefore the self-realisation of the Absolute, the Absolute referring to reason as both the knowable and as the knower.


48 HEGEL AND THE ETHICAL LIFE
This chapter builds upon the themes of participation, reciprocity and community that previous chapters have extracted from the ‘rational’ conception of freedom and identifies the potentials for an associative urban public from out of Hegel’s system of differentiation. Hegel’s philosophy is shown to construct and sustain a ‘thoroughly democratic politics’ (MacGregor 1998:xvii), making citizen participation possible at ascending levels of socio-political governance through the extension of public spaces.

As with Plato and Aristotle, Hegel treats politics as a branch of ethics. The state is not neutral but has the goal of promoting a form of ethical life in which all share a common terrain as citizens. Hegel goes beyond the formal rules and principles of an abstract public to set the actual individual within a set of ethical relations (Pinkard 1986:209/32). The structured system of family, civil society and the state that Hegel defines is a social differentiation that imbues citizens with a common purpose (PR para 207). Hegel’s ethical state articulates a principle of public life as an agency for unity, community and common good. Hegel’s Sittlichkeit is therefore not so much a description of the empirical state as ‘a rational reconstruction of what institutions must exist if rational freedom is to be possible’ (Smith 1991:130/1). Sittlichkeit explains how ‘the actuality of concrete freedom is to be achieved’ (PR para 260).

In offering a mediated as against an unmediated suffrage, Hegel developed an associative civil public rooted in a richly layered fabric of social institutions and a welter of intermediary powers (Avineri 1972:105 107/8 108 161 164/5; Dallmayr 1993:133 253; Meister 1990:120). 

Hegel presents the ‘rational’ conception in arguing that freedom extends to deeper, socio-relational levels than is contained in individualist conceptions. Personal, subjective and civil freedom are valuable because they serve determinate purposes in the context of actualising absolute freedom within a larger collective life so that particular ends pass over into the ends of the community (Wood 1990:258). This view reinstates the public dimension of individual freedom. Hegel rejects the individualist conception as entailing the egoistic competition that issues in the unconscious constraint of all individuals. Freedom is not an unfettered individualism that puts the self-interest of each against the public good of all but living subject to law within a just political constitution (Houlgate 1991:79). Thus, individual possibilities, which individualist liberals equate with liberty, actually requires a degree of social structuring which those same liberals reject as inimical to liberty. Hegel is clear that ‘subjective freedom’ is valuable but has some way to go before it completes itself as ‘absolute freedom’ (PR paras 21-24). Hegel thus affirms ‘substantive freedom’ (PR paras 145A 149 257) as completing and enriching ‘formal freedom’ on a higher plane (PR paras 123 187), ‘concrete freedom’ (PR paras 7A 260) as the higher development of ‘abstract freedom’ (PR paras 7A 123 149A), the ‘positive’ or ‘affirmative’ ‘freedom for itself’ (PR paras 10A 149A) as superior to ‘freedom in itself’ (PR para 10A).

Whereas individualist liberalism equates freedom with the absence of interference, criticising all forms of collective purpose as external to the self and as an infringement upon liberty, Hegel’s ‘rational’ conception is ‘positive’ in affirming that individuals obtain freedom through relationships. The possibility of constituting a general public order, actualising universality and connecting each with all, depends upon the quality of these relationships, upon whether they expand or inhibit publicity.

The principle that freedom is obtained in and through relationships enables Hegel to develop a sophisticated conception of an embodied public sphere. Hegel’s state is no abstract body but is located within the system of Sittlichkeit as the embodiment of the various ties binding individuals to the community. Hegel’s public is a framework of shared ethical understanding that affirms a sense of common civic identity (Haddock 1994:148). As such, Sittlichkeit contains potentials for a new civic urban sphere that is organised on the terrain of the associational space of civil society.

Hegel’s conception of the state as an ‘ethical community’ which rests upon reason rather than force incorporates Rousseau’s democratic doctrine of the general will (Pelczynski 1971:1/29; Kedourie 1995:145). Hegel praises Rousseau’s citizen assembly deliberating under rules of communicative rationality (Rousseau 1973:184/6 237 245 246 250) for defining the state in terms of human self-determination. Hegel affirms that individuals should ‘share in deliberating and deciding on political matters’ as members of the state (PR para 308R). But Hegel proceeds to argue that Rousseau’s argument presupposes the existence of a classical identity connecting public and private, something that is denied by modern conditions. This deficiency compelled Rousseau to have recourse to the device of the Legislator, since the general will and the will of all were abstracted from each other within modernity (Hegel 1977:355). 

Hegel argues that Rousseau is unable to ground his freedom in a genuine general will (PR para 258A). The problem is that since civil society has become ‘a battleground where everyone’s private interest meets everyone else’s’ (PR para 289), a genuine general interest cannot emerge. Rousseau’s error was to consider the general will not as the ‘absolutely rational element in the will but only as a general will which proceeds out of this individual will’ (PR para 258R). For Hegel, the individual leads a ‘universal life’ only through being a member of the state as the embodiment of individual freedom (PR para 258). This universal life is an organic conception rooted in social differentiation. The individual and the general, the private and the public, are not polar abstractions. Hegel’s Sittlichkeit integrates the individual in a social and political existence grounded upon principles of a common life and morality. The freedom of the individual is thus articulated only in a network of organised relationships with others. The constitution expresses a way of life for citizens (PR paras 273R 274).

Hegel revalues the associative life of civil society as a means of re-connecting public and private and of avoiding centralisation and atomisation. Intermediary associations check the power of the centralising state whilst offering individuals a sense of collective identity. As such, they play an important educative function in nurturing capacities for collective ethical experience and civil participation underpinning an urban public life.

Creating a social identity that ensures a coincidence of public and private interest creates the ethical state that embodies and expresses the collective and individual good as two sides of the same coin. For Hegel, ‘the state is actual only when its members have a feeling of their own self-hood’ and is ‘stable’ ‘only when public and private ends are identical’ (PR para 265A). This view decisively counters the assertion that Hegel is a ‘totalitarian’ thinker. Hegel’s state is not divorced from individuals but is based on the premise that the individual will is actualised through participation in the universal end of the state (PR para 257R). The state is only an ‘end in itself’ because it is the highest stage of individual self-actualisation, providing individuals with a fulfilling mode of life (PR para 257). Thus the rationality of the state consists in the ‘thoroughgoing unity of universality and individuality’ (PR para 257R), allowing ‘the principle of subjectivity complete itself in the independent extreme of personal particularity’ whilst simultaneously bringing it back to ‘substantive unity’ (PR para 260). 

Hegel thus grounds freedom in the unity of the universal and the particular in their appropriate spheres within the rational state (PR para 258). ‘Abstractly considered, rationality in general consists in the interpenetrating unity of universality and individuality; in content here concretely it consists in the unity of objective freedom and subjective freedom’ (PR para 258R0).

In the manner of Aristotle, Hegel connects politics in its narrow institutional form with the organised mode of life of the people as a whole (PR para 267), since social life becomes an object of rational human choice through the state (PR para 270). Sittlichkeit articulates a communal ethic that embeds individuals in a shared fabric of common life. What is ‘universally recognised and valid’ is available to all and common to the whole (PR Preface 15; PH 1956:43).

Individualist liberalism is unable to generate a genuine public life founded on a true universalism, reducing the state to a ‘protective’ device safeguarding private property and the person. Hegel recovers the Aristotelian sense of politikos bios as integral to the moral well-being and self-development of individuals. This public life achieves the unity of individuals not out of self-interest but out of a solidaristic sense of community (Avineri 1972:134).

The core principle sustaining the universality of a true public life is reciprocity. ‘Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative knowing of oneself in another self’ so that each ‘has real universality as reciprocity, in such a way that it knows itself as recognised in the free other, and knows this other insofar as it recognises it and knows it as free’ (PM para 436). This universal self-consciousness forms the substance of ethical life, enabling individuals to achieve a truly ethical condition within a community of minds within which individuals mutually recognize each other’s rationality (PM para 437; PR para 57A; HS 1983:112/8).

A purely individual freedom is limited. It is only as a member of the state, ‘mind objectified’, that ‘the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life’ (PR para 258R). The true fulfilment of individual freedom must be universal, requiring the state as the actuality of ‘the ethical Idea’ (PR para 257), of ‘concrete freedom’ (PR para 260), of ‘substantial will’, as the particular self-consciousness raised to universality, ‘rational in and for itself’ (PR para 258). Individual freedom can only be actualised in a universal sphere, a genuine public that connects each and all. The ‘rational freedom of the will .. explicates itself’ in the state (FA 1975:1:137). The state is thus ‘the power of reason actualising itself as will’ (PR 1942:279). The integration of the universal and the particular takes the form of a unity of the individual and the state via a whole range of intermediary bodies which enable the individual to enter into public life in an ‘objective way’ (PR paras 30R 158 166 182 207 209/229 242). The individual is empty in abstraction from ethical life and only acquires ‘a content and a living actuality’ when ‘filled with particularity’, attaining universality only in becoming ‘a member of a corporation, a society etc.’ (PR para 308). The participation of the individual in the state as their substance, founded on the particular spheres of interest (PR para 289R), as a member of corporations, associations etc., offers a mode of ethical integration and public education (Bildung) which transcends ‘selfish’ interests (PR para 253R) and passes naturally into the universal life of the state (PR paras 197 201 256).

Hegel does not reduce civil society to economic relations – the system of needs – but embraces the institutions which regulate these relations, the corporations which, with the family, constitute ‘the ethical root of the State, the one planted in civil society’ (PR para 255), ‘the firm foundation of the state’, ‘the pillars of public freedom’ (PR para 265). The state stands at the apex of a network of institutionalised relationships. Hegel affirms civil associations as ‘pillars of public freedom since in them particular freedom is realised and rational’; they are the foundations of ‘the citizens trust in’ the state (PR 1942:281 163). Hegel’s argument thus defines a public life constituted through a socially structured interaction between individuals and a universally valid authority generated through collective bodies, combining essential public authority (PR paras 121 185R 206R). Hegel’s public life is thus able to achieve universality whilst preserving personal and civil freedom as a sphere within which free choice can be exercised (PR paras 41 189). The state achieves the unity of individuals (PR paras 258R 261R) whilst preserving the differentiation of civil society (PR paras 181 184 186 263A). In the public realm, sublation operates as the general will conceived as the mediation of particular wills, ‘the will of all jointly and each individually’ (Hegel in Dallmayr 1993:59).

What is most remarkable about Hegel’s position is the way that he is able to assert the universal interest by enhancing rather than suppressing particularity. Not force but ‘the fundamental sense of order holds the state together (PR para 268A), unity being achieved ‘in and through particular ends’, not through their suppression (PR para 270A). Hegel structures the rational unity of each and all by rooting the public sphere in the civil associations comprising the social order. The individual comes to be free through social institutions and duties (PR paras 149 268). Hegel identifies the holistic bond in the living spirit of the people (Dallmayr 1993:5 47). Without this bond, society fractures into an aggregate of atoms, abstract private persons whose rights are incapable of generating a public consciousness (PS para 480; PR paras 256R 35A; Dallmayr 1993:124 125).

The tendency of individualist liberal society is to dissolve communal organisation and identity, something that weakens social bonds and contributes to the disengagement of the individual from public ties. This leads to a dependence of the individual upon markets, bureaucratic institutions and national governments. Hegel’s principle of public life checks this tendency. Hegel defines a structured system of social roles and civil associations which invests patterns of social interaction with ethical significance, integrating individuals in an organised dynamic which expands individual freedom by making the ethical life available to all (Hegel PS 1979:256/212; Wood 1990:25/30 200 201/2 219; Houlgate 1991:100/5; Avineri 1972:84). A functioning public order is socially structured through social identity, role and function (PR paras 207 252R 253 253R). Integrating individuals within a public life through their functional purpose possesses democratic possibilities that affirm the individual as an active member of society through the exercise of skill, industry, etc. Hegel’s Sittlichkeit contains the potential for an associative democratic public sphere which allows for ‘organic’ participation in the lawmaking function of government through civil associations and communities. This involves legislative co-determination through a mediated system of functional representation. This corporate system roots the public functions of representation, integration and socialisation in the real identities of individuals (Meister 1990:161 176 177). Providing a form of political activity between the system of needs and the state, the corporation offers a context within which individual abilities are shaped and exercised. It is an important source of Bildung in which individuals develop the virtues of cooperation and responsibility through the experience of engaging in shared activities with others. The most important function of the corporations is to provide its members with ethical goals (Wood 1990:241; MacGregor 1998:63).

Hegel’s differentiated and mediated public sphere offers an organised mode of participation that contrasts with the abstract and passive systems of representation of the liberal state (Kainz 1996:148). The gap between the state and civil society is mediated by corporate blocs, the ‘circles of association in civil society’ that are ‘already communities’. By entering the field of politics, ‘the field of the highest concrete universality’, political and civil life are united (PR paras 258 303).

Hegel’s organic conception of the public sphere proceeds through intermediary bodies to the universal sphere via a functionally organised pattern of interaction between individuals. Deputies are chosen not by an agglomeration ‘dispersed into atomic units’ but through an ‘articulated system’ constituted by ‘local communities .. and other duly constituted associations’, ‘the free establishment of civic authorities and self-administering bodies’ (NL para 153; PR para 308). Hegel thus criticises the ‘atomistic spirit’ of the undifferentiated suffrage for reproducing the split between public life and private life, the former being the province of a passive mass concerned only with private interests (NL para 121; PR para 308R).





The achievement of Hegel’s differentiated mode of functional representation is to have extended the rights of civil liberty in civil society into rights of public participation, thus grounding democracy in an active social designation. This offers an alternative to the monopolisation of public life within the abstract liberal state. Hegel develops the public sphere beyond its republican origins. The public sphere is no longer confined to a single level. In Hegel’s public ‘a series of levels have key roles to play, including the public rights of private persons, the publicity of legal processes, the public life of the corporation, and finally the interaction between public opinion and the public deliberation of the legislature’ (Arato 1991:318). Rooting the public sphere in civil associations offers a broad conception which embraces social movements in an ‘open ended public space’ forged by a ‘democratic social bond’ (Dallmayr 1991).

There are, however, problems with presenting Hegel as the philosopher of an associative civil public. Hegel is clear that civil society is a sphere of particularity and diremption which requires the higher surveillance of the state (PR para 185; Clarke 1991:52/3; Thomas 1994:56/7). Hegel’s argument for the higher institutions of the state and state bureaucracy to embody universality exists as a critique of the claims of civil society to absolute power (PR paras 205 277 303; Habermas 1989:122). 

The key task is to extract democratic norms from Hegel’s hierarchical assumptions concerning the ability of the state bureaucracy to embody universalism and commonality. To achieve an associative urban public, such universalism and commonality needs to be diffused throughout the social fabric itself so that individuals achieve an identity as citizens. This realises citizenship as an active principle of public participation. Conceiving an urban public sphere in this associative sense, extending participatory structures throughout civil society, maps out a programme for the ‘de-totalisation’ of socialism beyond the state and political party, the conventional agencies of the socialist public (Pelczynski in Keane ed 1988:364/5).

This draws attention to the need to resolve the fundamental cause of the diremption that denies publicity within civil society – capitalist relations. An associative public sphere can be theorised through the revaluation of civil society as capable of generating public life and consciousness in its everyday activities. This is to forge the bonds of universality and commonality within civil society. The democratic reading of Hegel’s ethical life revalues the associative character of civil society so as to develop an expansive concept of the public sphere. The idea of individuals participating as citizens in determining affairs of common significance implies an extension of public spaces and needs to be rooted in the project of restituting power to the social body.

Incorporating the themes and values of ‘rational freedom’ within a conceptual formulation of the associative urban public sphere/s, it is possible to outline the contours of a self-governing civil society functioning within an extensive public sphere that is autonomous of the central state. This opposes a decentralised discursive mode of rational coordination to the non-discursive forms of alien control exercised by the state and capital. The conception acknowledges that ‘no emancipation is possible in the modern world .. without a strong civil society that can strengthen the public sphere and can provide a haven from and a center of resistance to the Behemoth state’ (Goudner 1980:371/2).

Benjamin Barber criticises ‘thin democracy’ as political system which is subservient to individual rights and privileges and held together merely by a minimal set of abstract and formal rules. (The decline of the public sphere through its subordination to private interests has been noted by many authors, e.g. Arendt 1958; Sennett 1978). Barber’s ‘strong democracy’ savours a great deal of Hegel’s multi-layered fabric of intermediary institutions, a network of local and regional institutions (such as neighbourhood assemblies, town meetings, civil associations, cooperatives, etc.). ‘Strong democracy’ does not imply that the protection of civil and political rights needs to be abandoned: ‘My argument is that strong democracy is the only fully legitimate form of politics: as such, it constitutes the condition for the survival of all that is most dear to us in the Western liberal tradition’ (Barber 1984:xvi). The case for ‘strong democracy’ restores the classical conception of politikos bios, the connection of public life with human self-realisation: ‘without participation in the common life that defines them and in the decision making that shapes their social habitat, women and men cannot become individuals’ (Barber 1984:xv). Strong democracy is ‘a community that does not oppress individuals, a consensus that respects dissent, a politics that recognises conflict without enthroning permanent factions and a democracy that is strong without being unitary, rich without being fragmented, and consensual without being monolithic’ (Barber 1984).





The process of separating individuals from each other within society and of society from nature began with the dismantling of the commons. The village commons had formed a viable and well-developed form of rural polity which inspired the loyalty and activity of all its members. The most striking feature of the village commons is the democratic form of its governance. Peasant councils administered the commons. Decisions on crop rotation, planting and harvesting, grazing, the introduction of new crops, the cutting of forests, the allocation of water, and the use of farm animals and tools and implements were made by all members of the commune, jointly and democratically.

From the sixteenth century, land that had been held publicly, in common, came to be enclosed through a series of political and legal acts. These enclosure acts initiated a process of privatisation and commodification of the land. The long term political and ecological consequences of this radical reorientation of human beings’ relationship to nature are still unfolding as commodification and privatisation extend to every aspect of nature, water, air, the biosphere itself. 

The enclosure movement may be called ‘the revolution of the rich against the poor’ (ch4 2). But this way of stating the case underestimates the full significance of the way that these acts transformed the relationships between individuals within society, and between society and the natural environment, preparing the ground for the capitalist industrial and urban revolutions that made rich and poor class designations. From this perspective, the enclosure movement was not so much a revolution of the rich against the poor as the revolution of those who sought further riches through the exploitation of an urban working class recruited from the ranks of populations separated from the land. Millions of peasants were ‘freed’ from their rural homes and forced to migrate into the new industrial towns and cities to seek subsistence employment as wage labourers in the new industrial factories. Far from ‘freeing’ the individual from personal bonds and ties associated with the rural economy, enclosure systematically severed the bonds of intimate community to further exploitative relations of privatisation and commodification. The liberal figure of the ‘autonomous individual’ amounted in practice to each individual no longer being a member of a commons to which each and all related and belonged but becoming a self-seeking atom having to fend for himself/herself against all others. In the meantime, the rich and powerful were free to pursue their own naked self-interests whilst no longer being accountable to the larger community. Enclosure leading to privatisation and commodification not only destroyed the commons but also publicity. The common interest became something that emerged indirectly, unconsciously, as the unintended consequence of private motives and decisions.

The enclosure movement, associated with the destruction of the commons, transformed the nature of relationships at the heart of social life, altering the conceptions of freedom, power and security in the process. The privatisation and commodification which identified land as a ‘resource’ to be exploited was extended to nature in general and people in particular – the exploitation of natural and human resources lay behind the expansion of capitalism. Human beings were separated from nature and both were treated as means to external ends of accumulation rather than as entities with ends of their own. The places where individuals worked and lived were no longer valued in terms of the common experiences that once made up a town a civic life, a culture but only in monetary terms. Land was no longer something that all individuals belonged to and shared, but rather a commodity that some people – the dominant class of property-owners and exploiters - possessed. Land was quantified and commodified, measured by what it could be exchanged for rather than evaluated as a condition of life. The same exploitative approach was extended to human beings. Relationships were transformed and placed on a monetary basis. The reciprocity implicit in personal and customary ties came to be replaced by the nexus of callous cash payment. Where individuals once shared their work in common, they were now forced to sell their time and labour. Means and ends and the relationship between them were redefined and restructured as individuals began to conceive each other and everything around them in monetary terms as possible means to securing purely private ends. Each and all and everything became a commodity to be purchased at an appropriate price and exploited.

In the words of Max Weber, this restructuring of relationships involved the ‘disenchantment of the world’ – life, land, existence were all reduced to abstract quantifiable standards of measurement. Under capitalism, social and economic relationships have operated in an abstract, detached, superficial, and forced context. Max Weber identified the most salient characteristics of capitalism’s monetary economy:

The market community, as such, is the most impersonal relationship of practical life into which human beings can enter with one another. Where the market is allowed to follow its own tendencies, its participants do not look toward the person of each other, but only toward the commodity. There are no obligations of brotherliness or reverence, and none of those spontaneous human relations that are sustained by personal unions. They all would just obstruct the free development of the bare market relationship. Such absolute depersonalisation is contrary to all elementary forms of human relations.
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The privatisation of the common land and the commodification of humankind and nature as exploitable resources marks the extension of the abstract and analytical into the sphere of human and ecological relationships, fundamentally transforming freedom, power and security. Much more than riches and poverty identified in material terms was involved in the separation of individuals from the land. In dismantling the commons, privatisation and commodification destroyed the structure of common life and, with it, the cultural and spiritual life that had evolved alongside the material life to achieve security through investing a sense of place with a sense of purpose. The destruction of this security, this form of public life, left millions vulnerable, exposed to necessity, and easy prey to the new breed of capitalist landlords, later capitalist merchants and factory owners, and the bureaucrats and autocrats of the nation-state. Without a change in relationships, people as human resources will be easy prey to the technocracy that is in the process of emerging as a bastardised alternative to a genuine socialisation.

Security was no longer to be pursued through relationships between human beings in harmony with each other and their environment but on the basis of relationships that promoted and celebrated the ‘progress’ that opposition between individuals in society and between human beings and nature would produce. The self-interested pursuit of power and wealth saw the whole word and everything and everyone within it as an exploitable resource, a means to private ends. Such an antagonistic society was more than Hobbes’ war of all against all but was also a war of all against everything – everything and everyone. As such, it could only achieve order by imposition and coercion, building walls and fences, manufacturing arms and guns, fighting wars, conquering and subjugating lands, building great masted sailing ships, mechanisms, and machines. Security came to be identified with technological expertise and material possession rather than with just and equitable relationships that had evolved through history. In return for the world with each other they had lost, the new individual of the capitalist order was given a form of security that was measured in terms of accumulative power and possession, a private security that was measured in terms of separation from others in the community and which was guaranteed by money and machines.

The exploitation of nature has fundamentally transformed not only humanity’s relationship to the earth but also human beings’ relationships to each other in society. Nature, once a living force upon which human life depended, has been reduced to an exploitable resource to be conquered, commodified and parcelled out. Land and sea, the atmosphere and electromagnetic spectrums, and now even the gene pool have all been emptied of value to be measured almost exclusively in monetary terms. The privatisation and commodification of nature came with the promise to elevate humanity from servant to sovereign. In truth, the process of making nature an object of pure commercial exchange has also involved the exploitation of human beings are means to the end of capitalist accumulation. The appropriation and exploitation of nature goes hand in hand with the exploitation of human beings and the class system. Ecological destruction and human impoverishment are twin evils.

If capitalism is premised on the antagonism of human beings towards nature, then the war that is waged is detached and rationally, proceeding in a technologically and institutionally mediated way. The ecological and human cost does not show up on the electronic boards of the international commodities exchanges, or in the neatly stacked rows of numbers printed out on the computer screens in Wall Street investment houses. Occasionally, the human environmental toll is factored in by economists who use the term ‘externalities’ to refer to the unanticipated secondary cost of doing business. Even the term ‘externality’ conjures up the idea of marginality.

Commodification identifies freedom, power and progress with the expansionary dynamic of capital accumulation. However, since this dynamic is endless, capitalism is in fact a nihilism. There is a basic inversion of means and ends implicit in the capital system, with human beings, whose freedom, happiness and self-realisation ought to be the end of the system, becoming merely means to external ends given by systemic imperatives. The capital system pursues the idea of ‘progress’ as conditional upon an endless economic expansion without regard for the impact upon human capacities. Personality has been sacrificed to this ‘progress’; a rationale of progress – systemic necessity and functional imperatives – have displaced reason which in its concern with human self-realisation, possesses an ineradicable ethical anthropological and ecology component.
Keynes was well aware of the diabolism implicit in the capital system. He condemned capitalism as irreligious, as unconcerned with moral purpose, but argued that until necessity was conquered, this immorality is justified. Keynes utterly failed to appreciate the finality of the Faustian bargain. Once human beings have exchanged their souls for material ‘progress’, it cannot be reclaimed. No amount of material wealth can buy the soul back. Keynes was correct to make a distinction between real needs which are capable of being satisfied and wants and desires which are insatiable. Keynes believed that, from a technical perspective, the economic problem of natural necessity was within sight of being solved. He failed to understand the psychological damage of the loss of morality, the exaltation of means over means, things over persons. An artificial systemic necessity replaces natural necessity and human beings remain subservient to ‘things’. Without morality – without the concern with human self-realisation – human beings are ill equipped to reject false necessity and declare the end of the economic problem and the beginning of the realm of freedom. The worst part of this pact with Mephistopheles is that the constant stimulation of wants and needs burns external necessity deep within the human psyche and personality. Human beings have sold their souls in return for a promise of an increased wealth that neither the devil, nor god nor nature nor even human science, technology and industry together have the means of delivering. Human beings have enslaved themselves to a way of life that cannot produce the material riches it promises, for which human beings give up a concern with the realisation of their own potentialities.

The damage that human beings do to themselves is measured in terms of the distortion of human powers and potentialities, their partial development and destructive and negative manifestations. But as much as internal nature, this nihilistic system damages external nature. The entropic bill for the industrial age is now coming due. For centuries, humankind has been waged technological war against nature and, with industrial and commercial expansion delivering material riches far in excess of previous ages, had seemed to be winning the war. The fact that freedom, happiness and security remain ideals to be achieved indicates that there is something awry in the means by which nature has been assaulted. Human beings cannot win a war against nature in that they are themselves a part of nature. Nature is the source of all wealth. The environment is the greatest of all means of production. Any war against nature can only be lost, and there is much evidence in contemporary geo-political chaos, economic crisis, urban decay, moral decline, global warming of such a defeat. Whereas once freedom, happiness and security were conceived in terms of creative human self-realisation in the context of reciprocal relations with each other and with their environment, through the systemic control of capitalism, human beings have sought to redefine these ideals in terms of the forces of money, capital, technology, institutional and administrative power. Freedom has been identified with the self-maximisation and self-interest of the autonomous individual; happiness with the consumption of this individual; security with the enclosure of the global commons in order to commodify and consume the earth’s endowment. From being explicitly public terms concerned with a politikos bios, freedom, happiness and security have become private notions in which each acts without regard to all others, whether that all is designated in terms of culture, community, morality, the state, notions of the good life etc. The unregulated use of the machine for the endless expansion of material wealth and – as an indirect consequence rather than direct goal freedom, happiness and security - has only a short duration. And not only is ‘progress’ on these terms short-lived, it is highly ambiguous. The means for expanding wealth in material terms have also served to impoverish the human personality, culture and environment. But finally, the costs imposed upon human and natural life have been accumulated and are now presented as the price that nature charges for ‘progress’ on human terms. The price tag goes by the name of global warming. Humankind may have created a vast and sophisticated technological and institutional order in abstraction from – and opposition to – nature but cannot transcend nature. The resources required to create and sustain that order are drawn from nature and nature is presenting the bill. Humankind is now enveloped by the spent energy of the age of capitalist ‘progress’, trapped under a thick layer of industrial gases that were emitted so that the machines could operate, the minerals could be extracted, and the goods could be transported. Nature has been silently keeping the accounts. The greenhouse gases – carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbon (CFC’s), nitrous oxide, and methane – that now poison the atmosphere are the chemical balance sheet of the age of economic growth and material consumption.

The symbiotic relationship between the centralised nation state and the global capital system amounts to a system of alien control to which all human purpose is subordinated. The state and the capital system are, by their very nature, designed to appropriate, centralise and monopolise power, whether from labour, the community or nature. The state and capital expropriate and enclose human and ecological life systems together, commodify and privatise them in order to maximise the exploitation of scarce resources, expand production and consumption, and advance utilitarian self-interest. This expansionary, nihilistic system has generated the economic and ecological crises of the modern world. The alien control of the state and capital has been the principal agency for implementing the ideals of the Enlightenment. It is therefore crucial to comprehend the dynamic role that the state and capital have played in humanity’s attempt to achieve a material existence in autonomy from nature through the technological conquest of the environment.

In contrast to the polities which predated it, the modern centralised nation state is an artificial and instrumental structure, a mechanism of bureaucratic power. Village communities predate organised and formal political structures, going all the way back to the Neolithic era. These communities rested upon and were sustained by a form of organic legitimacy grounded in the sacred geometry of place. By way of contrast, the nation state is a purely instrumental creation, bound together neither organically nor spiritually but by abstract media of money and power. While in the past the formal political organisation claimed the allegiance of its members in moral, spiritual or anthropological terms, in terms of self-realisation on earth or in terms of an afterlife, the modern state is a thoroughly secular, denormalised institution that has been created to secure the expropriation, commodification, privatisation, manipulation, exchange, and consumption of the earth’s endowment. The modern nation state is the first political organisation in history that has its origins in and conceives its purpose to be the primacy of economics over politics.

The expansion of trade from the sixteenth century drew communities from all over the world within an interlocking and increasingly fractious commercial web. The expansion of the economic system went hand in hand with the growth of the nation state. Such a system required increasing political regulation over a more expansive geographical basis. The local autonomy of free cities and feudal principalities came under systematic assault and were ultimately forced to federate and be absorbed into centralised monarchies and nation states. The political centre organised the expansion of the economic system. The state administered the raising of taxes and the securing of finance capital to dredge canals, build towns, pave roads and construct ships (ch 12, 2).

The rise of the nation state brought about the transformation of the relationship between rulers and ruled. Whereas formerly, political rule had been based on local tradition, custom, and, even, agreements made on oral basis, the centralised nation state extinguished the traditional and communal bonds in codifying all relationships between government and governed in abstract legal documents. The new form of political authority was remote, abstract, bureaucratic, and, above all, centralized. Like nature, the body politic came to be conceived in terms of the Cartesian vision and administered with the instrumental rationality of Baconian science.

The emerging nation-state recognised no limits or boundaries fixed by custom, history, religion or ecology but, rather, conceived itself as an artificial construct that would continue to expand as the market expanded. Where political rulers from the pre-modern world claimed divine authority, the authority of the new secular rulers of the modern nation state rested firmly in the extent to which they secured access to and control over territorial resources and markets and facilitated the process of accumulation. In the secularisation of politics, God was overthrown not by human power as such but by human power in its abstracted, alienated form – capital.

Lewis Mumford argued that ‘all the great national states, and the empires formed around a national core, are at bottom war-states; their politics are war politics; and the all-absorbing preoccupation of their governing classes lies in collective preparation for armed assault’ (12:7). As both Marx and Weber make abundantly clear, material and political coercion lay behind the drive to commercially exploit the earth’s endowments. Adam Smith’s invisible hand could only have worked its magic through the physical force of the loaded gun, the forced separation of people from the land, both within the nation and without. The soldier stood behind the new political freedoms, waiting for orders from the centre to enforce what economic necessity failed to achieve.

Paul Kennedy has established the symbiotic relationship that developed between the state and capital as the banking community intervened to secure the finance the attempt to secure resources by force (The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers). The nation-state represented the common interest of merchants, bankers, industrialists, and aristocrats in securing the resources to entrench and extend the military-industrial complex that was in the process of expropriating the commons on a global basis.

The symbiotic relationship between the financiers and the state was mutually beneficial, the loans from the financial community to the state being committed to contracts with shipbuilders, arms manufacturers, and merchants, thus stimulating the growth of the capitalist economy directly and indirectly. ‘In many respects, this two-way system of raising and simultaneously spending vast sums of money acted like a bellows, fanning the development of Western capitalism and that of the nation-state itself’ (Kennedy 12:13)’.

The modern nation state has employed a combination of economic necessity, legal authority and military force in order to enclose and secure the global commons. The near total commodification of nature and militarisation of society which the nation state has presided over have proceeded hand in hand and are inextricably linked in the exploitative orientation to nature. In conquering nature human beings have been conquered by their own technique – they have been denaturalised and dehumanised.

The alien power of state and capital
The solution is not to return to pre-modern relationships of rulers and ruled, reinstating a theocratic or monarchical form of rule in order to protect individuals against the alien forms of secular rule to which they are subject in the modern world, but to reorganise common affairs as a public life concerned with self-realisation, thus putting them on a personalist basis. The practical reappropriation of social power alienated to the state and capital and its reorganisation as a social power within appropriate community spheres implies both the decentralisation of government and industry and a recognition of the global character of human interconnection and interrelation. Within a global framework concerning the common good, a network of international organisations concerned with international problems, the realms of work and political activity can be decentralised to form the basis of a vigorous and viable community life. To establish an interlinked network extended from the local to the global, with every level and sphere empowered and active, is in harmony with the ecological laws of life. Place will become the expression of personal development and cultural life, the enlargement of human relationships disempowering the vast impersonal concentrations of alien power that paralyse public and community life at present.

A new approach to power, freedom, happiness and security is called for, one that starts from the recovery of the original conception of politics as concerned with creative self-realisation. Such a politics recovers the anthropological concern to breach the thin casing of the instrumental rationality of the abstract institutional-systemic world to address the politics of individual consciousness.

In becoming increasingly narrow in its concerns, contemporary philosophy has done little to help human beings resolve the problems of the modern world. Obsessed with epistemology and the limits of knowledge, philosophy has come to have less and less to say, abandoning its original purpose as a quest for establishing how human beings can act reasonably. By recovering this ethical dimension and relating notions of politikos bios to ecology as well as anthropology, philosophy can make a lasting contribution to the positive resolution of the problems of the modern world. If human beings are a part of nature, then nature is a part of human beings. Restoring the planet to full health is part of the process of recovering human health; the realisation of the life aims of the one is associated with the realisation of the life aims of the other. 

Throughout modernity, security has been detached from the growth and development of human potential and power to focus almost exclusively on the expansion of institutional, economic and technological power. It is crucial to ensure that power ceases to be an institutional abstraction, but, instead, comes to embody a sense of self in the world. Transforming the rational character of civilisation will require a transformation in the personal character of each human being. The problem is that security has been sought not in the personal terms of creative self-realisation but in terms of an identification with human autonomy in abstraction from nature. The economic, political, and military security of human beings has been fought for in antagonistic relation to nature, increasingly separating the modern individual from the environment, from each other in society, and from their own personality and physical nature. Enclosure stands as the symbol of the modern age, expressing the carving up and parcelling out of large swathes of human life and their privatisation, their removal from and denial to others. At the end of the process are the modern private enclaves in which, the walled cities, the shopping malls etc. Weber portrayed rational modernity in terms of the metaphor of the ‘iron cage’. Foucault referred to the expansion of the panopticon society, referencing Bentham’s plans for a rational prison in which all inmates could be observed at all times. Certainly, the modern world is characterised by the erection of both visible and invisible walls separating individuals, groups, places, possessions from others and from community. For Weber, the ‘iron cage’ of modernity was not just physical but went so far as to embrace the very subjectivities of those within. Such a conception of modernity savours a great deal of Morgan’s conception of the psychic prison. ‘Progress’ has erected walls and bars around nature and around the human species, staking down and parcelling out place and personality, creating an invisible prison that becomes increasingly cramped and unbearable with further expansion of instrumental power.

In the pre-modern world, the individual lived in relation to rather than in separation from the natural world or the human community. Freedom and happiness were still public qualities and security was obtained in close proximity with others rather than in isolation from others. The enclosure of the commons severed the human bonds with each other and with nature and induced abstraction in the relationships between human beings, society, and nature.

The psychic counterpart of the expropriation and commodification of nature is the increasing privatisation and walling up of human experience associated with the emergence of the autonomous individual. The expropriation of the commons and the atomisation of community life shaped the economic, social and psychic dimensions of the modern age. The transition from the medieval world of communal relationships to the capitalist world of market forces was associated with the self-seeking, self-maximised atomistic existence of the bourgeoisie is the product of the enclosure movement. The bourgeoisie is distinguished by its thoroughgoing privatisation, the autonomous individual withdrawing from the external world of community life into a world of self-absorption. This rise of the private individual brought about the fall of public man. The notion of the self as an identity distinct from the well-being of the community was not well developed in the Middle Ages, the common will prevailing over the needs of the individual. The status of a person was determined according to the contribution each made to the commonweal rather than in terms of personal achievement as an end in itself.

The notion of security as a collective undertaking was dissolved as modern civil society became a sphere of universal competition and antagonism. Such social relations prevented the public life which alone could ground security as a common concern. The idea of the autonomous individual pursuing private gain on the market in competition for scarce resources with other autonomous individuals blocked the emergence of a common good. Whereas security was formerly based on communal ties, the rise of capitalism predicated security upon the individual accumulation of money and the exercise of power over other. 





Hegel’s conceptual formulation of the modern polis attempts to recover classical themes of unity in a modern world of differentiation. Marx developed this formulation much further in the direction of democracy, paying closer attention to the material life processes blocking and distorting the rational ideal. Marx was strongly influenced by the ideal of polis democracy as a model of political thought and practice (Gilbert 1981:31). He argued for the recovery of public life in explicitly classical terms, demanding that society ‘again become a community of men that can fulfil their highest needs, a democratic state’ (Marx 1975:201).

Marx’s ‘restored classicism’ (Lomasky 1989:115/6) was not a nostalgic project, however. Marx appreciated that the polis was insufficiently differentiated to accommodate the modern principle of individual emancipation. But he was also aware that modern individualism was one-sided in stressing emancipation from ties of personal dependence whilst ignoring the moral and cultural advantages of participation in a political community as part of an ongoing project of the good life (Marx 1975:201). Marx thus sought to ‘reconcile the Greek ideal of civic participation with the modern concern for individuality and economic well-being’ (Ryan 1991:74).

Marx is firmly part of the ‘rational’ tradition in philosophy, articulating the concern that the freedom of each and the freedom of all be united in a universal conception of justice. ‘In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all’ (Marx 1973:87). No individual shall be truly free, in the fullest sense of human self-realisation, until all individuals are free. This ethic leads directly to a public life that embodies social justice in a universal sense. 

Marx’s achievement is to have exposed the extent to which capital expropriated the rational framework of public life and imposed its own systemic and institutional imperatives in its place. The general interest of the state is ‘illusory’ in that its function is to maintain and reproduce a social order structured by the domination of labour by capital (Meszaros 1995:49; Thomas 1994:186). The state sanctions the rights of private property, behind which lies ‘free’ labour, resting upon the concentration of the means of social production in the hands of capital. Behind formal freedom and equality stands social reproduction in the iniquitous form of capital. Thus the formal protection and sanctioning of rights inverts reason into the institutional guarantee of exploitation and specifies the state as a moment within the ‘context of the valorisation process’ (Clarke 1978).

Marx’s process of democratisation proceeds through the practical reappropriation of the social power alienated to the state and capital. Extending democratisation into all spheres of collective life, Marx’s project of restitution entails revaluing the governmental capacities of associative civil society as itself capable of constituting the public sphere. With the restitution of social power to the social body, Marx outlined the contours of a new social order in which functional committees could assume the governmental functions of the central state and constitute the focus for the revitalisation of public life. The result would be to strengthen the social bonds connecting the freedom of each with the freedom of all, thus overcoming the social pathologies within bourgeois civil society as a sphere of universal antagonism, an Hobbesian war of each against all. The corporate organisation of social life would constitute a focus of common interests and social interaction from which a new and effective urban public would arise.

Marx identifies the demos as the ‘true ground’ and ‘concrete reality’ behind political institutions (Marx 1975:87/8 89 85) in order to dissolve the state power into a legitimate governmental sphere (Marx 1975:88). Abstraction is overcome by converting the formal political principle, the constitution, into the material principle, the empirical lives and everyday relationships of individuals (Marx 1975:88/9). The dualism of the state and civil society is abolished on the terrain of the social, with ‘abstract state citizenship’ (Marx 1975:195) being replaced by an emphasis upon the real nature and associative activity of the individuals composing the demos. Democracy is ‘human existence, whereas in other political systems man is a legal existence’ (Marx 1975:88). Marx is thus concerned to trace the state back to human needs to define a genuine politikos bios. Removing the state-civil society dualism abolishes the abstraction of public life from ‘the earthly existence of its actual reality’, identifying the ‘truly universal’ with the species (Marx 1975:89/90). This forms the true content of a genuine public life.

Marx values the suffrage as an attempt on the part of civil society to make itself political society, achieving a general participation and an active political existence for the individual as an ‘active member of the state’ (Marx 1975:188 189 191). Marx rejects both the state monopolisation of politics and the associated depoliticisation of civil society through the development of asocial, exploitative, exchange relations of capitalism (Marx 1975:146 233). Marx is concerned to recover common powers and concerns, properly called ‘public’, from the state and capital and to organise them as public concerns subject to citizen deliberation and determination within civil society.

Hegel’s state cannot constitute the universal sphere since it forms the other side of the particularism of civil society. With the dissolution of civil society into mutually antagonistic individuals, individuals coming to use each other as means to personal ends within instrumental relationships (Marx 1975:220) and capable of being united only in their formal legal existence (Marx 1975:411/2). This cannot generate a true public life; instead individuals are reduced to rights bearing beings for whom the state functions as a protective device (Marx 1975:233).

This leads Marx to criticise Hegel’s universality of the state as the antithesis of a genuine public life rooted in the democratic associationalism of everyday life. Universality and commonality cannot but be illusory when vested in a public that is abstracted from social reality. Public bonds need to be forged within the social fabric itself. Marx’s democratisation overcomes Hegel’s bureaucratisation through the restitution of social power to the social body. In controlling their social forms, the demos is able to constitute public order from below rather than being managed and manipulated from above. Public life is not confined within the formal legal-institutional apparatus but pertains to all institutions mediating the collective power of individuals within the social infrastructure. Such a public life is promoted throughout social relations rather than being projected beyond the civil sphere to the ideal sphere of the state. With the reabsorption of the state power into social life, public life rests upon a democratic social control that is no longer concentrated at a single point. The restitution and reorganisation of social power (Marx 1975:234) recovers politikos bios as central to human self-realisation, progressively eliminating the coercive-class moment of state politics.

Marx’s critique of bourgeois society implies a conception of public community. Marx conceives a public sphere that achieves a genuine universality beyond bourgeois society as a sphere of universal antagonism and egoism. In this public, individuals relate to each other in cooperative relationships so that the freedoms located in an abstracted juridical sphere become an everyday moral practise.

Emphasising the split between abstract citizen identity within the state and the real identities available in an antagonistic class society (Marx 1975:220/1) emphasises that universality and commonality can be actualised only with the emancipation of humankind from all kinds of partiality, particularity and limitation (religion, property, division of labour) (Marx 1975:218/20 221).

Whereas a genuine public life connotes a ‘truly human existence through the mutuality of man’, the alien control of capital extirpates public life in conceiving ‘the community of man .. in terms of exchange and trade’ (Marx 1975:266). In the place of the mutual relation of individuals sustaining public bonds, there is an ‘estranged form of social commerce’ based on egoism and antagonism (Marx 1975:266). As a consequence of this reduction of public bonds to exchange, ‘men do not relate to each other as men’ (Marx 1975:261) but to each other in terms of ‘things’. Mutual relations of intercourse are replaced by the impersonal dependence of all upon ‘alien powers’ (Marx 1975:220). Affirming the ‘political community’ in which the individual lives as a ‘communal being’ (Marx 1975:220), Marx endorses Rousseau’s ‘description of the political man’ as a truly socialised individual who substitutes solitary powers for powers that can be used only ‘with the assistance of others’ (Marx 1975:234). The problem is that the political community that institutionalises this associative ideal is abstracted from a civil society that has become the ‘essence of difference’ and the ‘sphere of egoism’, the ‘bellum omnes contra omnes’ (Marx 1975:221). The political community of the state is not a real universality but an ‘unreal universality’ (Marx 1975:220) founded upon the ‘asocial nature of civil life’ (Marx 1975:412). The public life which is crucial to human well-being becomes estranged from individuals through a process of rationalistic desolidarisation which dissolves civil society into its component parts, autonomous individuals separated from universal considerations (Marx 1975:233 234).

Realising a genuine public sphere beyond the abstract state means recovering the ideal of universal citizenship as an active designation as against its legalistic existence as a device protecting rights in a class divided society. Marx’s critique of rights extracts the universal-communitarian component of rights discourse to morally ground public life. This realises the principle of citizenship against the egoism and atomism of a rights based social order. This involves conceiving a socio-relational public sphere rooted in the socially situated character of human life. This is implicit in Marx’s conception of species being (Marx 1975:218/9 220).

As against the rights of man, which pertain to the rights of the private individual in a property based order (Marx 1975:229 231), Marx affirms the universal-communal significance of citizen rights. Public rights are ‘rights which are only exercised in community with others. What constitutes their content is participation in the community, in the political community or state. They come under the category of ‘political freedom, of civic rights’ (Marx 1975:227). This recovers the participatory conception of citizenship at the heart of public life.
To reabsorb political community into social life from the ideal form it takes within the state fosters the creation of a genuine public life based on mutually affirmative, identity-recognising, cooperative relations between individuals. The universal ethic combining the freedom of each and of all is realised by strengthening social bonds so that the individual is able to conceive the relationship to other individuals as a condition of, rather than as a constraint upon, mutual well-being. Public life is realised through the pooling of common purposes and powers so as to expand the freedom of each and of all.

For Marx, the identification of public life with a necessary set of authoritative rules, securing private rights and adjudicating between competing claims, derives from an asocial form of social life in which personal interaction is ordered by private property in terms of mutual utility, exploitation and estrangement (Marx 1975:230). In this context, the liberty of the private being is ‘not based on the association of man with man but rather on the separation of man from man’. Liberty is the ‘right of self-interest’. This monadic freedom is expressed as the subordination of all to a universal and mutual antagonism, a situation in which each sees in the other ‘not the realisation of but the limitation of his own freedom’ (Marx 1975:229/30). Liberty identified with private rights entails a mutual self-limitation as the public sphere loses its connection with universal well-being and becomes a juridical instrument regulating possessive, instrumental relationships.

Marx thus opposes a ‘political community’ based upon the removal of ‘all the barriers between the different sections of the people’ to ‘the rights of egoistic man, separated from his fellow man and from the community’ (Marx 1975:230). Marx’s active citizenship implies a social movement from below, recovering the classical conception that unites social and political spheres, and subverting the ‘abstract state citizenship’ of the modern age which reduces public activity to the regulation of egoistic civil society (Marx 1975:195). This leads Marx to demand real community against the alien forms that mediate human interconnection – property, money, capital (Marx 1975:230 241 249 358). Marx’s communism is thus the realisation of public life as the ‘true community’ in being ‘the essence of man’ and in being devoted to the fulfilment of ‘human needs’ (Marx 1975:265). Estrangement is replaced by a public mode of ‘real, conscious and authentic existence’ that realises ‘species activity’ and ‘species spirit’ through ‘social activity and social enjoyment’ (Marx 1975:265).

Marx’s classicism is evident in the way that he recovers the intimate connection of politics with the creative self-realisation of the human ontology. Marx defines an ontology of self-creation which recovers the classical sense of the public sphere as embodying a mode of life which realises human nature and fulfils human needs. The prime object of Marx’s ontology is labour, the process through which freedom, as essential human nature, is realised (Marx 1975:284/314). The alienation of labour is a denial of ‘free conscious activity’ as ‘man’s species character’ (Marx 1975:329/331). The realisation of ‘real species being’ has a public character in that it is only possible if all species powers are employed ‘through the cooperation of mankind’ (Marx 1975:386). Alienative relations impose a mode of life that denies species essence (Marx 1975:328 329/30 331).

In this argument, classical conceptions of public life are critically defined in relation to the modern terrain. Marx’s realisation of politikos bios thus emerges as human emancipation in general, as a genuine universalism that embraces all humankind. ‘All emancipation is the reduction of the human world and of relationships to man himself’ (Marx 1975:234). Total human emancipation realises the communal essence of individuals in those areas of life presently excluded from the political community transcending the state-civil society dualism by actualising an authentic public sphere grounded in real society.





Collective power is no longer abstracted from individuals and imposed upon individuals as the external force of the state and capital. This realises a genuine public community. With self-realisation, the individual experiences ‘his greatest wealth – the other man – as need’, recognising other individuals as the ‘source’ of their own individual life (Marx 1975:267). Social relationships are no longer experienced as external but form the content of an integral public life connecting each and all in a universal sense. In this context, when the individual is ‘in his most individual existence he is at the same time a communal being’ (Marx 1975:347), realising public life as ‘true communal life’ (Marx 1975:271/2). Marx thus succeeds in investing public bonds – the universality and commonality that Hegel vested in the state – in the heart of social relationships.

Marx is full of insight concerning how the process of rationalisation transfigures the terms of urban discourse. The new emphasis upon political economy brought a material relevance to the philosophical discourse of the city. There is a world of difference between the politico-juridical conception of citizen identity in the classical and early modern age and the economic understanding of rights and liberties in a political regime that sanctions capitalist property relations. From being centres of political virtue and the good life, cities came to be conceived as sites of economic expansion.

The Anglo-American liberal transformation of conceptions of urbanity and politics undoubtedly represents a decisive shift in perspectives, introducing the socio-economic context of politico-juridical and moral concepts. The capitalist model of politics and urbanity centres upon capital, ‘free’ labour and the exchange of products within mechanisms of valorisation and accumulation. The ‘free’ exchange of commodities is the centrepoint of the system, forming its normative core. Adam Smith is explicit concerning the extent to which this overthrows the older scheme relating to political virtues, arguing that passions like self-love and self-interest dominate over moral sentiments.

There is a need to examine the character of the social relationships in which individuals are located. For whilst liberal thinkers rejected the classical basis of freedom in slavery, Marx showed that economic servitude remained the basis of urbanity in the form of the capital system and the system of wage labour. The ‘free’ labour of the capital system is anything but free.

This understanding develops Marx’s alienation thesis as it emerges in Max Weber’s view of capitalism as an order that is destructive of the human ontology. In the work of Marx and Weber, the normative-utopian aspect of the rational-civic tradition of urbanism finds its space systematically diminished through the expansion of an instrumental rationality that accompanies the abstraction of power and control. Weber is aware of the possibilities for autonomous civil democracy in pre-modern and early modern solidarities. The cities of the Middle Ages were evolving a mediary space between the household economies of a prince or a church and the national economies. In the process, they were carving out an autonomous socio-political space of freedom for themselves. Such cities constituted autonomous units offering an alternative to legal-bureaucratic, traditional and charismatic modes of domination. The occidental city was ‘a place where their ascent from bondage to freedom was possible by means of monetary acquisition’. Such cities embodied community in a non-abstract sense through the availability and use of participatory structures of power (Paetzold 1997).

Yet, as Weber documented, the cities lost their autonomy through the growing concentration of power in the modern nation state. Rousseau’s concern to protect and enhance the autonomy of urban civic publics against the centralising imperatives of the modern state and the economics of exchange value was shared by Hegel. But Hegel had been forced to acknowledge concentration and centralisation in scale and quantity as permanent features of modernity. Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, however, ultimately articulates reason within the non-discursive, non-moral forms of state bureaucratic power and capital. The fact is that these are non-democratic forces of alien publicity, denying the civic freedom that Hegel argued for. Since this is so, there is a need to employ the critical insights of Marx’s alienation thesis, going on to define the project of emancipation in terms of the practical reappropriation of alien power and its reorganisation as social power.

Having shown how the ideological project of the state subverts the character of public life as a rational sphere, Marx proceeds to reveal its social determination in the ‘concentration of bourgeois society’ (Marx 1973:108). This constitution of the state entails the alienation of the controlling power over the means of socio-urban activity and the power of determining public purposes to capital and the state. This power needs to be practically reappropriated and reorganised as social power. The precise institutions regulating this social control may ‘have remained elusive’ (Bowles and Gintis 1987:146/7) but Marx’s democratic commitment, his broad notion of praxis, implies a plural and heterogeneous notion of the socio-urban infrastructure.

Marx defines the crucial problem to be that of subordinating the anarchically developing and destructive dynamics and imperatives of an alienated system of production to conscious common control. This involves the embodiment of the political-normative framework for public life drawn from the ‘rational’ philosophies of Plato and Aristotle within an everyday urban sphere that actualises citizenship as an active principle and as a social movement beyond the state.

Marx challenges the form of sociality under capitalism. Whilst individuals have never been more inter-dependent than under capitalist relations, this inter-dependency has assumed impersonal and external form. Commonality can be recovered only by putting this inter-dependency on an associative basis. The problem is that the forces of capitalist modernity – capital, the market, the state, bureaucracy – are collective forces which lack collective mechanisms of democratic control. The task is to develop genuine social control as against abstract community by achieving genuine unity and interconnection. Marx proceeds beyond ‘the imprisonment of a potentially self-defining humanity within defining and restraining forms’ (Tester 1993:35) by conceiving these forms – the state and capital – as alienated social powers capable of restitution.

Marx locates rationalisation within an alienated system of production, accompanied by the domination of the value form and commodity fetishism (Marx 1975:386; Clawson 1980:253 260/1 266). Capitalist rationality is not politically neutral but is a structured class antagonism in which alienated labour creates capital (Marx 1973:458). The labour that the capitalist class appropriates as surplus and transforms into capital creates the means of enslaving labour to ‘the compulsion to create yet further surplus capital etc. etc.’ (Marx 1973:455). Capital acquires ‘command over labour’ and exists in ‘coercive relation’ as the ‘exploiter of labour power’ (Marx C1 ch. xi). Capital is ‘alien labour’, the power of labour in alien form, ‘dead labour’ controlling ‘living labour’ (Marx 1973:462/3 306/8 238). Thus, imprisonment in Weber’s iron cage is a self-imprisonment which can be overcome by reappropriating living labour as the constitutive power of human subjectivity (Marx 1973:462/3). As the generative power, labour possesses the capacity to transform relations beyond capitalist rationalisation. Since capital is the product of the surplus derived from exploiting labour, capital cannot autonomize itself from labour but labour can autonomize itself from capital (Johnston 1989:51/2; Bonefeld I 1992:103; Meszaros 1995:606/7 718/20; Clarke 1991:118). Labour can disempower capital and subvert the mechanisms of accumulation and valorisation crucial to capital’s expanded reproduction (Cleaver 1979:73/4; Cleaver 1992:127/8; Negri 1996:164/78).

Marx’s project of human emancipation is therefore actualised in the project of the value creating class, the working class, coming to supply social labour directly through their free association as opposed to the indirect supply through the value form (Marx 1981:173; Meikle 1985:99/100).

The value of Marx’s position is that the dialectic of enlightenment is located not in a general and hence irrevocable process of rationalisation but in an alienated system of production (Clarke 1991:288/9). The Weberian loss of meaning subverting the ethico-political framework is revealed by Marx to be a loss of control by individuals of their mutual relations, their power, community and subjectivity (Habermas 1991:244; Miller 1982:33 35; Lowith 1993:48/9). The German Ideology is a key text in defining the concept of social control and in emphasising the reciprocal, situated, interactive character of public life. The key concept in this text is Verkehr or ‘intercourse’, defined in terms of the active contact, commerce, association, communication between individuals (Marx 1999:42/3; Therborn 1976:256). This concept affirms the interconnection between individuals that is crucial to self-identity.

The key problem concerns the way that relations achieve an independence of individuals (Marx 1973:652 146). The abstract communities of capital, money and exchange become the objective bond of society, dissolving human community and mediating the social interaction of individuals separated from each other in an impersonal and external way (Marx 1973:223 225/6 156/7).

Nevertheless, capital’s objective dependency establishes the material basis for the universal ‘connection of the individual with all’ (Marx 1973:161; Wood 1981:29). Capital’s universal expansion of the productive forces contains the potentiality for human agency to take more powerful and emancipatory forms, subjecting material life processes to the conscious control of freely associated individuals (Marx 1981:176). This achieves universality in terms of generating the material basis for connecting the freedom of each and all. Marx refers to ‘the possibility of the universal development of the individual’. ‘Not an ideal or imagined universality of the individual, but the universality of his real and ideal relations’ (Marx 1973:542). Freedom through the conscious control of circumstances has become a material possibility through the universalising dynamics of capital (Marx 1999:117/8).

Marx grounds public life in a real as against an alien community, achieved in the association of individuals assuming control of their collective social powers. Communist society subordinates social relations to a common control that is ‘exercised by and for all members of society’ (Wood 1981:52). Social forces are subjugated to ‘the power of united individuals’ (Marx 1999:86). And this implies an associative community as a public sphere:





The coincidence of the freedom of each and the freedom of all is thus actualised in the associative public of lived experience. The core value of the rational tradition of political philosophy takes associational form in Marx as a result of his locating the principle of rational unity between individuals in everyday social intercourse and solidary exchange. Marx praised Rousseau for understanding that individuals needed to associate in order to develop their solitary powers as collective powers, thus preserving and expanding their freedom (Marx 1975:234). Marx developed this idea further to establish the organisational basis of communist society: ‘Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals .. only when controlled by all’ (Marx 1999:86). This association achieves ‘the liberation of each single individual’:





Communist society is the ‘only society in which the original and free development of individuals ceases to be a mere phrase’. This is possible only through ‘the connection of individuals’, comprising the ‘necessary solidarity of the free development of all’ and the ‘universal character of the activity of individuals on the basis of existing productive forces’ (Marx 1999:117/8). Communism creates the basis for ‘rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals’ (Marx 1999:86). Alien, external, forms of mediation – state, bureaucracy, capital, money, exchange – come to be replaced by a true public sphere.


51 CAPITAL AND THE OVERSCALE CITY
The new capitalist order redefined urbanism in ways which conflicted with older urban solidarities and which continue to block the emergence of new solidarities in the contemporary world. The modern city is the site of the capital economy. Capital is the principal agency of rationalisation, something that transforms the character of reason. Reason comes to concern less the realisation of human nature and more the realisation of the surplus value invested in commodities. The predominance of exchange value is an inversion of subject and object that results in the loss of substantiality. This substantiality pertaining to persons is replaced by instrumental, fluid relationships that reduce persons to means to external ends. The capital economy generates the predominance of instrumental over substantive rationality, with irrational results for the socio-urban environment. The systemic processes of private accumulation have caused social dislocation, inequality, economic crisis and ecological destruction within the city. And as systemic, these processes are non-discursive, not open to citizen interaction and discourse; they are non-negotiable. The resolution of the problems of urbanism lie in the future reappropriation of the social power alienated to the built environment and social processes of the capital city. 

The city of capital represents a qualitative and quantitative break with the classical and medieval legacy and runs contrary to the ‘rational’ attempt to maintain a social and ethical component to rationalisation and urbanisation. The capitalist dynamic of accumulation for the sake of further accumulation implies the endless, nihilistic expansion of the city when translated into urban terms. The imperative of accumulation in order to accumulate is the motor that drives scale beyond human comprehension and control. The inevitable result is the endless expansion of the city as merely the site for endless production, advertisement, sale and consumption of commodities. Whereas the polis subordinated the market place to the public good of the city, capital reduces the city to the market, turning it into an economic entity, no more than the sum of its economic functions. This signifies the end of humanly scaled urbanity and the emergence of the overscale capitalist metropolis, the physical expression of the human loss of control of the mutual relations of material life.

Such a dynamic violates the principle of limit that had been central to the Greek definition of the good city. The expansionary dynamic of the capital system denies human values of self-actualisation and also urban values concerned with the establishing the appropriate physical, social and relational infrastructure for this self-actualisation. Paradoxically, capitalist urbanisation issues in a world without cities. The overscale cities of the capital system are anti-cities in which individuals exist for economic purposes but do not live well, in civic dignity and social intercourse. The city expands to proportions far beyond the control and comprehension of human beings and acquires functions connected with the process of private accumulation as opposed to human self-actualisation.





This institutional monumentalism of the megalopolis is a source of disorientation. It represents an architectural nullity that confines the individual within an interminable bureaucratic nexus of agencies and corporations. ‘These soaring geometric structures exclude social power in its most reified form: power for the sake of power, domination for the sake of domination’ (Bookchin 1986:146).

The modern world has unlearned the lessons delivered by classical civilisation on proportion, balance and scale with respect to urban form. There is a need to address the problem of formlessness as a result of expansionary dynamics that continue to achieve progress as further abstraction of human beings from each other, from nature and from human nature. Paradoxically, this abstraction is accompanied by an increasing concentration of individuals. Never have human beings been so far removed from humanity – their own as much as other people’s – than when concentrated as a mass society. Individuals have been torn from the earth to be crowded together in vast overscale cities far removed from the earth. Mass society, mass politics and mass psychology are synonymous with mass impotence, a dependence upon the centre, upon abstract government. An individualistic economic philosophy of enterprise has brought about the erosion of the human personality. The consumer has displaced the citizen. In the name of individualism the very core of the individual has been destroyed. In vain, successive governments attempt a legal or institutional solution to what is essentially a social problem of order. Every initiative which attempts to fill the vacuum left by a withered self-government being frustrated by the resentment of former citizens – of the masses. The state, in symbiotic relation with capital, structurally dependent upon a business interest that has now gone global in its interests and concerns, cannot address the problem of urban form at source lest it having to challenge the very forces upon which it depends for its secondary power and resources, the forces which it must serve – the forces of global capital. So we continue with a lack of form – imbalance and disharmony within and without, in the human psyche and in the physical world. The civil war between the haves and the have-nots is but a minor dispute in the bigger war that rages over the human personality. It is easy to pick sides when the opponents are ‘Them and Us’. The problem is that ‘the system’ has so manipulated the human psyche to serve its impersonal imperatives that its imperatives, its systemic needs, have become integral to the ‘Us’ of all humankind. The restoration of form requires a concern with balance, harmony and justice in the classical sense. Urban form is created by human relationships in the unity of each and all in society and the unity of society and nature. In practice this means unity of every level of the life-processes that define biosphere politics. Human beings must finally conceive and practise a politics worthy of the name in dissolving the illusory freedom and happiness promised by capitalist business politics in favour of a reciprocal unity between each and all in society and between society and nature.

Urban giantism and accumulation
Instead of recognising limits and establishing scale, the modern world continues to expand beyond its resources. Rather than limiting population density when there is no longer enough land for housing, authorities in league with developers build bigger buildings higher. Further problems result from the failure to respect limits, calling forth further technical and institutional solutions, development solutions in the form of roads and more, bigger, wider roads, encouraging further car use and more congestion and pollution as the lines of communication between work and home expand. And just when it appears that human beings will finally be forced, by the sheer weight of traffic, to address the problems of limitations on growth, they expand traffic in the skies with jet aircraft flying over city after city. Air travel is no solution, only a palliative, a temporary measure. It imposes no restriction upon growth but, rather, gives the impression that growth can continue at its exponential rate. It merely extends to the skies the problems of congestion, noise and pollution that has choked the city to death. For all of the concentration of people, these cities are now uninhabitable in a human sense. Certainly, individuals live in these places and do so in their millions. But they exist, survive, permanently subject to the realm of necessity. They do not expand or enhance their essential humanity. They do not live as human beings. 

Such reckless urban concentration is not a consequence of economic necessity or of population growth. The coming of electricity has long since made it possible to liberate industrial activity from inflexible sources of power, and the digital revolution makes it easier than ever to embrace decentralised forms. It is evident that the continuing and rising urban concentration afflicting all parts of the world is exceptionally dysfunctional. Why it proceeds, though, is not a mystery. Decentralisation of form implies a decentralisation of power and resources – a democratisation that existing power centres are determined to prevent as a condition of their own survival.

The continued pursuit of technological and institutional solutions to social and human problems continue to generate the very problems they promise to resolve – problems which have their roots in the technological and institutional imposition of order upon the natural self-governing order of human beings left alone. The classical philosophers make it clear that just as obesity in the person is a symptom of imbalance in the human character, so the largeness of cities indicates a moral disorder. The technical and institutional power of human ingenuity can only function in a progressive sense when set within the matrix of human ecology. The needs of the human being for space to grow – the demand of the personality – require that the obsession with endless and rapid material growth be checked and properly regulated according to a natural rhythm.

Economics, having sold its political soul cheaply, sidesteps such philosophical concerns with the merest of sophistry. The fact that individuals cannot agree on the kind of environment that they desire means that planning lacks any rational basis in being wholly ‘subjective’. Rather than some bureaucratic imposition of some never-to-be-realised utopia, which may be justifiably criticised as totalitarian, there is no alternative but to defer to the impersonal forces of the market. Which is another way of arguing that the iniquitous forces of money should rule. The rising costs of a city that has become increasingly congested and uninhabitable make it economically feasible for some other urban organisation to take its place. In this fantasy economics, the market always has the solution. It merely spells the death of politics as the art by which human beings, as conscious, social beings, come together to determine their affairs. The ‘impersonal’ market is literally inhuman. Human reason is denigrated as totalitarian, an imposition administered through ‘bureaucratic’ government. As though the ability of those with the greater share of money and resources to shape the policy agenda through the ‘impersonal’ market is any less of an imposition upon those with relatively less money and power. The view that it is impossible to conceive of urban form and the regulated city and the tendency to dismiss reason as simply ‘subjective’, lacking any objective foundation, is mere convenience. The foundation is anthropological, the human ontology. It becomes clear that the denigration of reason in the attempts to caricature urban visions as rational utopias whose reality is ensured only by bureaucratic imposition derives from the systematic devaluation of the human ontology. This is the price that capitalism exacts for progress on its terms – the assertion of the primacy of business – the realm of money – over politics – the realm of creative human self-realisation. And so long as the ubiquitous bureaucracy is on standby as a convenient scapegoat, the capitalist model of politics need never be made to confront its dehumanisation. The bureaucrat is always available to take the blame for problems caused by private business, problems which the bureaucrat did not generate and is not the source of but must nevertheless forever attempt to impose some kind of order upon. Human beings are thus caught between the twin ills of the impotent, interfering, incompetent bureaucrat and the expansionary, unregulated business system. ‘Bureaucracy’ is conveniently equated with all attempts at planning, with intervention of all kinds, with socialism and any other form of progressive intervention in the economic system when the truth is that this ‘bureaucracy’ is fighting a phony, pretend war with business. Society must recover a genuine politics by rejecting this alliance of inhumanity, generating a new politikos bios which is capable of checking the evils of unregulated growth and bureaucratic imposition by human growth within the balanced and harmonious community, as simultaneously decentralised and globalised. This is to argue for the conscious common control of the forces behind endless expansion. These forces are to be regulated from the perspective of the whole. The reciprocal relationship between each and all and between society and nature must be developed on the basis of an intuitive respect for all life forms within the biosphere. Such respect is the only secure basis for a lasting progress and prosperity in the world. Which is why there is a need to emphasise the objective foundations of reason and the rational capacity in the human ontology. There is a need to challenge the denigration of reason as subjective in individuals and as totalitarian in politics. Human beings need to understand their place within the whole, to recognise that there is a whole of which they are a part. We need to think hard about Spinoza’s equation of God and Nature. Human beings are a part of nature, not apart from Nature. But they are not above or superior to Nature. Human beings are not gods, certainly not in Spinoza’s sense of equating God and Nature. Human beings must regulate their material and psychological needs rationally in terms of their place within the whole or the whole will cease to support human life. Nature is equivalent with God, not humanity.

It should come as no surprise that capitalism’s assertion of the primacy of economics over politics should have issued in a dehumanisation. Politics, in its classical origins, is defined as the creative realisation of the human ontology. The growth of human beings in terms of the realisation of their potentialities and exercise of their faculties is the very stuff of politics considered in this essentialist sense. Economics on the other hand is concerned with expansion in the realm of things. The result is the replacement of a politikos bios with an environment that is standardised, quantified and commodified. These are no longer communities belonging to their inhabitants but physical entities owned and planned by corporations subject to systemic imperatives committing society to the path of endless exponential growth. The result is an urban form that is uninhabitable, that is literally inhumane. People exist in this form but live less than human lives in the process. The reason that has been exalted by the greatest minds since Plato must be recovered from its detractors and be restored to its place as the saviour of humankind, the true guarantee of human freedom. Only through reason does human security and power have any meaning. This reason must be employed to delineate the relationship between each and all in society and between society and nature. Politics in the classical sense of a creative anthropology must re-emerge as an ecological humanism that embraces all life forms. Only thus can reason redeem its original philosophical promise.

This overscale world is a privatised urban space populated by isolated monads rather than active citizens. The paradox of capitalist urbanisation is that it extends interconnection to an unprecedented extent but does so via impersonal bonds. The result is that individuals have never been so separated from each other. Urban relationships are commercial and utilitarian, superficial relationships which lack the civic sense of participation within an integral social realm. Civil society as a sphere of universal antagonism and egoism resting upon instrumental relationships dissolves the sense of community and solidarity that characterised the pre-modern civic order. But this does not simply leave an aggregate of isolated monads but a pool of competitive others. The individual becomes fearful. Mutual aid is replaced by mutual terror. Whereas the city once fostered solidarity and intercourse between citizens, bequeathing an urbanely rational legacy as the moral and social capital upon which the later capitalist age could subsist, this capital is progressively dissipated as the capitalist megalopolis replaces solidarity and reciprocity with an alien, externalised mode of interconnection, a substitute form of sociation in which objective bonds replace the bonds individuals once supplied for themselves. Within such a society, each and all are no longer interdependent in their freedom but are in antagonistic relation. Freedom becomes private rather than public.

The solidary infrastructure crucial to self-regulated social order is dissolved. Individuals in communities lose the ability to regulate their relationships but must instead rely on external authority and discipline. The capitalist city unites individuals not internally, through solidarity, reciprocity and mutual aid, but through instrumental relationships in which each seeks to make others mere means to personal ends. Where the city was once the sphere forming the common identity that united each and all, it now becomes a sphere of mutual estrangement and antagonism.

There are a number of conclusions that follow this analysis with regard to urban regeneration. Too much space is given over to the forces of capital and government, agencies and organisations that are part of the official institutional order. Too little space is afforded to the urban inhabitants who are consequently condemned to suffering the urban environment not merely as a place to work and live in but as a way of living. The urban plan rests upon assumptions concerning the functions of the city and its inhabitants that are detrimental to humane, civic conceptions of the nature of work, residence, recreation, structural size. Urban planning puts too much emphasis upon the container rather than the contents, the citizens. This rests on a clear assumption that the rational city is the product of good design whereas, in truth, it is constituted by the quality of relationships within urban space.

52 MAX WEBER – THE CITY RATIONALISED

The work of Max Weber is important in terms of the stress that he places upon the extent to which modern rationalisation has irrevocably changed the terms of moral argument. Max Weber may be considered the representative of the urban cosmopolitan conception of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century liberal world view. He argued for the superior rationality of the institutions of liberal industrial capitalism and the values of modern urban culture. Weber’s intellectual roots and moral concerns, however, are in the ‘rational’ tradition of philosophy dating from Plato and Aristotle. His concern with the ethical development of ‘Menschentum’ places him within German philosophical anthropology, demonstrating a normative concern with the most appropriate mode of life for human self-development (Schroeder 1992:4/5; Turner 1993:7 31 228/9; Hennis 1988:107ff). Weber thus shows how the social and cultural requirements of modern capitalism contradict the ontology of human beings (Turner 1993:xxvi), begging the question of the appropriate regimen for human self-realisation (Lowith 1993:42/3; Turner 1993:212).

Max Weber defined the essential features of modernisation in terms of a process of rationalisation that embraces all aspects of society, an increasing secularisation which brings about the disenchantment of the world, an irreversible bureaucratisation and a growing plurality of values. Weber’s work pertains to the ethical confusion of the modern world, the bureaucratisation of life and the standardisation of society, the disappearance of the autonomous individual of liberal theory and politics within the iron cage of modernity, the emergence of science, the decay of charismatic authority and the extension of the administrative machine, the destruction of face-to-face personal relations and their replacement by large scale bureaucratically organised structures.

For Weber, the emergence of a system of nation states and national bourgeois engaged in competition destroys the free city and is associated with a notion of calling which implies an urban individualism that extends throughout the whole fabric of society.





The modern state thus develops out of the dissolution of the urban communes and in part represents a recovery of the centralised jurisdiction of Roman law as well as being in part the product of the rationalisation of European absolutism. In theorising the transition to capitalism, Weber makes it clear that the modern city is a world away from the urban economic autonomy of medieval cities and petty commodity production. The alliance of the state, capital and the bourgeoisie is more than the Burgertum enlarged. The mechanisms of modern capitalism now revolve around a macro-level connection between state and capital.

Weber makes clear the extent to which the institutional fabric of rationalised modernity inhibits rather than expresses freedom. Modernity cannot be conceived as the progressive realisation of reason. Weber’s rationalisation thesis reveals that the triumph of reason has issued in the ‘iron cage’ of impersonal economic forces and bureaucratically organised administration (Weber 1994:314; Turner 1993:207). The fundamental question is whether it is possible to reclaim a public sphere embodying universal values in a modern plural disenchanted society. The collapse of the natural law tradition (Strauss 1953:36/78) reveals the moral failure of modernity, with the result that individual and social life lacks coherence. The modern individual lives in a morally divided world that lacks the overarching moral framework within which moral argument can claim authority. The world thus expresses a plurality of values, no one of which can claim priority over the others (Weber 1989:22; Lassman and Velody 1989:22). The disenchantment of the world destroys the traditional moral framework that bestowed meaning on human action (Lassman and Velody 1989:30; Schroeder 1992:113/4). This moral framework is replaced with a formal rationality that is agnostic as regards ends. Moreover, rationalisation is incapable of generating any kind of substitute for this moral framework. Hence the loss that Weber assigns to the process of rationalisation is irretrievable (Schroeder 1992:112/5). The lives of individuals are determined with ‘irresistible force’ (Weber 1985:181). This rationalised, disenchanted world becomes meaningless. The fate of the age is the emergence of a new polytheism taking the impersonal form of an irreconcilable antagonism between irreducible orders of value and life (Weber 1991:149; Wolin 1984:84). This subverts the possibility of an objective, integral framework for the common good (Weber 1991:155; Weber 1994:78/9; Habermas 1991:246).

Weber does not believe that the objective overarching moral framework of the common good can be recovered (Weber 1991:153; Wolin 1984:74). Weber consistently repudiated ‘communitarian’ solutions to the crisis of modernity. The attempts to recover the lost pneuma of the charismatics could not but be futile (Turner 1993:17/8; Sayer 1991:152). In modern conditions, community necessarily takes abstract form: ‘Ideas such as “state”, “church”, “community”, “party” or “enterprise” are thought of as being realised in a community’ whereas in truth ‘they provide an ideological halo for the master’. These communities are ersatz (Weber 1991:199; Sayer 1991:143 152).
This is a ‘godless and prophetless time’ (Weber 1991:153 155 199). Hellenic Sittlichkeit could not be retrieved in modern conditions (Weber 1985:180/1; Liebersohn 1988:ch4). Disenchantment means that meaning is established in personal relations rather than through socialisation according to an objectively valid and universally shared ethical framework. This book has employed the key principles of a number of ‘rational’ philosophers in order to demonstrate the possibility of recovering the Hellenic Sittlichkeit that Weber rules out. Thus Hegel has been shown to have developed a politico-ethical framework which is socially embodied, enabling public activity on the part of citizens which transcends private interest. Through Marx, the argument has shown the possibility for generating this framework from within restructured social relationships. Weber rejects these possibilities and is therefore forced to fill the moral vacuum created by the absence of Sittlichkeit with bureaucracy (Weber 1991:220).

For Weber, capitalism is merely a specific form of a more general ‘separation’ which forms the basis of the discipline which moulds individual subjectivity and plunges the individual into the iron cage of modern society (Turner 1993:207; Lassman and Speirs 1994:314; Schroeder 1992:114/6). For Weber, factory discipline, managerial surveillance and social regulation extend beyond the economic expropriation that most concerned Marx: ‘The ‘separation’ of the worker from the material means of production, destruction, administration, academic research, and finance in general is the common basis of the modern state, in its political, cultural and military sphere, and of the private capitalist economy’ (Weber 2 1978:139).

Separation of the material means of human action from the human agents forms the general foundation for all institutional rationalisation and differentiation for Weber. This characteristic lies behind the irreversible process of bureaucratisation that comes to embrace most areas of social life. Bureaucracy is discipline’s ‘most rational offspring’ (Weber 1968:29). Weber generalises Marx’s economic expropriation to theorize an all-encompassing separation of human agents from their means of production, administration, organisation and knowledge. For Weber, ‘severance’ characterises modern social organisation as such and extends across all areas of social life. Such a general alienation defines a concept of ‘mode of domination’ that runs parallel with the mode of production (Mouzelis 1988).





The ‘rational’ conception of a public life – politikos bios – that is concerned with creative human self-realisation is lost. The whole process of state-making ‘is a complete parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise through gradual expropriation of the independent producers’ (Weber 1991:82).

By making ‘separation’ the defining characteristic of the modern world, Weber generalises Marx’s alienation thesis beyond the economic sphere. This leads Weber to the pessimistic conclusion that alienation is general and untranscendable. The objective discharge of business according to calculable rules proceeds ‘without regard for persons’ (Weber 1991:215). The routinisation of behaviour, the extension of bureaucracy, the specialisation of tasks and the administration of society required by modern capitalism are quite incompatible with individual freedom and democracy. Weber points to the growing ‘loss of freedom’, claiming that it is ‘ridiculous’ to attribute to ‘today’s high capitalism’ any ‘elective affinity’ with democracy and freedom ‘when the only question one can ask is how all things can possibly survive at all in the long run under the rule of capitalism’ (Weber 1994:69). Weber also denies that taking the economy into social control will realise freedom, arguing that socialism will actually realise a general alienation (Weber 1994:70). On Weber’s premises, social control will extinguish rather than realise freedom and democracy.

Although Weber exposed the tension between capitalism and democracy, he does not believe that democratisation is a feasible alternative to rationalised forms. ‘Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy in contrast to the democratic self-government of small homogenous unity’. Democratisation in the sphere of mass parties and politics actually creates the favourable terrain for bureaucratisation (Weber 1991:209 229; Weber 1994:279). Weber cautions that democratisation does not necessarily involve the governed taking an increasing and active share in governing. Rather, authority remains detached from the governed. The crucial fact is the levelling of the governed in opposition to the ruling and bureaucratically articulated group. This group may occupy a quite autocratic position in form and in fact (Weber 1991:224/6 231). The political subjectivity of the governed is illusory. The governed exist as objects of public policy and administration rather than as subjects – citizens – of the political process. The ‘official secret’ is the ‘specific invention of bureaucracy’ and ‘nothing is so fanatically defended’ (Weber 1991:233).

Making the category of ‘separation’ the key figure for social development and dynamics orients the critical perspective towards overcoming the tyranny of abstraction, recovering powers alienated to the ‘impersonal’ for the everyday world of reciprocity, interaction and exchange connecting individuals. 

The argument builds upon the similarities between Marx’s alienation thesis and Weber’s rationalisation thesis (Lowith 1993; Turner 1993:212; Mommsen 1987:91/2). Both perspectives rest upon a philosophical anthropology which focuses upon what it is to be a human being and converge around the notion of estrangement and disenchantment. As with Marx, Weber’s view of social and historical development was concerned with the pathos of means coming to be asserted over ends. The penetration of abstract and impersonal money relations into all aspects of human life expresses the ‘reification’ of social relationships. At the heart of this process is human self-alienation, the commodification of human life. This process is accompanied by the refinement of discipline, surveillance and regulation and is articulated in the extension of bureaucratic methods of social organisation, the domination of administrative personnel and the increasing surveillance of the individual in all aspects of life (Sayer 1991:144; Schroeder 1992:114/5). 

Weber conceptualised the increasing subordination of the individual to social bureaucratic relations and rationality in terms of the metaphor of the ‘iron cage’. In Weber’s German rather than in the English translation, this metaphor conveys the extent to which the process of rationalisation imprisons human beings not merely physically but in terms of embracing their subjectivity. The iron cage that imprisons individuals not merely physically but also psychologically. The cage embraces the very subjectivity of individuals. The individual is instrumentalised, standardised and quantified, becoming an object to be managed and manipulated.

Weber is open to criticism here. In making ‘separation’ a general category Weber reproduces the dualistic framework of modernity, reinforcing the split between a public domain constituted by the state and capital and the private affairs of individuals separated from their means of control and operation. The individual is thus subjected to a developed and organised apparatus of social regulation and is treated as an object of this apparatus. In this sense, Weber is an ideologist of the iron cage rather than its critic.

Weber opened up a trail of thought that was developed further by critical theory. Weber’s ‘iron cage’ has clear affinities with Adorno’s notion of the ‘administered society’ and with Foucault’s ‘panopticon society’ (Turner 1993:127/8; Sayer 1991:122). These terms address the growing surveillance of populations from the cradle to the grave, the subordination of individuals to an all-encompassing bureaucratic rationality that is nothing short of totalitarian (Stauth and Turner 1988:41). The modern world in this perspective is an administered world that has extinguished the old autonomous liberal individual. In this world, the fragmented individual comes to be subject to the inexorable, all-pervasive logic of instrumental rationality.

On Weber’s premises, there is no way of avoiding the situation in which the individual subject comes to be confronted by an objective world which is meaningless, indifferent to human beings and their purposes, impervious to human action, and whose objectivity is defined functionally according to a formal, means-ends rationality. These ends have become divorced from their foundations in human activity and have come to be embedded in a structure conceived as external to human agents.

As questions of substantive value come to be subordinated to the questions of formal or instrumental value, the modern world comes to be afflicted by a substantive irrationality. The disenchanted world is a meaningless world, lacking a moral framework and coming to be dominated by bureaucratic structures. Marx explains this autonomy-destroying rationalisation in terms of the transition from ties of personal dependence to the objective dependency of all upon the mediation of ‘things’ (Marx 1973:162ff). Locating the problem in a general process of rationalisation, however, means that Weber has no way out of this dilemma.

Weber actually acknowledges the class rationality that underpins the formal rationality governing the world. For Weber, as for Marx, modern capitalism is defined by the generalised production of commodities through the system of wage labour and rests upon ‘the appropriation of all physical means of production .. as disposable property of autonomous private industrial enterprises’ (Weber 1961). Weber agreed with Marx that the basis of control is economic at root, lying in the social division of labour (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1980:155/169). ‘Free labour’ and ‘the complete appropriation of the means of production’ create the ‘most favourable conditions for discipline’ (Weber 2 1978:138).

Whilst these conditions establish the basis for the rational calculation that characterises the modern world, Weber reveals capitalism to be an inherently unnatural system. Weber identifies two moral imperatives in the ‘spirit’ of capitalism. In the first place, there is ‘the duty of the individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself’; and, in the second place, ‘the concept of labour as an end in itself, as a calling’ (Weber 1974:51 63). Neither of these imperatives is natural.





This is a ‘reversal’ of the ‘natural relationship’ and is ‘irrational’ to all not under the ‘capitalistic influence’. The formal rationality of capitalism is therefore also a substantive irrationality. It expresses the substantive class rationality of exploitative and alienative relations based upon the separation of workers from their means of production. The form of wage labour and the objective determinism of the capital system ensures that economic compulsion and dependence takes the form of necessity. Capitalism abolishes natural necessity only to impose a socially constructed necessity imposed by the systemic dynamics of capital (Meszaros 1995:108/9; Smith 1984:46; Perkins 1993:138/9; Marx 1973:299/300).

Whereas the tradition of ‘rational freedom’ sought to substitute force by morality in the regulation of human affairs, Weber is explicit that the purpose of ‘rational’ law is to protect class relations through the force of the state: ‘the modern economic order under modern conditions could not continue if its control of resources were not upheld by the legal compulsion of the state; that is, if formally ‘legal’ rights were not upheld by the threat of force’ (Weber 1964:160).

Breaking radically with the ‘rational’ legacy, Weber defines the state not as the embodiment of a rational telos but as an instrument of force. ‘Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends .. Ultimately, one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of force’ (Weber 1991:77/8). Weber identifies ‘politics’ with a struggle for power within and between states. This view departs radically from the politikos bios of Plato and Aristotle, from Kant’s end of political peace and Hegel’s end of ethical totality.

Weber’s argument expresses the transformation of ‘rational freedom’, concerning ends, emancipation and the good, into a lawful freedom establishing a framework of rights and justice regulating a diremptive society. The normative component is abandoned. The state, resting on force, could no longer be legitimised in terms of natural law and substantive conceptions of justice given the absence of an overarching system of values in a disenchanted, pluralistic world. Rather, the state could be justified only in terms of ensuring compromise between conflicting interests (ES1 1978:215 56; ES2 1978:874/5).

The abstracting tendencies at the heart of this process of transformation results in the personal being replaced by the impersonal, by the money form, the capital form, by the supply of social labour through the value form. For Marx, the fetishised social order is the product of alienated social forms that mediate the supply of social labour. The origin of the contradictory relationship between formal rationality and substantive rationality lies in the fetishistic social forms through which social labour is supplied. The problem of unreason needs to be located in the alienated system of production. Weber could not do this since he accepted these alienated social forms as rational and as subject to the methods of formal rationality. As a result, Weber comes to conceal the substantive class rationality of capital under the designation of formal rationality. 









Problems of scale and complexity, associated with the emergence of bureaucratic forms of organisation, have put a severe question mark against the democratic ideal as popular rule and participation (Pateman 1970:2). The task is to discover forms of mediation that enables participation in modern conditions. In affirming the importance of participatory theory in modern society, Pateman demands the reduction of the size of national political units: ‘it is only if the individual has the opportunity to directly participate in decision making and choose representatives in the alternative areas that, under modern conditions, he can hope to have any real control over the course of his life or the development of the environment in which he lives’ (Pateman 1970:110). The restitution of social power alienated to the state and capital to the social body, organised within the urban public sphere, makes good Pateman’s claim that ‘we can still have a modern, viable theory of democracy which retains the notion of participation at its heart’ (Pateman 1970:110/2).

There is a great similarity between Marx and Weber on the question of complexity in that both focus upon what may be described as the inversion of the means and the ends, criticising the dehumanising consequences which follow from the means becoming the ends (Turner 1993:212; Sayer 1991:133). Today, ‘material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no period in history’ (Weber 1985:181). ‘Things’ have come to acquire an existential significance as human beings have come to be reduced to the status of mere objects. Weber is, however, pessimistic as regards future possibilities. With Weber, the assertion of means over ends is built into the process of rationalisation and is therefore as ineradicable as that process itself. Weber thus leads us inexorably into the iron cage of modernity (Clarke 1991:288/9 323 324/5).

The critique of alienation is crucial in addressing the paradox of how human agency is transformed into human enslavement. Since alienation is human self-alienation it is an active process on the part of human agents and is therefore revocable. Alienation demonstrates the inversion inherent in social reality, an inversion that can only be removed by the practical transformation of social relations. What is interesting is to explore is an alternative mode of social life that recovers the possibility for social self-government from within the rational forms in which they are encased.

Weber gives strong reasons for doubting whether it makes sense to conceive of alternatives to the rationalised world. As the ‘objective indispensability’ and ‘impersonal’ character of modern bureaucratic forms of organisation become more entrenched, the idea of socialism ‘becomes more and more utopian’: ‘such a machine makes “revolution” in the sense of a forcible creation of entirely new formations of authority, technically more and more impossible, especially when the apparatus controls the modern means of communication .. and also by virtue of its internal rationalised structure’ (Weber 1991:230). The ‘mechanism – in contrast to the feudal orders based upon personal piety – is easily made to work for anybody who knows how to gain control over it’. ‘The ruled for their part cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus of authority once it exists’ (Weber 1958:229). Power has come to be separated from persons to take objectified form. As human beings have been disempowered, power has been disembodied. 

For Weber, the bureaucratisation of the world is inevitable on account of the ‘technical superiority’ of bureaucratic forms of organisation over other forms (Weber 1958:214). As a result, bureaucracy is extended to more and more areas of social organisation. Once established, bureaucracy is well-nigh impossible to uproot. For bureaucracy is the most effective form of organisation and an instrument of power. Throughout political revolutions, the ‘power machine’ remains the same (Weber 1991:229/30).

The problem with this argument is that it concentrates upon the technical superiority of bureaucracy to the exclusion of the interests, relations and struggles of power that are just as important in determining outcomes. Although Wright accuses Weber of conceiving capitalist development as a ‘harmonious rationalisation process’ (Wright 1978:217), Weber does actually set this process within a power infused infrastructure. As Weber himself acknowledged in relating formal rationality at the legal-institutional level to an inherent class rationality, rationalisation is not technical but political, serving to express and reinforce existing asymmetries in power and resources, favouring the powerful and privileged classes.

There is a split within reason here, showing the extent to which the reason of the tradition of rational freedom is quite distinct from the rationalisation process operating within capitalist relations. The reason that is integral to the realisation of the human ontology is inextinguishable and continues to confront the instrumental rationality of the capital system. The formal rationality of the market, of law and of bureaucracy is challenged by the demands for substantive rationality emitting from the various groups that comprise society. These demands are demands for a genuine public life that corresponds with human needs. The formalist social order is infused with substantive conceptions of justice pursued by marginalized and oppressed social groups and classes, all of which means that the process of rationalisation loses the harmonious character it has when conceived as a purely technical process.

For Alasdair MacIntyre, the process of rationalisation that issues in the modernity theorised by Weber has been a moral disaster. The moral tradition dating back to Plato and Aristotle has been undermined, making it impossible to identify let alone overcome the crisis of the modern world (MacIntyre 1981 1988 1989). The profound moral malaise in which human beings find themselves is a direct reflection of the moral disorder at the heart of modernity (Stauth and Turner 1988:45). The loss of moral meaning is located in the destruction of community and in the fact that modern bourgeois relations mean that the social identity which give moral appeals their social relevance are lacking (Poole 1991:155/6; Stauth and Turner 1988:45/6). There is, in fine, a division between the individual and the general good. Arguments that the good of all is also the good of each lack social relevance. It is a question, then, not of re-establishing the traditional overarching moral framework but of recovering the community and communal identity that makes that framework meaningful (Poole 1991:136). This thesis has sought to develop the ‘rational’ values of classical philosophy in a non-nostalgic direction, avoiding the reactionary snares that value pre-modern communities over against the modern world. This takes the high-road to modernity with Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. Introducing the critiques of Marx and Weber makes it possible to envisage a post-modern Aristotelian community that incorporates principles of subjectivity and social pluralism. 


54 THE PUBLIC OF EVERYDAY LIFE
The breakdown of urban politics in the capitalist city and the crisis of urbanist philosophies of social evolution in the contemporary era have created a space for new thought that envisages transcending the city of capital via new modes of urban expression and urbanity as discrete phenomena. Despite the way that life increasingly relates digitally and via mediascape, people still live, work and shop in cities, negotiating and interpreting the city as a place of solidarity, sociability and pleasure. The city continues to exist as a recursive practical achievement entailing the development of a social citizenship in its production and reproduction.

It is in this respect that the recovery of the ‘rational’ tradition of political philosophy, particularly its normative conception of the connection of humanisation with the city and public life, is important in conceiving the alternative to the capitalist model of modernity. For Wallerstein, socialism is to be conceived as ‘the city-state writ large’ aimed against liberalism’s vision of the ‘free’, i.e. property based, city (Wallerstein 1984:71). Building upon the political philosophy of Aristotle, Wallerstein emphasises that the Aristotelian city-state denotes a much more expansive entity than that envisioned by nineteenth century urban liberal politics.

The recovery of ‘rational’ themes and values is simultaneously their progressive dissolution into the everyday urban fabric of lived experience. Marx’s concept of praxis realises the fusion of philosophy and politics implicit in Plato’s conception of the philosopher-ruler. Reason is in control. To realise ‘rational’ philosophy’s desire for harmony and unity between each and all there is a need to transcend the diremptive forces of the capital system. The state and capital represent non-discursive/non-interactive institutional-systemic modes of control divorced from citizen and community activity. They cannot constitute a genuine public life.

Michael Taylor’s identification of the core attributes of the concept of community is useful in articulating public life as rooted in the everyday life activities of individuals. Admitting that community is an ‘open-textured’ concept, Taylor specifies that ‘relations between members of a community be direct and many-sided and that they practise certain forms of reciprocity’ (Taylor 1982:2/3). The quality of the relations between individuals in a community has precedence over the economistic argument concerning ownership and distribution (Taylor 1982:2/3). 

The problem with collectivities controlling and managing material resources is that they are mediated by representatives, bureaucrats, leaders, institutions like the state and by codes, abstractions and reifications (Taylor 1982:27/8). Without ensuring relations of reciprocity between individuals, there is a danger of reifying communal bonds:





Importantly, Taylor emphasises that ‘the state tends to undermine the conditions which make the alternative to it workable’ ‘by weakening or destroying community’. This is significant since community is the ‘necessary condition for the maintenance of social order without the state’ (Taylor 1982:57/8). There is a need to delineate the conditions for an authentic public detached from the state and capital as alien spheres of control. 

The points established by Taylor pertaining to the conditions of community apply to the idea of an urban public sphere as a viable alternative mode of social order which replaces the alien control of the state and capital with a sphere of citizen discourse and interaction. The conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere incorporates these themes of direct and many-sided relations, reciprocity, individual liberty within a community of free others, self-mediation and functional representation, associative democracy, the dissolution of reified institutional communal bonds, the parasitism of the alien publics of the state and capital.

The argument identifies the possibility of an urban public sphere coordinated by citizen-producer discourse, association and interaction. In integrating universality into everyday life, the urban public sphere emerges as a mode of societal integration that replaces the alien publics of the state and capital. This opposes a discursive and interactive mode of internal coordination to the non-discursive and non-interactive mode of external coordination. The state and capital proceed systematically whereas the urban public proceeds through genuine reciprocity and communication between individuals. In being relocated from the state to society, the public is not abolished but becomes coextensive with everyday life activities and relationships.

The concept of the urban public sphere pertains to Marx’s definition of the ‘true community’ of ‘life itself, physical and spiritual life, human morality, human activity, human enjoyment, human nature’. This defines the embodied public of everyday life and relationships and is ‘of quite different reality and scope than the political community’, i.e. the abstracted public of the state (Marx 1975:418/9). In affirming universality in a genuine public life, Marx affirms that ‘the man is greater than the citizen and human life than political life’ (Marx 1975:419). The ideal intersubjective community of ends contained in rational philosophy thus emerges as a democratic public of everyday life. Marx’s ‘true state’ is a politikos bios in that it embodies a genuinely universal and active citizenship in society (Marx 1975:112). This defines a new public organised by three constituent elements – ‘true democracy’, ‘true community’ and ‘true individuality’ (Marx 1975:87/8 223 265/7 277 347 348 419; 1999:117/8). The realisation of all these sides of human nature requires an integral politikos bios that overcomes the parcelling out and estrangement of the human ontology under capitalism. Human growth and development will be complete only through a transcendence of the fragmentation of human activities under existing relations and their integration in a genuine public life.





This return of human relationships to social existence constitutes the socio-relational core of the urban public sphere on the terrain of sensuous, interactive, solidaristic reality. This affirms an internal as against an external definition of power. Power operates through the promotion of human subjectivity and is thus a more intimate phenomenon than that conception which concentrates upon its institutionalised forms in the state and economy. This conception locates the source of power in the individual and seeks the ‘return of man’ from an institutionalised existence within alienated forms to ‘human i.e. social existence’ (Marx 1975:349). Through practical reappropriation and reorganisation, power does not act on individuals in a remote fashion, from the outside but, rather, acts on the interior of the person through their self as part of their subjectivity. A genuine public life is a mode of participation within social existence. Marx thus characterises communism as ‘at once real and directly bent towards action’ (Marx 1975:349). Marx here expresses the Aristotelian concern with the exercise of inherent faculties.

Critics argue that whilst Marx possessed an ‘admirable vision of the vast human potential for diversity in communist self-realisation’, he failed to provide concepts concerning the ‘organisational, political contexts in which such life choices are likely to be made’ (McLennan 1989:125/6). Marx ought to have paid greater attention to the institutional dispersion of powers (Cohen 1989:49/50). The concept of an associative urban sphere is invaluable here in establishing the institutional medium for the realisation of human projects, needs and exchanges. This concept recognises the need for an array of social spheres if individuals are to be free and equal in determining the conditions of their existence, enabling individuals to control their lives without direct interference from political agencies or other external parties. This implies a public sphere that is not subject to state control or capitalist dynamics but is open to organisations and associations pursuing their ends within a common framework of action. 

Marx offers an alternative framework for rationality, recovering creative human agency and emphasising social praxis within an affirmative materialism (Schmidt 1971; Markus 1978). Marx’s emancipatory project, as a life-affirming active materialism, is oriented towards overcoming the way in which human social power has become disembodied by being invested in an institutional-systemic world raised above real society, disempowering human beings in the process. Critical to this project is labour as a philosophical and anthropological category pertaining to human self-creation. The human interaction with the ‘sensuous external world’ is crucial to the formation and maintenance of personal identity (Marx 1975:325). Labour is ‘free conscious activity’, the ‘existential activity’ through which human beings realise their ‘universal nature’ (Marx 1975:327/9). The free human community, the ideal rational public predicated by philosophy, is to be established by overcoming the divisions in social reality which have estranged individuals from each other and from their communal essence (Marx 1975:348), from the social justice and creative self-realisation integral to politikos bios. Communism realises the public that individuals require in order to live the realised life.

Marx takes an activist view of human beings, defined in terms of capacities and powers (Parekh 1982:26), conceiving reality subjectively as sensuous human activity, practice. Marx emphasises human activity as the ‘practical-critical’ activity that creates objective reality (Marx 1975:421). This active materialism possesses a democratic character. The privileging of creative human agency subverts the idea of an alienated, inert totality. Since ‘circumstances are changed by men’ ‘it is essential to educate the educator’ (Marx 1975422). Praxis affirms the ‘coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity as self-changing’ (Marx 1975:422). This shows how a new associative public is constituted by human agents who are able to forge ‘rational’ bonds of universality and commonality at the heart of society (Marx 1974:250). Marx’s public is a broad notion constituted by proletarian self-organisation constituted through ‘local committees and councils or workers’ clubs or committees’ (Marx 1973:326), ‘constituent assemblies of the proletariat’ coming to form a civil state within the political state (Marx 1977:84; Marx 1974:91 92; Gilbert 1981:226). Unlike Rousseau, Marx had no need of the device of the Legislator as public tutor, generating the capacity for transformation and achieving a genuine publicity, commonality and universality from within civil society itself (Miller 1982:93/4), reconstituting individuals as free social beings as a process of self-transformation, without the need for external agencies.

This shows the possibility of reconstituting public life via active citizenship as a social movement. This is relevant to the contemporary ‘participatory revolution’ taking place through intermediate political actors outside of established public institutions, and to new modes of political expression emerging in the (post) modern world (Barnes and Kaase 1979:40f; Kaase 1984; Inglehart 1977; Forbes and Street 1986). Blocking the emergence of this postmodern public, however, are the processes of Weberian rationalisation.

The conception of the urban public subverts the conventional definition of the public sphere and proceeds beyond the constitutional conception located in the state sphere. The state public is elitist, hierarchical, disembodied and abstract whereas the urban public is the site of true fulfilment. Marx identifies the processes at work at the level of social relationships that induce society to alienate its power and project its sociality upwards to the abstracted realm. Hence sociality and subjectivity are directed into an abstracted politics and are therefore politically reconstructed within the state as an illusory community. Sociality and subjectivity can, however, be redirected into the everyday urban social terrain of individuals. The canalisation of social power into social as against abstracted institutional channels forms the basis of the reciprocal public.

The understanding of Marx’s praxis as the democratisation of politics, philosophy and power has clear affinities with the Nietzschean case that Stauth and Turner make for the centrality of the lifeworld as a reciprocal and solidaristic reality upon which the formal-institutional reality is parasitic.

The final level of the social world is the reality of regulating institutions which attempt to organise the inter-subjective world and the world of social embodiment. We treat these institutions as social bodies which, through an intellectual stratum .. seek legitimation over the world of communal reciprocity and individual embodiment. This ‘higher’ social world can be conceptualised as a form of institutionalised resentment which requires intellectuals, professional men and priests to smooth out its operation; they exist to render the world either acceptable or efficient. This culture of resentment stands in opposition to the human world of sensualism, practice and feeling.

Stauth and Turner 1988:14

An overarching regulatory framework has been constructed over social reality, creating a parasitic world that organises the disempowerment and disembodiment of the social world of reciprocity and solidarity. This institutional and systemic world is a world of alien control ordered by the non-discursive and non-interactive forms of the state and capital. Marx makes the important point that in the social world there exists only human beings and the social forms that they engender (Marx 1975:85; Meikle 1985:45). Any particular form, be it the state or capital, is merely the ‘objective’ expression of ‘socialised man’ (Marx 1975:87/8). Human beings, as creative, knowledgeable agents, could act to reappropriate their social forms. This praxis restores power to the world of experience, reciprocity and sensuous activity.

The collectivising, idealising and totalising representations of the modern world are related by Marx to the way that human beings are forced to externalise their social power by alienative relations, having it turned against them in the alienated form of political force and economic compulsion, of institutional and systemic violence.

The increasing subjection of the social world to rational calculation reveals capital’s colonisation of social life to be the central agency of modernisation. This calculation penetrates the relationships between human beings and forms the nexus connecting individuals. Capitalism and its alien rationality is constitutive of the forms of sociality and subjectivity in the modern world. To reconstitute those forms on a genuinely public basis requires a transformation of social relations. This has the objective of recovering the ontological component of rationality central to the ‘rational’ tradition of freedom. The argument affirms that the everyday lifeworld of real individuals is the sensuous material terrain for the embodied experience that provides the foundation for dissolving that abstracted rationalism divorced from human life. Opposing the social lifeworld of solidary exchange and interaction to the abstracted rationality of the impersonal institutional public, a sensuous urban public is conceived as resting upon self-regulation achieved through reciprocal rationality practised in everyday relationships.

In underlining the sensuous character of the urban material terrain, the argument is informed by Simmel’s aesthetic notion of totality in dealing with the interactions between individuals and society. ‘The essential meaning of art lies in its being able to form an autonomous totality, a self-sufficient microcosm out of fortuitous fragments of reality that is tied with a thousand threads to this reality’ (Simmel 1978:494/5). Simmel packs his texts with those fragments of human existence, apparently superficial social phenomena that nevertheless comprise the totality, something which Simmel developed into a universal principle in his later philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie) (Frisby 1995:24). The human subject plays an active role within this totality: ‘the formula of our life as a whole, from the trivial practice of everyday to the highest peak of intellectuality is thus: in all that we do, we have a norm, a standard, an ideally preconceived totality before us, which we try to transpose into reality through our actions’ (Simmel 1978:451).

Simmel’s sociology adopts an aesthetic approach to social reality and emphasises social interaction over ‘system’ and ‘structure’. These global concepts occupy a subordinate place in Simmel’s work, concerned as he was to avoid the reification or hypostatisation of ‘society’. Simmel insisted that ‘society is not an entity fully enclosed within itself, an absolute entity, any more than is the human individual. Compared with the real interactions of the parts, it is only secondary, only the result’ (Simmel in Frisby 1995).

Social interaction and forms of sociation, ‘the phenomenological structure of society’, constitute key elements of Simmel’s sociology and are directly relevant to determining the sensuous material terrain of the urban public as a relational concept. Simmel proceeds from ‘a regulative world principle that everybody interacts with everything else, that between every point in the world and every other force permanently moving relationships exist’ (Simmel in Frisby 1995:28/9). Since modern social reality is conceived to be in a condition of ceaseless flux, the concepts that best express this fluid reality are relational. Simmel makes interaction and sociation key concepts. Society comprises a web or network of relationships in which individuals and groups intersect, something that underlines ‘the fundamental interrelatedness of the most diverse phenomena’ (Kracauer 1920:314).







As this chapter has progressed it has become clear that something has gone awry in the project of reason. Reason has been transformed through the processes of modernity, issuing in an institutional order that suppresses and inhibits the human ontology where once it promised to expand it. In such circumstances the concept of ‘rational freedom’ has become a problematic notion. Michel Foucault exposes the repressive tendencies of modern rationalisation existing in the ‘other, dark side’ of the ‘formally egalitarian juridical framework’ in the form of the development and generalisation of ‘disciplinary mechanisms’ (Foucault 1979:222/3). Foucault identifies the soldier standing behind the citizen and the ‘military dream’ that lies behind democracy. Foucault’s ‘reason’ is a critical rather than emancipatory concept which relates individuals ‘not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility’ (Foucault 1979:169). Far from issuing in a free social order, reason is implicated in the militarisation of social and urban space, a process that is accelerating in contemporary times.

Max Weber had conceived rationalisation as a disciplinary modernising process that increasingly subjected the individual to a series of codes, rules and orders. Foucault argues a similar thesis in detailing a whole panoply of techniques for the normalised regulation of subjectivity (Foucault 1967 1977 1981 1984). The repressive tendencies of reason become institutionalised in the carceral network of ‘the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the “social worker”-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based’ (Foucault 1977:304). The notion of ‘judge’ here can be easily replaced by ‘police’ to characterise the process of urban incarceration that is currently sweeping the cities of the western world. Rationalisation has issued in an institutionalisation that suppresses the human ontology by confining individuals within an urban cage in the interests of preserving and extending an existing pattern of social injustice.

Weber located the roots of discipline in military organisation and in the extension of monastic practice in the wider society under the impact of the Reformation (Turner 1993:127). In Discipline and Punish (1975), Foucault argues that these monastic practices have come to form the basis of a new system of social regulation. This process culminates in a panopticism which functions as the model for regulation in all social areas, in schools, prisons, asylums (Foucault 1970). This expresses the culmination of the search for the total control of the socio-urban environment through new forms of knowledge, making the individual available as a target for disciplinary practices – penology, criminology, demography and social medicine (Foucault 1975). This regulation requires a self-regulation that is achieved through the individual being placed firmly within a set of disciplines that become habitual through being performed regularly.

Such views show a very different reason inscribed in the social and urban fabric than that normative reason enhancing the human ontology expressed by the tradition of ‘rational freedom’ in philosophy. Foucault reveals powerful tendencies at the heart of modern society, showing how a rational project that once promised human emancipation has instead issued in human incarceration. Modern society is modelled upon the panopticon as the ideal mechanism and diagram of power (Deleuze 1986; Turner 1993:118 127). The panopticon provides the model for the extension of correctional institutions throughout society, subjecting individuals to constant surveillance and imposing a mental re-education through the total disciplining of the body in a rationally managed architectural space (Foucault 1975 1977). Modern society is characterised by an expansion in the technologies of power, surveillance and control.

Foucault is both in and against the ‘rational’ tradition of freedom. Claiming that his critical ‘ontology of ourselves’ continues the spirit of the Enlightenment, particularly Kant (Foucault 1988:95 1986), Foucault is concerned to affirm the central theme of the ‘rational’ tradition – the link between ethics and subjectivity (Foucault 1987:124). He seeks to establish this link on another footing, rejecting the abstracting-out of experience in the modern tradition. Foucault thus invokes the Greek notion of ‘ethos’ to emphasise that ethics is always practise, a way of being. A good ethos is a ‘practise of freedom’ embedded in the social life of individuals (Foucault 1987:114 117). This creates the conditions for a politics of difference. Foucault characterises his method as the ‘freeing of difference’, embracing divergence, the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity that is not confined by the constraints of similarity (Foucault 1977:185). This offers a basis for uniting individuals politically without having to posit an abstract common identity through the state.

Foucault affirms ways of constituting subjectivity in ways other than the autonomous subject at the core of liberal modernity and its theoretical justification for the centralised state. Foucault thus defines freedom as a way of living between individuals, as a practice that is embedded in social life rather than as an abstract moral code institutionalised in the state. For Foucault, individuals are not autonomous subjects but are scripted by relations of power. The subject is constituted through practices of subjection and of liberation (Foucault 1991:70 110).

Foucault rejects Kantian, Hegelian, Marxist and other ‘rational’ meta-narratives. With Foucault, power is no longer located in structures or institutions at a single point of origin but circulates through ‘mobile and transitory’ interrelations of force at local levels (Foucault 1978:96). Power is ‘everywhere’ as ‘the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society’ (Foucault 1981:93). Power is not external to and causally related to other relations like economic processes but is something generated from within the multiple force relations operating in the apparatuses of production, families and institutions that constitute the social body.

Foucault’s detailed ‘micrological’ analysis shows how individuals are recruited, disciplined and subjected to various forms of institutional control through the operation of a pervasive ‘power/knowledge’. This power/knowledge extends throughout every aspect of private and public life (Foucault 1980; Rabinow 1985). From this perspective the problem is not the combination of class power or the class state but multiple, decentred ‘discourses’ which circulate without any clear point of origin, ‘technologies of the self’ that do not require punitive sanctions since they are voluntarily embraced by subjects pursuing self-knowledge. Far from realising freedom, reason is the pursuit of a pervasive ‘will-to-truth’ which subjugates the body to various disciplinary regimes.

Foucault affirms that it is still possible for human beings to influence the course of the future: ‘things can be changed, fragile as they are, held together more by contingencies than by necessities..’ (Foucault 1982:35). Future society cannot be rationally determined or designed in any simple sense. The future public eludes simple engineering according to a rational ideal. In a very definite sense, the present urban social order is eminently rational in character, in the carceral sense identified by Foucault and anticipated much earlier by Weber. There is a need to recover reason as capable of having an emancipatory transformative effect. 

The problem is that Foucault’s rejection of a class analysis and his failure to relate rational processes to existing social relations results in an inability to distinguish between oppressing, exploiting classes whose interests lie behind the extension of repressive technologies throughout urban society and emancipatory, exploited classes articulating progressive goals. Foucault’s concepts of ‘war’. ‘resistance’, and ‘power’ conflate all struggles into a universal struggle (Neocleous 1996:86). Foucault’s power/knowledge thesis generates a general ‘social warfare’, a concept that has more in common with the Hobbesian thesis that the pursuit of naked self-interest is the fundamental motivating force in human affairs than with the ‘rational’ thesis affirming that the freedom of each is achieved in relation with the freedom of all. Such a notion makes the coercive state a necessary instrument for imposing the civil peace. Further, it fits perfectly the contemporary extension of institutions and mechanisms of urban police in order to pacify a fractious and unjust urban environment. This is a retreat from the ‘rational’ tradition that sought not the containment of the problem of social war but its resolution through the creation of the ethico-institutional infrastructure of social justice.





THE ECONOMIC CONCEPT OF THE CITY

Part 5 THE ECONOMIC CONCEPT OF THE CITY






This volume introduces the second part of The City of Reason. This second part develops the argument of the first part by connecting the themes and values drawn from the ‘rational’ philosophical conception of the city with the political economy of the city. This approach highlights the impact of the dynamics and imperatives of the capital system upon the urban infrastructure. It also exposes the contradictory processes of the capital system and how these affect the fortunes of cities and other spatial units. A broad approach to urban political economy is adopted to examine the relationships between community, democracy and material life processes.

Assigning the primary focus to the causal relationship between economic form, urban development and social polarity, this part defines and applies an urban political economy. This second part explores the intricate ramifications of the social division of labour, the transnational structure of production and how the dynamics of local labour market formation create a field of forces that pervasively underpins the whole spatial pattern of the metropolis (Scott 1986:35). Urban analysis proceeds from the examination of economic relations to subject urban life to critical scrutiny according to a transcendent goal of social equality (Harvey 1973:ch3; Harvey 1992:588/601). This part develops a critical appreciation of the relation between the contradictory dynamics of the capital economy and the processes of rationalisation constituting modernity. A fundamental element in unravelling this process of rationalisation is the analysis of the asymmetries upon which capitalist production rests and which are reproduced and reinforced by the by the mechanisms of valorisation and accumulation. These processes are to be traced in their operation within the everyday practices of social life as structured by the ‘rational’ processes of modernity (Savage and Warde 1993). What emerges through the development of an urban political economy is a critical account of the city and of the possibilities for the emergence of an alternative city.

In the process, contemporary urbanisation is shown to realise not the good city but the carceral city. The argument also relates the urban fabric of social inequality to postmodernist discourse. Postmodernism is criticised for abandoning the meta-narrative of the good city to celebrate fragmentation, difference and otherness. This detracts from the social nature of justice and equality and reinforces the increasing tendency to metropolarity in the modern social structure. The importance of this point will become more clear in part III concerning the innovation of new modes of socio-political expression. The democratic ethos of postmodern political culture quite easily issues in conservative versions of identity politics, a politics of privilege practising exclusion via socially and economically powerful groups. The failure to challenge and restructure asymmetrical relations of class power make any politics of difference susceptible to being incorporated into an existing structural and institutional framework of exclusion, inequality and injustice. This is where the restatement of the meta-narrative of the good city becomes important, affirming the unity of the freedom of each and of all at a time when freedom is becoming equated with the freedom each particular some from all.

57 THE MAIN THEORIES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

In the ‘rational’ conception, the city is something substantially more than economics and the individual is more than the puppet of economic forces. This philosophical conception conceives individuals to be citizens, conscious actors capable of exercising control over their self-made environment and hence of determining their existence. Citizens are reality-constituting subjects rather than passive objects of forces and processes which are external to them. This philosophical position criticises the hegemony of capital as a systematic determinism that denies creative human subjectivity and hence conceives citizenship to be an active designation.

The argument in this part exposes capital as a force that shapes the city as a machine for economic growth, closing down the space for citizen discourse and interaction in the process. By grounding urban analysis in political economy it is possible to take into account the dynamics of productive activity and the complex web of social relations. Analytical focus proceeds from the division of labour and related economic processes of urban structure and form, showing how spatial specificity can cut back to effect economic forces and the character of the urban infrastructure of capitalism. The argument thus adopts an interactive approach.

Urban political economy reveals that the gains to be made from urban regeneration are considerably less clear than the bulk of the material would suggest. To a certain extent, this derives from the inability of economists to agree on theoretical issues as regards the macroeconomy and its implications for the urban environment – and hence to produce pragmatic policy. At the theoretical level, few economists agree as to the precise character of an ‘ideal model’ of the economy, let alone whether this ideal is desirable and/or realisable. After many years in which the Keynesian model of state sponsored development governed in urban areas, the entrepreneurial or ‘free market’ model has come to dominate. This marks a switch from urban regeneration as an end in itself to economic development as a condition of regeneration. The market model envisages the resolution of urban crisis by attracting capital investment. Urban regeneration is thus defined in terms of making the city an appealing site for capital investors. The rationale for such a view reflects a particular view of the nature of the economy.

Some economists argue that the concern of policy intervention is to eliminate periodic market failure; others concentrate upon the permanent need for regulatory policy since this failure is endemic to the market system. The approaches taken by economists to the macroeconomy – and hence to the economics of the urban environment – exist along a continuum. At polar extremes are the ideal types of the Austrian perfect competition model and the Marxist contradiction and conflict model. The advocates of the perfect competition model argue that an economy comprising large numbers of small firms, none of which is able to influence prices and wages, is a practical object for economic policy. At the most extreme, economists argue for complete deregulation and for the absence of policy by government on the assumption that the dynamic competition that generates these conditions is desirable as an end in itself.


The revival of neo-liberal arguments has justified a withdrawal of the state from planning and regeneration. The rationale is that the reduction of regulation and the restriction in the role of government is crucial to the strengthening of entrepreneurialism and the reliance upon the competitive forces of the ‘free’ market. Neo-classical economists have used mathematical models to argue that competitive markets are capable of ensuring the efficient allocation of resources (Bator 1957:22/59). In theory, that is. Pareto efficient allocation occurs only if conditions of perfect competition apply, if there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, there is perfect information and if the single motive is profit maximisation (Graaf 1957).

The Austrian school has revised the traditional conception of perfect competition as taking place between a large number of firms. The older conception of static equilibrium of atomistic competition has been replaced by a view of competition as dynamic, taking place in the context of change and uncertainty (Sawyer 1992:261). The Austrians reject the view that high profits are the product of monopoly or market power. Instead, they refer to above average efficiency as generating a high market share and hence high profits. These profits encourage firms to innovate in products and techniques so as to increase efficiency (Sawyer 1992:261). To resist the threat of entry coming from new firms attracted by high profits, firms must maintain above average efficiency (Sawyer 1992:262).

These arguments have important implications with respect to urban policy. The Austrian approach places a heavy emphasis upon private property and the role of the entrepreneur. In this conception, it is the existence of property rights that spurs the entrepreneur to pursue profits, secure in the knowledge that such efforts will be rewarded by the right to the gains that may accrue. This approach strongly favours private enterprise and expresses a poor view of the efficacy of government intervention and public ownership.

Government intervention to correct market failure has been justified in situations of divergence from the ideal competitive market. This is the case with respect to public or collective consumption goods, externalities, prisoner’s dilemma conditions, and distributional costs (Robbins 1952:55/61; Klosterman 1996:152). The public goods argument accepts that competitive markets efficiently allocate private goods. These can be enjoyed if they are purchased, prices reflecting individual preferences. But with public goods, the benefit individuals obtain depends upon the total supply of the good rather than the individual contribution to production. Externalities refer to the spillover effects of production and consumption not taken into account in voluntary market exchange (Mishan 1971:11/28). Government intervention is thus justified to remedy the public and external effects that are neglected in the pursuit of individual self-interest and private gain (Klosterman 1996:155). Critiques of planning recognise the limitations of markets but nevertheless maintain than markets are more efficient in resource allocation than centralised governments (Becher 1958:105/09; Wolf 1979:107/40).

The justification for the development state is that the private market does not necessarily produce the best possible outcome (Sawyer 1992:255/64). The argument affirms that a conscious direction and development exerted through a complex institutional apparatus is capable of altering the economic profile of a nation, shifting resources from certain areas to key growth sectors. In this scenario, a conscious strategy of urban development to create a thriving economic environment that will attract private investment can be envisaged. Increased private investment, in other words, will be the consequence rather than the cause of urban modernisation. This approach is the opposite of the economic development model that makes private investment the condition of regeneration. In the absence of a regulatory framework there is every reason to suppose that, far from generating a sustainable regeneration, market led strategies will serve the interests of the private forces that are eroding urban space and identity. For these forces are self-interested agents possessing private priorities and identities rather than a commitment to any specific urban place. Any advantage that accrues to the urban environment does so indirectly and accidentally.

The case for government intervention is not made solely on the strength of the theoretical limitations of the market. As Klosterman notes, popular dissatisfaction with the free enterprise system is based not upon an intellectual appreciation of the failures of classical and neoclassical theory but upon the failure to provide stable economic growth enabling a decent standard of living for all members of society (Klosterman 1996:156). The case for government intervention in the market may be made in theoretical terms but above all has to relate notions of efficiency ‘to alternative institutional mechanisms for achieving society’s objectives’ (Klosterman 1996:156). Such a view emphasises the primacy of an urban public sphere determining social objectives with references to the needs, interests, and aspirations of urban dwellers.

Pluralist theory offers a number of theoretical and empirical studies which purport to show, in the USA at least, that decision making in urban areas proceeds within a pluralist political structure in which no individual or group dominates others in knowledge and power. Pluralists admit that there may be a socio-economic context to decision-making but assert that decisions are reached through an open competition that encompasses the full range of social groups and interests. The decision making process in urban policy thus proceeds as a disjointed incrementalism. The open competition guarantees that no group is able to dominate over other groups, thus ensuring political stability.

In the pluralist model, government lacks a positive role. Government is restricted to providing the mechanisms of procedural justice in establishing and enforcing the rules of political bargaining. As with free market competition, political competition removes the need for government to have an independent, creative role in planning (Connolly ed. 1969:3/13).

The problem with this pluralist model is that it expresses in political form the same limitations expressed by the model of perfect competition in economic form. For just as the free market in economics is dominated by national and multinational capital, so the political realm is dominated by powerful groups. The notion of free competition presumes symmetries in resources and power that do not exist. Under the capital system, both politics and economics are under the control of blocks of money and administrative power. Critical pluralists acknowledge this. Modern ‘corporate capitalism’ tends to ‘produce inequalities in social and economic resources so great as to bring about severe violations of political equality and hence of the democratic process’ (Dahl 1985:60). Pluralism developed into neo-pluralism by accepting the Marxist thesis that governments are subject to structural constraints imposed by the functional imperatives of private accumulation (Dahl 1985:102). Government must facilitate the process of private investment, accumulation and valorisation to ensure the economic growth that generates the resources upon which the state depends and the employment and income upon which voters depend (Lindblom 1977:122/3). The policy agenda pursued by government cannot simply be the result of a supposedly open process of bargaining between all social interest groups. The power of the state is secondary and derivative and depends upon facilitating the process of private accumulation. This ensures the privileging of business and corporate interests at national and local level. Government cannot and in practice does not treat business as merely one interest amongst many but must offer incentives and provide infrastructure to attract capital investment, encourage business activity and facilitate the process of accumulation. Grants, tax rebates, low interest loans, etc. are all offered in packages designed to encourage commercial activity in urban areas. Business interests pervade governmental processes and social institutions (Lindblom 1977:170/233; Elkin 1982:720/32).

Clarence Stone shows how an unequal distribution of resources results in an asymmetrical capacity among political actors so that some are better placed to ensure that the rules of the game issue in benefits flowing more in some directions than in others, so that certain agendas rather than others make the public level and so that certain decisions rather than others are taken.

Asymmetrical relations of class power underpin political bargaining processes and ensure that the results of competition possess an inherent, systematic bias. Those possessing less power and resources find themselves and their interests marginalized, even excluded. Such groups are denied an effective voice in the decision-making process. Their urban environment is shaped by forces, processes and decisions that are external to them. The result of connecting political expression to asymmetrical relations of class power is to ensure that political processes of supposedly ‘free’ competition reinforce and even intensify existing inequalities in power and resources and hence fails to provide information that an effective policy making process requires (Gamson 1968:15/21; Pye and Zeigler 1975:225/84).

The result is that there remains a need for public agency capable of expressing and representing the shared interests of the community as a whole, coordinating the actions of various groups and interests so as to ensure a viable long-term solution. The pluralist notion of political bargaining implies a free and equal community without relations of superordination and subordination. This is not the real world but it may function as the object inspiring efforts to create the urban public sphere.







58 INDUSTRIAL URBANISM - THE MARXIST ASCENDANCY

The central question of this chapter concerns the extent to which urban regeneration and town planning must recognise the constraints of political economy in developing the city (Campbell and Fainstein 1996:1). ‘A particular city cannot be divorced from the encompassing political economy within which it is embedded and through which it manifests its particular functions and form’ (Hill 1983:ch14). 

From the late sixties, the main impulse behind industrial urbanism was Marxism, generating a concern with identifying deep structures and necessary relations in order to explain urban phenomena as a result of a single overarching logic of capital. In recent years the conceptual and discursive framework has shifted towards a postmarxist position, explicitly repudiating the idea of underlying structures and necessary relations. This book accepts many of the insights of the postmodernist and postmarxist position but does so by a critical reaffirmation of the metanarrative of the good city and of the key categories of Marxist critique applied to the urban environment. 

In arguing for the superiority of the Marxist theory over neo-classical theory the intention is not to replace an individualist or voluntarist model lacking in structural content with a structuralist model that denies creative individual agency. Marx does have a notion of creative human agency in arguing that socio-economic structures are created and formed by creative human praxis just as much as these structures establish the context for further praxis. The recognition of structural constraints does not imply that creative human agency is denied and that human beings are powerless to intervene and shape outcomes. ‘Those who misuse structural theory will inevitably fall victim to a sense of helplessness in the face of predestined social forces’ (Campbell and Fainstein 1996:3/4).

To establish the influence of the interplay of the forces of “structure” or “agency” is to enter one of the most contested zones in the philosophy of history. To acknowledge the power of the deep structures facilitated by the contemporary movements of capital and state forms to shape and condition events and outcomes does not imply a determinism in which creative human agency ceases to exist. The point of Marx’s critique of alienation is that determinism issues from certain relations that ensure that human agents lose comprehension and control of their creations. As much as circumstances shape human life, human agents, individually and as wider interests, strive and struggle to impose conscious human ends upon systemic imperatives.

The approach taken here opts for an ‘open’ as opposed to a ‘closed’ interpretation of the city, one that acknowledges the interpenetration of subjectivity and objectivity within the interactive processes at work within the city. Planners, developers, national and local politicians, community groups and ordinary citizens all engage in activities which shape the urban environment.

The crucial insight that Marxism offers urban studies and the projection of an urban future is that profit arises through the domination of labour by capital, that accumulation is the central dynamic of the capital system and that, as a result, the capitalist class is compelled, as a condition of its survival, to continuously expand the basis for accumulation. At the heart of the Marxist critique of the capitalist mode of production is the labour theory of value. This holds that value is created through the application of labour power, with the value of the commodity being determined by the labour time required for the reproduction of the labourer. What distinguishes labour power from other commodities is the capacity to create value. The capitalist purchases labour power as a commodity to use for a specified period of time, the working day. Part of the working day is spent creating value equal to the value of the goods and services necessary for the reproduction of the labourer. The value created in the rest of the day is surplus value appropriated by the capitalist. The accumulation of surplus value is the central motivation of the capitalist, the central dynamic of the capital system, through which the capitalist class reproduces itself and its domination over labour.

The reproduction of labour power is thus crucial to the capital system and requires social expenditure and the creation of a consumption fund. The capital flows in the built environment for production and consumption, the undertaking of social expenditures for the reproduction of labour power, then, are the structural links sustaining the urban process under the capital system.

Although labour produces values, it does not realise value. Labour power is engaged to produce values only to the extent that it can be used to produce exchange value and surplus value. The produce of labour has no exchange value until it is sold. The realisation of surplus value requires the distribution and exchange of commodities in addition to their production. Market conditions determine what is produced. The production of use or exchange values depends upon the exchange value of the product created. 

Accumulation as the central dynamic of capitalism is an endless process. The resources generated in capitalist production are not ends in themselves but a means towards further ends.





Such an approach has lost the moral concern with ends or goals that relate to the self-realisation of the human ontology and instead concentrates upon the perfection of the means of the endless expansion of power. Both capitalists and workers are subject to this endless compulsion to accumulate. Society in general is subject to systemic forces that are beyond the comprehension and control of individuals.

Aside from the political implications, the power of capital represents a new modality of power that shapes the character of urban space:





Marx’s Capital is a book of human self-understanding which lays bare the central dynamic of contemporary society, a dynamic which exerts its force systematically as a societal determination. It offers a way of reconnecting power with the affirmation of creative human subjectivity in a self-made social world. Marx seeks conscious human self-determination, the imposition of human ends in order to overcome a nihilistic process of development.

The new approach to urbanism that Marxism made possible contains a number of key elements (Walton 1984:78):

1)	Urbanism and urbanisation assume different forms according to particular modes of social organisation and political control and hence require appropriate definition and explanation;
2)	There is an interplay between relations of production, consumption and exchange and the structure of power embodied in the state;
3)	Actual urban processes such as community organisation, economic activity, class and ethnic politics must be understood in terms of their structural bases, showing how they are conditioned by the larger economic, political, and socio-cultural milieu;
4)	The urban process is connected to social change, which is conceived as arising out of class and social conflict. Economic change is not the product of a structural determinism but is socially and politically generated and mediated;
5)	Alternative positions have ideological and distributional implications which shape urban outcomes.

These key points of urban political economy render the model of planning as a neutral rational process untenable. The classical idea conceives planning as an independent agency based upon the ethos of professionalism, articulating an instrumental rationality and expertise, promoting economic growth and guaranteeing political stability (Dunham 1958:650/671). This model fails to appreciate the fundamental institutional and systemic constraints within which public decision-making and action proceeds. The idea of this process as being neutral cannot be sustained. The spatial structures underpinning social organisation reveal the character of society: ‘the spatial outcomes of a system founded in the capitalist ethic, provide manifest evidence of unfairness and inequality; a spatial analysis has, therefore, a part to play’ (Williamson and Byrne 1979:198).

David Harvey employs a marxist structural approach to address the contradiction between ideals and reality in urban planning. Planners subscribe to a public concern with social well-being whilst having to facilitate capital accumulation. Harvey exposes a contradiction between the liberal-progressive self-identity of the planners on the one hand and their actions in support of capital on the other. The purpose of planning and regeneration is to shape the urban environment so as to facilitate the process of accumulation and hence reproduce existing social relations.

It is on this point that Marxist approaches to urbanism are particularly relevant, adding a class and politically charged dimension to the notion of rationality as applied in debates concerning town planning and urban regeneration (Castells 1977; Harvey 1973:195/238). Marxist urban discourse connects urban conflict and the need for planning with the production relations of the capital system. The role of the state in the urban development process emerges as a crucial question (Carnoy 1984). State intervention in the urban development process is explained by the fact that the market system is incapable of maintaining and reproducing immobilised fixed capital investments in the built environment (bridges, roads etc.) which are used by capital as means of production (Harvey 1975:10; Preteceille 1976:69/76).The role of the state is not limited to maintaining the system of ‘urban use values’ but seeks to coordinate these use values in space (Preteceille 1976:70). In Francois Lamarche’s theory, urban planning and state intervention are linked to the sphere of circulation and the need to produce a ‘spatial organisation which facilitates the circulation of capital, commodities, information, etc.’ (Lamarche 1976:86). For Lojkine (1977) the state is primarily concerned to buttress and facilitate the direct productive investment of private capital. It achieves this through macro-economic planning and related infrastructure investment. Castells takes a different view. For Castells, the main function of the state is to provide collective consumption so as to aid the reproduction of the labour force and contain class conflict. Social provision in housing, education, transportation etc. is deemed necessary to ensure the conditions for capital accumulation (Castells 1977:276/323; 1978:15/36). The focus upon the role of planning and regeneration in shaping the built environment through the provision of housing, transportation, social services has kept political economists close to the spatial specificity of urbanism (Soja 2000:98).

These studies demonstrated how the everyday functioning of urban planning and decision-making is shaped by the power of capital, directly through the dominant institutions of capitalist society and indirectly through the systemic operation of capitalist economic processes. Capitalist constraints block the emergence and functioning of the urban public realm. The urban environment cannot emerge as a genuine public realm for the reason that its operation, development and movement are not autonomous but are set in an alienated context of political and economic power shaped by the symbiotic relation of capital and the state. The conclusion of David Harvey’s urban studies is that the absence of public control over the private forces of the ‘free’ market means that even the most liberal and progressive programmes for urban planning and regeneration become mere means for serving the interests of capital. Capital is the architect of spatial organisation in that the functional imperatives of capital shape land use and structures urban activity. The role of the state is thus tied to specific objectives. The state intervenes in the processes of urban development to ensure the rational allocation of resources, to ensure the reproduction of the labour force through social provision, to ensure social order within existing relations by balancing the interests of capital and labour. The state thus intervenes to guarantee the conditions facilitating the accumulation of capital. This activity proceeds within and reinforces existing capitalist social and property relations.

From this perspective, planning is an historically specific and socially necessary response to the self-disorganising tendencies of privatised capitalist social and property relations manifested within urban space (Dear and Scott 1981:13). More specifically, the state seeks to ensure the collective provision of the essential urban infrastructure and services and to reduce externalities that cause losses in other parts of the system (Dear and Scott 1981:11), resolving one problem only to create further problems, all the time raising the radical ideal of a planned economy (Dear and Scott 1981:14/5). Moreover, urban planning can only modify some parameters governing land use and development. It cannot change those parameters. Planning cannot remove the contradiction between collective action and private accumulation (Scott and Roweis 1977:107).

There is a tension between theory and practice in planning, the disorder and unreason of the latter denying the order and reason of the former. Interestingly, theorists attempt to resolve this tension by arguing that planning theory is less concerned to explain an existing urban world than to show that world as it ought to be. This view may be criticised for its absence of context, failing to specify the conditions necessary for the realisation of the ideal. It does, however, raise an ideal that is capable of challenging the existing world, functioning as the radical ought-to-be of ‘rational’ philosophy, expressing the deepest desire of philosophy as first revealed in Plato’s Republic – the perfect society. This makes it possible to recover the city of philosophy against the city of capital, criticising the real as the denial of the ideal. There is, however, a danger that this move by urban theorists has the ideological function of rationalising the irrational world, preserving existing power relations. Like Hegel’s world spirit, theory materializes itself in reality by introducing into the world a set of abstract, independent and transcendent norms (Scott and Roweis 1977:116). Indeed, the implications of the Marxist critique would appear to deny that planning theory can possess any normative or prescriptive content:





The contention of this thesis is that there are other, defensible, ways of formulating the normative dimension of urban theory and practice. What distinguishes Marx’s praxis philosophy is the creative synthesis of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be’, each informing the other. Praxis philosophy offers the means for critically recovering the city of philosophy on a modern material terrain, identifying the ‘rational’ with the creative realisation of the human ontology rather than with the provision of the conditions for capital accumulation. Ultimately, this normative view leads to the social concept of the city beyond capital’s economic determinism, something that is addressed in Part III.

A marxist politics has proved well-nigh impossible to initiate and sustain. Indeed, Marxist politics leaves little room for urban policy short of the abolition of the state and capital (Fainstein and Fainstein 1979:381/403). Even so, there is nothing to prevent the insights generated by the Marxist critique from being incorporated into a reformist agenda that is able to identify short range feasible goals, working with community groups and urban social movements to initiate and actualise realisable changes. Such reformist activity, a reformism from below, is able to contest the use and control of urban space with capital, even when such activity must take account of the priorities of capital. Such a process succeeds by drawing increasing numbers into reality-shaping, constitutive praxis. Revolution, in this sense, is the culmination of a process of smaller changes rather than being a one-off event.


59 THE PROCESS OF CAPITALIST URBANISATION
David Harvey invokes the ontology of internal relations in attempting to obtain the theoretical grasp of the dynamics of urbanism. Capitalism is organised around an inner logic of transformation that is sufficient to ‘shape the parts so that each part functions to preserve the existence and general structure of the whole’ (Harvey 1973:288/96).

The problem with this conception lies in its apparent privileging of structure over agency and in its apparent economistic bias, excluding creative human action and non-economic agencies (Duncan and Ley 1982:38/40). Hence the criticism that Marxist urban geographers ‘have been preoccupied with theoretical structuralisms of such forbidding abstraction that they leave scant space for human agency’ (Gregory 1982:256). Nevertheless, although Gregory criticises Marxist structuralism, his own conception of the ‘boundedness of human activity’ actually invokes Marx’s view of the interactive relationship between structure and agency:





An analysis of deep structures is not necessarily prejudiced against human agency and, indeed, is essential if the conditions for asserting creative, reality shaping human agency are to be established. The critique of the capitalist process of urbanisation is thus an attempt to recover human subjectivity within the urban environment against the external determinism of the capital system.

The mode of production characterises societies or social formations according to forces of production and the relationship of classes to the means of production, how surplus value is produced and extracted, how surplus value is distributed according to the class structure (Edel 1981:21/2). The urban political economy of David Harvey reveals the extent to which the city is connected to the processes of capital. The achievement of Harvey’s approach has been to underline the centrality of the process of the private accumulation of capital to the process of urbanisation. He focuses upon the way that circuits of capital within the processes of capitalist development have shaped urban spatial patterns and urban consciousness and have stimulated the bureaucratisation of the state and urban governance. Harvey’s analysis reveals the extent to which the private structural power and geographical mobility of capital disciplines the state within certain parameters and constrains the public agenda within such narrow limits that political competition is reduced to attempts to appeal to business and attract investment, offering policies which serve business interests and grant substantial benefits to capital:

The successful urban region is one that evolves the right mix of life styles and cultural, social and political forms to fit with the dynamics of capital accumulation .. Urban regimes racked by class struggle or ruled by class alliances that take paths antagonistic to accumulation .. at some point have to face the realities of competition for jobs, trade, money, investment, services and so forth.

Samir Amin has conceived this process in terms of an accumulation model that is composed of the most dynamic industries, forms of competition, business enterprises, patterns of geographical expansion and spatial structures in the division of labour (Amin 1975:7/44). Urbanisation and the structure and functioning of the city alters with each change in the process of accumulation but also expresses the laws of motion underlying each stage within capitalism.





The central dynamic of the capital system is capital accumulation, the ‘increase in the generalised wealth controlled by capital’ (Edel 1981:29). ‘Free’ competition expresses the coercive laws that compel capitalists to accumulate: ‘one accumulates or one gets accumulated’ (Heilbroner 1980:153). The owners and managers of capitalist enterprises have to pay dividends, maximise returns on investments, keep workers’ satisfied in their demands for an increased share of the surplus value, meet their legal obligations (taxes, rates) and sustain a programme of reinvestment (R&D, reequipment, retraining). On account of these pressures and commitments, accumulation is a functional requirement of the capital system. Capital has to reproduce itself and expand its value if stagnation and depreciation of values is to be avoided. There is no guarantee ‘that growth will be either continuous or tranquil under capitalism’ (Edel 1981:32). Competition generates growth but it also involves bankruptcy, deskilling and unemployment, increased social polarity and dislocation, urban degeneration.

‘Since the process of capital accumulation unfolds in a spatially structured environment, urbanism may be viewed provisionally as the particular geographical form and spatial patterning of relationships taken by the process of capital accumulation’ (Child 1983:231). The process of capital accumulation requires the fixed investment of part of the surplus product in creating new means of production; the production and distribution of consumption items so as to sustain and reproduce the labour force; the creation of an effective demand for the surplus product produced and therefore additional capital formation through product innovation, market penetration and economic expansion (Child 1983:231/2).

The city is the control centre at the heart of these operations. The capitalist city functions as a spatial generative centre through which larger quantities of surplus value are extracted. Sustained economic expansion requires ‘both a willingness and an ability for those in the urban center to put surplus value back into circulation in such a way that the city functions as a growth pole for the surrounding economy’ (Harvey 1973:249). Such notions suggest an urban system. The nature of the structures and functions of the city cannot be separated from the surrounding political economy within which the city is located. The urban system may therefore be defined as the ‘structure of relations between the process of production and the process of exchange and a process of management of these relations’ (Castells quoted in Brette and d’Arcy 1974:5/23).

The city can never fulfil the optimum conditions for accumulation. Regeneration and restructuring will remain an imperfect process given time lags, the inertia of institutions, shortages of investment, class conflict and popular urban resistance to change. The state intervenes in urban regeneration processes so as to overcome spatial inefficiencies, congestion costs and structural rigidities. Lojkine identifies the contradictory tendencies which prevent the ‘rational, socialised planning of urban development’. In the first place, urban expenditure undertaken by the state is required but a point is reached at which the private economy no longer generates sufficient resources to support such a programme. In the second place, the fact that firms are attracted to the best equipped cities in seeking to reduce indirect costs of production has the effect of increasing the costs of congestion and pollution within cities. In the third place, the private ownership of land and private appropriation of urban ground rent blocks the state’s goal of monopolistic control and generates segregation within cities (Lojkine 1976:128).

The city of reason promised by philosophy becomes the city of capital, a built environment that is given over to the process of private accumulation. The ‘more property capital extends its control over urban space, the more it is able to create and dictate the conditions for its own profitability’ (Lamarche 1976:102). This entails concentrating the means of production and developing the urban infrastructure so as to facilitate the spatial transfer of surplus value (Lojkine 1976:127). 

Capital’s attempt to control urban space to secure its systemic imperatives is never uncontested. Harvey conceives the urban environment in terms of the conflict over ‘production, management and use of the urban built environment’ (Harvey 1976:265). For Harvey, the term ‘built environment’ comprises physical infrastructure of roads, railroads, sewerage networks, parks and housing, which are collectively owned or consumed or which, as with private housing, have their character and location regulated by state policy. The politicisation of these entities follows the conflict that arises out of their collective ownership and control or as a result of the ‘externality effects’ of private decisions concerning their use. The crucial question concerns whether these facilities should be produced by the state or by the market, how they should be managed, used and by which groups and for what purpose. Capitalist development is subject to the tension between having to preserve the exchange values of an existing urban built environment and having to devalue the value of this investment so as to take advantage of emerging opportunities for accumulation.





Harvey’s analysis establishes a connection between urban restructuring and economic restructuring. The changing urban structure is thus connected with broader trends in the private economy. The study of urbanisation ‘should be concerned with processes of capital accumulation; the shifting flows of labour power, commodities and capital; the spatial organisation of production and the transformation of time space relations; movement of information; geopolitical conflicts between territorially-based class alliances and so on’ (Harvey 1989:7).

Cities in the legal sense have been stripped of the power and geopolitical influence that they had possessed in pre- and early modern times. Further, urban economies have now assumed megalopolis proportions, taking the city beyond the comprehension and control of city dwellers, spreading the urban process beyond the boundaries crucial to identity. The task is to integrate a comprehension of the urban process into a broad conception of the expansionary, universalising and, indeed, contradictory dynamics of capitalism.

Harvey critically examines the role of urban processes in the geohistory of capitalist development, proceeding to scrutinize the ways in which the surpluses of capital and labour power are produced and used in producing the physical and social infrastructures of urban life. This perspective shows how the spatial organisation of the city is produced through the interaction of capital flows into land development and the need to reproduce labour power and class relations (Harvey 1989:12). Harvey focuses particularly upon the circulation of capital (and value) through the production and use of the built environment. The geographical landscape of capitalism expresses the flows of capital. These flows can switch directions, sectorally and geographically, and can be involved in the formation and resolution of crisis (Harvey 1989:12). The point applies to urban issues of regeneration, deindustrialisation and suburbanisation. Harvey examines the different moments of money, commodities, labour power and its reproduction, and production within the circulation of capital. It is apparent that since each moment possesses a different capacity for geographical mobility, the transitions between one moment and another entail some kind of spatial movement (Harvey 1989:18).

In differentiating away from commodity and labour markets, financial markets acquire a degree of autonomy from production. Money, finance and credit form a central system at the heart of capital, regulating and controlling the circulation of capital as a whole (Harvey 1982:chs8 9). As a result, urban centres may become centres of decision-making, coordination, command and control centres at the heart of a hierarchically organised geographical structure (Harvey 1989:22).

In sum, the different moments and transactions within the circulation of capital expresses a geographical grounding of that process through the patterning of labour and commodity markets, of the spatial division of production and consumption and of hierarchically organised structures of financial coordination. The flows of capital require tight temporal and spatial coordination in conditions of increasing specialisation and fragmentation.

This whole process requires a ‘rational landscape’ (Harvey 1989:22/3). Harvey thus establishes the connection between city formation and the production, appropriation and concentration of an economic surplus (Harvey 1989:216/26). A landscape qualifies as ‘rational’ in establishing the conditions which facilitate the accumulation of capital. Such a notion underlines the process of transformation in which reason loses its connection with the philosophical-ontological concern with the appropriate regimen for human self-realisation and instead expresses an economic concern with material ‘things’. The accumulation of capital and the production of urbanisation proceed in close association. ‘Building a capacity for increased efficiency of coordination in space and time is one of the hallmarks of capitalist urbanisation’ (Harvey 1989:22/3). 

‘The reproduction of both capital and labour power requires a wide range of physical and social infrastructures. These infrastructures may be embedded in the land as a built environment of roads, bridges, sewers, houses, schools, factories, shopping centres, medical facilities, etc. They cohere as a spatially specific resource complex of humanly scaled assets to support production (fixed capital) and consumption (the consumption fund). These infrastructures absorb large quantities of long term and geographically immobile capital investment, requiring further capital investment over time to meet maintenance needs’ (Harvey 1989:145).

Harvey therefore theorises the ‘rational’ infrastructure required for capital accumulation. He also exposes the tensions within this infrastructure in relation to the dynamics of accumulation. With respect to the built environment, the assets embody or support a dominant technological mix, strengthening the notion of the structured coherence of production and consumption. Further, privileged access to any particular bundle of assets is a potential source of excess profit. Capitalists have a vested interest in the creation and location of such investments and in obtaining an advantageous location in relation to these investments. Moreover, the capital invested in the built environment is subject to devaluation. The preservation of the value of assets is a crucial objective for those who hold debt on them (financial institutions, governments, private individuals). In fine, there are powerful vested interests seeking to maintain and even to institutionalise the structured coherence of the urban-regional economy (Harvey 1989:145/6).

The dynamics and contradictions of the capital system have profound implications for the urban process. These implications need to be related to the way that capital flows throughout the built environment as an infrastructure for accumulation.





The critical task, then, is to demonstrate how capital flows into the creation of the built environment and creates a ‘rational’ infrastructure for accumulation, identifying the contradictory dynamics of this process. The implications for the urban environment become clear through the analysis of the principal forms that these contradictory dynamics take.

Capitalist crisis is the manifestation of underlying contradictions within the process of accumulation. Marx suggests in Capital that the capitalist mode of production contains the potential to achieve ‘balanced growth’ but that this potential is denied as a result of the prevailing social relations of production. The process of exchange under capitalist relations presupposes individual action and behaviour whereas the law of value is socially expressed. The result is a situation in which individual capitalists, acting in their own immediate self-interest, create an aggregate outcome which conflicts with the collective interests of capital. Harvey illustrates this point by arguing that the capitalist class has a tendency to generate states of overaccumulation within the primary circuit of capital with the result that either the accumulation process breaks down or new investment opportunities are discovered as capital flows through various channels into secondary and tertiary circuits.

With respect to fixed capital and the consumption fund, crisis tendencies are expressed in terms of a crisis in the valuation of assets. Overproduction results in the devaluation of fixed capital and consumption fund items, something that has an impact upon the urban built environment (Harvey 1978). Fixed capital increases the productivity of labour and hence facilitates the accumulation of capital. At the same time, fixed capital functions as a use value and hence requires that exchange values be converted into physical assets. The exchange value contained in this physical use value can be recovered only by fully employing the use value throughout its lifetime. Fixed capital as use value is not easily altered and so evinces a tendency to freeze productivity at a particular level. With the emergence of new fixed capital, increasing productivity, there is a devaluation of the exchange value locked up in the old fixed capital. Opposition to this devaluation has the result of obstructing increased productivity and, therefore, blocks the accumulation process. Nevertheless, the pursuit of new forms of fixed capital determined by the imperative of relative surplus value accelerates the devaluation of the old fixed capital.

The result is a contradiction. Spatial structures are created to overcome spatial barriers but, in time, become new spatial barriers. This constrains the accumulation process within an already existing and increasingly obsolete physical environment. This constraint can only be overcome through the substantial devaluation of the exchange value contained in the physical assets. The consequence of the contradictory dynamics driving this process is to subject urban space to constant disturbance.

60 THE CITY OF LIFE
Competition between individual urban governments for private investment has resulted in the segregation of local government functions into quasi-private agencies that seek to attract investment and the organisation of channels of political representation so that only certain interests favourable to capital may be expressed. However, advanced capitalism has also witnessed the emergence of urban social movements willing and able to engage in political struggles within the urban sphere. These have functioned as democratic forces capable of reconstituting the public realm from below as against the systemic constraints that capital imposes upon the formal institutions of government. To avoid the pitfalls of attempts to engineer the public from above – something which leads in the direction of the centralisation of power in the state – an approach which values the attempts of urban actors to assert the use value of the city and challenge and overthrow the tyranny of exchange value exercised over the city is required.

Harvey bases his conceptual approach to the urban process upon the twin themes of capital accumulation and class struggle. These themes are integral to each other. For Harvey, capital investment in the urban form can resolve crises in capitalism but only in a temporary sense. In time, this investment too becomes a problem which is only resolved by switching investment to other sites. Though this would commit Harvey to a view of the cyclical growth and decline of cities, he introduces the element of social struggle. The dynamic of accumulation provokes continuous revolution in the processes of production. This innovation in production also requires innovation in consumption and in social and physical infrastructures, spatial forms and social processes of reproduction. The ferment of urban politics, comprising social movements, forms part of this innovation. Urbanisation is a process which has no necessary fixed spatial boundaries, though always being articulated within and across a particular space. ‘To the degree that the processes are restlessly in motion, so the urban space is itself perpetually in flux’ (Harvey 1989:127). Groups within the community can mobilise against the withdrawal of capital investment, thus acting to preserve an urban infrastructure that no longer functions efficiently for capital accumulation. The rise and fall of cities is not just a matter of capital investment but also of political struggle.

The plight of cities subject to processes of urban degeneration expresses the contradictions immanent in the larger political and economic order of the capitalist mode of production. The production and reproduction of political, juridical, cultural and other institutional forms regulating society in the interests of accumulation follows. And this involves capitalism in a greater range of entanglements, extending contradiction and conflict beyond the economic sphere into political, social and moral spheres.

There are, then, limits to the capacity of capital to reproduce itself and these limits may become more intransigent with the increasing subjectivity of labour. The accumulation process itself undermines its own bases, generating conflict and crises which spread throughout the whole institutional fabric (Habermas 1976; Edel 1981:32).

Foglesong identifies the central contradiction of capitalist urbanisation as the ‘contradiction between the social character of land and its private ownership and control’. State intervention and urban planning expresses the social character of land. Land is not simply a commodity but is a collective good, a social resource rather than being merely a private right. Capital possesses an objective interest in socialising the control of land so as to overcome the externalities that arise from treating land as a commodity and to build the housing and other amenities required for the reproduction of labour power, to ensure the building of physical infrastructure (bridges, harbours, roads, transit systems) used by capital as a means of production, and to ensure the spatial coordination of infrastructural amenities to facilitate efficient circulation. The problem is that the institution of private property obstructs attempts to socialise the control of land for the purpose of satisfying collective needs. Hence the paradox that whilst the reproduction of the capitalist system requires state intervention and urban planning, capitalist relations constrain this requirement. State intervention and urban planning may be required to produce the conditions to facilitate accumulation but issue in a further set of problems, particularly in the sense of creating demands and institutional forms that threaten private ownership and control. In conditions of formal democracy there is a danger that the mass electorate of non-owners will assert their right of control over the minority of property owners.

To the ‘property contradiction’, then, Foglesong adds the ‘“capitalist democracy” contradiction’. Both serve to constrain planning under capitalism (Dear and Scott 1981:3/18). The property contradiction is internal to capitalism, arising out of capitalist relations of production. The capitalist democracy contradiction is external to capitalism in arising out of the conflict between formally democratic institutions in the political realm and the private ownership/control in the economic realm.

The capitalist democracy contradiction arises as crises originating in the economic realm come to be subject to political controversy, compelling the state to intervene in order to meet social needs and correct social imbalances – as registered in popular vote – arising from the property contradiction. And once state intervention is acknowledged, and receives democratic legitimacy, there arise further issues concerning how much further intervention could go. Resolving the capitalist democracy contradiction must necessarily entail a challenge to the institution of private property.

Foglesong poses the question ‘in what ways has the development of urban planning served to suppress or hold in balance the capitalist democracy contradiction in a manner conducive to the reproduction of capitalism’ (Foglesong in Campbell and Fainstein 1996:173/4). The minority class of capitalists is involved in attempts to politically constrain the claims of the majority class of noncapitalists, a clash that continually exposes the hollow character of the institutions of formal democracy. In the economic sphere, this decision-making process must facilitate the process of capital circulation and accumulation, the reproduction of labour power, the creation of the built environment, and the coordination in the usage of physical amenities – the very things that the private market system is incapable of doing. But with political intervention comes the demand from the electorate that the popular will, concerned with more social and welfare issues not necessarily favourable to capital accumulation, be translated into public policy. The capitalist democracy contradiction captures these problems. 

These observations concerning the contradictions of capitalism constraining urban space beg the question of what form an unconstrained urban space would take. This raises the ideal of a community of everyday life as an alternative to the capital infrastructure. A critical analysis of the built and urban infrastructure is useful in developing an expansive conception of urban life. Urban space comprises more than commodity and labour markets, labour processes and productive forces and more than production and consumption. Urban space is more than a ‘rational landscape’ for capital. The broader conception challenges the reduction of the city to economics with reference to the architectonic conception of politikos bios contained in classical politics. From this perspective, urban life is constituted as a living community – a community of life – endowed with certain physical and social resources generated in a complex process of ‘rational’ development and class struggle. The true wealth of the community is to be evaluated as a human and anthropological attainment. The problem, of course, is that wealth is exclusively measured in monetary terms under capitalism.

Urban life is perceived as a community that combines everyday processes of living and producing within a context of seemingly grounded social and physical infrastructures forming part of the landscape of capitalism. This may imply a class bound mode of production (Harvey 1989:148). But it implies something more, that ‘community’ can be reconstituted as a living entity embracing human self-realisation needs and potentially subverting the capitalist reduction of urban space to economics. Harvey sets the question ‘to which degree is the process set in motion through human agency then dominated by its own product? Put another way, do produced communities act as a barrier to class-bound accumulation? Important political implications follow’ (Harvey 1989:148). The question of how to constitute urban order as a genuine public realm is one of human relationships, how they escape human control and obtain independent life over against individuals, how they may be subordinated to the conscious control of associated individuals.

Harvey developed his discourse of social justice, implying universalist principles, in terms of the dynamic interrelation between spatial form and social process. This concentrates upon the redistributive effects of urbanisation. Developing this discourse so as to identify the material conditions for its realisation, Harvey took morality into the field of political economy.

Adapting insights drawn from Kant and Rawls, Harvey envisaged the concept of ‘territorial redistributive justice’ being founded upon a set of universalisable goals based upon need, contribution to the common good and merit conceived in terms of maximising the prospects of the ‘least advantaged territory’ and its poorest residents. But Harvey developed the universal principles of social justice as far as they could go within the constraints of the capitalist city. In the process, he discovered the limitations of the liberal formulation of justice. To realise a just distribution of income and resources justly arrived at would require the restructuring of power, overcoming the constraints that the contradictions of capital impose upon urban space.

Harvey traces the history of urban development in order to show how the capitalist labour process generates inequalities, how these inequalities are spatially expressed and then how spatial structures reinforce inequality and exploitation in their turn.





The crucial question in the creation of a just urban life is precisely how to achieve a mutually beneficial social and spatial structure. This is the end that this book has sought by embedding the universal ethic connecting the freedom of each and of all in ‘rational’ philosophy in an urban public sphere.

Harvey avoids an economistic interpretation of Marxism by assigning cultural and political forces a creative role. This entails more than valuing superstructural forces as having an effect upon the urban economic base but envisages a creative role for culture and community, race and ethnicity, struggles over issues arising around collective consumption, social reproduction and the built environment. Introducing urban actors into the debate serves to check the conservative reading of structuralism that makes human agency secondary and subordinate to objective structures and relations. This urban social politics possesses a creative role in generating the political subjectivity required to replace the class dynamics of an exploitative urbanism with a more cooperative urbanism. What Lefebvre (1974) referred to as ‘the right to the city’ requires the assertion of the rule of urban residents over the rule of capital. This is to assert the public over the private sphere.

The structuralist argument is therefore taken beyond economic determinism by incorporating a political indeterminacy which recovers a creative role for urban actors. Crises with transformative potential can be exploited by urban actors so as to pressure the state into acting in ways contrary to capital, imposing democratic imperatives against systemic imperatives. This brings the ‘capitalist democracy contradiction’ to the level of public controversy, something which demands resolution. The logical development of Harvey’s views leads to an evaluation of attempts by urban dwellers to reclaim urban life from the rule of capital. This means identifying alternatives to capital within the examples of meaningful community organisation and action that contain the potential to challenge large-scale regeneration schemes. Such an approach supports activities undertaken by residents for residents, thus extending the realm of the public sphere within the community.





The purpose of this chapter is to situate cities, urban life and their regeneration within global urban space. This chapter focuses upon the reciprocity between cities and globalised economic relations. The emphasis will be upon the impact that processes of globalisation have had upon the form, the economy and the socio-geography of cities. The city is no longer an autonomous unit of enquiry but is the site of economic processes and social forces which are now global in scale and scope. Cities are now interconnected by global economic links of trade, production and capital investment. Economic changes taking place in the urban environment, particularly the endless flows of capital seeking profitable outlets, are part of a globalised economic environment.

In broad terms, globalisation has been grasped as ‘the compression of the world and the intensification in the consciousness of the world as a whole’, as process deepening and widening ‘worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’ (Robertson 1992:8; Giddens 1990:84). The role of urban government and the character of urban politics are changing within an increasingly globalised economic order.


Of particular concern will be the extent to which the globalisation of trade, production and investment has sustained the emergence of a neo-liberalism and a post-fordism under the agency of the transnational corporations (TNC’s). The implications of this development with respect to the viability of the city will be examined, paying particular attention to the private control of the economic base of the city. The integration of the cities into the globalised economy will be shown to have generated new patterns of inequality, separating social groups within cities. With the institutionalisation of this division becoming an integral part of urban design, there is every indication that rationalisation will not deliver on its centuries old promise of human happiness and freedom, but will issue in the carceral city. Saskia Sassen has emphasised the ‘new inequalities within cities’, citing evidence which points to ‘sharp increases in socio-economic and spatial inequalities within major cities in the developed world’ (Sassen 1994).








The Globalisation Of Economic Relations

The question of city life and urban space needs to focus upon the globalisation of economic relations, of the processes of trade, production, employment and investment. For globalisation places a question mark against the notion of an urban sphere as a distinctive sphere possessing a clear identity. This, in turn, has put a question mark against the rationale of urban strategy as it becomes less and less possible to isolate an urban space from external pressures. Whilst a strong urban space requires an active, interventionist policy apparatus, globalisation has unleashed forces extraneous to the urban environment. And these forces are beyond the scope of urban control. Urban policy thus needs to establish linkages between urban spaces.

Globalisation has become the buzzword of late capitalism. Some have even claimed that globalisation studies are ‘the successor to debates on modernity and postmodernity in the understanding of sociocultural change and as the central thematic for social theory’ (Featherstone, Lash and Robertson eds 1995:1). The importance of globalisation can be measured in the growing array of effects visible in the cities of the world: processes of restructuring and urban-regional developments, an international division of labour, the formation of global regions, the transnationalisation of identity and citizenship and, most interestingly, the reassertion of the power of the local. Further global connections are evident with respect to the media, electronic landscapes, post- or new modernities, communications, the end of the nation state and the rise of the borderless world, the end of national/bureaucratic state socialism and the rise of a postmodern socialism, the end of the public and the rise of a private collectivism, the end of geographical space and the rise of transnational imagery.

Some observers deny that globalisation is a novel phenomenon (Chase-Dunn 1985:273). In this view, global trends have been unfolding for five centuries, with the globalisation of capital being the main agency. Contemporary development is however distinguished from this evolution by the acceleration of the trend. The key word here is intensification. The distinguishing feature of the contemporary era is not globalisation as such but intensification in the scale and scope of globalised social, economic, political and cultural relations (Soja 2000:191). Only now is the capitalist economy becoming truly global.





The global economy concentrates wealth, technology and power in the North, an area that broadly corresponds to the countries of the O.E.C.D.

‘Globalisation’ in this respect is, at best, a shorthand term for the speed with which capital can now move between locations and sectors of the economy. At worst, globalisation is a slippery euphemism for capitalism that allows the advocates of virulently pro-market economics to pretend that capitalism no longer exists and class no longer matters. There is clear evidence that the globalisation of production, investment, employment and trade flows universalises capitalist economic relations and is creating a new type of social insecurity. The global shifts of capital are facilitated by the new information and communication technologies in the informational economy (Castells 1996) and are create unemployment and insecurity of employment. Capital is free to moves rapidly from one economic sector to another, and one area to another, chasing profits across national boundaries, forcing governments into a ‘competitive devaluation’ with each other. In an attempt to attract and retain investment, developed economies compete with each other to reduce taxation levels on capital, ease social and environmental standards and lower employment costs. The result is that developed economies come to diminish the welfare state provision precisely at the time when it needs to be increased with unemployment and insecurity rising as a result of globalisation (Jordan 1996).

Developments in the global economy are directly linked to the processes of the city and of urban life. The globalisation of economic relations has produced a major paradigm shift in urban studies, as evidenced by the expanding literature containing the word ‘global’ in the title (Friedmann 1986; Cooke 1986; Dickens 1986; Henderson and Castells 1987; Hill and Feagin 1987; Perry 1987; Smith and Feagin 1987; Thrift 1987). However, these global perspectives on the processes of urbanisation and the city had been anticipated in the urban political economy of the 1970’s (Castells 1977; Harvey 1973), most particularly in the work of Wallerstein (1974) and Walton (1976). An important factor in arguing for the global reorientation of urban perspectives was the development of the world system paradigm (Wallerstein 1974 1979 1984). The major paradigm shift came in the 1980’s.

There are two main questions that this chapter seeks to answer. The first seeks to identify the main changes that have taken place within the objective structures and relations of socio-economic reality to cause this global reorientation of urban studies. The second is to show why globalisation has intensified since the 1980’s. The chapter seeks to show why the theoretical and conceptual understanding of urban development must address issues of globalisation and must be grounded in processes of globalisation.

Thrift has identified three ‘principal group of actors on the world stage’ – the multinational companies, the banks and the state governments (Thrift 1986). The activities of these three actors, taken together, have created the infrastructure for the emergence of the global city.

To take the TNC’s first. In the 1980’s, the TNC’s accounted for some 70/80% of world trade outside of the communist bloc (Feagan and Smith 1987:3). The expansion and internationalisation of capitalist relations of production has continued as multinationals have extended their control over the raw materials of the world, penetrated the markets of the world, shifted production to other markets and exploited cheap labour in the production of goods for re-export to the home country of the multinational. With major innovations in telecommunications, data processing and managerial and organisational techniques, the multinational corporation has been transformed, with subsidiary branches around the world. This leads to globally coordinated systems of production that promote global brand names.

These developments connect with the activities of the second principal agency, the banks. With the internationalisation of production has come the internationalisation of finance, comprising the internationalisation of domestic currency and the substantial growth of the Eurodollar market. Major innovations in communications have facilitated the internationalisation of banking. Banking has become ‘truly global’ with capital markets, 24 hour trading in securities, stock exchanges, futures markets and commodity markets expanding all over the world.

The third main agency in the globalisation of production and finance has been the state. The state is increasingly dependent upon resources generated not merely in the private economy – the central thesis of Marxist political economy – but in the international economy given the extent to which global forces increasingly penetrate the domestic market. The state has to create the conditions to attract foreign direct investment and to encourage foreign companies to relocate. The globalisation of the state is further encouraged by the entanglement of the state in an institutional matrix of international agencies concerned with running the global economy such as the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD and G7.

The internationalisation of production and of finance has enlarged the internationalisation of administration and control through advanced producer services, activities enabling user firms to undertake administrative, developmental and financial functions, whether R&D, strategic planning, banking, insurance, real estate, financial and legal services, consultation, advertising etc. This is the development that has so radically transformed the employment structure within contemporary economies, entailing the expansion of activities that have been crucial to the formation of global cities (Thrift 1986:60).

The export as well as the growth of these producer services fosters the growth of global cities (Sassen-Koob 1984). With the decline of comparative advantage in the production of goods, western industrial countries have sought out alternative sources of profit. This has induced these economies to exploit the possibilities generated by service industries, particularly those like banking, insurance, accounting and design in which technological superiority in information and data processing gives the western economies a comparative advantage. It is this comparative advantage that has prompted business and government in the West to promote liberalisation in the international market for services. And it is this that has ensured that information is concentrated in the global cities at the core. Trade wars in post-industrial take place over information.

The new transnational economy is organised around the globalisation of capital and of labour. The globalisation of capital is measured in terms of increasing foreign debt, foreign direct investment, the increased role of the import and export trade, and the intensification of flows of money, employment, and services across national borders (Soja 2000:194).

The most distinctive feature of contemporary globalisation is the expansion, diffusion and networking of industrial capital and industrial urbanism (Soja 2000:195). The principal academic and political focus has been upon the commercial circuit, with globalisation interpreted as the expansion and repatterning of world trade, or upon the financial circuit, with globalisation conceived in terms of a transnational integration driven by new technologies and electronic networking, reshaping the flows of money, credit and investment so that the world is perceived to be increasingly without borders.

Cowling and Sugden expect production and investment to be relocated away from the advanced industrial economies to the unindustrialised and newly industrialising countries (Cowling and Sugden 1987:87). For Nigel Harris, the rise of the NIC’s indicates the emergence of a new international division of labour, entailing the substantial transfer of manufacturing jobs from the First to the Third world (Harris 1987:93ff 124ff 129/30 142ff 187 265f). The global freedom of the TNC’s entails the creation of ‘movable jobs’. Capital obtains access to labour power at prices far lower than those obtaining in the advanced economies (Harris 1991:137). ‘The integration of the system proceeds apace, integration in an essentially private market system .. superseding the powers of local States and therefore the political target of the Left. We can already begin to see the emergence of an appropriate world social structure, with, at its base, a world working class, technically integrated but subjectively parcelled out to different States’ (Harris 1991:122/3).

Globalisation denies the public regulation that is necessary to sustain an effective urban politics. Public authorities have increasing difficulty in identifying ‘their’ economies. As Robert Reich asks: ‘Who is us?’ The expansion of foreign direct investment (FDI) indicates the rapidly changing structure of a truly global economy. International economic interdependence is being furthered all the time by the rapid increase in FDI, a 30% increase being recorded between 1984 and 1989 alone (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations 1991). FDI has become the major force in accelerating international economic integration. ‘It is in this sense that qualitative increases in FDI flows have reached the threshold where they create a qualitatively different set of linkages among advanced economies’ (DeAnne Julius 1990:36 40). Given this economic internationalisation it is difficult to restrict the focus of urban regeneration to urban space.

The globalisation of the economy involves the internationalisation of production, capital and technology flows. The TNC’s are the principal agents of this process. The largest TNC’s are economically greater than most of the countries in which they locate. The top 500 TNC’s account for 80% of the world’s direct investment and ownership of foreign affiliates (Czinkota, Rivoti and Ronkainen 1992:299). The TNC’s are in control of a vast supra-national process of restructuring and relocation, upon which governments and labour movements are dependent and over which they possess little effective control (Coates 1991:38/9). The TNC’s have also created an extensive network of business services, further promoting the globalisation of economic activity. ‘The result is an increasingly interlocking global system of transnational institutions’ (Dicken 1992:87).

Private business rather than public government controls production, investment and employment – the material life processes of urban space – and this inevitably constrains national – and urban - governments to shape public policy so as to serve the private interests of business (Lindblom 1977; Dahl 1985; Miliband 1965 1969; Offe 1975 1984 1985; Poulantzas 1975; Czinkota, Rivoti and Ronkainen 1992:324). The ‘power of allocation’ possessed by capital (Morin 1976:13) is exercised by the TNC’s in such a way as to force government to conform to their interests. This implies the internationalisation of power and authority, with international linkages being used to shape public policy according to private interests.

There is a need to stress the importance of the social relations of production here. For what these developments express is the emergence of a global social structure and a global class structure. This involves a transnational capitalist class committed to accumulation as a global process, creating transnational agencies and institutions so as to regulate the whole process. The networks of economic ownership transcend national borders.

The increasing mobility of capitalist production has enabled the TNC’s to evade and undermine the controls of national governments (Cowling and Sugden 1987:91; Brett 1990:82). The FDI and global operations of the TNC’s enables them to avoid tariffs, duties and other barriers, with trade being conducted between different parts of the same TNC (Murray 1981). Power is private and economic rather than public and political. The agenda is set by transnational business rather than by ‘sovereign’ governments and peoples (Czinkota, Rivoli and Ronkainen 1992:563). Given the global freedom of the TNC’s, the conditions have been created for the unimpeded relocation of production, investment and employment to countries offering lower labour costs, laxer social and environmental standards and a quiescent labour force.

The advanced infrastructure of the industrialised economies is clearly threatened by the existence of such flexible corporate structures that enable capital to move freely throughout the world (Cowling and Sugden 1987:87/8). The integration of national economies within a complex interconnected global economy has made it difficult to conceive what an urban policy should be, how urban space is to be defined and hence how the appropriate institutional framework facilitating interventionist strategies may be created. With the globalisation of production, particular urban space comes to have less relevance to capital than the process of accumulation throughout the global economy as a whole. Urban space is treated as part of a global productive grid. A global market economy implies the loss of effective political and institutional control to private economic forces operating within a global process of accumulation. The emergence of a transnational capitalism is characterised by the operation of systemic tendencies on a global scale, constraining all authorities and all official and semi-public institutions, agencies and networks to act in the collective interest of capital. The public good is identified with this collective interest of capital. This creates particular problems for urban government, whether at national or local levels. For capital, with global priorities with respect to accumulation, does not make any spatial commitment and is unconcerned if disinvestments leaves an urban wasteland. That is only an issue to urban dwellers and their political representatives.

This has implications with regard to the changing conception of urban regeneration in recent times. There has been a switch towards an economic development model that, under the cloak of neo-classical free market economics, reduces public intervention and expenditure and instead concentrates upon attracting capital investment. This strategy focuses upon levering private investment and effectively concedes power and responsibility to private business. The problem with regard to urban policy is that these TNC’s not only possess private priorities but global priorities also, priorities which relate to the process of accumulation as a whole. Capital is therefore beyond institutional control at the sub-international level. The dismantling of the old institutions of social democratic regulation within the nation state has unleashed a liberalisation of economic activity that delivers the responsibility for industrial and urban viability to private forces possessing private priorities. What is required is a reregulation of private forces that is able to connect the local level to the global level. This is to envisage a supra-national policy apparatus that makes a sub-national urban strategy policy feasible.

62 THE GLOBALISATION OF SPACE
Driven by the central dynamic of accumulation, capitalism is becoming the universal mode of production that Marx had envisaged. Capitalism is increasingly based upon ‘universalised competition’, overcoming the opposition of national states so as to create the ‘modern world market .. and the centralisation of capital’. This ‘has made all civilised nations and every individual member of them dependent for the satisfaction of their wants on the whole world, thus destroying the former natural exclusiveness of separate nations’ (Marx 1999:77/8).

The argument here pertains to the ‘unit of account’. It is no longer meaningful to refer to the self-sufficient nation state in an era of global economic interdependence. This applies even more to urban places. Physical boundaries are increasingly inadequate as analytical units given the globalisation of economic relations.

The capitalist class holds power by virtue of its control of the means of production. The capitalist class ‘holds the power of allocation and the power of management of the means of production’ (Morin 1974:13) and uses this power for reasons of private profit. This power of decision and allocation over productive resources has now become international with the globalisation of the forces of production. The private power of capital is now global in its scope. The relocation of production and investment according to labour cost differentials and the relative power of labour allied to improved communications and transportations, the information revolution and more flexible production technology has created a powerful mechanism for deindustrialisation in the industrialised world. The concentration and centralisation of capital within a ‘transnational monopoly capitalism’ evades attempts at government regulation with the result that the stagnationary tendencies threatening the existence of the capital economy are unleashed (Cowling and Sugden 1994:91/2 95 97ff). The greater the wages and power of labour, the more likely that employment will be lost to the unindustrialised or industrialising parts of the world where labour is cheaper and more quiescent. This imposes social and environmental costs upon the urban environment in both the deindustrialising and the industrialising parts of the world (Cowling and Sugden 1987:98).

This process is inefficient in that it is driven not by social and economic considerations but by the systemic imperatives of capital. This power is not exercised according to notions of efficiency-increasing output from existing resources but according to class interests (Cowling and Sugden 1987:98). The social costs of relocation are not borne by the TNC’s and there is nothing to deter them from exploiting their global freedom in such an inefficient way.

In subverting the power of governments and labour movements, in forcing the dismantling of social and economic infrastructures, the TNC’s are actually systematically suppressing the very social and political forces which could overcome stagnationist tendencies. The power of the TNC’s to shift production and investment generates a global tendency to stagnation. The inegalitarian distribution of income, towards profits and away from wages, and the monopolisation of product markets, leads to a deficiency in aggregate demand. With the unemployment of capital and labour, the monopolisation tendency turns into a stagnationist tendency. And the same tendency to stagnation that is present in the advanced economies will be carried into the newly industrialising countries by the TNC’s (Cowling and Sugden 1987:99 101). 

This ‘transnational reorganisation of production’ (Frobel et al 1980:15) is also undemocratic, undermining those institutions which are based upon the public expression of the popular will and creating an institutional order directly controlled by capital, organising the global economy around the principles of the free market and free trade (White 1969:37; Cowling and Sugden 1987:85/6). The policy orientation and power structure of these organisations corresponds to and reinforces disparities in world power relations (Brett 1990:71). The concentration and centralisation of capital directs productive resources and accumulates economic benefits in certain sectors and places rather than others.

And this international coalition forms international linkages and networks, establishing strategic alliances aimed at running a transnational economy in the interests of a transnational capitalist class (Gill and Law 1990:115). A transnational hegemonic bloc forms, including ‘incorporated’ labour (the core of well paid and protected workers), but under the leadership of the TNC’s, international finance and organisations like the IMF, G7 and IBRD (Cox 1987).

The transnational stage of capitalism is thus characterised by the global freedom of the TNC’s, the increasing mobility of capital, the emergence of a transnational capitalist class and the creation of international institutions promoting liberalisation and transnationalisation (Gill and Law 1988:146/7). A global social structure is emerging, one dominated by a transnational capitalist class and developing its own institutional framework. This framework is insulated from the ‘sovereign’ power of the demos, from the political insitutions which have incarnated justice throughout history. International economic relations are coming to develop a multitude of international agencies. The internationalisation of capital is thus leading to ‘the internationalisation of authority’ (Gill and Law 1988:365), ‘a permanent form of integrated cooperation, a de facto international state body’ (Murray 1975:107). But it is a state body which is shaped in the image of private power, not popular power. It is insulated from social and democratic control. The internationalisation of authority thus occurs in a non-public/non-democratic form, the result of a deliberate strategy on the part of the capitalist class (Ruggie 1982:379/415).

The implications of the globalisation of economic relations for the city and for urban society and culture are important. In recent decades, through the globalisation of production and the production of globality, the major metropolitan regions have been experiencing a major transformation of urban space. Urban space has been reshaped by global flows of capital, labour, technological innovation and information, creating new industrial spaces whilst rendering old ones obsolete, changing urban identities and divisions of labour. There has also been a ‘repolarized and refragmented pattern of social and spatial stratification’ (Soja 2000:196).

The importance of western capital cities in this respect is to be attributed to their coordinating function within the global economy. In Spatial Divisions of Labour, Massey (1984) argued that, in restructuring, companies tended to specialise their activities to where labour is cheap and pliable. R&D and administrative functions were located in areas near centres of power, where elite professional and managerial staff were located.

The implications of Massey’s argument is that capital has employed spatial differentiation in the pursuit of profit. Spatial advantage is gained by discriminating between existing labour forces. Geographical mobility gives capital a reach and a power that is beyond political organisation, coercing the nation state to provide conditions favourable to capital. And this connection between hypermobile capital and spatial differentiation shapes the character of the city and of urban space.

The fortunes of cities have been uneven within these global shifts. The financial capitals of the advanced economy have emerged as key command and control centres. These are global or world cities. The best jobs are located here. Global cities are those which depend on multinational financial services. They are linked to the circulation and realisation of wealth. Global cities are typically the site of the headquarters of the large TNC’s. They are the sites of ‘control functions’ (Massey 1988). Global cities are centralised, possessing a distinct urban core which specialises in global financial services. Within global cities there is a core group of elite workers serviced by a mass of poorly paid workers (Kasarda 1988).

Smaller cities have emerged which specialise in advanced manufacturing research and development and high technology services. Some cities have become tourist centres. The old industrial cities are those subject to decline owing to the collapse of old manufacturing industry. These cities are characterised by urban degeneration, poverty, unemployment, a decaying physical infrastructure. Such cities are even having to compete for low order service jobs in back offices, branch plant manufacturing and shopping centres. ‘In this context, because of the speed of these systems and the erosion of the attachment to place, city economics are more turbulent and face very uncertain futures’ (Graham and Marvin 1996).






The political and economic restructuring accompanying the ending of the long boom and Keynesian demand management has witnessed the emergence of the ‘global capitalist city’ (Soja 1983 1986). A common feature in explanations of world city formation is the globalisation of capital, that is, of capitalist relations of production (Sassen-Koob 1984 1986; Thrift 1986). The world system requires ‘nodal points to coordinate and control this global economic activity’ (Sassen-Koob 1984:140).Global cities now dominate the world economy as centres of financial management, international trade, and as corporate headquarters. 

The combination of spatial dispersal and global integration has had the result of creating a new strategic role for major cities. Over and above their historical role as centres for international trade and banking, these cities now function in new ways. The most salient characteristic of the world city is its global control function. This gives the world city its main geopolitical character. World cities concentrate control over vast resources, presiding over the restructuring of the urban social and economic environment proceeding through the finance and service industries (Sassen 1991:3/4).

The key characteristics of the global city can be delineated through a number of related theses:

1)	The form and extent of the city’s integration in the world economy and the functions assumed by the city in the new spatial division of labour has a decisive influence upon the structural changes taking place in the city.
2)	 ‘World cities lie at the junction between the world economy and the territorial national state’ (Friedmann and Wolff 1982). The agencies connecting the global economy and the nation state are the transnational corporations and international finance.
3)	Global capital uses the key cities of the world economy as ‘basing points’ in the spatial organisation of production and markets. Global cities are highly concentrated command points in the organisation of the world economy. The linkages that are produced enable world cities to be arranged in a complex spatial hierarchy.
4)	The control and command functions of the world cities are global in scope and this is articulated in the structure and dynamics of their production sectors and employment.
5)	World cities are the location for the concentration and accumulation of global capital.




7)	the main cities of the advanced countries of the global economy consist of a disproportionate number of the headquarter facilities of the world’s 500 largest transnational corporations. They also contain the offices of international banks. The banks connect the corporate headquarters to the international markets and articulate the global financial system.

The existence of corporate headquarters, global financial institutions and international centres presume the existence of:

8)	the rapid expansion of an international elite commanding high financial rewards. This is composed of a transnational producer service class, recruiting in the fields of law, banking, insurance, business services, accounting, engineering, advertising and operating in the production and export of services in world cities.
9)	‘As centres of global transport transport, communications, the production and transmission of news, information and culture, world cities, perform important ideological and control functions’ (Friedmann 1986).
10)	The growth of global management and financial services functions has issued in the refurbishment of existing office space and the widespread constitution of office space and high class residential accommodation.
11)	Global cities are sites of production, including the production of innovations in the leading economic sector.
12)	Global cities are markets for products and innovations.
13)	As a consequence of the growing economy, redevelopment and the concentration of capital, world cities become major centres for international investment. In 1988, some 70% of downtown Los Angeles was foreign owned (Wald 1988:88).
14)	The decentralisation of routine office jobs has been accompanied by the recentralisation of control and management functions in the world city.
15)	Intensified global competition and falling rates of profit have forced the rationalisation of manufacturing, implying deindustrialisation in heavily unionised blue collar industries. At the same time there has been a selective process of reindustrialisation in high technology, lower wage, assembly line jobs, lacking union organisation and often held by immigrant or ethnic minority labour.
16)	The expansion of the high level service sector fosters growth in some white collar employment but exhibits greater multiplier effects in relation to the growth of low level, low paid service employment, requiring little skill and offering few possibilities for advance. These jobs are increasingly taken up by non-unionised, often immigrant, ethnic minority female labour.
17)	 A great deal of the expansion in industrial employment is associated with informally organised types of manufacturing.

World cities are points of destination for migrants from home and abroad;

18)	The influx of immigration into the major urban centres has been associated with expanding employment opportunities but also with a growth in low living standards.
19)	 The consequence of these trends in employment, combined with the effects of immigration, has been to intensify income, occupational and social polarisation. The formation of world cities exposes the central contradictions and contradictory dynamics of industrial capitalism, particularly class and spatial polarisation.
20)	This polarisation is manifested in terms of an increasing spatial separation of residential space according to occupation, race, ethnicity, income. This has entailed an increase in ghettoisation.
21)	The expansion of a class of high income earners creates the conditions for luxury residential building and for the gentrification of other areas (Williams and Smith 1985).
22)	As a result of the above factors, a major crisis in housing results.
23)	The expansion of low wage/low skill employment combines with a surplus of labour in the city to expand the informal, street economy.
24)	 There is an increasing loss of control over an increasingly mobile capital and this is combined with growing public expenditure to attract and retain capital investment.
25)	 The expansion of certain sectors in the urban economy is accompanied by the decline of other sectors.
26)	 Intensified political conflict follows from the pressures of contradictory forces in the interstices of global capital and the requirements of the local state. Conflict also results from the restructuring of employment, housing, racial and ethnic relations.
27)	 Increasing social and economic polarisation, population mobility and the other factors fuse to generate a breakdown in law and order as expressed in racial conflict, social disorder, crime, street demonstrations. A massive increase in the expenditure on police and an expansion in private security spending follows.
28)	The expansion of world cities imposes social costs on a scale that exceeds the fiscal capacity of the state.

These are the most salient characteristics of the global city that is emerging through the connection of urbanisation processes to global economic forces. These points will be used to structure the argument.

Friedmann and Wolff offer an important insight into the process of world city formation. They are concerned with ‘the spatial articulation of the emerging world system of production and markets through a global network of cities’. In particular, they are concerned with ‘the principal urban regions in this network in which most of the world’s active capital comes to be concentrated, regions which play a vital part in the great capitalist undertaking to organise the world for the efficient extraction of surplus .. the world economy is defined by a linked set of markets and production units, organised and controlled by transnational capital, world cities are the material manifestations of this control, occurring exclusively in core and semi-peripheral regions where they serve as banking and financial centres, administrative headquarters, centers of ideological control and so forth’ (Friedmann and Wolff 1982).

Global cities of this kind are ‘the location of the institutional heights of worldwide resource allocation’, concentrating ‘the production of cultural commodities that knit global capitalism into a web of symbolic hierarchy and interdependence’. Global cities like New York, London and Tokyo are:

the headquarters of the great banks and multinational corporation. From these headquarters radiate a web of electronic communications and air-travel corridors along which capital is deployed and redeployed, and through which the fundamental decisions about the structure of the world economy are sent. In these global cities work, but not necessarily reside, the cadre of officials and their staff who, in their persons and official capacities, embody the concentration and centralisation of capital that now characterizes the global system.

Ross and Trachte 1983:393/4

Such cities are ‘the cotterpins holding the capitalist world economy together’ (Feagin 1985:30). With manufacturing dispersing worldwide, central management and planning and services come increasingly to concentrate in a few global cities. Global cities, clustered around the major banks and corporate headquarters, contain a host of service industries (advertising, accounting, legal services, business services, banking services, engineering and architecture) all of which do business with firms engaged in international transactions. A major development here is the commodification of the expanding sector of the financial services industry. This whole process has been buttressed by the huge expansion in international financial activity and service transactions. The buying and selling of financial instruments has become more than a means but an end in itself. These activities are concentrated in a very few countries and cities, principally London, New York, and Tokyo, operating as a single transnational marketplace (Sassen 1991:326). These cities are at the top of the hierarchy of global financial centres; they are the key locations for the production of new financial services. Most important here is the buying and selling of financial instruments (Reed 1983:227; Sassen 1991:12 87 126 326). For Saskia Sassen:





There is a vast complex of business services – advertising, accounting, legal services, engineering and architectural services – whose whole raison d’etre is to provide services for firms engaged in international transactions. Accountancy is dominated by the ‘big nine’ firms – all sizeable multinationals, six of which with headquarters in the City of London. Similarly, of the 153 major estate agents based in London, 101 are in the City of London; these also have an international character (Sassen 1991:326; Thrift 1987:218-21 223-5)
 
The implication of this analysis is that the world city is becoming increasingly ‘unhooked’ from the nation state, from the city and from the local community. Globalisation and local communities
Globalisation is in the process of hollowing out local communities. With the centralisation of the highly valued, more knowledge-intensive activities, an artificial specialisation is being imposed upon the local economy. Local production is being forced to compete globally, with the result that communities are increasingly subject to external forces over which they have little or no control. Communities have lost control over local place. The corollary of this is that the main activities taking place within communities are primarily focused upon serving interests that lie outside of the community and only secondarily with the community itself. The good of the community is made conditional upon the good of the interests that have occupied local space.
The global economy shifting into higher levels of technology increases the need for capital. The supply of capital that is available for local investment is, at the same time, stagnant or in decline. The viability of local economies has become conditional upon the vicissitudes of the ‘casino economy’, where big winners are few and losers are many. The result is the decline of the local community as a result of the centralisation of financial and public servicing, the domination of a few large stores in retailing, the expansion of research (capital) intensive processing and production and other such processes. Entire regions, their communities and members, have become expendable in relation to these overwhelming global forces. As distinct from the global, the ‘local’ is the space where activities are related directly to the concerns, conditions and needs of the local community. Local business shares the same fate and the same future with the local community and pursues local interests as distinct from serving global priorities. Local business is more likely to be sensitive to local needs than is the branch or subsidiary of a transnational corporation with its ‘global’ city headquarters.

With the globalisation of economic relations and the emergence of the informational economy, it is apparent that the ‘world city’, like the nation state, has its fortunes shaped by processes and forces which are external to it and over which it can exercise little control. As this process develops, the city becomes a sphere for capital, an arena for specialised operations within the global economy. Forced into competition with its major rivals in the global market, any obstacles or barriers that are identified as blocking competition are systematically removed as a matter of government policy. It is in this context that the interests of local populations come into direct conflict with the interests of global capital. The state, structurally dependent upon resources generated in the private process of accumulation, must ultimately sacrifice the interests of local people to the interests of capital, ushering in an age of legitimation crises.

In the capitalist global economy, world city identity issues in some substantial contradictions, particularly in terms of the dichotomy between public and private spheres. Rewards accruing in the upper echelons of the globalised private sector, as determined by international criteria, encourage a flight of skills and resources from the public sphere. The problem is that the interests of global capital necessitate the provision of infrastructural facilities which require a level of public expenditure that exceeds the fiscal capacity of the state. Reproduction functions in labour, health, education, training, administration, law and order are all crucial to the survival of the capital system but require a level of public expenditure that private agents are unwilling to assume. 

Further, in attempting to attract capital investment, states are in competition with each other to offer financial aid and tax concessions. The overall effect of such competition is to subsidize the location of command and control functions in an attempt to attract corporate capital within the region in the hope that this will permit the subsidy to be recovered through the appropriation of surplus value. This offers a route towards the survival of individual urban regions in a context of intensified inter-urban competition. But it cannot ensure the survival of all urban regions since it is premised on a zero-sum game in which some prosper at the expense of others.

The impression is given that the city of the future exists as a city of pure command and control functions, the ‘informational’ city, the ‘post-industrial’ city, the city which has services rather than manufacturing at the heart of its economic identity (Harvey 1989:49/50). There is evidence that such developments open up possibilities for the re-emergence of regional cities capable of mediating the space between global capital and the nation state. With shifts in the social and spatial division of labour and consumption, new regional centres may emerge. Indeed, command and control functions can form the cutting edge of regional restructuring and urban growth.

Some theorists argue that locality is increasingly unimportant as a unit of analysis in the context of a global environment. In Economies of Signs and Space, Lash and Urry examine what they consider to be a general move towards a ‘postindustrial’ capitalism. This is essentially and necessarily a ‘disorganised’ capitalism in that capitalist organisations increasingly have to be speedy and mobile, migrating across various labour and consumer markets so as to ensure survival and prosperity.

From this perspective, the conception of the city as a fixed location becomes less and less important, especially with reference to what Lash and Urry call the ‘new circuits of capital’. The three circuits of capital – money, productive capital, and commodities – circulate with increasing speed and energy through an increasingly globalised set of spaces. In the process, the development of electronic communications networks contains the potential to rework and even transcend modernist conceptions of the relationship of cities to production and consumption.

There is a particular concern with the ways that rapid development subverts ‘traditional’ patterns of behaviour, the ‘routines’ of individuals, the old certainties and beliefs in relation to the world. The main force driving this ‘detraditionalisation’ is the progress towards the global economy. The local imperative in the wider industrial nations like Britain is deindustrialisation, the seemingly irreversible decline of both mass industrial production and those communities dependent upon it. At every level in these older communities, individuals are forced to adapt to the way that rapid changes are irredeemably altering the character of their working and living environment, changing identity, reshaping community and social life, particularly in the local context.

The essential economic activities of certain towns have been transformed so that a substantial proportion of the ‘local’ population are employed in the high technology service industries (Saxeman 1989; Urry 1987 1990). Significantly, a great number of the individuals employed in the industries in these towns are no longer ‘locals’ themselves.

It is not, however, certain how many of these towns and cities, and the people in them, can be described in such a way. The extent to which these developments represent development towards cities as comprising ‘mobile individuals’ or simply the fragmentation of social class in a changing world is not clear: ‘not all local economies are experiencing the same pattern.. In Britain, Rochdale is far from being post-industrial and service dominated’ (Lash and Urry 1994:212).

The identity crisis that urban areas experience as a result of the transnationalisation of economic life, of the internal and external economic processes within urban space, is compounded by the information revolution. Castells concludes The Informational City with an argument concerning ‘the Reconstruction of Social Meaning in the Space of Flows’. Castells refers to the ‘historical emergence of the space of flows, superseding the meaning of the space of places’. By this, Castells means ‘the deployment of the functional logic of powerholding organisations in asymmetrical networks of exchanges which do not depend on the characteristics of any specific locale for the fulfilment of their fundamental goals’. The ‘new industrial space and the new service economy’ organise their operations around ‘the dynamics of information generating units’. Their different functions are connected to disparate spaces assigned to each task to be performed, the overall process being reintegrated through communications systems. ‘The new managerial class colonizes exclusive spatial segments that connect with one another across the city, the country and the world; they isolate themselves from the fragments of local societies, which in consequence become destructured in the process of selective reorganisation of work and residence’. The ‘new state’ fosters the development of ‘an advanced technological infrastructure that scatters its elements across undifferentiated locations and interconnected secretive spaces’ by ‘asserting its sources of power in control and strategic guidance of knowledge’. The result is a ‘new international economy’ which ‘creates a variable geometry of production and consumption, labor and capital, management and information – a geometry that denies the specific productive meaning of any place outside its position in a network whose shape changes relentlessly in response to the messages of unseen signals and unknown codes’ (Castells 1989:348).

The emergence of the space of flows in the place of the space of places ‘expresses the disarticulation of place based societies and cultures from the organisation of power and production that continue to dominate society without submitting to its control’ (Castells 1989:349). Ultimately ‘even democracies become powerless confronted with the ability of capital to be transferred secretly, of markets to be penetrated or neglected, of planning strategies of politico-military power to be decided without the knowledge of nations, and of cultural messages to be marketed, packaged, recorded and beamed in and out of people’s minds’. The real significance of this restructuring through new information technologies is the way that ‘the flows of power generate the power of flows, whose material reality imposes itself as a natural phenomenon that cannot be controlled or predicted, only accepted and managed’. This restructuring is ‘materially expressed in the separation between functional flows and historically determined places as two disjointed spheres of the human experience. People live in places, power rules through flows’ (Castells 1989:349).

Castells draws attention to the existence of an identity crisis in the cultures and peoples of Europe. This identity crisis is the result of the way that the trend towards supranationality is blurring national identities. In response, one sees the emergence of territorially defined identities at the level of the region, city and neighbourhood. If cities will be increasingly oriented towards their local culture, becoming distrustful of higher order cultural identities, ‘the issue then is to know if cities can reach out to the whole world without surrendering to a localistic, quasi-tribal reaction that will create a fundamental divide between local cultures, European institutions, and the global economy’ (Castells 1993).

The important question concerns the extent to which globalisation supersedes locality or, indeed, is actually compatible with a renewed emphasis upon locality. There is a need to reject the either-or dualism that sets the local and the global against each other as antithetical, opening the way for a reconceptualisation that integrates both aspects (Dunford and Kafkalay 1992). It is in this sense that Swyngedouw has offered the concept of ‘glocalisation’ as being ‘neither global nor local’ but a politics of scale (Swyngedouw 1997:57/66).

With the intersection of local and global, neither one of which obtains primacy, the concept of ‘glocalisation’ rejects the idea that globalisation and localisation are distinct processes in opposition to each other. Rethinking globalisation in relation to localisation, it becomes possible to envisage actions of individual citizens in local communities making a difference in face of vast global forces. Individuals can act locally, but such actions can ascend from being local to being global in scope, influencing and being influenced by the hierarchy of space, embracing regional, national and global levels.

Approaching localisation in this way also makes it possible to rethink globalisation not as an overarching process that operates beyond the control and consciousness of individuals but as a process that is capable of being localised at every level in the scale of urban life. From this perspective, ‘every locality in the world today .. is globalised – and also simultaneously urbanised, regionalised and nationalised’ (Soja 2000:199/200). This makes it possible to rethink the whole fabric of relations defining the spatiality of contemporary urban life, particularly the spatial specificity of urbanism (Soja 2000:200). This conceives a politics of urban scale.





The concept of ‘glocalisation’, then, is concerned with reducing human relations to appropriate scale, enabling the conscious control of these relations. The argument bears a close resemblance to Michael Storper’s efforts to develop a critical conception that recovers the human sense of place. Storper is critical of the territorialist overemphasis upon globalisation and the impression that this gives of vast impersonal processes that operate over the heads of individuals. Storper rejects the dualism of the local and the global as a false antithesis.





Storper’s definition of territorialisation is pertinent to the attempts to define appropriate human scale when establishing localisation and globalisation as forming a continuum. Localisation is here defined in an expansive sense as covering all geographical scales, proceeding according to an ascending theme of power, from the bottom up rather than the top down.

Supranational and supra-state forces imply not so much the end of the nation state as the need to develop a supra-national institutional structure if social control is to be reconstituted at a higher level. The interesting question concerns the constitution of this structure or framework and how it may embody a supra-national localism and regionalism.

The main issues in this geopolitical economy of globalisation are decentralisation and recentralisation, the resurgence of regionalism and the reassertion of the local. In between the blocks of geopolitical and economic power, there have been interesting developments containing possibilities that challenge the centralisation of control. Most relevant in relation to the philosophical concept of the ‘rational’ city which grounds this thesis is the argument that the scope and scale of geopolitical and economic power growing beyond the metropolis is creating intermediate spaces between the national and the local state that are being filled with forces and activities that suggest nothing less than the resurrection of the classical city-state (Petrella 1991:59/64). Hence ‘these subnational entities might best be described as (globalised) city region states to emphasise their resurgent regionality and their growing role as motors of the global geopolitical economy’. Soja declares his own preference as being ‘to combine their multiscalar description into the notion of the postmetropolis itself, as an incipient form of the postmetropolitan region – state or polity’ (Soja 2000:208).

These postmetropolitan regions have begun to assume the functions and authority of the nation state, in terms of diplomatic and trade relations, effecting investment partnerships, negotiating foreign loans. Though subnational city regions are not independent of the national state, they are more and more able to bypass the state through establishing global ties, bringing a political dimension to their rising profile as dynamos of the global economy. Regions have added a political dimension to their profile, generating new possibilities within the geopolitical economy of globalisation. The increasing globalisation of economic relations has promoted the resurgence of the region as the critical locus of economic order and as the powerful basis of competitive advantage. There is no great distance from regions as powerful economic actors coming to develop an acute awareness of themselves as socio-political and economic entities, an awareness that becomes all the more intense as regions come to find their fortunes – or otherwise - increasingly connected through both competitive and collaborative relationships across the boundaries of the nation state (Scott 1998). This offers a means of recovering classical conceptions of scale, balance and proportion on the terrain of (post)modernity, offering a mediating point connecting geopolitical economy with a (post)modern political culture, defining citizenship and democracy in relation to questions of the ‘rights to the city’, political identity, representation and participation, postmetropolitan regionalism, social and spatial justice. However, the ideal possibilities for new socio-political modes of urban expression and for social and spatial justice contained in these developments faces the harsh reality of division, inequality and injustice.


63 THE INFORMATION CITY

The contemporary world is undergoing a transformation that is increasingly separating the processes of urbanisation from the fixed location of city and region. Globalisation, the information technology revolution, and the shift from the production of goods to the production of services point to the emergence of a super-urban society that is detached from the conventional city. As the industrial city is superseded by the information city, an old set of problems is layered over by a new set. The society-economy-polity axis confined within national boundaries is undergoing a profound transformation that points to the end of the city. Distinguishing between the city as a spatial entity and the localised social system, these developments render any policy focused specifically upon urban place problematical. Since the various social pathologies of the contemporary city – crime, poverty, unemployment, drug addiction – have their causes outside of the city, they can only find their solutions outside of the city. 

The fundamental technological revolution that is underway is characterised by its all-pervasive effects, embracing production and consumption, management and work, culture and warfare, communication and education, time and space. This amounts to the emergence of a new technological paradigm, one based upon information. The world is witnessing the emergence of a new kind of economy and society and, as a result, a new kind of city. The dynamo, the creative force, is information technology. The informational revolution underpins a range of major structural transformations, furnishing the fundamental infrastructure for the formation of a functionally interrelated global economy. 

Society and the technologies of communication have been involved in a co-evolutionary process of mutual influence for centuries, shaping the view that people live and relate to each other within and between communities. This awareness of the social and cultural implications of the connection between community and communication media raises a question of the utmost socio-ethical importance. If the invention and uses of alphabets, books, printing presses or electronic web pages have shaped the way that human beings live, what can those human beings, the creative agents in this co-evolutionary process, do about the shaping? How can communication be placed on a conscious basis, increasing truth over falsehood, spreading information rather than disinformation, realising the philosophical dream of connecting reason with freedom? With communication increasingly taking electronic or digital form, there is a need to entertain the possibility of subjecting that process to more conscious control.

However, technology has never been and will never be a driver in some determinist way. New technology ‘shapes new opportunities, to create new industries and transform old ones, to present new ways of organising firms or entire societies, to transform the potential for living: but it does not compel these changes, and certainly in some societies and in some places the resulting opportunities may never be seized. There will be choices; and societies can influence those choices by conscious decision’ Hall 1998:943).

There is a need to avoid the overestimation of the political and ethical potentials of new technology, a new technological determinism. There is nothing necessarily democratic about technology that engages the people. Wild speculation concerning electronic democracy and push-button decision-making has given way to a more nuanced awareness of the connection between technology and democracy in the context of social relationships. The ethico-anthropological potentials of the new information technology can be realised only with a more nuanced appreciation of the connection between technological potential and social relations.

The transformative capacity of the ICT revolution is not primarily technical but has a socio-cultural character (Loader et al 2002). The emergence of forms of computer-mediated technology is changing established self-perceptions and generating new ones in their place in relation to the communities within which these forces are located. That said, social and cultural forces are at the same time, conditioning these ICTs. The technologies are not autonomous of the social relations and cultural milieu from which they have emerged. On the contrary, they are the product of thought, innovation and action undertaken within socio-cultural and economic relations and political parameters. And the important fact is that this social matrix of technological development is not only the creative context but a highly contested, power infused infrastructure in which competing visions and conceptions of the possible and the desirable are fought out.

Whilst the more spectacular events of the worldwide web have received the most publicity, more mundane but perhaps more important practices were being pioneered by people integrating the Internet within their geographic communities to ensure that technology does not follow a logic of its own but instead serves conscious human purposes.


There are a number of important points to establish:
	Technological determinism is a false thesis. Technology does not act but shapes and is shaped within social relations. Citizens can use technology to increase social capital, but technology does not add to the human good automatically. This is a function of creative human agency, not of technology as such. Knowledge, planning, support networks, and cooperation are required.
	Technology can serve the purpose of information and misinformation; can enhance freedom and democracy or can be used as a means of mass manipulation. The Internet is potentially liberatory in empowering and informing citizens but is repressive to the extent that increases the power of those who seek to control citizens and shape their opinions. The Internet is also accompanied by surveillance.
	The capital system is powerful, but not all-powerful. It expresses the necessary economic aspect of human cooperation in alien form and has proved incapable of producing all the public goods necessary for a humane life.
	Civic intelligence and citizen democracy are not going to be achieved as a result of some historical or technological necessity but require creative human agency – the individuals who compose the demos stepping forward, associating and acting to affirm the good of the public over system imperatives and commercial gain.

Whilst the possibilities for a genuine democracy seem thin in an environment subject to the domination of capital as a private regime, there are grounds for hoping that a democratic alternative future is feasible as a result of action undertaken by the informed citizenry. This is the ideal of liberal, socialist and democratic theorists, of Rousseau, Paine, Mill and others. And the fact is this: if this principle was false it would be difficult to explain centuries of democratic advance since the age when monarchs ruled by divine right. If, through communication and information and interaction, enough individuals come to know about what the range of political possibility is, outcomes which may seem unlikely in abstraction of real action become likely.

The perspective of urban political economy is invaluable here, building as it does upon the relational approach that is integral to the Marxist perspective. Eric Wright (1979) has established that social class is a relational phenomenon concerning the control over labour power. Manuel Castells (1972) emphasises the extent to which class pertains to relations of production and reproduction. Such views embrace community. The degree of control that individuals are able to exercise over their lives is influenced by the structure and composition of community networks. Further, access to resources is shaped by structural positions in community networks. In these ways, relations in cyberspace combine with relations in geographical place.

The crucial question concerns the location of community as a series of networks within socio-geographical place. This delineates the relationship between physical places like neighbourhoods and cyberspaces such as the Internet. 
In this conception, ‘community’ refers to networks of interpersonal ties that provide sociability, a sense of belonging and social identity – the very qualities characterising community as composed of groups like neighbourhoods.

The present crisis evinces a transition from an industrial age to an informational age, from a time when a substantial part of the workforce produce or handle goods to a time when the main part of the workforce will produce and manipulate, transmit and exchange information. The developed economies have all but reached this stage, with nearly 50% of the workforce in informational occupations engaging in informational activities (Castells 1989:7-32; Castells 1996:7 29-65; Hall 1987:95-9)

There are a number of crucial factors. The first is the emergence of the Internet as a new infrastructure of communication, pointing in the direction of an information superhighway. The second is the increasing interconnectivity of different electronic machines – telephones, computers, faxes, modems. This is measured in terms of both the numbers of connections and the bandwidth of the connections. The third factor is the fact that nearly all information is becoming digital. The fourth is the development on this basis of new applications. These are killer applications that will constitute the new basic industries of the informational age. Most important here is multimedia (Hall 1998:945).

The crucial point concerns how these technical transformations impact upon urban life. If the claim is that, in the new world, information will be available at the push of a button, the questions arise as to precisely where this button will reside, how many or how few buttons will there be, who and how many will be doing the pushing and in the service and interests of who and what. The when question can be left to futurologists, the what, who and where questions properly belong to urban theory.
 
Accepted norms of social and economic activity are being transformed by the emergence of new communication media like the Internet, digital television, cell phones, fax machines, fibre optic cable, communication satellites, global electronic mail, information highways, virtual reality, videoconferencing and multi-media. These ICTs are generating new modes of social interaction and exchange, challenging the distinction between home and work, private and public, raising new conceptions of what public space is. The contemporary age expresses a transition from an economy based on the production and circulation of material goods to one based on the production and circulation of immaterial goods, knowledge and information. The new information technologies are all transforming urban space in profound ways, altering the nature of interaction and reconceiving the notion of community and association. By facilitating communication between individuals regardless of place and time the new ICTs imply new modes of thought, action and organisation, new approaches relating space and place.

Some see the dissolution of urban community as a result of these developments. The new voices of technology have claimed that the traditional city is in the process of being replaced by a series of telematic networks that, in time, will come to constitute a city without a site. This is an anthropological and ecological nonsense that stems from certain political ideas. This vision subverts the collective in favour of the privatisation of the public domain. Others envisage the reconstitution of community in a more extensive and individuated form.

The expansion of information technology entails the dissolution of time and place. This has been characterised as the death of distance. ‘The death of distance will mean that any activity that relies on a screen or a telephone can be carried out anywhere in the world. Services as diverse as designing an engine, monitoring a security camera, selling insurance or running a secretarial paging service will become as easily exportable as car parts or refrigerators’ (Cairncross 1995:39; Cairncross 1997).

For some, the death of distance will have the positive effect of equalizing the locational advantages of all places in the world, enabling decentralisation from higher-cost or less-efficient locations to lower-cost, more efficient ones. Activity will be transferred to wherever people are.

There will be a day .. when you will be able to conduct business, study, explore the world and its cultures, call up any great entertainment, make friends, attend neighborhood markets .. without leaving your desk or armchair. You won’t leave your network connection behind you at the office or in the classroom. It will be more than an object you carry or an appliance you purchase. It will be your passport to a new, mediated way of life (Gates 1995:4-5).

The effects are global in their implications. The death of distance makes it possible for any place in the world to compete with any other place for employment, investment, capital, trade. How a competitive devaluation between nations can be avoided is not clear as governments – national and local – collide in an unseemly heap in offering territories and labour forces for exploitation.

The global economy will find itself spinning in the ether, as the nonplace urban realm presaged by Melvin Webber in the 1960’s takes the place of cities, locales and regions grounded in social practices, places and activities. This is a world in which all things continuously slide, as equivalent jobs are wiped out at a touch of a button through being more cheaply performed elsewhere. And it is not just cheap labour that is being exploited. The advanced economies retain leads in skill, education, linguistic competence; but not for long. Time has already fallen victim to the ICT revolution. Once all distinctions are eliminated, what remains of place?

In the 1980’s the debate concerned the threat to the developed economies and their social and welfare infrastructures arising from the competition of the Newly Industrialising Countries. There were predictions of the destruction of manufacturing and the massive transfer of employment from the old industrial nations to the new economies. The question runs much deeper than this in the contemporary age. Those same concerns apply. However, the globalisation of economic relations is now accompanied by the rapid expansion of ICT to threaten not this place or that place as a result of competition from some other place, but the very notion of place itself. Never has Marx’s phrase that ‘all that is solid melts into air’ been more apt. Every place on earth is subject to dissolution since all forms of economic activity may be relocated, regardless of distances, to other countries and continents, and may continue to be relocated further and further until nothing remains of place. In this scenario, the ages old prediction of the end of the city may well come true.

In the City of Bits, William Mitchell argues that: ‘The Net negates geometry .. it is fundamentally and profoundly aspatial. It is nothing like the Piazza Navona or Copley Square .. The Net is ambient – nowhere in particular but everywhere at once’ (Mitchell 1995:8). For this reason, the City of Bits ‘will be a city unrooted to any definite spot on the surface of the earth, shaped by connectivity and bandwidth constraints rather than by accessibility and land values, largely asynchronous in its operation, and inhabited by disembodied and fragmented subjects who exist as collections of aliases and agents’ (Mitchell 1995:24). The social glue that held the old aggregations together has been dissolved by the new ICTs, with whole chunks breaking away and reaggregating in other places and forms. If this does not itself spell the end of community, it may only be because the future community will exist in cyberspace (Mitchell 1995:94 160).

Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin (1996) envisage the development of urban life at ever higher levels in constituting a ‘planetary metropolitan system’. This is not the post-urban world envisaged by Webber, who predicted the rapid decline of the influence and relevance of geographic distance and place back in the 1960’s (Webber 1968), but is a distinctively urban world in combining place-based loyalties within online community interactions. This integrates the new telecommunications technologies into the human-made urban infrastructures composed of production, management and control. Graham and Marvin reject the view that urban functions are being completely substituted by dematerialised activities as naïve and shortsighted. Urban places remain unique arenas combining the webs of relations and ‘externalities’ sustaining global capitalism. They establish the terrain for social and cultural life, house the bulk of the population and are the key social, economic, political, cultural and physical concentrations of advanced capitalist society. A great deal of the activities that take place in the city cannot be telemediated: ‘Urban places and electronic spaces can be seen to influence and shape each other, to be recursively linked; it is this recursive interaction which will define the future of cities’ (Graham and Marvin 1996).

Economic and technological determinism is to be avoided. The recursive interactions between cities and telecommunications transcend determinism. The impact of telecommunications on cities is not direct and uni-linear and not can it be considered as a reflection of capitalist political economy. An interactive approach towards cities and telecommunications emphasises that social action shapes telecommunications applications in a number of ways, although this proceeds within the context of broad political economic forces. Telecommunications technologies create new options and capabilities through which urban processes are shaped. Further, social conflict and struggle between unevenly equipped groups and organisations is a key element of these processes. ‘Once technologies are available, political and social struggle and actions can redirect their application and change their effects – just as political and social influences can redirect the shaping of urban politics and the built environments of the urban places. Thus, similar technologies can be used in very different ways and have very different effects’ (Graham and Marvin 1996).

Futurologists describe the future of towns and cities by using such terms as ‘teletopics’, ‘telecommunities’ or ‘wired cities’. These describe urban areas connected by such interactive services like cable, video, telecoms, creating new communities of interest or ‘neighbourhoods without propinquity’ (Mulgan 1989). The ‘wired city’ enables individuals to escape their houses, tools and flats by providing them with the information contacts, networks and programmes that make it possible to use the city more effectively. These factors open up urban space and time to potentially connect individuals in the actual use of the city and enjoyment of the city.





 This society of networks subverts the formal organisation of politics and bureaucracy and implies a logic that is closer to language than it is to land. The possibilities of this will be examined further in relation to the Habermasian communicative ethic. The old political structures and boundaries will no longer apply, something that demands the innovation of new modes of representation and expression. Human activity proceeds within a network of information set within many networks extending to the global level. ‘If we are farsighted enough, we know that state structures and national boundaries will disappear’ (Ellul 1990:185). The ‘culture of networks is possible only on an international scale’ (Ellul 1990:135).

Castells characterises the contemporary world that is emerging through this technological revolution as the ‘informational society’. This refers to a social structure in which ‘sources of economic productivity, cultural hegemony and political military power depend, fundamentally, on the capacity to retrieve, store, process and generate information and knowledge’ (Castells 1993). ‘The Information City is the urban expression of the whole matrix of determinations of the Informational Society’ (Castells 1993).

The capitalist mode of production, in Castells’ view, has entered an ‘organisational transition’ from industrialism to informationalism. Information is thus the crucial raw material of which all social processes and organisations are composed. Material production and services come to depend upon the handling of information in the system of production and in the organisation of society. The competitiveness and productivity of regions and cities depends upon the ability to combine informational capacity, quality of life and connectedness to the network of major metropolitan centres at national and international levels. 

Castells theorises the rise of the Global-Informational City as a result of certain processes of development. ‘The global economy emerging from informational-based production and competition is characterised by its interdependence, its asymmetry, its regionalisation, the increasing diversification within each region, its selective inclusiveness, its exclusionary segmentation, and, as a result of all these features, an extraordinarily variable geometry that tends to dissolve historical, economic geography’ (Castells 1996:106). From the late twentieth century there began to develop ‘a new informational mode of development: on the basis of the convergence through the interaction of information technologies and information processing activities into an articulated techno-organisational system’ (Castells 1989:19). This does not mean that the capital system is being transcended. Rather, information technology has reinforced the capital system, making a powerful contribution to increasing rates of profit and to globalisation whilst generating a new policy agenda on the part of the state, an agenda that is concerned with facilitating capital accumulation at the expense of social redistribution (Castells 1989:23/32).

Castells’ argument here is contentious and many critics have been concerned to emphasise the continuation of industrialism (Storper 1997:236/41). Modifying Castells’ argument from this perspective generates an informational reading of industrial urbanism. This focuses upon ‘the locational pattern of information technology manufacturing and its effects on spatial dynamics’ (Castells 1989:ch 2). And it pays attention to the rise of new industrial spaces and the centrality of ‘milieux of innovation’, particularly with respect to high technology manufacturing (Castells 1989:82).

The regional and urban geography that emerges is characterised by sharp spatial divisions of labour. Production functions are decentralised, with flexibility in location combined with international industries remaining highly concentrated in innovative urban centres (Castells 1989:74). These centres of innovation are new urban places like Silicon Valley but also older places like Paris and Boston. These centres of innovation command the productive chains and form the dynamic centres of the contemporary capitalist economy (Castells 1989:124; Castells and Hall 1994:ch 7). High-level decision-making is increasingly centralised whilst other activities are decentralised, either locally, within metropolitan areas, nationally throughout entire economies, or, indeed, globally (Castells 1989:169). 


In Castells’ view, technology based cities represent ‘a new industrial space’ connected to a global ‘informational’ economy. The spinal assumption organising Castells’ analysis is the overarching argument concerning the subversion of the socially grounded space of places by the increasing power of the abstract and fluid space of flows. For Castells, this restructuring process has deliberately been concerned with ‘the supersession of places by a network of information flows’ beyond conscious human control. By space of flows, Castells refers to the system of exchanges of information, capital and power that structures the basic processes of societies, economies and states between different localities.

The space of flows supersedes the space of places. 





The implications of the space of flows replacing the space of places are profound and far-reaching.





The space of flows is characterised by increasing abstraction, removing the world further and further away from comprehension and control. ‘The space of flows, superseding the space of places, epitomizes the increasing differentiation between power and experience, the separation between meaning and function’ (Castells 1993).

Castells is concerned with the consequences of this development, emphasising ‘the ushering in of an era characterised by the uneasy coexistence of extraordinary human achievements and the disintegration of large segments of society, along with the widespread prevalence of senseless violence’ (Castells 1989:350).

Castells continues this theme in The Rise of the Network Society (1998). Here Castells argues that the implicit tendency of work styles in post-industrial economy is to become detached from traditional cultures, values and communities. The task that confronts the new informational cities is to reconcile the ‘new techno-economic paradigm’ with ‘place based social meaning’ so as to avoid ‘urban schizophrenia’. ‘At the cultural level, local societies, territorially defined, must preserve their identities, and build upon their historical roots, regardless of their economic and functional dependence upon the space of flows’ (Castells 1998). For Castells, territorially based institutions operating in the ‘space of places’ will give way to the ‘space of flows’. Industry and services will be organised on a global basis around the operation of information generating units. Castells envisages the dominant institutions of the future being powerful, secretive, multinational institutions free from ties of place.

The proliferation of electronic spaces issues in a ‘paradigm challenge’ that requires anachronistic ideas about cities be discarded. For Graham and Marvin (1996) it is ‘difficult to be normative and suggest what kinds of cities and electronic spaces we want and how these urban ideals may be brought to fruition’. Graham and Marvin attempt to reconfigure urban policymaking and studies in ways which directly reflect the increasingly telemediated nature of cities and hence revitalise the debate on urban futures. With telecommunications placed at the centre of the development, planning and management of cities, particular attention needs to focus upon the complex interactions between electronic spaces and urban places.

For some, the new ICT media contain the potential to regenerate communities and transform social relations; for others, their ability to function independently of time and place imply the breakdown of the placed-based social interaction integral to community. In the pessimistic view, electronic connectivity replaces social and geographic connectivity. With the dissolution of face-to-face interaction, a disembodied, incorporeal communication network takes the place of what was once regarded as real community (Kraut et al 1998). Meaning becomes space-based but whether it may still count as social may be questioned. If time and place are no longer considered important as communication increasingly takes electronic form, the question to put is whether an abstract and distant computer-mediated communication induces a similar distance and estrangement between the individuals who share the same geographical community space? (Haywood 1998).

The optimistic thesis is that such developments liberating communication from time and place represent not so much the end of community as its extension. This view holds that community is formed in networks rather than groups. This may not be how it seems. It seems natural to conceive society as organised in terms of groups (Freeman 1992). However, according to one view, individuals function not in groups but in networks. The replacement of groups by networks is evident in a number of respects. Trading and political blocs are no longer characterised by monological forms. Rather, organisations take the dialogical form of complex networks of alliance and exchange rather than cartels, with employers responsible to multiple peers and superiors. The management hierarchy and matrix is being replaced by multiple connected network (Berkowitz 1982; Wellman 1988; Castells 1996). 

Networked societies are characterised by permeable boundaries, multifarious interactions with diverse others, the continuous switching of connections between multiple networks, flatter and recursive hierarchies. Communities are remote, loosely bounded and knit, fragmentary and discursive. Most individuals relate to each other in multiple, thinly connected, partial communities that overlay the more traditional networks of family, neighbours, friends, work colleagues. Rather than belonging to a group as a result of geographical and occupational ties to those with whom they are associated, each individual creates his or her own ‘personal community’ (Wellman and Leighton 1979; Wellman 1999a).

There is a need to examine the impact of the spread of computer-supported interpersonal communication upon the ways in which individuals connect with each other. This connection is manifested in a number of ways: non face-to-face communication is expanded by vastly greater bandwidth, wireless computerised communication devices that can be carried anywhere anytime. Such innovations facilitate the ease of connecting with others and accessing information independent of time and place and contain potentials for the personalisation of technology and knowledge management. If such developments diminish the face-to-face communication integral to traditional communities, these technologies are also generating and sustaining new community ties in cyberspace. This point has some bearing on the issue of whether place based social meaning is to be recovered or is to be superseded by space based meaning. For, as individuals connect with others sharing common interests, engage in supportive and sociable relations with these distant others, and thereby invest their electronic activity with meaning, belonging and identity, cyberspaces are turned into cyberplaces.

ICTs are shaping a revolution in the understanding of place, community and the nature of social bonds and ties. Urban theorists and community historians would confirm that the traditional form of community has been located in place, in agrarian villages, trading towns and urban neighbourhoods. This thesis goes all the way back to Aristotle’s definition of the city as that place in which the centre is within the walking distance of all its inhabitants, a place that can be taken in one view. In these milieux, individuals could walk to any community centre and could walk to visit each other. In this definition, the community was spatially compact and densely knit (Thebert 1985; Batthelemy and Contaime 1985; Ward 1999). Indeed, since most community units numbered less than a thousand people, it is safe to assume that each knew if not everyone then knew of them. In the contemporary world of overscale cities, most individuals carry a mental record of a few hundred people whom they have known well enough to converse over a period of time with (Kochen 1989).

In the past, communities were bounded. This means that relationships extended within physical or natural boundaries – gates, walls etc. - rather than across them. Whilst such communities were not necessarily immobile, the possibilities for communicative intercourse were subject to limitations, even in big cities and trading towns. Most communicative action stayed within neighbourhoods of people who shared the same work, faith, interests, and opinions. Such communities had face-to-face connectivity. If there is a tendency to romanticise the connectivity of past, tightly-knit communities, it remains true that communities had many virtues, particularly in terms of the capacities of individuals within community being able to create a social order from within, to police their own communities.

In the contemporary age, communities in neighbourhoods are in retreat, particularly if community is defined in social as distinct from spatial terms (Wellman and Leighton 1979; Wellman 1999a). The reason why this is so is because individuals increasingly obtain the support, sociability, information, shared values and sense of belonging which once characterised face-to-face relations from those who do not live within the same neighbourhood or even within the same geographical area. Community ties are created and sustained through emailing, telephoning, writing, and travelling.

For theorists like Rheingold, computer-mediated communication contains the potential for a new form of social interaction. In this scenario relationships are not limited only to individuals who have physically met and continue to meet in person. Indeed, the odds of finding like-minded individuals are narrower in physical communities than in the newer forms in cyberspace. Electronic communication means that individuals can relate to each other independent of the bounds of time and place, accessing a greater number of others to form ‘communities of shared interest’ and relationships that were unconstrained temporal and spatial limitations (Rheingold 1996). Space-based meaning can in this sense be social. The virtual environments within which communication now proceeds can be conceived as ‘societies’ in their own right, with new behaviours emerging in the process (Dibbell 1996; Reid 1994 1996). The Electronic Freedom Foundation predicts the emergence of an effectively ungoverned hyper-individualistic liberal ‘e-society’.

‘Before mass access to the Internet arrived, there were those who thought they foresaw a social problem rather than the positive revolution. Varying degrees of decline in social interaction were predicted as a result of the emergence of cyberspace, with the ‘postmodern turn’ in the social sciences arguing that simulations and representations of reality may increasingly be preferred to ‘real’ social interaction. The Internet was seen as keeping people inside their homes following ‘inauthentic’ synthetic image centred relationships, when they should have been outside forming ‘real’ relationships and interacting with one another in the flesh (Kraut et al 1998). This breakdown in normal social interaction through living a ‘virtual life’ that was predicted as a consequence of mass access to the Internet has not taken place. It may be that, rather than blurring the lines between the real and virtual and thus undermining our relationship with the ‘real’, the Internet is merely another channel, maybe just another shopping channel.

In fine, the transformative potential of the Internet has been overrated. The potentials and dangers, virtues and vices of the Internet need to be evaluated in the context of prevailing social relations. The Internet as such is unlikely to lead to a massive social revolution or cause a massive social crisis. The impact of the Internet will be more varied and less extreme than the early Internet evangelists expected (Wellman and Gulia 1999; Parks and Floyd 1996). For all of the wild talk of e-government, e-democracy, and denunciations of the idiocy of computocracy (Bobbio), the most interesting development pertains to the subtle interaction on the lifeworld terrain between individuals and technology as electronic communication is absorbed into daily life through everyday social practices (Nettleton et al 2001).

The biggest issue with respect to urban place, community and social meaning is not the emergence of ICT’s as such but the way that the information revolution facilitates the globalisation of economic relations. The growth of information high-tech manufacturing, service and leisure industries has induced great changes in urban labour markets and urban dynamics. The development of a ‘global informational economy’ (Castells 1996) through the new ICTs generates new opportunities for opening up economic markets across the world. However, globalisation comes with a social and environmental price tag. Globalisation has also been accompanied by a liberalisation on a global basis that subjects regions to economic insecurity through intensified global competition. Liberalisation has fostered the growth in financial services that has led to the rise of global cities at the hub of international electronic and financial services networks. As a result of these developments, the economies of the West have come to be dominated by processing and adding value. Even commodity based industries like retailing and manufacturing becoming information rich. Information has assumed a central place in production in all sectors and is thus a key commodity to be bought, sold, traded, exchanged. All of which is facilitated by the way that telematics increases capabilities for processing, storing and controlling vast flows of electronic information on a continuous and real time basis. Further, although it would seem that the existence of a global network may increase co-operation and understanding between people across nations boundaries, it may also undermine national, regional and local cultural identities, generating an increasing cultural homogenisation defined by commercial rather than community forces in their place. 

As a result of these shifts industrial cities have become ‘information’ cities dominated by consumption industries and the processing and circulation of knowledge and symbolic goods. The bulk of new employment generated is now information based. ‘Investment in telematics – the basic information infrastructures of cities – now surpasses investment in other industrial machinery. Because telematics make information so easy to move around, these shifts increasingly take a global complexion, tied in with the wider shifts towards globalisation and the growing power of the TNC’s (Graham and Marvin 1996). Castells describes the Informational City as a Global City in that it ‘articulates the directional functions of the global economy in a network of decision making and information processing centres’ (Castells 1993). 

‘The critical question, though, is whether this means the end of the traditional city. Almost certainly, no: as in the past, technological change will bring about not a general dispersal, but a general reshaping of the map. Those activities capable of being decentralised will continue to disperse to back offices; some will end up in homes or local workstations .. But other activities will remain concentrated in face-to-face activity centres, though not always in present locations: growth and decentralisation within large metropolitan areas will produce a more polycentric pattern, already observable in London, New York, San Francisco, and Tokyo. And these activities, as ever, will be growing, innovative ones that need face-to-face contact’ (Hall 1998:961).

‘The pioneers and models have been described in this chapter; they include the superhighway, broadband telecommunications, and multimedia technology as the basic platform; arts, culture, and entertainment, in both live and broadcast versions; the media, both print and electronic; educational and health services; tourism and personal services; management generally, especially command and control functions; high level financial services, involving judgement and information and the capacity to innovate; and associated specialised business services ranging from law, accountancy, advertising, and public relations to architecture, engineering, management, and design. These activities are closely related and even overlapping: museums and concert halls and theatres are both cultural and part of tourism..’ (Hall 1998:961).

A general process of diffusion is not observed. Whilst manufacturing and routine information-processing diffuse both nationally and globally, a new division of labour by process is operating at the same time to concentrate the high-order functions associated with the highest-level global cities, London, New York, Tokyo, and their immediate competitors (Castells 1989:126-71; Hall 1995a:21; Sassen 1991). The reason for this points to the reason why the city will continue to exist – these activities involve face-to-face contact. The agglomeration economies, in production and in consumption, that this entails tend to cause these activities to cluster in cities, in their centres. If it is countered that ICT should reduce the need for agglomeration, then it should be pointed out that the creation and manufacture of the basic electronic product itself involves agglomeration. It is highly likely that this creation of the new products will proceed in various kinds of innovative milieu; traditional city centres, because they are and will be the centres of artistic creativity (London, Paris, New York, Tokyo); specialised technopoles, often university based (Cambridge – England and Massachusetts; Kyoto); sometimes artificially created (the ‘new science cities’; and entertainment centres.

This is not the first time that the demise of face-to-face contact and communication crucial to community, place and the environment has been predicted. Such effects were supposed to follow the invention of the telephone. If that experience is repeated one can even envisage an expansion of face-to-face contact as a need created by the dissemination of electronic media.

The great conflict of the contemporary age is that between the global and the local. This is inadequately polarised in terms of a simple either/or conflict between those forces and agencies promoting a free-floating rootlessness of capital and trade – generating poverty and insecurity and unemployment - and those looking to resist this by protecting local culture and local communities – leading to economic inertia. There are much better ways to set up this debate.

The most public manifestation opposition to ‘globalisation’ emerged in the demonstrations which have accompanied the meetings of the World Trade Organisation as they attempt to set the rules governing trade. The conflict also focuses upon the IMF as it attempts to enforce open trade and (tariffless) borders. More difficult targets of opposition are the transnational corporations which are the principal agents of global inequality, concentrating wealth and power in fewer and fewer hands. The invisible flows of digital messages via communications channels and from computer to computer are facilitating this globalisation. And this shows an aspect of ICT that is anything but benign. The history of computing and of computers is inextricably connected with the development of military communications and with the pioneering of global systems of management and control. The Internet originated in the Pentagon defence programme. And it is significant that the primary stream of applied technology is known as ‘Management Information Systems’. Applied information technology research has had the primary design objective to extend the power and reach of management in the concern to co-ordinate production and distribution organisation-wide, then nationally and, in the contemporary age, globally.
It is evident that ICT has implications with respect to control and power. Their concern to restrict computing opportunities stems from an awareness of the increasing access to management and control capacity that may follow the extension of ICT to other groups in society. The increasing availability of ‘personal’ computers at a low cost followed by the Internet (which wedded the information management power of low cost computing with low cost communications capabilities) has served to create and extend opportunities which previously had been the preserve of the rich and the powerful.

Globalisation is in the process of hollowing out local communities. With the centralisation of the highly valued, more knowledge-intensive activities, an artificial specialisation is being imposed upon the local economy. Local production is being forced to compete globally, with the result that communities are increasingly subject to external forces over which they have little or no control. Communities have lost control over local place. The corollary of this is that the main activities taking place within communities are primarily focused upon serving interests that lie outside of the community and only secondarily with the community itself. The good of the community is made conditional upon the good of the interests that have occupied local space.

The global economy shifting into higher levels of technology increases the need for capital. The supply of capital that is available for local investment is, at the same time, stagnant or in decline. The viability of local economies has become conditional upon the vicissitudes of the ‘casino economy’, where big winners are few and losers are many. The result is the decline of the local community as a result of the centralisation of financial and public servicing, the domination of a few large stores in retailing, the expansion of research (capital) intensive processing and production and other such processes. Entire regions, their communities and members, have become expendable in relation to these overwhelming global forces.

As distinct from the global, the ‘local’ is the space where activities are related directly to the concerns, conditions and needs of the local community. Local business shares the same fate and the same future with the local community and pursues local interests as distinct from serving global priorities. Local business is more likely to be sensitive to local needs than is the branch or subsidiary of a transnational corporation with its ‘global’ city headquarters.

That a new kind of city is being born is clear enough. There are those who say that this new city is no city at all. But, as Hall states matter-of-factly, ‘they will doubtless prove wrong’ (Hall 1998:943). For all of the predictions of the death of distance, these so-called ‘spacetranscending’ ICT’s have not extinguished the significance of geography. On the contrary, in combination with other factors, the effect of the ICTs can be measured in terms of an increasingly uneven pattern of development within the UK. Place still matters. With the importance of London as a global city, it should come as no surprise that there has been a massive expansion of information occupations and industries have grown dramatically in London and the South-East in the past ten years. Integral to this growth has been the rapid diffusion of computer networks hubbed on London, reinforcing its dominant position in the national and global urban system (Goddard 1992:199).

In some projections – visions even – the informational city as technopolis is defined in antithetical terms to the industrial city. Whilst the industrial city was ugly, fetid and unhealthy, the technopolis is the dream city in which the future has been mastered by technology (Ellul 1990:126/7). For Marx, true history would begin with the ending of the industrial city and the coming of the socialist city based upon the collective comprehension and control of human relationships by associated individuals. The kind of control upon which the technopolis rests is very different from the control that Marx envisaged as underpinning the socialist city. The technopolis is the product of the global tendency for decision making power to be transferred from the political spheres of society – spheres which are constituted under some form of democratic control and accountability – to the hands of technocrats.

This offers no long term, sustainable solution to the question of civic order and urban justice. Technique is not a philosophy. Organising society according to technique represents a drastic, dehumanising, break with the classical, historical connection of urban space with culture, civilisation and creative self-realisation i.e. with the philosophical roots of urban studies with which this book began. Information, knowledge and their communication are not merely valuable commodities to be valued for reasons of exchange but are a cultural resource. Information, knowledge and communication are integral to the self-definition of the human race, enabling individuals to create their identities and foster a shared sense of community whilst gaining an understanding of the communities of others. The offering of public information services in electronic form may imply a more direct democratic accountability of representatives to their electors but it could just as easily provide the tools for a more sophisticated mass manipulation and management. And then there is the attempt by politicians to induce citizens to trade a substantial part of their liberty for security. The extension of surveillance technologies like CCTV is justified on account of the need for public safety in the crime-ridden anti-cities of the modern capitalist order and, indeed, the extension may proceed by popular demand. However, regardless of the fact that community members who feel safer in their streets and homes may not necessarily be safer, the crucial point is that the information such technologies accumulate can also be used to threaten and remove the privacy and freedom of the individual from commercial or political abuse.

 ‘There can be no philosophy of technique because technique has nothing whatever to do with wisdom. On the contrary, it is solely an expression of pride. It makes excessiveness finally possible…, an excessiveness that on the one hand rolls on without wanting it or participating in it .. technique attains a dimension so exorbitant that we cannot even record its products, let alone direct them.. Hence our own machines have truly replaced us. We cannot make a philosophy of them, for a philosophy implies limits and definitions and defined areas that technique will not allow’ (Ellul 1990:216). The consequences of the absence of social justice are apparent as the information revolution and the globalisation of economic relations give rise to the Dual City. The Informational City and the Global City is also the Dual City on account of the fact that the informational economy possesses the structural tendency to generate a polarized occupational structure according to the informational capacities of different social groups.

64 THE TYRANNY OF ABSTRACTION
The world is being drawn together by networks of commerce, trade, investment, and military interest concerned with controlling access to and exploitation of the global commons. This can only result in the universalisation of an urban-industrial uniformity which is repressive of the human ontology. The pathos of technological omnipotence lies in the wide disparity between enormous physical power being made available to human beings who have rarely been so impotent. The fact that human beings cannot control the powers that they have unleashed gives the contemporary predicament its tragic dimension. There is the lingering suspicion that a society that cannot creatively live up to the power at its disposal must turn destructive. The price of such technological progress has been an inner and outer repression and the danger is that the continued existence of a repressed natural environment will unleash reactive forces from deep within the human psyche. Through personal impotence in face of vast impersonal systems, individuals rush to counterfeit communities. Once human beings fall so far, they may come to seek to partake of the reflected power of the totalitarian state. Impotent individuals despairing of security are the material with which self-serving mandarins construct the technocratic politics of urban-industrial society. Arnold Toynbee, whose history argued for a genuine universalism in which human beings live in harmony with their environment, described substitute religions thus:

Competitive individualism, bee-like or ant-like Communism and tribal minded nationalism all resemble each other and resemble technology in being impersonal. An impersonal dispensation is at variance with the essence of human nature. It is therefore a dispensation against which human nature is bound to rebel; and when human nature’s well justified protest is answered either on a stock official form or by sheer silence, a human being is driven to the conclusion that no action on his part, short of physical violence, will exhort attention to him as a person from the impalpable, elusive, Boyg-like smog of impersonal relations in which he finds himself caught..
Man has now decisively overcome nature by his technology: but the victor has been technology, not man himself. Man has merely exchanged one mastery for another, and his new master is more overbearing than his former one. Man is still the slave of his environment.

Arnold Toynbee The Times (5 April 1969)

Whilst Toynbee argues that goodness as a union of hearts is primary, the modern world remains addicted to unlimited technical progress as the cure for ills which technological imperialism has brought about. Individuals will remain hopelessly impotent and will be easy prey for the builders of the totalitarian and technocratic order. The emancipatory potential of reason has long since been subverted by its instrumental and technical aspect. Whatever the emancipatory potential of reason may still be in realising the free society, the dangers of scientific and technological rationality leading to a totalitarian and technocratic end of politics are clear.

The great irony is that in the attempt to achieve security by technological means through asserting human autonomy from nature, human beings have become dependent upon a new range of external forces over which they have little or no control – trade and capital flows, production and investment decisions in the hands of corporations, systemic imperatives of accumulation – whilst remaining dependent upon the biosphere.

It is significant that attempts to defend freedom in the contemporary world and envisage freedom in the future are couched in military terms of war, conquest, of order and security defined in terms of control of resources by physical force. And the extent to which politicians respond to the criticism of those whom they are supposed to represent with a defence of the troops they have sent to do their dirty work. In the emerging non-politics of the technology, citizens are replaced by soldiers, people who demand answers are replaced by technologically equipped and psychically regimented people who do as they are told. The soldier and not the citizen is the ideal being of the future order prepared by those whose response to system crisis is to entrench rather than transform. Soldiers are programmed individuals, unthinking servants of the system who are under control from within and without. Gramsci and Luxemburg dealt with the decay of capitalism in terms of the choice between socialism or barbarism. They both envisaged the individual of the future socialist order as the citizen-producer capable of exercising self-government in a reunified political and social realm. Failure to opt for socialism will generate a technocratic order populated not by citizen-producers but by unthinking and obedient warrior-technicians serving the system as so many dispensable and replaceable tools.

What would most baffle Enlightenment thinkers is the reference to the crisis of modernity given the extent of the physical power available to human beings. Centuries of scientific discovery, technological innovation and economic expansion ought to have ushered in the brave new world a long time ago. But, as William Blake knew from the start, the New Jerusalem could not be built by such tools, predicated as they were upon the degradation of the human ontology and the natural ecology.

Contemporary societies continue to express a commitment to the ideals of freedom and democracy, remnants of public life and political struggle past. Slowly but surely, though, the language of technics is creeping in, making explicit the content of the policy agenda. Policy making keeps up the appearance of politics as usual and ‘politics’ limps on as something concerning a clash between parties, voting at periodic elections, policy debates, and competition between leaders for office. In office but not in power – the phrase applies to all politicians, but politicians dare not admit the truth of it. For that admission would generate the question as to where real power lies. So politicians maintain the pretence of politics as the clash of leaders and parties in the service of the citizen body as expressed in periodic elections.

Yet the dramatic fall in the numbers of people who are prepared to vote at elections is evidence of the extent to which people are looking beyond the thin democratic veneer of what passes for conventional politics to address the question of where real power lies – and asking the question as to where it should lie. The people are aware of their political impotence and no longer see the point of exercising a right to vote which makes no difference when the power of decision belongs to those possessing money or guns, property or bureaucratic privilege. The language of democracy dominates contemporary politics, but political practice is all the more elitist for that. Democracy is being used as the formal surface of politics in order to cover its absence.

But real power is as difficult to discover as the true reality. The only reality that people have any experience of is the artificial environment, an environment constructed by machines and money and guns, a merging of economics, science, technology and military. Politics is in the process of being replaced by technocracy as an attempt to resolve the problems bequeathed by modern economics and technology. Technocracy is the logical end of technological imperialism, the very force which caused the problems in the first place by splitting reason off from human nature and natural ecology.

The state appropriates every collective interest from society and proceeds to project itself as the official guardian of the communal good. In symbiotic relation with capital, the state acquires a certain legitimacy through securing the conditions for the private accumulation of capital. People remain addicted to the notion that economic affluence equates with freedom and happiness or, more negatively, with the absence of gross physical privation. Individuals are hypnotised by images of material affluence and technological omnipotence. The question is how long will human beings fall for the economic bluff? And how long will they continue to take the technological bluff? The way that mass media and advertisement sell a system by promising happiness, luxury, fulfilment, leisure, and opulence is an integral part of the emerging anti-politics of technocracy. All such ends are private goods and are available for purchase on the market. There is no more need for politics or political participation and activity. It tells us: ‘behave and all this can be yours too; obey and the fat life is within your grasp’ (Roszak 56). This is what Jacques Ellul called the technological bluff. In taking the line of least resistance, believing the promises, endorsing the powers and obeying, the citizen disappears.

Keynes was correct to argue that the economic problem was close to being solved. Technique has enabled human beings to conquer natural necessity. However, the means employed in this conquest have become extended into ends, have escaped their human creators and come to form a new artificial necessity. And as human powers, forms and relations escape control and take oppressive alien form, the promised freedom turns into a new necessity. The autonomous individual achieves not freedom but, in isolation from greater relations, only an impotence. These impotent individuals, isolated monads, are not capable of communal self-rule in a genuine public life which unites each and all but exhibits a neurotic need for authority. The autonomous individual, the modern subject, is characterised by a fear and unwillingness to take personal responsibility. The withdrawal and retreat that characterises the approach of this individual to the world amounts to a refusal to embody the self as a creative agent in a world larger than private affairs. This is not only the fall of the public realm but is also the breakdown of personality and personal relations. It reveals the human incapacity to generate a genuine public life within prevailing social relations. The loss of the anthropological and ecological component of reason means that human beings lack a philosophical grasp of their personal relationships and do not know in what terms to conceive and promote a public life. The result is that life – human, animal, natural – comes to be subordinated to the functional imperatives of the system world.

The split within liberalism between political and economic concerns expresses the paradoxes of capitalist modernity, particularly the pathos of means and ends, human bondage through freedom. Politically, liberalism asserted the autonomy of the individual in personal relations and the freedom of the individual from authoritarianism. The problem is that the modern state which codified rights and liberties of the individual presided over a capital system which submerged all individuals within impersonal relations. Political freedom went hand in hand in with economic unfreedom, an economic system which condemned the propertyless to an existence of wage slavery. Such a condition of material subjugation was incompatible with assertions of personal autonomy. In practice, freedom became a function of economic power.

In the bifurcation within liberalism between political and economic aspects, the economic aspect was dominant. The possibility of recovering the public designation of an active citizenship through the political aspect of liberalism was denied by capitalism’s assertion of the primacy of economics over politics. Whether political liberalism can be recovered by highlighting the extent to which rights and liberties tap into an older tradition of public life concerning citizenship and community is worth exploring. This is to explore a philosophical anthropology with a strong ecological dimension. This is to recover liberalism as a defence of the personal life against the forces of unfreedom. As liberalism gained ascendancy, these forces were represented by monarchy and by aristocratic landlords. In taking on these forces, liberalism came too easily to identify freedom with the private sphere, particularly private property. In the process, liberalism undermined the foundations of its own ideals by subordinating the individual to economic progress. In time, freedom came to be equated with economic freedom. Liberalism came to assert personal autonomy whilst defending property relations that subordinated all to economics. The result is that the claims of liberalism in its political identity – autonomy, equality, - are stripped of all social, cultural and historical implication - class, religion, family, ethnicity, gender – and vested in the state in a condition of abstract non-existence. For all of the anti-statist rhetoric, liberalism requires the state. Rights are a quasi-legalistic notion and require the coercive agency of the state to enforce them, all the more so since the values embodied in abstract ideals are contradicted by real society. As a result, the liberal assertion of the equality of opportunity is quite compatible with a class system that generates the largest gap between rich and poor known in history.

The Air-Conditioned Nightmare
Denuding reason of its anthropological and ecological component and pursuing ‘progress’ in terms of a purely instrumental rationality has brought about not the end state of perpetual peace and freedom but the prospect of thermonuclear holocaust, ecological destruction, urban decay, moral disintegration and the degeneration of politics into totalitarian technocracy. These interlinked crises will either ensure the end of capitalist urbanisation and industrialism or justify its transition to a full blown technocratic totalitarianism.

Technocracy is the logical end point of technological imperialism and is the full blown technological illusion. The freedom and happiness which the perfectly efficient ordering of the artificial environment promise remains unattainable. As the artificial environment becomes more complex, more precision-engineered, more intricately networked within the everyday life upon which it is parasitic, it inevitably becomes an inflexible organisation which breaches the limits of human knowledge and expertise even before it breaches the limits of what the environment can sustain. The failure of technological rationality is all the more likely given the fact that it is in the service of the state and capital, facilitating the imperatives and priorities of administrative power and money.

The abstracting and collectivising media of the state and capital threaten to cover with a soft despotism of consumerist affluence and beneficent expertise so well rationalized that to question its rationality would constitute the very essence of madness. Within its own terms, the capital system has realised the project of reason and delivered freedom and happiness.

Technocratic totalitarianism does not amount to a perversion of modern rationalisation but its end point; totalitarianism is implicit in the instrumental rationality of modern social relations. One can trace the totalitarian strain of modern rationality through Bacon’s New Atlantis and Hobbes’s Leviathan, through to Saint-Simon and the Positivists to Bentham’s panopticon and the Utilitarians. Reducing human nature and human life to crude material self-interest, interest and desire, such rationalism envisages the surveillance of individuals from the cradle to the grave. Here is a rationalism denuded of its anthropological and ecological dimensions, denormalised and demoralised and made the function of appetite. This is the intellectual genealogy of the technocracy, a narrow instrumental rationalism characterised by an obsession with the strict and severe exactitude of mechanical science and mathematics, an impatience with the anarchy and disarray of human ways, which reveals itself in a concern bordering on mania for centralisation, order and control. The direct translation of scientific rationality into the political arena implies technocratic totalitarianism and not democracy. Such a regime orders the programmed society, not Kant’s republic of ends but a republic of automatons in the service of the system, human beings of no greater status than Cartesian coordinates.

By tracing the concept of reason to its classical origins and by thus revealing reason to be implicit in the human ontology, this thesis has sought to accentuate the anthropological and ecological dimensions of rationality. The expansive concept of reason affirmed by this argument identifies human exchange, solidarity and reciprocity with each other and with nature as forming the content of reason. Such reason implies an active democracy, participation in everyday life-processes, dialogic interaction and communication in a community of ends. Such a project of reason did not require the so-called ‘Age of Reason’, the seventeenth century in which scientists and philosophers discarded centuries old moral and political virtues to equate reason with a narrow and mechanical ethos. The scientific revolution has bequeathed a technocratic model of politics in which the role of reason is to rationalise the reduction of life and potentiality and essence to measurement, quantification and formula, facilitating central control in politics and commodification in economics. Whereas politics in the classical definition concerns the creative self-realisation of the human essence in a community of citizens, the scientific vision presents reason in the image of totally quantified social order of automatons thoroughly enslaved to predictable and hence manipulable and controllable appetites and instincts. Such a reason is ignorant of the essential creativity, spontaneity and autonomy of the human ontology, focusing narrowly upon only those base aspects of human nature that the system can measure and satisfy. This is the ‘reality’ principle, a reduction of the potentiality of the human ontology to the status quo. Such realism seeks to confine creative human potentiality, morality and consciousness – the reason that affirms the unity of mind and body - within the thoroughly rationalised urban-industrial order of capitalist modernity. The extent and limits of reason are located not in human anthropology but in the imperatives and obsessions of the system, the artificial environment which is presented as ‘reality’ despite being abstracted from human and external nature. To overthrow the technocracy requires not merely a physical political challenge but a mental effort, for it is apparent that the view of possibility and reality which people adopt is shaped by mechanical modes. The technocracy has shaped the psyche of its subjects and draws its strength from artificially narrowed horizons. The totalitarianism is not imposed and maintained by physical force but by inculcating a belief that freedom and happiness are the very things which the system delivers. Capitalism could not have survived if millions of people were not convinced that freedom and happiness were purchasable commodities – the more money people have, the greater their freedom and happiness. It takes some nerve to refuse the economic and technological bluff – for the system is all-encompassing and allows no alternative life style to that of wage labour.
 
The technocratic model of politics is an anti-politics in that it removes the uncertain, creative, conflictual, moral essence of politics and obsesses about the factual, quantifiable element, the element which the system can define and deliver. The distinctive things about politics is the struggle of right against right, that fact and logic is no sooner established than it is challenged and permanently challengeable. For individuals as citizens are and remain rational, thinking and critical beings capable of developing further ‘ought to be’s’ with which to challenge the ‘is’. A firm grounding in the classical origins of politics reveals that ethics rather than facts and figures is the stuff of politics. As Aristotle argued, the human individual is a zoon politikon, an animal which is political to the very core of his/her being. Such an animal requires a public life, a politikos bios, in order to realise the full range of human potentiality. Although this equation of the political order with a vision of the good life for human beings has resulted in Aristotle being condemned as a totalitarian, the truth is that Aristotle’s political order allows a wide creative role to tact, to finesse, and to compromise. Aristotle well knew that politics, in also being an ethics, did not permit of exact accounting or precise classifications.

At its most complete, this notion of reason implies the expansive relationship of each to all others, and issues forth gracefully in reciprocity, solidary exchange and empathy. These true qualities of reason are the condition of the peaceful, happy and joyous community, not the methodical calibration or intellectual exactitude. These qualities recover ontology, politics as concerned with the nature of being, human and natural and serve to check the insanities of technocratic politics. The solution is not to purge politics of its rational element, but to enrich its content by incorporating the anthropological and ecological dimension. This implies a commitment to a rational knowledge worthy of the name, a knowledge which is all the more scientific for being a self-knowledge, unifying the inner and outer dimensions of nature and redefining freedom and happiness in ontological terms. This would make it possible to repudiate the urbanism and industrialism of capitalist modernity and its mania for artificial, quantifiable, objectifying, thing-like power, growth, efficiency, progress to embrace the existential society in which human beings are at peace with each other and with their environment.

The vast, overscale anti-cities continue to eat up the planet’s landscape in the wake of burgeoning industries and offices, machines and roads, the tightening global networks of finance, trade, and agribusiness, accelerating means of mass communication and transport, the global processes of investment, employment, production and consumption which control the lives of millions with seemingly inexorable force. The scale and pace of capitalist urbanisation and industrialism has transcended all limits and boundaries to constitute an artificial institutional-systemic apparatus abstracted from conscious human control.

To recover the anthropological and ecological aspects of reason is restore politics to its roots and project a new civilisation based upon ethical principles of harmony, balance, human dimension, ecological proportion. Such a politics descales the urban and industrial environment and rescales the common life according to what constitutes the happy habitat from the perspective of the new unity of reason and nature. 

The abstraction from nature refers to much more than human beings giving up an animal existence in a natural life in exchange for ordered freedom in a civil life. In coming to identify freedom with individual autonomy, the modern world has done more than abandon ‘animal’ nature but has severed the inner connection to the natural environment. The physical being of humanity has been hollowed out and given an artificial casing. The abstraction from nature has been accompanied by a dulling of the senses that bond human beings to the natural world – touch, smell and hearing – so that human beings have lost the capacity to conceive freedom in its essential anthropological and ecological form. The decline in some senses has been accompanied by the accentuation of another sense, the sense of sight. This is significant. Sight is the most abstracting and expropriating sense, taking possession of all that falls under its gaze. The senses have been ordered hierarchically and sight has been exalted in the modern panopticon civilisation. Seeing has been digitalised and mechanised and institutionalised in the social fabric and operates to suppress feeling in the modern world. Sight is a classic case of pursuing security and freedom through abstraction from the body, the real source of human power, fostering the illusion that freedom and security can be ensured by a disembodied mind functioning autonomously in a natureless world.

By suppressing the organic senses in favour of the abstracting, expropriating and rationalising sense of sight, human beings have stripped themselves of the capacity with which the autonomising tendencies of the modern world may be checked and prevented from descending into disembodied isolation. As a result, abstract disembodiment comes to prevail over sensuous communion at every point. Diminished, underdeveloped and unused, intimate and instinctual powers lose their potency and definitions, further isolating the individual and making it even less likely that human beings may achieve a deep, meaningful relationship with the outside world.

This process has been accompanied by a redefinition of notions of freedom, power and security. Rather than rely upon the growth, realisation and exercise of their own innate powers, human beings have sought to rely upon an institutional world based upon control and subjugation, an artificial apparatus of surveillance and control and manipulation based upon disembodied objectivity and abstract autonomy. Such an apparatus gives the illusion and the promise of freedom and security but can never deliver the reality. True freedom and security and happiness depend upon intimate and personal relationship with one’s own innate powers and with others, a matrix of mutual respect and reciprocity in which security is enhanced the more human beings empathise with nature, their own and that of others. This notion of reciprocity directly contradicts the dominant concept of security that prevails in the modern age. Abstract power, disembodied autonomy, value-free pragmatism, and narrow utilitarianism have operated to subvert personal relationships, making human beings less free, less happy and less secure than they would otherwise be if they were allowed and enabled to rely upon the growth and expansion of their own inherent nature.

Recovery of Place – global and electronic rootlessness
Abstraction is the most salient characteristic of modernity. The abstracting, rationalising tendencies of modernity has severed human beings from the natural environment, altering nature within and without in the process. It should come as no surprise that the very processes and forces which have worked to denature human beings have also operated to denature the external world. The result has been a loss of being and a loss of place. This is nothing new, the result of the digital information revolution, but is inherent in modernisation. Information and Communication Technology layers a new electronic rootlessness upon a previous rootlessness and works to entrench the deep sense of alienation that characterises the modern experience. Human beings in general, not just their leaders and representatives, are losing touch with reality in a most profound and literal sense. This applies to all humankind in that all are seduced by consumer images and celebrity culture, by the promise of fame and fortune. How could it be otherwise when ‘reality’ has become a hyper-reality spinning away in an electronic environment? Human interaction, exchange and communication has always been mediated but within grounded relationships and communities. Digital mediation in the new hyper-reality is the ultimate disembodiment and serves not to enhance human solidarity and communion but to disorientate. Human beings are detached minds circulating with neither a sense of being or place. The modern individual is suffering from an identity crisis, no longer knowing who they are or where they stand. The information revolution continues the process of abstraction that began with global enclosure. Where once human beings were separated from natural place, ICT is separating human beings from ‘social place’. The result is that human beings become precisely what market economics idealised them as being – rootless, self-interested, self-maximising atoms. Market relationships have brought about corresponding changes in human nature, achieving the autonomy of the atom manipulated by greater forces – the state and capital, the market place and the transnational corporations.

The TNC possesses interests and priorities which are independent of territory; it lacks a sense of place. There is no country which the TNC may call home in the sense of owing it a particular loyalty. Human history gives no other example of an institution which commands such a great share of power and resources and which looms so large in the key decisions affecting society and yet which is so rootless, irresponsible and unaccountable in terms of place. The principal characteristic of the TNC is its spatial detachment. The TNC is a global institution in a world which lacks global allegiances, restraints, and obligations. The world order is still basically divided along national lines and boundaries. This gives the TNC an unprecedented autonomy in that it owes no obligations to any one nation or place or people or government. The TNC is utterly devoid of spatial grounding and is the most obvious manifestation of abstract power. Without ties and obligations to particular places and governments, the TNC is free to exercise power over the whole planet. And the evidence is that it is using its autonomy to create its own institutional apparatus within that of the global political order, threatening to subvert legal codes and institutions through which centuries of struggle have sought to encode and embody freedom, rights and democracy. 

The important thing to note about the process of capitalist modernisation is its systemic character. Marx’s comment in the Communist Manifesto about there being no Chinese Walls checking capitalist expansion is apt. Behind the ‘freedom’ of the market, the idea that individuals voluntarily define themselves as consumers and give consent to consumer capitalism, lies physical and legal force. In every country land has been expropriated from people who, given the choice, would have preferred the customary way of life. Government elites at national, regional and local level are easily bribed to extend the market and the commodity exchange into places that have expressed no wish for either. Loggers, ranchers, miners, oil drillers, and settlers are the invading force who move in to flatten and scorch the habitat which people are accustomed to. The implications and the impact of the destruction of cultural resources which have taken centuries to evolve only becomes apparent in the long run. In the short term, capitalism lives off the moral capital that human beings have developed to order their existence. But capitalism supplies no organising ethic of its own – only the worship and pursuit of money. This is a principle of disorder and disorganisation not a principle of union. It fosters and encourages tensions, rivalries and jealousies, fear and insecurity. This destruction of cultural resources is not something that humanity can survive in the long run and, on that account, is the counterpart in the social world of capitalism’s destruction of natural resources in the natural world. And the point is that the ‘free’ market and ‘free’ trade are coercive forces deliberately imposed on people by political and business elites and, above all, systemically imposed on all by the inexorable working of a commodity economy.

The transnational corporations are in command of supra-national processes of production, investment and employment, monopolise global communications and transportation systems and control raw materials, pools of labour, and primary and secondary markets. Some of the biggest companies maintain fleets on the high seas that rival those of major states (Exxon) and employ thousands of people in dozens of countries. The degree of control over global affairs that this gives corporate CEO’s is rivalled only by a handful of a few heads of state. These organisations are creating a new quasi-political order within the increasingly empty shell of the old global order. The managers of the TNC’s ‘are making daily business decisions which have more impact than those of sovereign governments on where people live; what work, if any, they do; what they will eat, drink, and wear; what sorts of knowledge, schools, and universities they will encourage; and what kind of society their children will inherit’ (Richard Barnett 39:5).

As a spatially disembodied form, the power of the TNC is quite ephemeral in comparison with that of the spatially bound states and empires of the past. The TNC controls the world not by military force but, rather, by the force of its global communications. Its principal asset is the ability to manage processes of production, employment and investment by controlling the global commons – the land, sea, atmosphere, electromagnetic spectrum, outer space, and gene pool. Subject to no spatial ties and obligations, the domain of the TNC is the whole world. The TNC is in all places and yet is of no place. There is no spatial political authority which is capable of challenging the TNC’s commercial control of the entire global commons. The temporal domination exercised by the TNC is of a far more extensive character than the spatial domination exercised by the most powerful of nation-states.

The revolution in information and communication technology has played a critical role in the meteoric rise of the TNC to aspatial global domination. ICT not only facilitates the everyday operation of these corporate enterprises, but allows them to make their global reach effective. Without ICT, the TNC’s companies could not ‘keep track instantaneously with millions of pieces of information from all over the world’ (39:7). The TNC transacts business in all places but is of no place, they are ‘not located anywhere except in the computer itself’ (39:8). (Rifkin 295).

The business corporation is an inappropriate framework for the realisation of an ecological humanism; it lacks a sense of being and a sense of place. Human beings cannot develop the society of reason through such a framework. The transnational corporations possess a global reach which enables them to determine trade and economic priorities independently of and against national governments. These corporations are the main agencies in promoting the expansionary dynamic of the capital system. There is no possibility of national governments moving to impose limitations upon growth upon the corporations. Populations – the mass electorates to which governments must appeal – are dependent upon the employment, salaries and wages that these enterprises provide. Governments themselves are dependent upon the taxation resources they raise from an expanding economy. There is little prospect of governments even having the will let alone the power to bring the corporations under political control.

The principal agency in modern capitalism is the private corporation. This private institution has more wealth and power than democratic governments in the public realm. The private corporation asserts the freedom and primacy of economics over politics. Having emancipated economic life from the old political and communal regulations, acquiring the legal right to make profits independently of political patronage and privilege, private business has reduced the state to a subordinate position. The state is structurally dependent upon private capital; its power is secondary and derivative. The state cannot reassert the primacy of politics over the capital system and instead accepts its partnership role in raising its own resources by means of taxation within an ever expanding economy. The power of the state is thus secondary in being dependent upon the continued and unimpeded expansion of private business and trade to maintain the public realm. The symbiotic relation is not a partnership of equals. On the contrary, the state has been given the role of having to facilitate its main rival for power and resources. For politics in its original conception concerns the capacity of a people to consciously govern its collective affairs by means of deliberation, discussion and decision. This implies the capacity of a people to control the means of its socio-material existence as a condition of having the freedom to develop, realise and exercise inherent human potentialities. The private control of the means of production which buttresses economic freedom as the license to make money is the very antithesis of politics in this sense and works to subvert the conscious communal control which is at the heart of an effective politikos bios.

The TNC address the world as a single market, a ‘global shopping center’ (Peter Drucker 39:10). By creating a quasi-political authority by hollowing out the shell of the old political order, the corporations are working to transform the loyalties, identities and ties of peoples within all nations. Not all people, mind, only those sections of use and importance to the cause of global economic expansion. The new political authority is an exclusive rather than an inclusive entity and has little truck with democracy. The new corporate politics is interested only in the core workers, the white collar and management employees and technicians in the various countries. Significantly, these are beginning to identify their primary loyalty with their multinational corporate employer rather than with their national state (39:296).

This corporate transformation of the political profoundly alters the character and definition of freedom, security and happiness. Where once these values were bound up with the authority and protection of the state, they are now identified with the possession of corporate credit cards, corporate medical insurance, corporate-sponsored vacations, and corporate-subsidized housing. In time, there is every prospect of the greater proportion of those who once formed the demos breathing life in the civil sphere and public realm coming to see themselves as autonomous of place and as belonging to the company. They have identified their freedom with material expansion, their happiness with consumption and their security with continued employment. For decades now commercial interests have been actively promoting the idea that ‘consumer democracy is more important than political democracy’ (39:12). This in itself reflects the economic liberal position that the market is actually a more democratic institution than the political electoral system in that all individuals are active as agents using their money as votes.

The globalisation of economic relations is the culmination of the process of commercial enclosure. The end is the transformation of the entire planet, biosphere and all, into a single market. The only hope of reasserting the primacy of politics over economics and of restoring economics to its proper place as a means to human ends lies in an anthropological ecologism or an ecological humanism. Human beings recover politics by once more placing the human ontology at the heart of politics. And human beings can only recover their own nature by seeing themselves as a part of nature as a whole. The recovery of being and the recovery of place are twin processes within the recovery of a biosphere politics. Only then will it be possible to conceive a politikos bios that is capable of reasserting the primacy of politics as conscious human control over economics as a mere means. The essential condition of this politikos bios is the location of politics in social and natural life.

In his ‘Letter on Humanism’ Martin Heidegger makes the significant point that the word humanus derives from the word humus, the Latin for a nourishing and fertile ground (ch 36:4). The recovery of being and place is an organic process which requires that human beings recover this nourishing and fertile ground by identifying precisely their place within Nature. The expansionary dynamics of a capital system that escaped human control served to uproot humanity’s long-standing sense of being and place. Recovering humanity requires that human beings come to strike roots once more in the ground.


65 THE DUAL CITY
This chapter analyses the emergence of the Informational City as the Dual City entrenched in social polarisation. This development has a socio-historical context. The breakdown of fordism has had a powerful disciplinary impact on the three partners in the social contract – capital, labour and the state. ‘Big’ business, ‘big’ labour and ‘big’ government have been radically ‘downsized’ so as to become ‘lean and mean’ (Harrison 1994). Yet these three components have not downsized in equal measure. Post-fordism is characterised by the even greater dominance of corporations, now taking transnational form, by the weakening of the power of labour and by the disengagement of the state from the social and political concern to regulate capital in the public interest. The distribution of the costs and benefits of transformation have been unequal. The new economic geography is intensifying rather than eradicating social and spatial inequalities, distancing the city further from the project of justice through a vicious cycle of metropolarities that are entrenching and exacerbating existing inequalities of class, race and gender.

As a neo-liberalism, transformation has been characterised by an obsession with getting lean and mean through cutting labour costs and reducing trade union bargaining. There has been an expansion of part-time and casual workers, of multi-job families and households, in the participation of women in the labour market, homelessness, a widening income gap, social polarisation, relocation, investment flight, government deregulation and the corporatisation of government business (McDermott 1991), the expansion of less labour intensive technology industries. 

Changes within the city, associated with the regime of flexible accumulation and the rise of the symbolic economy, have involved the widespread destruction of existing mutual aid mechanisms within the associational space of urban communities, mechanisms which had hitherto enabled communities lacking in power and resources to exercise some capacity within urban space. Further, the capacity to exercise some control over space through communal solidarity and mutually supportive associations have been undermined at the very moment that those spaces have come to be exposed to encroachment and occupation by others. There are some profound social and spatial conflicts embedded in this context. Increasing class polarisation, as manifested in the massive and highly visible manifestation of urban poverty alongside conspicuous urban affluence encourages dangerous comparisons. ‘Fundamentally different class mechanisms for defining the spatiality of community come into conflict, thus sparking running guerrilla warfare over who appropriates and controls various spaces in the city’ (Harvey 1989:273). There is a conflict between the unemployment suffered by workers in traditional industries and the employment opportunities available to those living in urban environments benefiting from downtown revivals based on financial services and the organisation of spectacle. A newly affluent generation of professional and managerial workers has come to occupy a dominant place in entire zones of inner city urban space. This generation came to demand product differentiation in urban environments, improved quality of life and the command of symbolic capital.


All of these phenomena possess consequences that are expressed as a negative side of the new geographical economy (Harvey 1996). Polarisation between various groups is entrenched and intensified by the way that new telematics and telecommunications have altered the social life of cities. The new information based economies threaten to open up a gulf between the information rich and the information poor. Affluent and elite groups orient themselves to the Internet and home information and telematics systems whilst others lack access owing to price or lack of skills, coming to be trapped in information ghettos. The value of being ‘connected to the Net’ for individual life chances is increasingly acknowledged. There is therefore an increasing concern being brought to the attention of policy-makers that many countries are witnessing the emergence of a digital divide between those members of society who have access to networked computers and who have the skills to use computers and a large sections of the population who lack both access to computers and the ability to use them. 

The growing divisions between affluent and poor areas can lead to rising fear of crime, the “fortressing” of neighbourhoods through electronic surveillance systems, and an increasingly home-based urban culture where people’s working, shopping, access to services and social interaction may become mediated more via telematics than by social interaction in the public spaces of cities. The parallel shift towards market-based telecommunications regimes has added further momentum to this polarisation and growing unevenness in the social landscape of cities.

Graham and Marvin 1996

In examining the ‘network society’, Castells identifies the emergence of an unprecedented urban poverty on a global scale. Castells’ point is that this represents a new impoverishment and social exclusion as a necessary component of the new social system. This global urban poverty and exclusion is systemic rather than accidental, a necessary feature of the emerging global system: ‘This widespread, multiform process of social exclusion leads to the constitution of what I call, taking the liberty of a cosmic metaphor, the black information holes of informational capitalism .. Social exclusion if often expressed in spatial terms. The territorial confinement of systemically worthless populations, disconnected from networks of valuable functions and people, is indeed a major characteristic of the spatial logic of the network society’ (Castells 1998:162 164).

Applying this critical focus to the United States, Castells characterises the informational city as a dual city. ‘By dual city, I understand an urban system socially and spatially polarised between high value-making groups and functions on the one hand and devalued social groups and downgraded spaces on the other hand.. The power of new information technologies, however, enhances and deepens features present in the social structure and in power relationships’ (Castells 1998:27).

Reference to the ‘Dual City’ shows the tendency to urban dualism that exists at the core of the post-fordist metropolis. The process of urban industrial restructuring rests upon a basic polarisation which reinforces and entrenches existing asymmetries of power and resources and confirms the urbanisation of injustice on a global scale. The ‘Dual City’ may be viewed as the urban expression of the process by which labour is increasingly differentiated between two sectors in the new economy: the information-based formal economy and the downgraded labour-based informal economy. ‘The economy, and thus society, becomes functionally articulated but organisationally and socially segmented’ (Castells 1989). Since the informational economy possesses the structural tendency to generate a polarized occupational structure according to the informational capabilities of different social groups, Castells conceives the Information City as a Dual City. The social and spatial consequences of this stratification in the postmetropolis are profound:





Improved productivity through information at the top can generate structural unemployment at the bottom or the downgrading of social conditions for labour, particularly if trade unions are undermined in the process or the welfare state comes under attack by governments with a neo-liberal policy agenda. ‘The necessary mixing of functions in the same metropolitan area leads to the attempt to preserve social segregation and functional differentiation through planning of the spatial layout of activities and residence, sometimes by public agencies, sometimes by the influence of real estate prices. There follows a formation of cities made up of spatially coexisting, socially exclusive groups and functions, that live in an increasingly uneasy tension vis-à-vis each other. Defensive spaces emerge as a result of the tension’ (Castells 1993). This generates the ‘fundamental urban dualism of our time’, opposing the ‘cosmopolitanism’ of the elite in daily connection to the world (functionally, socially, culturally) to the ‘tribalism’ of local communities, retrenched and taking a last stand in their spaces in an attempt to withstand the macro forces that shape their lives but that are out of their reach (Castells 1993).

Castells points to the existence of a two-tier economy in which the gulf between the educated elites and the marginalized urban populations becomes ever sharper. This issues in a new urban order that is separated from its cultural tradition as a stock of common meaning, identity and solidarity.


On the one hand is the informational elite performing the directional functions in the global economy; on the other hand is the locally oriented population that is subjected to external pressures and that suffers from an identity crisis as a result. The crucial issue is the increasing lack of communication between the informational elite and the locally oriented. ‘The separation between function and meaning, translated into the tension between the space of flows and the space of places, could become a major destabilising force in European cities, potentially ushering in a new type of urban crisis’ (Castells 1993).

Castells’ argument raises important questions with regard to the relative power of local and national governments confronted with the information domination of multinational institutions. His analysis also suggests that information technologies will build upon existing levels of social inequality to generate an even greater gulf between rich and poor. A ‘dual city’ in which a professional and managerial elite manipulate and exploit a disadvantaged mass can be envisaged on these trends.

Castells concludes that the most important challenge facing all the major cities of the world ‘is the articulation of the globally oriented economic functions of the city with the locally rooted society and culture’. The separation between these two levels generates a ‘structural urban schizophrenia’ that threatens the social equilibrium and the quality of life. Whilst local governments are as powerless as national governments in face of global forces, they are much more adaptable to the changing social, economic and functional environment of cities.

Castells makes an important point here with respect to emerging models of urban governance. The effectiveness of political institutions will depend more on the capacity for negotiation and adaptation as against the power that they command. Power is fragmented and shared among a variety of decision-making organisations. The purpose is not to control the whole complexity of the new society but to address specific sets of problems and goals in specific local conditions. Local governments are therefore to be strengthened as a precondition for managing cities given their ability to work in the global economy and live in the local culture.

To realise this managerial potential, certain criteria must be fulfilled. The role of the citizen body is crucial. With the fostering of citizen participation, strengthened local communities are able to provide local government with information, communicate citizen demands, and form the ground of the legitimacy of local government. This enables local governments to become respected partners with the global forces operating in their territory. The interconnection and cooperation between local governments reduces the power of global economic forces to play governments off against one another, ‘thus forcing the cooperation of the global economy and local societies in a fruitful new social contract’.
A qualitative upgrading of the cooperation between local governments is made possible by new information technologies. A network of instant communication between local leaders enables ‘the formation of a true association of interests of the democratic representatives of the local populations. An electronically connected federalism of quasi-free communes could pave the way for restoring social and political control over global powers in the informational age’ (Castells 1993).

The realisation of such conditions would make it possible to reconfigure polis democracy on the (post)modern terrain. Some writers respond positively to globalisation and to post-fordist developments to envisage of future urban era composed of city regions. These would be units of taxation and would be more responsive to human needs than current regimes (Short 1989:26). So long as city regions could be carefully demarcated so as to reduce disparities in resources it is possible to envisage city institutions able to draw on local savings and invest in local businesses. This would make it possible to mobilize local authority pension funds and the savings of community associations. Local capital could be mobilized to sustain local communities, uniting investment, enterprise and community life. Financial capital would cease to be its own guiding principle but would be employed to aid those areas most in need. This would ensure a progressive redistributive effect rather than the regressive impact of widening inequality that typifies current developments.





This chapter will examine the trends and tendencies within post-fordist urbanisation which are intensifying social and spatial injustice, institutionalising increasing metropolarities in the carceral city. The city of reason envisaged in the philosophical roots of urban studies comes to be realised in the form of a repressive rationalisation.

Socio-Economic Polarities
The trends generating inequalities within towns and cities, what may be called metropolarities, are operative across the entire global economy. The overall effect is a tendency towards increased socio-economic polarisation, in the use of land, the organisation of labour, in housing provision and in the structure of consumption.

The expansion of service employment in cities and the expansion of inequality that has accompanied this development bears closer examination. A critical analysis of service-based urban economies reveals that there is extensive articulation of firms, sectors and workers who would appear to have little connection to the urban economy constituted by finance and specialised services. The truth is that they perform a series of functions which form a crucial component of the service based economy. The problem is that they do so under conditions of intensified social, material and often racial and ethnic polarisation.

The question to be answered here relates to the character of the city. The city, like the justice, democracy and freedom that constitute it, is a contested concept. Cities are the physical expression of the relations of power and control which structure society. The inhabitants of the city are varied, embracing a range of different identities and social divisions, rich and poor, young and old, men and women, black and white. These relationships are asymmetrical. Some are more advantaged or disadvantaged than others owing to the inequalities in power and resources. Different identities give rise to a diversity of needs, experiences and aspirations which do not receive equal weight within the city. One recalls here Colin Ward’s point that ‘the city exists for one particular kind of citizen; the adult male, white collar, out of town car user’ (Ward The Child in the City). Whilst some cities are better than others to live in from the perspective of the rich and powerful, the experience of the poor and powerless is depressingly similar. For poverty does not simply mean a lack of income but exclusion and marginalisation, a lack of opportunity to participate in urban processes and influence their outcomes in any meaningful sense. The poor are unable to register their needs, interests and concerns in the public arena. That is the nature of their exclusion. Their poverty is reinforced as a result.

Ultimately, pursuing the universal agenda of justice as applicable to all equally, there is a need to incorporate all voices in an urban politics. This is to generate a new, inclusive urban politics that is able to overcome the division between the core and the periphery. There is a need to conceive and sustain a politics concerned with the urbanisation of justice, encouraging the engagement and participation of all so as to create cities which embody the needs and preferences of all as citizens, recognizing the fact that the real urban wealth is the collective and individual creativity of all individuals as citizens capable of a public life, i.e. as something more than consumers.

The generically defined restructuring processes underway comprising globalisation, new information technologies and the transition to a postindustrial or postfordist society has entailed an acceleration of metropolarities. Inextricably entwined with the complicated spatiality of the globalised postfordist exopolis is the way that sociality is being recomposed in a diremptive, decentred and fragmented form. A more polymorphous and fractured social geometry is being layered upon older class polarities. The boundaries and relations of class, income, occupation, race, ethnicity and gender have been restructured so that the older polarities are joined by new polarities to create metropolarity within the new city. We are thus presented with multiple axes of differential power so as to generate an intensification of inequality at the heart of the emerging city.

Advocates of the new city point to the increasing numbers of billionaires and millionaires, the growing numbers of entrepreneurs and the way that these are able to exploit the range of global, national, regional and local processes that are now available. Building on the existing concentration of wealth in large cities, which have now become global cities, the rich and powerful are able to exploit new urbanisation processes to expand their wealth. ‘Here, they are able to maximise utility to profit from the new urbanisation processes, and, through their more footloose and reflexive locational choices, escape from most of the negative spillover effects of the postmetropolitan transition in protected residential enclaves and globalised financial and investment networks stretching out from their multilocational home bases’ (Soja 2000:269).

This generates a new poverty and polarity through a spatial mismatch. New technologies and the availability of cheap land stimulates the suburbanisation of employment and industry and leaves the disadvantaged trapped in the deindustrialised inner city, further estranged from mainstream society in a process that may be called ‘hyperghettoisation’. The transition to knowledge-intensive and information processing industries exacerbates this spatial mismatch with a corresponding educational and skills mismatch that works to further marginalize and exclude the underclass’ (Soja 2000:271).

A further problem concerns the organisational, political and intellectual capacities of social and spatial movements with an interest in pursuing social and spatial justice. Whilst polarisations around class (labour versus capital), race (black versus white) and gender (women versus men), the three areas of inequality embedded in capitalist society, are being intensified, it is becoming increasingly difficult for groups within each identity to mobilise around each of these interests. At the same time, the traditional practices of equality politics have faltered and become ineffective (Soja 2000:279). This has led to attempts to go beyond more explicitly class or labourist politics of social redistribution to develop new strategies for achieving social and spatial justice which are ‘more adaptive to the specificities of the globalised, post-fordist, exopolitan, and culturally heterogeneous contemporary urban society’ (Soja 2000:279). In Thirdspace, Soja relates these adaptive strategies to the development of a new cultural politics that addresses the problems of inequality not simply by focusing political struggle upon class, race and gender but by organising it around more cross-cutting and inclusive foundations of solidarity, collective consciousness and coalition building. This new cultural politics builds upon the three discursive ‘turns’ in critical theory and practice – the cultural, postmodern and spatial (Soja 2000:279).


In the meantime, whilst the new cultural politics struggles to innovate new modes of expression and representation, polarities intensify and multiply, building upon older polarities that have never been remedied. For the information poor are also the money poor, confined to housing estates, education and health systems characterised by underprivileged service.
Marx considered ‘the proletariat’ to be the universal class. The problem then was that it proved well-nigh impossible to unite the class around its common interest. The problem is worse now. The workforce is split between core and periphery. Marx focused upon the working class on account of it being the class which possessed the structural capacity to transform social relations from within. The problem now is that the most powerful section of the new workforce is firmly a part of the system, within but not against it. Information technology will serve about one-fifth to a quarter of the workforce in the new economy, those termed the manipulators of symbols by Robert Reich. These are the core workers whose health, welfare, education etc. the system ensures. The jobs requiring theoretical abstract intelligence plus deep and specialised education and knowledge, remain firmly locked in the centres of the largest western cities. There is also a huge range of jobs, of varied skill levels, which serve the new informational economy. These include the provision of personal services in restaurants and hotels and transport. These also remain firmly locked in the cities where the informational economy is located. There is a clear potential here for the labour force to polarize, fracturing society and institutionalising injustice in the process. As Charles Handy argues, information technology will split society. On the one hand there will be the ‘symbolic analysts’ who will ‘have a busy life but a nice life’ away from the crowd in the suburbs; one the other hand ‘there’ll be the rest, who don’t know how to use it, who don’t know how to make products out of it. And they live downtown, and they use public transport, and they’ll have a tough time. And this is the underclass’.
 
Workers in the old industrial urban centres are threatened by the casualisation of the middle class. The tradition of a lifelong secure professional career has ended, with the world of short-term contracts extending to embrace bank managers and even civil servants. Will Hutton has coined the phrase of the 40-30-30 society as a consequence of these changes. The top 40 per cent of the workforce can still count on the old-fashioned fixed career prospects; the middle 30 per cent are workers who move from one short contract to another, the irregularly self-employed and part-time workers; the bottom 30 per cent are unemployed or economically inactive on account of having given up hope of ever finding work. An iniquitous society will social injustice embedded into its infrastructure will issue from such figures. But whether it can last is doubtful. Hutton points out that the top 40 per cent is a shrinking group, with increasing numbers being forces into the zone of insecurity in the middle (Hutton 1995b:105-10).

The disturbing question concerns the evidence that the production of an underclass may not merely be the product of the deregulated economies of the Anglo-American world but that the underclass is becoming increasingly present in all advanced capitalist economies and their cities, regardless of social and historical specificities. The Keynesian solution to the problem of the underclass would be public expenditure to reflate the economy. The problem here is that many of the jobs that have been lost as a result of economic transition have gone for good and can never be recovered whilst the new jobs that have sprung up in their place require the new informational skills. The economy that the underclass has to enter and participate in is now an informational economy. Further, there are serious problems with the notion of a general economic strategy focused upon ‘the underclass’ as such. For the underclass comprises a variety of different strands, each of which behaves differently to the others. For Jencks, there is not one underclass but several. The only certainty is that economic prospects for less skilled workers have deteriorated markedly; after that, the evidence is patchy, with no general conclusions possible: ‘male joblessness and unmarried parenthood have increased; but welfare dependence and violence have stopped getting worse, school drop out rates and educational performance have got better, while teenage parenthood and poverty have stopped getting better..’.

Proposals to remedy the situation of the underclass make constant reference to the same things – education, training, social reforms, full time employment. But there is a pessimism with regards to whether society will ever be without the underclass. At the most basic level, this pessimism is born of a despair in public purpose: ‘For one thing, nobody seems to want to put up the money’ (Friedman 1993:464). As politics concerned with the public good fades away, it has become increasingly difficult to raise taxes for the public investment necessary to achieve the public purpose. JK Galbraith spent his career making the same point in much more propitious circumstances. It is difficult not to agree with Friedman when he concludes that: ‘For this reason, I fear, we are likely to bump along more or less as we are .. for now, at least, there may be nothing to do but grit our teeth and pay the price’ (Friedman 1993465).

Reflation will have little effect since the problem is one of job mismatch, that is, the underclass are defined by the very fact that they are undereducated and undertrained for the new urban informational economy.

Peter Hall is pessimistic in this regard, arguing that the ‘typically urban’ phenomenon occurred wherever traditional male employment opportunities disappeared and increasing numbers left without work descended into crime, drugs and alcohol dependency. As Hall argues: ‘The twin evils of crime and penury have been recurring leitmotifs of big-city life, at least since the urban explosion of the nineteenth century, more likely since the first cities of the ancient world; and usually they have been associated’ (Hall 1998:613). In the great cities the phenomenon is part of the general polarisation of income and living standards within free market capitalism but is ‘most exaggeratedly evident in global cities like London and New York and Los Angeles’ (Hall 1996:405/6). Hall admits that urban planning as such seems to have few answers to these developments. Local urban action proved incapable of remedying the problems caused by long-term unemployment, the causal connection of lack of employment with crime and drug addiction. These problems have their origins and hence their solutions outside of the boundaries of the urban authorities (Hall 1996:406). Hall fears that ‘polarisation might remain at the heart of the contemporary urban problem, and thus of the world that urban planning has to deal with’ (Hall 1996:408).

As the split between income rich and income poor is reinforced and exacerbated by the split between information rich and information poor, the threat of a total polarisation increases. The issue will not, however, rest there since there is every reason to believe that the problems of the excluded and impoverished left behind in the informational economy come to rebound on the more comfortable majority (Hutton 1995a).

The grounds for pessimism are many. The numbers of those dropping out of school (or being expelled from school), of training, of being unemployed having never been employed, of being unskilled at a time when the economy increasingly requires skill point to society being fractured within. Social exclusion is an inevitable consequence of such figures – one third of all young men under 31 have committed a crime (MacLeod 1995).

A more positive assessment focuses upon the fact that many jobs which are now available simply did not exist a quarter of a century ago. Studies reveal that job creation has exceeded job destruction in the advanced economies. Whilst the information technology revolution has, as predicted, destroyed jobs it has also redefined and created others. Jobs with low and even medium skill requirements may well disappear, not only in manufacturing but also in services. But the IT revolution will generate new jobs - systems designers, network engineers, programmers, interface designers, software producers, and producers of ‘infotainment’ plus many new openings in software delivery, training and consultancy (Hall:1998:981).

The question is whether the creation of these new IT jobs can be sustained in sufficient numbers in more than a few areas. As employment diminishes in manufacturing and then in services, there is every reason to fear ‘the nightmare scenario’ of a polarized city’ (Hall 1998:984). the condition becoming general. ‘Rising levels of worldwide unemployment and the increasing polarization between rich and poor are creating the conditions for social upheaval and open class warfare on a scale never before experienced in the modern age. Crime, random violence, and low-intensity warfare are on the rise and show every sign of increasing dramatically in the years immediately ahead. A new form of barbarism waits just outside the walls of the modern world’ (Rifkin 1995a:290). For Rifkin, such developments entail the end of manufacturing employment within the first decades of the twenty first century, followed by the automation of service work in the mid-decades. Rifkin concludes: ‘If the talent, energy, and resourcefulness of hundreds of millions of men and women are not redirected to constructive ends, civilisation will probably continue to disintegrate into a state of increasing destitution and lawlessness from which there may be no easy return. For this reason, finding an alternative to formal work in the marketplace is the critical task ahead for every nation on earth’ (Rifkin 1995a:291).

If technology has caused problems, it has done so by being applied in an already iniquitous and unjust society. Technology could also be a solution, achieving different results of more lasting benefit to society as a whole when allied to a progressive reform agenda. In this respect, technology has a central role to play in developing and sustaining an urban order in an informational context. The failures of compulsory state education with respect to basic numeracy and literacy can be remedied in less formal, post-compulsory educational settings in which technology facilitates self-paced learning, carefully adapted to the needs of particular individuals. With public provision, access and investment, skills can be acquired so that the information poor can turn themselves into the information rich much more easily than the income poor have ever been able to become the income rich. Applied in this manner, technology could become an agent of social reintegration rather than being used, as at present, as an agent of social division. Technology is not constrained by time and place, a point which implies that many of the factors which have served to exclude people from mainstream society will be less important – technology can serve the elderly, the sick and disabled, to people who live in distant communities with few services, people who don’t drive, the lost generations of the urban poor. There is no reason why a globalized community cannot be achieved, offering extensive life chances for its citizens, no longer having to seek satisfaction in the goods and services of distant places, who come to know their neighbours and even participate in local affairs: (986) (Mitchell 1995:103 170) an electronic version of Periclean Athens.

If this positive resolution of the urban crisis is not achieved, then the nightmare scenario of a polarized city takes over, urban dualism becoming designed into the physical and institutional fabric to ensure protection, safety and security from the negative consequences of urban injustice. (Hall 1998:984).

In this scenario, technology is employed not to educate and train but to oversee and to control. Bentham’s Panopticon assumes a new meaning as CCTV becomes ubiquitous throughout an increasingly uncivil society and as the electronic tagging of miscreants becomes commonplace: ‘discipline and punishment sans slammer’ (Mitchell 1995:77-8) ‘Already, in the cities of the West, batteries of public surveillance cameras are backed up by further phalanxes inside private offices, homes, university campuses, subway stations. Orwell in Nineteen Eighty Four never imagined a Big Brother as all-pervasive as was the urban reality half a century after he wrote. And this is just the beginning, if the crime statistics continue their rise and the public consciousness of crime continues to magnify reality. Certainly, reports from America suggest that increasingly police forces are seeing themselves engaged in a war against crime, using methods learned in low-intensity-operation overseas wars: Americans have found a new enemy, but this time within their own cities’ (Hall 1998:986; Woollacott 1996)

There is a crucial rider to even the most optimistic visions of technological progress. Even if most of these predictions are realised for most of the urban population, that does not itself imply the justice that is integral to a genuine urban order. The income and information rich may come to form a majority of the population and may come to enjoy a material affluence that is quite without parallel in history. But such a scenario could also imply that the minority not only exist in dire poverty, excluded from society, but are left there by the comfortable and well-off. ‘By redirecting access to services and opportunities, the growing information infrastructure has the potential to create winners and losers on a vast scale. It is pleasant to imagine a nation of networked Aspens and cyberspaced Santa Monicas peopled by convivial, bicycle-riding locals, but the obvious danger is that such restructuring will instead produce electronic Jakartas – well-connected, well-serviced, fortified enclaves of privilege surrounded by miserable hyperghettos’ (Mitchell 1995:170-1). At this point there is a need to reinstate the ethic of rational freedom that insists that the freedom of each is conditional upon the freedom of all and that no-one person is genuinely and fully free unless all are free.

For all of its potential, there is a real prospect that before the problem of social injustice arising from the division between the income rich and the income poor has been resolved, the ICT revolution will layer on an extra division, that between the information-rich and the information-poor. Such a scenario promises an almost total and maybe even irremediable polarisation in which the rich cannot fail to get richer whilst the poor must inevitably become poorer. In this scenario ‘the bandwidth-disadvantaged are the new have-nots’ (Mitchell 1995:17) who come to be completely excluded from the activities and opportunities of the mainstream economy and hence from the mainstream society. The new age of supposedly universal information by no means implies that access to information is universal; inequalities of income join inequalities of information.

The book will return to the development of the new modes of cultural politics on the part of citizens and communities. The next chapter, however, will consider whether the experience of the global cities – London, New York, Los Angeles – offers something of a paradigm of the future development of all cities. The chapter will address issues of the militarisation of urban space and the destruction of public space through an ecology of fear which has been generated in the context of division, inequality and injustice.

67 URBAN UTOPIA AND DYSTOPIA
Suburban Insecurity
Before the modern age, security had been a public or collective undertaking lodged in the local community. In the pre-modern world, cities stood apart as scaled workshops or markets whose common life and identity was bounded by their own walls. The walls were about limits rather than the enclosure of a private sphere. Walled cities represented a way of life within strict limits. The modern city – megacity or anticity – extends its concerns well beyond its already sprawling perimeters, absorbing every hinterland and wilderness into its instrumental metabolism, sucking them dry to sustain its own parasitic existence. With the rise of market society and the nation state, this notion of security was subverted. With the prevalence of market relations, civil society could no longer generate a common interest from within its affairs. The notion of the common good became an abstract notion appropriated by the state. In the process, the immediate community of everyday human experience was hollowed out and emptied of content, left utterly incapable of ensuring security.

In place of community is the surrogate community of those who have sought security through private accumulation and consumption – suburbia. Detached, autonomous, and isolated from the external environment, the character of the suburban house mirrors the personal character of its occupants. After 1870 ‘the new idea was no longer to be part of a close community, but to have a self-contained unit, a private wonderland walled off from the rest of the world’ (21:7). (Rifkin 165)
The security offered by the suburbs was defined in contradistinction to the public realm and community and was measured in varying degrees of separation from others. In such a world all individuals are strangers with the potential to encroach upon private space, even neighbours. Suburban security comes with a heightened sense of isolation. The process of withdrawal continued with the invention of air conditioning and television, community life disappearing as people retreated to behind closed doors. The tendencies to isolation even extended to journeys into the wider world via the private automobile. The modern individual appears through one set of doors only to disappear through another set, once more cocooned in a small world, this time of the car. And the promised security purchased at such a high price is so thin that the individual becomes obsessed with shutting the external world and other people out. That fear is a fear born of a real inner sense of insecurity. The pursuit of security through private accumulation and consumption cannot but be illusory in proceeding within wider social relations of a universal insecurity. Instrumental relationships in which each and all are engaged in competition for the private expropriation of scarce resources generates a condition of universal insecurity; even those who are successful cannot purchase, as they think, security, only a relatively more secure position in a war of all against all that must necessarily continue.

The growth of suburbia is exponential, each development representing not an incremental change but a change of scale. The first suburbs remain in close proximity to city and countryside alike. But as the city continues to expand and the countryside continues to retreat, suburb joins suburb, beginnings and endings blur into vast tracts of sameness and the scale of the whole thing balloons beyond recognition. 


Los Angeles – the Anti-City
Los Angeles is the paradigm of the attempt to redefine public notions of freedom, happiness and security. Patrick Geddes named the centreless, pseudo-urban forms that grew in response to industrial expansion ‘conurbations’ in order to distinguish them from real urban areas or cities. The beginning of twentieth century witnessed the emergence of loose industrial suburbs around Los Angeles area with the booming oil industry. This set the model for suburban settlement on which the rest of America came increasingly to be pattered. More than one-third of the area of metropolitan Los Angeles and two-thirds of Downtown LA is given over to the automobile in the form of highways, parking lots, and interchanges.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, America boasted the best and most used public transportation network in the world. With each railroad suburb clustered within walking distance of its station, with plenty of countryside between, the network effectively comprised a number of interconnected green villages. The process of sprawl began with the invention of the electric streetcar making a closer spacing possible. Cities trebled in size but the nexus of the web was really torn apart by the car. The key was to redefine freedom no longer as a public notion concerning relations to others, to community and place, but as an autonomous notion. Eric Fromm has written perceptively of the ‘fear of freedom’, of human beings fleeing from a freedom that they lack as personalities and are afraid to fight for. The car is the perfect embodiment of this freedom as a flight from the real thing. The car is the promise of an escape from a real world in which individuals, for all of their material power and conspicuous consumption, know that they lack real freedom. Henry Ford promised to ‘build a motor car for the great multitude’ so that every man might ‘enjoy with his family the blessings of hours of pleasure in God’s great open spaces’ (Eden 253). The implication is that the places where individuals habitually reside, work, live etc. are so degraded and despoiled, denatured and dehumanised that the car is necessary to take people away, periodically, to see how life should be. All over the nation, roads are laid out at great public expense, further diminishing the area of ‘God’s great open spaces’. Car makers, tyre makers, oil companies, road contractors, and developers joined in lobbying for new roads.


There is little nature anywhere that has escaped commercial or industrial encroachment, that is not criss-crossed by roads and air traffic skylines. This vehicular flight to a better place lies behind the expansion of tourism that sends opulent city dwellers ‘back to nature’ like a plague of locusts, turning that remnant of nature into something ersatz, appealing to tourists who have been denatured for so long that they are unable to recognise the real thing. The tourists only ever see what they want see, which, after years of indoctrination, is all that they can see, consumerized fantasy wilderness, nature as an amusement park. Tourists travel miles, by private car or jet, bringing with them the necessities of their urban-industrial civilisation, cluttering nature up with cars, phones, radios, cans, packaging and other commercial detritus. This nature isn’t nature at all, only a carefully constructed wilderness for the visual delight of urban dwellers on their days free from the grind of urban money making. The freedom promised by the car is not real freedom, only the freedom from.
 
A well-supported network of public transportation system would ensure and enhance the geometry of a region in a way that the addiction to the car and the airplane cannot, but even this network could not make good the loss of a varied landscape in close proximity to walk in, cycle in, and play in.
Suburbia can never form the basis of a genuine public life. It expresses an ethos that is incapable of universalisation. The suburban existence is available only to some and not to all. The suburbs are parasitic upon their environment, using resources and generating waste at unprecedented levels, and involving patterns of consumption that would exhaust natural resources if all adopted the suburban way. As an aspiration, suburbia is either physically impossible or an ideological deceit. It is a private rather than a public notion and the implication is that the promoters of the suburban way of life envisage it being taken up only by the affluent few and denied to the rest. As such it is a deceit. Should the way of life be universalised, however, resources would soon be exhausted. Suburban sprawls squanders land and energy and even time as individuals are forced to commute to work, school etc. Lack of time also places the emphasis upon convenience in eating and other functions, leading to a growth in pre-packaged life wasting even more resources. Suburbia is replete with commodities. Yet suburbanites never seem to have enough, are never happy, are always in pursuit of something extra to fill up their inner hollowness. 

Modern civilisation is characterised by millions of suburbanites who have withdrawn from relations to others in community to retreat within an almost hermetically sealed and sanitized pattern of existence. And such an existence is in abstraction not only from the community of other people – with all that that implies in terms of the decline of the public realm – but also in abstraction from nature. The suburban world is a shell, palaces of human dominion in which everything is possible at the touch of a button. The heat, the noise, the sights, the atmosphere, and the smells within are all artificial, indicative of human supremacy over nature. Centuries of ‘progress’ have sent the human race into this cul-de-sac. Behind this encaging of human experience is the Promethean promise that the more technological invention and artifice there is, the more ‘progress’ there will be; and the more progress there is, the greater the security for human beings. The truth is that technological imperialism has produced a human environment that is secure only in the way that a prison, a cage, a factory, a military camp are secure. Human beings began by seeking to conquer nature by technological means only to finish as prisoners of an artificial environment of their own making but which is beyond control. This self-imprisonment is a product of the identification of reason with the technological assault upon the natural environment is morally and ecologically blind. Blind to the damage that systems of material largesse have done to the human ontology, those who are addicted to private notions of freedom and happiness are uncomprehending when faced with the evidence that the deterioration of the biosphere a) is a consequence of human action and b) is now threatening the survival of human life on earth. The assertion of the autonomy of the technologically supreme human species has been assumed for so long that individuals are genuinely shocked to learn that their existence is in any way connected air, water, soil, plant or animal. The first reaction is one of denial – further withdrawal and retreat.

The discourse of (post)industrial urbanism, identifying the contours of the postmetropolis as a post-fordist flexible regime has drawn substantially upon the literature detailing the experience of southern California. And Los Angeles is in many respects the ideal case study when it comes to weighing up the future of the city. The Janus faced nature of the city is evident in the extreme views that writers have expressed with regard to its character. 

Although Lewis Mumford (1960) condemned Los Angeles as an anti-city dependent upon the automobile and suffering from ‘metropolitan elephantitis’ and ‘sprawling gigantism’, Los Angeles has also been considered a paradigm of the future city as the radically decentralised, polynucleated metropolis implicit in the promise of postmodernity. That Los Angeles has appeared as less a city than a conurbation of suburbs causes attention to switch back to the middle class suburbs developing in a sprawl outside major urban centres. Los Angeles shows the different pattern that suburban development can take. The ‘Edge City’ suburban ring is different from the old suburban development. It is here where houses, cultural centres, even jobs, are located. For Robert Fishman (1987), the new Edge City suburbs are actually technoburbs forming a new decentralised city. 

In the opinion of Sam Bass Warner jr, the land use and transportation structure of Los Angeles affords glimpses of a more humane environment than has ever been seen. He praises the low density of settlement, the ease and scope of movement by the citizens and the comparative lack of domination by a single downtown area. As a result of these features, Los Angeles has avoided the rigid core, sector and ring structure of business and residential occupation from which cities are trying to escape. In the early seventies, Warner thus offered a qualified optimism with respect to the future of Los Angeles: 





Warner was clear, however, that blocking the realisation of the potential for justice was the fact that Los Angeles contained a mechanism for class, racial and ethnic segregation. Far from being abolished in the decades since Warner wrote, this mechanism has been intensified by contemporary developments, opening up a sharp contrast between the high potential of the new metropolis and its bigoted, class-bound failure to realise that potential.

To overcome the waste and suffering associated with such a city, Warner called for a commitment from federal government and large corporations. Government needed to adopt a carefully considered policy for urban growth so as to ensure that the modernisation of the cities and of the economy would proceed humanely. Warner further called for the socialisation of the corporations so as to make them accountable for the public consequences of their actions. ‘Like the legitimate demands for decent work, comfortable housing, and an open inclusive society, the promise of today’s economy and its cities will not be realised unless the American public demands that government and business serve the goals of a humane society’ (Warner 1972). As this chapter will show, the potential for justice in Los Angeles has been realised in antithetical form; that is, the injustice of LA’s social relations has been designed into the institutional and urban fabric of the city by using material resources that could have remedied the problem of segregation through public policy.

The Los Angeles experience is important in having universal implications with respect to the emergence of the postmodern metropolis of the future. Los Angeles is an example of the city that is emerging as a result of the massive restructuring of global capitalism in recent decades. Los Angeles is one of the pre-eminent centres of the global economy. The city has all the features of the postindustrial city in its locationally dispersed financial services sector, in its extensive FIRE sector and its connection with the larger regional economy, consisting of a still substantial manufacturing base. Although Los Angeles may be described as a post-fordist city, it is not a post-industrial city. Whilst Los Angeles appears to be a bastion of private capitalism, its economic health is largely dependent upon government and public expenditure. This is particularly the case with respect to the military. Defence and aerospace contracts have continued to boost the economic growth of the region. Los Angeles is a ‘federalised metro-sea of state-rescued capitalism’ (Soja). 

These points relating to public expenditure are important in underlining the continued possibility of the social market solution to the problems of the city. Although government intervention for progressive social or public purposes is dismissed as belonging to a past Fordist or Keynesian model of urbanisation, the experience of Los Angeles shows ‘big’ government to be very much alive in the post-fordist era. The transfer of power and resources required so that business and government serve public goals, which Warner made the condition of the realisation of the potential for urban justice, retains its rationale. At present, however, the power and resources that could be available for the realisation of justice are being used to reproduce a condition of social and spatial injustice. Naturally, this impacts upon the character of urban space. Los Angeles boasts a huge concentration of police headquarters and courts as well as the largest women’s prison in the US. Los Angeles is a ‘dual city’ in which ‘yuppies’ live and work just a short distance away from the poor. Behind the glitz and the glamour enjoyed by the affluent, Soja identifies the hard edge of a class divided, racist, patriarchical landscape which the theme park imagery projecting middle class niceness conceals but can never suppress (Soja 1989).

This chapter is concerned with the emergence of a new postmetropolitan mode of urbanisation, paying particular attention to the development of the carceral city to regulate and urban context of social and spatial injustice. To check the tendencies towards violence and disorder there has been a move towards the greater regulation of society. This intensification of social and spatial regulation proceeds through a variety of developments in policing, surveillance, design, privatisation and governance in the urban environment. The result is that the political geography of cityspace exhibits a tendency towards greater repression. 

Influenced by Foucault, the postmetropolis can be articulated as a collection of carceral cities, an archipelago of normalised enclosures and fortified spaces which both voluntarily and involuntarily barricade individuals and communities into urban enclaves. These enclaves are shaped by restructured forms of public and private power, from enforcement and enclosures to the manipulation of imagery.

This is to focus upon the dark side that lies behind the glitz and the imagery of the city. The post-industrial economy is accompanied by extremes of affluence and poverty, with gated communities for the rich, patrolled by private guards, and ghettos for the poor, under total police surveillance. Police stations, courts and prisons are central institutions of the downtown. Impoverished violent ghettos characterise the urban ecology of the Los Angeles region, threaded throughout like a cancer in the body politic.

In the City of Quartz (1990), Mike Davis details how public spaces have been reshaped in Los Angeles through surveillance systems and security procedures. The urban fear expressed by the affluent has been institutionalised and embedded in the carceral city. Davis characterises the postmetropolis as a ‘Carceral Archipelago’, presenting a compelling picture of the ‘proliferation of new repressions in space and movement’ and of the ‘security obsessed urbanism’ that the pervasive ‘ecology of fear’ generates (Davis 1990). This ‘ecology of fear’ has become endemic in the postmetropolitan landscape, characterised as it is by a plethora of protected and fortified spaces, isolated and exclusive enclaves protected against the real and the imagined threats and dangers of everyday life.

Davis relates the most obvious features of spatial fortification like the gated communities and walled-in shopping malls that characterise the carceral city to the zeitgeist of postmetropolitan cityspace. Davis presents a picture of a totalising incarceration resulting from a security-obsessed urbanism. Police rather than polis forms the crucial part of the everyday life of the postmetropolis. This implies the destruction of the city:





The reference to the social imprisonment of a service proletariat is important in showing that the problem of the ‘other’ within the carceral city is not a problem of people who are not needed, an underclass, but is a class product. The people condemned to live in ‘repressive ghettoes’ are sections of the working class who perform essential functions in the urban economy.

In the chapter ‘Fortress LA’, Davis engages in a vigorous critical assault upon the disappearance of ‘genuinely democratic’ public space as a consequence of privatisation, incarceration and the militant assertion of social warfare over social welfare. Davis connects the destruction of public space to the ‘security offensive’ conducted by public officials, urban developers and professionals in order to satisfy ‘the middle class demand for increased spatial and social insulation’ (Davis 1990). As the walls were coming down across Eastern Europe, opening up an era of liberalisation, the western world was busy erecting its own walls within its own cities. The walls of the contemporary world divide not nations without but classes and races within. Behind the market driven strategy is a powerful bloc of class interests, driving through a process of privatisation, deregulation, and anti-welfare policies whilst employing the new technologies to control spatial access.

Davis highlights the obsession with physical security systems and with the architectural policing of social boundaries. This obsession has become the master narrative in urban restructuring. It represents the ‘militarisation of city life’, a ‘programmed hardening of the urban surface in the wake of the social polarisations in the Reagan era’ (1990). This expresses the transition to a post-liberal regime in which the affluent section of the community are prepared to protect their luxury lifestyle by the extension of new repressions throughout urban space supported by the pervasive ‘armed response’.

Police replaces polis, upholding a protective as against a developmental conception of the city. The city no longer concerns the progressive realisation of the human ontology, as with the Platonic and Aristotelian roots of urban studies, but instead focuses upon containing the consequences of a diremptive order which is destructive of the human ontology. Policing city space in order to impose civil peace replaces the concern with the good life as the master narrative. Whereas a humane urban order is naturally self-policing in being based upon justice, order being generated through solidary exchange and negotiation in cooperative, mutually supportive and enhancing relationships, the carceral city is created to impose policing in a physical, bureaucratic, institutional and coercive sense. The external ugliness of the city at the level of layout and design is a manifestation of its internal ugliness at the level of relationships.

Social trends point in the direction of the emergence of more carceral cities. The exclusive city replaces the inclusive city. These are ‘fortress cities’ which are divided internally between the ‘fortified cells’ of affluent areas and the ‘places of terror’ in which a criminalized poor live lives subject to constant police harassment. The formation of such cities is ‘a zeitgeist of urban restructuring’ and a ‘master narrative’ of the 1990’s stemming from the neo-liberal ascendancy at government level. A language of social warfare that considers the conflicting interests of the urban middle class and the urban poor to be mutually exclusive has replaced the language of social reform in the common interest. The interests of the middle class prevail at the level of public policy, with the poor all but forgotten. This has a profound impact upon the social relations of the built environment.

Los Angeles is thus part of a wider transformation of the spatial specificities of urbanism that, through the process of globalisation, is extending to the other main cities of the world. This transformation exhibits a tendency to fuse urban design, architecture and police control into a single, overarching apparatus of security. Davis argues that the ‘voracious consumption of private security services’ is driving the ‘enclavation’ of Los Angeles, studding the urban landscape with such repressive features as ‘high tech castles’, ‘belligerent towns’ and a ‘mansioning mania’ for terrorist proof residential bunkers. This ‘ecology of fear’ is self-perpetuating in that it feeds off itself, the profitable provision of ‘security’ in the private market serving to generate its own demand through an increasing paranoia. As a result, ‘security’ becomes a positional good defined by income access to private ‘protective services’ and by membership of an isolated urban enclave. Such ‘security’ measures offer not so much personal safety as personal insulation in residence, work and consumption. Social exclusion characterises such a society, marking the concern of the affluent to insulate themselves from ‘unsavoury’ groups within society.

The ‘neo-military syntax of contemporary architecture insinuates violence and conjures imaginary dangers’. Such a society offers not a genuine public culture but a plethora of ‘upscale pseudo-public spaces’ designed for affluent groups who locate happiness and freedom in the private space – shopping malls, office centres, cultural acropolises and architectural images. These ‘public’ centres are class infused infrastructures that correspond to the private interests of the affluent. They are ‘full of invisible signs warning off the underclass “Other”’. This shows how the urban built environment contributes to exclusion, reinforcing divisions between affluent groups who are ‘legitimate’ members of the community – it is ‘their’ community – and the poor whose presence in the community is resented and feared – they do not belong and are policed accordingly (Davis 1990:223/6).

(Davis has extended his concern with urban incarceration to environmental matters, showing the connection between social injustice and environmental injustice. Together, social and environmental injustice lead to ‘ecocide’ (Davis NLR 197 1993:3/28; NLR 199 1993:29/54; NLR 200 1993:49/73; 1998).

Examining the architectonics of security obsessed urbanism, Davis draws attention to ‘Sadistic Street environments’ created and sustained by a ‘low-intensity warfare’: ‘The city is engaged in a merciless struggle to make public facilities and spaces as ‘unliveable’ as possible for the homeless and the poor’ (Davis 1990:232). An ‘urban cold war’ is being waged to confine the poor and the homeless in Skid Row, employing ‘architectural policing’ so as to create a controllable ‘outdoor poorhouse’. Armed guards, locked gates and security cameras protect urban buildings and their inhabitants, hermetically insulated from the real world (Flusty 1994). In Policing Space (1997), Steve Herbert presents a first-hand account of a police division engaged in everyday operations to define, mark and control territory. Herbert’s perspective combines the work of Weber, Foucault, Giddens and others on the ‘microgeopolitics of state power’ to delineate ‘the normative orders of police territoriality’. He presents a number of ‘normative orders of police territoriality’ that contribute ‘to the ways that police officers conceptualise the areas they patrol and how they mobilise to control those areas, how they make and mark space’. These orders comprise Law (preserving legal regulations), Bureaucratic control (maintaining internal order through the chain of command and the differentiation of responsibilities), Adventure/Machismo (demonstrating strength and courage), Safety (preserving life) and Morality (demonstrating goodness through triumphing over evil) (Herbert 1997:5).





These strategies for defining, marking and controlling space on the part of various groups stems from the infrastructure of social and spatial injustice and the way that it generates an ecology of fear which feeds the increasing militarisation of urban space. In the absence of real community, a community based upon reciprocity and solidarity that is able to generate order internally, the recourse to force is inevitable. To legal force is added technological force, merging an external form of policing and a technologised form of self-policing. The urban environment falls under a disciplinary technology of security and surveillance that comes to police the entire region with endless eyes. This amounts to an urban incarceration ‘a de facto urban renewal program, operated by police agencies.. threatens to convert an entire salient of Downtown – East LA into a vast penal colony.. Jails now vie with county/USC Hospital as the single most important economic force on the Eastside’ (Davis 1990:254).

One recalls here Warner’s demand that business and government need to be made to channel power and resources positively into the creation of a humane order so as to realise the potential for justice contained in contemporary urban developments. The problem with the dissolution of the Fordist-Keynesian paradigm is not that this potential for public good has diminished but that the power and resources to achieve positive ends are being canalised into sterile, repressive forms designed to maintain a failing order of urban injustice:





Incarceration and a policed state are embedded in the city centre, the Detention centre emerging as the jewel in the crown of carceral downtown (Davis 1990:257). An extensive panopticon mall of federal government offices and highly controlled spaces emerges, with the ‘postmodern Bastille’ at its heart. A public space that is genuinely democratic in being accessible to all is all but extinct. Public amenities are in rapid decline and streets are becoming desolate and deserted. Municipal policy takes its lead from the middle class demand for security and for increased social and spatial insulation. To check this process requires that the destruction of public space be reversed so as to reconstitute urban public space as a genuine public realm.


68 THE DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC SPACE
The most important aspect of Davis’ argument with regard to the critical purposes of this thesis pertains to his exploration of the way that the militarisation of urban space impacts upon public space. ‘The universal and ineluctable consequence of this crusade to secure the city is the destruction of accessible public space’. Public spaces are devalued as urban redevelopment converts vital pedestrian streets into ‘traffic sewers’ and public parks into ‘receptacles for the homeless and wretched’. The city is being turned ‘outside in’. ‘The valorised spaces of the new megastructures and super-malls are concentrated in the center, street frontage is denuded, public activity is sorted into strictly functional compartments, and circulation is internalised in corridors under the gaze of private police’ (Davis 1990:226/7). In Los Angeles, genuinely democratic space is all but extinct.

For Davis, the old liberalism is no longer in operation as a mode for regulating urban society. Rather, a neo-liberal or, even, a post-liberal political culture exists as the creed of the rich and the powerful, once more asserting the identification of liberty and property, and closing off the possibility of social reform through a ‘rhetoric of social warfare’. Asserting this social warfare against social welfare, neo-liberalism backs its dogmatic assertion of the claims of the affluent with a political calculus that engages the poor in a zero sum game that they will not be allowed to win. The notion of a public sphere that is genuinely inclusive in combining the freedom of each with the freedom of all has been systematically dismantled. All that remains is the ‘democracy’ of the market in which all have to shift for themselves as individuals. This transformation has sent the gradual development towards a more egalitarian distribution of wealth into sharp reverse. Distribution finds itself on the political agenda now not in terms of a more egalitarian distribution of social wealth but in terms of restructuring material incentives to the enterprising. At the same time, the power of labour – the social force capable of underpinning a politics of social redistribution - is systematically undermined. The welfare state is dismantled as a matter of deliberate policy. Further, interurban competition intensifies the process of polarisation at the local level by replacing a concern with egalitarian redistribution with subsidies to business and upper income groups with a view to encouraging investment. Rising living standards are made a function of economic growth rather than of a redistributive politics of social justice.





Cities are subject to processes and forces that are external to them. The urban environment is subject to the control of large scale forces of private capitalism and public authority. The impact upon urban life is pathological. The key elements of cityspace are expanded beyond human scale, reducing the sense of and capacity for control on the part of city dwellers. With the phenomenon of giantism, individuals lose the capacity to comprehend and control their homes, neighbourhoods, communities and cities.

There is a need to be aware of the strong strain of nostalgia that is present in a good deal of urban studies. Much twentieth century writing exhibits a yearning for the civic achievements of the Athenian polis, the Roman republic, the cities of Renaissance Europe, the township democracy of New England. Such nostalgia extends also to the Fordist-Keynesian city insofar as such a city sought rising living standards for all on the basis of an equitable social redistribution. The critical revaluation and appropriation of past urban forms and (ever present) ideals must necessarily be layered upon the appreciation of real, immanent potentialities contained in existing processes of urban restructuring if nostalgia is to be avoided. This is to mobilise and actualise emerging sources of solidarity in the (post)modern political culture, innovating new strategies in the struggle for social and spatial justice. 

From this perspective, the new social movements that have excited so much interest in post-marxist academic circles can be appreciated as spatial movements that are capable of operating as vehicles of socio-urban and ecological justice. This has profound implications.





A comprehensive range of politically significant socio-spatial movements have developed in recent years within urban regions, promising to restructure power in progressive directions and containing the potential to reassert social welfare against social warfare. Such movements offer a ‘new’ politics that is significantly more nuanced than the simple class-polarised politics associated with capital-labour relations. Instead, the new socio-spatial movements proceed from the active attachment to location and neighbourhood, mobilising a coalition of individuals and groups across rigid class, gender, generational, racial and ethnic identities. An intercultural politics of space is both the premise and the promise of this development. Such a politics is more attuned to the postmodern political culture than the simple two class model of Marxist politics, promising a dialogic mode of thought, action and organisation as against the monological model associated with top-down bureaucratic structures.

From this perspective, Mike Davis’ City of Quartz is too closely tied to the old model of politics, inviting nostalgic visions of proletarian subjectivity and class struggle, even of the disappearing ‘old liberal paradigm’ or reformism. Davis portrays a premonitory picture of a rigidly binarized metropolis and continues to embellish its pathological diremption with a detailed description of the destruction of the public sphere in response to the ecology of fear. 

Davis’ analysis is characterised by an inherent pessimism. The postmodern metropolis emerging out of present trends and tendencies seems to be the result of an inexorable, irreversible process. The carceral city is irrevocable. On his own premises, Davis can propose no way of escaping the nightmarish vision he projects. To chart a path towards the reconstruction of the public realm, the good life and social justice means identifying the forces and agencies for creating an alternative urban future.

Davis’ analysis is heavily focused upon a range of urban pathologies forming the ‘bad edge’ of postmodernity. This view implies that postmodernity possesses a ‘good edge’ that is worthwhile to explore for alternate possibilities. Presenting Davis’ argument this way leaves open the progressive possibility of adapting to the new cultural politics and the participatory revolution that is underway, generating new modes of socio-political expression, a new expressivist mode of political culture (Gibbins ed 1989).

Davis is undoubtedly correct when he argues that the public sphere is in rapid retreat in confrontation with the rapacious pressures of private interest. With commercial appropriation and privatisation, public spaces are becoming progressively less public and progressively more exclusive. Formerly public areas come to be governed and financed, largely or wholly, by a private organisation, often in the guise of a quasi-public authority. In terms of power and resources, these private organisations are much better placed than corresponding public organisations. Zukin makes these points with respect to the public parks in New York.





The consequences are a decline in public life, culture and consciousness. ‘Public space that is no longer controlled by public agencies must inspire a liminal public culture open to all but governed by the private sector’ (Zukin 1995). Motifs of local identity come to be chosen by commercial property owners and merchants, giving a different form of visual consumption catering to a different constituency. As a result, ‘culture functions as a mechanism of stratification’ (Zukin 1995). ‘The flight from “reality” that led to the privatisation of public space in Disney World is an attempt to create a different, ultimately more menacing kind of public culture’ (Zukin 1995). The point of such developments is to generate an illusion of safety so as to foster consumption. Rather than connecting the visitor with an authentic past, such schemes project a fantasy world in which an ostensibly meaningful existence is made available for purchase (Fainstein 1994).

Such developments lead to the enforcing of distinctions through public policy and civic design in such a way as to erase the roots of civil rights and liberties as things that are universal and hence applicable to all members of society. This point has a substantial bearing upon the social modes of expression emerging from within communities. Since society is grounded in asymmetrical relations of power and resources, it follows that the social movements that emerge to press their particular interests will not necessarily be progressive and emancipatory in pressing the universal interest but may well be vehicles of inequality; to premise urban social movements on this basis of unequal relations suggests the phrase that Marx used with respect to the medieval estates – democracies of unfreedom.

Post-structuralist urban critics like Christine Boyer and Michael Sorkin have ‘read’ the lineaments of power in the form of the built environment (Boyer 1992:181/204; Sorkin 1992). Looking back to a time when the city expressed a greater heterogeneity, Boyer and Sorkin criticise the artificiality and ‘false diversity’ of theme park projects which produce only a simulacrum of urbanism, an ‘analogous city’ (Boddy 1992:123/53). By the same reasoning, one should be aware of social organisation and activism that projects a veneer of democracy and community interest but which has private interest at its core. Such movements do not aim at universalism and social inclusion but have the preservation of exclusion as their aim.

Rather than emphasise uneven development, post-structuralist critics are concerned to criticise the contemporary city as being the product of a white male capitalist elite using its privileged position to impose order upon subaltern groups who have potentially unruly lifestyles (Sennett 1990; Wilson 1991; Zukin 1991; Knox ed 1993). The mechanisms of city planning are geared to achieving subordination, segregating use through zoning and isolating social groupings through the development of large projects and separated suburban communities (Sorkin ed 1992; Fishman 1987). The peak of the development of this trend towards exclusionism is the rise of gated communities. These appear as bourgeois utopias protecting social homogeneity and property interests through a vicious class politics in which middle class homeowner groups combine their privatised politics with capitalist elites in control of global processes in order to extinguish progressive social welfare policies and destroy the public interest.

Mention has already been made of gated communities with respect to Mike Davis’ work on Los Angeles. The gated community is present in both the poor inner cities as well as in the affluent outer cities. Blakely and Snyder have estimated that there are at least 20,000 gated communities in the US, comprising some 3 million households and 8.4 million residents (Blakely and Snyder 1997:7).

Dennis R Judd presents a more narrowly focused version of Davis’ perspective on gated communities. His ‘The Rise of the New Walled Cities’ begins with an historical analysis of the erosion of public space. This forms the starting point for the comprehension of the evolution of fortressed space (Judd in Liggett and Perry eds 1995:144/66). In a section entitled ‘Appropriating the symbols of Public Space’, Judd shows how architects and developers employ the imagery of the ancient public marketplace to refashion the urban fabric around highly enclosed, privatised and monitored commercial and residential space. Judd builds upon Kowinski’s The Malling of America (1985) to describe the transformation of shopping malls into enclosed fortresses of a pseudo-urbanism. These ‘new megastructures’ are ‘fortified cells of affluence’ and ‘gilded private enclaves’ that serve to seal off the city from the outside. Judd compares the enclosed city of the contemporary era to the enclosed marketplace of medieval times, addresses the impact that the creation of new urban enclosures is having upon the restructuring of citizenship.





Examining the way that private power impacts upon public policy, Judd examines the enclosure of the residential community in the ‘common interest development’ (CID), typically presented as ‘community’. In this ‘community’, residents own or control common areas and shared amenities while possessing ‘reciprocal rights and obligations’. Conceiving Davis’ Los Angeles as a possible ‘harbinger of the urban future’, Judd argues that the ‘boundaries of CID’s separate the private from the public world both physically and symbolically. The relative affluence and security of the protected realms creates a stratified culture of separation that makes public space less and less desirable’ (Judd 1995:162).

These CID’s are formed by contractual agreement binding residents to certain rights and obligations. Sometimes these contracts are ‘themed’ according to a chosen image for the community. In this scenario, contracted rights and obligations are thicker and more restrictive in that they are concerned above all with maintaining the official community image. Some lawyers refer to CID’s as association administered servitude regimes, a phraseology which strengthens the argument of those for whom CID’s represent a form of oppressive ‘private socialism’.

CID’s and gated communities are privatised forms of community and are heavily involved in the erosion of public space and the fortressing of the city. The gated community is at the apex of this fortressing and takes many forms. The Lifestyle Community embraces retirement, leisure and golf communities as well as the suburban new town. The Prestige Community refers to preserves for the rich, the famous, the executive, all in the very highest upper income bracket. The Security Zone Community is constituted as a response to the fear of crime and of outsiders. Blakely and Snyder divide this community into three types: the city, the suburban and the barricade. The barricade is primarily located in the poorer areas.

Blakely and Snyder give a detailed definition of the typical gated community:

Gated communities and residential areas with restricted access in which normally public spaces are privatised. They are security developments with designated perimeters, usually walls or fences, and controlled entrances, that are intended to prevent penetration by non-residents. They include new developments and older areas retrofitted with gates and fences, and they are found from the inner cities to the exurbs and from the richest neighbourhoods to the poorest. Their gates range from elaborate two storey guardhouses staffed twenty four hours a day to rollback wrought iron gates to simple electronic arms. Guardhouses are usually built with one lane for guests and visitors and a second lane for residents, who may open the gates with an electronic card, a code, or a remote control device. Some communities with round the clock security require all cars to pass the guard, issuing identification stickers for residents’ cars. Others use video cameras to record the license plate numbers and sometimes the faces of all who pass through. Entrances without guards have intercom systems, some with video monitors, that residents may use to screen visitors.

Blakely and Snyder 1997:2

Gated communities of this kind are becoming widespread, rapidly increasing in numbers around large metropolitan areas. The technologies of surveillance are becoming endemic in the urban form, reconfiguring urban areas as controlled space. Under the association-administered servitude regimes, microgovernance and ‘civic secession’ revolve around what Foucault referred to as ‘little tactics of the habitat’. As such, they represent experiments in private local democracy. They represent a process of renegotiating public and private boundaries but not in the sense of generating a new public but in the sense of confirming the erosion of the public, the subversion of a genuine universal public by dominant private interests. This is the very reason why Plato denied private property to the Guardian class and why Rousseau was sceptical of partial associations. 

There is, however, another view. Just as Aristotle argued for private property as the basis of the state and Hegel sought to achieve an institutional mediation via corporations. There is a case for arguing that the renegotiation of the boundaries between public and private space taking place today is as much a reconstitution of the public sphere as its destruction. From this perspective, the focus falls upon the ‘opportunities for progressive change built in to the fortressed and territorialized geographies of the postmetropolis’ (Soja 2000:302). Describing homeowner’s associations (HOA’s) as ‘residential private governments’, Evan Mackenzie conceives Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government in terms of an emerging Privatopia (1994). Mackenzie argues that ‘the words public and private may seem distinct enough – and they are used in popular and political discourse as if they were – but they are not’ (Mackenzie 1994:123/4).

Mackenzie explores the implications of HOA’s, CID’s and RCA’s as a private and public empowerment. Mackenzie’s final chapter opens with Ebenezer Howard’s view that the Garden City as a form of planned community would replace the traditional city. Privatopia lacks the socialist character of Howard’s Garden City. Nevertheless it is possible to see new forms of private government emerging from within the old form of the city:

The provision of RCA’s could be extended to the private governance of existing neighbourhoods that consist now of individually owned properties. Using the RCA model, the concept would be to establish the private neighbourhood as a building block for metropolitan political and economic organisation…




CID housing involves more than the privatisation of a number of local government services. It ‘constitutes and facilitates privatisation of the land planning function itself and of the process by which it is decided where and how people will live in American urban areas’ (Mackenzie 1994:182). The suggestion is that these ‘private governments’ will come to assume an increasingly crucial role in the future.

There is a danger of reading the transformation that is taking place in urban space as necessarily implying an undemocratic transfer of power to the private sphere, something that involves an unambiguous diminution of civic freedom and is a denial of citizenship. The institutional separation of public and private space, which liberal theory makes the condition of democracy, works to prevent a more comprehensive awareness of democratic possibilities contained in the spatial specificities of urbanism. It blocks the emergence and expansion of a consciously spatial politics which is able to identify spaces and places of mobilisation, resistance and solidarity in the city, a politics which is able to contest the pathological developments identified by Mike Davis. Showing the influence of Foucault, Thomas Dumm highlights the possibilities for resistance contained in the restructured governmentality of cityspace.

The new Enclosures cannot endure because they cannot sustain themselves. While suburban life is not yet an oxymoron, it will become one if those excluded from its peace are given only the miserable and incommodious lives of exclusion to live. The alternative future is upon us in the United States. It can and will result in the replication of the Los Angeles riot. But at the same time it is possible for the emergence of a politics of deterritorialisation and reconnection, a politics in which arguments over space – its enclosures, exclusions and internments – become subjects for debate and discussion, and more important, for resistances and transgressions.

Dumm in Gooding-Williams ed 1993:178/95

Engin Isin’s geohistorical analysis of ‘the metropolis unbound’ seeks to reorient the contemporary discourse on global urbanisation to delineate the shift from the metropolis to cosmopolis (Isin in Caulfield and Peake eds 1996:98/127; Isin in Bell, Keil and Wekerle eds 1996:21/34; Isin 1997:115/132). Isin focuses his critical analysis on the contemporary struggles over citizenship and the ‘rights to the city’. Isin is concerned to develop these questions at a much deeper level, tracing a Foucaultian genealogy of citizenship and cityspace in the ‘history of the present’. ‘The period between 1921 and 1971 was the era of the metropolis: a dominant city core surrounded by several cities, towns and villages economically and socially integrated with it… The twentieth century metropolis has become a polycentric urban region’ (Isin 1996a:98/9).

Isin envisages the city of the future as the poly- or the multi-nucleated city. Isin comes up with a number of terms to describe the ‘metropolis unbound’ – the multi-nucleated metropolitan region, the polycentric urban region, the new techno-city, post-suburbia, the city without, the postmodern urban form, the city-state. Isin describes the metropolis unbound as the ‘cosmopolis’: ‘The cosmopolis .. signifies the global character of the metropolis unbound .. still a polis, albeit a fragmented, sprawling and global one’ (Isin 1996a:123).

Isin’s conception of the cosmopolis reorients urban discourse by identifying the opportunities and challenges generated by postmetropolitan transition in a global environment. This makes it possible to rethink traditional conceptions of democracy and citizenship from a more explicitly spatial perspective. In the process, established and institutionalised conceptions of the public realm and its connection to civil society, community organisation and development, cultural politics, social justice and moral order can be reworked (Friedmann and Douglas 1998).

Whatever the name, the new urban form is ‘marked by hitherto unimagined fragmentation; by immense distances between its citizens, economic, cultural, social and political; and by novel planning problems, which raise the stakes for and may very well demand changes in the way we think about urban planning itself’ (Bloch 1994:225). For Raymond Rocco, ‘the spaces created by the complex and multidimensional processes of globalisation have become strategic sites for the formation of transnational identities and communities and the corresponding emergence of new types of claims within these transformed spaces’. These claims to ‘associational rights’ and the ‘networks of civic engagement’ promoting them are grounded in and derive from ‘situated practices’ that are attuned to the particular geography of the globalised city-region, particularly to those ‘spaces of difference’ theorised as third space or margins. These claims, then, are essentially spatial claims, localised demands for increased rights to the city and for spatial justice and regional democracy. These generate new urban spatial movements, not merely social movements, especially amongst the marginalized and the excluded, the immigrant populations and the working poor. It is amongst these radically particularised and politicised spaces that geopolitical and critical discourses may join to further the comprehension of the emerging postmetropolis as a lived experience (Rocco in Isin ed; Rocco 1999:95/112).

Post-fordist transformation contains within it points of resistance and empowerment. Possibilities for decentralisation and deconcentration combined with the cultural concern with the qualities of place and space generate an environment that enables the politics of community, place and region to develop in new directions. In this context, Frampton (1985) advocates a regional architecture of resistance to the homogenizing forces of global capital.

The poorer sections of the urban community have never had greater opportunities for political involvement through their immediate localities. There is every prospect for the extension of a grassroots, cross-class and intercultural movement and consciousness that embodies and articulates the ‘private’ concerns of HOA’s in a public sense: greater levels of self-governance; greater control over speculative private development; improvements in the quality of life; greater environmental protections; representation in planning decisions; improved safety; affordable housing. All of these developments amount to a reassertion of local power against the alien control of the external forces and processes of globalisation and urban restructuring. This is to argue that the ‘new urban environmentalism’ need not be restricted to the ‘privatopia’ of the middle class but has a more general and progressive significance. This new urban environmentalism has sparked an environmental justice movement in all classes and nations. A new spatial politics is emerging which is capable of embedding issues generated by inequalities associated with class, race, gender and ethnicity in a new strategy of space and place making.

The struggle over the city and its culture is a struggle over social justice and civil rights. The question of whether a genuine universalism is possible is crucial to the survival and reinvigoration of public life and culture. The affluent, possessing class stress only the identification of liberty with property as against the universal concern with human right in general. The identification of liberty and property asserts right as privilege and reinterprets public life as a problem of order imposing the civil peace. This propertied class divides the public from within as they withdraw into small urban spaces protected by walls and barriers, refashioning their spaces of private control to project the image of civility whilst denying its reality.

Neil Smith points to the emergence of this new kind of urbanism in the US. This new urbanism represents a ‘galvanation of global shifts and personal identities via a gathering and vengeful reaction that pervades an increasingly market-determined public policy – the advent of ‘the revanchist city’ (Smith 1996). Hitherto accepted notions of social justice and explicit concern with injustice, which had been central to progressive urban objectives in the 1960’s and 1970’s have fallen away, along with liberalism and socialism. ‘The new urbanism results from the political and cultural rush to fill this vacuum’ (Smith in Merrifield and Swyngedouw 1995:117).

The new American urbanism to which Smith refers has two aspects, internationalism from above combined with a revanchism from below. These two aspects are inextricably interconnected. Faced with the global power and reach of international capital, nation states are increasingly reluctant to expand regulations and, indeed, have been more concerned to dismantle existing social democratic controls in order to improve their attractiveness to capital. The dismantling of social democratic controls and the privatisation of public functions are responses by governments to redefine a political role for themselves at a time when their economic functions are increasingly subordinated to the global economy. Smith concludes by noting that the ‘trickle down’ theory promoted by neo-liberal governments supported by the affluent is associated with the decline in public institutions, increasing economic and personal insecurity. These are the ‘progenitors of the revanchist city’ (Smith in Merrifield and Swyngedouw 1995:117).

The power and wealth of the privileged has been augmented by the new informational technologies, multimedia and telecommunications, reinforcing asymmetrical relations. Those on the receiving end of these developments – the poor and the powerless – have come to be imprisoned by them (Massey 1994). Castells envisages ‘a new and sinister urban form: the Wild City’:





The alternative has to be developed through a social transformation. This means envisaging a distinctive form of urbanisation. An investigation of the urbanisation of capital, particularly at this post-fordist juncture, reveals the possibilities that may be exploited as well as the structural and systemic constraints that obstruct the emergence of the alternative. The geohistory and political economy of capitalism has shaped the social and physical environment profoundly. ‘These landscapes now form the humanly created resources and productive forces and mirror the social relations out of which socialist configurations will have to be carved’ (Harvey 1989:57). The difficult question concerns how it may be possible to break out of the structuring and reproduction of spaces of domination and subservience, of advantage and disadvantage, without thereby destroying the basis of social life. ‘The urbanisation of capital imprisons us in myriad and powerful ways’. ‘The problem is to understand the possibilities and create the political instrumentalities appropriate to their exploitation’ (Harvey 1989:57).

Any theory concerned with the transition to socialism must grasp the process of how capitalism becomes urbanised. In the final paragraph of Social Justice and the City, Harvey writes: ‘A genuinely humanizing urbanism has yet to be brought into being. It remains for revolutionary theory to chart a path from an urbanism based in exploitation to an urbanism appropriate for the human species. And it remains for revolutionary practice to accomplish such a transformation’ (Harvey 1973). Such a view begs the question as to who the ‘revolutionaries’ behind this genuinely humanizing urbanism may be. Traditionally in Marxist theory the proletariat is the revolutionary agency, the class possessing the structural capacity to transform social relations and constitute the new social order. But Marxist class politics has been faltering throughout the twentieth century, the proletarian agency being all too often subverted and displaced by parties and institutions dominated by the professional middle class. There is a need to restate revolution as a praxis and as a process in which those constituting the new social order participate, changing themselves as they change their circumstances. In this sense, the praxis of a genuinely humanizing urbanism is and remains in the hands of the members of the urban community themselves.


69 NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE SOCIAL MARKET ALTERNATIVE
The globalisation of economic relations has been accompanied by the hegemony of monetarist ideology and the demise of Keynesian demand management. Privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation became the keywords of the 1980’s, emphasising private enterprise, market forces and the withdrawal of the state from economic activity (Dunford 1992a:166).

There has been an explicit repudiation of Keynesian ideas of economic management through public intervention and regulation (O Donnell 1994:77). External pressures have compelled governments into introducing policies of competitive disinflation. Rather than pursue macroeconomic goals, the emphasis has been upon deregulation and supply side measures. The undermining of national controls and the failure to develop a supra-national regulatory framework has had the effect of generating a ‘huge increase in system wide uncertainties’ (Grahl and Teague 1990:180), forcing an offensive restructuring which deregulates the market and increases the tendency to a low wage, low productivity economy (Dunford 1992a:172).

Since the ‘free’ market is the domain of the large transnational corporations, liberalisation within the global political economy is anything but ‘liberal’. Rather, it represents the internationalisation of monopoly capitalism. Restructuring and deregulation favours concentration, with power accruing to a small number of large corporations (Tsoukalis 1993:107/8; McGowan and Seabright 1989:308).

Globalisation and liberalisation has occasioned the demise of urban planning as public policy. The advocacy of supply side economics exhibits a political aversion to government intervention and has reduced the space for raising the revenues required for urban improvement. The combination of liberal politics and monetarist economics has declared public policy for urban and regional areas to be redundant. 

The logic of pursuing the regeneration of urban space through a market led approach may, however, be questioned. Market-led regeneration privileges private, internationalised economic relations, the very forces that lie behind urban degeneration. The technological changes associated with economic restructuring, along with the dismantling of social democratic controls and welfare provision, imposes social costs which endure in the shape of an economically, socially and culturally disadvantaged class. The unfettered market widens inequalities and entrenches social injustice by concentrating production and wealth in the most advanced areas (Holmes 1992a:59; Sawyer 1994:296). 

For this reason, there is a need to take a positive approach to state regulation in light of the experience of various societies that have proved capable of generating a higher civic awareness and collective morality than that which prevails in the Anglo-American world. Scott’s essay ‘Industrial Urbanism in Southern California’ (1995) emphasises the crises being generated by social polarisation, the ‘hotbed of social predicaments and tensions’, ‘the never ending spiral of wage-cutting’ and the ‘huge deficit’ in appropriate ‘institutional infrastructures’ which, if not checked ‘threatens to take Southern California .. straight toward the bleak “Blade Runner” scenario..’ Scott projects a social democratic future for the region as an alternative. The social market model is characterised by ‘relatively high levels of governmental direction of economic affairs, significant degrees of cooperation between private firms and a corporatist social structure that tries to build solidarity by providing safety nets for all major constituencies in society’. Two ‘main thrusts’ are locally essential in moving towards social democracy: ‘Concerted institution-building so as to enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the region’s main industrial clusters’; and ‘massive investment in social overhead capital so as to improve the quality of the workforce, and .. foster re-incorporation of currently underprivileged groups (among whom women, African-Americans, the homeless, and unskilled migrant workers are significantly represented) into the mainstream of society’.

Scott offers four ‘subsidiary lines of action’ as nurturing more cooperative, information-sharing, inter-firm relations and transactional networks; regional technology development and labour training programmes; efficient ‘steering mechanisms’ aimed at developing high skill/high wage employment; and mechanisms of development programmes down to the community level, particularly in the ‘more disadvantaged’ parts of the region.

Scott concludes by recapturing the public policy perspective. ‘The analysis that I have tried to lay out .. suggests that out of all the possible futures that the region now faces, there is at least one that can offer a better deal, economically and socially, than the future that will certainly come to pass if we simply pin our hopes on .. “the magic of the market”’.

The politics of neo-liberalism have played fast and loose with the bonds of civil society, destroying irreplaceable cultural and community resources and structuring everyday life around short-term monetarist pursuits. The ideology of the ‘free market’ has made urban space available to the irresponsible and unregulated power of the TNC’s. This is a mechanism for urban degeneration and deindustrialisation. Public policy has been shaped with a view to attracting capital investment rather than to organising and directing investment according to democratically determined conceptions of the public good. This competitive devaluation is self-destructive in that the most prosperous and dynamic economies compete not on price and wage costs, which often form a marginal component of total costs, but upon quality. The economy achieves a competitive edge through continuous investment and innovation. And this is spurred by the insistence upon high social standards, an insistence which is built into the institutional framework. Economic policy is to have a large social component built into it.

The U.S. employment record in generating millions of jobs has been held up as a model for regeneration, showing the benefits of deregulated labour markets. However, it has become apparent that a significant percentage of the jobs created have been poorly paid, service sector jobs. The employment problem has been ‘solved’ by creating a poverty problem (Dahrendorf 1988:149).

More insightful members of the political and business class have sought what they called a Middle Way. Realising that capitalism was faltering but not wanting to embrace the socialist alternative, this political and business elite sought to create a new capitalism, one that incorporated social concerns in its operation. In Sweden in the 1930’s political leaders, businessmen and government bureaucrats drew up plans for a complete welfare state that sought, as a matter of public policy, to extend political democracy, achieve a substantial degree of economic equality and ensure economic growth. At the heart of the project was the conviction that it was possible to induce all sectors of society to make an ambitious, long-term and binding social compact that promised all equality, solidarity and ultimately prosperity within the capitalist system.

The thought behind the project is not distinctively Swedish and can be found in the social and economic policies of most nations in northern and western Europe. So much so that it is even possible to write of the Rhine-Alpine model of capitalism (Albert 1993)

There is a clear case for arguing that the most successful and dynamic economies are those that possess developmental, quasi-public institutions, and which have established the institutional infrastructures that operate to spur innovation and hence give the economy a high value added profile. Regulated labour markets, far from suffering from rigidities, as neo-liberal theorists allege, actually enable ‘major improvements in industrial competitiveness and efficiency’ (Nolan 1994:71). Deregulation works in precisely the opposite direction. Labour market management thus emerges as central to economic success (Rhodes 1994:121/2). And there is clear evidence that regulated systems are not only more socially just and egalitarian, strengthening civil bonds, but are also more economically efficient than deregulated systems with respect to the training, organisation and deployment of labour. The neo-liberal argument for ‘flexibility’ fails to understand the dependence of capital productivity upon the quality of human capital. And since manufacturing, at the high value added end, is increasingly capital intensive, it has become less dependent upon low labour costs and more dependent upon the skills of the workforce. ‘Hard productivity’ achieved by research, technical innovation and capital is supplemented by ‘soft productivity’ achieved through motivation, cooperation and equipment (Ellul 1990:314). In contrast, the market mechanism, left to itself, possesses an inherent tendency to devalue human and physical capital, something which leads to uncompetitiveness and a low productivity economy.

In consequence, capital will be most attracted by those economies that are able to offer the greater standards in education, training and skills rather than those offering the cheapest labour (Rhodes 1994:144/5). The emphasis upon ‘flexibility’ may often be an attempt to rationalise ‘social dumping’, reinforcing the low value added profile of an economy caught in a vicious circle of decline (Sharp 1992a:248). An economy which seeks to be internationally competitive at the high value added end of the market must focus upon quality and quantity in research and development (R&D) and in investment (Sharp 1992a:245/6). A highly skilled and trained workforce working with up to date equipment will produce a higher quality, higher technology, more value for money range of goods and services and this requires the existence of developmental institutions and infrastructure (Sharp 1992a:247/8; O Donnell 1994:54).

One can therefore be critical of neo-liberal demands for deregulation so as to overcome ‘rigidities’ in the labour market (Michie and Wilkinson 1994:16/7). For what neo-liberals condemn as ‘artificial’ constraints are actually the ‘institutional constraints’ that spur innovation (Streeck 1991). Productivity is the key to competitiveness (Porter 1990:84). An economy is more competitive the more it is able to upgrade itself. The improvement of the duality of human and physical capital must be sustained (Porter 1990:84), improving product technology and product quality, incorporating up to date features, improving the skills content of the products and so on. The existence of ‘institutional constraints’ – employment protection, ‘rigid’ wage determination forcing employers to ‘adapt their product range to non-price competitive product markets’, worker participation and consultation rights, the obligation upon employers to train and retrain – closes off the short cut, low wage route to success and instead forces, induces and enables employers to pursue improvements in production, design and management.

And there is a social dimension to this argument, treating all parties as stakeholders in the economic whole. In addition to business coordination, there is ‘a tacit contract with labour’. A highly skilled, cooperative labour force is essential to achieve international competitiveness and can be obtained only through making a lifetime bargain with labour. Such relations facilitate the opening of ‘communication channels’ (Soskice 1991:52) between banks, business, trade unions and government, developing a strategic thinking capacity that enables the discovery of solutions to problems that the market alone cannot solve.

Economies that are deprived of an abundant supply of cheap labour are compelled to compete by continuously upgrading and innovating, thus achieving higher labour productivity and obtaining higher value (Porter 1990:80). The result is to induce ‘a virtuous circle of upmarket industrial restructuring’ (Streeck 1991:54). Hence it is necessary to stress the importance of ‘the institutional conditions of diversified quality production’ against the short cut approach of social dumping. These high standards on employment, production and the environment are not ‘burdens’ but spur economies to upgrade, improve the quality of its labour and capital and to achieve a competitive advantage (Porter 1990:87).

Rather than orient economic policy towards the reduction of inflation, labour costs and public expenditure, an emphasis upon raising productivity through ‘offensive restructuring’ (Von Tunzelman 1992a:48) would be more economically and socially beneficial. Indeed, a genuine supply side revolution would involve upgrading skills, training, organisation and management. Against this, in a market-led privatisation strategy for urban and economic regeneration, supply side measures have served to rationalise a ‘defensive restructuring’ which concentrates upon cutting costs and downsizing (Glynn 1991; MacInnes 1987).






Since the 1980’s, the field of urban regeneration has been characterised by the emergence of new forms of urban renewal and new practices of urban governance in the context of post-fordist transition. The objective of this chapter is to revalue local urban institutions and politics from the perspective not only of urban regeneration but also of social government and civic participation. This is to examine urban regeneration with a view to identifying the necessary conditions for the socialised reconstitution of the urban public sphere.

The argument conceives urban regeneration in its widest sense. Lewis Mumford, the writer on the city who believed that he may have invented the term ‘urban renewal’, slammed that regeneration which was obsessed with economic growth for having made the term a ‘filthy word’ (Miller 1992:494). This chapter adopts Mumford’s understanding that regeneration is a spiritual and moral phenomenon first and foremost and is physical only in a secondary sense. The success of regeneration projects in a physical sense depends upon getting the spiritual and moral dimension right. How this is to be achieved is the subject of this chapter.

The Crisis Of Modernist Planning

In recent decades, modernist planning has been subject to a series of damaging criticisms, some of which have substance. However, a qualified defence of modernist ideals can certainly be made against those critics who too easily make the planners the cause of the problems with which planning is called upon to deal. A typical attack upon modernist planning is contained in Alice Coleman’s ‘Utopia on Trial’. In this book Coleman slams the modernist ‘utopia’ for ‘treating people like children’ (1985:184). The obvious implication of Coleman’s charge, which is made clear throughout the book, is that individuals are grown-ups who are quite able to take care of their own (private) interests – on the market. Certainly, individuals should have their futures in their own hands. But the question that has eluded liberals, democrats, socialists, communists, anarchists alike has been how to develop and maintain mechanisms of common control so as to give individuals power over their society-making abilities. Rather than address this meta-power question, Coleman’s book indulges in a sweeping condemnation of the entire planning tradition. It is easy, as Coleman does, to condemn official policy as ‘bureaucratic’. The more difficult part is to engage in an institutional and structural explanation to show how the deficiencies of planning at the ‘bureaucratic’ level are not due to something inherent in the modernist ‘utopia’ but to the connections of the state with capitalist relations, with the state being compelled to intervene in civil society in order to organise accumulation. On the crucial question of the structural dependence of the state and how this forces the state to facilitate the process of accumulation, Coleman is silent.

Books like Utopia on Trial (and Boyer’s Dreaming the Rational City) give the wholly false impression that the modern urban crisis is the product of ‘utopian’ ‘rational’ ideas in planning rather than of deeply structured socio-economic processes, political choices and asymmetries in class power. Coleman’s populist caricaturing of modernist planning as overwhelmingly rational-bureaucratic charges planners with imposing a perfect utopian order upon the people (1985:ch 2 ‘Utopia Accused’). Planners are easy scapegoats for the urban problems with which they have to deal. Planners did not create the problems of the megalopolis and, within the institutional parameters in which they have to work, planners do not have the solution to these problems. Moreover, the criticisms that Coleman makes with reference to such things as tower blocks could have been made by the people she condemns as ‘utopians’. Mumford certainly did. 

The ease with which Coleman moves from the condemnation of bureaucratic urban planning to the advocacy of the market shows the dangers of an urban populism. True, one wing contains an impulse towards economic democracy, subverting plutocratic elites: ‘the political analysis offered by urban populism was essentially a streetwise version of elite theory: a small closed elite, stemming from the upper economic class, uses its control over wealth to manipulate government for its own selfish purposes’ (Swanstrom 1985:129). In this respect, urban populism has the same egalitarian objective as Marxist political economy. It does not, however, engage in a critical analysis of economic structure and capitalist dynamics. Whereas Marxism can boast sophisticated theoretical equipment, urban populism is heavily practical in its emphasis. 

At the centre of the democratic claims of urban populism is the assertion of popular preference over political or expert judgement. It is in this respect that Gans criticises planners for putting forward schemes that conflict with mass taste. ‘The planner has advocated policies that fit the predispositions of the upper middle class, but not those of the rest of the population’ (Gans 1968:21).

Given that such attacks on the elitist version of modernist planning can be generalised against the notion of urban planning as such, the question arises as to what the principal vehicle of urban populism can be. The obvious tendency is for urban populism to find expression through ‘the market’. Alice Coleman’s demand that choice and responsibility be taken away from the ‘bureaucrats’ and be placed in the hands of the people finds expression in the demand that initiative be returned to the ‘free market’, with ‘minimum regulation’ and ‘maximum consumer choice’ (Coleman 1985:184). That was certainly the way that urban policy went in the 1980’s. And it generated further inequality and injustice within the urban landscape, raising the question of the extent to which preferences expressed through the market can be considered to be genuinely popular when consumer choices are not ‘free’ but are constrained by the unequal distribution of resources. Urban populism is revealed to be a species of social and spatial injustice. It is part of the problem of injustice within the city, therefore, and not a solution to it.

The argument that the market is capable of producing the public good needs to be given short shrift – economic breakdown, externalities, the provision of public goods and infrastructures, uncoordinated investment decisions, mass unemployment, the devaluation of capital through restructuring, environmental protection all make state intervention, expenditure and regulation necessary. This involves a policy framework for industrial development, social welfare, land use, urban planning and transport. If urban planning exhibits a bureaucratic and elitist character, the solution is not to abolish planning but to democratise it. Alice Coleman may defend the ‘free’ market in terms of choice and responsibility. The fact is that the market is the very antithesis of these qualities in imposing external necessity over all. The market model imposes the universal interest as an external systemic force encompassing all.

Choice and responsibility are possible only within a collective project that enables individuals to associate and exercise control over what are collective or supra-individual forces. For collective purposes defining the common good, it is necessary to devise collective mechanisms of decision, action and control.

This is not a case of deciding between social and individual choice and responsibility. In a world governed by supra-individual forces, particularly by the monocratic blocs of alien power in the shape of the state and capital, the individuals living in the city are already and always subject to forces and processes which are external to them. A form of collective control is always being practised, long before any bureaucratic intervention for reasons of urban planning and order. The agents of the state and of capital, politicians and capitalists, manage and manipulate individuals visibly and invisibly through institutional or systemic means. With this context, self-government is all but extinguished in a social, economic and political sense.

Capitalist relations generate abstracting, rationalising and bureaucratising tendencies that result in order and unity having to be imposed via an artificial legal-institutional order. Subject to instrumental exchange relationships, society lacks a self-regulating and self-enforcing capacity. There is a principle of social control that needs to be established here. The greater the number of individuals in a state of interaction with each other, the greater is the level of collective control required to enable individuals to preserve their autonomy. Individuals thus unite in order to secure those goods that are common and necessary, which are in the interests of all. This necessity of social control contains the key to realising the elusive notion of human scale. This form of self-socialisation at the level of everyday urban life enables individuals to associate to exercise supra-individual control over the supra-individual forces of the state and capital. Particularly effective in this regard are functional interest units, rooting organisational forms in a self-governing actuality.

What Coleman (and Boyer) need to consider is the way in which ALL modernist planning ‘utopias’ of every kind have been selectively pilfered and partially applied and the reason why this has necessarily been the case. The overriding concern in modern state planning has not been utopia but urban order within a diremptive capitalist urbanisation. Planning ideals have been expropriated as exploitable cultural capital to be used by those interested in reproducing the capital order via growth, development and regeneration. What issues is not the ‘garden city’ or the ‘radiant city’ or, in Coleman’s estimation, failed utopias but a landscape which qualifies as being ‘rational’ only on account of being given over to the task of accumulating capital. Boyer may write of ‘dreaming the rational city’ but this landscape of capital has nothing in common with the ‘utopian’ vision. And the urban failures of this landscape are not those of utopian ideals as implemented by ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘authoritarian’ planners but of prevailing social relations that have ensured that ideals are vitiated in practice. There is not a single reference to capital or capitalism in Coleman’s book. Fundamental social and economic contradictions that are endemic to capitalist urbanisation are parented upon the ‘bureaucrats’. The pro-market solution that follows justifies the very mechanism that generated the problems that required the intervention of ‘bureaucratic’ planners in the first place.

The defence of modernist planning does not deny the existence of a tendency towards bureaucratism and authoritarianism. The concern is that, along with the undemocratic practice, the inclusive ideals of planning come to be repudiated also. There is a need, then, to retain and accentuate all that remains valuable in the modernist tradition whilst at the same time incorporating post-modern insights.

Robert Beauregard argues that planning is presently suspended between modernity and postmodernity. This ‘ambiguous position’ of planning necessitates a reorientation of planning so as to redefine and incorporate the strengths of the modernist ideal. These strengths comprise an emphasis upon the process of city-building; a mediative role between the state, capital and labour; and a great push towards democracy (Beauregard 1996:149). Beauregard also identifies the weaknesses of modern planning that are to be eliminated – the outmoded view of the city; the lack of democracy; the illiberal attitude towards narratives and the insensitivity to the diversity of communities (Beauregard 1989; 1990; 1996:229.

Beauregard offers three suggestions for a reconstruction that would serve to bring about a city-centred and democratic planning.

1)	Urban theorists and practitioners need to rededicate themselves to the built environment as the object of action and enquiry. The built environment contains the rationale of urban planning. The built environment is a source of capital accumulation, the locus of consumption and reproduction, and a site of struggle. What needs to be reworked is the idea of the modern city as the city of property, capital and the unitary plan concerned with reproducing capitalist order. Planners need to acknowledge the emergence of the post-fordist city containing hitherto neglected forms and dynamics. This is particularly the case with respect to the city building process and the built environment that it produces (Beauregard 1988). This focus furnishes a substantive basis for grounding planning in the practicalities of the everyday life world of individuals. Further, by comprehending the connection between city building and political, economic and cultural phenomena, urban planners are able to extend their reach, practically and theoretically, so as to generate the basis for a critique of capitalist ideology and its politics of growth within the planning agenda.

2)	Urban planners need to assume a mediative role between the state, capital and labour. Planning exists as a countervailing power to capital but it can only fulfil this role by securing a base within the community and by being able to use its institutional position within the state. Being able to involve the public in various deliberations concerning planning developments would increase the influence that planners have within state departments and channels (Benveniste 1977). Building a constituency for planning is both a prerequisite and a positive outcome of such a process, serving to enhance democracy as a result.

3)	The practitioners and theorists of urban planning must be prepared to open planning up to a variety of constituencies, recognising that modern plural society comprises a multiplicity of cultures and communities. In explaining the current phase of capital restructuring and its impact upon urban regeneration, attention needs to focus upon the basis of social conflict, emphasising social and cultural heterogeneity. ‘In these ways, the modernist project of planning can be partially reconstructed while its links to postmodernism are enhanced. In order to establish a state planning concerned with the humanity of the city, a clear practical and theoretical discourse must be combined with political conviction and a respect for democracy’ (Beauregard 1996:229).

Beauregard’s perspective is important in that it identifies grounds for retaining and enhancing the ‘utopian’ strand in modernist planning. For the greatest failure of contemporary urban regeneration is a loss of vision resulting from the equation with economic development. Regeneration as development serves to intensify the very forces that are responsible for urban degeneration.

The idea of retaining the modernist ideal within postmodern conditions is a valuable one, certainly in distinguishing urban regeneration from mere economic development but also in identifying the alternative society that is immanent in post-modern political culture. In Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities (1998), Leonis Sandercock projects a personal-as-political ideal of cosmopolis as an achievable utopia.





Such a ‘utopian’ vision contains the prospect of giving individuals control over their future, but as a ‘common destiny’, i.e. as all being in control of matters of common concern. Sandercock’s principles of the ‘postmodern utopia’ offer a means of overcoming the metropolarity and incarceration that lie at the heart of the modern urban fabric, of locating the modernist ideal of creating urban space for all within postmodernist plural conditions, and of recovering regeneration as something more than economic development. Sandercock proposes ‘new concepts of social justice, citizenship, community and shared interest’ so as to ‘suggest a new style of planning which can help create the space of/for cosmopolis’ (Sandercock 1998:125).

Sandercock defines her ‘normative cosmopolis’ as ‘a Utopia with a difference, a post-modern Utopia’ that ‘can never be realised, but must always be in the making’ (Sandercock 1998:163). In focusing upon a theory and practice of planning, Sandercock’s goal is a ‘paradigm shift’ from ‘modernist planning wisdom’ to ‘a more normative, open, democratic, flexible and responsive style that is sensitive to cultural difference’ (Sandercock 1998:204). Sandercock’s ‘transformative politics of difference’ envisage a transition from metropolis to cosmopolis so as to expand the horizons of urban regeneration in a progressive direction. Sandercock concludes with a ringing defence of the normative commitment of urban planning:





The reformist tendencies and totalising visions of modern urban planning have little influence, if any, in contemporary urban regeneration. The pluralist balancing of interests and the political commitment to regulate capital to promote the good of the whole of society is no longer part of the planning agenda. The contemporary urban strategy is to overcome the problems of society by creating ever wider circles of economic growth. Economic development has displaced urban regeneration linked to social reform. With this transition, the regulation of capital and the creation of the welfare state have been displaced by the priority of attracting investment capital and employment.

In the modernist approach, growth was accompanied by reform. This served to distinguish urban regeneration from economic development, urban planners from property developers. Now, the two sides of this spectrum have become indistinguishable in public-private partnerships. Urban planning now proceeds according to an entrepreneurial model whilst planners have become property developers and deal makers as opposed to being regulators of urban space (Fainstein 1988). This development undermines the urban public sphere, reducing the amount of control that communities and individuals may exercise over matters of common concern. Advocates of policies to expand local economies seek to conduct their affairs outside of the sphere of public deliberation, control and scrutiny. Decisions concerning industrial investment, infrastructure development, subsidies to private capital are presented as technical, as the province of experts and hence as outside the realm of politics, political deliberation and alteration.

Modernist planning has hitherto assumed that local actions determined local conditions, thus offering a partial justification of local urban planning. This can no longer be justified. The intensified spatial mobility of capital has served to give large-scale property development and industrial investment a regional, national and even global scope. The local determinants of investment are relatively unimportant in comparison (Cooke 1988; Simonsen 1988; Soja 1986; Zukin 1988).

In seeking to attract capital investment, public officials interpret regeneration in terms of civic boosterism and economic development in terms of attempts to commodify the ‘particularities of place’ through public spectacles (Harvey 1987). The process of accumulation and consumption has become ‘flexible’, less bound by place. With the state disengaging from its interventionist role, replacing modernist planning with the entrepreneurial model, planners find themselves lacking the legal capacity and political scope to restructure the investment prerogatives of capital. Local communities come to rely upon cultural conditions and amenities to generate economic growth and hence are vulnerable to the control that capital exercises over consumption and lifestyles.

The modernist assumptions at the heart of urban planning have been rendered problematical by the fragmentation of capital and labour. The expansion of the economy during the post-war ‘long boom’ had seemed to offer an opportunity to maximise the material interests of all individuals regardless of class. The problem is that growth has failed to overcome inequalities associated with class, race and gender, meaning that the notion of unitary planning, the ideas of creating an urban environment for each and all, cannot be sustained. The modernist era in urban planning failed to create the unitary city, a ‘rational’ city based upon the active participation of all individuals and groups, failed to produce an equality of freedom, and failed to overcome injustice and inequality, regardless of the expansion in material wealth. The problem is that the post-modern era threatens to exacerbate existing inequalities in class, race and gender, making them a permanent feature of the urban landscape. In these circumstances it is well-nigh impossible to sustain a modernist notion of a conflict-free public interest.

The reduction of the role of the state and the increasing subservience of the state to capital investment and accumulation have intensified the negative consequences of economic growth and uneven development (Smith 1984). Fuelled by the globalisation of economic relations and hence the hypermobility of capital, cities have come to benefit from increased growth but not without suffering increased social costs (Feagin 1988). Cities operate as centres of ceaseless conflict around the benefits and costs of growth and its (often negative) impact.

With economic crisis in the 1970’s, the notion of planning underwent complete change. The structural weaknesses of the economy were exposed, with a substantial part of the manufacturing base being destroyed, taking some two million jobs between 1971 and 1981 (Massey and Meegan 1982; Massey 1984; Hausner 1987). The new urban geography has opened up a sharp contrast between declining industrial areas and the expanding high tech corridors (Boddy, Lowering and Bassett 1986). The immediate effect of economic restructuring and deindustrialisation has been to have shifted the emphasis firmly upon increased economic competition and to have pushed the policy agenda away from the urban regeneration of cities as a public good benefiting the quality of life of residents toward more aggressive attempts to promote economic development with cities. In areas suffering from economic dislocation, planning as something concerned with the regulation and guidance of urban growth has been replaced by a concern for the promotion of economic growth by any means necessary. Rather than being concerned to regulate urban growth by various means, planning came to concern more economic growth. The conception of the urban environment was narrowed down to being merely the site of wealth creation. In the new scenario, the overriding objective of planning is to generate wealth and hence appeal to capital. The public good follows as an indirect consequence of commercial gain. Once adversaries, planning and development are now allies, united to mean one and the same thing (Hall 1996:343). In truth, this is not a merger – economic development has simply displaced planning. 

Particularly important here is the extent to which, in the advanced capitalist economies, the local public sector authorities in cities have assumed many of the activities that characterise the private sector. The emphasis in the urban public sector is now increasingly upon profit generation, place promotion and economic development as taking priority over the previous concern with managing and distributing urban resources (Harvey 1989). As a result, urban regeneration has come to sponsor activities that are harmful to the urban environment as lived space.

In the USA, there were similar developments as in Britain. As the older industrial regions were beset by crisis as a result of intensified foreign competition, declining profits and deindustrialisation, some 38 million jobs were lost in the 1970’s, and 35 million being lost between 1969 and 1976 (Bluestone and Harrison 1982:26 30).

The scale of economic crisis and deindustrialisation took urban political leaders and urban planners unawares. A neo-conservative counter-attack began against Keynesian social democracy. The problem is that economic crisis was not the fault of government intervention or urban planning but of structural forces within the capitalist economy. The concentration and centralisation of capital in fewer monopolistic hands has had the result of shifting control of firms and industries out of local hands into the headquarters of increasingly remote transnational corporations. The implication of this is that resolution is beyond the scope of urban planning and government regulation and cannot be achieved within the structural constraints of capitalist relations.

Separated from regulation, regeneration comes merely to concern economic growth. The attempt to regulate capital within structural constraints has been abandoned. In the contemporary scene, there is a pro-development bias ranged against corporate interest groups, local communities have little power. Regeneration in the sense of development is reduced to levering the private sector. In any public-private partnership, private capital is dominant or hegemonic. The only way to obtain investment and employment within capitalist relations is from private capital. The notion of partnership in this scenario entails mobilising social interests and government agencies and using public funds to leverage private investment.

This approach extends concessions to private capital in order to leverage private investment and, so the theory goes, revitalise the economy. The intention is to make the more depressed areas of cities attractive to private investment by offering financial incentives, grants and by cutting taxes on capital. Employers have received tax credits or grants for each worker (usually low skilled/waged) they have employed.

The notion of making economically declining areas attractive to capital was first expressed in the ‘enterprise zones’ initiative. This initiative attracted a good deal of critical coverage, with enterprise zones exposed as ‘urban sweatshops’ that could never offer a secure foundation for the urban economy (Harrison 1982; Glickman 1981:310/1; Le Gates and Wilmoth 1981).





Apart from confirming the low productivity profile of the economy, this approach, in privileging the interests of capital, promises to unravel health, safety, environmental, minimum wage, zoning and building regulations. The similarity to the minimum conditions applying throughout South East Asia and Latin America is evident. The idea, originating in the US, is ‘to create low wage districts in which business will be able to extract higher profits than it could otherwise’ (Glickman 1981:511).

Urban regeneration strategies came increasingly to emphasise a competitive market situation. In Britain, the City Challenge Scheme, followed by the Single Regeneration Budget, abandoned fixed allocation of funds for the open competition for funds. City authorities have argued that this was a device for concealing cuts in funds for regeneration programmes. The contemporary embrace of ‘partnership’, in which various social and political agencies engage in alliance with private economic interests, is a tacit admission that the era of urban planning as regulation in the public interest is over. 

The problem is that urban planning as economic development is obsessed with chasing the consumption dollar, gentrifying the area around downtown and populating the city with boutiques, wine bars, restaurants and malls. The regenerated city is envisaged as a major attraction in terms of leisure and entertainment, a site of consumption rather than of production. Such regeneration schemes incorporate a new range of activities – leisure, culture, shopping – and are unashamedly consumption based. Recreation and entertainment are to the fore within this image of the city. And this image simulates real life; it is not the same as a genuine urban life. This model of regeneration has in mind ‘the Main Street America exhibit which greets entering visitors at the Californian Disneyland, undangerous and seven-eighths real size. Around it, the charmingly restored streets – all yuppified – have exactly the same quality: they manage to look like a Disney movie lot of an imagined urban America, but they happen incongruously to be real’ (Hall 1996:351).

This conception of urban regeneration is open to substantial criticism. Too much investment has gone into hotel projects. This might have generated the low skill/low wage employment opportunities required in urban areas with mass unemployment, but it does so at the cost of tying up human capital in low productivity sectors, thus confirming the low growth profile of the domestic economy. There is also the question of the extent to which such jobs would have been generated anyway, with or without development projects biased in favour of private capital. Such projects could never generate employment opportunities of a scale comparable to the jobs that have been lost in manufacturing (Hart 1983:26/7). To those for whom ‘manufacturing matters’ (Cohen and Zysman 1987) the service economy generates mainly low wage/low skill employment, as in fast food enterprises and is no substitute for a strong manufacturing base.

With the bursting of the property bubble it became clear that the development cycle had been exhausted. The developers had overreached themselves. The predictable destruction that followed raised the question of whether a strategy based upon property, which became the dominant approach, could generate an enduring regeneration beyond the initial burst of optimism. Hall poses the question of whether, in a 1980’s world in which service industries were the economic driver, any strategy other than commercial speculation was available: ‘perhaps this was the only game in town: any town’ (Hall 1996:412). The problem is that this game didn’t and couldn’t fill the gap left by the demise of modernist planning. Behind the façade of urban public policy and regeneration strategies for cities, the problems of economic crisis began to accumulate.

The main point is that urban regeneration has ceased to concern the character and quality of urban life of the lived experience of citizens in being identified with economic development. There is, indeed, a sense in which the old ideal of modernist planning – a good living environment for all – has been privatised and commodified. A good living environment is income elastic. The more affluent the society, the greater the market demand for the good. The current trend is for the affluent sections of society to build walled enclaves within the urban environment in order to secure their private conception of the good. 

But affirming that the freedom and justice at the core of the good have a universal quality, requiring that the relations between each individual and all individuals be put on an ethical basis, there is a need to discover the basis of an urban public realm. For if ‘the good’ is genuinely universal or is not a good at all, merely a subjective claim within a polytheism of competing values, then the only way that it can be actualised is through the public domain. And that means conceiving an urban regeneration that is capable of constituting a genuine public realm. The task is to innovate a public strategy that fosters economic development by improving the quality of life of urban dwellers. This is to ensure that efforts to promote the city are not accompanied by the destruction of neighbourhoods, increased social polarization and segregation, whether geographic or electronic. 

There is, then, a need to bridge the private activities pursuing a better environment for some with the idea of the good environment for all. This would restore the progressive, universalist rationale of modernist planning, the concern with which this section opened. Since the 1980’s there has been an explosion of such activity. Many people have been keen to organise to protect their immediate environment against the ravages of development, taking part in meetings, joining voluntary organisations, engaging in campaigns and attending public inquiries. This tendency shows the possibilities of a post-industrial planning concerning not so much economic growth, its stimulation or regulation, as the quality of life. It shows the policies of planning becoming more expansive and more participatory, even more protracted and conflictual in the collision of competing agendas (Fielden 1979; Blowers 1980; Hall 1980).

71 POST-FORDISM AND URBAN REGENERATION

There have been a number of alternative approaches to urban regeneration in the context of socio-economic transition. The industrial crisis of the 1970’s, associated with the collapse of Fordism and the era of mass production and employment, has ushered in an era of experimentation that has revised and even discarded past notions and practices. The main concern of urban regeneration in this context has been to improve the competitive position of urban areas within the global division of labour. Even here, however, there are a number of widely differing that could be taken. In Marxist terms one can distinguish strategies aimed at increasing the rate of exploitation of labour power in order to generate absolute surplus value from the application of superior technologies and organisation in order to generate relative surplus value. The political strategies required and social consequences that issue are very different. 

To take increasing relative surplus value first. The use of superior technology and organisation is the most fruitful option for urban regions to adopt in meeting intensified competition. This can be achieved in a number of ways. Improving the physical infrastructure, improving the capacity to generate relative surplus value, as does investment in the social infrastructure (education, science, and technology), making the urban region a centre of innovation (Harvey 1989:45/6).
The alternative to increasing relative surplus value is to raise the rate of exploitation of labour power. This entails a systematic assault upon the real wages of labour through increased unemployment, job insecurity, the reduction of the social wage (particularly welfare spending) and the creation of a cheap reserve army of labour. This strategy implies an assault upon the agencies and organisations of the working class. This approach is economically and politically crude and entails the systematic downgrading of the utility of skills and education in employment.

There has been an obsession in regeneration schemes with creating a ‘favourable business climate’ in order to attract capital investment. This involves a ‘competitive devaluation’, trading off the social wage for corporate grants and subsidies. The problem is that the pursuit of a market-driven agenda plays urban areas against each other, thus undermining any public policy concerned with the urban environment as a totality. A great deal depends upon the relation of the rate of exploitation to the qualities of labour power. The different package of qualities that each urban region may offer to attract mobile corporate capital implies interurban competition over quantities, qualities and costs and also exerts a disciplinary effect upon a labour force desperate for unemployment at a time of crisis and competition. Intensified competition between urban regions subverts a holistic approach to urban regeneration. The continuous leapfrogging of one area over another through new technological and organisational forms has a destabilising influence upon the urban environment, the competition to attract investment and employment from highly mobile corporate capital serving to devalue the assets and infrastructures of older urban regions employing increasingly antiquated technological mixes in industry. This strategy has political risks. There is a latent class politics at the heart of such schemes which could be inflamed by a class conscious political mobilisation against capital. Conflict and resistance to change can be encountered at a number of strategic points. For there are a host of checks which ensure that transition never proceeds directly. The transfers of technology between urban regions is more the province of corporate decision making and power. It is the corporation that, in the main, exercises control over technology, taking attention away from the innovative character of the urban mix. In this respect, the social dimension of the social division of labour dominates over the spatial dimension. This does not, however, apply to the provision of infrastructure. Here, the state acts as entrepreneur (Goodman 1979), attracting corporate capital by offering a number of inducements.

Urban regeneration cannot be understood in abstraction from fundamental transformations in the organisational and structural details of advanced economies. The pressures arising for the production, control and realisation of surplus value are forcing major changes in the direction of the urbanisation of capital. The forces driving urbanisation are changing along with the meaning of the urban process with respect to social, economic and political life.

At the most immediate level, restructuring has been associated with deindustrialisation. With rapid technological change, faltering accumulation, international financial crises, there has been employment loss, capital flight and corporate disinvestments in production. A crucial question concerns the extent to which a national economy can survive on the basis of the service industries that have increasingly replaced manufacturing industries. These industries now constitute the dynamic element in the economy and are characterised by greater occupational dispersal, eroded union bargaining power and a larger share of unskilled jobs in low paying areas along with an increasing share in high income jobs. The corresponding institutional framework governing the employment relation departs from the previous one. The new arrangement conditions a reshaping of the sphere of social reproduction and consumption, in turn having a feedback impact on economic organisation and earnings. In the old framework, the feedback effect contributed to the reproduction of the middle class. In the new arrangement, the feedback effect reproduces a growing earnings disparity, the casualisation of the labour market and consumption restructuring (see Sassen, Cities in a World Economy).

The world is being redivided, not merely between First and Third World’s but between new and old, post-fordist and fordist, post-industrial and industrial. The old industrial cities as well as inner city ghettoes within post-industrial cities are being left behind as financial capital withdraws in search of better returns.

The most salient characteristic of socio-economic change in the old industrial centres in the last decades of the twentieth century was the massive loss of employment, particularly the loss of secure, well-paid jobs in the manufacturing sector. This sector dominated local labour markets and its decline shook the economic foundations of local communities. ‘In a decade from 1979 .. 94% of all job losses occurred North of a line drawn from the Wash to the Severn. Of the manufacturing jobs lost, 70% were in the North’ (Dickinson 1990:76). This industrial catastrophe took place against the background of a huge withdrawal of the institutions of the state from social provision and welfare. Homelessness and begging on the street followed the twin processes of deindustrialisation and the reduction of social welfare.

The postindustrial thesis, dating back to Daniel Bell in the 1960’s, has been updated to take account of new information technologies and the organisation of the economy around consumption and consumerism rather than production. The notion of an information society has entered urban studies, a development that has become all the more appealing given the apparently intractable problems of deindustrialisation in the old cities. The restructuring of urban space takes the form of the disintegration of the industrial city and its re-emergence as the postindustrial information city. This expresses a decisive shift away from the structure and logic of industrial urbanism, undermining the privileged position that industrialisation processes once assumed as the foundation of a vital urban life.

Any attempt to chart a path for urban regeneration must proceed from the assumption that manufacturing matters. A strong manufacturing industry is the precondition of substantial and sustainable economic strength within the urban environment. Only productive capital adds value to raw materials through the investment in long term fixed capital. Manufacturing is thus open to productivity gains and is the dynamic sector of the economy as a whole (Welford and Prescott 1993:52). The importance of manufacturing for wealth creation and technological dynamism is supported by the fact that the overwhelming proportion of patents and innovations in the modern economy derive from manufacturing, some 95-97% in the US (Von Tunzelman 1992a:20). Manufacturing products are more tradeable than services, accounting for nearly 62% of exports and 64% of imports in 1990 (Sawyer 1992:243).

Although there has been a shift towards services, the evidence confirms that manufacturing is crucial to technological dynamism, productivity gains and international competitiveness (Dyker 1992a:6). Despite a growth in the trade in services, manufacturing still accounts for 90% of total world trade. Further, services are inextricably connected with and dependent upon manufacturing (the servicing of equipment being one of numerous examples) (Sharp 1992a:235/6). A strong manufacturing base is necessary to the economy. A decline in manufacturing will certainly impact upon the supposedly dominant service sector, hitting the invisible trade in services (Griffiths and Wall 1993:662).





The information and business services crucial to the postindustrial thesis are actually manufactured commodities and are thus ‘produced’ every bit as much as cars, steel, and coal. Further, the provision of personal services (household, finance, health and education) and of public and semi-public goods (collective consumption) are ‘important components of and/or adjuncts to the basic structures of production and work in modern capitalism’ (Scott 1988:8). And to further erode the distinction between manufacturing and services, Scott argues that specialist sectors like corporate administration, banking, accounting, marketing, insurance, advertising etc form the ‘inner motor of the entire capitalist economy’ (Scott 1988:8) and hence represent in the contemporary, supposedly ‘post-industrial’ economy precisely what they have always represented, essential functions managing, directing and controlling the global system of industrial production. In other words, the whole question needs to be considered in the context of the globalisation of economic relations and the functions that the old industrial cities may carry over as they become global cities.

The arguments have a bearing upon the way that urban regeneration is to be conceived. The shift from fordism to post-fordism is not necessarily to be understood as entailing deindustrialisation and the replacement of manufacturing by services. It could mean reindustrialisation via different forms of manufacturing. In this sense, the future for manufacturing is not with outmoded notions of mass production but with an economy based upon ‘flexible specialisation’. Economic success is achieved by innovating products and systems in response to change and in response to more sophisticated consumer tastes rather than in investing in large scale mass production in order to lower costs (Welford and Prescott 1993:107).

The post-fordist economy is based upon new technologies, smaller size, new management strategies, changing employment relations and forms of pay. Flexibility and smaller scale will be required so as to enable production to respond to more specialised techniques and more sophisticated demands (Lipietz 1992: chs 1 and 2). Competition in this sense relies upon such non-price factors as quality, design, reliability, after sales service and marketing. A relative surplus value strategy concerning improvements in skills, training, technology and organisation clearly possesses a greater rationale here than the concentration with absolute surplus value through increasing the rate of exploitation of labour.

The shift from fordism to post-fordism has had substantial long-term implications with respect to the character of the urban economy. There is a strong ideological case being made in favour of the interests of finance. The primacy of finance characterises the output of business pages and journals. The viability of economic policies and proposals comes to be defined in terms of finance. ‘Finance’ is the dominant mode of perceiving reality. The financial institutions are in a position to define the when and where of investment, what is institutionally acceptable, what can and cannot be produced in the built environment. Deindustrialising and declining cities face problems in securing funds for urban regeneration. Industrial estates and office developments get built to meet the approval of pension funds and insurance companies, their value as investment taking priority over their social value.

The result of the domination of finance is that the city is defined and developed more for maximum financial returns and less for a mode of living. Investment rather than well-being is the dominant motive. The city is designed more for profit than for people and hence ceases to be a place for use and enjoyment. The soul of the city has been sold to the highest bidder concerned with maximising returns on investment.

There is an underlying assumption of post-industrialism in much of the literature on this subject. Saskia Sassen exhibits a tendency towards post-industrialism. She argues that the restructuring processes generate distinct modes of economic organisation and corresponding uses of space. ‘The postindustrial city of luxury high rise office and residential buildings located largely in Manhattan; the old dying city of low rise buildings and family-type houses, located largely in the outer-boroughs; and the Third World city imported via immigration and located in dense groupings spread all over the city.. Each of these processes can be seen to contain distinct income-occupational structures and concomitant residential and consumption patterns, well captured in the expansion of a new urban gentry alongside expanding immigrant communities’ (Sassen quoted in Castells 1989:215).

Sassen concentrates her critical attention upon the production of services, giving the notion of post-fordist/post-industrial urban regeneration a particular character. This conception exalts the ‘power holding organisation’ of the FIRE stations (finance-insurance-real estate). For Sassen these financial, banking and producer services are the primary postindustrial production sites and possess a commanding role in the world economy, ordering the economic activity of global cities and shaping a ‘new urban regime’ of capital accumulation.

Emphasising the importance of growth in the FIRE sector, especially in enabling cities like New York to recover from deindustrialisation and fiscal crisis, research focusing upon New York has emphasised the effect of telecommunications and information processing technologies, the transformations taking place in global capital markets and the emergence within local economies of an elite of urban professionals composing brokers, bond sellers, security dealers. The other side of what New York researchers call the Dual City is the underground or informal economy and the underclass dependent on welfare, struggling to survive in the new urban landscape.

There is a pronounced tendency in these analyses to downgrade the significance of manufacturing and hence to downplay the principles of industrial urbanism. The way that the FIRE stations dominate urban discourse has displayed a tendency to condense the processes of globalisation and localisation around Wall Street and its sphere of influence, focusing almost exclusively upon the FIRE station and the command and control functions in relation to global flows of capital investment and labour migration. This overwhelming emphasis upon the commanding FIRE sector is apparent in the studies of global cities in general (Fainstein 1994; Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe eds 1992). This has had a crucial effect in evaluating postfordist urban regeneration, altering and shaping perspectives on the emerging geopolitical economy of urbanism, highlighting some possibilities at the expense of others. For there is a definite sense in which contemporary developments, far from expressing an irreversible deindustrialisation, actually amounts to a reindustrialisation, an industrial restructuring. Acknowledging the huge decline of employment in the manufacturing sector in the five boroughs of New York City, the Greater New York region exhibits continuous manufacturing growth. This growth is part of a process of reindustrialisation taking place in the metropolitan regions of Boston and in other cities in the East of the USA. And the argument that these developments represent a reindustrialisation is strengthened even further once one considers ‘producer services’ as applying to services to manufacturing industry.

One of the crucial aspects in evaluating the merits of post-fordist transformations of an urban region pertains to whether an individual urban area contains the infrastructure and capacity with respect to the production of services and of innovation as crucial to regeneration in these ‘new’ times. The same applies to ‘lifestyle’ facilities that will appeal to national and international companies so as to induce them to relocate.

The older industrial cities have been attempting to reposition themselves in the global economy by becoming pleasurable post-industrial places. The danger is that, seduced by postindustrial imaginings, they become overly dependent upon and oriented towards the financial services sector, uncritically accepting the presentation of this sector as the engine of growth in the economy. In consequence, there can be a contradiction between post-industrial development strategy and the health of the local labour market. Robert Fitch has shown how New York City’s dependence upon the FIRE sector has led to the city becoming the ‘headquarters’ only of employment loss, 400,000 payroll jobs having been lost between 1988 and 1993’ (Fitch 1994:17). New York City possesses the lowest ratio of manufacturing employment to FIRE sector employment of any major metropolitan area in the USA. The crucial question concerns the optimal balance that any locality may achieve in a global environment with respect to investment in FIRE, manufacturing, construction, trade and service industries.

The great majority of cities in the old manufacturing areas have been subject to a process of deindustrialisation. The prevailing conditions in the global economy have evinced a shift from Fordist mass production and consumption. ‘In economic terms, the central feature of the transition is the rise of “flexible accumulation” in place of the old assembly line world of mass production. It is this, above all, which is orchestrating and driving on the evolution of this world’ (Hall and Jacques 1989:12). The emergence of post-fordist arrangements has entailed substantial transformations in the labour market, particularly in relation to the structure and composition of the local labour market and the security of employment. These transformations have resulted in unemployment for millions whose skill and experience were specific to manufacturing industry.

Can older manufacturing towns and cities re-emerge as new centres of initiative and enterprise? For all of the excitement that post-fordism has generated in academic circles and in urban practice, it is worth pointing out that the social and cultural life of the majority of those living in urban areas continues to be lived out in the ‘old’ world. The evidence with respect to industrial cities like Manchester is ambiguous. Celebrated for its dynamic approach to economic redevelopment, Manchester is also known for its crime and violence as well as for high levels of ill-health, poverty and housing need. Manchester ‘is a city with many areas of extreme poverty and deprivation, sitting alongside areas in which the much celebrated pursuit of private success and wealth continues unabated’ (Taylor, Evans and Fraser 1996:54).

It is clear that the phenomenon of deindustrialisation has involved a major process of economic restructuring and hence entails something much more than the decline of traditional industries in old nations. ‘Previous differences between growing and declining industries, and hence between growing and declining regions, have narrowed considerably if not disappeared’ (Keeble 1981:460). However, the evidence points to continuity rather than to discontinuity. Behind the celebration of the emerging ‘post-industrial’ city lies a sharp class reality that derives from the old industrial capitalism, the reindustrialising or newly industrialising city. For all of the superficial newness of high technology, this economic restructuring is actually a form of reindustrialisation. And part of this process is a deep de-skilling, the routinisation of monotonous, low wage labour, casualisation with new systems of outwork, subcontracting and homework. Behind the attractive veneer of post-fordist regeneration lies class realities derived from prevailing social relations.





In evaluating new, ‘post-fordist’, approaches to urban regeneration, there is a need for scepticism. There is a need to be aware of the continuities as well as the discontinuities, to identify how long standing are the forces behind the ‘new’ developments.

The danger of loss of employment, of corporate flight and disinvestments, the need to exercise fiscal probity and rectitude all underline the shift that has taken place in urban politics away from social justice and equity towards an entrepreneurial model operating according to purely economic notions of profit, efficiency and innovation. This model has favoured the pursuit of absolute surplus value over creating the institutional framework for generating relative surplus value.

The adoption of the entrepreneurial model has had social consequences, generating new patterns of inequality. Life support mechanisms for the poor and unemployed have been cut back as resources have come to be used to offer inducements to private capital. This has compelled the disadvantaged to have recourse to the informal economy (Castells and Portes 1987). A life of crime promises greater rewards, certainly in the immediate sense, than offered in a highly unstable labour market. The divisions within cities have become entrenched. ‘The use of increasingly scarce resources to capture development meant that the social consumption of the poor was neglected in order to provide benefits to keep the rich and powerful in town’ (Harvey 1989:272).

The question is whether this has been the inevitable result of economic and technical processes or whether a positive governmental intervention that favours a strategy of relative surplus value whilst using socio-institutional controls to block absolute surplus value routes could make a difference. The restructuring of industrial forms is manifested as a postfordist reindustrialisation in which the most dynamic and profitable sectors are characterised by ‘flexibility’ in spatio-economic practices. New information based technologies (electronics, computers, robotics), corporate, structural, managerial and organisational innovations, transactional economies of scope replacing economies of scale, the expansion of local and regional networks of enterprises and entrepreneurs form the content of the ‘flexible’ mode of accumulation. The concern with undermining trade unions and depressing wages and cutting social welfare and public expenditure is of little relevance to the conditions. The most appropriate public strategy for economic restructuring in this context concentrates upon the raising of relative surplus value through the application of new technologies and improvements in skill and organisation. Public policy would here focus upon investment in the physical infrastructure and in the social infrastructure (education, science, and technology) so as to ensure that the urban region functions as a centre of innovation. Creating the institutional framework for relative surplus value assigns a positive role to government intervention and expenditure, the very thing that liberalisation has subverted.
Of huge importance with regard to the strategies pursued by local urban growth coalitions is whether the delivery of services, by managers and workers, knowledgeable of local circumstances, can be effectively and profitably developed in respect of intensified competition across the international market. This challenge is certainly understood by those working in local high technology and ‘cultural intermediary’ industries, especially in the rapidly changing media, music, leisure and communication sectors and in the pioneering high technology industries.
There is, however, a huge contradiction at the heart of the post-fordist city. Intensified inter-urban competition generates socially wasteful investments that add to rather than resolve the initial crisis of accumulation behind the transition to flexible accumulation (Harvey 1988). There is a limit to the number of convention centres, sports facilities, waterfront developments, and leisure complexes that an urban space can have. Success can be short lived, rendered obsolete by alternative innovations elsewhere. And over-investment in things like shopping malls to cultural facilities renders the values embedded in urban space vulnerable to devaluation. Urban regeneration based upon FIRE stations, where people process loans and conclude real estate deals for people employed in financial services and real estate, actually succeeds only through the massive expansion of personal, corporate and governmental debt. And this risks an ever-greater crisis in the future. The serious over-investment in post-fordist urban redevelopment risks serious financial devastation.

72 FROM FORDISM TO POST-FORDISM
There is a general consensus that in the city has undergone such a significant transformation as to make ‘old ways of understanding the city and cityspace appear increasingly anachronistic’ (Soja 2000:149). The dominant interpretative framework adopted by scholars theorising the new process of urbanisation relates the emerging postmetropolis to the geopolitical economy of urbanisation and to the flexibly specialised postfordist economy. These discourses relate to the twin processes of globalisation and localisation as applied to capital, labour, culture, and society and to the new hierarchy of world cities that emerges as a result of this process. In this context, the new postmetropolis appears as a new cosmopolis, fostering the most heterogeneous cityspaces in history, generating new possibilities for urban public spheres constituted by citizen participation and plural identities.
The argument focuses upon the way that the urban spatial form is being restructured in these postmodern times, the way that the decentring and recentring of cityspace is having the effect of turning the modern metropolis inside out and outside in, altering accepted definitions of the urban, suburban, exurban, non-urban and rural (Soja 2000:154/5). Attention shifts to the social mosaic of the postmetropolis but also, more negatively, to the continuation of social inequality and the emergence of metropolarities – social, racial and demographic marginalisation and exclusion in the context of extraordinary affluence. The project of social justice and universal emancipation, which Part I located in the ‘rational’ principle of political philosophy, connecting the freedom of each with the freedom of all in reciprocal relationships, faces substantial difficulties as the postmetropolis becomes the ‘Fractal City’, fragmented and polarised within.

And the problems are not merely confined to the intensification of inequalities but pertain also to the celebration of difference and of the plurality of identities in such a way as to deny a common framework concerned with the general good. The city in this cultural definition is the locus for creative new hybridities. A postmodern cultural politics emerges which is concerned less with overcoming inequality than with preserving difference and fostering flexible ‘transversal’ identities (Soja 2000:154/5). The question to examine is whether it is possible to recover the sense of the universal public that incorporates a notion of social justice, uniting each and all whilst nevertheless preserving the plurality of identities.

That the postmodern celebration of difference, otherness, diversity and even conflict is not enough, that, no matter how much plurality is welcome, a universal ethic underpinning a genuine urban public is required, becomes apparent when the discussion moves on to consider how the postmetropolis has taken shape in contemporary cities. The argument here employs a Foucaultian understanding of the repressive incarnation of reason in the modern world, showing how the carceral society is generating the Carceral City.

The Carceral City is an expression of the socially fractious process of globalisation and of postfordist restructuring. It is a fortressed space possessing complex surveillance mechanisms and technologies of control. The emergence of such cities represent a shift from polis to police, showing a radical shift from a concern to live well to a concern in the modern world simply to survive. The city is no longer the sphere providing the conditions for creative self-realisation but a controlled space attempting to contain fractious processes. This represents a shift in urbanisation from an ecology of well-being to an ecology of fear.

Related to the notion of the Carceral City is the notion of the E-City, the electronic or wired city. This also expresses a form of social control. In this scenario, the postmetropolis appears as an agglomeration of simcities, the urban imagery being restructured in electronic as well as more materially concrete cityspace. This represents the ‘hyperreality of everyday life’ (Soja 2000:155). The question to be answered concerns the extent to which polis democracy can be recreated as lived experience, rooting an urban public sphere in an everyday life world of human interaction, exchange and solidarity. As such, this hyperreality of everyday life is to be criticised as extending the sphere of abstraction over against the everyday social life world, thus denying the life experiences and relations sustaining a genuine urbanity.

The Crisis Of Fordism

This section is organised around the concepts of Fordism and post-fordism, tracing the evolution and dissolution of the fordist city and the emergence of the new post-fordist city. This chapter proceeds from the premise that the global capitalist economy has undergone a transition from a Fordist mode of production, characterised by mass production, large industrial factories and state administered welfare, to a post-fordist economy, characterised by flexible forms, small firms, specialised production and permeable sovereignty in a global environment. This chapter will discuss the impact of this transition upon urban space, paying particular attention to urban economics, regeneration and the quality of urban life. 

The concepts of fordism and post-fordism derive from the neo-marxist Regulation School and its theoretical development of a distinctive approach to urban differentiation. The key thinkers here were Aglietta, Boyer and Lipietz. These developed a set of key concepts – regime of accumulation, mode of regulation, Fordism – so as to establish the relationship between the state, labour and capital. The concept of Fordism identifies key characteristics of mass production, scientific management and economies of scale. In contrast, Post-Fordist arrangements are characterised by small batch production, small size production units, customised products, and flexible working practices. In the shift in the regime of accumulation, the Keynesian welfare state of the 1950’s and 1960’s has given way to the Schumpeterian workfare state of the 1980’s, placing the focus upon innovation and deliberate creative destruction (Aglietta 1979; Jessop 1993; Jessop et al 1988).

Geared to large-scale production, the corporations under the Fordist mode of production focused upon mass markets rather than the small privileged and custom markets. And this necessarily entailed a concern with the consumption needs of the working class, the people who formed the greater part of the mass market. The era of Fordism was thus characterised by large scale production, increased productivity and higher wages. The switch to Keynesian strategies of fiscal and monetary management generated a demand-side urbanisation, ‘a state organised response to what were interpreted as the chronic underconsumption problems of the 1930’s’ (Harvey 1989:37).

These developments had a profound impact upon urban space. Keynesianism shaped the fordist or industrial city as an artefact for consumption. The socio-economic life and governance of the city came to be organised around the order of state-supported, debt financed consumption. The focus of urban governance shifted away from organisations of classes contesting class issues towards conditions of classes organised around themes of consumption, distribution and the production and control of urban space. The result was a deep conflict between cities as workshops for the production of surplus value and cities as centres for the realisation of that surplus value. This tension came to be expressed in a number of forms (for instance,. the tension between the circulation of capital and the circulation of revenues, between the spatial division of labour and the spatial division of consumption). The Keynesian approach profoundly altered the character of temporal and spatial displacement of the overaccumulation problem. The problem is that the process depended upon unlimited debt creation irrespective of how it was worked out (Harvey 1989:38).

The city of Keynesianism put greater emphasis upon the spatial division of consumption relative to the spatial division of labour. This represented a demand-side urbanisation resting upon the activation of the power of consumer sovereignty. Intense conflict occurred over distribution, consumption rights and control over social space. The aim of using the urban process as a means of redistribution broke down in the interface with the structural facts of class division, income differentials and social deprivation. The powerful processes of spatial reorganisation of urban landscapes as vehicles of consumption could not overcome the poverty, deprivation and inequality built into the social structure and, in substantial part, concentrated in urban regions.

Further, cities as workshops for production and as centres for consumption were not easy to make compatible with the need to create favourable conditions for accumulation. Investment in physical and social infrastructures along with redistribution policies laid the basis for crises of overaccumulation that afflicted states and cities when times changed. In the contemporary age, the global mobility of capital makes it easier for investment to be switched from urban areas, destroying the value of physical and social assets in those areas. The mobility of financial capital combines with the geographical mobility of the transnational corporations to render cities vulnerable to capital flight, disinvestments and unemployment (Harvey 1989:41/2). 

The basis of the policies designed to overcome underconsumption dissolved from the late 1960’s. The expansion of world trade through international capital flow intensified the problem of overaccumulation. The inflationary pressures of debt financing had appeared to resolve the problem but this was only by generating a wave of international lending that was later at the core of the monetary difficulties and international debt crises of the 1980’s.

These same policies created a spiralling flow of surplus capital and labour power into the construction of urban built environments (property investment, office blocks, housing development). But the tightening of monetary policy in response to the inflationary shocks of the 1970’s brought the boom in fictitious capital formation to an end. As the cost of borrowing increased, property markets collapsed and local government was subject to financial crisis. The result was a reduction of the capital flows into the production of physical and social infrastructures. The secondary and tertiary circuits of capital slowed as recession and increased competition put the accent upon the productivity of such investment. It became clear that there had been a serious overaccumulation of assets in the built environment. The burden of social expenditure to maintain such an environment came to be perceived as unsupportable. ‘The pressure to rationalise the urban process and render it more efficient and cost-effective was immense’ (Harvey 1989:43/4).

What this meant was that, after an era in which the urban process was organised according to the notion of demand-led urbanism, the (class-political) question of production was restored to the heart of urban process.
These changes have political implications. In the Keynesian city, the class character of the social relations of production was partially concealed by the consumption process and the struggles over distribution and the control of social space. Politics became less and less concerned with containing class conflict and ordering class relations and became more concerned with issues of distributive justice. ‘There were fights over consumption (individual and collective) and distribution as well as struggles over command of social space and what it contained’ (Harvey 1989:43).
A new regime was evolving, one characterised by a remarkable flexibility with respect to labour processes, markets, products and patterns of consumption (Armstrong et al 1984; Aglietta 1974; Piore and Sabel 1984; Scott and Storper 1986; Harvey 1988). The basic transformations in urban form and organisation in declining industrial societies was described as ‘post-Fordism’ (Hall and Jacques 1989). By the 1990’s, the restructuring of economic relations had proceeded to such an extent that it became apparent that the problems of urban degeneration, uneven development and deindustrialisation, embracing also the failures of schemes for urban regeneration, were an integral part of profound transformations underway in corporate organisation, new technologies, globalisation and the accompanying social and spatial divisions of labour.
The emergence of a post-fordist political economy and postmodern political culture is characterised by new political forms and economic relations, generating new crises for cities and urban regions, subverting the premises upon which urban development has rested. The emancipatory dimension of modernist planning, the sense of building a new social order, has been abandoned in favour of an economistic model more concerned with developmental and entrepreneurial goals. The philosophical quest for the good life, as expressed in the meta-narrative that applied to the city as well as to the state, was abandoned (Dear 1988; Soja 1989).
The effects of the abandonment of Keynesian demand-side urbanism were felt most immediately. The search for profitable production possibilities under conditions of intensified competition between firms, urban regions and national economies indicates rapid transitions in the sociotechnical and organisational conditions of production and consumption. And this implies the disruption of the structural coherence that may have been achieved in the urban economy, involving the substantial devaluation of physical and social infrastructural assets. It also implies the destruction of many traditional skills within the labour force, the devaluation of labour power and the disruption of cultures of social reproduction. ‘Bringing the Third World back home is not an easy follow up to Keynesian style urbanisation’ (Harvey 1989:56).

73 POST-FORDIST ECONOMICS
Various studies have demonstrated how the restructuring of capital issued in a post-fordist political economy (Beauregard 1989; Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Bradbury 1985; Castells 1985; Harrison and Bluestone 1988). This post-fordist political economy is characterised by information, symbolic capital, high-technology products and processes, a greater concentration upon the financial circuit of capital, more flexible work processes and a defensive and weakened labour force (Albertsen 1988; Cooke 1988). Post-fordist forms of flexible accumulation represent a strengthening of the hegemony of capital and the weakening of the power of labour, especially of organised labour (Albertsen 1988; Cooke 1988).
The contemporary restructuring of capital has altered the character of state intervention and approaches to urban regeneration. Planners and professionals are increasingly subject to property interests and industrial capital through the state’s increasingly explicit dependence upon the process of capital accumulation. Urban regeneration, as a result, now pivots around economic development, attracting capital investment and boosting employment (Stone and Sanders 1987). In the process, new spatial forms have emerged (Conzen 1988). These constitute a postmodern city as the counterpart to the postmodern political economy of flexible accumulation and the globalisation of capital (Harvey 1987; Soja 1986).
For Michael Piore and Charles Sabel (1984), the restructuring propelled by the crisis of Fordism represents the beginning of a ‘second industrial revolution’ characterised by a shift away from the ‘necessity of bigness’ that had been behind previous capitalist development. Geographical association, minimising the frictions of distance, serves to reduce the costs of transactions and thus encourages vertical disintegration and re-agglomeration. ‘In these ways, intensely developed clusters of producers develops on the landscape, and with the growth of markets, the clusters themselves grow in size and become increasingly internally differentiated’ (Scott 1986:29).

This re-agglomeration is most intense and dynamic in high technology based production, particularly electronics, aerospace and biomedicine. These generate new terms like technopoles, technopolis and silicon landscapes. It is also apparent in craft based industries, which are design intensive and often labour intensive. Examples here include the production of clothes, furniture, jewellery. And, finally, there is the FIRE sector comprising finance-insurance-real estate firms and extending to related activities in advertising, marketing and legal services. The contemporary literature has, both empirically and theoretically, sought to show the propulsive importance of these ‘cutting edge’ sectors of the post-fordist urban-industrial space economy.

A new economy of flexible specialisation characterised by intensified competition, entrepreneurialism, new labour-management relations, reorganised production processes and new technologies has emerged. The clusters of small and middle sized firms, no longer dependent upon the old large scale agglomerations of fordist mass production, assume the leading role in economic innovation and the creation of ‘possibilities for prosperity’ in new industrial spaces. Rather than mass production concentrated in big cities, production is smaller scale and clustered in a number of industrial districts and is facilitated through flexible business networks.

Flexible business networks refer to the sharing of information, contacts and resources within informal groupings of enterprises. There may be occasions when members of the network collaborate on a project. With the fulfilment of the contract the formal relationship ends. The enterprises involved return to being colleagues rather than business partners. Northern Italy is cited as the best example of the value of flexible business networks. A number of very small furniture, ceramic, textile and metalworking firms have organised as flexible networks in the Emilia-Romagna region to turn a once stagnant region into one of the most vibrant and successful economies in Italy. The attempts to draw general conclusions concerning the importance of flexible business and manufacturing networks to local economic development have identified the fact that the availability of capital is less important than access to the right kinds of information, training and marketing support for products in determining the success of small enterprises, a view which contradicts the tacit assumption in economic development strategies that now dominate urban regeneration.





The argument is complemented and supplemented by the conception of the innovative or creative regional milieu, theorised by Philippe Aydalot, and the conception of the creative city, proposed by Gunnar Tornqvist and Ake Andersson (Andersson 1985a 1985b Aydalot 1986 1988 Aydalot and Keeble 1988).

For Aydalot, there are at least three different kinds of innovation: the first entails in-house corporate restructuring by a large firm; the second involves the restructuring of an old industrial environment by means of a creative synthesis between outmoded activities and new technologies; the third, the most fundamental, concerns the production and application into manufacture of knowledge by new entrepreneurs from a research background. The key in comprehending innovation is to locate the firm in its local and regional context and identify the external conditions that facilitate the creation of new firms and the adoption of innovations by established firms (Aydalot 1988:23 43; Aydalot and Keeble 1988:8-9). Local milieux are thus defined as ‘the nurseries, the incubators, of innovation and innovative firms’ (Aydalot and Keeble 1988:9) and are considered especially important in nourishing small emerging firms in close proximity to each other. This proximity is not simply a question of reducing transport costs, as the old neoclassical economics would have it. Rather, proximity is essential in ensuring the efficient functioning of those activities that are crucial to competitive success in advanced-technology industry and of certain systems of inter-firm relationships. The most favourable milieux in Europe are to be found in the leading metropolitan regions in their adaptability, flexibility and diversity.

The economies and synergies of factors within local and regional contexts is similar embraces the range of educational and training institutions, a concentration of R&D, established technological and management consulting, risk capital, and locally rooted decision making functions. The problem in drawing general lessons for urban regeneration is that these factors are context specific, informal and extremely difficult to export or transplant (Aydalot and Keeble 1988:11-12 15 17; Perrin 1988:145-6). A regeneration strategy cannot be made to order.

The concept of the innovative milieu forms a central part of Manuel Castells’ The Informational City. Here Castells argues that there is an economic transition underway which is as significant and far-reaching as the industrial revolution. Castells argues that this transition is leading to the emergence of an informational mode of development. Through the convergence of information technologies and information-processing activities as a result of rapid technological process, a new techno-organizational system will emerge. This is no simple technological convergence but entails a convergence between the technology and the organisation of production processes, changing the technical relationships of production and engendering a completely new mode of development (Castells 1989:17 19) ‘The development of productive forces by the liberation of information flows does not require that capitalism be superseded’ (Castells 1989:16).






74 THE SYMBOLIC ECONOMY
Sharon Zukin (1996) identifies two main approaches to the study of the built environment. The most familiar is the political economy approach. This focuses upon the material conditions of urban society and the class interests of social groups within urban society. The second approach is identified with the symbolic economy. This approach concentrates upon representations of and by social groups and the visual means of excluding or including these representations in public and private spaces. The symbolic economy approach focuses upon the relationships between the dominant representations of the city as expressed in urban design, architecture, advertising. From this perspective, the continuous negotiation of cultural meanings in built forms (buildings, streets, parks) is inextricably connected to the construction of social identities.

The most fertile analyses of the urban environment rest upon interpretations and interpenetrations of culture and power. The material reproduction of the urban environment is undertaken through the continuous reproduction of space in a concentrated geographical area. The crucial factors here are those of political economy, land, labour and capital. Beyond this, the production of urban space is shaped by decisions taken concerning what should and should not be visible, what concepts of order and disorder are employed, and the strategic interplay between aesthetics and function. In developing service economies, cities have both encouraged but have also been taken over by an aesthetic impulse.

Zukin is concerned to show that culture is a powerful means of controlling cities, symbolising who belongs in specific places, defining the image of a city through heritage and tourism. ‘With the disappearance of local manufacturing industries and periodic crises in government and finance, culture is more and more the business of cities – the basis of their tourist attractions and their unique, competitive edge’ (Zukin 1995). The expansion of cultural consumption (art, food, fashion, music, tourism) fuels the symbolic economy of the city, its visible ability to produce symbols and space. Zukin argues that ‘the cultural power to create an image, to frame a vision, of the city has become more important as publics have become more mobile and diverse, and traditional institutions – both social classes and political parties – have become less relevant mechanisms of expressing identity. Those who create images stamp a collective identity’ (Zukin 1995).

Zukin goes on to define the symbolic economy, drawing attention to the way that a significant number of new public spaces owe their particular shape and form to the intertwining of cultural symbols and entrepreneurial capital. Whilst building a city depends on the combination of the traditional factors of land, labour and capital, it has also come increasingly to depend upon the manipulation of symbolic languages of exclusion and entitlement. This has two aspects. Cities have always possessed a symbolic economy in the sense that the look and feel of cities reflect decisions about what and who should be visible – and what and who should not. In addition to this, modern cities are based on a more abstract symbolic economy.

There is a tendency to see this evolution of the city of symbols as somehow apolitical, a process of abstract cultural creation and recreation disengaged from the material concerns and conflictual practices of political economy. This view points to a classless city of endlessly changing symbols. The view is mistaken. There is no such thing as an apolitical order. And just as there is no way of avoiding politics, so there is no way of avoiding morality. To be truly rational, in the sense of containing an ethical component that affirms the unity of each and all, the city needs to embody social justice in its everyday practices, relations and structures. Every society is founded upon socio-political forces and all developments in society imply a socio-political order that is a more or less reasonable, responsible, humane form of collective existence (Heilbroner and Milberg 1995:127).

There is a need, then, to locate the symbolic economy in socio-political foundations in order to fully grasp its character and meaning. Flexible accumulation represents a capitalisation upon cultural developments, the concern with individuality and difference, implying the rejection of standardisation. Under this regime, producers need to be more responsive to taste and preference, adopting a more differentiated approach than was necessary under the fordist regime of standardised accumulation through mass production.

In the process, a central aspect of capital accumulation has come to be reinstated: the production and consumption of ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu 1977:171/97; 1984). Bourdieu defines ‘symbolic capital’ as ‘the collection of luxury goods attesting the taste and distinction of the owner’. Such capital is a transformed form of money capital but ‘produces its proper effect inasmuch, and only inasmuch, as it conceals the fact that it originates in “material” forms of capital which are also, in the last analysis, the source of its effects’ (Bourdieu 1977:188). The ideological character is clear and operates to conceal, through the sphere of culture and taste, the real bases of economic distinctions.

The symbolic economy, then, is not necessarily free, democratic and plural but is rooted in asymmetrical relations of class power (Smith and Lefaivre 1984). Freedom, democracy and diversity have to be fought for. Further, the emergence of the symbolic economy within the urban built environment is part of the process of globalisation in which capitalist economic relations become all pervasive. A vigorous and expanding symbolic economy succeeds in attracting investment capital from the global portfolios of real estate investors, banks, property developers and large property owners. There is continuity with the past, with global cities such as London and New York coming to create a role for themselves beyond their imperial and commercial past. These developments also issue from the concern to obtain comparative advantage over competitors. The symbolic economy of global cities generates a lingua franca of the global elites and facilitates the circulation of images that come to shape climates of opinion and investment.

Global cities share with regional urban centres a common cultural strategy that generates a new way of perceiving urban landscapes, globalising them, abstracting a legible image from the service economy, connecting it to consumption as against production. The difference is that in global cities, the processes of producing space for cultural hegemony, have a greater intensity and effect than in regional urban centres.

This expresses a conflict within public space as between two symbolic economies, the global and the local. The legibility of central command complexes contrasts with the identity that is negotiated in neighbourhoods and streets. Yet, despite problems, streets generate and sustain a quality of life that inhabitants prize, a space that is genuinely public in an associated sense, making neighbourhoods liveable and causing attachment to place. The experience of economic decline and deindustrialisation creates problems with respect to the economic base of a city but also offers an opportunity for inhabitants to think creatively – and publicly – about representations at a time when economic crisis makes large scale projects financially prohibitive. Renewal can be explored in a more than economic sense, bringing politics, morality and culture back into the project of shaping the urban space so as to create a genuine public realm.

The symbolic economy is ambiguously positioned with regard to this project. Since ‘the most successful ideological effects are those which have no words, and ask no more than complicitous silence’, the production of symbolic capital serves an ideological function since the mechanisms through which it contributes ‘to the reproduction of the established order and to the perpetuation of domination remain hidden’ (Bourdieu 1977:188).

Bourdieu argues that ‘every established order tends to produce the naturalisation of its own arbitrariness’. The ‘most important and best concealed’ mechanism for doing so is ‘the dialectic of the objective chances and the agent’s aspirations out of which arises the sense of limits, community called ‘the sense of reality’ which is ‘the basis of the most ineradicable adherence to the established order’. Knowledge, perceived and imagined, as a result ‘becomes an integral part of the power of society to reproduce itself’. The ‘symbolic power to impose the principles of construction of reality – in particular, social reality – is a major dimension of political power’ (Bourdieu 1977:164).

This explains Tafuri’s assertion of the impossibility of any radical transformation of culture and therefore of a radical architectural practice capable of transformation prior to any transformation in social relations.

For Zukin (1996) the legibility of urban space is defined by four conditions: the exit of the middle class, the undermining of place identities for major businesses, the standardisation of consumption experiences and the reassertion of centrality as a landscape of power as the countervailing strategy of elites. The extent to which these conditions have generated the polarised expansion of cities will be examined shortly. For now, the concern is with legibility. This legibility is emphasised by design. It makes it easier for cities to attract people with money, employers and consumers in the private markets.

This has important consequences with regard to the tendency to conceive urban regeneration according to an economic development model. For the new significance of people with money is accompanied by a decline in the importance of urban planning as concerned with an ideal vision of the city. Urban planners have been struggling to find answers to questions raised by deindustrialisation and the shift to the post-industrial city. How does urban planning relate to the symbolic economy? How is it possible to plan the urban economy when telecommunications mean that large businesses create their own footprints in the suburbs and the exurbs? There are problems which follow these developments, particularly with respect to producing public goods for low income, unemployed and homeless groups when the rich refuse to pay for them. Given these material conditions and constraints, it comes as no surprise that the landscapes of cities have been reorganised for visual consumption, abstracting an image of freedom and power that commands, in its abstraction, a degree of consensus.

The debate needs to be set within the spatial framework proposed by Henri Lefebvre (1974) in his “three moments of social space”. For Lefebvre, space could be perceived, conceived or lived, giving an interpretation capable of conveying these three interrelated visions of space.

Perceived space is “the materialized, socially produced, empirical space, directly experienced, open, within limits, to accurate measurement and description. It is the traditional focus of attention in all spatial disciplines .. “ (Soja 1996:66) Thirdspace, Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell). With respect to new urban public spaces, the concern is with built physical space. In this architectural concept it is the spaces of stone, the spaces of design, the spaces that citizens observed and assessed before occupying them with different motivations and results that matter.

Conceived space is a “conceptualised space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived” (Soja 1996:66/7). Conceived space is the dominant space, the space of power and of regulation. In relation to public space, conceived space will be the space of renovation, with particular attention focuses upon those public spaces that were conceived and built to renew their immediate urban environment, thus contributing to the renewal of the urban tissue.

Lived space relates to social space, constituted by various complex symbolisms. Lived space is the space that is apprehended by its inhabitants and users with the capacity to generate qualitatively different spaces, virtual “counterspaces”, spaces of resistance to the dominant order (Soja 1996:68). Such a notion entertains the potential for the lived space of citizens to exist as a counter-public, a domain in which citizens may organise counter-veiling power to challenge and change a dominant institutional order. Lived space is capable of radical interpretation, which possibly explains why, in the scrutiny of public space, it receives much less attention compared to conceived or a perceived space. To actualise this radical potential requires that individuals be placed back into the heart of public spaces as citizens. This is an essential condition of effective research in comprehending and evaluating spaces in all their complexity. But treating individuals as citizens is also crucial to the practical emergence of a citizen body capable of (re)constituting the city as a viable public realm. Lived space will then emerge as the space of citizens, of a disparate public articulating and serving different uses. And these uses may well be quite distinct from those uses – instrumental, commercial, institutional - for which the spaces were designed from above to serve existing power relations and system imperatives.

Public space is necessarily related to particular conceptions of urban space. Public space has always been a critical factor in urban intervention. The symbolic power of the notion of the public realm, public order and public good has been historically used to support and legitimate the urban plans of political and/or corporate elites. Nevertheless, public space is also space constituted by citizen self-activity and self-organisation, a space that is appropriated, organised and used by citizens. In the split between the city as use value and the city as exchange value there is no necessarily dominant conception. It all depends. The city is a space of power and counter-veiling power, of dominant power and subaltern publics, a space of conflict and contact, of institutional and bureaucratic control from above and of self-control from below, a space of bureaucratisation and of socialisation, of entertainment and of routine life processes, of fear and of play. This indicates the extent to which the city is a space that is subject to various and often contrary pulls and forces, is adaptable to the purposes of various citizen users and commercial exploiters and has a changing meaning. As against private space (space of security, space of regulation, space of order), public space is always a space of uncertainty, of entertainment, of conflict, out of which new situations and possibilities can be generated by different groups and interests forming counter-publics within and against a dominant order (Wilson, E (1995) “The Rhetoric of Urban Space”, New Left Review, 209, pp 146-60).

There is no integral reason why Perceived space, Conceived space, and Lived space should be mutually exclusive conceptions. These are not necessarily three alternative conceptions, one of which must prevail to the exclusion of the others. A synthesis may be possible. This would seem to be Soja’s ambition in Thirdspace. Where Firstspace designates the materiality of spatial forms and Secondspace designates ideas about space, Thirdspace indicates the mixture of real and imagined places. Soja argues that rather than focus upon one of these specific modes of thinking, the attention should be upon ‘the creation of another mode of thinking about space that draws upon the material and mental spaces of the traditional dualism but extends well beyond them in scope, substance and meaning’ (Soja 1996:11).

The fundamental argument of this book is that the city is not the sum total of its artefacts, buildings, institutional and physical infrastructure but is the individuals composing it, constituting a people and a public. The physical aspects of the city are the manifestations of internal, cultural, communicative and emotional relations between individuals. This doesn’t mean that the city is always the people. As the distinction between use and exchange value implies, there are times when the institutional-systemic logic of things comes to be exalted to dominant position over the use-oriented perspective of people. The argument thus has the radical ought-to-be logic that if the people are the city, then, when things dominate, the people should be the city. And for that to be achieved may require a restructuring of power and a transformation of prevailing social relations.

The argument that the city is the people composing it, a city of use value, implies a reconceptualisation of public spaces via the diverse ways in which inhabitants appropriate, order and use the city and, in consequence, give it authentic meaning. Since hegemonic conceptions of the city are no longer challenged by alternative conceptions through social practices in the everyday life world, public spaces are the privileged site for the creation of new possibilities and innovation of new order through social appropriation, resistance and action. Public spaces are spaces of contact or contact zones (Pratt, M (1992) Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, New York: Routledge) between different perceptions, uses, cultures and aspirations. As such, public spaces can be considered as places where ‘all places are’ and, as such, as places that make possible the Thirdspace integration of perceived, conceived and lived space envisaged by Soja’s critical appropriation of Lefebvre’s insights.

The question concerning the intertwining of space, symbols and power relates to the possibility of concealing and constructing public spaces in cities that are truly public in being inextricably connected with the lived experience of the citizens. These public spaces would be spaces for citizen interaction and association rather than for profit or market based consumption, for solidary social exchange as opposed to economic exchange, for community and solidarity rather than for individualism and privatism. Public spaces become places for spending time rather than spending money.

A great deal of postmodern writing on the city demonstrates a preoccupation with the image of the city. This is expressed, for instance, in an interest in the casual affluent shopper cruising the fashionable shops of a downtown that has been gentrified by a process of development concerned principally with the post-fordist image of the city. Images of this kind dominate contemporary advertising. The city is viewed and reconstituted not as a site of everyday living but as a site of playful activity, consumption and aesthetic pleasure. Images point out the bright city lights, the arcades and squares, the clubs and restaurants.

This discursive reconstruction of the city in the imagination as a site of play and pleasure devalues the real lived experience of city dwellers. The imaginative presentation of the city as a site of play and pleasure involves the systematic devaluation of other, more essential, aspects of cities as living environments. The actual lived experience of city dwellers become less accessible in postmodern theories of pleasure. What comes to be neglected is the unavoidable daily necessity of the urban population to travel, work and live in urban space.

A sharp split has developed in which issues of work, travel and life are left to urban planners whilst social theorists pursue the cultural dimensions of city life, as though the two are distinct and may be held apart. Anthony Giddens is unambiguous on this point, emphasising that for the vast majority of their users, cities remain places of work and schooling, are encountered repetitively rather than playfully throughout the week (Giddens 1984:144 154).

The imaging of the city as presented in advertising portrays a consumer paradise. Those behind such imagining have a professional or commercial interest. The image also appeals to sections of the academy, particularly those engaged in cultural studies and who are concerned to present a celebration of consumer culture. Postmodernist imagining is revealed as an ideological project to the extent that the presentation of the city as a site of play and pleasure conceals the substantial evidence of urban poverty and deprivation and the way that social inequality structures the pattern of shopping for the urban population. It also serves to conceal the real socio-economic forces driving the reconstruction of the city as a site of profit – play and pleasure are to be purchased on the private market rather than fulfilled in the public domain. This ideological reconstitution of the city bears only a partial relation to patterns of use, missing the specifics of how urban populations appropriate their environment.

The abstract symbolic economy is devised by ‘place entrepreneurs’, officials and investors who generate ‘real’ results in real estate development, new business and employment through their ability to deal with the symbols of growth. ‘What is new about the symbolic economy since the 1970’s is its symbiosis of image and product, the scope and scale of setting images on a national and even a global level, and the role of the symbolic economy in speaking for, or representing the city’ (Zukin 1995).

Zukin is concerned to restore a concern with everyday life – lived space - against vast abstracting processes: ‘I also see public culture as socially constructed on the micro-level. It is produced by the many social encounters that make up daily life on the streets, shops and parks – the spaces in which we experience public life in cities. The right to be in these spaces, to use them in certain ways, to invest them with a sense of our selves and our communities – to claim them as ours and to be claimed in turn by them – make up a constantly changing public culture. People with economic and political power have the greatest opportunity to shape public culture by controlling the building of the city’s public spaces in stone and concrete. Yet public space is inherently democratic. The question of who can occupy public space, and so define an image of the city, is open-ended’ (Zukin 1995).

The crucial question relates to the character of urban regeneration, particularly how the everyday public life of urban communities could be revitalised in the context of the digitalisation of the world. Greater emphasis is now placed upon new sectors emerging in the arts, culture and entertainment fields, in health and education and in tourism. The expectation is that new high technology would fuse with the creative sectors to generate new industries – multimedia, virtual reality. Such possibilities would be facilitated by the total digitalisation of information and the resulting fusion of hitherto separated technologies – broadcasting, computing, telecommunications.

There is a strong suspicion that the flow of information will come to dissolve the entire basis of cities. It would be possible to perform any activity in any place, providing that the right digital connections are available. Trading on the screen would take the place of the Stock Exchange floor, distance learning would replace educational institutions.

Experience, however, points to other conclusions. Although new industrial sectors could conceivably develop in any location, the evidence suggests their expansion in traditional urban centres. The reason for this is that, as with all creative activities, expansion depends upon human interaction and interconnection, networking, all of which is to be found in traditional urban centres. Whilst the new activities were presented as replacing direct face-to-face communication, their expansion actively demands the existence of such communication and reinforces the need for it. Electronic entertainment is likely to foster the demand for the real thing, as with electronic consultancy, electronic education, electronic everything. 
Further, new multimedia industries require low rents for start-up companies and these are to be found in the interstices between the high rise tower clusters of the business districts of traditional urban centres. Beyond this, these industries interact with a host of specialised business services in the fields of design and which have a distinct existence from the financial service industries that normally cluster around banking quarters.
New possibilities bring new problems. There are some worrying trends and tendencies. As informational industries, these emerging sectors are dependent upon the ability to access and use information, ‘which meant education and sophisticated kinds of knowledge; thus, they might prove to be the agents of yet further and yet more fundamental polarisation of the economy, of society, of the city .. (Soja 2000:408). These new possibilities and problems are the subject of the next chapter.


75 THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL OF URBAN REGENERATION
Whilst partnership has become a ‘fashionable’ notion in recent times, particularly with respect to justifying a much greater private sector involvement in the provision of public services, the partnership ethos is of an older vintage. Partnership is a consensus-based as against a class-based notion and evinces a predisposition in favour of the ‘harmony of interests’ as against a recognition of the necessary conflict of interests rooted in asymmetrical social relations. Any discussion of the practice of the partnership model of urban regeneration must begin with a critical investigation of partnership as an ideological project that serves to conceal and rationalise asymmetrical power relations through the assertion of a unity of interests between unequal parties.

Something of the nature of partnership as an ideological project is revealed in the insistence that partnership objectives be realistic and attainable given the powers and resources available. In this scenario, the ‘harsh realities of the commercial world’ – class based asymmetries in power and resources - are assumed rather than being made subject to political intervention. Partnership reduced to being a means of attracting private investment presumes the very objective relations and structures, and hence systemic imperatives and crises, which generate urban problems in the first place. At national level, neo-liberal policies reign, leading to the reassertion of capitalist imperatives over public self-determination. In this context, ‘partnership’ becomes a consensus-orientated local politics that fills the gap in socialisation at the urban regional level, establishing the necessary conditions and the collective mediation required to facilitate the process of private accumulation at the local level. A collective self-help at community level is used to take the place of a fully resourced regeneration strategy undertaken by public authorities (Hayter).

This view is alive to the conservative implications of partnership as compensation for public retrenchment and private failure. There is a need to be aware of the ideological character of partnership in order to properly evaluate the combination of forces and interests and objectives within any specific partnership. An awareness of potential and actual disparities between objectives stated as serving the common interest and the underlying realities of particular interests makes it possible to evaluate partnership according to its practise. Local and central government have always worked with business in regeneration activities. In recent times, there have been attempts to incorporate another ‘partner’ – ‘the community’. Cynically, and on a strategic level, this democratic input – passive consultation or active involvement – could be read as an attempt to shield particular interests behind the pretence of a common interest. Which sections of the community? Who represents the community? What happens when the views of community groups collide with those of dominant business interests?

The question of ‘public-private’ partnership needs to be considered in the context of an urban terrain conceived as being deeply contested between more egalitarian and more conservative forces. The former favour the public realm and push for its reconfiguring in terms of the general good; the latter favour the indirect service of the public good as a result of private self-interest. The result is that, whatever the assertion of a unity of interests within partnership, there can never be a settled or fundamental consensus.

The question of what constitutes a successful regeneration partnership depends critically upon how ‘narrow’ or ‘broad’ the terms of success are conceived. The argument proceeds from the narrow conception of partnership as limited to economic objectives to a broader conception of community development. This is to argue for communal self-direction and self-initiative over against the bureaucratic institutionalisation of the agencies and bodies of the urban regeneration industry. In this scenario, the actively democratic impulse of community organisation transforms the conception of urban government and transcends the narrow terms of the partnership as practised between official agencies in defence of the existing power-infused infrastructure. In the broad definition, partnership is a counter-hegemonic project on the part of the ‘community’ reclaiming the urban environment and asserting use values over exchange values.

The distinction between use and exchange values is important here. The urban environment exists to fulfil a wide range of functions that are necessary to everyday social life. The traditional functions include shelter, security, social intercourse, the exchange of goods and services. The relative significance of each of these functions changes over time and this evolution is reflected in the physical design and layout of the city, in the way that land is used and infrastructure provided.

The urban environment is the site of human interaction and activity. However, in addition to the use that the urban environment has for human beings, it also has a value as a source of material or commercial wealth. The distinction between the use of the urban built environment for human activity and the market appropriation of the environment to expand values is a distinction between use values and exchange values (Fainstein 1994:1). Members of the community are interested first and foremost in use values; business interests are concerned first and foremost in exchange values. 

The split between use and exchange values subverts the whole notion of harmony of interests at the heart of the self-image of partnership. The distinction between use values and exchange values is expressed in the various controversies that occur over the character and goals of regeneration schemes and the way that schemes driven by economics envisage the use of the urban environment. The urban environment is a contested terrain as different groups struggle to impose their definition of the urban environment, whether as a site for human activity or as a bundle of economic assets, as concerning the quality of life for the inhabitants or as economic development in the direct interests of business.

The whole process of regeneration is subject to contrary pulls and competing interests as the urban environment evolves over time, forever seeking the appropriate balance between external and internal forces. Local and national politicians, community groups, local business and transnational capital, trade unions, landowners, urban planners and economic developers all make contributions from their particular perspectives, expressing very different socio-political and economic values and implying very different governing structures for urban society.

The term ‘urban regeneration’ thus conceals a wide range of policies and possibilities. Given the diversity of forces and interests within the urban environment, there can be no single model of urban regeneration. Much depends upon the objectives, the participating members, the relationships between them and the relationship between their particular interests and the common goal. Urban regeneration exists in many forms and serves many functions. The wide range of purposes covered by urban regeneration reflects the wide variety of issues that fall within the province of urban regeneration.

Addressing the causes and consequences of urban degeneration and evaluating schemes for urban regeneration must conceive the urban environment as complex, dynamic and interactive, as constituted by the interplay of subjective and objective factors. In general, urban regeneration seeks to check the variety of factors and processes causing urban degeneration and reverse their impact. The urban environment gives physical expression to a variety of social, political, cultural and environmental transitions taking place within its realm, being the site of, and sometimes the change-agent of, these shifts. No urban environment, large or small, can insulate itself from the external forces and processes that drive change, or from the internal pressures that arise within the interaction and exchange that proceeds within urban relationships.

Urban regeneration is the product of the interplay between these myriad forces and processes but is, most of all, a reaction to the problems resulting from urban degeneration. Urban problems and their solutions are place-specific but do share enough common features for general principles of good practice to be identified.

For these reasons there is a need to conceive urban regeneration as an ongoing process of activity and interaction that evades simple solutions and conclusions. The organisational and spatial frameworks of urban regeneration will vary according to the specifics of time and place altering policy objectives, government priorities and urban goals. The problems and possibilities of urban regeneration exist within a spatial continuum:

The spectrum of regeneration activity varies from the individual site to the nation state, there is no single or fixed field of action that represents the ideal spatial level for the practice of regeneration over time.

Roberts and Sykes 2000:6

Urban regeneration establishes a framework for the identification and resolution of urban problems, for identifying the development potential of an urban area, for the formulation of an overall strategy for an urban area, for implementing a strategic plan of action, for making and maintaining contacts with effective urban agents, for identifying resource requirements, and for monitoring progress towards goals.

Urban regeneration has functioned as something of a testing ground for the evolution of the partnership approach. The shift from state direction to private sector led urban initiatives has caused a great deal of controversy. Under the guise of partnership, the private sector has increasingly assumed functions formerly performed by the public sector. This raises issues of local authority control and local accountability. At the same time, central government has strengthened its power in relation to local government, increasing its control over spending and policy (Oatley 1995). The partnership model in its contemporary form emerged as a result of these shifts (Chapman 1998).

The partnership model has drawn upon the experience of similar institutional structures in the US and Europe, the emergence of grass roots organisations and the growing awareness of the valuable contributions that voluntary organisations can make to social provision. There is also an awareness that partnership enables a collective strengthening which is able to compensate for a lack of power and resources among participating groups. Although it has similarities with the patterns of political and social governance in Europe, the term in its recent incarnation is American and pertains to the relations between city governments and the private sector (Hall 1996:348).

The meaning of ‘partnership’ has evolved over time. Where once it had referred to national and local government cooperating together, it has come to refer to the cooperation of the public sector with the private sector, developing policies to attract private investment and involving business directly in running projects and making decisions.

In the 1980’s, partnership working was imposed by central government. Conservative governments, influenced by a neo-liberal emphasis upon the market and a diminished role for the state with respect to both social welfare and economic policy, assigned primacy to private business in economic development and urban regeneration. Business interests were facilitated through deregulation, fiscal aid and through being given a dominant role in public-private partnerships. To receive urban regeneration funds, local councils had to produce bids in conjunction with the private sector and community interests. The purpose of this approach was to introduce a business culture into urban policy, thus subverting the perceived bureaucratic character of public sector dominated regeneration. 

In 1987 the UK government established Urban Development Corporations in order to circumvent ‘bureaucratic’ (or simply politically hostile) local authorities. The Urban Development Corporations of the 1980’s were government imposed initiatives designed to leverage private investment into projects through the use of public subsidy and the creation of a favourable financial and legal climate over the use of sites and lands. This involved market-led regeneration, with responsibility for regeneration being handed over to private forces. The purpose of an Urban Development Area was defined in terms of securing regeneration through bringing land and buildings into effective use, encouraging the development of existing and new industry and commerce, and generating an attractive environment as well as housing and social facilities for the people who work and live in the area.

The UDC’s have a mixed reputation. Property-orientated and dominated by the private sector, the UDC’s were intended to foster long-term growth. Although hailed a success by Conservative governments for attracting £11 billion of private investment against a total grant aid of £3 billion, the UDC’s were criticised for being business dominated, for having limited social objectives, for having objectives being deliberately set outside of local authority provision and for being insulated from local community involvement (Hill 2000:28).

The partnership model emerged as a result of the tensions and failures of central-local government relations, particularly the attempt of the centre to constrain local government within tight spending and policy parameters (Oatley 1995; Chapman 1998). Partnership has become a ‘fashionable’ notion (Roberts and Sykes 2000:3). As the limitations of single sector, single agency approaches became apparent, a consensus began to emerge extolling the virtues of the partnership model of integrated development. The multi-sector, multi-agency approach therefore came increasingly to be favoured as the deficiencies of the single sector, single agency approach became apparent when confronted by multidimensional urban problems (Healey 1997; Roberts 1997:4).





The problems that urban areas face have multiple causes and hence require a multi-agency approach for their solution. Developing partnership according to this approach makes it possible to conceive of a form of urban government that operates across functional divisions.

A point worth emphasising is that the move towards multi-agency partnership expresses a mix of consensus and coercion. The fact is that the agenda set by central government connected with funding requirements makes partnership imperative. The justification that partnerships satisfy the demand for a voice from local individuals appears thin in this context. Without genuine community involvement and effective structures for participation, partnership risks becoming a mask for existing interests.

There has, however, been a consensus forming around the notion of a mixed economy of provision involving public, private and voluntary sectors. The emphasis is upon building partnerships to secure a wide range of urban goals from economic growth to social inclusion, empowering local people and local communities in the process. ‘New Deal For Communities’ thus targets deprived areas, bringing together local councils and Regional Development Agencies to check economic decline. 

The partnership approach has come to be perceived as necessary since the sheer scale and complexity of urban problems seems to require the combined efforts of different levels of government and other public, private and community agencies to envisage their solution. Not the least reason for multi-agency partnerships becoming increasingly preferred in models of urban regeneration is the recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of urban problems. Partnerships help to coordinate urban activity on the spot, thus overcoming the problems of local-central relations. And they also offer a means of giving local communities real involvement.

The variety of partnerships makes categorisation difficult. In the self-image of partnership arrangements, the concern is to engage and harness the talents and resources of community in the interests of regeneration. Partnership as the organisational vehicle of urban regeneration purports to unite different levels of government with various private agencies and community organisations within a strategic framework invested with adequate incentives, sanctions and resources.

This framework unites three groups of organisation involved in urban regeneration:

1)	Public organisations. These include local authorities, central government departments, National Health Service Trusts, and the Police. There are also other agencies such as the business led Training and Enterprise Councils that play a prominent part in urban regeneration.
2)	For-profit private sector organisations. These are active in communities through corporate social responsibility programmes and sponsorship. The non-profit Business in the Community (BITC) unites companies with voluntary organisations and local government to implement programmes at the local level.
3)	Not-for-profit private sector organisations, voluntary organisations and charities.

There is an emerging consensus that in order to address the multidimensional nature of the problems within urban areas there is a need to develop a strategic framework that unites a wide range of agencies (Healey 1997). This consensus is based upon the assumption that effective and sustainable urban regeneration requires a strategy that fits local circumstances and accommodates a wide range of interests.

The shift from the single agency, single sector approach to the multi-agency, multi-agency approach has redefined urban regeneration as an activity which seeks to achieve an all-encompassing and sustainable solution to urban problems. This implies the need to adopt a strategic approach to overcome the fragmentation of regeneration initiatives as an aggregate of connected but uncoordinated interventions and actions. A strategic vision and framework enables a clearly defined set of objectives and clear expectations of the contributions that partners are to make. Successful partnership will therefore articulate a model of strategic urban regeneration in which action is rendered effective through clarity and confidence with respect to intended objectives and outcomes, increasing the ability to command and direct resources and hence establish the conditions for sustainable development (Roberts and Sykes 2000:302).

The emphasis upon strategy reflects the necessity of creating partnerships that evince a long-term purpose as opposed to being merely a transitory alliance constructed for the purpose of securing funds. The need for a strategic framework for urban regeneration issues from the limitations of a market-led regeneration that has privileged property interests in urban areas whilst suffering from being piecemeal, small scale, geographically dispersed and lacking connection with structural trends within the urban economy (Hausner 1993). The existence of a strategic framework is crucial in creating these conditions for regeneration, fostering links between various social partners as well as with the wider community. It is ‘no longer possible to approach urban regeneration through the promotion of urban transformation projects in isolation’. Instead, ‘the emphasis should be upon creating the conditions for economic, social and environmental regeneration’ (Healey 1997:109).

Partnerships need to be integrated within a wider framework, establishing contacts with other partnerships to avoid isolation. Partnerships require the support of agencies at the level of the city, the region and the nation. There is a need to devise a strategic framework to establish the context within which a multiplicity of community-based regeneration initiatives can pursue local visions of how regeneration should be orientated and developed. The strategic approach enables a locality to be analysed in terms of its strengths and limitations, planning and managing initiatives focused on possibility within an overarching institutional apparatus (Carter 2000:49/50). Strategy ensures that the dynamics of partnership are managed and directed in the long-term interests of the whole.

The trend in favour of the decentralisation of powers, the support and development of regional economies, and greater political autonomy makes the notion of partnership potentially significant in offering opportunities for extended community participation, thus creating a distinctive and successful urban regeneration based on local decision making in tune with local circumstances.

These developments are in line with the new approaches required as a result of the shift towards post-fordism in the context of globalisation. The evidence is that economic health requires independent city authorities that are able to match local resources and needs to high priority sectors in the global economy. New bargaining systems and new forms of public-private partnerships have been developed so as to coordinate a disparate group of interests and organisations. The realm of local political organisation and action has been broadened beyond local government. This has entailed the redefinition of the relation of the local government to business, voluntary and community groups.

For Margit Mayer, local government politics is becoming increasingly important since national governments lack the power to manage the increasingly complex global system. Although there is an attack upon local government provision, particularly with respect to social consumption and welfare, Mayer argues that in becoming leaner, local governments are coming to assume new command functions as activities are undertaken through a combination of private sector organisations, non-profit organisations and local government itself.

Local government determines an agenda that comes to be carried out through public-private partnerships and nongovernmental organisations. Economic development, training and government programmes are increasingly developed through a process of bargaining between local governments, private corporations, and community groups. Since this is the case, it is bargaining structures rather than blocks of public and private power that become the focus of schemes to extend participation, engagement, democracy, and inclusiveness.

Mayer theorises the emergence of local post-fordist regimes whose levels of responsiveness depend upon the extent to which local actors are able to seize the emerging opportunities. Mayer delineates a ‘post-fordist city politics’ that shows how local governments are undertaking new roles in response to capitalist economic restructuring.

The new regime contains both dangers and possibilities. Certainly, there is a shift away from redistributive policies as spending on social provision and public services is reduced. Activities are being contracted out or privatised. Social consumption expenditures are being reduced. At the same time that local governments are de-emphasising redistribution, they are adopting pro-active development strategies. There is, therefore, a clear movement in the direction of the ‘entrepreneurial city’. Local governments are forming partnerships with the private sector in pursuit of economic growth and development. Further, they are partnering with nonprofit organisations in order that the social consumption and public service functions they have been divesting themselves of come to be carried out. In many areas, these activities have become private activities. 

The impact of private finance upon urban regeneration has been greatest in certain sectors – the modernisation of telecommunications infrastructure, up-market housing, the rapid increase in hotel provision and office blocks, the booming of restaurants and bars, the creation of shopping centres. Whilst it has been conventional to present such developments in terms of ‘partnership’, with a heavy emphasis upon the input of - and benefits accruing to - the private sector, there is a need to emphasise the importance of the public realm. This is particularly so with respect to the leadership of partnership projects and particularly with respect to the need to commit municipal funds to catalyse action.

Evidence for the success of the public realm approach is contained the transformation of Barcelona. The projects for urban regeneration for which Barcelona is internationally lauded were, in the main, concerned with issues and interests considered as ends in themselves, as good in themselves, in terms of public benefit. As an indirect consequence of success in these areas, the city’s economy was boosted and its global competitiveness increased. For instance, tourism flourished as a consequence of increasing the attractiveness of the central area. A functioning public transport system was provided primarily for the residents but served to enhance the quality of visitors’ experience. Urban improvements for locals have been made as worthwhile public goals and goods in themselves but have been seen to ‘pay’ in a commercial and global sense. The success of Barcelona has impressed city managers the world over. However, those city managers need to understand the nature of the public-private relation with respect to Barcelona. Private gain has followed by serving the public good of those who live in the urban environment, and has certainly not been achieved by prioritising commercial and global interests over local interests. By emphasising the good of public space, the city has earned a good reputation that has encouraged investment generally in manufacturing, research and services by transnationals. The substantial public investment in motorways, the airport, industrial land provision around the region has proved to be of immense commercial benefit. 

The post-fordist local regimes are still in a condition of emergence and hence lack a fixed character, whilst there is a clear danger that such developments represent a pro-capitalist shift away from social justice and redistribution towards an entrepreneurial model, there is also a case for arguing that there is an extension of local urban structures facilitating citizen engagement and participation. In this sense, much will depend upon the effectiveness of local groups in organising, mobilising and bargaining.

Across advanced economies, local politics has become the focus for proactive economic development policies. The renewed focus upon the local level of politics as being more responsive to the complexities of development needs to be set within the context of the liberalisation and globalisation of economic relations, increasing capital mobility and changing social and technological organisation undermining the ability of the state to control economic forces. Under Fordism, local modes of regulation played a subordinate role to the state and other large-scale models. This approach is no longer tenable since the state can no longer determine the specific conditions of production and reproduction required by hypermobile capital. In the context of a ‘perforated sovereignty’ in which countries are open to trans-sovereign contacts by subnational governments, regional and local forces become proactive in orienting locational developmental strategies to the global market. Whilst this does not imply that the local state assumes greater power of autonomy, it does mean a greater relevance to economic realities and relations, permitting more effective strategic intervention. Local urban political organisation is increasingly important in the implementation of the economic development model in a global environment. Local political organisation is much more effective in negotiating with multinational and supraregional capital so as to provide appropriate local conditions and meet local needs.

With the reduction of state support since the late 1970’s, local government has had to innovate new methods in order to address problems arising from restructuring. Local economic interventionism has increasingly replaced the central state as local government has sought to mobilise indigenous skills and entrepreneurialism, engage non-governmental actors in local economic development. This describes a process in which the local state comes to organise the accumulation of capital by partnership with relevant private actors. The attempts to develop a climate favourable to business to attract capital investment has entailed a shift in emphasis from redistributive policies towards economic development strategies, implying the subordination of social provision to economic growth. This economic restructuring has important implications with respect to public services and social consumption. The provision of social consumption goods and welfare services comes to be de-emphasised as economic development strategies assume priority. Social expenditure is reduced as a proportion of overall local government expenditure whilst the greater involvement of non-governmental organisations and public agencies directed by market criteria leads to a restructuring of urban governance.

As has happened with respect to economic development, the public sector involvement in service provision has been reduced, supplemented and even replaced by a combination of private, voluntary, and semi-governmental agencies. With the shift towards the ‘entrepreneurial city’, social services come to be restructured – cut, contracted out, privatised. Private non-governmental organisations now play a key role in local economic policy and public service provision. This has necessitated the creation of coordinating structures. The movement from service provision via unitary central government to more fragmented structures involving private and voluntary sector agencies has redefined the role of local government in urban politics. Local government is now a partner in growth coalitions. It perhaps retains something of its old importance in being conceived as the enabling part of this coalition but it is no longer the only actor.

The new forms of public-private cooperation in the sphere of economic development and social provision expressed by the partnership model indicates changes taking place in the form of urban politics and governance. There is a need to examine the extent to which these new processes have the effect of entrenching and reinforcing capitalist relations by unravelling policies of social justice and equality or whether more genuinely democratic and participatory structures are emerging which will sustain more accountable and egalitarian models of urban governance. If partnership is employed as a strategy of capitalist restructuring to eliminate social democracy, then it will exist as a divisive and exploitative model that reinforces and entrenches existing processes of polarisation and marginalisation. If, however, it represents an attempt to relocate social democracy from the level of the central state into the local urban realm, partnership promises to extend citizen empowerment, engagement and participation in ways that embed social justice and equality in real institutions.

The public realm is under threat from the way that the ‘contract culture’ seems to be replacing local government provision. What was formerly a unified body of local provision via public policy has become a portfolio of a multiplicity of different service contracts, negotiated by different council departments with a whole host of commercial firms, with little or no communication or connection between them. Refuse collection, street cleaning, housing provision, leisure services, old people’s homes, public transport have all been put out to tender. Education, too, has been detached from local government control. In this context, the coordination between services that is required by successful regeneration becomes increasingly difficult to achieve.

This bodes ill for the idea of an associative civil society as a network of autonomous organisations and interests sustaining the bonds that integrate society and sustain a genuine politikos bios. Instead, civil society is fragmented from within whilst unity is imposed from without via the centralised agency of the state.

Whilst the market is presented as the most efficient mechanism for distributing goods and services, it suffers from serious deficiencies when it comes to the basis for urban order. The market can coordinate economic activities but it cannot generate and sustain the ties that bind society together. In consequence, ‘community’ has to be imagined and imposed via an external agency like the state, the political-institutional alternative to the abstract communities of money, capital and exchange. Against this, there is the increasing anomie that issues from economic individualism and state collectivism. As Asa Briggs (1968) argued in relation to the emergence of the large Victorian city, ‘economic individualism and common civic purpose were difficult to reconcile’.

In retrospect, it is easy to put ‘utopia on trial’, abandoning the progressive social ideals of modernist planning in favour of an urban populism that the market happily serves. The large tower blocks and housing estates may well have deprived individuals of their independence and initiative in creating their own communities. But so, too, does the market and the emphasis upon private consumption as the principal economic dynamo. Not to have a credit card is to be disenfranchised from town centre life, from the city as a site of consumption.


76 PARTNERSHIP AND THE CAPITALIST MODE
Within prevailing capitalist relations, the partnership model needs to be related to the capitalist mode of production. In this context, success or otherwise of the partnership approach is determined by the extent to which partnership facilitates the process of accumulation. This is the systemic imperative at the heart of capitalism, a functional need that ensures the domination of commercial interests within partnership and within public policy more generally.

Whilst capitalist relations necessarily bias partnership arrangements towards business interests, in the self-image of partnership all participatory members join together in the service of the general good. To the extent that all economic actors have some interest in joining a partnership, the competition is open rather than structurally predetermined by environing social relations. The precise composition of partnership emerges as the result of a process of negotiation. The objectives and the composition of partnership can change according to different issues. Whilst capital and labour may be united in the pursuit of new investment and employment, they can be opposed over the way that production is regulated. The politics of partnership can thus point in different directions at the same time. Different partnerships articulate various and often contradictory ends. Some partners may be pro-growth, others more anti-growth in defence of an existing community or quality of life. 

Behind partnership lurks the unitary ideology that assumes the harmony of interests, the still point of planning within the capitalist mode of production (Harvey 1985:194). Harvey describes the presuppositions of harmony within the capitalist world as ‘perhaps the most imposing and effective mystification of all’ (Harvey 1985:194). For whilst unity between social forces for the overall social good is a desirable aim, the fact is that within such ‘partnerships’, capital and its interests are hegemonic. The assumption of a harmony of interests is ideological since conflict rather than harmony is at the heart of capitalism. Capitalism rests on a social relation of domination of capital over labour.

From a Marxist or class conflict perspective, the whole notion of partnership is highly suspect. In light of this structuring relation, ‘partnership’ no longer appears as being freely determined through the commitment of equal partners but is the ideological product of the hegemony of capital. ‘And we might even come to see that it is the commitment to an alien ideology that chains our thought and understanding in order to legitimate a social practice that preserves in a deep sense, the domination of capital over labour’ (Harvey 1985:194/5). The implications of this is that it is not so much a transformation of urban planning and regeneration that is required than a transformation of social relations. Labour takes its place as one partner among many, all united around pro-business objectives.

Various social groups can secure a powerful position for themselves within capitalism by convincing the subaltern classes of society that its claim to power is legitimate in being backed by expertise. This means defining the terms of regeneration. For all these ‘official’ social partners, working firmly within existing institutions and relations, present versions of regeneration that serve the interests of capital and the state. Partnership within these confines is thus exposed as an ideological project, implying a harmony of interests between all participatory groups whereas in fact it proceeds on the basis of an inherently biased structure. In return for the promise of employment and high wages, labour has to relinquish its autonomy, abandoning the pursuit of its own separate agenda. Labour is induced to believe that its interests are best served not when pressed independently but when merged within a collective interest in alliance with other groups, groups which, like business, are often better placed by existing relations.

Whether ‘partnership’ can deliver a sustainable regeneration over against prevailing social relations can be doubted. It is less than clear that state planning plus markets plus local involvement plus professional development agencies equates to a regeneration strategy. The context of this critical comment is set by the dilemma of planning as a democratic enterprise committed to the social good but which nevertheless proceeds through practices and relations antithetical to this good. The problem is that the technical and administrative machinery and the social relations of class domination within which this machinery is set are based on the power of capital. Planning thus stands revealed as an ideological project, concealing and promoting the interests of capital behind the claim to the general good.

In this critical approach, planning is exposed as the site of struggle between classes for the control of urban space. Indeed, revelation of the class dimension of planning has led to a search for a form of partnership beyond the divisions of capital and labour. At its best, this search for a more sophisticated appreciation of the plurality of experiences and interests in urban society strengthens the democratic impulse behind planning. Unfortunately, ‘partnership’ has been applied within a political agenda that positively promotes the interests of business whilst dismantling the social democratic regulatory framework of a past mode of accumulation that treated labour as a partner within a social contract.

To the extent that partnerships between diverse social interests within the urban environment are formed around the need to preserve and enhance physical and social urban infrastructures that are used by all, all classes, groups and interests possess a motive to engage in partnership politics. There is also a common basis in employment and economic growth for partnership between all classes or, in the least, sections of all classes. Certainly, sections of labour that have achieved positions of relative privilege within an existing environment will support such a partnership under the banner of jobs.

Other goals which can earn common assent are asserted as desirable within the project of partnership, citizen awareness and environmental sustainability being two. But the question is whether this ideal can be compatible with the structural basis of planning within capitalist relations. The partnership that is founded under capitalist hegemony is a powerful shaping force in the urban landscape but its effects are felt in a particular way. The objective of partnership under capitalist hegemony is to facilitate the process of accumulation by protecting and enhancing existing models of production and consumption, proceeding on the basis of dominant technological mixes and patterns of social relations, labour power, physical infrastructures.

When partnerships are proposed, members of the community and of labour need to determine just what purposes are being advanced by the effort. It is one thing for community groups and working class organisations to participate in a project which they have exercised independent initiative in devising. It is something else entirely for them to join a programme that is designed to serve predetermined interests of economic growth and development. This subordinates all partners to the central systemic dynamic of the private accumulation of capital, setting strict parameters on what partnership can achieve.

On account of class composition and on account of the fact that economic growth is not a politically neutral concept, partnerships are inherently unstable. Divisions within and pressures without combine to expose the different ends of the different partners:





Factional divisions within capital (between financial, consumer, producer, real estate and landed property interests), divisions within labour (men and women, skilled and unskilled, employed and unemployed, blue collar and service), divisions between local community producers and multinational organisations make it difficult to perceive of a long term common interest which could serve as a foundation for a sustainable partnership. Different interests have different intentions with respect to the use of urban space. There is no way that a partnership can act without thereby serving or damaging the interests of one faction or class. Decisions over the allocation of time and resources must necessarily have unequal class impacts in a class divided society. Existing social relations, operating with a systemic class bias, must either be reinforced or undermined, depending upon the character of decisions taken. Class division remains as a potentially disruptive structural fact that partnership may be able to contain but can never eradicate.

Within capitalist relations, partnership must operate within two kinds of external constraints:

1) All economic actors have the option of seeking improvement in the local community or of relocating to places where profits, wages, employment, life style, quality of life are already available and do not have to be created. This choice is not unconstrained. Different factions and classes have different opportunities to move. Mobility depends upon uneven capacities according to unevenly distributed assets. 

This applies within as well as between classes. Thus banks and finance capital exercise control over the asset that possesses the greatest geographical mobility – money. But holdings of local debt tie them to a particular urban region, reducing mobility. Similarity, transnational corporations possess the capacity to relocate production rapidly. But this mobility is reduced by dependence upon a particular mix of fixed capital, the quality of local labour and its availability, particularly infrastructures. Decisions to reinvest or relocate are, as a consequence, much more difficult than the notion of hypermobile capital would suggest. And this gives local community and labour forces greater power than they would appear to have.

2) The second constraint refers to forces from the outside that work to undermine a partnership. The introduction of labour power of lower cost and of different quality, takeovers of local production and retail outlets by outside capital, the substitution of locally produced commodities by imported commodities, the inflows of money capital all work to change the interrelationship between the various partners in a partnership. Indeed, that class or fraction which is able to invoke such external forces holds an advantage over those who cannot do so to the same extent. The other side of this is that classes and fractions that are more mobile than others can use this power to threaten to relocate out of an area if its demands are not met and its interests are not served. This can make it the dominant partner in the partnership, subordinating all other partners to its objectives.

These forces undermine the attempt to develop a structured coherence within an urban economy by rendering partnership unstable and exposed to internal dissolution.

Most importantly of all, however, are the political mechanisms which operate to define, express, and act upon partnership objectives so as to develop a policy favourable to dominant capitalist interests out of the antagonistic and contradictory interests contained within a local partnership formation.

Any partnership proceeding within capitalist relations has to accommodate its policies and objectives to the fundamental systemic purpose of capital circulation and accumulation. To do otherwise is to obstruct the mechanisms of valorisation intrinsic to the capital system, bringing about crises in reproduction. A successful partnership, within this context, must necessarily be a procapitalist alliance. The problem is that there are many ways to be procapitalist. Further, the inner contradictions of capitalism render any attempt to be consistent moot (Harvey 1989:155). Being procapitalist does not necessarily imply serving local capital interests, since these may not be serving the interests of capital or even their own interests well. ‘And when we introduce the uncertainties of spatial competition under geographical conditions of changing space relations, it becomes evident that no single line of argument or action can define what it means exactly to be procapitalist’ (Harvey 1989:155).

The instability of this process makes available a space for relatively autonomous political processes, thus giving politics a creative role in relation to structure and, potentially, leading the urban region into a unique path of development. Assessing possibilities for social government arising out of partnership involves revaluing the creativity of politics over the determination of structure, demonstrating a creative function in bringing about an alternative future.

The effect of partnership upon urban economic growth, technical innovation, social transformation and reproduction can be profound and enduring. Partnerships can exert a direct shaping control over the formation of social and physical infrastructures and, as a consequence, shape the fundamental socio-economic character of the urban environment. Partnerships can attract or deter employment, business, commerce, labour, finance, real estate and they can foster new forms of development, creating new patterns of social relations. In this respect, the political-economic evolution of partnership offers the prospects of a relatively autonomous form of social governance.

The multidimensional character of these new political processes operating within urban space, forging unique alliances between various individuals, groups, classes and fractions represents a powerful political mobilisation of social forces. The question is whether this mobilisation is compatible with capitalist relations or whether it possesses the capacity to subvert capitalist processes, resolve capitalist contradictions and constitute a new social order. This implies the assertion of the use value of urban space by city dwellers and urban citizen movements over against the reduction of urban space to an exchange value by capital. This issue is discussed in the next chapter with respect to the concept of the local growth coalition.


77 THE LOCAL GROWTH COALITION
This section investigates regeneration partnerships through a critical focus upon the concept of the ‘local growth coalition’ in Harvey Molotch and John Logan’s taxonomy of urban futures. Analysing the condition of cities in the US of the mid-1980’s, Molotch and Logan argue that ‘there are two distinct sets of urban interests (and local political agendas that follow from them) in any .. urban area. Some people seek wealth through the development, sale or rent of land and buildings; others’ primary interest in place is as a setting for daily life and production. These two corresponding sets of purposes, often in direct conflict with one another, correspond to the Marxian description of commodities as providing for both exchange and use value’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144).

This distinction sets up the argument in terms of a conflict between the capitalist reduction of urban space to exchange value on the one hand and the attempt on the part of the citizen community to reappropriate urban space as a use value on the other.

Urban regeneration in the US in the 1980’s focused firmly upon exchange value. Dominant in the redevelopment and gentrification of US cities were ‘a set of actors who push for local growth maximisation to increase returns from real estate manipulation and other business activities specifically dependent on local growth – collectively making up the “growth machine”’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144). The focus upon the activities of ‘local growth coalitions’ in the US reveals the extent to which these coalitions are dominated by restless and aggressive commercial interests. The policies pursued by such coalitions are often ‘environmentally destructive, fiscally damaging and socially regressive for urban populations’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144; 1987).

Molotch and Logan thus present a fundamentally polarised conception of the interests comprising the urban environment. This argument shows that the interests of urban growth coalitions dominated by commercial interests not only do not necessarily coincide with other urban interests but may well conflict with the interests of others in the urban locality, particularly in the sense that citizen interests are primarily ‘oriented towards use values of urban space’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144). This orientation towards use values pits local citizens against those commercial interests more concerned with the exploitation of exchange values. One can therefore argue that urban space will be characterised by a latent tendency towards conflict and divergence between the users of urban space and the exploiters of urban space, between those who conceive urban space as a living environment for citizens and those who conceive urban space as a site of commercially exploitable economic activities. This implies antagonism between citizen interests and commercial interests, between community groups concerned with living space and growth coalitions concerned with exchange value.

The local urban growth coalition is quite different from a ‘rescue squad’ that seeks to patch up a social and economic fabric that has been badly damaged by economic crisis and deindustrialisation (Taylor et al 1996:305/6). Molotch’s analysis of the city as a growth machine proceeds from the conception of accumulation as entailing the conversion of surplus capital into new commodity production through combining surplus means of production with surplus labour power. Accumulation also requires the previous production of the fundamental prerequisites of production, particularly social and physical infrastructures. The production of necessary preconditions requires that previous speculative investments meet the requirements of further speculative growth. It is here that the notion of the growth machine is important. The growth machine speculates on the production of the necessary preconditions for accumulation, socialising the risks of this speculation through finance capital and the state. 

The growth machine is a capitalist machine in which certain interests achieve a dominant position. Banking, finance, property, building, developers as well as representatives from within the formal political sector have the initiative.





Beyond this, the freedom that individuals and groups have to intervene and participate in this politics is as fundamental as that of business to innovate and change. ‘The social ferment and conflict of urban social movements born out of class struggle, possessive individualism, community rivalries, and segmentations and segregations based on labour qualities and life style preferences can be mobilised into creative processes of socio-political innovation. The successful urban region is one that evolves the right mix of life styles and cultural, social and political forms to fit with the dynamics of capital accumulation’ (Harvey 1989:158).

This begs the question of knowing when the right mix has been achieved. As with individual capitalists, the urban region has the autonomy to pursue its own course whilst being constrained by external coercive laws of competition. But capitalist imperatives do not extinguish the unique character of urban regions. Acknowledging the systemic imperatives of capital, accumulation does not preclude different mixes of specialisations, coalitions and political processes. Various combinations are possible within a particular social, geographical and historical context. And this context is also global. The urban region has to compete within an international division of labour. The urban region is to be conceived as a competitive collective unit and geopolitical entity within the global dynamics and uneven geographical development of capitalism. The power of the capitalist class within the urban region depends upon the competitive position of the region. Power is not evenly distributed but is deployed within a hierarchical structure. There is a hierarchy of size and a hierarchy of function. There is the power of innovation, in social and political affairs as well as in the production of goods and services. Political leverage is also an important factor. ‘Power, in this case, depends largely upon the coherence and legitimacy in the local ruling coalition in relation to national politics’ (Harvey 1989:159).
The growth coalition seeks to mobilize internal and external forces to create an upward spiral of local development. The growth coalition has to operate as a collective capitalist; it possesses a double-edged role. Competition between urban regions and coalitions helps coordinate the political and social landscape ‘rationally’ from the perspective of facilitating the process of accumulation. It helps to discipline geographical variations in accumulations and class struggle so as to confine them within capital’s dynamic as a whole. It also opens up new possibilities and spaces within which this dynamic may flourish. The various coalitions become key agents in the uneven geographical development as an outlet for capital’s contradictions (Harvey 1989: chs 12 13).





Another aspect of growth coalitions is the attempt to position urban areas as headquarter cities. Redevelopment here is oriented towards capturing key command and control functions in government and finance for the city. These functions tend to be highly centralised and possess considerable power over a whole range of activities and spaces. Cities are thus reshaped with the intention of them becoming centres of finance, capital, information control and government decision-making. This approach demands a particular strategy to provide the appropriate infrastructure. Achieving centrality within a global network of communications and transport is crucial and requires substantial public investment to provide airports, rapid transit systems, communications etc. A public-private partnership to provide the necessary office space and linkages puts the interests of property, finance and development first.





The dominant response to the crisis of the 1970’s and 1980’s has been for urban regeneration strategies to be concentrated upon attracting and keeping footloose private capital. Whilst cutting back the role of public intervention and investment, central and local government, have offered grants, fiscal incentives and other such packages designed to appeal in that it makes it seem that governments are acting even as they are withdrawing from economic life. But the strategy of appealing to private capital does not generate long-term solutions to economic crisis. By its nature, hypermobile capital is constantly searching for profitable outlets. Areas seeking regeneration are continuously competing with each other to offer more attractive packages in order to leverage in private capital. The problem with this competitive devaluation is that it appeals to hypermobile capital, that is, to a capital that is always liable to move when relative profits and advantages change, as they continually do. The whole strategy is predicated upon an inherent and permanent urban instability.

And then there is the issue of the quality of economic growth obtained. The quality of employment generated by footloose or hypermobile capital is poor, involving few opportunities for further training and advancement. Government supplies at high cost the conditions of attracting investment only to generate a growth that rests predominantly upon low wage/low skill employment. This is a problem caused by the overemphasis upon the quantity of employment to the neglect of quality. There is a need to develop a strategy that generates high skill/high wage employment and fosters and harnesses human creativity. Such a strategy is based upon investment in human and social capital. Investment is channelled into enhancing local abilities. Every local area contains people who have particular skills and expertise. A regeneration strategy based upon improving the quality of human capital has the effect of using capital to enhance the skills base of the economy, unleash entrepreneurial potential and harness both individual and collective abilities. This would be to focus regeneration strategies upon developing human capital, increasing relative surplus value rather than upon exploiting labour power.

To pursue this kind of regeneration strategy is to seek to build local and national economies that are dynamic and responsive in always being able to meet changing market needs. Unfortunately, uneven development, inter-urban competition, and the existence of fixed capital means that it is not easy to respond to changing market needs. For most places, the best way to obtain long-term sustainable employment in the economy is to move towards greater self-sufficiency. This means building local economies rather than structuring them to fit the global market, encouraging local businesses, creating local markets and aiding factories that serve local needs. Plenty can be achieved once the hold of global markets and transnational capital is broken. If nations could adopt selective import taxes, it would be possible to create the conditions stimulating export substitution.

This emphasis upon the local realm does not imply parochialism. Local economies in the advanced world could establish trading arrangements, having greater control at this level than is the case with anonymous transfers of aid. Establishing genuine links with other parts of the world could affect an enduring international understanding that involves the transfer of goods, people and ideas. It is possible to act locally and think globally. But it is also possible to think locally and act globally. Greater self-sufficiency makes sustainable employment possible. Given the facts of uneven development, some cities will be better placed than others at first. But self-sufficiency would make local economies less dependent upon a range of goods and services from outside the area. This would have the effect in the long run of reducing costly transportation. The end in view is to overthrow the tyranny of exchange value as a systemic imposition and to assert the primacy of use value as determined by the citizen body. ‘Ultimately, capital would be for the use of people rather than people for capital (Short 1989:21).

Examining the forms that this principle could take brings the discussion into the area of community empowerment, organisation and development.

‘True community development cannot rest on foundations of outsiders delivering services. Such an approach inevitably fosters dependence on external ‘experts’ and ‘resources’. This dependency hinders the development of indigenous leadership, broad participation and local self-reliance. Ultimately, it often degenerates into a form of social control, strengthening subordination to the dominant culture, furthering the homogenisation of communities, and reinforcing centralisation of power and policy making in the hands of outsiders. This approach leads to the disempowerment of communities and citizens, not their development. (Clark 69/70).

‘The linchpin of this strategy is to offer incentives for private enterprise to ‘develop’ a community, thus subsiding its subjugation’ (Clark 70).

‘The definition of community development here is economic. The assumption is that business will provide jobs, jobs equal income, and increased income constitutes community development. Yet, the reality is that although such an approach may possibly increase income for individual community members, it is done at the cost of cultural tradition, community cohesion, a healthy physical environment, and community control of important resources’ (Clark 70).

‘Another traditional approach to community development, ‘urban renewal’ through city planning, has had an equally dismal record. The failure of ambitious plans for the rehabilitation of massive areas has been well documented. Yet, planners persist in imposing new spatial relations on neighbourhoods with the expectation that their designs can create community. While architecture and planning can help to reinforce particular social relations, community development is not a ‘design’ problem. Grandiose plans for urban renewal reflect a technocratic mentality which permeates our civilisation, a belief in the quick fix of technics. Historically, people have understood that design requires integration into the social life of a community if it is to enhance the quality of life. There is a tradition which recognises the holistic nature of community design, but it is largely ignored by the technocrats who populate professional planning.
 The tendency of our society to seek technical fixes, technological solutions to what are essentially social problems, is a strong one, and has been carried over into community development efforts’ (Clark 70/1).


78 CAPACITY BUILDING AND COMMUNITY ORGANISATION
This section examines partnership as the organisational form of community regeneration and empowerment. In this aspect, partnership mobilises the talents and marshals the resources of communities within an urban regeneration project. Partnerships combine bottom-up and top-down approaches. Aspects of partnership suggest the potential to transcend the parameters of official, institution-led partnership in the direction of a self-organising, self-governing community. This is especially the case with respect to capacity building and reciprocal understanding across participating members. In this regard, the true measure of a successful regeneration partnership is the extent to which a regenerated community is able to transcend the institutional parameters of the partnership, replacing the representatives of ‘official’ society, public and private, with more organic forms. A successful partnership model is thus one that is self-transcending or self-dissolving within the active community. The successful emergence of community organisation across a variety of fields implies the increasing capacity of a community to be truly self-ordering and self-governing.

From this community oriented perspective it is possible to highlight the limitations of the partnership model in recent experience, not only with respect to urban regeneration but also with regard to its political implications. The partnership model compares very unfavourably with the American inspired ‘broad based organising’ (BBO) (Farnell et al 1994). In the BBO approach, local ‘actions’ promote initiatives that are fully accountable to local communities. Most importantly, emphasis is placed upon ‘political pressure’ proceeding from the bottom-up through organisation building. This contrasts with the top-down approach that characterises the partnership model. The BBO approach involves a broad based form of community involvement sustained by a ‘day to day activism’ that gives voice within the community to the ‘hitherto voiceless’ (Farnell et al 1994).

There is a need, then, to examine the conditions that enable community groups and agencies to develop their organisational, political, cultural and intellectual capacities so as to be able to participate effectively in regeneration schemes. This is to envisage partnership as resting upon genuinely bottom-up structures, powered dynamically from below as a result of the development of social capital on the part of local communities.

This shows an aspect of capacity building within the community that possesses the organisational and moral potential to transcend the official institutional approach within ‘top-down’ partnerships. In becoming active in community organisations and in gaining access to the policy process through partnership, individuals – the hitherto marginalized and excluded – develop their capacities to engage in local regeneration.

There is a great and growing demand for participation in community affairs. As Colin Ward argues, if people no longer trust local or central government to analyse their problems and prescribe their solutions, they also reject the narrow presentation of alternatives on which they could comment before final decision. There is now a demand for much more proactive community involvement:





For Ward, the concept of public-private partnership as a relationship between government and the private market is flawed by its exclusion of a third sector, ‘the residents of the community affected’.





The point is that if ‘the money motive’ is the only serious force in an urban regeneration project, then that project will almost certainly fail. There needs to be an input from members of the local community. This is the heart and soul of a genuine regeneration. ‘There is less chance of getting things seriously wrong if sensible and effective ways are found of consulting the existing inhabitants of our cities’ (Ward 1989:56). Local community organisations are highly effective in a way that government agencies and business interests are not. In contrast to the millions spent on official projects, which in so many cases seem to have little if any permanent effect, the community-inspired self-help activities lay the groundwork for first stabilising an area and then becoming a springboard for recovery (Ward 1989:62).

The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR 1997a) acknowledges the role that communities have to play in the strategic direction and management of programmes and is therefore concerned that communities develop the capacity to exercise this role.

To fully develop this role, however, there is a need to develop capacity building within communities. For the DETR this involves:

1)	the skills required with respect to project planning, budgeting and fund raising, management, organisation, development, brokerage and networking;
2)	the knowledge of the programmes and institutions of regeneration, their systems, priorities, key personnel;
3)	the resources needed if local organisations are to be able to achieve their objectives;
4)	the power and influence required to shape the plans, priorities and actions of key local (and national) agencies.

The process of capacity building empowers communities, making it possible for people to do things for themselves. It creates the organisations, structures and networks facilitating the process of self-activity and self-initiative. And it develops the skills of local people so as to enable them to take charge of their urban future. The challenge facing communities is to improve their access, extend social and economic opportunities and ensure that local needs are met through the development of services (Geddes 1995).

Many community groups face obstacles to their involvement in community projects on account of their disadvantaged position. Many groups find themselves excluded on account of race, age and gender (Bennington 1994). The difficulty of reconciling different needs and interests is compounded by the discrimination that socially deprived groups face within community. Partnerships need to promote a sense of social inclusion and belonging to ensure that the disadvantaged do not lose out in the competition of interests. Policy goals need to allow for differences in race, age and gender whilst containing proposals of how to counteract disadvantage within a consultative framework.

Poor and excluded groups all have contributions to make in the regeneration of communities as local people most in need of regeneration initiatives. However, there can be divisions between local interests, racial and ethnic groups, between economic growth and environmental conservation. It is important, then, to agree a joint vision for the community, one, that is, that can be shared by all and one so as to determine priorities for action.

The evidence suggests that policy decisions and implementation are improved through the greater involvement of local people working with the public and private sectors. Community action forming community identity possesses a unifying impulse that establishes linkages between the different interests of local councillors, public officials, company executives and local people. This unifying impulse can develop a broader awareness of regeneration problems and a shared vision (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994). Communities have an active role to play in regeneration in fostering a common purpose and a cooperative ethos (CBI 1988; Taub 1994) that can be articulated in vision statements and policy commitments. Success depends upon the extent to which local people can identify with these objectives.

Whilst acknowledging the importance of community involvement, there is the problem that the most active groups and individuals in a community do not necessarily represent local people or local interests. This presents a problem given the importance of ensuring that local programmes are run by boards that are representative of the community as a whole (DETR 1997a). The DETR guide proposes that ‘credible’ representatives represent networks of local groups so as to empower communities.

This begs the question of who, within a community, the ‘credible’ groups are. Often, organisations achieve a high status within a community through evidence of their expertise within an area. Independent or voluntary sector organisations perform a valuable service within communities (Ware 1989), representing groups that face obstacles in having an independent voice. Voluntary organisations are able to offer professional assistance to groups seeking funding and can work alongside local people in ensuring that local needs obtain expression.

The path is open for a challenge to public policy, the community interest becoming a visibly contested concept. The principle of representativeness should therefore ensure the joint ‘ownership’ of initiatives by the community (Farnell et al 1994) so as to permit the broadest acceptance of aims and objectives (Jacobs and Dutton 2000:114/5).

Policies giving local people greater access to services and exercise greater influence over the use of community resources can produce empowerment. Empowered communities are able to establish the ‘ownership’ of programmes and projects so as to enable local people to assume responsibilities for influencing and taking decisions on SRBCF management boards and so on. Empowerment is a policy strategy aiming to further ‘community development’ (West 1993). The language of empowerment is at the heart of community regeneration partnerships, practical examples being tenants in public housing having the choice to own their own homes, parents having greater choice in selecting schools or parents having the opportunity to make selections about the care they receive. ‘Diversity, choice and enterprise are thus firmly established in the vocabulary of community regeneration’ (Jacobs and Dutton 2000:115).

Capacity building on the part of the community is a process that enhances:

1)	the empowerment of communities, because people increasingly do things for themselves;
2)	the ability to create structures and networks to assist this process;
3)	skills to enable local people to take charge of their futures (Jacobs and Dutton in Roberts and Sykes 2000:118).

Capacity building in this respect contains a radical implication that runs contrary to the need for partnerships to demonstrate a realistic respect for existing institutional and financial constraints. This aspect is worthy of further exploration. The extent to which social, welfare and health objectives are included in urban regeneration implies a commitment to create new social infrastructures in a way that presupposes the development of material, organisational and intellectual capacities within local communities: ‘local initiatives imply a requirement for local expertise across a range of capacities’ (Jacobs and Dutton 2000:118).

The evidence of community organising within the development of grass roots partnerships shows a creative response to a lack of power and resources through the creation of social capital. The point goes further. One can perceive in the operation of partnership an affirmation of the ‘participatory’ conception of democracy, with individuals emerging as active citizens, as against the more passive identity within the institutions of representative democracy. And one can also perceive something of the socialised conception of government that Part I delineated in relation to the Germanic theories of urban freedom.

Local authorities have experience of working in partnership in a wide variety of fields, from economic development, crime and neighbourhood safety, health and community care, environmental improvements. There is a wide scope of collaborative arrangements, comprising both formal and informal mechanisms and different levels of decision making from the sub-regional level to individual projects (Hambleton, Essex and Mills 1996). Partnership is an approach that pervades all policy sectors, under the Crime and Disorder Act, the development of primary care groups in the NHS, care in the community and projects aimed at overcoming urban deprivation. With regard to urban regeneration and government, the centrality of partnership reflects the changing relationships between the state, civil society and the market (Geddes 1997). The renegotiation of the boundaries between public and private, with governmental functions being increasingly assumed and performed by social agencies, points to a redefinition of democracy being underway.

Partnerships emerge in a much wider field than urban regeneration. Active partnerships possess the potential to transcend urban regeneration by embracing a broader range of activities, thereby extending the participatory conception of democracy into the decision making sphere. This wide scope increases the possibility of envisaging partnership as broadening participatory structures within the community, enhancing democracy by involving wider sections of the urban public directly in decision making. Hill gives the examples of residents’ associations, area fora, the users’ committees of a variety of facilities such as leisure centres and youth and age groups, to emphasise a shift in the conception of democracy towards working with rather than merely for local people (Hill 2000:182/3).

This raises a question as to whether a new form of social government is in the process of evolution. In engaging with partnerships with non-elected bodies, local authorities are required to maintain democratic accountability to the community as a whole. Yet, in many respects, the partnership model threatens to undermine formal political accountability as partnership bodies obtain influence at the expense of local councillors not involved. Involved or not, local councils now have to share responsibility over issues where formerly they assumed complete responsibility.

Hill recognises the extent to which partnership may transform the terms of democracy, being concerned that local authorities forming partnerships with non-elected bodies maintain their democratic responsibility to the community as a whole. Partnerships are potentially subversive of formal political institutions to the extent that non-elected bodies obtain influence at the expense of the community of electors and their representatives. There is a danger that, given the tendency for these coordinating mechanisms to become institutionalised (Pierre 1998), forming governing units in their own right, the party political direction of democratically elected councils comes to be bypassed ‘in favour of shadowy boards, in which business has a privileged position’ (Hill 2000:182). Democratic accountability and responsibility have traditionally been matters for the relationship between the democratically elected local authority and the local electorate. Where non-elected bodies and members gain power at the expense of local politicians there is the possibility of a democratic deficit, especially given the tendency of private business to dominate and given the lack of parity in power and resources between participating members. The fear is that the normal processes of party conflict, which most people identify with politics, come to be replaced by a managerial approach that proceeds through remote boards on which private business is dominant. Alternatively, partnership could entail the expansion of democracy through the active involvement of a wider range of stakeholders in policy and service delivery (Hill 2000:182). Whether these developments necessarily represent a diminution in local democracy depends upon the perspective taken. It is possible to argue that local democracy, far from being undermined, is actually increased through the involvement of a wider range of stakeholders in policy and service delivery. The emerging system savours a great deal of Hegel’s differentiated system of social mediation which integrates society according to a structured system of ascending purposes, making available to all individuals a form of public activity above the private level. This system rests upon an active sovereignty that is expressed through a functional conception of representation.

The ‘participatory’ conception of partnership, however, cannot be accepted without examining the democratic credentials of the partners, determining whose interests they represent and how representative they are of the community. There is an issue of equality among partners given the existence of asymmetrical relations of power and resources in the community as a whole. A functionally orientated democracy rooted in existing relations will express a systematic bias in favour of those with greater power and resources.

The question is whether there are ways of counteracting inequalities of power and resources through the creation of ‘social capital’. There has been much research on the concept of social capital, with theoretical and empirical studies by political scientists, sociologists, economists and scholars from other disciplines giving distinctive views as to what social capital is. Foley and Edwards reviewed forty-five publications detailing research in which social capital played a central role. In the majority of these works, social capital is treated as an independent variable that has an impact upon a range of societal characteristics (economic growth, school attendance and neighbourhood stability). In other works ‘social capital is treated as a dependent or intervening variable, with particular emphasis on the sorts of voluntary organisations said to produce it’ (Foley and Edwards 1999:147). Foley and Edwards repudiate both conceptions of social capital for referring principally to attitudes, paying scant regard to the milieu in which social capital is understood to be present. To remedy this deficiency, Foley and Edwards develop a model that explicitly acknowledges the context-dependency of social capital and makes allowance for differentiation along the continuum of unequal distribution of resources in terms of access to and possession of resources (Foley and Edwards 1999:168).

Putnam (1993) employs the concept ‘social capital’ with respect to the ways in which norms such as trust, reciprocity, and social networks facilitate collective action in societies and communities (see also Foley and Edwards 1999:142). Differentials in social capital explained differences between governmental units in different regions of Italy:





With respect to the study of a rural town in Minnesota, Riedel et al (1998) conceive social capital as a dependent variable of a community network. From this perspective, proposals for electronic democracy are valued as a means to achieving equality of political participation. Such a notion implies equality in terms of access to information technologies and to the skills necessary for using the technologies. The authors argue that such equality can be achieved by accentuating social or group-based forms of participation. In this respect, social capital is a valuable concept since it ‘deals directly with equality by predicting the conditions under which those lacking resources can co-operate to accomplish collective ends’ (Riedel et al 1998:375). In their empirical studies, Riedel et al focus upon the three essential components of social capital (interpersonal trust, social norms and association membership) and evaluate the impact that computers and network use can have on these elements.

In one view, social capital pertains to the social relationships, expectations, obligations and norms that facilitate productive human activity. Social capital contrasts with physical capital (for example machines) and human capital (for example education). But is there is something inherently limiting to connect the notion to productive human activity? Productive in what sense? Commercial life? Or community life?

Putnam makes a distinction between two types of social capital. The first type is bonding social capital, relationships within a group; the second type is bridging social capital, relationships that link a group with others. Together, these comprise the social capital of any given social group: ‘Bonding social capital is good for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilising solidarity. Dense networks in ethnic enclaves, for example, provide crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the community .. Bridging networks, by contrast, are better for linkage to external assets and for information diffusion.. Moreover bridging social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves’ (Putnam 2000:22-3). 

In Coal, Capital and Culture, an examination of the sociology of changing conditions in former mining areas, Warwick and Littlejohn define a concept of ‘local cultural capital’ in terms of the strength that the community drew from social networks ‘based in kinship, friendship and neighbourliness in household and community settings’. These networks held community together in a ‘period of change’ during which the local economy was destroyed. The networks were the strength of the towns and villages (Turner 2000:2)

Margaret Thatcher’s dream of an ‘enterprise culture’ could never be easily embedded in a community which rested upon solidaristic notions. Academics analysed local efforts at economic regeneration to determine how many and what kind of new jobs had been created; Training and Enterprise Councils produced figures about the number of training placements they provided; local authorities circulated glossy brochures concerning the number of multi-agency partnerships they had established; and regeneration agencies boasted about the call centres they have established on shiny new industrial estates.

But something was missing, ‘spirit’, that elusive quality which Warwick and Littlejohn identify as ‘local cultural capital’. It may be true that urban degeneration is manifested most obviously in the deterioration of the physical environment. However, this physical degeneration is the outer manifestation of a moral, spiritual and cultural degeneration proceeding within the heart of the community. Strategies that focus exclusively upon the regeneration of the physical environment have merely one part of the problem in view. Efforts at regeneration through partnership may provide training places and employment opportunities and self-employment starter packs in new priority areas. It may be possible, over time, with sufficient resources, to rebuild urban areas. But rebuilding the spirit of community takes longer and requires the active participation of community members themselves (Turner 2000:280). The fact remains that the communities that are most in need of regeneration were formerly held together by a ‘spirit’ that can neither be quantified nor objectified. This was a spirit that members of the community had developed over generations, a spirit based on collectivism, kinship and upon advancement by cooperation rather than individualism, solidarity rather than self-interest. The social institutions at the heart of community symbolised this collective spirit that true regeneration needs to recover: the Co-op; the miners’ welfare; the club trip; the union.

Property- or market-led regeneration, with the private sector as the lead agency, is inimical to this collective spirit, this culture of collective purpose and identity. Regeneration orientated towards fostering an enterprise culture, where the engine is private effort and where the motivation is private gain, fails to address the real issue – the true spirit of a community and the consequences of its loss, the rupturing of society, the dissolution of a collective community through a rationalistic desolidarisation. Regeneration that does not address the loss of this collective culture will fail. Regeneration efforts need to enable members of the community to unite themselves so as to transcend a series of individualistic survival strategies and hence generate a local cultural capital.

In seeking to determine the terms of regeneration so as to broaden the conception of a ‘successful’ partnership, it is worth returning to the distinction between use value and exchange value in relation to place. This is to distinguish between the use that individuals make of the built environment as a site for work, life and recreation and the market exchange value of that environment to commercial interests (Fainstein 1994:1). This distinction puts a tension in regeneration strategies in urban areas in the sense that it exposes different perceptions of the urban environment by different agents, the urban environment as a lifeworld site of everyday human activity and the urban environment as the site of commercial activity. The tension that this creates ‘lies at the heart of a number of urban problems and also helps to define the limits within which solutions can be constructed and applied’ (Roberts 2000:10/1).

Partnership approaches to the regeneration of urban areas have been accompanied by various attempts to coopt ‘the community’ as another partner, as just one partner among many. Part of this process has involved reducing ‘social capital’ to being merely a ‘factor of production’ like labour and machines and raw materials. For Francis Fukuyama ‘if people who have to work together in an enterprise trust one another because they are operating to a set of ethical norms, doing business costs less’ (Fukuyama 1995 Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity).

This is an impoverished notion compared to the way that ‘social capital’ is being defined and used in this argument. Proceeding from Warwick and Littlejohn’s conception of ‘local cultural capital’ as pertaining to the behavioural norms specific to a local community, social capital is to be defined as a solidaristic notion that pertains to the collective resources that a community generates through its self-organisation and self-activity to counteract its lack of material power. 

The concept of ‘social capital’ defines the capacity of those lacking material power and resources to create capital through their organisation and activity. Community organising creating ‘social capital’ has a direct bearing on the success and sustainability of regeneration schemes, offering a wider view than that which concentrates upon ‘the economic’, upon quantifiable measures of how much land and how many buildings have been brought into industrial use, how many training places have been provided, etc.

‘Social capital’ generates cooperation, trust, self-discipline. This is a conception that concerns the strengthening of social bonds and relationships between members of a community. Unlike physical capital, measured in terms of products, or human capital, developed through education and training, social capital possesses a cultural dimension pertaining to ethical and behavioural norms within a community. The concept of social capital is important in that it recognises that psychology or culture, the ‘spirit’ of a community – whether individual or collective – is as strong a factor in regeneration as is the level of capital investment, employment opportunities, training places. To emphasise the importance of social capital is to widen the scope of regeneration projects beyond that which can be quantified and measured and hence which is normally recognised.

It is interesting to close the discussion here by considering the implications of the new ICT’s upon community capacity building and social capital. ‘A new, “wired” political community is emerging, a net-polis. The contours and nature of this political community are only in formation, nebulous. The task of research is to study what is happening, why, and what possible patterns might emerge. A major concern – for politicians, scholars and citizens – is maintaining democratic values in cyberspace: equal access, responsibility, representativity, public control and accountability’ (Walch 1999:23).

Remote or distributed self-management on the part of local communities is enhanced by the new ICTs. Connecting decentralised computing capacity with a communications capacity enables for work to be undertaken from any remote location that is networked. Local information has the same capacity under networked local control and management as when it is under central management and control. There is the potential here for the local ownership and management of information; the potential to engage in information-intensive activities at a distance, to exploit local nuance, accent or timbre in the processing of information and of products; and the ability to exploit economies of disaggregation, the synergies of distributed production networks and the flexibility of small-scale distributed management and control. The implications for small communities are significant, easing access to markets and suppliers, to information providers and to others for mutual support. This enhances the possibility of competing effectively from a distance with globalised producers (Gurstein 1998).

The rapid expansion of Internet-enabled activism and organising, as most clearly manifested in the anti-WTO protests, indicates future lines of development involving distributed opportunities for information-management and information control. The activities of others in distant places but with common concerns and common goals serves to inspire the emergence of local groups concerned to press these issues and interests on the local terrain. Information is exchanged seamlessly between different locales. The broader struggles are supplemented and complemented by local concerns and local resources, strengthening both through pooling numbers, resources, experiences, knowledge and information.

Community networks or community networking provide a means of developing and sustaining locally based information systems to buttress local development, facilitating local empowerment through the management and use of local systems.

The development of community information infrastructure of systems and networks creates the means by which local interests, objectives and responsibilities may be served. ICTs are set within a framework which permits their use to manage local processes and to participate in global processes. Increasingly, these local processes are in opposition to and even in direct conflict with the global processes and the way that technology and economic activities are remotely managed and controlled.

Castells conceives community networking as forming a potential counter-current to globalisation. There is a need, in this sense, to develop the pragmatics with respect to the means for adapting ICTs within community processes – community development, e-health, e-culture, e-government and e-politics and not least e-exchange and e-commerce.

Community networking offers the organisational means for grounding a local framework of ICT within community, offering the possibility for the management and control of a locally based computing buttressing collaborative community-based activities. The true potential of local computing is realised as local empowerment achieved by enhancing computing access with the effect of integrating individuals into local structures of computing and community. 

As access to computing facilities increases, there are numerous and parallel applications, including the opportunity for the community to assume ownership and control of its own identity, especially the ‘products’ of its culture and language. This is important at a time when the corporate forces of globalisation are looking to capture and commodify vast swathes of culture and knowledge as intellectual property, protected by rules of copyright and patent. Communities have the ability to respond, utlilising ICTs to preserve, capture and exert ownership over the products of local cultural development, production, history and knowledge (Turk and Trees 2000).

Whether one refers to traditional development organisations or the newly established community-technology centres, networks are integral to the most successful strategies for ICT-based development. This doesn’t simply apply to a network of computers but applies more generally to the process of linking individuals together using computers – thus combining the ICT resources with local capacities in flexible, creative structures.

The emergence of new types of networked small enterprises, both public and private, demonstrates the potential for exploiting the synergies of scale and of intra-organisational linkages (ease of communications, common administrative systems, creation of common organisational cultures) that had formally been considered to be available only to the large corporations.

Projecting visions of the ‘information society’ has largely been the preserve of those who have profited from new developments: ‘wired condos in the sky, high-tech communications between the suburban semi-castle and the Caribbean island time-share, wired cities speeding the commerce of the rich and bringing infotainment to the rest. These are actually the dullest aspects of the potential of ICT. The real potential of ICT with respect to reinvigorating the ‘local’ community and economy, the form that the ‘wired world’ may take if ICTs were adapted into the social practices of counter-publics creating their own social capital has been largely ignored.

 The true radical potential of the ICTs lies in the decentralisation of power, control and resources. The mainframe era characterised by the concentration of computing power and the supporting technical resources is disappearing. Personal computers permit powerful yet decentralised computing for local users and not just, as in the past, for those who can afford specialised technical support. The potential for the empowerment of individuals and local communities arising from the personal computer is in the process of being realised.

The expansion of ICTs shows no signs of slowing down. Unlimited communications capacity with broadband and completely mobile wireless communications can already be seen on the horizon. There is the prospect of the convergence of media – text, sound, image, motion and even smell and touch all available for distribution and manipulation. Not that this means that a simulated reality will displace the true reality. Physical locale and local activities remain requirements. There will always be the need to communicate from and to place, for individuals to be in tune with their own physical selves and with the selves of others. Human beings will always require physical ‘place’ or ‘locale’. Human beings need to eat and sleep, to procreate and manage our wastes. And virtuality is no help at all in these physical processes. And for these physical activities to be undertaken and successfully accomplished there is a need to establish and extend the linkages to others – kin, colleagues, neighbours, friends - within locales that function as communities.

Technological developments generate increasing opportunities to rethink and reinvigorate the relation between the individual and the collective. The most basic and enduring collectivity is the community. This implies that a good deal of the potential available as a result of technological development is capable of becoming the power of individuals turning themselves into ‘citizens’ through acting within decentralised public institutions. ICTs offer a means of realising the dreams of the participatory theorists of democracy by infusing political structures with transparency, flexibility, the summative power of networks and networking. In this context, ‘open source’ pertains to the way that the key community institutions function in their governance superstructures along with their technical infrastructure.

The nexus of power and the rejuvenation of citizenship are likely to reside in the interaction between the virtual and the real. Physical place will be empowered by the global reach of the virtual; the virtual will be empowered by the material force of the real. It is in this zone of engagement that the true resistance to the global and the globalising will be contested.

The ongoing attempts to subordinate communities, whether virtual or real, to commercial objectives will flounder for the simple reason that the most valuable activities within communities share the ethic of the ‘gift’ and ‘hacker’ culture as opposed to the commodity cultures of the e-commerce juggernauts. Communities are primarily concerned with assuming responsibility for the immediate environment – whether physical resources, the cultural environment of the education and arts and language and music, the reproduction of ethical systems, the virtual environments of communications and vital usable information. The economic exchange and commerce which are also essential community concerns function as an element of re-production rather than being the principal object of the ‘enterprise’, emerging as the unintended consequences of more vital urban activities, not as the overriding imperative as with urban regeneration as economic development strategies.

The potential will be realised when virtual and physical force merge so that the ‘hi touch’ of the physical is reinforced by the ‘hi tech’ of the virtual.


79 PARTNERSHIP AND SOCIALISATION
With public expenditure coming under tight control and with the need for redevelopment becoming ever more pressing in conditions of industrial decline, local government has been forced to investigate novel ways of undertaking urban development. This concluding section explores the potentialities for an alternative urban future contained in the principle of partnership. The chapter examines the extent to which the principle behind partnership implies a new form of social governance. This is to distinguish true regeneration as concerned with every aspect of urban space from development as concerned merely with the economic aspect. From this perspective, community involvement and capacity building contains the potential for resisting the encroachment of exchange value over urban space, extending the sphere of use value in achieving genuine community control.

Regardless of the consensus forming around the notion of public-private partnership, there is a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the partnership model, particularly when set in the context of capitalist relations and the ensuing hegemony of private business interests. Partnership may be the site of negotiation but since it is set within asymmetrical relations of power and resources, the participating partners are unequal and the terms of cooperation express an inherent bias in favour of some interests as against others. The overriding need to attract private capital investment shapes the character of partnership and defines it as pro-capitalist. The model is not, therefore, politically neutral, despite what terms like ‘partnership’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘negotiation’ imply. In this sense, partnership represents part of the process in which the level, organisation and scope of the public sector is being redefined from the perspective of the needs of private capital. The ambiguity lies in the extent to which cooperative structures open up spaces for local government, community organisation, and other ‘public interest’ groups to intervene and ensure that their definition of public good prevails. Harvey captures something of this aspect:





Partnership can offer possibilities for evolving into a new form of social government. The capitalist class is much more comfortable in dealing with a centralised political authority as opposed to a myriad of power centres. As the alliance between capital and the state shows, the capitalist class has historically sought to concentrate authority, powers and functions in one centre that it can control, removing power from autonomous social centres and spaces that it cannot control. Such a concern lies behind the emergence of the nation state, undermining alternate sources of political power and authority. The capital system survives not simply through the production of space but also through ensuring the command over space (Harvey 1989:58). It is this command that is to be challenged by the attempt to organise new social centres of power and authority under the control of non-capitalist community groups.

The innovation of cooperation processes across policy fields, serving to connect a variety of different actors across sectors, is issuing in new bargaining structures that exhibit a style of policy making by negotiation. The role of local government is to coordinate this cooperation rather than assume the leading function. This process is based upon a non-hierarchical mode of organisation as crucial to combining together the various intersecting spheres of interest on the part of the different actors. What is particularly innovative about this development is that bargaining systems and decision making processes are taking place outside of conventional structures of local government. In this sense, urban governance comes to rest upon a functional system of representation, with local government coordinating a variety of social interests and actors in order to ensure the social and economic health of the local region.

The partnership model offers the possibility of developing a more functionally and socially rooted form of urban governance, checking the abstraction and alienation associated with the large blocs of monopoly power concentrated and centralised in the state and capital. The social interests and actors participating in this new model include business associations, chambers of commerce, companies, banks, research bodies, educational institutions and trade unions. The extent to which community based organisations, citizen movements and grassroots campaigns can intervene is an important factor in determining the extent to which the partnership model really does contain the potential for the redefinition of democracy, citizenship and community or whether it is merely the cover for neo-liberal capitalist restructuring.

The argument here returns to the notion of a shift from fordism to post-fordism. The post-fordist mode of regulation embraces a range of possible alternate forms, encompassing the whole range of the political spectrum. Certainly, local governments have overwhelmingly favoured the entrepreneurial model, defining partnerships in terms of the interests of private capital and identifying urban regeneration with economic development. In the process, local state politics moves away from redistributive policies with respect to collective consumption and social provision towards economic development based upon on appeal to private capital. That this is the dominant model is understandable given the functioning of partnership within capitalist relations. Currently, there is a danger that the Fordist welfare state is giving way to the post-fordist workfare state, with parties of the centre-left coming to speak the language of the ‘enabling’ state.

The emergence of new bargaining systems evinces a great deal of difference with respect to the level of inclusiveness and responsiveness. Social interests and actors outside of the hegemonic business, real estate and investment sector experience great difficulty in pressing their claims in anything other than a subordinate role to capital. Further, partnerships have fractured through cleavages being exposed between local communities and neighbourhoods one the one hand and developers and companies on the other. This shows an aspect in practice of the distinction between use value and exchange value.

The partnership model makes possible more or less egalitarian, social, pluralist, democratic forms according to the constituent partners and the relations and relative power between them. If one is inclined towards a critical assessment, underlining the extent to which the new model falls within capitalist relations, it can also be pointed out that the new bargaining systems are not any more biased towards private capital than were the old centralised forms and, indeed, offer greater scope for mounting challenges to capital from within the processes of negotiation on the part of community groups and urban social movements. The extent to which the new model of urban governance favours or challenges the power of capital, releases capital from or subordinates it to social democratic regulation, depends upon the extent to which local urban agents are able to mobilise and organise in order to exploit the opportunities that this model offers them to press their claims.

In sum, the partnership model defining a post-fordist local state offers opportunities for social movements to translate their egalitarian, democratic and environmental perspectives into the policies and practices of urban government. This is to distinguish between different forms of partnership. Economic development partnerships are of a very different character to community-based partnerships, particularly with respect to their degrees of local citizen participation, responsiveness to local needs.

There is a distinction to be made here between vertical and horizontal modes of organisation. The former belong to the old Fordist city politics, the latter to the new post-fordist regime. The horizontal mode of bargaining and project specific partnerships contain the potential for but do not necessarily generate greater democratic participation, responsiveness and accountability. There is a danger that participating agents and interests may form exclusive groups, coming to represent only sectional interests. 

That there remain substantial differences in the relative power and resources commanded by the participants – business, trade unions, community groups – exposes the partnership model to precisely those criticisms that Marxists levelled against pluralist theories – equality at the level of bargaining and negotiation necessarily generates unequal outcomes in conditions of structural inequality. And, in addition, over and above the disparities of power and resources within partnership, there is the problem of those excluded, marginalized and unorganised sectors of the local community. There is a wider social exclusion that partnerships of this kind serve to reinforce.

In light of these points, partnerships will remain ambiguous phenomena, varying in their degrees of democracy, inclusiveness and responsiveness. At the same time, partnerships have continued to redefine urban governance and institutional relations, creating a more open political terrain for urban actors in the local community. This entails a more expansive notion of ‘the political’ than that which is identified with the central state and formal political parties and elected representatives. Politics comes less to be about policy formulation and implementation from the top down than about negotiation and renegotiation from the bottom up.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the partnership model is the extent to which it implies a ‘third sector’ economy between public and private sectors that is able to meet social needs. Such a model develops the institutional-organisational structure of an alternative society. In delineating the shift from fordism to post-fordism, a ‘new times’ determinism committing the local state to one form of urban governance is to be avoided. This opens the way for the examination of the partnership model for the possibility of arriving at different compromises within the new mode of accumulation. A post-fordist regime may incline towards the entrepreneurial local state, particularly if the interests of private capital dominate. But other forms may be possible as community based organisations come increasingly to play an active role in the partnership. It all depends upon the extent to which the terms of the partnership are predetermined within particular parameters or whether they are genuinely open to negotiation.

The partnership model fosters the development of new institutional relations which involve the hierarchical central state giving way to a more pluralistic, socially rooted and, potentially, egalitarian local state. This restructuring of local urban governance responds to the need to establish effective connections between the different policy areas – economic development, technological innovation, education, training, infrastructural provision. In the process, the realm of local political action has been extended to include research bodies, educational institutions, trade unions, chambers of commerce. The expansive notion of ‘the political’ is sustained by partnership arrangements that involve the local state doing deals with private sector business in the interests of regenerating the local economy. Constructing local networks and bargaining systems practising negotiation replaces the centralised, hierarchical, bureaucratic structures that induced the Fordist state to inertia whilst generating waste and inefficiency through policies imposed from the top down. Encouraging urban social protest and organisation, the new post-fordist local state could conceivably offer a route into politics for the new social movements.

A number of post-fordist scenarios covering the whole political spectrum – conservative, liberal, democratic, corporatist, social democratic – can be envisaged. Whether partnership is developed in the direction of the entrepreneurial model or the social model will depend upon the composition of the partnership and which partners are hegemonic. Given this element of social struggle and organisation and mobilisation it is difficult to argue exactly how social and political conflict will impact upon the establishment of new arrangements so as to create a dominant or typical mode of social regulation.

The persistence of capitalist relations and, hence, of the overarching systemic imperative of capital accumulation, the domination of the formalised system of party politics and the general institutional fetishism, all operate to block the realisation of potentialities for alternative modes of urban governance. These alternative futures remain immanent possibilities. Flexible accumulation opens up new avenues for social transformation. Spatial dispersal permits much greater geographical equality of opportunity so as to attract new activities. A consequence of this spatial dispersal is that position within the urban hierarchy becomes less important, implying that big cities come to lose their politico-economic power to dominate. Smaller cities and towns are able to attract new investment and economic activities so as to improve their position. But the harsh climate of competition is evident here too, as it proves an effort to hold onto these new activities. There are winners and losers in the whole process. Whilst the uncertainty in labour markets operates to undermine the power of organised labour, flexible production also creates the possibility of developing cooperative forms of labour organisation with an element of worker control. Piore and Sabel (1984) regard this development as a significant moment, pointing capitalism in the direction of democratic forms of industrial organisation. The tendency also emerges in relation to the social consolidation of ‘informal sector’ activities entailing cooperative and worker controlled labour. To this extent, flexible accumulation develops worker and community control as a feasible alternative to capitalism.

Alain Lipietz has argued for the creation of a ‘third sector’ between public and private sectors performing socially useful tasks. Workers in this sector, through the organisations they work for, would receive money from the state and undertake socially useful schemes.





The third sector sets up a new social sector of activity between plan and market, containing the potential to transform the wage relation (Lipietz 1992:104). Workers in the third sector combine in self-governed agencies and make contracts with groups of end-users, local government, regional sickness insurance funds, agencies for energy efficiency etc. ‘Under the contract, these customers pay the intermediate agencies sums of money which are added to the universal allowance to give members a normal wage. The quality of the service provided is assessed periodically by the two parties to the contract. It is not a matter of the bureaucratic abolition of commodity relations, but a situation where commodity relations give way to contractual and partnership relations’ (Lipietz 1992:105).

The third sector thus involves experiments in social relations. Internally, the sector is organised by small self-managed cooperative agencies. In the relations with end-users, the third sector seeks new relationships for the provision of services that are contractual rather than commercial, patriarchal or administrative. Permanent democratic control by customers ensures that the activities of the cooperatives are really ‘socially useful’.





The problem is that this ‘third sector’ already exists to some extent, just not in a democratic form that practises self-management but as a repressive and authoritarian form of labour market discipline. Since the third sector exists as a complex, differentiated, conflictual set of arrangements subject to public and private pressures, as well as being exposed to internal conflicts and cleavages, the real demand is for social movements to assume the dominant position and innovate a genuinely alternative sector to the state and capital, making power and resources accessible to those marginalized groups currently being pressured by the polarising forces of a divisive model of post-fordism. In this respect, urban social movements appropriate the new channels and forums furnished by partnership in order to launch a democratic challenge to the powerful tendencies towards polarisation and marginalisation under post-fordist forms. This is to attack social division and exclusion in favour of a more egalitarian and inclusive politics, thus forming the democratic content of the emerging forms of urban governance.

The problem facing those wedded to the old politics of social welfare redistribution is that the institutional forms required for such a project are increasingly outmoded and are attracting declining support. The inefficient, intrusive, bureaucratic form of the welfare state has been part of the crisis of fordism. And above this, the preconditions of the old fordist contract no longer exist. Mass industry with large trade unions no longer exists. Further, large capital is multinational in scope and no longer requires the corporate structures within the nation state so much. A new strategy is required which is able to make the necessary connections at supranational and subnational levels. Only then will the specificities of the alternative third sector be made plain, developed in an explicitly democratic sense. 

This is to begin to develop a functional system of representation rooted in social realities and interests as against the abstract representation of the central state. Urban governance is increasingly based upon a social representation of functional interests within the local urban environment. The local state has to recognise, at least to some extent, the specific functional character of all participating members in the partnerships. And all these members command resources and power crucial to the effective implementation of policies. Since this is so, social movements that are able to enter partnership arrangements have a real opportunity insofar as this may lead them to challenge the hegemonic power of capital, this mobilisation is more struggle than negotiation. A conflictual element thus potentially exists within new bargaining systems.

This means that the post-fordist regime, evolving new modes of accumulation is subject to long term disintegration as the divergent interests of various partners comes to be exposed. The emphasis upon economic development presumes the dominance of capitalist relations. With social welfare and distribution subordinated to growth strategies, existing polarities and inequalities will inevitably be intensified, renting civil society within and accelerating urban degeneration. Given the prospect of an increasingly polarized social structure under the entrepreneurial model, social movements need to organise to exert pressure upon the local state to adopt policies that check social segregation and exclusion, going on to exert pressure so that resources are used to meet social and environmental needs. To the extent that new social movements can achieve this, post-fordist politics may contain a democratic, progressive element.

The instabilities and uncertainties of partnership formation generates a space in which a relatively autonomous urban politics can emerge. The confusion of interests, ends and roles of various participants, combined with the vicissitudes of the process of accumulation (growth, technological innovation, class struggle) serves to keep social relations in a permanent condition of transformation and uncertainty. Here, politics refers to the skill of forging a relatively coherent coalition of interests so as to express a unified sense of community interest.

Although local government tends to be the conventional political unit around which partnership politics proceeds, it is no longer the only means and is certainly not the most important. As Harvey writes ‘the political processes at work in civil society are much broader and deeper than the local government’s particular compass’ (Harvey 1989:153). It may well be that, in the long run, the partnership model may emerge as the shell of a new urban public sphere in which a self-organising, self-governing citizen community, controlling its own affairs, transcend the forms and institutions of ‘official’ society.

In conclusion, the partnership model offers a novel approach to regeneration, one that may go some way towards generating and sustaining a new civil culture and an active social citizenship in an urban public sphere. Partnership offers the possibility of a multilayered fabric of social organs and agencies achieving social control vis the state and capital. The interimbrication of civil institutions and the interpretation of class, group and individual relations within and between the state and civil society provide the complex socio-institutional matrix for constructing a social government.

The regeneration of town life and of civic culture is more likely to be achieved through the cooperation and coordination between various social organisations and interests, local government, business groups, voluntary organisations, interest groups and other community bodies. The enduring strength of local government stems from the fact that it is elected by the local community. If it fails to respond to local needs and interests it may be elected out of office. Likewise, the business sector has to respond to local, national and global forces as a condition of its own survival. Economic success depends upon business identifying opportunities in local conditions so as to employ physical and human resources effectively with respect to wider processes of production, distribution and exchange. The network of social groups and voluntary organisation is important in strengthening the ties that bind society together in mutually and reciprocity, in fleshing out the bond between each and all and in the provision of moral and social order.

In addressing the question of what constitutes a successful urban regeneration partnership there is a need to have a conception of what a town or city is, of what urban space is for. The urban realm is much more than an economic concept concerning the production and consumption of goods and services for profit. Connecting regeneration to the social and communal heart of urban space is crucial to constituting a new urban public realm out of civil activities and institutions. 

This is to argue that towns and cities have more to gain by establishing and extending connections with their counterparts in Europe than by importing US models of urban regeneration which entrench and extend the privileging of private economic interests. These are the very forces behind the decay of the urban fabric and civic culture.
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80 THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PLURAL
The achievement of urban order concerns much more than the provision of the physical and economic infrastructure and is a profoundly ethical and social question that presupposes a philosophical anthropology. Only a relational perspective that emphasises the connection that each has with all will ultimately suffice. It is not simply that the urban environment is composed of many individuals but that it comprises many groups of individuals with different interests, backgrounds, interests, individuals who differ from each other on account of race, religion, nationality, social class and wealth, different indeed in every aspect of the self-identity that differentiates individuals as individuals. Such individuals interact and communicate with each other through social relationships of almost infinite complexity. The problem of establishing a universal ethic of the common good in conditions of (post)modern pluralism and diversity is the key question in achieving urban justice. In the old rural and urban communities, moral constraints were imposed directly through visibility and familiarity and were daily reinforced by customary social relations buttressed by a general acceptance of the moral order established and regulated by religious inhibitions. This dissolved as Gemeinschaft – a unitary society of all as one - came to be displaced by Gesellschaft - a society in which atomistic individuals shifted for themselves in pursuit of an individual good. The basic sociological themes of alienation and anomie made their presence felt (Nisbett). With the dissolution of traditional moral constraints, customary relationships were replaced by the nexus of callous cash payment (Hall 1998:612/3).

In affirming an ontology of the good, the philosophical tradition of ‘rational freedom’ offers a paradigm for free and equal relationships within community. The ‘rational’ conception is, however, confronted by the problematic character of ‘the common good’ in a modern world whose most salient characteristic is plurality. The difficulties of theorising the universal ethic in a plural society are apparent in the way that Raskin, in The Common Good, presupposes an implicit conception of the commonality of the good, assuming a ‘caring instinct’ as common amongst individuals on account of their human nature (Raskin 1986:89). Raskin takes his stand on ‘the bonds of community and natural law’ (1986:195), the ‘natural right that people have as a result of their being human’ (1986:276). The problem with this approach is that it presumes precisely what is absent in the modern world - a social identity which connects the private interest of individuals with the common good. In a pluralist, and increasingly atomised and privatised, society, Raskin’s appeal to the common good on the basis of natural right lacks social relevance. As the sections on Weber in Part II demonstrated, the modern moral subjectivism and polytheism of values means that it is impossible to construct an overarching framework of moral meaning. To construct that framework means making a social identity available that connects self- and social interest, the private and the public. This requires formulating the common good in terms that recognise and incorporate modern plural identities.

To embark upon such a project is to swim against the postmodernist tide. William Connolly’s Foucaultian critique repudiates the modernist ‘quest for a perfectly ordered self and a perfectly ordered world’ for being part of a ‘drive to force everyone and everything into slots provided by a highly ordered system’, pretending that ‘the result is self-realisation, the achievement of reason, the attainment of the common good’. Connolly explicitly targets the ‘rational’ tradition, identifying Hegel and Marx as ‘unwitting allies of technocratic agencies of social control’, suppressing ‘otherness’ (Connolly 1989:14). The faith invested in reason results in social life being penetrated more and more by coercive power and being subjected to detailed regulation. Hence, with respect to Rousseau, Connolly refers to the ‘docility’ which results from replacing ‘faith in a common God with a common faith in the civilising power of citizenship’ (Connolly 1989:39/40). Such criticism follows Weber and Foucault in its awareness of how emancipatory-normative reason came to be transformed through modernising processes into a repressive rationalisation.

The principle of citizenship affirmed by this thesis is not to be identified with Connolly’s target. This thesis has sought to define the classical conception of an active and social citizenship as a social movement that constitutes public life from within the practices, processes and relations of everyday life. The ascending conception of citizen identity not only permits plural identities but presupposes them. This chapter seeks to resolve universal principles within a differentiated socio-political culture, affirming a politics of difference within the common good.


81 POSTMODERN POLITICAL CULTURE
The ‘rational’ project of realising a universal freedom has been rendered problematic by the emergence of new social movements and the politics of difference. Laclau and Mouffe affirm ‘the rise of the new feminism, the protest movement of ethnic, national and sexual minorities, the anti-institutional ecology struggles .. the anti-nuclear movement, the atypical forms of social struggle in countries on the capitalist periphery’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1988:1). Such developments place a question mark against the notion of the unitary public sphere. The merit of the conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere is that it is able to conceive of the public as being composed of a plurality of spheres rooted in civil social reality whilst canalising these spheres to ensure the universal good.

The emancipatory project has to confront the problematic character of reason within modernity. The world is not as rational as the Enlightenment promised. The problem of rationalisation is one of an expanding power that is increasingly beyond control and comprehension. Although a certain wing of postmodernism possesses an anti-modernist aspect, rejecting the tradition of reason deriving from the Enlightenment (Turner 1993:16; Eder 1992:119 125; Habermas 1990:4), it is more profitable to read postmodernism as exposing the instrumental rationality which dominates Weberian modernity as an anti-humanism which imposes mastery in the technocratic sense (Bauman 1989; Bahro 1984:172). 

This critique of the underlying ethic of modernisation is directly relevant to the character and quality of the living environment of human beings. Eco draws attention to the problems facing modernity through the emphasis upon technological development and an extension of abstract systems of knowledge and expertise: ‘gridlocks and malfunctions .. production of poisonous and carcinogenic foods .. and useless objects .. deforestation .. pollution of water, atmosphere and vegetation, the extinction of animal species, and so on’ (Eco 1987:78).

Habermas acknowledges that the Enlightenment promise, the view that the development of ‘objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art, according to their inner logic’ would lead to a more rational society has yet to be fulfilled (Habermas 1981:9). Indeed, the differentiation of science, art and morality characterising the process of modernisation has ensured that these spheres have become the exclusive province of experts and professionals divorced from the forms of interaction, communication and reciprocity intrinsic to human activity in the lifeworld. This does not justify abandoning ‘modernity and its project as a lost cause’ (Habermas 1981:11), however, but demands resolving the ‘ambivalent content’ of modern forms of life so as to embed spheres of science, art, morality, and politics in the lifeworld. 

Modernity needs to be recognised as a ‘double-edged phenomenon’ (Giddens 1990:7), imposing order whilst generating disorder (Bauman 1991:6/7). Such a view is inherent in Hegel and Marx’s conception of alienation as an instrument of progress. Before the promise of reason can be redeemed, its problematical incarnation needs to be resolved. It is pertinent, then, to investigate the social and political implications of ‘the passage of modernity into its postmodern stage’ (Bauman 1991:244). From the perspective of the attempt to reconstitute public life as the moral and rational urban society, the ‘good’ city of the future, it is worth exploring the emergence of postmodern modes of thought, action and organisation as the reconstitution of normative, even ‘utopian’ themes in relation to the ‘rational’ philosophical ideal identified in Part I. This investigation employs the criteria according to which Hegel, Marx and Weber distinguished between the emancipatory-reconciling aspects of rationalisation and the repressive-alienating aspects of rationalisation so as to develop a critique which is able to ‘discern contrasts, shadings and ambivalent tones within the flat and faded landscape of a totally administered, calculated and power-laden world’ (Habermas 1990:338).

Giddens (1990) is alive to the ‘utopian’ aspect in conceiving postmodernity as a potential, alternative sociality that is ‘beyond modernity’. This possible future can only emerge if the issues raised by modernity have finally been settled and human beings have thus succeeded in disentangling themselves from the endless transformation and disturbance driven by the abstract powers and agencies which characterises modernity (Bauman 1983). Giddens envisages a post-scarcity society, a multilayered democracy with active participation, and the humanisation of technology (Giddens 1990:164). The emancipatory promise of reason is thus redeemed so as to embed the human dimension in a self-constituting public life.

Such alternative forms promise a regaining and reworking of the public sphere, reinvigorating the politics of the Left. Whilst the First Left was inspired by the idea of free and equal citizens and the Second Left was based upon the proletarian movement, the concept of the Third Left unites the ideals of both whilst nevertheless going beyond them to embrace the new social movements (Andersson 1996:69). The Third Left affirms three fundamental values:

1)	‘Real freedom for all’ is a value formulated at the level of the individual and can express the central value of the First Left;
2)	‘Democratic communities’ is a value pertaining to collectives and societies and expresses the solidaristic values of the socialist Second Left;
3)	‘Sustainable development’ relates to the global and ecological system as a whole and brings in the values of the Green Left (Andersson 1996:70).

These three values are all pertinent to Giddens’ six point framework for a reconstituted radical politics: 1) to repair damaged solidarities; 2) to recognise the centrality of lifestyles as well as life chances; 3) to allow individuals and groups to make things happen to them; 4) to develop dialogic democracy; 5) to rethink the welfare state in relation to global poverty; and 6) to confront the role of violence in human affairs (Giddens 1994:12/20).

The principles that Giddens affirms form the basis of a feasible alternative urban public that may be envisaged on the postmodern terrain. As against the textualist, linguistic and aestheticising preoccupations of some postmodernists, the investigation of postmodern political culture in this final part will be more concerned with contemporary social dynamics and the emerging forms of a new society beyond modernity.

Whether this alternative urban order realises the emancipatory promise of reason depends upon whether universal values come to embed particular practice and identity. The need to affirm universal values so as to define an inclusive politics of social justice is pertinent when it comes to determining the relation of the public sphere to identity politics and the new social movements. The underpinning of a universal ethic is essential to check a postmodern populism which, in rejecting universal values, leads in an anti-democratic direction, supporting privilege and exclusion within an existing society of injustice, and being quite incapable of apprehending the common good, the good life as applicable to all as well as to each (Frankel 1997:57/8). 

Blocking a postmodern conception of the public sphere is the denial of universalisation. The age of the grand narrative is declared to be over; universal claims are implicated within a politics of totalitarianism and terror (Lyotard 1984: 81; 1988:179; 1989:26). Marxism becomes just one strand within a reconstructed emancipatory-critical project. Lyotard refers to commodification due to new technologies in both everyday life and in the work process as the ‘traditional province of Marxism’ and as becoming ‘more and more important and serious’ (1989:21). Marxism remains an important strand, just not dominant as it once was.

The question to be asked is whether public life can be recovered within a postmodern political culture. Much depends upon whether a way can be found to overcome the severance of the coincidence between reason and freedom. There is a sense at present of an emerging ‘social, political and cultural configuration’ (Boyne and Rattansi 1990:9), an ‘epochal shift or break in modernity involving the emergence of a new social totality with its own distinct organising principles’ (Featherstone 1988:198). Back in 1959 C Wright Mills announced the beginning of a ‘post-modern period’ (Wright Mills 1970:184). Crucially, Mills focuses upon the ambivalent nature of reason. ‘The increasing rationalisation of society, the contradiction between such rationality and reason, the collapse of the assumed coincidence of reason and freedom’ means that ‘increased rationality may not be assumed to make for increased freedom’ (Wright Mills 1970:185/6 187). The anthropological consequences of this rationalisation show the extent to which the conditions of the politikos bios that human beings require in order to realise their essential humanity are absent in the modern world. Alienated from production and consumption, the material means of their existence, individuals adapt themselves to a managed and manipulated world, subjecting themselves to a ‘self-rationalisation’ in which they come to systematically regulate their impulses and aspirations. ‘There is then rationality without reason. Such rationality is not commensurate with freedom but the destroyer of it. It is no wonder that the ideal of individuality has become moot’ (Wright Mills 1970:188/9).

Questions of reason, freedom, individuality, authenticity and control are essential themes in the attempt to define an urban public, identifying the contradictory and ambivalent features of capitalist modernity with a view to establishing future possibilities for a genuine public life that is constituted by participatory citizen structures.

The Enlightenment assumption of a coincidence between the expansion of reason on the one hand and increases in freedom on the other has been rendered problematic by forces intrinsic to modernity, putting a question mark against whether the project of modernity can ever be completed (Lyotard 1988: Kumar 1978:chs 3 4; Berger, Berger and Kellner 1974:chs 8 9). In contemporary society, ‘all old and prospective blueprints for a “good society” seem embarrassingly unreal and naïve’ (Bauman 1987:194). But rather than abandon the notion of the ‘good society’, it is more profitable to formulate this end more adequately than has been done. The reconstitution of the connection between reason and freedom, then, becomes the basis for a reconstitution of public life based upon everyday experience within the urban environment.

For some, postmodernism is the product of a changed regime of accumulation and mode of regulation and is the expression of ‘late capitalism’ (Jameson 1985). Situated within a continuous process of capitalist rationalisation, postmodernism is explained as a form expressing ‘late’ developments in the capitalist mode of production towards more flexible forms of accumulation (Harvey 1984 1989) and a ‘disorganised’ capitalism (Lash and Urry 1987). The critical political economy perspective has serious social and cultural implications. Harvey criticises Atkinson’s postmodern ‘radical relativism’ (Atkinson 1991:58) for generating a situation ‘where nothing remains of any basis for reasoned action’; this goes ‘beyond the point where any coherent politics are left’ (Harvey 1990:116). This leads to a ‘new depthlessness’ in theory and culture. As a result of an overwhelming preoccupation with surfaces, images and interpretation, there is ‘a consequent weakening in historicity’; the decentring of the subject; broad changes in time and space associated with ‘a whole new economic world system’ (Jameson ‘Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, NLR 146 p58).

As the ‘cultural logic of late capitalism’ (Jameson 1991), postmodernism systematically ignores the reality of power and conceals the fact of asymmetrical relations of power. Postmodernism in this guise is associated with the worst excesses of consumerism, emphasising the mass consumption of ephemeral services and useless goods. The appearance which postmodernism celebrates is actually a manipulated mass consciousness submerged under manufactured images and inculcated with notions of instaneity, temporariness and disposability. This is the very antithesis of the public realm.

There is a comparison here with Frankfurt theorists like Adorno and Marcuse. These had argued that the individual is almost completely entangled in a web spun by bureaucracy, technology, mass culture and consumerism. This ‘administered’ or ‘one dimensional’ world is a world in which individuals are manipulated and in which the capacity for critical thought has been suppressed. Human society and consciousness are now totally reified and have come to acquire the qualities of objects (Adorno 1964 1966; Adorno and Horkheimer 1972). But where the critical theorists condemned this abstruse, manipulative world, postmodernism in certain respects celebrates it. Such a postmodernism is highly problematic with regard to constituting or even conceiving public life, certainly in any inclusive or universal sense. This postmodernism – and there are others (Soja 1989; Hebdige 1988) – denies that there are underlying structures and lines of development and denies the notion of universal values. The consciousness, culture and politics constituting public life are left utterly groundless since there exists nothing from which to read them off from (Pepper 1993:56/7; Scott 1990:103). The public sphere is hardly important at all from this perspective.


Harvey’s assessment is mainly negative: ‘postmodernism is dangerous for it avoids confronting the realities of political economy and the circumstances of global power’ (Harvey 1989:117). The extent to which the global political economy of capital is currently reshaping the world, with hypermobile capital the principal agent controlling vast processes of production, investment and employment, clearly has implications for the everyday urban environment of individuals. Any ‘new politics’ is capable of generating a true public life only by rediscovering the perspectives on class and power that are intrinsic to the ‘old’ politics (Gottlieb 1992:196).

As against this negative assessment of postmodernism as a theory, it is more profitable to identify the positive features of the changes occurring within and possibly even beyond modernity. This more creative engagement addresses the more positive and emancipatory themes of postmodernity, relating them to universal values so as to broaden the perspective in the direction of a future public life. This attempts to connect an emancipatory conception of postmodernity with the emancipatory features of an alternative future society immanent but repressed within modernity. From this perspective, postmodernity represents a shift towards a more expressive mode of life politics away from the conventional parties and movements of the formal political sphere (Giddens 1991).

Ed Soja condemns Marxist approaches that identify postmodernism as the cultural logic of ‘late capitalism’ as inadequate. Soja, however, does not call for the abandonment of Marxist categories but for the opening up of these categories to the emergence of a postmodern discourse (Soja 1989:5 40). Marxist critique is still capable of generating insights into the capital system and its contradictory dynamics. At the same time, it is tied to a special social formation and hence deals much less adequately with the novel and the different within postmodern political culture. This is particularly the case with respect to the constitution of identity independently of the capital-labour relation.

And there is some room for manoeuvre even within the work of the Marxist critics. David Harvey acknowledges that to the extent that postmodernism is concerned with difference, with the complexity and specificity of interests, cultures and places, ‘it exercises a positive influence’ (Harvey 1989:113). For Jameson, there is a need to generate new forms of representation appropriate to the ‘late’ condition of multinational capitalism so as to ‘regain a capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralised by our spatial as well as our social confusion’ (Jameson 1984:92). This is not a question of substituting a total class/party politics for the politics of new social movements but of expressing ‘local struggles involving specific and often different groups’ within a common project so as to effect a ‘total transformation of society’ (Jameson 1988:360 355). This implies the need to develop new modes of socio-political expression. The problem lies with the inability to integrate this concern with plural identities within a universal concern for the good and for the freedom of each and all.

This thesis attempts to articulate the universal normative-emancipatory themes of the ‘rational’ concept of freedom within a postmodern political culture that appears ostensibly to be hostile to such an overarching morality. The thesis affirms the possibility of combining both aspects within a reciprocal public that expresses the universal interest whilst embracing plural identities, realising the legitimate claims of both as mutually enhancing. This is to develop a strategically postmodern left politics that is progressive whilst not being restricted to defetishising the structural necessities of the capital system. This entails the innovation of an alternative political imagery and discourse that fosters resistance to and subversion of the conditions of postmodernity that are survivals of the class-exploitation relations of the capitalist mode of production.

Such an approach is capable of accepting the criticisms of Harvey and Jameson that postmodernism is the cultural logic of late capitalism as valid but not exhaustive of postmodernism. It is in this regard that Ed Soja demands the opening of new spaces in the postmetropolis ‘to practice a strategically postmodern politics of social and spatial justice, building on the insights and actions of intercultural and hybridised coalitions that cross the boundaries of race, class, gender and geography rather than being confined by them to separate channels of resistance’ (Soja 2000:345). This is the social basis of the plural public, embodying and expressing difference within the universal ethic of justice.

Hebdige’s engagement with postmodernism follows a Gramscian approach which opens Marxist strategies and analyses to local forms of radical politics, flexible strategies and decentralised power. Although he denies it, Hebdige effectively adopts postmodernist themes in arguing that nothing is anchored ‘to master narratives, to stable (positive) identities, to fixed and certain meanings: all social and semantic relations are contestable, hence mutable; everything appears to be in flux: there are no predictable outcomes’ (Hebdige 1988:206). Hebdige’s approach has the merit of opening up public life to postmodernism to the extent that it represents ‘the opening up to critical discourse of lines of enquiry which were formerly prohibited .. the opening up of institutional and discursive spaces within which more fluid and plural social and sexual identities may develop; .. the erosion of triangular formations of power and knowledge with the expert at the apex and the “masses” at the base, if in a word, it enhances our collective (and democratic) sense of possibility’ (Hebdige 1988:226).

The basis of emerging postmodernist modes of public life can be glimpsed. These modes are more direct, participatory and expressive. They are less fixed, less permanent and less impersonal. The emergence of new social movements indicates the existence of new forms of struggle and representation, new social identities, new modes of conducting politics. These developments make possible a new approach to constituting the public sphere.

This approach transcends the socialist public sphere and the way that it is organised around class interests and class perception. The ‘trends and upheavals in today’s politics simply cannot be understood in modernist-class categories’ (Heller and Feher 1988:3). This alters the way that the constitution of the public sphere is conceived. The way that a unified class agency is connected with a centralised political agency and impersonal unitary public needs to be deconstructed in favour of a view of transformation as processual and as based upon the plurality of social agents and struggles.

Emphasis has shifted away from the socialist public sphere, with its connotations of ‘the party’ and the state, of bureaucratic control and industrial production, towards the idea of public spheres that are constituted as radical and plural democracy. Socialism has a role to play in this project in being ‘necessary to put an end to capitalist relations of production, which are at the root of numerous relations of subordination’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:178). But radicalised democracy is ‘the absolute precondition of articulating social issues, as a conditio sine qua non of the various types of socialism’ (Heller and Feher 1988:117). Such socialism is the key to the realisation of the values of liberty, diversity and solidarity that offer ‘a chance of a better society’ (Bauman 1991:276).

There has been a rise of new forms of collective action and political expression that point to new forms of public life (Forbes in Gibbins ed 1989:233/4). The new social movements derive support across the old class divisions and mobilise people around other than material interests. This points to a new form of collective struggle, suggesting a postmaterialist public ethic which contains the potential to develop into a radical democratic and communitarian movement against traditional forms of state politics, including citizen identity (Eder 1992:112/118 137 ch 8 169/80). The new social movements have become the motor for processes of pluralisation and individualisation in a new expressive mode of public life.





There is a potential here for a more active sense of democracy and of citizenship, transforming the conception of the public sphere. These developments within the postmodern political culture make it possible to conceive a move away from the impersonal identity of the top-down unitary public of the state towards a bottom-up approach constituted by a plurality of publics rooted in the everyday experience of individuals as citizens. There is a need to create a social identity connecting individual and community, private and public good, so as to avoid an overly moral, overpoliticised conception of citizenship. Such an identity is based upon social pluralism and differentiation. Unlike the abstract state citizenship, a universal identity is not imposed upon individuals in an external sense, independently of social identity thus avoiding the tendency to promote an oppressive, overarching conception of community over individuals.


82 THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE AND COMMUNITY
With the emergence of a postmodern political culture there has been a shift in left politics from a politics of equality to a cultural politics. This new cultural politics is concerned with differences between individuals and groups, how these are created and sustained, externally imposed and culturally represented via an inherently political process of identity formation and the constitution of subjectivity. It is difficult to accommodate this ‘new’ politics of difference within the meta-narrative of the good life and the good city defined by this thesis. This meta-narrative is constituted on the basis of a social and spatial justice defined in terms of a universal ethic. The greater stress upon the differences between individuals in the new cultural politics has the effect of diluting and even displacing the fundamental concern with equality between individuals. The new cultural politics evades being canalised into the global channels of resistance and are structured according to categories of class, gender, race, ethnicity, nationality and so on, each an exclusive identity. This fosters substantial conflict between new and old social movements, each being separately defined and organised according to one of these specific categories. According to the old politics, organised around a struggle to overcome inequality in the universal interest, such diversity would be conceived as undermining the political and organisational power of channelled struggles. In the new politics, such multiplicity is embraced as offering new opportunities. The construction of a meta-politics and meta-ethics must acknowledge the heterogeneous nature of reality by creating and sustaining an open, adaptive, coalition building politics.

Rather than simply repudiating the old dualisms of capital and labour, men and women, white and black, the postmodern cultural politics of difference has sought to rearticulate these identities within inclusionary networks that are flexible and adaptive to the particular circumstances of the present moment. These are celebrated as liberatory assertions of ‘otherness’; they exist as forces for heterogeneity in an increasingly homogenised world. This sustains an urban life of difference and pluralism. The pioneering texts of post-structural urbanism are Jane Jacobs’ Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961) and Richard Sennett’s Uses of Disorder (1970). The distinguishing feature of post-structuralism is the identification of the diverse bases of identity and the multiple roots of oppression. This recognition goes much further than the capital-labour relation and implies a celebration of difference:





The danger is that the celebration of ‘otherness’ and difference may come to reinforce the bifurcations and polarities that are dividing urban space within and are fostering urban incarceration. The question is whether the celebration of difference and diversity is compatible with the universal ethic that affirms that the freedom of each is compatible with the freedom of all. The universal ethic requires social and spatial justice, something that, in turn, directly addresses the inequality in the structures of reality. In postmodernist thought, however, economics – class, exploitation – is replaced by culture as the root of political identity. Individuals are members of socio-political groups from which they form their identities. There is a certain malleability about this conception which underlines the degree to which individuals may constitute their own identity. As a result, the hierarchies imposed by the objective structures and relations of capitalism are less fixed than had appeared to be the case with the Marxist political economic critique. The old and new politics can be united rather than being conceived as antithetical to each other. The emancipatory – and hence political – objective of the postmodernist project is the empowerment of those suffering from a relative lack of power. The fulfilment of this objective may coincide with the material improvement of the least powerful but is not tied to or confined within that material objective. 

The demand for universality within a politics of the good has been subjected to intense criticism by those concerned with the politics of difference. Iris Young has offered the strongest, most sophisticated case for the politics of difference at the core of postmodern political culture. Young proceeds by criticising some of the dominant themes of feminism relating to the ideal of community. The ‘desire for unity or wholeness in discourse’, she argues, ‘generates borders, dichotomies and exclusions’. Further, the concept of community ‘often implies a denial of time and space distancing’ and an insistence upon ‘face-to-face interaction among members within a plurality of contexts’. However, Young continues, there are ‘no conceptual grounds for considering face-to-face relations more pure, authentic social relations than relations mediated across time and distance’ (Young 1990).

Actually, there are conceptual grounds for arguing precisely this. The extent to which mediation is internal to everyday human relationships or is abstract and alienated determines the extent to which power is subject to human control, enhancing the human ontology, or is out of control, generating pathological consequences which serve to inhibit the human ontology. This is the critical point. Although Young acknowledges that ‘in modern society the primary structures creating alienation and domination are bureaucracy and commodification’, she denies that this means that mediated relations necessarily entail alienation and domination.

Young is concerned to affirm group difference against an overarching conception of the community as oppressive of difference:





To the extent that the freedom of city life ‘leads to group differentiation, to the formation of affinity groups’ (Young 1990:238), so the conception of social justice appropriate to contemporary society ‘requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression’ (Young 1990:47).

The key words here are ‘without oppression’. That commitment to abolish oppression implies a universal ethic that makes it possible to identify the forces, relations and structures that repress an essential human potentiality or nature. The task is to reinstate the universal ethic of ‘rational’ philosophy within a reciprocal public that does indeed celebrate difference but does so by emphasising what individuals have in common on account of their essential humanity. This means identifying the conditions and contexts individuals need to share in common in order to fully realise their potentialities as human beings.

This argument is directly relevant to urban life. Young argues that emancipation lies in the assertion of a ‘positive sense of group difference’, the group defining itself through this process rather than being defined from the outside (Young 1990:172). The politics of difference ‘promotes a notion of group solidarity against the individualism of liberal humanism’ (Young 1990:166).

But, surely, that rejection of the atomistic conception of liberal humanism implies an ontology of community. Young seems to identify community with a unitary and external imposition of identity. It all depends upon how broadly or narrowly community is conceived. Different groups interacting with each other within the city implies a conception of community. Interaction, like all structured human action, presupposes a context.

There is a danger of embracing an overly moral conception of community over against the real bonds and ties constructed by real individuals themselves. By positing a society of immediate face-to-face relations as an ideal community, community theorists impose a dichotomy between the ‘inauthentic’ society of the present and the ‘authentic’ society of the future, determined by the level of alienation and oppression associated with bureaucracy and commodification. Young rejects both sides of this dichotomy in favour of what she calls the ‘unoppressive city’. Young builds upon the positive experiences of city life in which differences of all kinds are embedded, negotiated and tolerated within all kinds of mediated relations in time and space. Young defines the ‘unoppressive city’ in terms of an ‘openness to unassimilated otherness’.

The great merit of Young’s argument is the attempt to locate the postmodern celebration of difference and diversity within an overarching conception of unity. Young’s politics of difference projects a lofty ideal that, although abstract, can to be developed as the basis of an emancipatory urban politics leading to the city ‘without oppression’. The crucial question concerns how that abstract ideal can be embodied within urban space. At the level of the everyday urban life world, the conception raises obvious dangers of an ‘exclusive inclusivity’ which can work to undermine the ‘openness to unassimilated otherness’ (Young 1990).

Pursuing this politics of difference necessarily entails that the postmodern political culture be grasped in its full complexity. The appreciation of the sociology of race, gender and age as well as class within urban space, alongside the critique of everyday activities within real life in an age poised between modernity and postmodernity, opens up the city as the site of different life projects. This justifies a critically aware, sociologically sophisticated attempt to locate the various kinds of dominant and subordinate social groups that comprise the populations of the cities. This is to emphasise the fact that the city is made up of several different publics. A reconstituted urban public sphere must necessarily be multi-layered and multi-sectored. In this respect, any particular social group within the city constitute what Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge refer to as a ‘counter-public’, a subaltern public which possesses an emancipatory potential to the extent that the pursuit of its own interest promotes the interest of all in the struggle against oppression, exclusion and marginalisation. By virtue of challenging its own marginalisation, the counter-public tends to develop ‘a sense of solidarity and reciprocity rooted in the experience of marginalisation or expropriation’ (Hansen 1993:xxxvi). The challenge lies in extending this sense of solidarity and reciprocity to other counter-publics fighting the same marginalisation and expropriation rooted in the same exploitative and alienative relations.

Postmodern celebrations of group difference present a conception of society as composed of diverse and separate cultural groupings and is associated with a conception of politics as coalition based. To this extent, postmodernism reproduces the conventional understanding of liberal pluralism. The Marxist perspective is critical of such pluralism in seeking to expose the inequalities between social groups structured within asymmetrical relations of class power. The end is a social emancipation through the coalition of excluded, subaltern groups that have little in common other than a shared interest in the abolition of existing hierarchical and exploitative social relations. But how to establish a coherent political agenda by relating the universal interest to the diversity of social groups remains problematic. The complexities of an alliance based politics contrast with the simple division of the class politics of the Marxist critique.

There is a pluralist dimension to Marx’s argument that shows that Marxism is quite able to accommodate difference and diversity as well as new forms of expressive life world politics. Rejecting the identification of the individual with the species as inconceivable, the abolition of alienation makes it possible to conceive of a ‘societised humankind’ in which every individual has a conscious relation to the species. Identity means that each person can appropriate the totality of the wealth of the species and conscious relation means that each individual can choose from the wealth of humanity what they need for the rich and multi-faceted development of their own personality. The development of the wealth of the human species and of the individual personality are processes which mutually involve each other (Heller 1984:155 169). Marx’s communism thus realises the ‘rational’ politikos bios by establishing a coincidence between the general-universal and the singular-individual in a community of free individuals. Communism is the realised society of realised individuals (Meikle 1985:58).

Ruling out the identification of the individual with the species, it is possible to conceive a conscious relationship of individuals to the species so that Marx’s ideal can be formulated thus:





Since each person is unique, Marx’s ‘from each according to their abilities’ not only implies an ideal which enables pluralism but actually presupposes it. Marx envisages ‘a plurality of needs, of abilities, of forms of life’ (Heller 1984:171). The development of wealth is thus associated with its appropriation in a manner appropriate to the multi-faceted development of the abilities and needs of each individual.

Developing this aspect of Marx’s thesis makes the point that the generation of new modes of socio-cultural and political expression characterising the emerging postmodern world is anticipated by Marx’s communism. This conception is quite capable of achieving unity with difference within community. For Marx, the fundamental entities that compose society are individuals in social relations. Through development within these relations, individuals are able to become fully social and realise their human possibilities (Gould 1978:1).

Marx formulates community in such a way as to avoid abstraction and homogeneity and to incorporate the principle of modern differentiation and subjectivity. Marx here goes beyond the Aristotelian roots of his thought. Marx is not simply arguing that association is natural for human beings as social animals but is offering a novel form of association as appropriate to a society of free individuals. Unity for Marx does not refer to herd instinct. Communism is the unique combination of unity and individuality, each commensurate with rather than being reduced to the other. ‘Under communism, all individuals are free to pursue their own development, to differentiate themselves in the context of a truly social existence’ (Forbes 1990:179).

For Marx, community under communism is generated from within individual relationships rather than imposed by any external unifying power, legal or moral. The free individual is capable of taking the initiative to rationally reorder social forces. ‘Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time consciously treats all natural premises as the creatures of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals’ (Marx 1999:86). Through the transformation of existing society, ‘all-round dependence, this natural form of the world-historical cooperation of individuals, will be transformed by this communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of men on one another, have till now overawed and governed men as powers completely alien to them’ (Marx 1999:55). Marx’s conception of the relation between community and individuality thus ultimately transcends the Aristotelian conception of society as a natural phenomenon. The individuals composing communist society are not merely social beings but also free beings (Forbes 1990:179 211). There are, then, ways of conceiving community as something more than an externally imposed unity without differentiation. Marx’s communist community combines unity and difference.

Young objects to ‘community’ as projecting unity over difference (Young in Nicholson ed 1990:302). But such a view presumes that community can take only an abstract, oppressive and statist form (Hoffman 1995:208). Conceiving the individual in relational terms makes possible a conception of community that suffers from none of these defects, that is able to combine both sameness and otherness, integrating difference within unity: ‘A relational view of common interests requires us to break with an abstract individualism which conceives conflicts of interests in zero sum terms and with a communitarianism which denies that differences exist at all’ (Hoffman 1995:209).

The appeal of the principle of community implies a communal need or essence that, if unfulfilled through the construction of a real community, tends to be projected to some ideal or institution and is re-imposed as a false universalism. To achieve genuine community, there is a need to transcend the instrumental social relations of the liberal order that fosters a dualism between social atomism and political centralisation. Within such relations, community is necessarily abstract, imposed in a legalistic sense through the state.

There is, however, no intrinsic reason why community and difference are antithetical. The antithesis between the individual and community stems from asocial social relations that separate private and public interest and that separates individuals and others. Overcoming such relations, this section has shown that the assertion of plural identities requires a universal ethico-institutional framework, since it is such a framework that alone embeds mutual recognition and respect.


83 THE UNIVERSAL FRAME

A major concern of this thesis has been to relate the universal ethic implied by ‘rational’ philosophical conceptions of city life to the ways in which urban histories are lived, experienced and actively interpreted by the different publics who comprise actual cities. The critical question which this section addresses is that of constituting a universal moral frame which respects plural identities whilst nevertheless canalising them into the common good so as to enhance their shared and mutual interests. This involves a critical analysis of the practical strategies employed by different publics in appropriating and reinterpreting urban space and entails means respecting the view that, within each particular context there are different configurations of urban space for each of these different publics.

A united front in face of common sources of oppression is required to enable groups to confront collective and general structures of power and oppression in their communities. The question concerns how identity politics, with its tendency to dislocation, can obtain a unified discourse of justice, making the necessary connections between groups within an openly unified framework. How can a unified organisation be established without the particular agendas of social groups being subsumed under a universalist discourse or political agenda.

At a time when there is a unified capitalist class presiding over global relations of domination, creating an international framework to entrench and extend this power, subjecting urban life to external processes of investment, accumulation and production, confining inhabitants within zero-sum contexts, there are indications that some compartmentalisation is occurring within identity politics. Such compartmentalisation serves to prevent a united front. A meaningful identity politics has to be devised in terms of a universal interest and an agreed, consensual community.

The emergence of the new social movements has strengthened the view that ideas of social justice are relative. Each new social movement presses its own particular conception of what justice is. And there appears to be no way of resolving the clash of divergent conceptions. To leave the question in this state of mutual cancellation serves only to reduce the postmodernist celebration of difference to conservatism. For it becomes impossible to avoid oppression coming to be defined in a relativist and particular way. And it becomes impossible to avoid a fragmentation that builds upon existing metropolarities rooted in an actual, objective, socio-economic oppression. In this respect, Eric Hobsbawm is right to point out that whilst the mass social and political movements of the left were coalitions of group alliances, they were held together not by aims specific to the groups but by great universal causes that applied to all humankind. The movements of the left spoke the universal language of social justice and equality (Hobsbawm 1996:42). Noting that the labour movement lost the capacity to be the potential centre of a general people’s mobilisation and general hope for the future when it became narrowed down to being a sectional movement of industrial workers, Hobsbawm emphasises that the ‘political project of the Left is universalist: it is for all human beings’, for everybody as human beings rather than for some sections as something particular. ‘That is why the Left cannot base itself on identity politics. It has a wider agenda’, however much that does involve supporting particular social groups involved in particular struggles against injustice and oppression (Hobsbawm 1996:43).

Hobsbawm thus criticises the extent to which the Left has abandoned the concern with social justice and equality in favour of identity politics. The result is that the Left has come to be conceived as a coalition of minority groups and interests: of race, gender, sexual or other cultural preferences and lifestyles. Such a postmodern politics is defined in terms of otherness, emphasising what separates one group from other groups. This enhances the forces for diremption and fragmentation. Hobsbawm notes that adding up minorities is quite distinct from winning majorities (Hobsbawm 1996:44). It is certainly very different from fostering a genuine public life. 





Hobsbawm points out here that the only one of the new social movements which crosses all boundaries is that of the ecologists.

What this means is that, for all the dangers of formulating and imposing overly-moral, overarching and homogeneous conceptions of the common good, the Left has no option other than to develop a conception of community and public life which embodies universal values of social justice and equality. As Todd Gitlin has stated in The Twilight of Common Dreams: ‘What is a Left if it is not, plausibly at least, the voice of the whole people? .. If there is no people, but only peoples, there is no Left’ (Gitlin 1995:165). The task is to encompass difference groups within a universal public in such way as to enhance rather than inhibit their freedom. This means conceiving a way that allows all groups to negotiate the common good so that the freedom of each may coincide with the freedom of all within public life.

This is to open up a search for a way of enabling different social groups themselves to join together to negotiate the common good, compromising with each other within open and fair procedures so that a conception of and a commitment to a universal interest emerges and may command universal respect. In this way, the conception of the public good is not defined and imposed in abstraction from the groups and forces subject to it but is negotiated by them in pursuit of their own good.

The point is that a global strategy of resistance and transformation has to proceed from realities of place and community. The task is to create a common politics out of the politics of difference so that counter-publics are able to challenge the increasingly centralised power of flexible accumulation whilst nevertheless being true to the grass roots of local resistances.





Harvey raises the question of whether there is a higher order discourse to which everyone could appeal. Harvey is concerned to avoid taking capitalistic notions of social rationality and justice as universal values capable of being deployed under socialism (Harvey 1992). Social rationality and justice need to be formulated independently of prevailing social relations. There is a need to distinguish the irredeemable hostility of social groups owing to the existence of a class structure from the possible coexistence of social groups who owe their existence to social heterogeneity. This is a division between class and function. Whereas a coherent universal frame is impossible on the basis of the former, it is possible on the basis of the latter. In criticising certain social relations in favour of others according to the extent to which they enhanced or inhibited the human ontology, Marx subscribed to a notion of justice as something more than something relative to the distribution of social power. To emphasise this point, this thesis has established Marx’s project in the normative and emancipatory themes of a ‘rational’ philosophy which derives from Plato and Aristotle, conceiving the ‘rational’ in terms of creative human self-realisation. This approach makes available the higher discourse for which Harvey searches. The point is an important one to establish if one is to negotiate a path beyond moral relativism and hence avoid postmodernist repudiations of all meta-narratives of the good life and the good city.

David Harvey has made an original attempt to draw out the implications for urban planning of Iris Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference. Harvey draws out the merits of Young’s ‘five faces’ of oppression in relation to the struggle to create liveable cities for the twenty first century:

1)	That just planning and policy practices must confront directly the problem of creating forms of social and political organisation and systems of production and consumption which minimize the exploitation of labour power both in the workplace and the living place;
2)	That just planning and policy practices must confront the phenomenon of marginalisation in a non-paternalistic mode and find ways to organise and militate within the politics of marginalisation in such a way as to liberate captive groups from this distinctive form of oppression;
3)	Just planning and policy practices must empower rather than deprive the oppressed of access to political power and the ability to engage in self-expression;
4)	That just planning and policy practices must be particularly sensitive to issues of cultural imperialism and seek, by a variety of means, to eliminate the imperialist attitude both in the design of urban projects and modes of popular consultation.
5)	A just planning and policy practice must seek out non-exclusionary and non-militarized forms of social control to contain the increasing levels of both personal and institutionalised violence without destroying capacities for empowerment and self-expression.
6)	That just planning and policy practices will clearly recognise that the necessary ecological consequences of all social projects have impacts on future generations as well as upon distant peoples and take steps to ensure a reasonable mitigation of negative impacts.

Harvey adds this sixth principle which acknowledges that all social projects are ecological projects and vice versa. All social projects are to be assessed for their ecological consequences.

Social policy and planning has to work at two levels in overcoming the competition between differentiated conceptions of justice in favour of a universal ethic which secures the good of all equally.





Harvey rejects the universal notions of justice embedded in the market and in state welfare capitalism and asserts that force decides between competing conceptions of justice. But in declaring authoritarian imposition and an inability to listen to alternative conceptions to be part of the problem, Harvey points to the potentially liberating effect of looking at the conceptions of social justice and rationality which have emerged from within the new social movements. Harvey’s principles are devised to speak to the marginalized, oppressed and exploited in this time and place. It is out of such conceptions that a genuine liberatory and transformatory politics can be developed (Harvey 1992). And this forms the basis for a universal politics of the good.

The question of the universal cannot be avoided. Even in the most minimal of senses, a public realm will always exist in any society and will be concerned with the universal interest, making a claim to the universal interest in the making of laws and the taking of decisions. Applications can turn out to be divisive in practice, as differing conceptions of differing groups emerge from within competing interests.

Communities and the various groups comprising them need to recognise each other’s legitimacy within a universal ethic. This is to situate all different groups within a common standard of justice in which the freedom of each is coexistent with the freedom of all. Without this universalism, difference can degenerate into disagreement and internal conflict can result in inaction. The lesson for urban regeneration is that identity politics, the ‘politics of difference’, needs to be affirmed whilst pursuing a mutually agreed definition of commonality. How to realise such a definition is the critical question.

The definition of identity in purely separatist terms generates a factitious border which blocks the emergence of contact zones facilitating the interaction between different communities and which may lead to a reasonable commonality, an agreement between individuals who look and act differently but who might nevertheless reach agreement over a common appreciation of culture and experience. Digging ‘city trenches’ (Katznelson) around single issue interests or demarcation lines makes it difficult to conceive and effect a transformative and emancipatory politics that is able to get to the heart of contemporary urban issues, relating urban problems to the megastructures of power, resources and control. 

The way that the universal themes of the Left come to be replaced by an identity politics could invite degeneration into an urban populism that reinforces difference and pluralism as exclusion and marginalisation. The ‘democratic’ component of urban populism quickly reduces itself to the defence by particular groups of their particular interests and privileges. 

A more nuanced approach to particularism is available. Jurgen Habermas makes a distinction between those movements pressing the claims of particular interests and those movements whose interests are of universal significance. From this perspective it is possible to reinstate concepts of social rationality and justice as independent of prevailing relations. But there is a need for great subtlety in establishing how the universal ethic is to be constructed. The best way forward is dialogic and democratic and allows the social groups and movements to negotiate and compromise around a coherent common frame. This is to oppose a communicative model to the market model. In this communicative model, the various groups comprising society negotiate the universal interest and may renegotiate in response to changing needs and demands. All social groups active within the community need to act and mobilize to negotiate a reasonable commonality. This is to enable all groups to engage in the rational reordering of social existence so as to negotiate the common good. (This conception will be developed further in the chapter on Habermas and dialogic democratic practice).


84 THE CIVIC TRADITION OF RATIONAL FREEDOM
Recent years have evinced a shift within the project of the Left away from Marxism and the agency of the working class towards the new social movements; this shift has been associated with a displacement of the Left objective of socialism by the objective of radical and plural civil society. Whilst this development has had the merit of undermining the top-down, statist and exclusive character of the old socialist public constituted by ‘the party’, it is less than clear that this shift towards new social movements is capable of constituting a new public sphere. For there is ‘a tendency to see those movements in oppositional terms, as a source of renewal against the state and the old politics’ (Hirst 1994:14). Left theorists like John Keane conceive civil society as an autonomous sphere whose function is to check the state power rather than viewing civil society as a sphere that is capable of constituting publicity in itself. The associational space of civil society needs to be conceived not in oppositional terms, as limited to checking or policing the state power, but as capable of constituting the public sphere itself. This approach revalues the political and governmental dimension of civil society.

Associationalism has become relevant again after a long period of eclipse by state socialism and liberal democracy (Hirst 1994:2). With the concept of associationalism, Hirst seeks a transformation of political institutions so that the state is combined with the creation of social communities in civil society. Without this transformation, ‘the new movements will be constrained and limited’ (Hirst 1994:14). Associationalism raises the possibility of constituting a public sphere as a post-liberal polity that is grounded in the associational space of civil society. Reconstituting the civil sphere as an urban public in this manner furnishes the basis for a ‘politics of difference’ which is concretised and contextualised in being grounded in a mode of life.

The conception of an urban public sphere revaluing the associative space of civil society renegotiates the boundaries between the public and the private by combining federal or central states with local and civil associations and communities. This expands the public spaces for the exercise of an active citizenship, thus undermining bureaucratisation. 

The key activities of the urban sphere are to be conceived as having a public governmental significance.

If core activities of central concern to the life of the citizen like welfare, public services and economic production are not to remain dominated by top-down administration and if policy is not to become the prerogative of a marginal elite, then the whole of society and not just the state needs to be viewed politically, as a complex of institutions that require a substantial measure of public and popular control over their leading personnel and major decisions. That is, civil society must no longer be viewed as a ‘private’ sphere, it needs to take on elements of ‘publicity’ in the original sense of the term. We require a constitution for society as much as we do for the state.

Hirst in Hirst and Khilnani eds 1996:101

Such an approach innovates ‘governing institutions’ (Middlemas 1979) within civil society, organs of social and democratic control which go beyond the officially ‘political’ concentrated at the centre. The notion of associationalism needs to be related to the civic conception of the city and defined as an alternative to the economic reductionism which characterises the individualist liberal tradition.

This book seeks to make the case for the extension of participatory structures of public life throughout civil society so as to constitute an associative civil public. This section develops this conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere through a critical analysis of liberalism, exposing the liberal identification of liberty with private property and revealing political liberalism to be a rationalisation of the symbiotic relationship of the state and capital, the alien power which disempowers and depoliticises the citizen body.

The emergence of ‘the economy’ as both an autonomous and determining feature of social existence undermined the consideration of the city as an entity in itself. With the rise of the capital system, the city ceased to be discussed within the sphere of jurisprudence and political philosophy, as pertaining to citizenship and sovereignty, and instead came to use terms drawn from the discourse of political economy. The city came to speak the language of economics and was reduced to the capitalist model of politics, i.e. the non-politics of profit, efficiency and accumulation (Lomasky 1989). Schemes for urban regeneration are cast within that model.

At the core of the liberal discourse is a concern with the rights of the individual in relation to the state. The two most important of the early thinkers were Hobbes and Locke. Both developed a contractarian model of society which maintained that individuals in a natural state concluded a bargain with the state. For Hobbes, individuals alienated their rights to a single central authority since each could not trust the others not to encroach upon personal liberty. The central authority would therefore rule on behalf of all, imposing the order that individuals could not provide for themselves.

John Locke also adopted a contractarian model but was concerned to avoid having to invest the central state with substantial powers. Locke conceived society as composed of discrete individuals in possession of certain rights, life, liberty and property. The role of the state was to be strictly limited to the protection of these rights and had no role in promoting a positive conception of the good.

For both Hobbes and Locke, society is constituted by a set of property owning individuals. The political problem is to devise rules which would allow property holders to engage freely in and gain legitimately from private economic activities. In essence, this offered a market conception of citizenship, one which relocated political rights of life and liberty from a public realm concerned, in a positive and Aristotelian sense with happiness i.e. the self-realisation of the human ontology, to a private realm concerned with the material satisfaction of self-interest. A market conception of citizenship replaced the social conception as freedom was relocated from the public realm of individual citizen interaction and discourse in a collective setting to a private realm of self-interested activity.

Such a conception rested upon the assumption of the publicly beneficent effects of private interests and actions. The connection between private actions and public outcomes was asserted by Adam Smith in theorising a commercial society organised around the beneficial effects of the market to society as a whole. The invisible hand ensures that the interplay of private interests issues in the social good, thus obviating the need for extensive state intervention to ensure the public interest. The state thus came to be limited to a protective function preventing individuals from encroaching on each other’s liberty, ‘protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it’ (Smith 1937:651). Such a conception of the state is the very antithesis of the ‘rational’ connection which affirms not the separation and opposition of individuals to each other as a condition of freedom but the unity of each with all.

Adam Smith had no respect for the city as a general social entity in its own right. The universalism that was once connected with the public realm was identified by Smith with market relations. The individuals who participate in the market are proprietors of their own self-interest and hence enter market relations with each other on an equal footing. Status identity, whether noble or bourgeois, is of no relevance within market relations. There is no intrinsic difference between the participation of different actors possessing different status identities in the market place. Smith’s definition of universalism thus entails that corporate urban institutions of the medieval city are incompatible with the market as a system of natural liberty.

Smith is quite explicit in his defence of the social inequality that issues from the system of natural liberty. One of the most important functions of the state is to preserve the social order generating this inequality, defending the institution of private property at the heart of the market system: ‘Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor’ (Smith 1937:674). This conception is the polar opposite of the ‘rational’ conception of the state as integral to the good life. Smith’s individualist liberal conception reduces the state to being a coercive instrument whose function is to protect private property, impose the civil peace, and hence preserve the asymmetrical relations which generate social inequality and embed social injustice in the heart of the city. The universalist thrust of Smith’s market conception has a pronounced tendency to dissolve the social conception of the city. Modern society is a commercial society built upon exchange relations between individuals in civil society.

A challenge to the individualist, property based conception of Anglo-American liberalism came from within that tradition in the shape of John Stuart Mill. Mill’s emphasis upon the potential of a rational, informed citizenry to constitute a true civic order serves to connect individualist liberalism to much older roots, reaching back to the Athenian conception of public life. Mill introduced essential ‘rational’ themes concerning public life into a liberalism desperately in need of developing a political and communal component in order to balance its dominant economic and privatised aspect.

Mill defines a civic ideal within liberalism, emphasising the educative potential of participation and making an active citizenry a crucial part of realising the core liberal value of autonomy. For Mill, participatory structures are crucial in educating the individual in public life. This is a reciprocal rather than a pedagogic notion. Participation and self-identity exist in mutual relation in entrenching a civic culture. Citizenship as an active principle is crucial to the constitution of self-identity. For Mill, the assembly of citizens in Athens ‘raised the intellectual standard of an average Athenian far beyond anything of which there is as yet an example in any other mass of men, ancient or modern’. The Athenian citizen was under the obligation ‘to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in the case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good’. The Athenian citizen was thus associated in the same work with minds more familiarised than his own with these ideas and operations, supplying ‘reason to his understanding and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest’ (Mill 1948:196/8).

The socialist challenge to the capitalist order broadened the debate over rights and citizenship as the working class sought to carve a place for itself within the sphere of politics. Under pressure from the political and economic organisations of the working class, the liberal right to property came to be overlaid with the democratic rights of the citizen body. Formerly considered to be antithetical, liberty (identified with the propertied) came to be combined with democracy (once identified with the propertyless). And, as a further consequence, the state came to be involved in the operation of the market. Liberalism thus developed a concern with social justice, liberal philosophers (Green; Hobson) coming to understand the ‘rational’ argument that freedom is a collective project. In the process, the concept of rights came to be extended so as to obtain a social dimension. Contemporary liberalism emerged as something of a bifurcated philosophy and politics, split between the ideal and the real, principle and practice. One wing continued to assert the classical rights of the private individual, entailing the assertion of rights at the expense of equality; the other wing argued for the compatibility of rights and equality in a conception of justice.

The attempt to extend the social dimension within liberalism, combined with the extension of the state into private affairs so as to improve the general social welfare, provoked a reaction from individualist market liberals concerned to reaffirm classical individualist tenets. Whereas liberals like Dworkin and Rawls have sought to incorporate equality within liberalism, putting it on the same footing as rights, the likes of Hayek have explicitly sought to uphold the notion of individual rights at the expense of equality. Hayek is uncompromising in his anti-collectivism, dismissing the pursuit of social justice as illusory:

The old civil rights and the new social and economic rights cannot be achieved at the same time but are in fact incompatible; the new rights could not be enforced by law without at the same time destroying that liberal order at which the civil rights aim.

Hayek vol 2 1982:103

Hayek identifies the paradox at the heart of a liberalism that has sought to accommodate itself to the socialist inspired notions of freedom without thereby abandoning the liberal social order. This perceptive passage demonstrates the awareness that the realisation of the civic implications of liberal rights entails the abolition of the economic foundations of the liberal order, i.e. the rights of the individual as a citizen come to override the rights of private property. In his book Autonomy, Richard Lindley asks what a liberal would do when faced with a choice between the core liberal value of autonomy and the key liberal institution of private property. If liberal principles conflict with the institutions of the liberal social order, which will the liberal choose? Hayek is unambiguous in his answer; he sacrifices the principle in order to protect private property. The contradiction within liberalism between its political-communal dimension and its private-economic-individualist dimension is suppressed by affirming the latter as the only true basis of liberty. But to those who continue to affirm freedom as autonomy, this is not a genuine resolution; the institutions of private property continue to exist at the core of the autonomy-denying structures of the liberal social order.

Robert Nozick is another individualist liberal philosopher for whom individual rights are incompatible with anything more than a minimalist state. Nozick explicitly attacks those who assign a redistributive function to the state. Such a state must necessarily keep interfering in private affairs so as to achieve equality of holdings (property, income) and just patterns of distribution. But this equalisation implies injustice, Nozick argues, since individuals are different and spend their holdings differently. State interference to ensure equality is thus illegitimate.

Against patterned distribution via the agency of the state, Nozick proposes an entitlement theory. This states that a just distribution is the result of things being acquired justly. The state has no right to assume a redistribution function altering individuals’ holdings if resources have been legally acquired. The social order that Nozick defends is thus characterised by the minimal state and unviolated property rights. It is also characterised by considerable social inequality, generating a social pathology that makes the social habitus so fractious as to require an extensive coercive policing designed into the living environment. Paradoxically, as could have been envisaged on Hobbesian grounds, Nozick’s argument for a minimal state generates a war of all against all in civil society that is so fierce as to require a Leviathan state to impose order.

These reassertions of classical tenets of individualist liberalism against social liberalism ignore the reasons why liberalism was compelled to acquire a social dimension in the first place. The tendencies to concentration and centralisation at the heart of capitalist modernity make the minimalist state an anachronism. The state is now required to intervene in the processes of civil society in order to organise the conditions for accumulation. Moreover, the assertion of individual rights is chimerical in conditions in which individuals are confronted by vast impersonal blocs of political and economic power. The state and capital are involved in a symbiotic relationship and in command of vast processes of production, employment and investment. In this context, the reversion to classical liberalism is an ideological project which serves to conceal the extension of the bureaucratic control of the state and the extension of the corporate form of property throughout society (McDermott 1991).

Liberal discourse is dominated by the private interests of individuals, conceived not as citizens concerned with the public good but as property owners motivated by self-interest. This concedes only very limited social obligations and is problematic with respect to urban order. The urban environment in which individuals live, work, relax, is a collective world. Individuals live together, in relation to each other, engaging and communicating with each other. In this world, individual actions have consequences which affect others. The narrow prosecution of the rights of some individuals can impose hardship for other individuals, affecting the character of society in a way that is detrimental for all.
There are two basic paths that may be taken from this position. The first path involves the defence of existing property relations. These relations take effect as the privileges of some and the hardship of others. As a result, the urban environment is divided within. Injustice comes to be institutionalised as the advantaged attempt to seal their privileged existence off from the disadvantaged. The second path is to transform asymmetrical relations within society so as to distribute life chances equally, realise social justice and bring about the good city which ensures the coexistence of the freedom of each and the freedom of all.
The recognition of the inherently social character of urban life extends the terms of liberal discourse beyond a narrow individualism to theorize the conditions of an authentic individuality. In the urban sphere, there is much more to citizenship, democracy and government than the protection of the individual rights of property owners. The political dimension of rights discourse introduces collective values which pertain to a public sphere or community. And this contains the potential for creating an urban public sphere as an alternative to the non-discursive, depoliticised ‘publics’ of the state and capital.

85 BEYOND LIBERALISM
This section explores the contradictory character of liberal rights discourse with a view to identifying a self-transcending logic focused upon a democratic communal-public identity. The purpose is to extract the public and universal significance of liberal rights discourse and radicalise it so as to envisage a new public order beyond liberalism. Liberalism would thus be transcended by coming to realise core liberal values against key liberal institutions.

The rehabilitation of the concept of rights is undoubtedly associated with the revival of liberalism in recent years. The recommendation to take rights seriously is based upon the notion that all individuals, by virtue of their humanity, are endowed with a set of absolute and inviolable moral claims which take priority over competing reasons or policies (Rawls 1971; Ackerman 1980; Dworkin 1977). Rights are morally necessary in attributing to the individual an absolute and irreplaceable dignity. Without rights there would be no grounds for criticising or resisting policies or forces that treat individuals merely as members of an impersonal social aggregate to be used according to any collective purpose imposed by the state. These claims are not easily discarded or suppressed on account of coming to clash with the institutions and mechanisms of a specific social order. If rights have the prior claim in pertaining to the realisation of the human ontology, then the particular institutions and mechanisms blocking these rights are to be transformed.

This is how Marx’s argument for transcending rights needs to be read. The classical-civic dimension of Marx’s critique of rights needs to be emphasised in order to develop Marx’s communism as a reconstituted public sphere rooted in social life. This is clear in Marx’s condemnation of the reduction of citizenship to being dependent upon rights. Marx defines the ethical mode of an integral citizenship against a self-interested abstract state citizenship which is erected over an atomistic, egoistic social order. This underlines once more how the ‘rational’ tradition of political philosophy established the paradigm for a common or public life constituted by free and equal relationships. This ethos of a communal modus vivendi is missing in the self-interested philosophy of Hobbes, Locke and liberal contractarianism generally. The ‘rational’ tradition – discussed in this thesis in relation to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Habermas – demonstrates a concern for concrete others, for mutual recognition, reciprocity and ethical relations as against the detached and impersonal individualism of the modern polity.

Marx’s distinction between the rights of the citizen and the rights of man exposes the contradictory character of rights as split between formal and substantive equality and freedom. Marx contrasts two sets of rights, the norms of the liberal political tradition to liberal social reality, the rights of democratic citizenship to the realities of ownership rights. For Marx, personal rights, the public rights of citizens which are applicable to all, should prevail over the exclusive rights of property which are applicable only to property owners. 

In examining the contradictory relation of class and citizenship, T.H. Marshall presents the classical statement of a radicalised social liberalism, associating citizenship with the extension of democratic rights (Marshall 1981; 1992). Citizenship emerges as a condition in which all members of society possess clearly defined and steadily expanding civil, political and social rights. However, the principle of equality inherent in the category of citizenship brings it into conflict with the inequality engendered by the capitalist economy (Bottomore 1993:25).

The expansion of the discourse of rights challenges the coherence of liberal discourse itself. This exposes liberalism as a contradictory philosophy which embraces a form of political equality whilst protecting an unequal society characterised by ‘disproportionate power’ (Bowles and Gintis 1987:xi). The attempt that Bowles and Gintis make to connect democratisation with the expansion of personal as against property rights is full of insight. Bowles and Gintis identify the two historical tendencies which make a clash of rights the central dynamic of liberal democratic capitalist societies. The first is the ‘expansionary logic of personal rights, progressively bringing ever wider spheres of society .. under at least the formal if not the substantive rubric of liberal democracy’; the second is ‘the expansionary logic of capitalist production’ which subjects social life to ‘the imperatives of accumulation and the market’ (Bowles and Gintis 1987:11 29).

This clash between these two expansionary tendencies is the practical problem of the modern world. The modern individual is forced to live a dual existence, split between the philosophic demand for rights, equality and democracy and reason on the one hand and the alienated social forms which frustrate those demands on the other.

What makes Bowles and Gintis so interesting is that they, like Arendt and Bookchin, attempt to establish the basis of a democratic pluralism to counteract liberal atomism by looking back to the township democracy of the American Revolution. Jefferson’s ‘small republics’ constituting the ‘main strength of the great one’ (Arendt 1963:257). This democratising project, fostering the proliferation of vital and autonomous self-governing communities standing between the individual and the state (Bowles and Gintis 1987:139/40) is not far removed from the attempt made in this book to revalue the social and solidaristic component of the ‘rational’ tradition of normative political philosophy. From this perspective it is possible to unite each and all, the particular and the general, within a universal order that encompasses rather than suppresses diversity.





This is precisely how this book has sought to present the ‘rational’ tradition of political philosophy, revaluing the public significance of the associational space of civil society. This associationalism has been developed to form the basis of a conceptual formulation of an urban public sphere. Bowles and Gintis make a good point in this respect: ‘the era of the ballot box and the marketplace did not so much destroy the intervening communities as it did disempower and depoliticise them. As a result, the state came to monopolise politics’ (Bowles and Gintis 1987:140). This defines the project of the urban public sphere concisely, conceiving the reappropriation of power from the alien spheres of control exercised by the state and capital to be a repoliticisation through the investment of associational civil space with governmental significance. This is the political investment of civil society.

86 THE CIVIC TRADITION
The argument is now able to push beyond liberal conceptions to realise the rational-civic conception of freedom on a (post)modern terrain. The main deficiency of liberalism lies in its inability to embed its rights oriented conception within the collective purpose of society. If individuals are as self-motivated and self-interested as liberal philosophy maintains, then there is a problem of how they may combine in order to reach agreement over larger social ends. This problem is most apparent in relation to ensuring the public good. How can individuals as atoms agree on the creation of the good city, one that conforms to the essential humanity of each and all, let alone act together to realise and maintain that vision? In recent years there has been a shift from a social to a market citizenship. This entails a shift from a collective viewpoint to an individualistic one in which issues from health and education to welfare are seen as the responsibility of the individual. The market conception of citizenship implies that self-interested individuals generate the public good indirectly, as an unintended outcome rather than as a deliberate purpose. The problem is that unintended consequences issue in public bad as much as public good.

Liberalism cannot provide a plausible account of the connection of public and private good. It has little to offer on the space between individual rights and state power, even though this space forms the everyday life world of the citizen and the city. In contrast to the unencumbered self of liberal discourse, the ‘rational’ civic tradition conceive individuals as essentially social, political and moral beings, the three terms being interrelated. Individuals can only individuate themselves in relation to others in society. Individual capacities are fully realised only within a collective life and purpose. The failure of individuals to engage with others in society, to identify a personal interest with a social purpose, cuts them off from the greater, richer range of human potentialities. From this ‘rational’ perspective, classical liberalism is an impoverished theory characterised by a thin conception of the individual, focusing exclusively upon private rights, failing to see the greater freedom that is available through locating those rights within a public setting. 


The ‘rational’ tradition defines a very different model of political life, bringing civic culture and citizenship to the centreground in the formation of individual-social identity and emphasising engagement and participation on the part of individuals as citizens. An interesting aspect of this tradition is the extent to which its concern with individual self-development generates an opposition to a powerful central state as inimical to the public life that individuals require in order to realise their potentialities and exercise their capacities. The ‘rational’ tradition is characterised by its concern to relate all collective institutions and purposes to the individual. The rational tradition is richer and embraces a greater range of possibilities and connections than the individualist conception. In Aristotle, citizenship is defined in terms of ruling and being ruled in turn. This definition puts the accent on the citizen rather than the state, the person rather than the institution. The concern with civic engagement and political participation chimes with contemporary demands for empowerment and emancipation. 

This section conceives the possibility of civic democracy through the extension of participatory structures and public spaces throughout civil society. This enables individuals to engage in all the various activities of their public life and implies a democratisation in the way that individuals determine collective purposes. Recovering the classical sense of the politikos bios as essential to human self-realisation, there is a need to ensure that politics is co-extensive with real everyday social practices and life processes. Community gains by fostering and enhancing these connections since they expand the range of human activities, increasing human talent and creativity.

If there is a role for formal institutions of government, then there is a need to discover the forms most appropriate to civic engagement and empowerment. The solution is to make the centres of public power more accessible and responsive. Government is to cease to be the remote institution that it is in the liberal tradition, external to the individual and a potential threat to liberty, and instead is to become visible and immediate. There is a need to draw a distinction here between the state and public power. Shifting the locus of political power from centralised state systems to more local centres implies the dissolution of the state and the expansion of the public realm, an urban-civic sphere.

This is to favour the bottom-up, ascending model of the public as rooted in associative civil society as against the top-down, descending model centred upon the state. The descending theme of government concentrates power at the centre and necessitates a centralised bureaucracy, conceding limited powers to the lower levels of government. The ascending theme of government diffuses power among a number of small scale centres and canalises this power upwards to a delimited central authority. A necessary step from the descending/state theme to the ascending/civic theme of power and government involves the decentralisation and deconcentration of power from the coercive institutional-systemic apparatus to the social body, thus empowering individual citizens in their social relationship and interaction. 

The descending theme has dominated the political life of western state systems has issued in a narrow conception of political culture. ‘Those who look from the top down consider that the whole authority of the state is concentrated at the centre. To them, the centre is the only legitimate source of power.. This school of thought .. is more interested in efficiency than democracy, in uniform standards than in local responsibility: it regards the citizen more as a consumer than a participant in government’ (Rees 1971). This form of government confronts the citizen with a couple of paradoxes. Those forms of government which are most accessible to the citizens are also the ones which have the least power and are least effective; those which have the most power and are most effective are also least accessible. Embodying the ascending theme in appropriate institutions would reverse this situation by connecting power with accessibility, ensuring that the represented are more in touch with those who represent them. 

Overcoming the centralisation of power under the state and capital makes it possible to expand public spaces enabling the active exercise of citizenship. This overcomes the dualism of the governed and the government, the represented and the representative:





These considerations raise the problem of scale and quantity. If urban centres are too large, then they reproduce the problems associated with the centralised bureaucratic state. If they are too small, then they are subject to problems of fragmentation, isolation, possible exclusion. The solution requires a division of municipalities within the whole, maximising social heterogeneity without compromising political accessibility, a solution which goes back to Aristotle’s concern with optimum size.

Given issues of scale and quantity, there is a need for representative forms. Indeed, it is likely that elected officials would be required even in the smallest units of government. However, the ascending theme assumes the existence of an active, informed citizenry. This ‘places the emphasis on local authorities as nurseries of democratic citizenship, revels in diversity and local initiative, is impatient of central control and wishes to involve the citizen, not so much to bring him into contract with the state, as to foster his self-reliance’ (Rees 1971). With this in mind, it is possible to think of citizenship less in terms of a continuous interaction between electors and elected, represented and representatives. Accessibility and participation are thus exercised as civic rights, as public rights. ‘A certain number of positions on any council should be set aside for citizen involvement on the same basis as for jury service, that is, as a civic right and obligation open to all .. The same system could be gradually incorporated into representative forms of government so that everyone gets a turn, every citizen has the right and the obligation to perform in a governmental institution whether to be alongside or as a replacement for elected representatives’ (Short 1989:97/9). ‘Regular elections, automatic recall with a majority referendum, pegging politicians expenses so that they receive the average wage in the area, and limitations on the length of service are just some of the methods possible to bring the governing closer to the governed’ (Short 1989:99).

The concept of the urban public sphere has its roots in the conception of municipal or township democracy. ‘The town presents the single raw material of local proximity out of which municipal life is to be built. The first business of the municipal reformer, then, is to transform this excessive proximity into wholesome neighbourhood, in order that true neighbourly feelings may have room to grow and thrive, and eventually to ripen into the flower of a fair civic life.. to evoke the personal human qualities of this medley of city workers so as to reach within the individual citizen, to educate the civic feeling until it takes shape in civic activities and institutions, which not only safeguard the public welfare against the encroachments of private industrial greed, but shall find an even ampler and nobler expression in the aesthetic beauty and spiritual dignity of a complex, common life – all this work of transformation lies in front of the democracy, grouped in its ever increasing number of town units’ (Hobson 1926).

Describing society as ‘a moral rational organism’ in that it possesses a ‘common psychic life, character and purpose’ which cannot be reduced to its individual elements, Hobson emphasises that ‘the City has been the largest and most convincing example of this real moral unity’ since ancient and medieval times. ‘The civic spirit was no mere phrase to describe the views of the average citizen: the City State of the Greeks is only intelligible as a moral unity’ (Hobson 1988:66 68). This leads Hobson to develop an organic conception of politics as based upon the functional self-government of local centres constituting the whole (Hobson 1988:69/74).

The ascending system of government provides a diversity of public centres and spaces and is capable of generating a diversity of policies. It is possible to envisage various local authorities fostering and maintaining local traditions and cultures, articulating a variety of political and economic arrangements, including the kinds of anarchic urban communities favoured by Richard Sennett in The Uses of Disorder (1970). Sennett’s proposal of self-policing communities implies that external coercion could be replaced by internal dialogue in regulating human affairs. This conception offers a powerful insight into the contours of an alternative city. 

Renegotiating public-private boundaries makes possible a more expansive conception of politics. Notions of civic engagement and political participation would no longer be confined to the formal institutional sphere and hence rendered remote, abstract and passive. Formal arrangements ensuring effective government are important but the process of creating such arrangements cannot be divorced from the problem of ensuring that citizens have a role in exercising power. Such involvement has massive benefits in facilitating the identification of individuals with their environment, permitting the emergence of novel forms of political expression based upon the identification of self and community. 

The development of the urban public realm fits in with the emergence of a postmodern political culture which is innovating new modes of political expression. Soja refers to the attempts to go beyond the politics of equality to develop strategies for achieving social and spatial justice that are adaptive to the specificities of the globalised, post-fordist, exopolitan and culturally heterogeneous urban society of today. Soja connects these adaptive strategies to the development of a new cultural politics.





The spatial turn is the most recent addition to the discourse on new cultural politics, energising this politics around a shared consciousness of the interrelations of space, knowledge and power. Whereas the politics of equality mobilises its radical subjectivity around the taking control of the ‘making of history’, the new cultural politics of difference, identity, and representation adds a new source of mobilised consciousness rooted in the more immediate collective struggle to take control over the ‘making of geography’, over the social production of human spatiality (Soja 2000:280/1). What of the making of culture, which is responsible for shaping history, geography, society, etc.

Since the 1990s, the spatial turn has influenced postmetropolitan politics in a significant way. ‘Open ended coalitions aimed specifically at addressing the multiple oppressions of race, class, gender, sexuality and other individual and collective sources of marginalisation and inequality are increasingly being mobilised in many postmetropolitan regions around a shared spatial consciousness, as awareness that oppression, marginality and inequality are produced and reproduced to a significant degree through the new urbanisation processes and the restructured socio-spatialities of urbanism’ (Soja 2000:282). Soja offers the movement for environmental justice as an example of fundamental spatial struggle; he also refers to a more inclusionary feminism. Such spatial struggles goes beyond the old boundaries of gender, race and class to reshape postmetropolitan cityspace. Urban social movements addressing the geographically uneven effects of globalisation, postfordist economic restructuring and the reconfiguration of urban form. Such movements are opening up spaces of resistance in the postmetropolis, redefining citizenship in the process and creating sites for progressive political action (Soja 2000:282).





87 RAWLS – JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY

From the time of the Athenian polis, the ‘rational’ tradition has emphasised the community of which individuals are members by virtue of shared customs, beliefs, habits, languages and institutions. In this tradition, the view that individuals could be conceived in abstraction from place or role makes little sense. The ideal of community, its values and its location, therefore plays an important role in the concern to define an urban public sphere distinct from the state. 

This concern locates the conception of public life within a conception of the good, something which has not gone unchallenged from a liberal perspective. In the first place, liberal thought, more attuned to the state monopoly of public life and the depoliticisation of an atomised civil society, finds it difficult to conceive of a properly ordered civic community as a collectivity of individuals looking after their own well-being. In the second place, modern liberalism is sceptical of the notion of the good, asserting the priority of the right over the good. And in the third place, liberal thought is sceptical of the concept of community. John Rawls criticises the concept of community as a vague notion which is probably oppressive of individual liberty. ‘For reasons of clarity among others, we do not want to rely on an undefined concept of community, or to suppose that society is an organic whole with a life of its own distinct from and superior to that of all its members in their relations with one another’ (Rawls 1971:264).

Few would be prepared to advocate community in these terms. This book has shown how Aristotle (mistakenly) took Plato to task for proposing some such notion. One can defend an organic conception of community as a natural order whilst also emphasising that the quality of that community depends upon the individuals composing it and the character of the relationships between these individuals. In the ‘rational’ tradition founded by Plato and Aristotle, the individual and the social are not antithetical but express two sides of the same human nature. The historical failures of liberalism to generate a genuine public life, allowing individuals to emerge and act as citizens in their daily lives, justifies an investigation of the politics of community in the ‘rational’ tradition.

The problem with community is not that it is an impossible to define concept but that modern instrumental relations and the institutional separation of the state (public affairs) and civil society (private affairs) render it impossible to achieve in other than abstract form, i.e. in the oppressive form that Rawls criticises. For Marx, the external imposition of a collective purpose is part and parcel of the alien control exercised by the capital system. Marx demonstrated how the abstracted communities of capital, money, the state and bureaucracy are parasitic upon and destructive of real community, appropriating the common affairs and collective powers of the community and given them alien expression in relation to the community.

These issues have, partly at least, been addressed in the debate between individualist/deontological liberalism and communitarianism. This debate is particularly relevant with respect to evaluating the extent to which individual freedom requires socio-political bonds. The question concerns the nature of justice and its location.

The debate thus turns to John Rawls as the most influential contemporary liberal philosopher attempting to affirm the compatibility of equality and rights. Rawls’ ‘public conception of justice’ represents an advance over the classical liberal identification of the natural system of liberty with the market, a conception which deliberately minimised the public sphere. In considering the best way for binding individuals together, Rawls extends the concept of the social contract well beyond earlier liberals like Hobbes and Locke. Society is defined as a ‘cooperative venture for mutual advantage’. Rawls thus identifies the shared concept of justice as a mechanism for binding individuals since ‘among individuals with disparate aims and purposes, a shared conception of justice establishes the bonds of civic friendship; the general desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends. One may think of a public conception of justice as constituting the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human association’. 

Rawls’ ‘public conception of justice’ therefore belongs in the ‘rational’ tradition to the extent that it is a shared conception the bonds between individuals rather than their separations. The problem is that Rawls’ theory of justice reproduces the classical liberal separation of the state from civil society with the result that justice comes to be confined to an abstract public sphere removed from the real life affairs of individuals. Individuals lack a public life in their everyday life activity. They lack community and they lack a substantive conception of the good. They lack politikos bios.

Rawls proceeds by developing the Kantian moral framework in terms of asserting the categorical priority of universal rights over substantive conceptions of the good (Rawls 1971:256; 1980:517). For Rawls, liberalism offers a framework for individuals to pursue ends that they have chosen for themselves. This framework is neutral with respect to particular ends and exhibits no preference as regards a way of life, as regards what constitutes the good life for particular individuals (Rawls 1971:30/3 446/52). Rawls’ assumption of mutual disinterest ‘involves no particular theory of human motivations’ (Rawls 1971:130 189). Liberalism is silent on the good. ‘That we have one conception of the good rather than another is not relevant from a moral standpoint’ (Rawls 1971:537). Rawls’ attempt to replace Kant’s realm of ends with an ‘original position’ corresponding with liberal-empiricist conceptions of justice replaces the normative conception of ‘rational’ philosophy with a deontological liberalism (Rawls 1977:165; 1971:264; 1979:18).

Rawls’ argument is based on the primacy of justice. Justice is the first claim on institutions, their fundamental virtue (Ryan 1981:228). Social cooperation requires some unassailable agreement over the just and the unjust. Rawls thus attempts to find ‘an Archimedean point for judging the basic structure of society’ by means of the device of the ‘original position’ (Rawls 1971:260/3 384). Crucially, Rawls insists that in building this abstract model of a just order, none shall be preferentially or undeservedly placed in the determination of principles. Individual subjects determine principles of justice from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, unencumbered by the contingencies of real life, principles that express the nature of human beings as ‘free and equal rational persons’ (Rawls 1971:256).

In this abstract model, individuals act rationally, are mutually disinterested, and are connected with each other through symmetrical relationships. Rawls is now able to argue that the institutions of this hypothetical society can be governed by an appeal to principles of justice. Rawls arrives at two principles of justice which are fair as regards the whole of society and which are untainted by particular desires and interests.

The first principle is the formal expression. This states that: ‘Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all’. These include the right to vote, freedom of thought, right to property etc. The second principle asserts that ‘social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged; b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971:302). Rawls orders these principles hierarchically. The first principle is the fundamental one. The right to equality in basic liberties has priority over the virtues of the second principle. The basic rights of the first principle cannot be sacrificed for increased prosperity.

Rawls thus summarizes his position: ‘All social values are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage’ (Rawls 1971:62). Societies, institutions, and cities that are ordered according to these principles are just.

Rawls proceeds to distinguish his argument from more familiar arguments in moral philosophy that connect justice with ‘desert’. He is most concerned to distinguish his principle of fair equality of opportunity from the equality that ‘leads to a callous meritocratic society’ (Rawls 1971:100). Rawls is critical of the liberal conception of equality of opportunity that presumes an equal starting position for all but which nevertheless distributes rewards unequally in a competition through which desert is proven through success (Schaar 1980:166). Such equality of opportunity has overcome inequality through birth, patronage and tradition only to impose inequality in new social forms, setting society on the model of a competitive individualistic market. New inequalities replace the old. For Rawls, justice is inextricably linked with fairness (Beauchamp 1980:133). This notion places equality before all other claims save liberty.

Rawls’ theory of justice implies the ideal rational community of free and equal beings interacting within an unconstrained sphere of intersubjective communication. There are, however, problems which serve to block the emergence of a genuine public life. Significantly, Rawls’ lexical ordering and separation of the two principles of justice presupposes the liberal institutional separation of state and civil society. The ‘public conception of justice’ reproduces the split between public and private which results in politics and morality being removed from the everyday social life world of individuals and taking an abstract legal and coercive institutional form within the alien state. Rawls’ theory of justice may be commended in expressing the ‘rational’ attempt to unite the freedom of each and the freedom of all in a shared conception of justice. But Rawls fails to achieve a genuine reciprocity. He attempts to forge his bonds of civic friendship on the basis of the abstract individualism and instrumental rationality of modern society. There are no grounds for supposing that individuals, as rational-egoistic agents, will choose to submit to Rawls’ fair principles of justice. For these principles have been determined in abstraction from the real lives of individuals since Kant sought an external vantage point – the Archimedean point – from which to assess social issues.

The problem here lies in Rawls’ attempts to reformulate Kant’s morality without having to abstract from experience. In defining the ‘original position’ as ‘a procedural interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative’ so that these notions are no longer ‘purely transcendent and lacking explicable connections with human conduct’ (Rawls 1971:256), Rawls offers a means of deriving principles of justice which abstract from contingent influences but without having to postulate, in the manner of Kant, a noumenal realm and transcendent self beyond experience. 





Both Hegel and Marx sought to develop Kant by introducing the socio-historical context of morality with respect to social roles, relations etc. The problem becomes one of how to embed justice. Here, Rawls’ ‘original position’ taking account of circumstances reduces Kant’s realm of ends to the diremption of an empirical world that is characterised by ‘natural restrictions’ of ‘moderate scarcity and competing claims’. The recovery of human situation against Kant’s disembodied conception is achieved only at the expense of reinstating the diremptive features of an existing society which makes moral self-regulation impossible and coercive legal-institutional regulation necessary. This is not a resolution of the moral failure of modernity. Rawls is compelled to lock common interest up in the abstract public of the state: ‘There is, to be sure, one collective aim supported by state power for the whole well-ordered society, a just society wherein the common conception of justice is publicly recognised; but within this framework communitarian aims may be pursued, and quite possibly by the vast majority of persons’ (Rawls 1975:550)

But Rawls is being disingenuous here since the freedom to pursue communitarian ends is based on individualist premises. Rawls’ self is antecedent to the interests and ties that the individual has and, being independent of the virtues any particular individual has, precludes any sense of individual participation in community as itself constitutive of self-identity: ‘the essential unity of the self is already provided by the concept of right’ (Rawls 1971:563). Community, from Rawls’ perspective, is merely one possibility among many that may be pursued by antecedently individuated selves within a framework already defined by principles of justice.

Cautioning that Rawls’ project is doomed to failure, Sandel notes Rawls’ attempt to define a concept of self that steers clear of the twin reefs of Kant’s radically disembodied subject on the one hand and the self as radically situated on the other (Sandel 1982:19 23). Sandel argues against the ‘unencumbered self’ that Rawls employs in his account of the ‘original position’. In continuing the Kantian tradition of seeking an external vantage point – the Archimedean point – from which to assess social issues (Sandel 1998:16/7 23/4), Rawls has formulated a morality that is denuded of social context and implication, undermining the very conception of the self (Sandel 1998:167 177/8 182 182/3). For Sandel, this account of identity is metaphysically questionable in its assumption that individuals can abstract from their particular attributes and still exist as significantly distinct individuals, since these identities are constituted by the social attachments that individuals form. Rawls’ conception serves to cut individuals off from the relationships constituting self-identity, thus undermining the sense of self. It is difficult to conceive of the individual at all within Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ (Sandel 1998:182 182/3).

The ‘unencumbered self’ is incoherent and unintelligible; the subject that Rawls presupposes is indefensible. And since this subject is the cornerstone of the argument, Rawls’ theory of justice is rendered incoherent. The problem with deontological liberalism is that the self, stripped of all possible constitutive attachments, is less liberated than disempowered (Sandel 1982:176/8). Since, for Rawls, individuals are distinct persons prior to relationships with others, the subject is ‘antecedently individuated’. Rawls’ subject is thus beyond experience and possesses no essential characteristics (Sandel 1982:53 62). As a result, community can never be a constituent element, only an attribute (Sandel 1982:69 74). The ‘unencumbered self’, interpreted in terms of monadic rationality and subjectivity is much too thin an entity to constitute a basis for a public life embodying morality and community. Yet Rawls’ concept of justice requires a constituent concept of community. Without the connection of the subject to the community, Rawls’ key argument in favour of a principle of distributive justice lacks any foundation.

Rawls’ theory thus fails. Recognising the force of this criticism, many liberals have been engaged in a search for a liberalism that is historically sensitive and socially rooted (Walzer 1983; Galston 1980; Raz 1986). Sandel argues that the relationships that individuals form in the family, community or nation are both definitive and constitutive of the identity of subjects. Morality requires this socio-relational context pertaining to the real lives of real individuals. Rawls’ attempt to mediate the conflicts of contemporary plural society by appealing to impersonal and impartial rules neglects the particular attachments which are constitutive of identity and which make individuals moral agents in the first place (Sandel 1982:147/52). Against Rawls’ disembodied subject, Sandel proposes what he calls a ‘wider subject’, a subject marked by constitutive community, a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings which the opacity of the participants is reduced (Sandel 1982:172). This subject is constituted in part by conditions and is open to transformation in light of a revised self-understanding (Sandel 1982:172).


Sandel thus seeks to restate the richer, affective bonds of community against the narrow, legalistic conceptions of individualistic liberalism (Sandel 1982:147). Sandel attempts to find a middle way between the disembodied subject and the radically situated (or ‘socially constituted’) subject by defining a subject that is only partially constituted by communal relationships. Such a subject possesses a ‘core self’ which, though partially socially constructed, is not radically situated. Looking to restate the bonds of community against the narrowly legalistic character of formal rights and rules, Sandel offers a definition in which ‘community would describe not just a feeling, but a mode of self-understanding partly constitutive of the agent’s identity’ (Sandel 1982:150). 


And some such concept is implicit in Rawls’ notion of shared final ends in the community of humankind, individuals cooperating to realise their common nature so that ‘the self is realised in the activities of many selves’ (Rawls 1971:527 529 565). Rawls’ theory of justice tacitly recognises the situatedness of individuals. 

Rawls, moreover, can only sustain his position by reference to a substantive conception of the good. Despite his disclaimers, Rawls does have his own particular conception of the good society. Rawls explicitly defends a liberal theory of justice premised upon western institutions and a ‘model conception of a moral person’ (Rawls 1980:515/72; 1982; 1985:223/51; 1987:1/25; 1988:251/77). Behind Rawls’ assumption of neutrality, then, lies the definitive liberal ethic pertaining to individual autonomy and the existence of a reasonable moral community sharing specific value commitments.

The conflict between neutralist and communitarian liberalism may be more apparent than real, with broad agreement over liberal values and institutions. Since, from the other direction, most communitarians – MacIntyre being the obvious exception – are concerned to salvage liberal values from contractarian and individualist foundations in order to reconcile individuality and communality (Taylor 1982 1989; Walzer 1983; Barber 1984; Balbus 1982). 

The crucial issue, then, is to determine how successful both sides in this liberal-communitarian debate are in realising their end of a shared and public conception of a cooperating humanity realising itself through the activities of many selves. But it is in specifying what form common life should take and how to achieve this moral ideal that the inadequacies of the communitarians become apparent: ‘their conclusions are disappointingly similar to the abstract liberalism to which they take exception’ (Boucher and Kelly 1994:26).

The reason for this failure of the communitarian critique to define a novel concept of community is not hard to find. With the notable exception of MacIntyre, the communitarians are themselves liberal, particularly in the reproduction of the institutional separation of the state and civil society, holding public and private apart as a condition of freedom and democracy. The attempt to achieve a synthesis in which individuality and communality are not antithetical but are unified in a community that reconciles the individual and the social self is vitiated by this dualism (Unger 1975; Taylor 1982; Barber 1984; Balbus 1982; Buchanan 1989). As with any dualism, the two elements – individual and community – are interdependent. The one cannot exist without the other. There is a need, therefore, to address the roots of this antithesis in the division of social space into public and private spheres. With this division, the public exists as an impersonal sphere of rationality which is abstracted from a private world which is the exclusive province of personal issues. A synthesis between these public and private discourses does nothing in itself to subvert the terms of that dualism or to generate a new discourse.

Liberals are sceptical of the idea of a unitary good as something that is well-nigh impossible to reconcile with the pluralism of values in modern society. The possibility of an overarching moral system entailed by the meta-narrative of the good life or the good city is thus rejected. An alternative view would attempt to specify the conditions, in terms of institutions and relationships, which make it possible to reconcile social pluralism with the common good through an internal social and moral coordination proceeding from within everyday relationships as opposed to an externally imposed good embodied in an overarching institutional-legal apparatus. It all depends upon how broadly or narrowly the nature of the good is conceived.

The argument relates the question of the public sphere and its location to the need to ground a universal morality uniting each and all in the project of justice in social control and social identity. And this means addressing the nihilism that Weber exposed as lying at the heart of modernity. Modernity is in the paradoxical position of requiring morality whilst undermining its grounds. For, as the chapter on Weberian rationalisation has shown, morality has become a matter of subjective opinion in the modern world, something which denies the universal moral framework that human beings require in order to realise their human potentialities. 

Contemporary Rawlsian liberalism has become a deontological theory. Since morality in the modern Weberian world has become a matter of irreducible subjective opinion, liberalism is in the process of changing from being an ethical or ‘comprehensive’ theory to becoming a political theory, thus avoiding controversy over conceptions of the self (Rawls 1993:xx xxvii). Rather than engage in a search for the philosophical or ontological foundation of principles of justice, Rawls defines a ‘political’ liberalism which rests upon an ‘overlapping consensus’ (Rawls 1993:10). Rawls modifies the Kantian position by taking the standpoint of persons as autonomous selves given prior to their ends to be limited to the public identity of persons as citizens (Rawls 1993:30). The encumbrances of the individual as a matter of personal identity must be bracketed out in the public realm so that the individual is independent of particular loyalties and conceptions of the good (Rawls 1993:31).

This ‘political’ liberalism seeks to shed what are perceived to be unsustainable anthropological themes and values concerning the nature of human beings. These were once the core component of the definition of public life. Now, under the influence of Rawls, liberalism is more concerned with ‘fair’ institutions and procedures. Despite its shortcomings in terms of a conception of politikos bios, deontological liberalism, as a neutralised and demoralised liberalism, appears to be the only option within the parameters of the disenchanted Weberian world.

Rawls’ ‘political liberalism’ clearly fits the contours of dualistic modern society. Rawls supports the dualistic political conception of the person, split between public and personal identity in abstracting from ends, by arguing that this dualism ‘originates in the special nature of modern democratic society’ (Rawls 1993:193). The problem is that, from the perspective of a politikos bios, this modern political culture is a denial of ‘true’ democracy, community and individuality. In asserting the priority of the right over the good, particularly in defining an unencumbered individual apart from the controversies over the nature of the self, Rawls shows the extent to which the project of deontological liberalism presumes the dualistic framework of modern society. This sheds the ethical core of liberalism in order to adapt to a disenchanted modern order.

Deontological liberalism expresses a key aspect of rationalisation – disenchantment as the expulsion of value from the social world. Modern morality is formal, seeking not to guide choices concerning a good or humane way of life but to restrict them. This refers specifically to the liberal priority of the right over the good (Sandel 1998:1 15/7). Morality has come to be limited to what is right, leaving individuals alone to work out the good for themselves. Such a morality is unable to contribute to more substantive questions as to how well-being might be achieved. Liberal morality is silent on the good. Williams brings out the extent to which a morality of duty – which Williams tellingly identifies with ‘morality’ as such – distorts the nature of moral deliberation when it attempts to address ethical questions of any substance (Williams 1985:ch 10). 

This thesis has challenged the notion that the Weberian process of rationalisation is irrevocable. The realisation of the core liberal value of autonomy needs to pay attention to Marx’s attempt to recover human subjectivity from within the alien forms within which it is encased in the modern world. The roots of this disenchantment are located in the alienation of labour and of sovereignty in the fetish systems of production and politics. Recovering an integral conception of essential, creative human nature as something that is actualised in a self-made social world, it becomes possible to propose an alternative public life that counts as ‘good’ in actualising the human ontology rather than, as with rationalised capitalist modernity, contradicts it. The emphasis upon the social world as the real world of individual reciprocity, exchange and interaction, forms a crucial part of the attempt to conceive public community in the real and active sense of the demos producing and constituting their social existence. 

The concept of the urban public sphere, connecting normative philosophical roots of the city with associative realities, attempts to forge the necessary ethical bonds not at the abstract level of the state but within social relationships. This public sphere makes available a richer conception of morality than is possible on the disenchanted terrain of modernity.

Rather than reject modernity by embracing pre-modern solidarities and communities in the manner of communitarians like MacIntyre, and rather than accept Weberian disenchantment to produce a denormalised and demoralised liberalism – which is what the deontological position amounts to – there is a need to develop a critical conception of public life from out of the immanent possibilities of modernity, identifying those trends and forces that contain the potential for constituting an alternative future. In this future public, universal morality is to be embedded in social practices through the availability of a social identity that connects the individual with a wider moral purpose.

The great merit of the conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere lies in the possibility of transcending the liberal-communitarian debate. In changing the register to individual interaction within a relational conception of community and the public good, the concept of the urban public shows the liberal emphasis upon rights and codes within an impersonal juridical sphere of the state to be misplaced. At the same time, the communitarian conception of community and common interest is shown to be vitiated by the reproduction of the abstract dualisms of individual and society, private and public, which constitute the liberal framework. Uprooting the liberal antithesis of individual and society makes it possible to realise the principles of autonomy, identity and sociality that are at stake in the liberal-communitarian debate. This argument makes clear the extent to which morality possesses a social content. 

88 JUSTICE IN THE CITY
It is worth pausing here to explore the immediate implications that Rawls’ conception of justice had for the city. The issues of resources, equality and justice are directly relevant to urban life. David Harvey’s Social Justice and the City (1973) represents an attempt to follow up Rawlsian notions of justice in an urban context. The book was hugely influential. As a result of its impact, ‘social justice emerged as the fashionable idea of the 1970’s’ (Goldsmith 1980:146). Urban studies came to be associated with the goal of a just social order. This necessarily came to focus upon the questions of poverty and inequality, the question of the distribution of resources: ‘the new principles are evolving around issues of equity in the distribution of public resources: who pays and who benefits and who is excluded from established policies? .. When poverty is viewed as exclusion from membership in society, public policies become necessary which will attempt to alter the distribution of resources’ (Rein 1976:123). Rein makes the moral case for public intervention in the ‘free’ market economy in order to correct the unjust and inegalitarian outcomes of that economy. The faltering of these principles under the neo-liberal hegemony is due less to their deficiencies than to the way in which they were only partially adopted within mainstream urban theory and public policy, both of which remained subject to an overriding concern with the process of private accumulation.

In Social Justice and the City (1973), David Harvey argues that inequality is inherent in the natural operation of the capitalist system. Capitalism possesses an inherent tendency to redistribute real income to the wealthy, thus generating inequality. Even redistribution from the rich to the poor via taxation does not eradicate such inequality, holding it in check at best. Market forces and public decision-making constrained by a business agenda generate a particular, asymmetrical urban geography that constrains organised and conscious efforts to achieve greater equality.

Harvey’s analysis opens Rawls to the charge that his principles of justice have inequality built into them. For Harvey, the principles of justice have great value in comprehending the connection between social processes and spatial form. Harvey proceeds to establish this connection by locating justice in the social matrix of an urban environment (Harvey 1973). This represents a ‘move from the predisposition to regard social justice as a matter of eternal justice and morality to regard it as something contingent upon the social processes operating in society as a whole’ (Harvey 1973:15). In particular, Harvey emphasises the way that space impinges upon resource allocation within cities and shapes the distribution of real urban income. Harvey thus develops Rawls’ arguments for justice in a much more explicitly socialist direction.

There is a need to tread carefully here. For the danger of Harvey’s position is that the universal ethic which the first part of this thesis has made central to an authentic public life could end up being relativised and fragmented according to class, material interests and power. That may or may not be useful in serving a political purpose but it would lose the whole underpinning of justice that is essential to public life. This is the strength of Rawls’ attempt to define principles of justice in abstraction from social context. Human behaviour and action motivated by class and material interest has a socially determined origin rather than a moral basis in universal principles.

Harvey’s main concern in defining the city ‘as a gigantic resource system, most of which is man-made’ (Harvey 1973:68) is to examine the capacity of the urban system to block the redistributive goals of social policy. Harvey argues that attempts at redistribution are frustrated by the unequal way that cities are structured, systematically skewing distributional outcomes.

Harvey is concerned to discover ‘how changes in the spatial form of a city and changes in the social processes operating within the city bring about changes in an individual’s income’ (Harvey 1973:54). Harvey draws attention to the way that the real income of groups in the city is affected by allocation decisions taken with regard to industrial zoning, public facilities, transport networks, the location of households and other such factors concerning the structuring of the city. Harvey’s point is that the continuous restructuring of the city has distributional effects which are not intended by the agents and that decisions should be taken with resource allocation more in mind. By taking account of these ‘hidden mechanisms’, Harvey permits the development of a broader account of real urban income than that contained in other accounts.






89 COMMUNITARIANISM – THE SOCIAL EMBODIMENT OF JUSTICE
This section examines the most sophisticated attempts to recover a liberal theory of community, social justice and the good life against the dominant conceptions of deontological liberalism. The argument concludes with an attempt to go beyond communitarianism to define an essentialist-associative mode of public life.

The ‘unencumbered self’, interpreted in terms of a monadic rationality and autonomous subjectivity, is too thin a basis for public life and community. So much so that liberals are searching for a more historically and socially grounded liberalism. Liberal theorists have attempted to resolve the impasse in the liberal-communitarian debate by making explicit ‘the full theory of the good latent within liberal practice’ (Galston 1982:627). Such theorists seek to define a richer, more historically and socially sensitive form of liberalism than that of Rawls. For such theorists, the conditions for individual autonomy are not attained merely as a result of protecting the individual against the interference of others. Further, for these theorists, is too simple to argue, as does Rawls, that the individual is free to pursue the good as s/he sees fit. Rights need to be considered as ‘fundamental components in the way of life of a community’ which is committed to certain forms of flourishing for all (Finnis 1980:222). This implies a community actualising a conception of the good life:





Finnis argues that the primary bond of society is a ‘shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community’ (Finnis 1980:220). Affirming individuality and sociality as two sides of the same coin, one may agree. Such an approach does not leave the character of these goods open to historical contingency. The Aristotelian influence is evident in the way that Finnis defines these goods according to a set of characteristics which distinguish the human species.

As has been argued with respect to the authentic public sphere, essential human potentialities and their realisation point in the direction of a specific mode of life enabling human flourishing. This universal human nature gives the world a certain moral order so that the plurality of goods pursued by individuals may be compatible. Communitarian liberals thus seek to develop a conception of the good in this manner, exhibiting the ‘rational’ concern to establish the unity of the freedom of each and the freedom of all. Thus Raz’s argument is predicated upon ‘the belief .. that personal autonomy depends on the persistence of collective goods, and therefore that the notion of an inherent general conflict between individual freedom and the needs of others is illusory. Though an individual’s freedom, understood as personal autonomy, sometimes conflicts with the interests of others, it also depends on those interests and can be obtained only through the collective goods which do not benefit anyone unless they benefit everyone. This fact, rather than any definition, undermines the individualist emphasis on rights’ (Raz 1986:250).

The attempt to secure the core liberal value of individual autonomy within a communal context is, however, undermined by the fact that, far from being of a genuinely universal significance, the communitarian solution offers an idealisation of community within a liberal framework. The communitarians are correct in emphasising that autonomy presupposes a collective social context. However, the failure to go beyond the public-private dualism has entailed claims for universality being invested in an impersonal realm raised above ethical and social plurality. This contains dangers of an overly moral liberalism that imposes a particular definition of community through the state, a definition that represents specific dominant interests rather than a genuine plurality of identities.

Given the modern process of differentiation and the way that it results in individuals adopting different, even contradictory, modes of reasoning in different contexts, the identities and loyalties of individuals are multiplied through the membership of groups. In the context of the liberal institutional separation of public and private, this situation means that no ethical code can integrate human life, in all its diversity, into one scheme of values.

Acknowledging the force of these points, Raz argues that autonomy presupposes a competitive pluralism which issues in a number of difficult, conflicting, choices: ‘Whatever a person does, he would irreparably damage one of the projects or relationships which he pursued or which shape his life’ (Raz 1986:366). For Raz, the morally good person tolerates the existence of such a dilemma in society as crucial to autonomy.

Raz has an important part of the truth in criticising neutralist and individualist liberalism. Autonomy is not a subjective creation but requires a community within which it may flourish in relation to others. The activities individuals pursue in defining themselves as individuals are shaped by interrelationships within a particular social context. Community supplies the social forms making the conditions for autonomy and its exercise – inseparable from each other – possible. Raz concludes that ‘for those who live in an autonomy supporting environment there is no choice but to be autonomous: there is no other way to prosper in such a society’ (Raz 1986:391).

As Raz argues, once social forms ‘enshrine sound moral conceptions’:





Reciprocity is built into social relationships so that, in acting in pursuit of private ends of personal benefit, the individual also achieves public ends of benefit to all. Private and public good coincide directly and not merely coincidentally (if at all) as in the market conception of liberal citizenship.

There are, however, some worrying features in Raz’s argument that identify his theory as liberal, as confining the ‘rational’ themes and values within the dualistic framework of liberal modernity. Raz makes a distinction between ‘personal well-being’ as a higher rational interest and ‘self-interest’ as a lower natural interest (Raz 1986:ch 9 295/7). Raz’s distinction reproduces the classic modern dualism of reason and nature, raising the former above the latter. This dualism introduces a potentially oppressive element in that it abstracts the good from real individuals. The problem is that, historically, there has been no other way of embodying the moralised liberal community that Raz envisages other than through the abstract unitary public of the state. The impersonal public of the state is the embodiment of the rational nature of human beings presiding over the private realm of personal, self-interested, appetitive interaction.

Walzer’s contribution to this debate makes clear the extent to which communitarian attempts to develop a liberal conception of the good have remained aspirational rather than having become actual. Walzer attempts to delineate a nonabsolutist approach to morality through the character and purpose of society: ‘Human society is a distributive community .. We come together to share, divide and exchange’. It follows that distributive justice is the moral problem that human societies must face (Walzer 1983:3). On this premise, Walzer defines his central thesis concerning the pluralist nature of the principles of justice – different social goods are to be distributed according to different principles and by different procedures (Walzer 1983:6). Whether distributions are to be considered just or unjust is determined relative to the socially creative meanings of the goods at stake (Walzer 1983:9). Societies are characterised by different spheres of justice which must be kept separate from one another: ‘Good fences make just societies’ (Walzer 1983:319).

Walzer comes to the connection of justice with equality and reciprocity between all human beings. Crucial to Walzer’s argument is the notion of justice as ‘rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts that constitute a shared way of life’ (Walzer 1983:314). Walzer defines philosophy in terms of the attempt ‘to interpret to one’s fellow citizens the world of meanings we share’, arguing that the meaning we share is an egalitarian society. Such a notion is implicit in our concepts and categories (Walzer 1983:xiv 320). The aim of this political egalitarianism is to achieve ‘a society free of domination’ (Walzer 1983:xiii). The sharing of a common life is impossible in conditions of domination (Walzer 1983:250n). Walzer this advocates a ‘complex equality’ that renders domination impossible; spheres are autonomous, with no one sphere dominant (Walzer 1983:19/20). 

Such a view implies a plural public sphere replacing the unitary conception of the public locked up within the abstract state. Walzer cannot, however, avoid connecting the public sphere with the state. Walzer admits that ‘the political community is probably the closest we can come to a world of common meanings’ (Walzer 1983:28). This appeal to political community reveals Walzer’s inability to proceed beyond the dualistic framework of liberal modernity, identifying the abstract public of the state as the realm of equality whilst preserving the diremption of the real private world intact. This betrays the tendency of ethical liberalism to have recourse to the state in order to impose an impossible moralised community upon recalcitrant individuals (Bellamy 1992:35 39 46/7 155/6). Walzer’s plural spheres ultimately derive not from the (self) representation of difference within the sphere of civil society but from liberalism’s abstract political community under a state monopolising the public sphere.

This same criticism applies to Rawls. Rawls argues that the final, highest stage of moral development is the morality of principles as abstract and above ‘contingencies’ (Rawls 1971:462/79). Rawls is not looking for a priori principles but for the moral sentiments that people espouse: ‘The social role of a conception of justice is to enable all members of society to make mutually acceptable to one another their shared intuitions and basic arrangements by citing what are publicly recognised as sufficient reasons, as identified by that conception’ (Rawls 1980:517). Rawls looks to ‘the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognised basic ideas and principles’ (Rawls 1993:8).

As with Walzer, such views seem egalitarian, pluralistic even. But, as has been seen, the individuals who articulate Rawls’ principles of justice are autonomous and disembodied subjects. With identity conceived in abstraction from the relation that each individual has with other individuals, it becomes difficult to conceive of activities which are genuinely other-directed. The connection between the pursuit of self-interest and overall social well-being is maintained only within the limits set by private property and contract. Yet, since there is no guarantee that self-interested individuals will acknowledge those limits, there is a need for an effective legal-institutional apparatus, based upon force, to constrain individual behaviour. Once more, the common purpose is located in the state rather than in the real community of everyday life. Even the communitarian Sandel concedes the necessity of justice in this legalistic-institutional sense since ‘we cannot know each other, or our ends, well enough to govern by the common good alone’ (Sandel 1982:183).

The problem is that the communitarians are themselves liberal and hence work within a dualistic liberal framework. Most important here is the reproduction of the institutional separation of the state from civil society, holding public and private apart. The objective of synthesizing the claims of the individual and the community is doomed to failure without a challenge to the roots of that dualism. The crucial task is to change the dualistic framework of the debate by confronting the roots of the antithesis between individual and community in the division of social space into public and private spheres. As a result of liberal institutional separation between the state and civil society, the public sphere becomes an impersonal sphere of rationality abstracted from a private world within which personal issues are confined.






90 DOUBLE DEMOCRATISATION – THE LEFT AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Historically, the ‘rational’ tradition of political philosophy has reached an impasse within the dualistic framework of liberal modernity. Whereas the Aristotelian concept of the polis evoked the image of an undifferentiated polity of self-governing citizens overcoming the distinction between rulers and ruled – a democratic ideal of government by, for and of the people – modern differentiation makes it seem that the institutional separation of the state and civil society, denying the identity of rule and self-rule, is the highest and final form of public freedom. Despite its anthropological shortcomings with respect to public life as creative self-realisation and self-definition, liberal institutional separation is claimed to be ‘the best we can hope to achieve’ (Levy 1993:111).

A number of contemporary democratic theorists (Held, Heller, Keane, Bobbio) make this institutional separation the condition of freedom and democracy. However, by showing how this institutional separation obstructs creative self-realisation, the attempt is made in this thesis to recover the classical politics of the good on the terrain of modernity so as to develop the possibility of a (post)modern polis democracy as a differentiated urban public of self-governing citizens beyond the dualism of rulers and ruled. This public life is rooted in the creative human essence and thus rests on an ontology of the good.

For contemporary democratic theorists, any possible socialism can achieve liberty and equality only on the basis of an institutionalised separation of the state from civil society. These theorists make ‘formal democracy’, based on rights, contract, pluralism, and representation and silence on substantive issues, the condition of democracy (Heller 1988:130/1). Any attempt to overcome this division of social space, replacing representative institutions by direct, participatory forms of democracy, issues only in statism (Pierson 1986:150/1). This amounts to a ‘startling rediscovery’ of liberal political theory by the Left (Aronowitz 1990:256/7) and upholds the formalised distinction of the state from civil society to provide the framework for legislative activity, law enforcement, rights, the protection of liberties, conflict resolution which is essential for democracy. Only with this centralised machinery in place can the Left proceed to democratise the state on the one hand and civil society on the other, keeping both processes and both spheres apart (Held and Keane 1984:176). Democracy has therefore to be ‘reconceived as a double-sided phenomenon: concerned on the one hand with the re-form of state power and on the other hand with the restructuring of civil society’ (Held 1987:283).

The problem is that the institutionally separated state, no matter how much it is democratised, cannot meet Held’s requirement that it be ‘free of the inequalities and constraints imposed by the private appropriation of capital’ (Held 1987:283). Held’s belief that capital can be publicly controlled (Held 1987:283ff) ignores the structural and systemic nature of the ‘private’ control that capital exercises over government and society (Marx 1975:166/9 173; Miliband 1965:280; Poulantzas 1972:245/6; McLennan 1989:253). The constraint free vision of democracy requires that Held’s ‘double democratisation’ be reformulated as a singular process which restructures the social relations at the heart of civil society, achieving the restitution to the social body of the social power alienated to the state and capital, overcoming the separation of the state and civil society in the process (Marx 1975:88/91). Against the determining power of capital, Held’s double sided democratisation looks exceedingly thin and ineffective and, as a substitute for the socialisation of the means of production ‘has had little concrete impact’ (Hirst 1994:14).

John Keane’s concern to develop forms of socialist public life accessible to individual agents has the merit of offering a counterpoint to the statist degeneration of socialism, envisaging an ‘extended process of decentralisation of decision making power to a plurality of public spaces’ (Keane 1988:8). This is a political strategy oriented ‘towards a “socialist civil society” of non-patriarchal public spheres that relate to state institutions only at the levels of criticism, negotiation and compromise’ (Keane 1984:256/7). This promising formulation is vitiated by the fact that Keane makes ‘the preservation of the institutional distinction between state and civil society’ the ‘sine qua non of democracy in complex societies’ (Keane 1988:25 27/8). Further, in being limited to holding the state ‘permanently accountable’ (Keane 1991:8), Keane’s public sphere represents a retreat from the ideal of the associative public discerned in the ‘rational’ tradition. Keane theorises power as something external, to be staked down and fenced in as potentially oppressive of the individual. Keane thus defines democracy as a ‘system of procedural rules with normative implications’, a ‘method’ which subjects governors to ‘procedures which enable others to question, rotate or sack them’. This makes power ‘secular and disembodied’ (Keane 1991:8 9).

The result is that Keane is cut off from richer possibilities in the definition of public life. Rather than having real public significance in expressing creative self-realisation and popular power, democracy for Keane is merely a ‘mechanism’ for ‘limiting the scope and haughtiness of state power’, a check that disembodies power, keeping it remote and under institutional control as a protection against abuse (Keane 1991:9/10 15). In reducing democracy to method and procedure, Keane reproduces the identification of ‘the public’ with the abstract state and cannot, therefore, revalue the public significance of the associational space of civil society. 

Whereas Keane limits civil society to having a ‘watchdog function’ in relation to the state (Lane 1995:144), there is a need to pay greater attention to the articulation between civil society and the state. Social centres within pluralist civil society need to be valued as more than intermediate associations which are autonomous of the state and whose functions are limited to holding the state in check. The fusion of the state and civil society need not entail administrative suffocation through the absorption of civil society within the abstraction of the state (Keane 1988:58; Habermas 1990:70) but implies an extensive public sphere in which politics is no longer extraneous to everyday life. Reabsorbing power back into society and reorganising it as social power implies a reduction in the size of units of control, offering a means of recovering the democratic ideal as popular rule and participation (Pateman 1970:2 110/12).

Keane offers his own version of this thesis in arguing that democratic reform ‘depends crucially upon the weakening of the power of the corporate and state bureaucracies through the establishment and strengthening of spheres of autonomous public life’ (Keane 1984:2). These ‘bureaucracies’ are better formulated in Marxist terms as alienated social power vested in the state and capital. This emphasises liberal society’s ‘unprecedented accumulation of unaccountable power in the state and economy’, ‘undermining sources of personal and traditional collective autonomy’ (Bowles and Gintis 1987:98/9).

Whereas Marx’s critique of alienation entailed legitimate governmental functions being restored to society (Marx 1974:210/1), the trend in the contemporary world is towards the corporate conquest of governmental tasks (McDermott 1991:116). The emergence of a new property system based upon the corporate form threatens to erase the roots of liberal democracy and create a ‘post-society’ as the final victory of private property over social and communal bonds (McDermott 1991:13 14 145). In restricting their aspirations to the completion of the project of liberal democracy, maintaining the institutional separation of the state from civil society (Sayers 1991:4), the ‘new democratic left’ (Keane 1991:17) becomes part of this process of corporatisation rather than offering a coherent and effective democratic response to it.

These same criticisms apply to Norberto Bobbio’s attempts to make democracy central to the project of the Left. Bobbio affirms democracy as ‘a much more subversive idea than socialism itself’ (Bobbio WS 1988:74) in challenging the traditional sense of power as something that flows downward. One can point out that this charge applies to party-state socialism rather than socialism as such. The crucial point, however, is that Bobbio affirms democracy in terms of the ascending theme of power whilst expressing a Weberian view of liberal modernity which involves a defence of rationalised social forms which systematically check ascending conceptions. Bobbio argues for the necessity of representative institutions, bureaucratic organisations and expert decision making in modern ‘complex’ society, thus ruling out the particular forms of direct democracy, revocable and binding mandates, referenda and popular assemblies (Bobbio WS 1988:47/84 109/110; Bobbio FD 1988:47/52). For Bobbio, the ‘excess of participation’ creates a ‘total citizen’ and ‘results in the political satiety and increasing apathy of the electorate’. ‘Nothing risks killing off democracy so much as an excess of it’ (Bobbio FD 1988:31). In defending a procedural definition of democracy, Bobbio confirms Schumpeter’s view that ‘the defining characteristic of a democratic regime is not the absence of elites but the presence of several elites in competition with each other for the votes of the public’ (Bobbio FD in Polity 1995:302/3).


These comments are directly relevant to the idea of extending and embedding the public sphere in the associational space of civil society. Bobbio notes the absence of democracy in the institutions of civil society. In schools, churches, factories and families, autocracy is the mode of government (Bobbio WS 1988:113). These various centres of civil power ‘are subject to no democratic control’ (Bobbio WS 1988:43). The extent to which key institutions are run on despotic principles indicates a severe limitation on democracy as a practical force within society. Thus Bobbio reconceptualises the franchise in order to place democracy within a wider social context, extending the number of places where individuals vote. Bobbio makes the case for the representative principle in extending the right of free organisation and decision from the political ballot to the basic units of practical existence, work, leisure, home, education. ‘The present problem of democracy no longer concerns “who” votes but “where” we vote’ (Bobbio WS 1988:114; FD 1988:56). 

Although this view implies the extension of public spaces practising a form of direct democracy, Bobbio confines this objective to representative forms. The problem is that Bobbio is acutely aware of the objective processes which currently block the operation of representative democracy as institutionalised in the state, let alone its extension – corporate power, bureaucratisation, technocracy, massification (Bobbio FD 1988:28/9). Bobbio acknowledges that the ‘representative state’ is something of a misnomer since the state consists of administrative and coercive apparatuses of an authoritarian, descending, secretive and hierarchical character which predate, and are largely insulated from, representative democracy (Bobbio WS 1988:82/3). The representative aspect of the state has never been able to make the authoritarian aspect ‘wholly submit to it’ (Bobbio WS 1988:83). Bobbio realises the futility of his argument even as he makes it: ‘We seek ever more democracy in conditions that are ever worse for obtaining it’ (Bobbio WS 1988:69).

Further, Bobbio’s argument fails to recognise that there is more to political participation and public activity than voting. Making it easier to vote on a whole range of issues is not the same thing as participation in public affairs. Bobbio criticises the ‘excess of participation’ only to seek the solution of contemporary undemocratic forms in the extension of voting in a number of social areas. The excess of participation that Bobbio criticises is not an excess of public participation but an excess of voting in the context of a dualism of the representative (enclosed in the state) and the represented (confined to civil society). To that extent, his points are well made. Yet he seeks to extend democracy in social life by extending voting. However, the democratisation of civil associations and communities to constitute an urban public sphere offers a richer conception of democracy than that conception which predicated a mass of isolated individuals on the one hand and the central state on the other hand, connected only by voting, physically, electronically or otherwise.

Bobbio is ultimately a prisoner of the descending conception of power as the only possible mode of government given the ‘complexity’ of modern society. Bobbio accepts the permanence of the hierarchical division of labour, the structural power of capital and the institutional separation of the state from civil society (Bobbio WS 1988:47/84). If these features of a rationalised social order are presumed, in Weberian manner, to be irrevocable, there seems precious little point in voting and precious little to vote upon. For these are the very forces which are responsible for blocking democracy and emptying the public sphere of political content.

To do better than Bobbio requires that what Bobbio depicts as the ‘two great blocks of descending and hierarchical power’, ‘big business and administration’ blocking ‘the democratic transformation of society’ (Bobbio 1988:57) be formulated in Marxist terms as the state and capital – alienated powers which are capable of being restituted to the social body and reorganised as social powers within the self-governing society. The attempt to revalue the associative space of civil society as a public sphere needs to be related to Marx’s practical reappropriation of social power. The democratic concept of autonomy and community integrated via active citizen participation, which this thesis articulates through the conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere, requires more than the atomistic model of democracy. Bobbio’s concern to democratise existing conditions by means of extending the principles of formal representation and rights has become progressively more dependent upon changing the material determinations and imperatives of a capital system based on a process of private accumulation and valorisation. The attempt to control a substantively uncontrollable system of production by political means is doomed to failure (Meszaros 1995:712/3; Reuschemeyer 1986:70). In arguing that ‘complexity’ would survive capitalist relations, Sayer shows the need to go further than property relations which merely concern the ownership of the title deeds to address the production relation itself. Common ownership is not enough to realise socialism. It is necessary to abolish the hierarchical division of labour and assume control at the very roots of production. Capital is a socio-economic metabolic system of control. It is the metabolic functions of society that need to be thoroughly transformed from the roots up (Meszaros 1995:729 737 981).

Contemporary democratic theory fails to grasp the extent to which socio-economic realities structurally and systemically deny liberal democratic principles. Like the old Keynesian reformists, the new democratic theorists fail to understand that the capital system is not a public domain subject to democratic control through conscious deliberation and decision making but a regime of private accumulation which imposes its necessity systemically (McLennan 1989:253). The roots of a project of democratisation are all the more flimsy given the tendency under transnational monopoly capitalism for the state to extend its intervention in the processes of civil society in order to secure the conditions for private accumulation and given the move to a corporate society in which a dictatorship of the clever – the managerial, professional, and technical class – is instituted under big capital (Haymer 1987:31/46; Cox 1987; McDermott 1991:16 68 201). Whereas an urban public requires what Marx referred to as legitimate governmental functions being assumed by society, the contemporary world evinces a trend towards the conquest of traditional governmental tasks by the corporations. This represents the corporatisation of the public business (McDermott 1991:116). This is part of the emergence of a new property system based upon the corporate form ‘erasing liberal society’ and the roots of liberal democracy and raising the prospect of a ‘post-society’, the victory of private property over society (McDermott 1991:13), moving from a factory Taylorism to a social Taylorism which organises, disciplines and trains workers on functional lines (McDermott 1991:14 145).

These points make it clear that the postmarxist ‘radicalisation of democracy’ (Heller and Feher 1988:34) fails to address the anti-democratic roots of the capital system (Hennessy 1996:228; Jameson 1996:20/1) and possesses a firmer basis when theorised as an associative public based upon the restitution of social power from the state and capital. One can be critical of the lack of structural analysis of capitalism in the liberal democratic Left’s rediscovery of the value of pluralism: ‘In terms of the politics of the newer Left, their model is little more than one of a pluralism of conflicting and cooperating interest groups’ (Fine et al 1984:9). The next section examines this claim in order to discern a more positive contribution to the project of the Left.


91 PLURAL AND SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY
In this book, the conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere attempts to locate the ‘rational’ themes connecting the realisation of the human ontology with the city and the state – the polis ideal – within the emerging postmodern political culture. This is to articulate the transition from monological modes of thought, organisation and action – characterised by top-down authority – to dialogical modes – characterised by bottom-up communication and interaction. The contrast between ascending and descending themes of power and government proceeds from a philosophical understanding of the connection of human self-realisation with a politikos bios. This perspective is employed to challenge the abstract systems of control that the state and capital impose in lieu of an authentic public.

In the process of this exploration, the case is made for a new approach to citizenship based upon a concept of an urban public sphere. This is a plural concept that overcomes the unitary conception of the bourgeois public that is instituted within the abstract public of the state. The public-private dualism that characterises liberal modernity is reworked via a relational conception of the self and the city. Such a view looks to overcome public and private bureaucracies in favour of an authentic public life that is coextensive with everyday social practises rather than raised above them as an abstract sphere. This realises the ideal of contemporary democratic theorists concerning ‘the establishment and strengthening of spheres of autonomous public life’ (Keane 1984).

From this perspective, the most promising aspect of the developments within contemporary democratic theory lies in the revaluation of the governmental significance of civil society. Civil society is conceived as something more than a non-state sphere dominated by capitalist corporations but rather as a sphere comprising a variety of institutions that are legally guaranteed and democratically organised. At the heart of this advocacy of a ‘reconstituted civil society’ is an aspiration for a ‘socialist pluralism’ (Pierson 1986:180). John Keane thus calls for a ‘socialist and pluralist civil society’ (1984) whilst Jean Cohen examines the possibilities for a new theory of civil society (Cohen 1983:184). Such conceptions entail the weakening of the controlling bureaucracies in private and public spheres in favour of establishing and strengthening spheres of autonomous public life. Cohen argues that civil society needs to be recovered as a sphere in which diverse emancipatory struggles proceed – race and gender in addition to class. This perspective needs to go beyond struggle, showing how the achievement of emancipation is constitutive of a new public. At this point the idea of a ‘civic culture re-emerges as a substantial issue’ (McLennan 1989:122). 

This is to define an ideal of revolutionary or radical citizenship as a social movement from within the demos as against the passive and abstract identity conferred by the state. The possibility of an urban public sphere grounded in social pluralisation and emphasising democracy as an inclusive category emerges through an attempt to establish citizenship as socio-political participation on the part of the demos, overcoming the regulation and exclusion of the state. The concept of citizenship contains radical potential in exposing the political failures of capitalism whilst enhancing the democratic rights of the people (McLennan 1989:122/3). 

In this sense, Marx’s argument for the restitution of social power alienated to the state and capital back to the social body implies not the extinction but the extension of public spaces so as to enable mass participation on the part of an active citizenry (McLennan 1989:124). Marx’s demand for the abolition of the state and capital is a call to end the depoliticisation of the state and to initiate the repoliticisation of society. This is not the end of politics (Polan 1984) but the relocation of ‘the political’, the political investment of society. Civil society is capable of incorporating decision-making procedures (Levine 1991:6/7 13/4 28). This conception invests social institutions with the political power previously monopolised, centralised and bureaucratised under the state. The repoliticisation of civil society roots the urban public in direct and immediate experience and removes the distinction between everyday life activities and the procedures and processes of political practice. With the reintegration of the alien power of the state into the social body, social control is extended and broadened rather than concentrated at a single point (Thomas 1994:18). The social roots of the unitary bourgeois public are thus replaced.

In such a public sphere, coordination is ensured by citizen discourse, association and interaction. This founds urban politics upon a substantive and participatory process that checks the development of a technocratic and bureaucratic politics that subverts citizenship (Habermas 1987:67 75/6). Technological and instrumental advance can be turned into human progress by being subject to the conscious control of a demos which has constituted itself as a genuine public. ‘A scientized society could constitute itself as a rational one only to the extent that science and technology are mediated with the conduct of life through the minds of its citizens’ (Habermas 1987:79/80).

A way has to be found of regaining democracy in its active citizen conception within modern conditions, conceiving democracy as a continuum of direct and representative forms, with power being located and exercised at the most appropriate level in terms of scale and competence.

Ralph Miliband is not prepared to push democratisation the whole way to participatory democracy as against representative democracy. Representation is inherent in all organisations above the immediate level and hence there will always be some distance between representatives and represented. There are, then, two questions – how this distance may be reduced and how representative and participatory forms may be combined (Miliband 1994:89).

Nicos Poulantzas is full on insight in pursuing the question of extended public spaces that are independent of the state power. Poulantzas does not reject representative or parliamentary democracy but considers its claims to be an unsubstantiated liberty. Without the parliamentary supplement, there is every possibility that direct democracy may degenerate into a divided economic-corporate structure that can be unified only externally via authoritarian-statist forms (Thomas 1994:160/1). The merit of Poulantzas’ position is that it avoids the old antithesis between a top-down politics based on existing representative institutions and a bottom-up politics based on direct democracy. Maintaining the existing state is a road leading to social democratic statism and liberal parliamentarism. Basing everything on rank and file democracy is a path that leads to ‘statist despotism’ or ‘the dictatorship of experts’ (Poulantzas 1978:256). Poulantzas’ ‘democratic road to socialism’ offers a way of ‘combining the transformation of representative democracy with the development of forms of direct, rank and file democracy’. Poulantzas defines the task:





Poulantzas avoids fetishising the state power by conceiving it not as a ‘qualitative substance’ but a ‘series of relations among the various social classes’. To win state power there has also to be a change in the balance of forces. This change must have a popular dimension, the result of ‘mass struggle’. The ‘democratic road to socialism’ does not imply the capture of state power as an event but is a ‘long process’ entailing the creation of ‘diffuse centres of resistance which the masses always possess within the state networks’, establishing ‘real centres of power on the strategic terrain of the state’ (Poulantzas 1978:258). Poulantzas offers an approach that shows how it is possible to constitute the public sphere from within society through the self-organisation and self-activity of the citizens. This forms the substance of a socially grounded plural public that goes beyond abstract state citizenship. This accepts the need for representation in complex democratic societies (Beetham 1993:40/53) but also looks to extend self-representation deriving from the active exercise of functional social power from below.

And this implies a differentiated system of mediated representation. By conceiving sovereignty in individual terms, so that political society is premised upon the agreement reached between sovereign individuals, the state is envisaged without the intermediary bodies which had characterised the corporate community of autonomous medieval cities. The challenge is to reconstitute this intermediation so as to envisage a public sphere composed of subsidiary civil associations of social groups and interests mediating the sovereignty of individuals. The individual is to be conceived as a member of intermediary bodies integrated within a common framework of public life.

This argument connects the postmarxist commitment to ‘a socialist and pluralist civil society’ (Cohen 1983:184; Laclau and Mouffe 1985:140; Mouffe 1988:32/4) to the notion of an associative public sphere rooted in civil society. But the Marxist understanding of capital and class emphasises the need to distinguish clearly between the less-than-pluralist contemporary civil society, structured by asymmetrical relations of power, and the ideal of a future democratic civil society, functioning as an authentic public sphere.

Against contemporary democratic theorists who argue that the institutional separation of the state from civil society is a condition of democracy, conceiving civil society as constituted by public associations actually represents a democratic advance (Postone 1992:173; Fraser 1992:133/4). For Fraser, a multi-sectored public sphere replaces the unitary concept of the public (Fraser 1989; 1992). The role of social representation is no longer assigned to the institutions of the formal political sphere, the state or ‘the party’, but proceeds through a differentiated public that comprises a multiplicity of forms. In speculating upon the form that the interimbrication of a plurality of competing publics may take against the single, overarching public, Fraser refers to market socialism (Fraser 1992:122/3 136). Much better in envisaging forms of self-management, interpublic coordination and democratic accountability is the conception of an associative public rooted in civil society, particularly in everyday urban reality.


92 THE ESSENTIALIST PUBLIC
This chapter examines the connection of an essentialist conception of human nature with the constitution of public life so as to ensure that there is no need to de-nature human beings in order to realise the rational city.


The Democratisation of Authority And Morality

In recent years, poststructuralism has problematised the unitary agency of liberal thought and the particular form that the subject takes in the political realm, the citizen capable of autonomous action. The crucial task in light of this development is to accommodate this postructuralist deconstruction of the rational-autonomous subject and unitary state within the comprehensive moral and political framework that the rational tradition justifies in terms of the coincidence of the freedom of each and the freedom of all. This is achieved by identifying the ‘rational’ ethic tying the freedom of each with the freedom of all as an intersubjective notion that also challenges the category at the core of the individualist liberal tradition – the universal citizen-subject. This section attempts to form a bridge connecting this intersubjective, relational character of ‘rational freedom’ with the emerging postmodern political culture.

Historically, Kant’s formal principles did not generate a new morality in practice but were instead employed to provide a framework for regulating existing activities. Such a morality is designed not to overcome self-interest but to constrain its effects within capitalist structures (Poole 1991:20/1). In this legal framework, the individual is divided between the command of duty and the imperative of self-interest, neither of which contribute to human fulfilment. The problem is that the moral tradition founded by Kant is ultimately agnostic as regards the possibility of the good life. A formal morality offers no moral criterion for distinguishing one way of life from another.

A way out of this impasse is to argue that the phenomenal world of the empirical self is not out of bounds for morality. Kant himself pushed against the boundaries he maintained between the moral and the empirical. The morality of duty is comprehensible in Kant’s terms only when it is placed within a larger framework designed to give meaning to individual existence. 

This larger framework implies a conception of the good that makes recourse to impersonal and artificial legal constraints redundant (Unger 1984:68). Unger criticises the liberal conception of society as only held together by rules. In liberal society ‘rules are the main devices for establishing order and freedom’ (Unger 1984:83/4). Unger refers to this as the ‘artificial view of society’ that requires the ‘coercive enforcement’ of laws. The absence of a ‘natural community of common ends’ explains ‘the importance of rules and their coercive enforcement’ in the liberal notion of public order. Such a society lacks a self-regulating and self-enforcing order since it is constituted by individuals and individual interests locked in perpetual struggle. As Unger argues, ‘the less one’s ability to rely on participation in common ends, the greater importance of force as a bond among individuals. Punishment and fear take the place of community’ (Unger 184:75). This points to the need to reconstitute public life through substituting cooperative relationships for antagonistic relations, enabling public interest to be generated from within civil society. 

The ideal of a public order that replaces coercion with reason begs a notion of the good that overcomes the subjectivity of values. The impartial and impersonal processes of legislation and adjudication central to liberal public order can be dispensed with only if objective values permitting knowledge of the true good were available. This begs the question as to whether a regime of substantive justice is possible (Unger 1984:93 98).

The contrast Unger offers between an order based on rules and an order based on values expresses a contrast between an abstract public life reduced to coercive order and a genuine public life constituted by citizen activity. The theory of adjudication and instrumental rationality is incapable of conceiving a way of keeping society together, ‘hence the need for rules and more rules’. ‘The study of substantive justice suggests an alternative hypothesis’ (Unger 1984:100 98).

On this reasoning, the strengthening of community within a conception of ethical relations connecting the freedom of each and all offers a means of overcoming impersonal and abstract systems of rules to create a genuine public life. The concept of the urban public sphere achieves social order through the realisation of that internal coordination of reason that exists as a normative ideal in the tradition of ‘rational freedom’. An authentic public life does not imply the dissolution of institutions and communities but their free and conscious construction, distinguishing between powers of domination and humane powers so as to constitute human solidarity (Heller 1989:320). Politically and socially, legal, institutional and systemic constraints and authorities are dissolved to form an authentic public life. Norms, values and constraints are internalised in the relationships between individuals, abolishing all spheres extraneous to these relationships. This conception builds upon the communal-relational core of the principle of rational freedom – affirming the unity of the freedom of each and all – to present a vision of the ethico-rational public sphere from within ‘rational’ philosophy and locating it within everyday life.

The argument looks to relate the urban public sphere to the attempt to create new mechanisms and structures in and outside the abstract state (Keane 1984:ch 5; Melucci 1989:ch 8; Young 1990:ch 6). This affirms that the ‘refusal of a unitary construct of citizenship as exhaustive of the political tasks of the present’ (McClure 1992:123).

The argument problematizes the central category of liberal political and legal theory, the universal citizen/autonomous moral subject. In the liberal conception, agency takes the form of citizenship, an identity assumed by the subject within the impersonal public realm of the abstract state. Rawls emphasises the rights of this citizen as a means of ensuring the freedom and equality of all persons. For Rawls, the category of universal citizenship thus exists as a mechanism of inclusion. The problem is that the assumption of universal citizenship organising political and legal institutions excludes those claims which do not apply to such a subject. Poststructuralism has problematised the notion of a rational, autonomous subject as the necessary form taken by political subjectivity in the liberal conception. Postructuralist perspectives are sceptical of the tendency to induce and assimilate all perspectives and claims, drawing attention to what is neglected or suppressed in the construction of this subject. Liberal political and legal thought is thus shown to possess a totalising character in instituting a closure around the public. The individual is divided between a public identity which is allotted in law on the one hand and lived experience as an actual individual on the other hand. Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ expresses metaphorically the boundary separating the ‘public’ from the ‘private’.

The split between the public identity assigned to the individual as an abstract state citizen and the lived experience of this individual defines liberal citizenship as a mechanism of exclusion rather than of inclusion. This split effects a closure around the public realm with respect to who is and who is not to count as a citizen. The Rawlsian conception of citizenship operates ‘as a mechanism, not of inclusion, but of closure’. It cannot, however, rest on this exclusion since it is constantly disrupted by the forces of ‘the Other’, forces which remain ‘beyond accommodation’ and haunt any attempt to close off the categories of the political realm (Barron 1993:xi).

Of particular importance is the way that liberal state citizenship atomizes public life for individuals. For conferring the dignity of citizenship upon the individual rather than incorporating the collectivities of which the individual may be a part precludes the view that individual identity is an achievement of inter-subjective negotiation between individuals in a social context. It also has the effect of devaluing the bodily and affective aspects of social existence by asserting abstract public identity in the form of reason over nature. Feminists have shown how the public-private distinction has served to deny women political rights precisely on account of this split between reason and nature (Pateman 1988 1989; Phillips 1991; Dietz 1992; Barron 1993).

The task is to affirm the heteronomous, plural, flexible, individual and material character of citizenship as a social-interactive-relational conception as against the autonomous, unified, fixed, collective and abstract character of liberal citizenship. The universal citizen of liberal thought has only an abstract identity. The radicalisation of the liberal category of citizenship via the postructuralist critique conceives a reworked citizenship that is able to incorporate the identities which fall outside the forms of liberal political subjectivity without thereby suppressing them. Citizenship thus becomes a genuine mechanism of inclusion. 

The task of specifying a mode of life which combines the mutual claims of individual and community needs to be strengthened by a concept of human nature which is able to suggest what is required for the realisation of that essence. This entails a philosophical anthropology that enables the connection of ‘true’ conceptions of individuality, democracy and community within a genuine public life.

The most influential versions of this argument in recent years are of an Aristotelian character, relying upon a concept of human well-being or ‘flourishing’. This argument affirms the social nature of human beings, arguing that a realised human life requires participation in a community so that individual well-being takes the form of what is necessary to maintain social life. Such arguments can possess conservative implications in identifying human nature with the character of prevailing institutions. Virtue theory, however, possesses radical political implications in placing the accent upon the realisation of essential human nature and can be employed as a critical tool by revealing the extent to which existing institutions and relations contradict the human ontology. Virtue theory affirms that individuals are political animals who can lead a truly human life only through public association and interaction, holding that individuals ought to flourish rather than merely exist or survive. This conception upholds a broader range of possibilities in terms of human capacities and needs.

Such views point to the creation of a public sphere rooted in human life activities as against the centralised impersonal state divorced from everyday society. Against overscale states and cities which are removed from individual comprehension and control and which involve patterns of life which contradict the human ontology, Martha Nussbaum identifies the growing turn from the overscale impersonal politics and formal morality of liberal modernity towards an alternative conception of public life:





Most important is Nussbaum’s distinction between Socratic and Aristotelian ethics, the former entailing an abstract, removed and disembodied ethics (Nussbaum 1986:195), the latter affirming the responsive intercourse of individuals and the achievement of happiness (Nussbaum 1986:361/2). Nussbaum identifies various things and capacities which form the essential core of a human life and which may serve as the basis for a common radical humanist project, from basic needs like food and shelter to cognitive capacities, affiliation, relations with nature. Nussbaum goes further to include conceptions of autonomy, cooperation and harmony, thus turning what had initially appeared to be a basic list into a substantial conception of the individual human being.

Since needs vary in different cultures, moral theory would seem to lack a universal base. Nussbaum denies the relativist implications of her argument by arguing for the compatibility of Aristotle’s particularism, the concern with the concrete, with universalism, the view that individuals in the same situation should act the same way (Nussbaum 1990:165/6). The virtue ethic reconciles both particularity and universality (Nussbaum 1992:9). Nussbaum argues that it is because this conception is essentialist that the accusation of absolutism and insensitivity to difference is mistaken: ‘it allows in its very design for the possibility of multiple specifications of each of the components’ (Nussbaum 1992:202/46). Nussbaum’s conception therefore accommodates difference and relativity but is not relativist since its core concept is cross cultural.

Nussbaum’s essentialism informs the attempt to define an associative and reciprocal public life in terms of a conception of the good. This conception integrates the philosophical, ontological and anthropological by socialising the ‘rational’ principles of reciprocity and interaction in the everyday life world and the relationships of individuals to each other. The public sphere is thus envisaged as a mode of life which provides a free and fulfilling existence for each and all as individuals, integrating individual and community in the process. The convergence between a form of social life and human flourishing is the condition of establishing an authentic public sphere.

The task of specifying a mode of life which will earn the assent of all individuals is a daunting one, particularly in the context of a modern pluralistic community. By affirming a concept of the creative human essence it is possible to envisage the public sphere as a specific form of human life which establishes the conditions for a conception of the common good. The associative public sphere establishes the grounds for a common life as the good life for all individuals in the diversity of their everyday activity.

93 FEMINISM AND THE CITY

Martha Nussbaum’s essentialist Aristotelianism is an attempt to integrate particularism and concreteness with universalism within a conception of human flourishing. Her argument has been used to develop a conception of the public sphere as an essentialist mode of life that socialises the ‘rational’ principles of reciprocity and interaction in the everyday life. This envisages a public life which is integrated with essential aspects of human nature and personal, hitherto considered to be part of ‘private’ life.

One appreciates here the existence of an alternative to modern liberal morality in Aristotle’s practical ethics (Flanagan 1991:180; Jaggar 1991:83; Code 1988:196; Nunner-Winkler 1984). But what is required is not a contemporary ‘communitarian’ form of Aristotelian ethics but a new morality and politics. This is what the relational subject promises in deconstructing the autonomous subject in modern moral philosophy – implying a completely different understanding of the ways in which subjectivity is constituted. The relational approach locates morality - and politics – in the social interaction and mutual practices of individual subjects possessing multiple moral identities. In opposing a mode of life to an abstracted institutional-systemic apparatus, the intention is to identify possibilities to deconstruct modernist moral philosophy, positing a subject that is not autonomous but is contextualised and constructed (Coward and Ellis 1977). This new morality/politics of experience offers the possibility of reconnecting the public sphere with multiple sources of identity which have been fragmented with abstract conceptions of the rational self.

Feminist theory has made a valuable contribution here. Nancy Chodorow has replaced the autonomous, separate self as the paradigm of selfhood with the relational self. ‘Differentiation is not distinctness and separateness, but a particular way of being connected to others’ (Chodorow 1987:257). Other thinkers have opened up consideration of the body and of emotional life as constitutive of self-identity (Kellerman 1975 1980; Boadella 1987 1988). These thinkers suggest the need to reconsider the place of the body and somatic experience within a modern philosophy and social theory largely shaped by Cartesian rationalism and the mind-body split (Turner 1984 1992).

For Murdoch, the rational autonomous concept of the subject is the source of the problem at the heart of modernist moral philosophy and is quite unable to grasp the complexity of moral life. Murdoch rejects the concept of the rational, disembodied individual in favour of an embedded, situated subject. Individuals ‘are not isolated, free choosers’ but are ‘sunk in reality’: ‘what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons’ (Murdoch 1983:49). 

Liberal moral philosophy abstracts from the moral practices of situated individuals to postulate a universal and absolute moral realm with such concepts as Kant’s categorical imperative and Rawls’ original position. The tendency of this modern liberal tradition has been to define a unitary morality within an abstracted public realm, excluding all other forms lying outside this realm as not truly moral. This hierarchical conception holds certain parts of the self to be ‘higher’ than other ‘unworthy’ or ‘immoral’ parts. This shows the repressive aspect of reason as an internalised moral compulsion in which individuals remake their identities so as to be better able to conform to externally regulated moral codes and standards. Such a morality realises only the attenuated self and does not enable individuals to trust themselves as moral agents in their social practices.

Hoagland rejects the concept of ‘autonomy’ as implying separation. In its place she proposes a definition in which the self is expressed in terms of relations with others, in terms of what she calls ‘autokoenony’, that is, self in community (Hoagland 1988:144/5). For Hoagland, it is by ‘attending’ to each other that individuals increase their own and each other’s moral agency (Hoagland 1988:115). The end of this ‘attending’ is not control or power as in the impersonal state public but empowerment and enablement (Hoagland 1988:137). In the relational conception, moral agency does not mean the exercise of ‘free’ choice – the ideal of the self-legislating, autonomous subject – but working within limits and recognising boundaries (Hoagland 1988:231).

What the concept of an urban public sphere offers here is the possible location of internalised boundaries within individual relationships as against institutionalised boundaries imposed externally. Differentiation is achieved through relations which establish connectedness without dependency (Keller 1986:161). Keller thus defines a ‘composite selfhood’ in terms of multiplicity without dispersion (Keller1986:163).

This view is suggested by Virginia Held (1984 1993). She argues the need for different moral approaches for different spheres of life. No single morality or public sphere can encompass the diversity of life. In line with this, Nancy Fraser argues for a multi-sectored public sphere that would replace the unitary concept of the public that dominates the modern liberal tradition (Fraser 1992:10/42). The need for multiple publics appears to be divisive only if it continues to be assumed that the public sphere needs to be founded upon a common identity. This liberal assumption is associated with the public-private dualism that opposes the rationality and universality of an impersonal-abstracted realm to the situated and contextual sphere of real individuals.

Carol Gilligan (1982) develops a morality of responsibility and care based upon the relationships that individuals have with each other. Most important is Gilligan’s argument that there is a ‘different’ moral voice that has been silenced by the hegemonic voice. This argument is extended in this thesis so as to rework the moral and the political as well as the boundaries of the public and the private so as to theorise a multiplicity of identities and hence underline the need for a multiplicity of publics connected to moral subjects who are related and situated rather than autonomous and disembodied. Morality is thus what individuals do in their interaction with each other, embedded in their social practices. Morality is an everyday practise, something active and ongoing in the everyday relationships of the urban sphere, not something objective and impersonal, invested in an abstracted legal-institutional apparatus.

Gilligan’s work is of universal significance in that the morality of responsibility and care is not particular to women but applies also to other disadvantaged and oppressed groups (Tronto 1987; Collins 1990). All share a commitment to reciprocal social relations. 

Rather than offer a distinctively feminist epistemology (Sandercock and Forsyth 1992), the argument that is developed here seeks to incorporate feminist themes so as to expand the planning perspective beyond technocratic approaches that merely apply scientific and technical knowledge via bureaucratic elites. This is to pay more attention to the ‘social policy of everyday life’ (Forester 1989). Knowledge is inseparable from the talking, listening, acting subject. Knowledge possesses an autobiographical component and is a social construction. The various kinds of knowledge must be shared through communication processes to construct meaning. Knowledge is a continuing process to be integrated with politics.

Communitarian thinkers have developed sophisticated critiques of liberal individualism which offer alternative conceptions of the relation of the individual to community. Feminist theorists have, however, demonstrated a much more critical attitude with regard to hierarchically organised traditional structures in the nation, family etc. As against traditional communal ties, feminists have sought to develop alternate models based upon more progressive communities such as self-help groups, trade unions, cooperatives (Friedmann 1989).

Whilst Richard Sennett has decried ‘the fall of public man’ (1977), feminist theory has been celebrating the rise of the public woman, developing an expansive conception of the public realm that includes women’s issues that had hitherto been confined to the private sphere. Any new politics that exists has been decisively shaped by feminist perspectives. The issues that feminist thought addresses are of direct relevance to urban politics and the urban environment, refashioning and reshaping both. These issues include the economic status of women, location and movement in the built environment, the connection of patriarchal relationships to capitalist relations, the relation between public and private life, the nature and extent of ‘the political’, modes of interaction and communication. The character and scope of the public realm has been correspondingly expanded. In challenging the conception of the public realm in liberal theory, feminist thinkers have criticised liberal theory for being silent upon and actually devaluing the political nature of the personal life. Feminist thinkers have also emphasised the fact that effective citizenship is conditional upon socialisation processes taking place in the private realm.





In defining an ideal of polis democracy on the modern terrain, relating citizenship to rights discourse by affirming the rational unity of each and all, this thesis conceives public life as a social movement from below. This chapter defines this project in terms of a conception of anarcho-Aristotelianism, relating anarchist conceptions of the Social City to the classical origins of urban studies. From here, the thesis examines the significance of new and urban social movements as agencies for the self-constitution of public life from within social reality.

With the demise of party-state socialism (revolutionary and reformist), the space has been created for the emergence of an autonomous social-ist politics operating on the terrain of civil society outside of the formal political sphere. Marxists have condemned the new social movements for lacking revolutionary content, for a middle class composition and orientation, for degenerating into an apolitical left liberal reformism (Smith 1994). One can, on Marxist grounds, question the structural capacity to act. Where is the structural capacity to transform society? Nevertheless, the values of self-management, direct action, mutual aid, cooperation and spontaneity are represented in the contemporary world not by the working class as such (still less by its party agency) but by the new social movements, the ‘peace and green movements, youth and student movements, women’s and gay movements, communalist and cooperative movements’ (Walter in Rocker 1989:xviii).

There is a danger of a ‘movementism’ here that reacts against conventional politics and the encroachment of the system world upon the life world but which nevertheless lacks the power to change either (Habermas 1994:111; Anderson 1992:279/80 319 324 325 327/31; Miliband 1994:59/60 61; Aronowitz 1990:xxv 60 62/4 66 67; Jameson 1992:55/6 378/9). The result is that a reformism from above comes to be replaced by a reformism from below, adopting a piecemeal approach that lacks the structural and organisational power to confront the class power and contradictory dynamics of the capital system. Bookchin admits that the new social movements, like the old workers’ movements, have shown a tendency to be incorporated by capitalism (Bookchin 1994:1).
In relating the recovery of the libertarian third stream of left politics within the postmodern political culture to the ‘rational’ themes of political philosophy, the term ‘anarcho-Aristotelianism’ is apposite. The perspective of anarcho-Aristotelianism succeeds in relating anarchism and its perspectives on urban governance to the normative philosophical roots of city studies. This view shifts anarchism away from a spontaneous, unmediated form of existence. Baugh’s reference to self-assumed obligation has clear affinities with the ‘rational’ attempt to secure a political order based upon the coincidence of the freedom of each and the freedom of all (Baugh 1990:103/4; Graham 1996:77). The development of anarchism in this direction would bring it more clearly within the older architectonic conception of politics away from the atomistic liberal conception.
Any reference to anarcho-Aristotelianism has to be qualified. The basic theme of rational philosophy deriving from Aristotle (and Plato) has been that of legitimising public authority. Throughout history, this has taken the form of codifying law and supplying norms for the state. The attempt to define an urban public as an anarcho-Aristotelianism extracts from this rational tradition of rightful authority a principle of the state that is expressed in terms of ensuring the coexistence of the freedom of each and of all, going on to argue that the principle can be realised only in the self-organising society. This is to turn the normative claims made to justify the state as a public realm against the actual empirical state as an institution that rests upon force. The institution of the state as a coercive organ superimposed upon society would be abolished in realising the principle of the state as legitimate authority concerned with the promotion of the common good.

This approach brings out the ‘anarchism’ which is implicit in the normative aspect of ‘rational’ political philosophy, revealing the good society as an historical possibility to be established by human beings in the social world of reciprocity, solidarity, cooperation and personal exchange as against the imposition of the common good through an institutional legal-political apparatus projects ideals as ideology. The idea of the perfect city or civic community is explicit in Plato and Aristotle’s politeia, in Aquinas’s corporate community, Rousseau’s moral order, Kant’s noumenological society and Hegel’s state as ethical agency. The ‘rational’ principle is ‘anarchistic’ in the sense that, in being realised, the perfect community is regulated through the self-rule of individuals rather than through the legal-institutional apparatus imposed upon less than perfect individuals living within less than perfect social relations.

Historically, the problem of political obligation has been addressed with respect to determining the legitimacy of the state. Whereas the terms of this obligation were too strict, with Hobbes’ permanent alienation, or vague, with Locke’s tacit consent, Rousseau’s originality lay in conceiving the coincidental moral transformation of the state and contracting members. Rousseau developed the democratic implications of liberal voluntarism and contractualism by giving consent an active, continuous expression. This poses the subversive question of how the state can be justified if individuals are able to govern themselves (Pateman 1985:2 12; Hoffman 1995:99/100).

Universalism and consent
‘The need for consent is fundamental for the founding of any universal society or indeed expanding any political unit that unifies once separate states. .. Consent, however, to be lasting, must rest upon common beliefs about the good life on which trust can be founded. Without this, unity falls to pieces. The problem of a formal freedom without any common belief to back it up is not so easy as it may seem to those who put a simple faith in liberty as an infallible means to unity. The use of force, even in the form of law, may become a substitute for the unity created by a common belief and trust which has for its object the conservation of the feeling of fellowship – without fraternity there cannot be liberty or equality’ (Waller 31).

Law – Self-assumed obligation – Reason and coercion
‘Law must deprive men of spontaneity and transform them into law-abiding machines. The more a society has a common faith in which it believes, the less the need to multiply laws… The more citizens feel their lives to be satisfying, the less law has to be introduced. Law is a last resort because it is based upon force. Crime, as often as not, is an expression of resentment – a rebellion against the environment. It may also be a relief from boredom and provide a pseudo sense of purpose. A regular police force was first introduced into this country at the time of the Industrial Revolution. As industrialisation has spread the force required to keep order never seems to have been great enough.
 Law as a means of compelling people to act in accordance with social needs is the measure of the lack of common faith and beliefs.. The British, more than most nations, have understood the threat to freedom that underlies the multiplication of laws. The immense increase in the number of laws since the war – so that only experts know the law on any particular subject – is a sad symptom of the breakdown in social life. The greater the destruction of the ties of kinship and the life of the local community, the greater the need for force and law. Medieval Europe, at heart, understood this dilemma as well as we do – or better. Christian Europe has always been haunted by the idea of a free society held together by Christian love. ‘Love and do what you like’ – said St Augustine’ Love universalises the feelings of kinship and translates organic feeling into a principle. To state a principle is not so difficult as to give it reality through feeling. Unless in harmony with human feelings a principle cannot be effective.

In practice, Europe has resorted to legalistic forms of government of increasing complexity and it has mistaken this complexity for civilisation. Complexity is now thought of as part of progress, whereas it is really regress. The teaching of Jesus indicates clearly that love reduces the need for law, so that where law has to be introduced – as it must be when people behave lawlessly – it is a measure of the failure to be a Christian society. To rely upon law is like relying upon drugs, chemical sprays, antibiotics etc to preserve health instead of improving the environment. The aim of every society must be to find beliefs that inspire people to do by consent what they are now compelled to do by law or coercion of some kind. The motive for reform must be to create the environment, the means, that encourage people to act voluntarily. Reform must make fraternity easier, as this is the organic basis of reason. As long as beliefs which people do not accept, or have come to doubt, rule a society, its citizens, as life becomes repugnant to them, as fraternity breaks down, have to be increasingly coerced or, alternatively, bribed. Bribery ends in inflation and bankruptcy. When such conditions become so obvious that we cannot any longer ignore them or sweep them away as temporary, a humanist revolt gathers pace beneath the surface of society, erupting in activities that have to be controlled by law or which cause public concern. By what ideas will revolt be shaped? Will they be an expression of reason?

The liberal ideal of law by force, belief by consent, as a simple division in society that guarantees fundamental freedoms, though an advance on the totalitarian state, has not worked in practice.. The Romans tried it from time to time and discovered how difficult it is to divorce belief from what people actually do. Liberalism in this form has tended to be an interregnum between the collapse of one belief and the establishment of another which legalises itself by force of law. The impasse would seem to be insurmountable. Is the history of society to consist of a never-ending series of temporary societies that succeed for a time in winning a measure of consent backed by law, but centred upon a ‘truth’ that is so partial that it is certain in the long run to provoke a humanist protest? Such has so far been the case: every society seems to have violated human nature. There are no sophisticated societies in the world today that look stable. We cannot revert to an organic or tribal society, yet the organised society cannot depart too far from the organic basis’ (33/4)
Plato – destruction of a traditional moral code and the inability to generate a new moral code.

The polis as spiritual as well as institutional, integrating ideal and real at the level of everyday social practices.

The question is to be resolved in favour of an associative public sphere conceived as a self-governing society embracing ‘rational’ political principles of reciprocity, interaction within a solidaristic everyday life world.

Approaching obligation in this manner suggests a need to develop the concept of anarcho-Aristotelianism by connecting the values and themes of ‘rational’ philosophy with the anarchist origins of urban planning. This connection is developed to define a democratic, non-authoritarian libertarian conception of social authority as against the subjection of the individual to a moral and political obligation which is codified and administered from above. The democratisation of authority is also the de-authorisation of morality and politics, detached from the state and invested in a rooted public sphere. This public sphere overcomes the cult of authority associated with the abstract public of the state.

There is no room in this public sphere for power to be projected above the level at which real individuals – not abstract state citizens – and real communities – not the abstract communities of the state and capital – directly exercise control. No cult of authority develops since power is grounded, no longer becoming independent of individuals. This achieves an integral mode of integration and coordination which overcomes the alien control of the state and capital. And it implies a functional democratic conception of authority which serves to ground individual freedom in a world of supra-individual forces.

In this manner, some non-individualist anarchists have been developing the ‘rational’ principle of self-assumed obligation as a non-coercive and non-authoritarian form of social authority. Maintaining that the primary duty of the individual is to preserve moral autonomy at all times issues only in a monadic freedom which serves to cut the individual off from freedom- and life-enhancing relationships to others. To acknowledge relationships is to recognise the need to determine the collective conditions of individual freedom. And this requires a principle of authority regulating relations between individuals. This affirms the ‘rational’ argument that cooperation between individuals expands the scope of individual action and initiative as a collective form of self-empowerment proceeding through free agreement and association. ‘Through the creation of social relationships of reciprocal obligation, free association gives expression to and reaffirms human solidarity’ (Graham 1996:76). The idea that association, solidarity and cooperation, far from threatening individual autonomy, are actually crucial to autonomy in developing individuality through relationships emphasises, against the individualist ideal, that freedom is not the absence of constraint but a social relationship between individuals (Graham 1996:77).

Further, ‘richly articulated’ relationships educate the individual into ‘moral probity, self-awareness and social commitment’ so that ‘each person acquires the competence to manage social affairs directly’ (Baugh 1990:104/5). Legal rules enforced through coercive sanction are replaced by morality as practised within individual relationships (Baugh 1990:106). Importantly, obligation is not reified so that it is owed to an institution, ideal or law. The free association of individuals for purposes of collective decision creates horizontal ties of political obligation with each other as opposed to vertical ties with some separate body raised above them such as the state (Baugh 1990:104/5). The point is relevant to the constitution of an urban public sphere embedded in associative civil society to replace the centralised, unitary conception of the public within the abstraction of the state. Political obligation resting on voluntarily created horizontal ties requires a ‘more fluid, less institutionalised conception of direct democracy’. Rather than ‘one general assembly having jurisdiction over all those in a certain area’ there will be a ‘multiplicity of political associations’ responsive to changing needs and interests (Baugh 1990:105).

In the associative public sphere, individual citizens collectively legislate the rules of their association, are bound by these rules but may also modify them. Rather than exchange obedience for the protection of the state, as in the social contract tradition, active citizens create ‘reciprocal relationships of obligation in their collective undertakings and social life’ through voluntary action extending from the workplace to the community (Graham 1996:78).

Whereas Anglo-American individualist liberalism limits the public realm of the state so as to protect personal liberty, the rational conception recognises that freedom is something that proceeds reciprocally, through mutual bonds. Marx rests the universal ethic upon the realisation of the species being which is common to all individuals. In this conception, other individuals are not conceived as active obstacles to individual freedom but as integral to this freedom as self-fulfilment. Morality and politics comprising public life become practises of freedom within everyday relationships, each individual becoming equipped as citizens able to participate in the social regulation of common affairs. Obligation achieves universality whilst becoming a reciprocal conception practised within real relationships. Political obligation and morality cease to be abstract codes enforcing universality via the legal-institutional sphere but are situated within the interactions of individuals within definite social contexts. The cult of authority, institutionalised as law, can be dissolved in favour of possibilities for free action, initiative and association. Where once social coordination had to be imposed from above, the reciprocal conception affirms a voluntary mode of integration that is situated on the level of everyday social practices. The cult of authority, institutionalised as law, can be dissolved in favour of possibilities for free action, initiative and association. Where once social coordination had to be imposed from above, the reciprocal conception affirms a voluntary mode of integration that is situated on the level of everyday social practices. This offers a means of integrating a modern complex society through free exchange and association, solidary self-regulation, with a minimum of coded obligation and a maximum of initiative within a broad, participatory political structure which connects individual activity with the good of the whole. The question is how to organise a decentralised public life around these themes by identifying possibilities for free association, self-determination, interaction and solidarity in the modern rationalised world.


An instance of how such ideas concerning an anarchistic conception of the public sphere can be developed is provided in the work of Murray Bookchin. Bookchin explicitly connects anarchist communalism with the old civic or municipalist political tradition: ‘What should unite anarchist theories and movements today is not only their defense of society against the state but a commitment to participation in municipalist politics in its classical civic sense, and additionally .. an attempt to create a popular confederal counterpower to the nation state’. Arguing that anarchism abolishes all hierarchical relations to achieve a free and rational society, Bookchin proceeds to distinguish a civic, confederal politics based on direct democracy from the state. Bookchin argues for a ‘community movement and a civic political culture based on the coordination of human scaled municipalities along confederal lines’. Advancing municipal confederations against the nation state and direct democracy against representative republics, Bookchin defines a ‘practise of citizenship within a new public sphere’, a ‘new politics’ proceeding from below as a process of consociation, self-activity and self-management (Bookchin in Ehrlich 1996:27/9). Such a politics reaches back to classical roots in identifying the ethical and command components of contemporary issues. And Bookchin’s argument is directly relevant to the conceptual formulation of an urban public sphere assuming governmental power from the abstract state. Such a notion involves ‘the recreation of a new public sphere as a civic, confederal counterpower to the state, structured around an institutionally new politics (to use the term in its Hellenic rather than its parliamentary sense) based on directly democratic institutions and full public participation’ (Bookchin 1996:24).

This conceives the creation of a public or civic sphere against the state, fusing political and social relationships in an urban sphere practising an active citizenship. In this respect, one can refer to a ‘social anarchism’ founded upon the federation of free, autonomous and self-governing cities. This would achieve a ‘flourishing civic awareness’ (Purchase 1990:10) within a civic community in which the city, the natural unit of organisation, becomes a public body of active citizens (Bookchin 1995:173ff).


Social anarchism has expressed itself in terms of self-governing communes as the basic unit of social organisation (Neville 1990:5). The general meeting or assembly in the new town brings these units together. The unit of organisation is small scale and hence enables active participation as citizens. The federation of these units occurs at city, regional, national and international levels. Delegates participate in the federal bodies and are mandated by the groups who delegate them. Such delegates are not professional politicians ‘representing’ a mass, passive constituency but participate in federal bodies as fully accountable to the groups who send them.






Davis, Soja et al depict the large postmodern city as a vast anonymous space, a violent, polluted, noisy prison-like environment that enforces segregation and symbolises social inequality. This nightmare vision begs an alternative conception of the city. There is a need to identify the forces and trends for an alternative future, allying the goals of urban life with the forces for their realisation. Accenting the normative philosophical vision makes it possible to project possibilities and principles for a humane urban fabric for cities. Proceeding from the classical awareness of the necessity for creating a politikos bios for human self-realisation, the argument in this book has traced the evolution of the rational conception of the city through the processes of modernity. Underpinning the argument has been an anarcho-Aristotelian thread which has been concerned to detach a genuine public realm, rooted in the everyday social life world of individuals, from the abstract, centralised state. Such an approach emphasised Hegel’s Sittlichkeit as containing possibilities for a civil public. This possibility was shown to build upon Rousseau’s conception of small town democracy as an alternative to the dominance of big cities within the centralised nation state. Such a civil democracy requires the active exercise of sovereignty and hence the existence of participatory strictures and social transparency.

Rousseau and Hegel were applying classical insights on the modern terrain. For classical political philosophy, the city rather than the state is the central institution. As Strauss argues, the greatest political philosophers, from the classical period to the eighteenth century, justifiably preferred the city to the state in the light of the standards of freedom and civilisation (Strauss 1988:65). Classical political philosophy possesses an anarchical strain in that it preferred the city to the centralised state as the key form of political association. The question from this perspective becomes how to resolve the themes of political philosophy into the everyday urban terrain.

This approach to philosophy and urbanism was lost as the emancipatory potential reason came to be actualised as a repressive rationalisation associated with the large central state and bureaucratic forms of organisation. 


In rooting a conception of the urban public sphere in ‘rational’ political philosophy, a good deal of attention must be given to the anarchist and utopian roots of town planning. The profession of town planning has its origins in the visionary ideas of anarchist and anarchistic thinkers. The professionalisation of planning resulted in its bureaucratisation and its depoliticisation, obscuring the origins of planning so as to suppress the visionary impulse. 

The origins of modern urban planning lie in the public health, utopian reform and aesthetic movements of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The inherent anarchism of much of this thinking came to be suppressed as the urban ideal was detached from its origins and made the subject of bureaucratic state activity as a result of the professionalisation of planning. Peter Hall opens his Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century with reference to ‘The Anarchist Roots of the Planning Movement’. He argues that in the process of translating the ideal into reality there occurred ‘a rather monstrous perversion of history’. Investigation of the future possibilities for the city must make reference to the remarkable insight that anarchist visionaries like Kropotkin, Patrick Geddes and Ebenezer Howard showed into the profoundly decentralising tendencies of modern society. The original anarchist vision was not merely an alternative built form but an alternative society, a society that was neither capitalist nor bureaucratic socialist. This would be a society based upon voluntary cooperation between individuals, working and living in small self-governing commonwealths. The problem is that, in the absence of a large, self-organising, self-acting social movement, ideals could only be translated into reality through the agency of the state bureaucracy, resulting in a perversion of a vision of freedom into its opposite (Hall 1996:3). 

There are some critical points to establish concerning the origins of town planning. The original planners adopted a holistic approach against a narrow specialisation that separates the urban environment into distinct disciplines. Instead, physical layout and architecture, spatial organisation, geography and economic functions are integrated within the political, social and ecological issues relating to the quality of urban life. Le Gates and Stout are correct to argue that ‘the utopian visionaries were more than just planners, if they can be said to be planners at all… Together, the utopian modernists concerned themselves with great philosophical issues such as the connection between Mankind and Nature, the relationship of city plan to moral reform, and role of urban design and technologies to the evolutionary transformation of society. It would be left to more practical men and women – the actual members of the urban planning profession as it developed in the twentieth century – to address the real world problems of ever changing cities and metropolitan regions’ (Le Gates and Stout 2000:297).

The utopian and anarchist origins of modern urban planning express a moral and holistic approach to creating the ideal or good city. The anarchist pioneers based their conceptions upon larger philosophical issues concerning the human ontology and the appropriate regimen for human nature and the realisation of ethical, communal, associational potentialities. This was a question of the quality of the relationships between human beings, something which cannot be reduced to institutional reforms. The holistic approach sought to establish the relationship between human beings and their environment, between individual and community, on a new basis. The pragmatists appropriated the ideal but lost the total vision. They lacked an idea of progress as anything other than bureaucratic implementation.

Urban thinkers and planners like Howard, Geddes, Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier and Mumford have addressed the relevance of utopian themes in a modern urbanised society, demonstrating how towns and cities of humanly scaled but still substantial dimensions can be realised in urban-industrial societies. Some, like Howard, looked to establish new towns. Others, like Le Corbusier, sought to transform existing cities. Either way, the way that urban planners addressed the problems of scale, quantity and complexity in urban society has made a powerful, and largely neglected, contribution to the transformation and redefinition of the character and scope of ‘the political’. Rejecting the conception which identifies politics with the formal institutions of the state, the town planning tradition makes it possible to rethink the public sphere in terms of the relation between urban society, urban governance and politics.

The question of what constitutes a good environment is not simply a physical question but a political and, indeed, moral and anthropological one. The contemporary experience of urban degeneration needs to be addressed in its fullest, holistic sense. The physical decline in modern industrial cities is a problem of changing economic relations and also of overscale. The cost of maintaining such cities, let alone regenerating them, is beyond the fiscal capacity of even the wealthiest and most technologically advanced nations. The problem is beyond economic and instrumental solution, beyond the bureaucratic fixes of public policy. From this awareness stems the need to re-think the involvement of the community and the quality of urban relationships so as to envisage towns and cities being re-invigorated from within. This amounts to the recovery of a central theme of the utopian and anarchist planners, placing the primary focus upon the contents rather than upon the container.

For these reasons, the utopian and anarchist roots of urban planning need to be re-connected with politics and political philosophy so as to envisage a public sphere rooted in a humane mode of life. Although the affairs of everyday urban reality do not fall within the conventional definition of politics, this separation of the political sphere from the social world of real individuals is questionable. In terms of the ‘rational’ themes of normative political philosophy, as concerned with the appropriate regimen for creative human self-realisation, politics should not be confined within formal political institutions but should embrace a broad anthropological concern for such issues as physical layout and design, the quality of the urban environment and the quality of relationships within urban space. The conventional concern in political theory with the forms and institutions of government, decision-making and laws, with elections and the role of parties, conceives politics only in its most formal aspects, aspects which people are often least interested and involved in. The overemphasis upon the formal institutions and activities of politics serves to neglect and even devalue the everyday social roots that feed politics and which constitute the main life activity for most individuals. The crucial questions of everyday life have little direct connection with the formal political sphere and little relation to party allegiance. But the questions of work, housing and transport, of local amenities, of green spaces, the balance between town and country, the architectural design and aesthetic experience within the living spaces of individuals are of direct relevance to these individuals and much more politically significant to them than periodic elections to decide between predetermined choices. In seeking to address the disillusionment with ‘mass politics’ throughout the liberal democracies of the western world, political theorists need to find a way of reconnecting politics with the everyday realities of urban society.

For Neville, the criterion for anarchists is simple: ‘Do they accept the authority possessed by the state as the essential prerequisite for the maintenance of social order? If so, then they are of the authoritarian camp’ (Neville 1990:5). There is a need to qualify this stark antithesis since it is possible to distinguish a principle of authority from the institution of the state, locating this principle within the reciprocal relationships of individuals so as to enhance individual freedom. This does indeed affirm that social order can be generated from within the social body without the need for the coercive regulation of the state. To take this approach is to reject ‘legal fetishism’, the idea found in most liberal theory that legal systems are an essential component of social order and civilisation. This is the thesis that a legal order is the necessary basis of a social order: ‘unless there is a system of laws designed to ensure compliance with a set of rules which define rights and entitlements then no civilisation is possible; if laws and legal institutions were abolished, anarchy would immediately break out’ (Collins 1984:10/1). This legal fetishism inverts the true relation between the two spheres. The political-legal order is the product of social relations rather than vice versa, however much that political-legal order regulates those relations. To challenge liberal legal fetishism requires that the conditions for self-regulating social intercourse are specified. The perspectives discussed in this section all show ways of constituting social order from below, from within decentralised communities.

Anarchism promotes the freedom of the individual as something circumscribed only by the active and voluntary consent of the individuals concerned. Anarchism aims ‘at the replacement of the authoritarian state by some form of non-governmental cooperation between free individuals’ (Woodcock 1977:11). Condemning representation as an alienation of individuals’ responsibility to other individuals and to institutions, anarchism seeks to arrange the determination of common affairs through arrangements which enable individuals to participate directly in issues of concern, reaching decisions with other individuals (Berkman 1964:31/2 37). ‘The anarchist “commune” is a community of people attempting to create relationships and institutions based on an organic, ecological, cooperative view of existence’ (Clark 1996:94).

Citing Martin Buber, Clark calls for a communitarian praxis which replaces the inhumane, bureaucratic, objectifying relationships created by the state, capital and high technology by personalistic, cooperative relationships arising in the primary communal group. The argument assumes an Aristotelian character in the call for an organic commonwealth built not out of individuals but out of small communities to form ‘a community of communities’ (Clark 1996:94). In a ‘social anarchist framework’, revolution is a ‘process’ which integrates means and ends in pursuit of the ‘good society’, experimenting with principles and forms of social organisation (Ehrlich 1996:332/3).

With increasing disillusionment with formal political institutions, there is a need for a new political vision beyond liberal capitalism and state socialism: ‘these systems, with their deep commitment to such values as industrialism, high technology, centralism, urbanisation and the state, have been instrumental in creating the social atomisation and ecological imbalance which are at the core of these crises’ (Clark 1996:85).

Ebenezer Howard’s Garden Cities is a crucial book for tracing the development of utopian and anarchist ideas into town planning. Peter Hall describes Ebenezer Howard as the ‘most important single character’ in the history of urban planning (Hall 1996:87). Howard’s Garden Cities was originally published under the title of Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform. This original title underlines the extent to which Howard was more than an urban planner but was a social visionary. Howard’s Garden City idea presents a holistic vision which seeks to unify the whole range of urban issues in a single comprehensive vision. The Garden City idea recalls the small town democracy presented by Rousseau. Howard sought to limit the number of inhabitants to around 32,000, to ensure exchange between city and country, and to establish the centring of cultural institutions. Howard envisaged ‘a group of slumless, smokeless cities’, cooperatively owned and controlled. The built up part of the Garden City would be surrounded by a much larger green belt.

In the opinion of Lewis Mumford, Howard’s Garden Cities ‘has done more than any single book to guide the modern town planning movement and to alter its objectives’ (Mumford in Howard 1965:29). For Howard, urban planning is a cause, a social movement which mobilises popular support. As an ideal, the Garden City is worthy of support. It envisages a compact society combining rural and urban poles within human scale.

Howard and Green Cities
‘We generally think that a city is a city: if nature is going to get in, a special place (such as a park) will have to be reserved. This premise is rejected by proponents of the ‘ecocity’ – a city that would not be a city in the usual sense, for it would welcome nature in its every nook and cranny’ (Eden 372).
 ‘A good network of wildness should have in it the seeds of self-expansion. Linkages should bring wildness into the heart of the Tower [city]; they should also help restrain or turn back the Tower’s own relentless self-expansion. The kind of greenway known as greenbelt is exactly that: a green belt that holds back the gluttony of the city, for its own good as well as nature’s.
 Perhaps the first greenbelt bylaw can be found in Numbers 35, in which the Children of Israel are told to give the Levites cities with ‘open land’ about them ‘ from the wall of the city and outward a thousand cubits round about’. The open land would be pasture ‘for their cattle, and for their substance, and for all their beasts’. God was not singling the Levites out in this respect; he was just making sure their cities would have what most ancient cities had’ (Eden 405).
‘In 1898, alarmed by this juggernaut and hoping to reclaim the balance between nature and culture that small cities of the past had known, Ebenezer Howard published the book that would later be known as Garden Cities of To-morrow. Fleshed out with social theories and economic projections, Howard’s basic ideas were two: First, that a small, collectively and flexibly planned city, partly industrial but girdled with an ample, inviolate belt of farmland, would be, for most modern people, the perfect place to live. Second, that when cities start to swell beyond their ideal size, they should spin off satellite cities to which they would be linked by rail lines.
 Just as the first idea had its origins in the ancient world, so did the second. Growing Greek cities routinely gave birth to daughter cities, though mostly at a colonial distance. Roman planners too would found new cities when old ones got too fat (a regimen never imposed on the city of Rome itself). The idea did not exactly die in the Middle Ages, which was after all a time of busy city-founding, but it did lose much of its rigor. Leonardo da Vinci in his notebooks conceived a plan for relieving the overcrowding of Milan by building ten cities of five thousand houses and thirty thousand inhabitants each, with horse and foot traffic kept apart, and with gardens watered by municipal pipes’ (Eden 406).
‘The plan has been a great success – in some ways, too great a success. Industry has thrived in the New Town ring, drawing population not only from London but from other parts of the country. The shift toward a service economy keeps much of the jobs growth in London, and the rail system is so good that a commute of forty or fifty miles is considered a trifle. Between these factors and the postwar baby boom, the New Town ring (to say nothing of the ring beyond it) has gotten far more crowded than the planners planned. Though the New Towns have – as Howard hoped – their own greenbelts about them, many of the older towns (Reading, High Wycombe, Luton, Bishop’s Stortford, and so on) are now ringed with their own miniature suburban sprawl’ (Eden 407),
‘In wilder America, a greenbelt can give city folks access to correspondingly greater wildness – as in Portland, Oregan, whose citizens live cheek by jowl with elk, bald eagles and Chinook salmon’ (Eden 407).

Howard characterises his Garden City as the ‘Social City’. Howard’s famous diagram of the Three Magnets is an attempt to show how the best features of town and country can be combined in a new kind of settlement, Town-Country: ‘Town and country must be married, and out of this joyous union will spring a new hope, a new life, a new civilisation. It is the purpose of this work to show a first step can be taken in this direction by the construction of a Town-Country Magnet’.

To bring this new settlement into existence requires that a group of individuals, including people of commercial competence, establish a limited dividend company, borrowing money so as to set up the garden city in the countryside. Buying land that is far away from the city, and hence is at a relatively low price, agreements should be sought from industrialists to relocate their factories there. The Garden City would have a fixed population limit of 32,000 people and these would live on 1,000 acres of land. This ratio would be one and a half times that of medieval London. Around the Garden City would be a larger area of permanent green belt, also owned by the company. Howard proposed 5,000 acres which would contain all the institutions of the Garden City. This greenbelt would serve to limit growth and provide land for both agricultural and recreational purposes. All land is held in trust and rented to occupants (Howard 1965).

As people moved out of the old cities and into the Garden City, the planned population limit would be reached. At this point, another garden city would be created. This process would be repeated as limits continue to be reached. In time, a planned agglomeration would be developed, extending as limits in each garden city are reached. Each garden city would evince a wide range of jobs and services, being connected to all other garden cities by a rapid transit system, an inter-municipal rail system. Technological innovation has a profound impact upon industrial location, pointing in the direction of small scale workshops. This means that the garden city would make available all the social, economic and cultural opportunities of the large city. This polycentric vision was given the name of the Social City by Howard. And it is this holistic vision of the planned agglomeration of garden cities, not the individual garden city as such, which amounts to the realisation of the Third Magnet, the Town-Country.

Howard did not merely offer a blueprint of the physical city. The last words under the Third Magnet were FREEDOM, CO-OPERATION and these reveal the moral and political vision integral to the plan. Howard was more interested in social processes than in the physical form. On this he compares with Mumford, for whom the contents are more important than the container.

Howard’s Third Magnet is thus not merely a garden city but a ‘third’ socio-political system, distinct from and superior to individualistic free market capitalism and bureaucratic state socialism. At the heart of this new system would be local management and self-government. Services within the new order would be provided by the municipality or by private contractors, dependent upon which proved the more efficient. Other services would be provided by people themselves in a series of pro-municipal experiments. For example, individuals could build their own homes with the aid of capital provided by building societies, friendly societies, cooperative societies or trade unions (Hall 1996:94).

Howard understood reflationary economics as a solution depression long before Keynes’ General Theory. The merit of Howard’s view, however, is that his approach did not envisage large scale centralised intervention via the state. Rather, Howard’s plan was to be realised through a web of small scale enterprises in which each person would be a craftsperson or an entrepreneur. This would require ‘for the very highest talents of engineers of all kinds, of architects, artists, medical men, experts, surveyors, builders, manufacturers, merchants and financiers, organisers of trades unions, friendly and cooperative societies as well as the very simplest forms of unskilled labour, together with all those forms of lesser skill and talent which lie between’ (Howard 141). This is a vision of homesteading combined with new technology to bring into existence a new social order.
 Howard was not alone in believing that technological innovation would have a profound impact upon industrial location, facilitating the dispersal of population and industry. In the Probable Diffusion of Great Cities, an essay from 1990, H.G. Wells envisaged the deconcentration of people and resources from the large cities to decentralised ‘urban regions’. Such a development would render the city as ‘obsolete as a mailcoach’. Wells predicated his anticipation of the decentralised region upon the emerging networks of communication and transportation.

Wells envisaged the ‘urban region’ of 2000 as a series of villages consisting of small homes and factories in the open fields and connected by high speed rail transportation throughout the region. The old cities would come to be divested of their financial and industrial functions as productive activity came increasingly to be located in the decentralised urban region.

The problem is that the ideal came to be implemented through bureaucratic imposition, thus suppressing the anarchist impulse underlying the argument made by Howard. And there is even a sense in which Howard invited the identification of urban rationality with structural design, an identification which issued in the distorted institutional realisation of the ideal. 

Howard identified town planning as a social movement for the reform of society; his concern was not the narrow one of design. Nevertheless, there are a number of objections to Howard’s position. For in his concern to discover a peaceful path towards social transformation, Howard makes political tasks concerning the alienation of social relations and economic organisation the responsibility of design. As a structural design, Howard’s Garden City is appealing. And it is as a structural design that it is to be evaluated. Howard attempts to design into his project greater opportunities for human consociation, structural instruments for interaction and community, attempts to facilitate easy communication between home, work, shopping and leisure.

As a design project, Howard’s Garden City has the form of the good life whilst being silent on its content. The nature of human consociation, community and communication is treated as secondary to structural design, as a consequence of good planning rather than as integral to good city. Most damaging for a project that replaces politics with design, Howard avoids the problem of social conflict and competing interests. What little Howard does say here savours more than a little of a benevolent, even a paternalistic, capitalism which purports to occupy the middle way between the ‘extremes’ of ‘communism’ and ‘individualism’ (Howard 1965:90 113/5). Such a conception locates itself in the crowded terrain between free market capitalism and state socialism and opposes a piecemeal do-it-yourself reformism from below as an alternative to Fabian bureaucratic reformism from above. What it doesn’t offer is a revolutionary politics to match its social aspirations, connecting the ideal with the forces and processes for its realisation. Instead, it invites a pragmatic reconciliation with the institutions and profession of a substantively irrational society, as though irrational social forces can be tamed and rendered benign without social transformation.

The problem lies in the assumption that town planning can proceed in abstraction from the social relations of production. Such a view implies that the Social City could be built on the foundations of an alienated system of production. Howard’s approach leaves the question of the character of the means of producing and reproducing social life unanalysed, ignoring the conflicts endemic to the relations within which office developments, factories and shopping centres are set. Underpinning these physical entities are asymmetrical class relations, a system of alienated labour, competing interests. Great problems arise when structural design is promoted as a way of avoiding the political question of social transformation. This either ensures that the Garden City is a never-to-be-realised Utopia or an only very imperfectly realised ideal. Worse, it serves an ideological function in throwing a veil over the social disparities and relations of subordination and superordination which persist within the Garden City. These are political issues which rest upon objective relations and structures which cannot be designed out.

Even when evaluated as a utopia, Howard’s Garden City evinces a number of flaws. The limitations of the Garden City are manifest when comparison is made to the polis ideal. Whereas the classical polis conducted collective affairs on the basis of a face-to-face democracy, Howard opts for an election based departmental structure leading up to the central council. Even if the necessity of some degree of mediation and representation is accepted in order to address the problems of scale, quantity and complexity, Howard could have guarded against the re-alienation of power by introducing the recall mechanisms that Marx valued in the Paris Commune. As far as economic organisation is concerned, Howard is completely lacking in a conception of workers’ self-management. Instead, the use of social labour remains determined by capital. Capital remains, not so much as a physical thing, as a system of ownership, but as a social relation, which is precisely how Marx defined it.





To do better than Howard, these problems need to be addressed so as to make the ideal available. This is precisely the achievement of Petr Kropotkin. Kropotkin is clear that the realisation of the ideal city requires that production be re-organised on a new basis, overcoming the wages system and ensuring that property is held in common, so that production is geared to the satisfaction of needs and that free time beyond necessity is shared equally (Kropotkin 1990:71/5 101/2 103 107). Kropotkin’s fundamental political ethic was ‘Anarchist Communism, Communism without government – the Communism of the Free’. Society is to be reconstructed from the base upwards on the foundation of cooperation between free individuals. Kropotkin was committed to ‘common property’ ‘so that the collective interests of men may gain from it the greatest good for all’. Mutual aid is the principle of the new social city beyond the state, a principle which realises the unity of the freedom of each and all, the core value of ‘rational’ political philosophy. The practice of mutual aid affirms ‘the close dependency of everyone’s happiness upon the happiness of all’ and ‘the sense of justice, or equity, which brings the individual to consider the rights of every other individual as equal to his own’ (Kropotkin MA xiii/xiv).

In meeting with workers at their own place of work, exercising self-initiative in their productive activity, Kropotkin discovered a spontaneous freedom coercive authority or authoritative direction from above. In their self-sufficient communities, the Jura watchmakers gave Kropotkin a model of a society that could be self-governing. This permitted Kropotkin to define a functional authority. Kropotkin believed that such a community could succeed in that it did not require the artificial or external imposition of a ‘system’ but was simply a matter of enabling the natural and productive activity of the workers to flourish according to their own needs and interests.

Kropotkin’s rejection of authority suggests the need for caution in appropriating ‘rational freedom’. He attacks an education that seeks to develop ‘submission to authority’ so that individuals can no longer understand that ‘it is possible to exist otherwise than under the reign of law, elaborated by a handful of rulers’ (1970:197). The state and its ‘cult of authority’ need to be abolished in favour of a society that has reduced obligation to a minimum and practises authority as merely an immediate and temporary exchange proceeding through free initiative, action and association (1970:123/4).

After having striven long in vain to solve the insoluble problem – the problem of constructing a government ‘which will constrain the individual to obedience without itself ceasing to be the servant of society’, men at last attempt to free themselves from every form of government and to satisfy their need for organisation by free contracts between individuals and groups pursuing the same aim. The independence of each small territorial unit becomes a pressing need, mutual agreement replaces law in order to regulate individual interests in view of a common object – very often disregarding the frontiers of the present States.
All that was once looked on as a function of the Government is today called in question. Things are arranged more easily and more satisfactorily without the intervention of the State. And in studying the progress made in this direction, we are led to conclude that the tendency of the human race is to reduce Government interference to zero; in fact, to abolish the State, the personification of injustice, oppression and monopoly.




In seeking to realise ‘the idea of a society without a State’, Kropotkin in many ways is attempting to strengthen the social bonds which classical thinkers made central to the essential politikos bios. Kropotkin is realising the central principle of political philosophy, as concerned with social justice, against the central institution of political philosophy, the State. Kropotkin puts the anarchist case against even ‘rational’ authority in favour of the free society of free individuals, exchanging the domination of moral-political obligation under the state for a society based on minimal obligations and functional authority beyond the state. Kropotkin’s free community would be the society of realised, self-conscious, free individuals no longer administered from above.

This is consistent with the way that this thesis critically appropriates the tradition of ‘rational freedom’ as an Anarcho-Aristotelianism, arguing for a democratic, non-authoritarian, libertarian conception of social authority as against the subjection of the individual to a moral and political obligation which is codified, administered and imposed from above. The democratisation of authority according to social function represents the de-authorization of morality and politics. Kropotkin’s anarcho-communist society of free individuality is aimed against the cult of authority and its association with the abstraction of the state (Kropotkin 1970:141; 1987; 1988:77 78 79 82 83 98; 1990:50/2). There is no room in Kropotkin’s communist society for any power above the level at which real individuals and real communities directly, actively and consciously exercise control. No cult of authority develops since authority is not delegated to a level at which it becomes independent of and opposed to the will of individuals.

Taking his cue not from the classical polis but from the medieval communes, Kropotkin argues for decentralisation so that control is vested in local communities, integrating town and country so as to realise social and ecological harmony. This community would be characterised by flexible technologies, artisanship and direct democracy.

Kropotkin argues that a ‘communalist’ revolution had occurred in Europe in the twelfth century and that this was crucial in protecting European culture and society from being suppressed under theocratic and despotic monarchies. This revolution manifested itself in the local village community and in the urban fraternities and guilds (Kropotkin MA 165 169). Each section or parish within the late medieval city formed the province of an individual self-governing guild, the city being the union of districts, parishes and guilds, whilst also being a free state in itself.





‘The city organised itself as a federation of both small village communities and guilds’ and was based upon the practices of self-jurisdiction and self-administration (Kropotkin MA 177 178). The city was a state but depended little on the political form of the state.





The aim of the medieval city was to guarantee peace, liberty and self-administration (Kropotkin MA 181).

The centralisation of power under the nation state in early modern Europe destroyed these achievements in what Kropotkin characterised as the triumph of the Roman-Imperial authoritarian tradition. The students of Roman law and the prelates of the Church succeeded in paralysing the ideas at the foundation of the free cities, the ideas of self-reliance and federalism deriving from ancient Greece, imposing the view that salvation must be sought in a strongly centralised State, placed under a semi-divine authority (Kropotkin MA 220). The result was the decay of communal institutions. The Roman idea of the centralised state triumphed over the Greek idea of federalism between free cities (Kropotkin MA 221).

At the present stage of history, however, Kropotkin believed that this repressive centralisation was due to be challenged by its antithesis, the popular-federalist libertarian movement. This challenge would be sustained by new technologies extending cooperation, decentralisation and small scale workshops (Kropotkin 1985:149 150 151). Kropotkin refers to the pronounced tendency of the factories to migrate to the village as being expressed in the garden cities movement (Kropotkin 1985:151). New organisations, pointing in the direction of communism, organisation economic life according to need, are springing up within the individualist order (Kropotkin 1990:47 49). New sources of power, hydraulic and particularly electric, mean that it is no longer necessary to have a large centralised unit of power (Kropotkin 1985:153). The new industries generated by new technologies have a tendency to be small scale, promising to render the great industrial concentration inert.









This crucial insight was adopted and developed by Patrick Geddes whose holistic vision, in turn, influenced Lewis Mumford. Geddes’ City Development: A Study of Parks, Gardens and Culture Institutes (1904) and Cities in Evolution: An Introduction to Town Planning Movement and to the Study of Civics (1915) reveals his intention to unify the physical dimension of urban planning with its social aspects, making the point that planning is a matter of social civics. 

Geddes had absorbed the principles of anarchist communism from his contacts with French geographers at the turn of the 19th century. These put forward a vision of free confederations of autonomous regions. Geddes showed the influence of Reclus and Kropotkin in arguing that the reconstruction of society was to be undertaken not through governmental measures initiated and imposed from above but through the voluntary efforts of individuals from below. Only in the new era, which Geddes called the Neotecnhnic age, would we ‘apply our constructive skill, our vital energies, towards the public conservation instead of the private dissipation of resources, and towards the evolution instead of the destruction of the lives of others’ (Geddes 1912:183). The neotechnic order meant ‘the creation, city by city, region by region, of a Eutopia’. After the 1914-1918 war, Geddes argued that the League of Nations ought to take the form of a league of cities, not of the capital cities, which were the centres of the war machines, but the great provincial cities which, once more becoming autonomous centres, would voluntarily federate on the Swiss model.





Lewis Mumford continued in the tracks of Howard, Kropotkin and Geddes, developing the argument that the new transportation and communication technologies are forces for the decentralisation of population and industry. With the end of decentralisation in view, Mumford sought to develop a form of regional planning that ensured that the current tendency of urban development towards megalopolitan sprawl would be replaced by a conscious policy of creating a humane pattern of appropriately sized cities that fit harmoniously within the region.

Mumford has been most articulate in developing the Rousseauan strain of ‘rational’ urbanism deriving from classical political philosophy (Mumford 1961 1995). Mumford is a strong advocate of urban institutions in generating and sustaining an active civic sense and identity – theatres, libraries, schools, museums join political institutions in Mumford’s conception of the city. Like Aristotle, Mumford’s approach is holistic, analysing urban culture with respect to the city as a megalopolis embracing governance, material existence, planning processes, hygiene, culture and aesthetics, the social composition of the inhabitants. Behind Mumford’s demand that limits be placed upon the growth of cities lies a critical concern with the manifestations of an inevitable urban decay accompanying the gigantic super cities of the contemporary era (Mumford 1968). Urbanism needs to be discussed in the context of the issues of quantity and quality, the need for scale and balance. Mumford’s regional solution to urban problems favours essential social, economic and ecological balances. Mumford answers the question directly by arguing that size is a ‘function of the social relationships to be served’. ‘There is an optimum numerical size, beyond which each further increment of inhabitants creates difficulties out of all proportion to the benefits. There is also an optimum area of expansion, beyond which further urban growth tends to paralyse rather than to further important social relationships’ (Mumford 1937). ‘Limitations on size, density, and area are absolutely necessary to effective social intercourse; and they are therefore the most important instruments of rational economic and civic planning’ (Mumford 1937). Mumford thus challenges the modernist-capitalist equation of endless growth with progress, rejecting the accusation that establishing limits would decrease economic opportunity. Limitations are necessary so as to break up the functionless, hypertrophied urban masses of the past. Mumford thus envisages the ‘mono-nucleated city’ being replaced by the polynucleated city comprising a cluster of communities.

Mumford emphasised the changes taking place which are making for decentralisation. The emerging sources of power, transport and communication mean that a whole region is opened up with no single centre being the focal point of all regional advantages. Mumford thus predicts the decentralisation and dissociation of urban facilities so that ‘the needs of close and continuous human association at all levels will be uppermost’ (Mumford 1937).

Mumford thus defines the principles of the polynucleated city: ‘It is a town in which the various functional parts of the structure are isolated typographically as urban islands, appropriately designed for their specific use with no attempt to provide a uniform plan of the same general pattern for the industrial, the commercial, the domestic, and the civic paths’. Mumford thus defines the Radburn idea in terms of its main relationships: ‘the differentiation of foot traffic in independent systems, the insulation of residence quarters from through roads; the discontinuous street pattern; the polarisation of social life in specially spotted civic nuclei, beginning in the neighbourhood with the school and the playground and the swimming pool’ (Mumford 1937).

The principles of the polynucleated city are clear:

Such plans must result in a fuller opportunity for the primary group, with all its habits of frequent direct meeting and face-to-face intercourse, they must also result in a more complicated pattern and a more comprehensive life for the region, for this geographic area can only now, for the first time, be treated as an instantaneous whole for all the functions of social existence.

Rather than relying on the massing of population, the necessary social concentration and drama are to be achieved through deliberate local nucleation and a finer regional articulation.





Deliberately counteracting any regressive tendencies, Mumford argues that the regional site of the city is balanced with a cosmopolitanism. Mumford thus avoids the nostalgic paradigm which recovers classical insights only by repudiating the historical achievements of modernity.

For Mumford, the city is to exist in a political, economic and cultural balance with the countryside in its environs, integrated in a relationship of exchange as opposed to one of exploitation. The city should articulate a balance between culture and nature, thus overcoming the crucial dichotomy at the heart of modernity.

In a paper of 1917, Mumford had written of ‘Garden civilisations in preparing for a new Epoch’. This paper concerned industrial decentralisation and garden cities (Hall 1996:148). These were the views which Mumford pursued from 1922 within the Regional Planning Association of America, a body which emerged from the association of Mumford, Clarence Stein, Benton Mackaye and Charles Harris Whitaker and which sought the practical realisation of the new city. What emerged from the RPAA was ‘the new concept of the Region’ (Survey 1925:129). Mumford’s article The Fourth Migration concerned the two Americas, ‘the America of the settlement’, developing the coasts and plains by 1850, and ‘the America of the migration that cleared the land west .. and opened the continent..; the second migration, that worked over this fabric a new pattern of factories, railroads and dingy industrial towns .. the America of the third migration, the flow of men and materials into our financial centres, the cities where buildings and profits leap upwards in riotous pyramids’ (Mumford 1925:130).

Presently, ‘we are now in another period of flow’, a fourth migration based on ‘the technological revolution that has taken place during the last thirty years – a revolution that has made the existing layout of cities and the existing distribution of population out of square with our new opportunities’. ‘The tendency of the automobile .. is within limits to disperse population rather than to concentrate it; .. the telephone, the radio and the parcel post had the same effect; so did electric power’ (Mumford 1925a:130/3). What distinguishes this fourth migration from the first three is that, for the first time in history, human beings had the ability to consciously guide the movement. ‘Fortunately for us, the fourth migration is only beginning; we may either permit it to crystallize in a formation quite as bad as that of our earlier migrations, or we may turn it to better account by leading it into new channels’ (Mumford 1925a:133). Mumford’s argument neatly addresses the problem that the neotechnic era may simply represent an evolution from the palaeotechnic era, reproducing many of the worst features of the old civilisation within the new.

Mumford’s argument was developed by Clarence Stein, who argued that the new technologies rendered New York, Chicago and other such cities ‘Dinosaur Cities’ subject to collapse under the pressure of congestion, inefficiency and escalating social costs. The result was that these large cities were becoming the least logical places for industrial location.

Mumford anticipates the neotechnic era when he put the clear choice: Either society will be characterised by overgrown cities constantly increasingly in size, ‘more and more of worse and worse’ as Mumford quotes Geddes. Or it can embrace regional planning:





Neotechnic technology is the means to greater mechanical efficiency but is also the means to ‘a fuller quality of life at every point in the region. No form of industry and no type of city are tolerable that take the joy out of life’ (Mumford 1925b:151). This view shows the enduring influence of Howard. Regional planning forms the framework for realising the ‘civic objective’ of the Garden City, ‘not as a temporary haven of refuge but as a permanent seat of life and culture, urban in its advantages, permanently rural in its situation’. But this entails ‘a change in aim as well as a change of place’.





In Kropotkin and Geddes, Mumford adds a distinctively American strain:





The work of the RPAA was well ahead of its time, anticipating many of the problems that continue to afflict modern cities. The solutions that the RPAA proposed were not adopted, with the result that overscale cities have grown to unmanageable levels. The work of Howard, Kropotkin, Geddes and Mumford has never been more important than it is now, as new technologies once more raise the prospect of the decentralised, polynucleated city. The problem is that, for all of the talk of the post-fordist city, nowhere is it possible to see the radical vision of the pioneers of the garden city.


98 NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Having examined the moral philosophical terrain of a new socio-cultural politics beyond liberalism, the question arises as to which social forces constitute the content of this new politics. This section considers the possibilities opened up by the new social movements for the social transformation of politics beyond the unitary public sphere of the abstract state towards a public that incorporates plural identities and facilitates participation so that individuals achieve an actual citizen identity.

The new social movement’s (NSM’s) have been portrayed as a new post-materialist politics (Eder 1992:185/6), as experiments in the transition from ‘monological’ to ‘dialogical’ modes of thought, action and organisation (Offe 1985:825/32 834), and as motor processes for pluralisation, individualisation and democratic participation (Habermas 1994:92). Such developments entail the rejection of a public life based on monological forms deriving from industrialisation, centralisation and bureaucratisation (Gombin 1975:14 19 78; Lyotard in Appignanesi ed 1989; Lipietz 1992:ix; Gorz 1980 1982; Bahro 1984 1986; Toffler 1983 1984).

The nsm’s value grass roots activism and informal organisation outside of the conventional political sphere, whether represented by political parties, state bureaucracies, business organisations or trade unions. Green politics thus develops a new politics of neighbourhood and community based experiments in local democracy (Tokar in Dobson ed 1991:188/9 191). It is in this sense that Kelly defines the Greens as the ‘anti-party party’ (Kelly in Dobson ed 1991:193/5). The nsm’s exist as subterranean public spheres to the extent that they develop outside the dominant institutions; their pressing of issues from within autonomous centres of civil society raises questions about the nature and legitimacy of macro power relations, publicizing grievances from within the everyday life world (Miliband 1989:96) and affirming the legitimacy of social interaction within civil society.

Not all of the nsm’s are emancipatory or possess the same emancipatory potential. Habermas distinguishes between those movements concerned with ‘particularistic’ change and those ‘that seek fundamental change from a universalistic viewpoint’ (Roderick 1986:136). In a similar vein, Miliband distinguishes between those social movements whose aspirations can be realised within a liberal order and those who push towards fundamental social transformation (Miliband 1989:100/5).

Andre Gorz argues that ‘ecology embodies the revolt of civil society and the movement for its reconstruction’ and presupposes the ‘restructuring of societal institutions and of the state’ (Gorz 1983:40). By civil society, Gorz means that ‘web of social relations individuals establish amongst themselves within the context of groups of communities whose existence does not depend on the mediation or the institutional authority of the state’ (Gorz 1983:36). Gorz argues that the ‘displacement of the civil society by the state corresponds, at the political level, to the replacement of self-regulation by regulation by the outside’ (Gorz 1983:37). Internal as against external regulation requires the dissolution of the alien control of the state and capital into civil spheres that have been transformed so as to be able to undertake governmental functions.


Some critics are sceptical of the ability of the nsm’s to replace class based politics. For Frankel, ‘women, environmentalists, peace activists, gays, etc. do not have a ready-made identity as a social movement’ (Frankel 1987:235). This lack of a common identity makes it idealistic to argue for an inclusive progressive alliance of social movements to replace socialist parties. This is not in itself a decisive criticism. There is no need for social movements to form a single identity; there is great emancipatory significance in respecting their autonomy. What matters is that groups be identified and evaluated according to how the promotion of their interests and their emancipations changes the conditions of existing societies for the better.

Other aspects of the nsm’s are more problematical. From a Marxist perspective, the nsm’s lack structural leverage, epistemological vision and historical trajectory (Meister 1990:25). Limited advances may be valuable but they amount neither to socialist revolution nor to the constitution of a genuine public life (Miliband 1989:108). From Marx’s perspective it makes more sense to identify that group or those groups combining an emancipatory interest with the structural capacity to act than to attempt to impose or fashion a common identity. The true test is material or social futurity, the connection between the realisation of particularistic aims with a social transformation of more fundamental, universalistic significance (Miliband 1989:109).

There is a danger that in switching the focus to the nsm and identity politics, the ‘old’ politics of class interests and material power come to be neglected, to the detriment of emancipatory attempts to forge new public bonds. This is the issue that Nancy Fraser takes up in delineating the shift in the political imaginary. The shift from socialism to postmodernism is expressed in terms of a shift from redistribution to recognition as the central problem of justice. Classes struggling to defend interests and end exploitation come to be replaced by culturally defined groups and communities of value struggling to defend their identities and end cultural domination. ‘The result is a decoupling of cultural politics from social politics and the relative eclipse of the latter by the former’ (Fraser 1997:2). The impression is given of an ‘old’ politics being extinguished rather than embraced in a new radical project (Fraser 1997:11). The case for working class politics needs to be made within a genuine pluralism which respects social agents and identities (Phillips 1997:147). Justice requires that both socio-economic injustice and cultural injustice be fought. A politics of redistribution and a politics of recognition thus co-exist (Fraser 1997:12). In the concern to achieve equality whilst recognising difference, economic inequality has been displaced (Coole 1996:19; Phillips 1997:144/5). However, since economic and social rights are part of the substantive precondition for an effective deliberative democracy, there is every need to bring class back into the picture (Benhabib 1996:7).

Affirming the whole range of ethnic, sexual, cultural and ecological movements and identities ‘is not equivalent to writing off those necessary universalistic political objectives that overcome the often uncooperative and inward looking aspects of identity politics’ (Frankel 1997:81). The question is how can the universal be constituted within a public based upon the recognition of plural groups and identities?

For some, the nsm’s represent a new class politics prefiguring new social relations or, at least, are the bearers of new relations (Eder 1993; Scott 1990; Gorz 1982; Lash and Urry 1987; Meister 1990:25). Scott identifies the nsm’s as constituting a ‘collective actor made up of individuals who understand themselves to have common interests. Unlike political parties or pressure groups they have mass mobilisation or the threat of it as their prime source of social sanction’ (Scott 1990). In contrast with the labour movement, the nsm’s resist being incorporated into the existing political order, are anti-authoritarian and seek to abolish the power of the state by by-passing it.

For Murray Bookchin, the new social movements – environmentalism, feminism, anti-militarism and municipalism or local community control – represent a basic shift in the modes of political thought and action away from a radicalism which seeks to control the centralised public of the state towards a decentralised approach which focuses upon the public significance of regions, cities, towns and neighbourhoods (Bookchin in Goodway 1989:268). He refers to a municipalism that draws its inspiration from social ecology and its emphasis upon human scale, regionalism, decentralisation and localism. This humanly scaled political municipalism reworks the notion of the public sphere, sustaining an anti-hierarchical civic movement against the centralised public of the state (Bookchin 1989:269). This shift to decentralisation, local self-management and confederal political structures subverts the centralised unitary public of the state, large scale planning, traditional party structures, nationalisation, and the primacy of the economic (Bookchin 1989:269).


As against a socialist public sphere based upon class identity, Bookchin emphasises the radical potentials of an ‘electric public sphere’ rooted in everyday experience and a citizen identity which enables individuals to recover their ‘human face as members of a creative community’ (Bookchin 1996:22). Bookchin defines a new public infrastructure characterised by direct democracy, decentralisation, representation, liberatory social structures and social forms based on face-to-face relations (Bookchin 1996:222/3). Criticising the loss of a sense of the public sphere through the politicisation of society by state institutions, the substitution of bureaucratic ties for human relations and the homogenisation of social forms and personal relations, Bookchin is concerned to recover the classical conception of the citizen as a self-acting agent participating in a self-managing community as the condition of a ‘free society’ (Bookchin 1986:225). This is to explore the problems of self-empowerment, the forms of decentralisation and the concepts of self-administration that are to the foreground of a new leftist politics (Bookchin 1996:29).

The question is whether the nsm’s possess the structural and organisational capacity to engage in the necessary social transformation and constitute a new social order, something which means determining their social location in the process of production (McCarney 1990:125/6; Eagleton 1991:218; Wood 1986:112).

Raising this question points to the need to bring old and new social movements together in a common emancipatory struggle. This commitment does not necessarily find concrete expression in a new politics that celebrates the pluralism of the myriad of forces comprising society by valuing identity and recognition to the exclusion of redistribution. There is a need to go further than a ‘politics of resistance’ to develop a politics of ‘radical transformation’: ‘While capitalism is always in a state of pre-socialism, it is scarcely on anyone’s agenda these days to think about something as daring as the transition to socialism’ (Harvey 1989:277).

Harvey draws attention to the abundant cracks in the shaky edifice of modern capitalism as a result of stresses inherent in flexible accumulation. However, objective crisis is a necessary but not sufficient condition of social transformation. There is the need for the intervention of the subjective factor, a class or group developing its political, organisational and intellectual capacity, adding political force to its structural capacity to act. For Bourdieu, the currently disempowered obtain a voice by coming to possess ‘the material and symbolic means of rejecting the definition of the real that is imposed on them’ (Bourdieu 1977:169).

The modes of resistance and opposition developed by the subaltern class against flexible accumulation must be valued. The task is to develop practices that define a discourse of class and territorial alliances through which a global challenge to capital can be developed and sustained. Such an opposition must have a material basis and an institutional expression so as to unite the myriad social forces and organisations that are too specialised or too small to undertake transformation on their own. To create a counter-hegemony which synergises the potential of social forces and organisations so as to give them material and institutional power requires a grand coalition.

But not a unitary party leading to a unitary state-public. The historical failures and inadequacies of the socialist public sphere are manifest. The results of socialist attempts to manufacture a political culture externally, via the ‘ideal’ agency of ‘the party’ are poor (Jancar 1984:71; Brown ed 1984; Brown and Gray 1979; White 1979; Almond 1983:127/8). ‘Communist revolutions can readily be interpreted as self-conscious efforts on the part of Leninist revolutionary elites to impose a universal way of life (Soviet plus electrification) on all humanity’ and are thus wars between ways of life (Meyer 1983:6).

What makes the attempts to impose socialist hegemony all the more problematic is the increasing complexity of capitalism in its ‘disorganised’ phase. The whole notion of a singular public is questionable in a context of radical change, changes in work, production, technology, consumption, media work to fragment and individualise identities. Indeed, postmodernist writers note that the rise of more hedonistic, narcissistic and expressivist cultures subvert the economic and social structure of bourgeois society and demand new forms of political expression that are appropriate to the new plural society (Meyer 1983:8).

Contemporary social and cultural dynamics have profound implications with respect to class politics and the location of the universal in a public life. The fragmentation, even subversion, of the old political culture by a pluralistic, anarchic, disorganised, theoretical and abstruse culture (Kroker and Cook 1988; Featherstone 1988; Held 1987:241/2) suggests that the old political cleavages and alliances are dissolving and new ones emerging. A ‘new politics’ based upon values of ethnicity, ecology, gender and the immediacy of lifestyle and consumption has emerged to delegitimize old state politics, parties and government. Public life is increasingly detached from its location within the abstract sphere of the state (Connolly ed 1984; Blumemberg 1983). 

A postmodern political culture would emphasise a pluralism rooted in a way of life against the homogeneity, discipline, bureaucracy and mechanical operation of the power politics of modernity. A postmodern politics offers a paradigm which is appropriate to new cultural and social phenomena, the emergence of new social agents and social movements, the distrust of government and bureaucracy, the fragmentation of identity, the appeal of the private against the homogeneous, singular public sphere. Such a development points in the direction of a radical and pluralist politics in which individual freedom flourishes in communitarian and democratic activity, opening up the public space/s vacated by the old politics (Dallmayr 1984; Arendt 1959 1961 1970; Bernstein 1976 1986).

There are serious doubts as to whether the class politics of Marxism retains any transformatory significance. For whilst capital is the foremost mechanism of the generation of developmental crises of modern society, class no longer appears to be the remedy of these crises but a part of them. There is a crisis of class politics (Eder 1993:185) and this expresses the ‘self-blockage of society’ through its ‘incapacity to act on its own crises’ (Eder 1993:185). Class is part of and is subject to the general crisis of modern society. The crisis of class politics decouples class and politics, thus eroding the capacity of classes to act on society and hence for society to overcome its endemic crises (Eder 1993:185/6).

For Lash and Urry, the root of the crisis of class politics is the fact that the material conditions which could have produced a politically conscious working class have disappeared (1987). Changes in the nature of production have placed a question mark against Marx’s theory of exploitation and the capital-labour relation as the source of relations of domination (Aronowitz 1990:127). Social movement theory replaces class theory as the nsm’s are presented as the carriers of postmodernism and postmaterialism. And even here there are important questions to be asked as to whether nsm’s are conscious actors generating social transformation or are merely the functional mechanisms of such a change (Eder 1993:186; Hirsch 1988; Inglehart 1990). Touraine seeks to resolve the crisis of class politics by broadening the notion of revolutionary agent by opposing ‘the public’ to ‘the system’. ‘The system’ includes not only the state but also the trade unions, the organisations of the exploited class. Touraine offers the nsm’s as the actors destined to resolve the crisis of modernity (1982). But, logically, does not postmodernism demand an end of social movements as such, old and new, an end to the notion of collective agents? (Eder 1993:186). If this is so then we are no longer dealing with conscious collective actors but a functional explanation in which groups are mere unconscious bearers of new social relations. Such a view puts a question mark against the very notion of a postmodern political culture constituted by nsm’s and innovating new modes of public expression. It all depends upon the extent to which it is possible to conceive nsm’s as conscious collective actors as distinct from mere functional groups created by emerging social relations. This same question is asked in the next chapter when the focus narrows upon urban social movements – are usm’s conscious and creative agents ushering in the new order or are they expressions of and adjustments to a change that is already taking place?


99 URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
The Marxist ascendancy in urban theory the 1970’s made it clear that urban politics serves the function of regulating the conflicts which are endemic to capitalist urbanisation. Of particular concern in this section is the work of Manuel Castells in broadening the Marxist political economy perspective with respect to ‘collective consumption’ and urban social movements. Castells’ work is valuable in that it reveals the possibilities and limitations of urban social movements in challenging urban governments, asserting the use value of the city over the exchange value pursued by capitalist interests and in constituting the content of the future urban public realm. The urban social movements can be evaluated from the perspective of the necessary social transformation of ‘the political’, showing the urban/social origins of the civil rights movement, ecology movement, community protest and organisation.

Castells emphasises that production constitutes only half the Marxist critique of the capitalist economic system. Attention needs to be placed upon the other half, the necessity for goods to be consumed and, within this generalised consumption process, for the ‘reproduction of labour power’ through the provision of life sustaining facilities. In the modern industrial economy, a degree of health and education, along with other public services, form a necessary component of the process of reproduction. Universal education and health care, transport services and recreational and leisure facilities are also essential to ensure the existence of an available mobile and compliant labour force. The pressure of the labour movement has forced provision in these areas. What Marxists refer to as the ‘reproduction of labour power’ and the ‘extended reproduction of labour power’ incorporating the wide range of necessary social services, are secured through public and private provision. These are referred to by Castells as ‘means of consumption’. Castells thus defined the ‘urban’ as the arena of ‘collective consumption’. And it is within the urban system that these consumption processes are located; and it is over these processes that conflicts within the urban system occur.

Castells regards the contemporary organisation of urban space under advanced capitalism as an ‘expression of the process of collective treatment of the daily consumption patterns of households’ (Castells 1978:16). In particular, Castells refers to the extensive intervention of the state in order to organise collective consumption. This shifts the responsibility for the reproduction of labour power from private capital onto the state.

Consumption assumes this level of importance in Castells argument since:

1)	mass consumption is essential if the economy is to maintain levels of production close to capacity;
2)	the state assumes greater responsibility in providing the collective means of consumption and in reproducing labour power;
3)	competition and conflict revolving around the allocation of the collective means of consumption has increased as an object of class struggle (building on class struggle revolving around the means of production).

For Castells, the emphasis upon collective consumption is crucial to explain the qualitative differences between the large metropolitan areas of monopoly capitalism and the cities of the age of competitive capitalism. Castells calls this new urban system Monopolville (Monopoly City), characterised by a routinised pattern of everyday life as a consequence of the uniform collective treatment of households of the state (Castells 1978a:24 33). Indeed, government under monopoly capitalism has assumed such a responsibility for the provision of urban goods and services, urban planning and policy that ‘the state becomes through its arrangement of space the real manager of everyday life’ (Castells 1977b:64). This increased involvement of the state in urban development and city life has generated a new form of urban politics and community action based on struggles over the character and terms of this intervention. Castells applies the term ‘urban social movement’ to those groups and organisations active within urban based class struggle.

Castells has argued that for many people, urban protest means adopting a position in the consumption system which is akin to that adopted by those engaging in class struggle in the productive system (Castells 1978:34/6). The formation of urban class alliances around consumption ought to be considered ‘a major element of the social dynamic’ (Castells 1978:36) to the extent that this serves to unify anti-capitalist struggle.
Castells thus reconstructs urban sociology in such a way that the urban system is no longer to be conceived as the location of geographically contained social processes but rather is the focus of political conflict organised around state intervention in the provision of key public services. In this conception, the urban is the site of a range of challenges escalating against the dominant capitalist order, taking its place alongside – and maybe even replacing – class as centred upon the workplace as the fundamental source of social transformation.
The important question that this raises is whether the organisation of space possesses ‘a separate structure with its own laws of inner transformation and construction’ or is the ‘expression of a set of relations embedded in some broader structure (such as the social relations of production)’? Even the most spatially sophisticated Marxists are now concerned to underline the primacy of non-spatial social determinants (Soja 2000:208).

The understanding of space necessitates a critical investigation of the social processes are registered in space, the city may be conceived as the ‘projection of society on space’ (Castells 1977a:115). The conceptualisation of space must proceed further than this, however, so as to recognise that ‘spatial structures are also implicated in social structures and that each has to be theorised with the other’ (Gregory 1978:112).

In this respect, Soja proposes a ‘socio-spatial dialectic’ as the most fruitful way of analysing the way that space is structured (Soja 1980:211). Combining society and space in a socio-spatial dialectic affirms that space can be reflexive. In this approach, the social relations of production are both space forming and space contingent so that there is a reciprocity between social structure and spatial form. There is no need to be precise about the relative causal weighting that applies to either term.

Developing this idea further, in addition to reciprocity, the socio-spatial dialectic implies a series of chain reactions. The city is fused with wider society but in turn is also capable of provoking a response from social forces and agents (capital, government etc) which are obliged to take account of space. Intervention in turn comes to provoke further spatial restructuring, generating a new spatial realisation, etc. There is, however, a crucial rider to be added here. The way in which social instruments and practices refashion space is shaped largely by the economic structure. The economic structure of society establishes the context within which social action and development take place.

Such a view has similarities with Habermas’ argument that the encroachment of the system world upon the lifeworld is generating the most important conflicts in the late capitalist world. The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory has generated a culturally sophisticated Marxism that is directly relevant to this question (Van den Berg 1980). The main task for this school is to investigate the strategies employed by the state to avoid crises in the economy, of rationality, of legitimacy and of motivation (Habermas 1976). State intervention and the rise of organised capitalism are the product of continuous adaptations which are required to preserve the system against its own contradictory dynamics.

For Offe, crises are related to power relations. Crises in rationality issue from the administrative decisions of the state (output) whilst crises in legitimacy result from the failure of the state to maintain mass support (input). Offe’s model of state action may be defined thus: as against the ‘direct politics’ which characterised early capitalism, state agencies now adapt as required so as to act as a buffer between conflicting classes or fractions of capital, managing potentially unstable and conflictual political situations, to devise pragmatic political compromises and deals and hence contain the class struggle within existing power relations (Roweis 1981:169).

In The Urban Question (1972), Manuel Castells repudiated the dominant urban sociology that negated social conflicts in favour of a new conception of the urban problem based on the theory of “collective consumption” - goods and services which are directly or indirectly provided by the State – and/or urban social movements that, in the struggle to ensure the fair share of those goods and services, become the catalyst of the just transformation of the relations of society. The change in emphasis is important. The urban social movements are, first and foremost, concerned with the organisation of an urban space shared by various interests and groups. Entailing conflict with the State over the provision of, access to, or defence of, urban services and housing, usm’s are not directly concerned with or necessarily tied to class interests or workplace issues but focus primarily upon the ‘public’ concerns of the neighbourhood (Pickvance, C 1985 “The Rise and Fall of Urban Movements”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 3). They were, in other words, “the symptom of a process of social readjustment”, and the change necessitating readjustment was rapid urbanisation (Lowe, S 1986 Urban Social Movements: The City After Castells London:MacMillan).

For Castells, class can no longer be considered the crucial determinant of social change: ‘Although class relationships and class struggle are fundamental in understanding urban conflict, they are not, by any means, the only primary source of urban social change. The autonomous role of the state, the gender relationships, the ethnic and national movements, and movements that define themselves as citizen, are among other alternative sources of urban social change (Castells 1983:291).

Castells does not deny that primary class conflict takes place at the economic level. He is, however, concerned to argue that issues stemming from collective consumption can in specific circumstances come to occupy a central role in anti-capitalist struggle. For ‘a structurally secondary issue can be a conjuncturally principled one. This means that the political importance of an urban movement can only be judged by relating it to the effects it has upon the power relations between social classes in a concrete situation’ (Castells 1977:377). Whether urban issues assume a crucial role in struggle and change, therefore, depends upon the extent to which they are able to decisively alter the balance of power between classes and hence transcend their status as secondary considerations. For this to occur, the issues at stake must express a contradiction emanating from within the social structure so that definite material interests are being contested. It is in this sense that Castells defines urban social movements as organisations within the urban system which possess a definite issue and interest base and hence the structural capability to initiate and effect a decisive shift in the balance of class power.

In The Urban Question (1977), Castells treated urban social issues as secondary contradictions in the social system. In The Grassroots and the City, however, this view is replaced by an awareness of a plurality of other primary sources of change. There are three main types of movements for social change, defined according to the goals that they pursue:

1)	there are groups which are involved in collective consumption issues. These seek to develop urban life based on the notion of the city as an entity concerned with need (use value) rather than with profit (exchange value).
2)	there are groups which seek to defend or found communities which have a particular cultural identity. These are community movements.
3)	there are groups which pursue the goal of local self-government and the decentralisation of service provision. These lead the ‘struggle for a free city’ against the central state. These groups are citizen movements.

These themes of the relationships of consumption, of communication and of power are central to Castells’ urban political analysis and it is upon these themes that he rests his theory of urban social movements.
Characteristics of usm (Borja, J 1977 “Urban Movements in Spain”, in M. Harloe (ed), Captive Cities, New York: John Wiley).

The issue to be addressed is the extent to which urban social movements exist or may constitute themselves as vehicles of self-socialisation possessing the capacity to overcome the liberal institutional separation of public and private, to resolve the dualism of individual and community, and to constitute the new social order according to the ascending theme of power. The issues raised in the previous sections are thus resolved in the constitutive urban praxis of social movements situated within the material terrain of everyday life. Urban social movements are thus to be valued as popular organs that are capable of recovering a sense of place and identity against the global and private forces appropriating urban space, asserting the use value of the city over against its reduction to exchange value in the process.

Castells defines his purpose as to demonstrate ‘the specific role of social movements in the production of urban forms and urban meaning’, showing the impact that these movements have had not only in victory but also in defeat. ‘Their lasting effects are present in the breaches produced in the dominant logic, in the compromises reached within the institutions, in the changing cultural forms of the city, in the collective memory of the neighbourhoods, and, ultimately, in the continuing social debate about what the city should be’ (Castells 1983:71/2). Castells thus emphasises the role that urban social movements have in imposing new meaning on urban space, having a significant impact upon public policies and spatial structures. It is important, then, to understand the direction and extent of this impact and the networks of relationships between state, space and society (Castells 1983:xv).

Castells’ The City and the Grassroots is premised on the argument that it is only by analysing the relationship between people and urbanisation that it is possible to understand citizens and cities at the same time. ‘Such a relationship is most evident when people mobilize to change the city in order to change society’. Important is the implicit direction of Castells’ argument to dissolve the abstract overarchings of politics into the everyday interaction of real individuals. ‘Every day, in every context, people acting individually or collectively, produce or reproduce the rules of their society, and translate them into their spatial expression and their institutional management. Because society is structured around conflicting positions which define alternative values and interests, so the production of space and cities will be too’ (Castells 1983:xvi). This points to the existence of an everyday urban praxis that sustains and reproduces urban space and that, invested with material, organisational and intellectual power, has the potential to remake urban space according to certain goals.

Castells defines his purpose as that of constructing a new theory of urban change that can light the path to a new city (Castells 1983:xvi). He wants to know how spatial forms, economic functions, political institutions and cultural meanings combine in a process of urbanisation that is perceived as the outcome of social struggle and social bargaining. This provokes the further question of how class, gender, race and ethnicity, cultural tradition and geographical location contribute to the formation of the social actors intervening in urban space and how the pattern of relationships varies in history. The question is how contemporary urban movements contribute to the formation of new historical actors and hence to the general process of social change (Castells 1983:xvii).

Castells summarizes his argument (Castells 1983:xviii):

1)	The city is a social product resulting from conflicting social interests and values;
2)	Because socially dominant interests have been institutionalised and resist change, major innovations in the city’s role, meaning and structure tend to be the outcome of grassroots mobilisation and demands; when these mobilisations result in the transformation of the urban structure, we call them urban social movements;
3)	Yet the process of urban social change cannot be reduced to the effects produced on the city by successful social movements. Thus a theory of urban change must account for the transformation resulting from both the action of the dominant interests and from the grassroots resistance and challenge to such a domination;
4)	Finally, although class relationships and class struggle are fundamental in understanding the process of urban conflict .. our theory must recognise other sources of urban social change .. the autonomous role of the state, gender relationships, ethnic and national movements, and movements that specifically define themselves as citizen movements.

Castells challenges the explicit assumption that nature, technology, economics, culture and power fuse to form the city, which is then imposed upon citizens as a given. On the contrary, citizens create cities and have the decisive shaping impact upon urban social structure (Castells 1983:3).

Whereas Castells had previously related the division and the use of space to the prevailing mode of production, so that the urbanisation process is conditioned by industrial capitalism, with the urban as the focus of the consumption process, he is now concerned to include the social process. This conception of the social process comprises the conscious activity of individuals and social groups in shaping the city in their own ways:





In revising his former structuralism, Castells incorporates social process so as to redefine his conception of the urban. ‘Urban is the social meaning assigned to a particular social form by a .. historically defined society’ (Castells 1983:302).

The city is not therefore a predetermined product of prevailing economic functions and relations but is the outcome of the interaction between social classes, interests and individuals. Each city has its own particular meaning in consequence of the outcome of this interaction and the dominant interests and classes coming to stamp their image and functional purpose on urban space and process.

Although Castells considers urban social movements to be mechanisms for ‘changing the urban meaning’, he nevertheless argues that they primarily play a defensive role and are thus ‘not agents of structural social change’ (Castells 1983:329). Despite this disclaimer, Castells gives reasons for believing that urban social movements contain within their self-organisation and self-activity a vision of the alternative city of the future. Pursuing the use value of the city over against the reduction to exchange value, usm’s lead the struggle for the free city.

Castells’ argument is founded upon a revaluation of Marx’s model of commune democracy. Castells explicitly acknowledges the relevance of the Paris Commune:





In developing a ‘theory of urban change’, Castells is concerned to emphasise that ‘urban structures will always be the expression of some institutionalised domination, and urban crisis will be the result of a challenge coming from new actors in history and society’ (Castells 1983:xvi).

Castells values urban social movements for their capacity to bring about a qualitatively new balance in the relations of power within the social system. The change pertains to the impact on urban meaning. Only the organisations which are able to incorporate and integrate into their practices the three themes of collective consumption demands, community culture and political self-management have the capacity to effect a change of urban meanings. Urban social movements are therefore defined as ‘a collective conscious action aimed at the transformation of the institutionalised urban meaning against the logic, interest and values of the dominant class. It is our hypothesis that only urban social movements are the urban-oriented mobilisations that influence structural social change and transform the urban meanings’ (Castells 1983:305).

As far as Castells’ argument goes, the urban social movements possess a highly significant role as harbingers of the transformation of the social relations of society (Lowe 1985:2). The urban social movements contain the potential for constituting an alternative social order; they are harbingers and imitators of alternative political and cultural systems. As such, their self-constitution implies a resolution of the crisis of the state from within society itself as a form of self-socialisation. For Pickvance, the concept of urban social movements should only be applied to groups that achieve social transformation (Pickvance 1983:9).

The distinctive thing about the organisational style of these movements is their grassroots orientation and their anti-hierarchical mode of organisation, their independence from the formal party system, and their emphasis upon direct action and active participation. These characteristics serve to distinguish urban social movements from the conventional pressure group politics of liberal pluralism. It is this character that identifies urban social movements as potential agencies for the constitution of the future urban public sphere embodying communication, community and control. The concept of urban social movements as being qualitatively superior to formal political parties and other forms of organisation is important is showing the potential for an alternative socio-political and cultural order comprising new modes and new meanings.

The point that urban social movements, as originators of social transformation, are autonomous from political parties is important with respect to constituting the urban public sphere of the future. This is to envisage a political strategy that affirms the disengagement of urban social movements (centred on civil society) from political parties (centred on the state).






Castells insists on the separation between urban social movements and political parties as a result of his conception of the social system characterised by social process. This refers to personal and group interaction to effect changes in meaning. For Castells, political parties are inextricably connected with the ‘political level’, the state apparatus which corresponds with the interests of the dominant class. Urban social movements, in contrast, operate within civil society, a separate level from political society and in which dominant interests are contested rather than being necessarily accepted and institutionalised. Since the urban social movements are independent of the entanglements of the formal political sphere with the multiple crises of late capitalism, they are therefore not implicated in the various attempts of the state form to manage those crises in order to reproduce existing relations. As a result of the separation from the formal political sphere, usm’s exist as independent organisations that are capable of generating new ‘meaning systems’.

However, the changes initiated by urban social movements require an open political system in order to be carried through:





The problem with this formulation is that it entails that urban social movements can initiate social change but cannot carry it through autonomously. The transformation of society ultimately requires that changes initiated at civil level be carried through a series of adaptations at the political level. And if this is the case, the distinction between urban social movements and formal political parties breaks down, undermining the claim that usm’s have the potential to create an alternative political order as autonomous agents.

Castells’ words on neighbourhood associations in the Spanish context demonstrate the existence of an associational space in civil society which potentially forms the basis of a new public order. The neighbourhood became the organisational base of struggles which, though stemming from a particular problem, addressed associations to all matters of everyday life, from housing to open spaces. Whilst the most militant protest arose in working class wards, neighbourhood associations extended across the social spectrum. Middle class areas joined popular neighbourhoods to fight their own issues. As a result, neighbourhood associations came to gain the support of most sectors of society. Hence neighbourhood association in Spain shows ‘how a civil society that had been shunned by the state took its revenge by developing such a prolific social tissue that the political institutions became increasingly obsolete in relation to the reality they were supposed to shape’ (Castells 1983:215). Civil society created its own public space.

Under the impact of the Neighbourhood Movement, Spanish cities, political institutions, social relationships and urban culture were transformed. Society’s conception of what a city should be was fundamentally altered: ‘living conditions were improved .. rehabilitation and renovation programmes were promoted for the benefit of slum dwellers; shanty towns were redeveloped and replaced by low cost public housing to be allocated to the squatters; open space was provided; urban spaces were improved; some environmental protection was legislated for; and public transport was either nationalised or municipalized and given priority… the metropolitan area became a public place enriched with street life, cultural activities and community and city gatherings. Urban policies shifted .. the betterment of public amenities was given priority over more profitable new developments; community life was enhanced and the neighbourhood associations won de facto recognition in most public programmes’ (Castells 1983:216).

Urban mobilisation addressed a wide range of issues: housing, schooling, public health, open spaces, transport, social life, urban policies. Improvements in these areas resulted in the basis of the creation of an associative public space with spaces for citizen participation: ‘the Citizen Movement forwarded a new demand: the request for grassroots participation in the elected institutions of local government, in the planning agencies, and in public programmes for urban redevelopment through the ad hoc representation of neighbourhood associations’ (Castells 1983:224).

Demanding that the Spanish Constitution (1978) should recognise the degree to which neighbourhood associations were in the public interest, the Citizen Movement expressed their demands in a distinctive way, moving from defensive demands like resisting gentrification and displacement to offensive demands like public redevelopment for the benefit of residents, demands to enhance local culture and raise the level of institutional reform, participation in local government. ‘This progression and the ever widening goals that came with it are crucial to our evaluation of the Citizen Movement as an agent of social change’ (Castells 1983:224/5).





Against those for whom the Madrid experience was an extended manifestation of class struggle and those for whom the struggle was limited to distribution and was therefore reformist, Castells defines the Citizen Movement as being ‘occupied in a class structured society as a movement not defined by class which affected the overall structure of society, and therefore relationships between classes, through its organisation, mobilisation and demands’ (Castells 1983:264).





The demands of the Citizen Movement do have a relation to class, class struggle and socio-economic justice. For Spanish financial capital connected to the multinationals lay behind the model that was forcing metropolitan growth and industrial concentration. Urban development proceeded through a business network encompassing banks, real estate firms, and landowners.





Castells thus defines an urban social movement as ‘a conscious collective practice originating in urban issues, able to produce qualitative changes in the urban system, local culture and political institutions in contradiction to the dominant social interests institutionalised as such at the societal level’ (Castells 1983:278).

The Citizens Movement succeeded in introducing a host of urban issues into the political sphere (Castells 1983:263) whilst altering the urban meaning of the city. Particularly important here is the introduction of the concept of ‘the city as use value’. The essential functional purposes of the capitalist city – accumulation, bureaucratic power and the symbolic representation of modernisation – continued but were now layered over by the popular demand originating from below that the city should be a ‘collective good, a shared experience and should be governed by its own grassroots’ (Castells 1983:262). 

Demands from within urban social movements do not necessarily produce social transformation if the intention is merely to expand the urban meaning of the capitalist city to include the welfare of those making the demands or if the intention or outcome is merely to make the city a part of the social wage without thereby challenging and changing the core urban meanings and functions corresponding to capitalist relations. But even limited achievements have the value of including the concept of use value within the functions of the city, offering a contrast with the dominance of exchange value.

Urban social movements, therefore, are important instruments in challenging the reduction of the city under capitalism to exchange value and in raising the ideal of the alternative city corresponding to use value. This, as Castells argues, requires ‘the strengthening of local networks and the development of community life’ (Castells 1983:260).

Of particular importance in the evolution of Castells’ thought is the role assigned to women in the socio-cultural process of urban change, showing an aspect of how usm’s connect with nsm’s to effect widespread transformation (Castells 1983:33).





Feminist thought contains the potential to renegotiate the nature of the political and the boundaries between public and private life.

Nevertheless, whilst Castells positively evaluates the feminist movement and feminist thought in extending the emancipatory dimension of urban struggles, this creative view of feminism is not integrated into his model. As with his ambiguous separation of urban social movements from political parties, so with the feminist movement. The feminist movement must be ‘connected’ to urban social movements whilst respecting the autonomy of urban social movements in the process of innovating new urban meaning. Castells’ insight here is largely undeveloped. To what extent ‘identity’ and ‘communication’ are exclusively feminist themes is not developed. Castells does not look further into the nature of the connection to social change and his new specifications of urban social movements.

Castells envisages the ‘alternative city’ as a network of self-managed, ‘culturally meaningful’, communities representing the seamless integration of his three core themes of collective consumption demands, community culture and political self-management. However, Castells fails to relate his ideal with the necessary material processes and forces for its realisation, something which leaves him open to the charge of utopianism. The social relevance and purchase of the alternative city is not clear. Castells does not establish the mechanisms by which urban movements come to initiate social change and constitute the new social order whilst carefully preserving their political autonomy.

There are other problems too. Urban social movements are not necessarily emancipatory and progressive but may be active in urban politics in support of conservative politics which maintain and reinforce existing patterns and relations of division, exclusion and oppression. There are, indeed, a number of social movements whose aims are antithetical to radical aspirations. The ratepayer movement, for instance, is hostile to trade unions and public sector provision. Such movements foster and entrench exclusionary tendencies within the urban sphere and hence cannot constitute a genuine public based upon a universal ethic.

From a marxist perspective, the lack of a political and class dimension leaves the usm’s seriously limited with respect to achieving larger goals. And, indeed, it is true that the momentum, power and membership of the usm disappeared in short time. There are several reasons for this sudden change. With the successful completion of a number of neighbourhood projects, the usm’s lost their raison d’etre. What larger political goals the usm had were concentrated primarily upon opposition to the Franco regime. That political dimension was dissipated with the democratisation of the political system and the achievement of a socialist administration that was composed to a large extent of former members of the usm’s. Urban social movements came practically to a standstill (Pickvance 1985). The fate suffered by the Spanish usm’s and the experiences of other usm’s therefore indicate a contingent nature (Dunleavy P (1980) Urban Political Analysis, London: Macmillan; Lowe 1986; Pickvance 1985; Fincher, R (1987) “Defining and Explaining Urban Social Movements”, Urban Geography, 10:604-13; Purcell, M (1997) “Ruling Los Angeles: Neighbourhood Movements, Urban Regimes, and the Production of Space in Southern California”, Urban Geography,18, No.8:684-704; McKeown, K (1997) Marxist Political Economy and Marxist Urban Sociology, London:Macmillan).

However, the radical potential of the usm’s was left largely unfulfilled by these developments. The hope that the socialist administration would install a more participatory form of democracy remains unfulfilled. Experience suggests that Castells overestimated the capacity of usm’s to endure and have a long-term transformatory impact upon social relations. Urban social movements have not acted as agents of social change or as harbingers of a new era. The aspirations for more participatory forms of government have not been realised. ‘It is possible that urban social movements and the conflicts which accompanied them, far from predicting a new era, were the expression of the last and most conflictive stage of a process of change and readjustment to it’ (Ceccarelli, P (1982) “Politics, Parties and Urban Movements: Western Europe”, in Fainstein N. and Fainstein S (eds), Urban Policy Under Capitalism, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, p 264).

One is entitled to ask here whether the Spanish experience has come to suffer the fate of international socialism since the late nineteenth century – deradicalisation as a result of the displacement of the social dimension concentrated upon civil society by the political dimension centred upon the state. This makes it necessary to look hard at the principle of autonomy and insist upon the usm’s separating themselves from the formal political sphere; implicit in this insistence is the assumption that usm’s contain the potential to generate publicity from within themselves. Larger aims need not be displaced to a formal political level that, given the structural dependence of the state upon capital, must necessarily disappoint movements towards a new social order.





The political economy of urban social movements and their relation to urban space is the central question. For the usm’s are the latest in a series of attempts by human agents to organise and mobilise in order to impose conscious human purpose upon an urban space that their social practices engender and reproduce and yet which exerts a shaping influence upon their activities. ‘The urban realm is .. a “concrete abstraction” that reflects how individuals act and struggle to construct and control their lives at the same time as it assembles within its frame real powers of domination over them. Urban politics is a realm of action which individuals can easily understand and to which individuals can immediately relate. The sorts of processes we have studied .. provide a real context of conditions to which individuals, groups and classes must accommodate and respond. The processes appear as abstract forces, to be sure, but they are not the kinds of forces that we can ever afford to abstract from .. the urban community and its distinctive politics are produced under capitalist relations of production and consumption as these operate in and on geographic space’ (Harvey 1989:163). Human agents need to impose urban meaning on these abstract forces by subjecting these relations to their own conscious control.

The question is how individuals are to associate to assert their control of urban space over external forces. Soja refers to ‘the creative spatiality of the city’s social life and culture’ (Soja 1996). There is a need to examine the conditions for a socially just and humanly scaled urbanism. This necessitates the overthrow of the tyranny of abstraction, the domination of exchange value over use value, and the creation of civic order as against the overscale ambitions of a modernist planning reduced to economic development and under the control of business.

The question as to what role class plays in urban social movements is particularly important in relation to the construction of community, the essential element of public life. For the various classes composing community construct their own different senses of community. This crucial fact is apt to be overlooked by those who presume the existence of some ideal typical ‘community’ that human beings construct on account of some ahistorical essence, regardless of specific social and political context. Investigating class agency in relation to community construction shows how similar spatial practices can have radically different contents.

Given differences in material circumstances, there are different spatial practices and processes of community construction. People with low incomes lack the resources to command space and find themselves trapped in space. Within this space, mutual aid and predation share use values between those lacking exchange values. People with higher incomes command space through spatial mobility and economic ownership. Already in possession of abundant exchange values, the upper income groups are not dependent upon community-provided use values to sustain life. The construction of community from the perspective of the affluent is mainly oriented towards protecting or expanding exchange values. Use values in this context relate to questions of aesthetic appreciation, taste, symbolic and cultural capital. Community organisations here are concerned with the ‘tone’ of community space, not merely with its survival. ‘Conditions of economic oppression and socio-political domination generate quite different kinds of spatial practices and styles of community formation than will typically be found under other class circumstances’ (Harvey 1989:267).

There has been an attempt to overcome urban inequalities through use of the public realm. This, however, has had the paradoxical result of institutionalising and entrenching inequality. Herman Hertzberger in The Public Realm in Architecture and Urbanism argues that the ‘great paradox’ of the collective welfare concept as developed with socialism is that it makes individuals subordinate to the very system that is supposed to liberate them. The institution of public works from above in the interests of urban regeneration is not something that the individual can identify with. As a result, the system ‘produces a widespread feeling of alienation’ (Hertzberger 1991). This induces passivity, a pervasive feeling of powerlessness, reducing the motivation for civic involvement. This ‘elicits aggression, which in turn leads to further tightening of the web of regulations’. This begins a vicious circle in which the lack of commitment and the exaggerated fear of chaos have a mutually escalating effect.

The vast destruction of public property, which is escalating in the major cities of the world, can partially be attributed to the alienation of individuals from the living environment. But what is most revealing is that this trend and its escalation is treated as a problem of organisation, the problem being dealt with by periodic repairs. The overriding concern is protection and safety rather than the creation of a genuine public life. Objective regulations backed by coercion take the place of personal involvement. The conditions for the suppressive system of order makes individuals into lessees as opposed to co-owners, into subordinates rather than participants. ‘Thus the system itself creates the alienation, and, by claiming to represent the people, obstruct the development of conditions that could lead to a more hospitable environment’ (Hertzberger 1991).

Hertzberger argues that the more responsibility that users have for an area, and hence the more influence they have over an area, the more care they will be prepared to invest in it. And the more an area is suitable for the specific uses of its people, the more users become inhabitants. This involvement constitutes publicity (Hertzberger 1991). The purpose is to articulate such a form in public spaces so as to increase the feeling of personal responsibility. Each individual in the community will contribute to a local environment to which each member can relate and identify with.

The modernist approach to urban planning is exposed to the criticism that it is an elitist discourse, the domain of experts and professionals who come to impose their ‘rational’ vision of an idealised bourgeois world upon a resistant community. As long ago as the 1960’s, critics were demanding that the top-down approach be replaced by a bottom-up participatory process. Thus David Godschalk argues that ‘what is needed is a modus operandi which brings governmental planners face-to-face with citizens in a continuous cooperative venture. Such a venture could not only educate and involve the community in planning, but could also educate and involve the planners in community’ (Godschalk 1967:972). Friedmann identifies such views with the ‘struggle .. for a recovery of the political community on which our Western ideas of democratic governance are based (Friedmann 1987:327). In discussing the role of radical planners in bringing about social transformation, Friedmann argues that planners must be prepared to appropriate the knowledge commanded by those ‘in the front line of action-households, local communities, social movements’ (Friedmann 1987:394).

On these terms, the yardstick by which to judge the success or failure of urban policies is the extent to which opportunities for participation on the part of the citizens is enhanced. The problem is that, in the absence of a social movement capable of engaging in social transformation, ideals can only be realised through the centralising mechanisms of the state. Modern bureaucratic systems necessarily transform the emancipatory ideals of architects and planners into their opposite. The means displace the ends.

The alternative approach envisages people experimenting with the components of design and construction, forming new concepts, reappropriating creativity from the few.





This thesis has sought to recover the roots of urban theory in ‘rational’ political philosophy, conceiving freedom as a collective project in which individuals associate in order to exercise conscious control over their circumstances. Overcoming the institutional separation of the state and civil society that is central to liberal modernism supplies the new political theory. It also supplies the new aesthetic theory in that revaluing the public significance of civil society also affirms the capacity of individuals as creative agents capable of transforming their circumstances as self-made. Ward cites Hassan Fathy here: ‘a man who acquires the solid mastery of any skill grows in self-respect and moral stature. In fact, the transformation brought about in the personalities of the peasants when they built their own village is of greater value than the transformation in their material conditions’. The moral is that people should shape and reshape the places in which they live. Not only does this process create cities; it creates citizens.

Affirming that people make their own cities, Ward values popular direct action as integrating the unofficial economic, housing, welfare and transportation systems into the cities. In this respect, the decentralist tradition is more pertinent than the technical projections of the future city. Prophecies of skyscrapers, tower blocks, automated and metered urban motorway and plastic domes are boring since they fail to address what is at stake. ‘Design is a question of ethics and morality’ (Cornelius Van Eesteren). Regeneration is a moral and spiritual question. Town planning began as a social movement. For the likes of Geddes, Howard and Kropotkin, planning was not a technical question, a profession or a body of legislation, but a popular social movement, a public enthusiasm, an integral part of the social economy (Ward 1996:43 44). Such a view is less concerned with professional expertise than with infusing citizens with a vision and a comprehension of the possibilities of the city. The view affirms the value of citizen participation in town planning (Ward 1996:45).

The rise of municipal socialism in Britain and community control in the US built upon the local community and the mobilisation of the new social movements and underlined a trend away from official agencies and institutions towards people absorbing politics into the grassroots. People can engage in politics at both local and regional levels, empowering themselves within the communities in which they live. Community organisations can be actively involved in the provision of social services and economic activities in the local environment, enhancing mutual aid mechanisms and strengthening social solidarity. Such movements generate a social and cultural capital to compensate for a relative lack of material resources. Such movements can pressure ‘official’ institutions to provide a supporting framework for the empowerment of local populations. Such a framework is sympathetic to local movements fostering cooperative organisation in the provision of services, of housing and in production. Such an approach nurtures the formation of skills through being able to tap the resources in the local community.

Such local community development is crucial in revitalising urban society and culture. The strengthening of local networks and the development of community life improves urban life markedly through increased public activity and reduced levels of crime and disorder. Castells points out the extent to which urban protest actually creates a community; a community as such does not exist until its members raise their voices and take action on urban issues. Urban social movements are, then, important from the perspective of community building, sharing mobilisation by building upon a network of activities and organisations. ‘The struggle for community created a communal foundation on which to base a broader fight’ (Castells 1983:260/1).

Community building and mobilisation from below extends structures and practices of participation and encourages demands for participatory democracy at higher levels of organisation.

In the contemporary world, civic order is being overtaken by civic attrition, leading to the extension of coercive forms of social control. Homogeneity of bureaucratic imposition replaces the heterogeneity of neighbourhoods, industrial development, fiscally supported by government agencies, replaces the constitution of a civic order through a socially active citizenry. The principal concerns of those who run cities in the contemporary world are economic expansion and development rather than civic culture, public integrity and community activism. The principal concern of city dwellers, treated as clients rather than as citizens, is the provision of services, of which they are passive recipients, not active participants. With success coming to be measured in economic rather than civic terms and with freedom coming to be located from the public to the private realm, urban governance becomes a matter of bureaucratic management and manipulation of the masses so as to deliver the objectives set by a pre-determined developmental business agenda. 

The diminution of spaces for citizen discourse, interaction and association is tantamount to the death of the city as such. Classical political philosophy conceived the city-state as a public sphere, an arena of communication and administration. Such a notion presumes a public consciousness, public spaces for the formation of opinion. Without such a public arena in which individuals assert themselves as rational citizens, there is no polis, no community and no citizenship. Instead, public life takes the form of political and business agendas formulated by professional elites in abstraction from the demos and promoted via top-down ‘public’ institutions. This is the very antithesis of public life. The bureaucratic management of social space in the interests of accumulation has the effect of turning the urban environment over to the imperatives of endless economic development. Such things as the mallification of the city symbolise the extent to which individuals are treated as consumers rather than citizens, reinforcing the extent to which the pursuit of freedom is no longer a collective project undertaken in conscious deliberation with others in the public realm. In this depoliticised urban landscape, individuals are treated not as citizens but as taxpayers. Politics is given a price. Freedom is identified with keeping that price as low as possible.

Movements for community control look to realise the goal of civic self-management, overcoming social domination in favour of a free, self-governing citizenry independent of the formal state sphere. This active citizenship is realised in institutional forms organised within a civic public sphere. This envisages a number of public spaces capable of challenging class designation in favour of an active citizenship, pushing beyond material exploitation to overthrow domination in all its form in the name of a universal citizenship.

There is a need to recast new and urban social movements in an emancipatory direction concerned with the self-constitution of public life. The urban social movements are highly significant forces in that they represent the attempt to reclaim urban space for citizen identity and activity. Regardless of the particular ends that these movements promote – although a democratic movement of the left would insist on certain progressive, emancipatory and universalisable claims – the important aspect of the urban social movements is their extra-parliamentary nature. The urban social movements can be valued to the extent that they are autonomous of the formal political sphere. They are vehicles for the subversion of the abstracted public of the state and for the repoliticisation of the civil sphere. The urban social movements are vehicles of a self-socialisation which contains the potential for filling civil society with political content, organising society around collective issues properly considered ‘public’. The movements are based upon extensive participatory structures.

Associations of civic groups are part of a process in which the demos cease to be a mere aggregate and instead become a citizen body. This citizen activity takes place outside of formal political organisation and official governmental processes. The urban social movements extend and embed social structures and encourage and facilitate citizen participation in contrast to the way that formal political structures narrow the scope for participation. This is to check the pervasive sense of powerlessness that disfigures contemporary city life. The specific goals of the urban social movements are important but so too is their mere existence as evidence of a burgeoning civic awareness and responsibility, the reassertion of civic activism as containing the potential for social transformation driven by a public agenda. The social movements represent an advance in the assertion of social structure over political structure through the participatory aspirations of their members. They represent a claim to urban governance on the part of members defining their individuality in terms of citizenship, expressing a tendency to deliberation, interaction and cooperation and thus forging the associative bonds of an emergent public sphere.
The city itself is composed of a variety of community groups and associations articulating a vision of neighbourhood government and grassroots democracy. The complex networking of these groups promotes a conception of decentralised urban governance practising forms of self-management. The activity of such groups leads to a developed sense of social awareness, developing a degree of civic liberty in everyday life activity. The mobilisation of city dwellers through urban social movements represents an attempt to reclaim the city as an urban public space constituted by an active citizenry. Rationality here denotes a civic self-awareness and public consciousness which presumes an urban environment in which individuals as citizens can conceptually comprehend the forces that shape social life and assume control of them. Comprehension and control are crucial conditions of autonomy, the core value of liberalism. And these require the practical reappropriation of power alienated to the state and capital and the reorganisation of this power as a social power to be diffused throughout a civil society that has acquired a governmental capacity. The mental, material and institutional appropriation and exercise of social power that follows cultivates the growth of human being, generating social forms and organs of popular control which expand rather than inhibit the human ontology.

Such a conception of the urban future is ‘rational’ in being scaled to human dimensions, being accessible to human comprehension and control. This forms a true city in that it is constituted by and can be reshaped by citizen activity. It is a city that possesses an active citizen body as its content. For Aristotle, an active, rational citizenry is the core of the city. Without this citizenry, there is no city. Aristotle’s argument emphasises that public life, crucial to human self-realisation, requires human scale. In conditions of overscale power this argument implies decentralisation. Power is to be kept within human proportions so as to ensure everyday human contact and exchange. Human scale is not merely institutional but intellectual and spiritual and anthropological. This defines an existential civic arena based upon an active rational citizenry. Such a citizenry forms the content of the city. Marx’s demand for the restitution of social power to the social body and for conscious common control of relations affirms the classical principle of scale as the condition of the politikos bios which is crucial to self- and social fulfilment. The ideal city asserts the ‘rule of man’ over the ‘rule of property’ (Marx 1975:208).

There is another sense in which the urban future may be conceived as being ‘rational’. The emergence of the new information and communications technologies (ICTs) has added a potentially radical dimension to the notion of community control and promises to realise the ‘rational’ ideal of an intersubjective community of active, interacting citizens in its most direct and literal form. There may well be a direct connection emerging between citizenship as an active designation, community culture, communication and political self-management

There is a need to revalue the potential of individuals to shape the new communication media in forms that are liberatory, creative, educational and socially supportive. This suggests the connection between electronic communication and local community. Whilst information technology implies new electronic networks independent of geography, there are grounds for believing that new technologies may be integral to the recovery and strengthening of place based social meaning. The liberatory and transformative potentials of the information and communications technologies (ICTs) such as the Internet have been investigated and enhanced by the activities of a myriad of community groups, social support networks, voluntary organisations and government agencies. Together, these represent a rich form of social action involved with attempts to create sustainable communities through economic development, urban regeneration and civic participation.

 Community informatics (CI) are engendering new possibilities for fostering social cohesion and inclusion over social exclusion and polarisation, strengthening neighbourhood ties, overcoming cultural isolation and giving community members, urban activists, and policy-makers an awareness of feasible alternative futures (Rheingold 1994; Schuler 1996). In this perspective, the new media contains the potential for reviving community life in a world that seems governed by vast abstract processes which are beyond human control. To the likes of Rheingold, computer mediated social relations function as the conduit through which spontaneous electronic interaction engender new forms of community structures and culture.

Community informatics is a multidisciplinary approach to the relation of the new ICTs and the community. The approach emphasises the social and cultural factors shaping technological developments, going on to evaluate the implications of the new media for community development, regeneration and sustainability. Community informatics thus seeks to embed the transformative potential of the ICTs within community social relations.
Community informatics makes it possible ‘to connect cyber-space to community-place: to investigate how ICT’s can be geographically embedded and developed by community groups to support networks of people who already know and care about each other. It thereby recognises both the transforming qualities of ICTs as well as the continuing importance of community as an intermediate level of social life between the personal (individual/family) and the impersonal (institutional/global)’ (Loader et al 2000:81).

Society and the technologies of communication have been involved in a co-evolutionary process of mutual influence for centuries, shaping the view that people live and relate to each other within and between communities. This awareness of the social and cultural implications of the connection between community and communication media raises a question of the utmost socio-ethical importance. If the invention and uses of alphabets, books, printing presses or electronic web pages have shaped the way that human beings live, what can those human beings, the creative agents in this co-evolutionary process, do about the shaping? How can communication be placed on a conscious basis, increasing truth over falsehood, spreading information rather than disinformation, realising the philosophical dream of connecting reason with freedom? With communication increasingly taking electronic or digital form, there is a need to entertain the possibility of subjecting that process to more conscious control.

There is a need to avoid the overestimation of the political and ethical potentials of new technology, a new technological determinism. There is nothing necessarily democratic about technology that engages the people. Wild speculation concerning electronic democracy and push-button decision-making has given way to a more nuanced awareness of the connection between technology and democracy in the context of social relationships. The ethico-anthropological potentials of the new information technology can be realised only with a more nuanced appreciation of the connection between technological potential and social relations.







There are a number of important points to establish:

	Technological determinism is a false thesis. Technology does not act but shapes and is shaped within social relations. Citizens can use technology to increase social capital, but technology does not add to the human good automatically. This is a function of creative human agency, not of technology as such. Knowledge, planning, support networks, and cooperation are required.
	Technology can serve the purpose of information and misinformation; can enhance freedom and democracy or can be used as a means of mass manipulation. The Internet is potentially liberatory in empowering and informing citizens but is repressive to the extent that increases the power of those who seek to control citizens and shape their opinions. The Internet is also accompanied by surveillance.
	The capital system is powerful, but not all-powerful. It expresses the necessary economic aspect of human cooperation in alien form and has proved incapable of producing all the public goods necessary for a humane life.
	Civic intelligence and citizen democracy are not going to be achieved as a result of some historical or technological necessity but require creative human agency – the individuals who compose the demos stepping forward, associating and acting to affirm the good of the public over system imperatives and commercial gain.

Whilst the possibilities for a genuine democracy seem thin in an environment subject to the domination of capital as a private regime, there are grounds for hoping that a democratic alternative future is feasible as a result of action undertaken by the informed citizenry. This is the ideal of liberal, socialist and democratic theorists, of Rousseau, Paine, Mill and others. And the fact is this: if this principle is false it would be difficult to explain centuries of democratic advance since the age when monarchs ruled by divine right. If, through communication, information and interaction, enough individuals come to know about what the range of political possibility is, outcomes that may seem unlikely in abstraction of real action soon become likely as soon as individuals begin to act as citizens. Having addressed social movement, community culture and control, self-management and ICT, the next section focuses more specifically upon communication. For recent developments indicate that the intersubjective community of rational co-legislators – the ideal of ‘rational’ philosophy – may well be within historical range.
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Communicative Planning And Dialogic Community

This thesis envisages alternative urban futures by placing substantive issues at the heart of the urban agenda. Reason has been conceived as having an ethical component concerned with the creative realisation of the human ontology. The ‘rational’ in this sense has been examined in terms of a focus upon place, community, culture, and consciousness. This heavy emphasis upon reason requires qualification. French deconstructionism and German Critical Theory have developed a body of thought which rejects the primacy of reason in human affairs. They have been most concerned to expose the kind of reason that has been dominant in the modern world. As logic allied with scientifically constructed empirical knowledge, reason has been exposed as extending its control over forms of being and knowledge, achieving hegemony and suppressing moral and aesthetic discourses. Further, following Weber’s rationalisation thesis, reason as an abstracting, reifying power has been shown to dominate the key institutions of modernity. Even institutions ostensibly subject to democratic control have been subject to an anti-democratic bureaucratic rationality. Urban planning is necessarily implicated in the administrative power in the form of the state, reinforcing the repressive and dominatory power of systemic-institutional reason. Far from being a democratic force for the good, planning is revealed to be an elitist project pursuing a good formulated in the abstract by experts and professionals and imposed upon communities from the outside. The authoritarian-elitist conception of knowledge and politics stands condemned for its failure to deliver, leaving a democratic deficit at the heart of urban politics and planning.

The question this thesis puts to itself is how can the reason at the heart of the project of modernity be given rational form within a democratic community to form the urban public sphere? Rational in this sense contains an ethical component in being connected with the creative self-realisation of the human ontology. The basic question facing urban planning in the contemporary age, poised between modernity and postmodernity, lies in the need to recover a progressive-emancipatory meaning for democracy within the anti-democratic trends and tendencies of rationalising modernity.

A key concept in answering the question of how reason can be made rational is ‘community communication’. This focuses upon the communication behaviour of individuals in a specific context as distinct from being an element of a mass audience (Hollander and Stappers 1992). In this conception, ‘community’ pertains to either a geographically delineated region or to a bonding founded upon common interest. In the geographical definition of community, individuals are identified as inhabitants of a specific region – a neighbourhood, district, town, or city. On account of this identification, they are able to understand the meaning and significance of issues raised in community media – not news in general but local news, not national politics and international affairs but local politics and community affairs, not crime somewhere and everywhere, but crime here on the doorstep. This also applies to membership in communities that are founded upon shared interests or upon cultural or ethnic bondings. In fine, community communication entails the mediated and non-mediated intercourse of individuals in specific contexts, whether those contexts be geographically situated or issues of interest unconstrained by location in time and place.

The theoretical attempt to ‘capture’ the relationship between a social system and its corresponding communication system is of German origin. The concepts Kommunikationsram (communication-space) and locale Offentlichkeit (local public sphere) are the products of the communication-in-context orientation (Hollander 1988; Hollander and Stappers 1992). The most important feature of these concepts concerns the way that communication is conceptualised as a form of ‘sharing’ rather than as simply the ‘transmission of messages’ (Carey 1989; Chaney 1978). There is an inbuilt reciprocity in this orientation that emphasises the connection that each has with all in a genuine community. This is the ethic of ‘rational freedom’ applied to the urban public sphere.

Applying the ‘rational’ ethic to constitute the urban public sphere emphasises the communicative ethic which sustains a notion of deliberative democracy and dialogic community, establishing collectivity through public consciousness and participation. This position develops Jurgen Habermas’ notion of communicative community with respect to urban planning and politics. Habermas’ critique of the irrational incarnation of reason in the modern world and his attempt to place reason on a rational basis has generated a number of insights which inform the attempt to conceive urban public sphere in rational form.
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The most distinctive and ambitious feature of Habermas’ thought lies in his attempt to recast the growth of reason within society within a theory of communication. 

‘Wittgenstein realised that language was an aspect of life, so that it had spontaneous growth and development. What he left out of account was reason – he tried to see language as wholly determined like any other biological forces, so that man was ruled by language rather than cooperating with language as one of the tools of reason. A language that is entirely impersonal would destroy personality, just as a language that was entirely personal would be incommunicable. The two aspects are synthesised in personal action by reason. Thus we must have a holistic conception of language which incorporates all three levels of understanding. We cannot leave language just to life: it is also created by man himself in reflective action.. Language provides a good example of the way in which reason leaves its imprint on life. It is thus a witness to the way in which man makes his own history’ (Waller 94).

Habermas affirms the importance of knowledge and culture within the forces of production, arguing that labour is not simply an economic category but is also an ‘epistemological category’ (Heller 1982:ch1). Habermas thus reconstructs social evolution as a process that develops through expanded possibilities for learning. The normative structures of law, morality and religion and symbolic interaction therefore exist as pacemakers of social evolution (Habermas 1979:98 120).

Habermas’ communicative ethic contains the potential to define a public sphere which achieves coordination by discourse, association and interaction, entailing a substantive and participatory process that prevents a bureaucratic and technocratic conception of politics (Habermas 1971:75; 1987:67 75/6). This raises possibilities for a democratic public sphere generated out of the reciprocal relationships of human community. Habermas seeks to embed a universal ethic in a reciprocal community (Habermas 1992:146), implying a genuine public life beyond capitalism. Habermas’ communicative ethic can critically evaluate the practices and processes of urban planning and development in existing society in terms of a conception of the good life (Habermas 1989:8 11 23 26/7 34/42 60/2 86 143/4 150/2 163 180/1 186 187).





The good society is thus defined in universal terms, emphasising the satisfaction of the human needs of all as against the subordination of all to the imperatives of external and arbitrary power that benefit some. Uprooting the ‘power constellations’ which generate ‘unreason’ through blocking inter-subjective structures makes it possible to recover the potential for reason in forms of social reproduction (Habermas 1982:221). Habermas thus offers a means of integrating reason within the material terrain of human existence and activity.

In emphasising the communicative dimension of human life, including moral praxis and critique, Habermas develops a means of defining a discursive public sphere. This public sphere is constituted by communicative action as against the systemic ‘publics’ of the state and capital. And it is a public which is rooted in the lifeworld and is aimed at holding the forces of the system world in check. ‘Lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt) is the ‘background consensus of everyday life’, the key methodological term which defines the substratum in which social and economic structures interpenetrate with human action and consciousness (Habermas 1981:4/31).

Habermas distinguishes between the logic of the system world of economics and politics, regulated by money and administrative power, and the logic of the lifeworld of self-organising public spheres grounded in everyday solidarity, interaction and communication. This is a more sophisticated variant of the distinction between use value (need) grounded in civil society and exchange value (profit) arising from the capital system. The distinction is directly relevant to the determination of the character of the city. Habermas makes an important distinction in this respect between ‘socially integrated action contexts’ and ‘system integrated contexts’. Socially integrated action contexts refer to self-organising public spheres in the lifeworld in which actions are coordinated through an intersubjective consensus between individuals about norms, values and ends. In contrast, system integrated contexts pertain to the abstracted sphere in which actions are coordinated through the functional interlacing of the steering media of money and administrative power (Habermas 1989:189/92 202 338/40; Giddens 1987:232/3).

Habermas is concerned that the uncoupling of this steering media of money and power from the lifeworld will generate a contradictory relationship between these two action contexts, generating certain social pathologies. The lifeworld is subject constantly to the expansionist logic of the steering media of the system world. Through rationalisation within capitalist modernity, ‘institutions are replaced by compulsory associations and organisations of a new type; they are formed on the basis of media that uncouple action from processes of reaching understanding and coordinate it via generalised instrumental values such as money and power. These steering media replace language as the mechanism for coordinating action. They set social action loose from integration through value consensus and switch it over to purposive rationality steered by media’ (Habermas 1991:342). ‘Thus there is a competition not between the types of action oriented to understanding and to success, but between principles of societal integration – between the mechanism of linguistic communication that is oriented to validity claims – a mechanism that emerges in increasing purity from the rationalisation of the lifeworld – and those de-linguistified steering media through which systems of success-oriented action are differentiated out’ (Habermas 1991:342).

Strengthening the lifeworld so that the communicative interaction of free and equal individuals may generate a rational consensus achieves a substantively rational society (Habermas 1991:69f 339; 1989:126/7 187 352/3). These structures are grounded in the lifeworld ‘as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming at situation definitions that are intersubjectively recognised’ (Habermas 1991:69/70).

The problem is that Habermas diminishes the possibility of a discursive lifeworld public grounded in everyday interaction by accepting the necessity of a system world in which the steering media of money and administrative power coordinate human action on non-discursive grounds. For, although Habermas seeks to confine instrumental rationality to the system world, he is aware of the tendency towards the encroachment of the steering media upon the lifeworld and the way that this generates socially pathological consequences (Habermas 1991:299/303; 1989:311/2 355/7 367/73 375 391/6). Habermas refers to ‘systemic constraints’ which ‘instrumentalize a communicatively structured lifeworld’, a ‘technicizing of the lifeworld’, which issues in a ‘structural violence’ that is ‘exercised by way of systematic restrictions on communication’ and ‘distortion’ (Habermas 1989:183 187). ‘Monetarisation and bureaucratisation’ ‘overstep the boundaries of normality’ by instrumentalising the lifeworld (Habermas 1991:323), destroying communicative contexts. These ‘systemically induced life-world pathologies’ are to be checked by communication (Habermas 1989:197).

Habermas is working with a conception of politikos bios which identifies citizenship as a participatory mode of public existence with human self-realisation. Thus Habermas poses the question as to why modernisation has excluded ‘the erection of institutions of freedom, which protect the communicatively structured action domains in the private and public spheres from the reifying peculiar dynamic of the economic and administrative systems’ (Habermas quoted in McCumber 1989:332). This exclusion issues in ‘a neutralisation of the possibilities for political participation opened up by the role of the citizen’ (Habermas 1991:346/7).

Habermas thus asserts a practical-moral rationalisation which is achieved through the abolition of ‘those relations of force that are inconspicuously set in the very structures of communication and that prevent conscious settlements of conflicts and consensual regulation of conflicts’. This communicative public has the emancipation of the individual as a truly universal ‘species being’ as its end, unifying particular and universal interests (Habermas 1979:115 119).

Habermas can be read – against his own explicit statements concerning the necessity of functional separation – as attempting to subordinate the system world of money and administrative power to the democratic ethos of the lifeworld (Ingram 1987:115/6). Pursuing this ethos to its logical conclusion, the lifeworld may be conceived as a public sphere of emancipatory interaction which is to be invested with the social power alienated to the steering media of money (capital) and power (the state). Habermas denies this possibility of developing democracy as an idealised lifeworld, arguing instead for the co-existence of system and lifeworld as confined to their appropriate spheres. Nevertheless, his communicative ethic articulates the demand that society be governed normatively over against the domination of instrumental rationality. And this view projects an ideal public sphere organised around the discursive coordination of human action centred upon the lifeworld as the necessary reality of individuals.

In recasting the study of society through his theory of communication, Habermas envisages a public sphere which rests upon a discursive mode of coordination. Habermas thus values language as ‘what raises us out of nature’: ‘Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus’ (Habermas 1972:314). Habermas is concerned to release the ‘potential for reason embedded in communicative action’ so as to overcome the repressive aspects of rationalisation. This emancipatory reason ‘is expressed above all in the increasing reflexivity of cultural traditions, in the processes of individuation, in the generalisation of values, in the increasing prevalence of more abstract and more universal norms, etc.’ (Habermas 1985:75/105 101).

Language contains a normative framework in that each communicative act implies the possibility of constraint- and domination-free interaction: ‘the agents involved are coordinated through acts of reaching understanding’ (Habermas 1991:285). Understanding is uncoerced and disinterested, a notion which suggests both Kant and Rawls. The vision of a domination free ‘ideal speech situation’ contains an implicit vision of a good or rational society embodying universal values and presupposing symmetrical replacing asymmetrical relations in a society governed by discursive will formation (Habermas in Thompson 1984:264 266). The ideal of communication implies a public life in which social relationships are domination-free and the unequal distribution of power and resources has ended (Heller 1984:74; Miller 1987:75).

The ideal speech situation entails the establishment of a communication community oriented towards mutual agreement (Habermas 1979:109). It is the ‘achievement of mutual understanding by a communication community of citizens, their own words, that brings about the binding consensus’ (Habermas 1989:82). Habermas thus affirms norms based on a ‘rational consensus’ against those norms which ‘stabilize relations of force’ (Habermas 1979:111).

No matter how much it may be distorted, communication always contains a transcendent moment which implies a radically egalitarian and free society, a universal humanity as real rather than merely ideal, a community of mutual understanding mutually supporting different forms of life overcoming relationships of subordination and superordination (Heller 1984:138). Habermas realises Marx’s ‘social humanity’ (Marx 1975:423) on the basis of a communicative ethic, something which suggests the dialogic-democratic model of public life expressed by Rousseau (Habermas 1979:178/205).

‘The rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue communicative action’ (Habermas 1991:17/8). ‘Participants in argumentation have to presuppose in general that the structure of their communication, by virtue of features that can be described in purely formal terms, excludes all force .. except the force of the better argument’ (Habermas 1991:25).

Habermas thus develops a ‘rational infrastructure of action oriented to reaching understanding’. ‘In communicative action, the very outcome of interaction is even made to depend on whether the participants can come to an agreement among themselves on an intersubjectively valid appraisal of their relations to the world’ (Habermas 1991:106). ‘A greater degree of communicative rationality expands – within a communication-community – the scope for unconstrained coordination of actions and consensual resolution of conflicts’ (Habermas 1991:15). ‘What was intended by the categorical imperative can be made good by projecting a will-formation under the idealised conditions of universal discourse’ (Habermas 1989:95). The ideal communication community provides a model for impartial, rational will-formation entailing non-alienated communicative interaction which affords reciprocal scope for spontaneous self-presentation in everyday life and demands reciprocal empathy. Habermas addresses the ‘utopian’ projections contained in the ideal communication community in such a way as to reconcile the particular and the universal, the plurality and difference of modern society and the general good:





Membership in an ideal communication community has the power to burst bonds through the development of subjectivity against existing alienated constraints. ‘The structures of nonalienated social intercourse provoke action orientations that reach beyond established conventions in a different way than universalistic orientations; they are aimed at filling in the spaces for reciprocal self-realisation’ (Habermas 1989:97).

Conceiving interaction in a broader sense than the common control of the means of production (Habermas 1971:81/122; 1973:195/282; 1968:43/60) expands democratic possibilities beyond economic ownership and beyond economic growth or the mere technical expansion of the productive forces. The problem is one of the relation of technology and democracy: ‘how can the power of technical control be brought within the range of the consensus of acting and transacting citizens?’ (Habermas 1987:57). Habermas cites two antithetical alternatives. In the first place, there is the private form of appropriating socially produced goods under capitalism, under which use values fall under the alien law of an economic process that is concerned with producing exchange values. In the second place, the reproduction of social life can be rationally planned as a process of producing use values under the technical control of society. This control is exercised democratically in accordance with the will and insight of associated individuals. This second alternative cannot be reduced to an instrumental model without it issuing in the authoritarian or bureaucratic state. Habermas therefore argues that this alternative be supplemented by ensuring that goals are determined and clarified through public communication (Habermas 1987:57 58). Such a view implies the assertion of the primacy of the public sphere over technique. This answers the question of how society exercises its sovereignty over the technical conditions of life, integrating them into the practice of the life-world (Habermas 1987:59). ‘Through the unplanned sociocultural consequences of technological progress, the human species has challenged itself to learn not merely to affect its social destiny, but to control it. This challenge of technology cannot be met with technology alone. It is rather a question of setting into motion a politically effective discussion that rationally brings the social potential constituted by technical knowledge and ability into a defined and controlled relation to our practical knowledge and will.. The irrationality of domination, which has today become a collective peril to life, could be mastered only by the development of a political-decision making process tied to the principle of general discussion free from domination. Our only for the rationalisation of the power structure lies in conditions that favor political power for thought developing through dialogue. The redeeming power of reflection cannot be supplanted by the extension of technically exploitable knowledge’ (Habermas 1987:61).

To restore the connection between reason and freedom requires that the development of technique and organisation in the human interaction with nature be subject to rational control in a normative sense. The praxis of labour must become a moral praxis. The expansion of the productive forces creates the potential for freedom and is not to be equated with freedom as such:





‘The growth of productive forces is not the same as the intention of the “good life”. It can at best serve it’ (Habermas 1987:119).

Unfortunately, in giving a purely instrumental account of production, Habermas ignores the ‘anthropological meaning of work’ and hence excludes an important part of the human ontology from his conception of the good life (Heller 1982:34). Conceding essential human activities to the logic of instrumental reason are no longer available to enter into the construction of a public life. As a result, society is split between two forms of rationality, with no good reason to think that communicative rationality could resist the seemingly inexorable tendency of instrumental rationality to colonize the lifeworld (Heller 1982:29). The normative principle of ‘free and unconstrained dialogue among reasoning individuals’ is left without a material or institutional basis (Benhabib 1992:88).

Habermas’ thought is capable of projecting an ideal public organised by a dialogic mode of communicative reason operative in the social lifeworld. This exists as an alternative to the monological mode of instrumental rationality entailed by political and economic domination. But there is a need to locate this struggle to assert discursive coordination over non-discursive imposition in an alienated system of production (Clarke 1991:323 325). The steering media of money and administrative power need to be reformulated as the state and capital as alienated social power that is to be restituted from the system world back to the lifeworld from where it originated. This is to conceive a public life which embraces a broader range of activities than is contained in Habermasian communication alone. Interaction is both material and symbolic.

Habermas’ public sphere projects a potential mode of societal integration within which progressively larger spheres of life come to be subject to discursive coordination via citizen interaction. This replaces the non-discursive modes of state power and market economies. The democratic reconstitution of the public sphere enables individuals to exercise their sovereign power ‘in’ and ‘through’ communicative interaction through action that is ‘oriented to reaching an understanding’. Conceiving democracy as a process of shared learning, achieving agreements through communicative action, makes it possible to distinguish public arenas citizen discourse and association from state apparatuses.

Habermas is thus concerned to distinguish his position from traditional – party political – attempts to engineer the public sphere. He defines the intersubjective conception of public life. This establishes ‘forms for living together in which real autonomy and dependency can appear in satisfactory relation’ without having to surrender modern differentiation (Habermas 1981:28). The way that Habermas’ concept of the public sphere integrates rational discourse, communication and informal interaction (Hohendahl 1979:89/118) sets the classical Greek polis within the citizen model of liberal modernity. The public sphere is the realm in which citizens behave as a ‘public body’, conferring in ‘unrestricted fashion’ on ‘matters of general interest’ (Habermas 1974:49/55).

Habermas repudiates the contemporary reduction of the politically functioning public realm of the citizenry to the mere legitimisation of the ruling group. ‘The reason that democratic choice takes the form of acclamation rather than public discussion is that choice applies only to those who occupy positions with decision making power and not to the guidelines of future decisions themselves. At best these decision-makers legitimate themselves before the public. Decisions themselves .. must remain basically beyond public discussion’ (Habermas 1987:67). ‘The depoliticization of the mass of the population and the decline of the public realm as a political institution are components of a system of domination that tends to exclude practical questions from public discussion’ (Habermas 1987:75). Habermas therefore condemns the ‘scientization of politics’ for reducing the process of democratic decision-making to ‘a regulated acclamation procedure for elites alternately appointed to exercise power. In this way power, untouched in its irrational substance, can be legitimated but not rationalised’ (Habermas 1987:68). The ‘bureaucratised exercise of power’ has its counterpart in a ‘public realm confined to spectacles and acclamation’ (Habermas 1987:75). The key task of the public sphere in Habermas’ conception, then, is to ensure that power becomes rational. ‘This could be guaranteed only by the ideal conditions of general communication extending to the entire public and free from domination’ (Habermas 1987:75).

Habermas develops a model of a civil public based on the associational space of civil society. Habermas rejects state-centred conceptions of public life. The ‘administrative power’ ‘is not a suitable medium for fostering emancipated forms of life’ (Habermas 1996:372; Ingram 1987:166/7). Habermas’ ideal public subjects markets and administrative bureaucracies to a popular will formed in open and free public debate (Habermas ST 1989:27 319). The ‘institutional core’ of Habermas’ model of the associative civil public excludes economic and governmental associations and comprises ‘more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organisations and movements’ which communicate popular concerns to the public sphere (Habermas 1996:366/7).

Outlining the contours of a civil public based on the associational space of civil society, Habermas’ views are relevant to the nsm’s. Habermas affirms the potential of new social movements – environmentalism, feminism, anti-militarism and municipalism – to constitute the public sphere as a sphere of political resistance checking the encroachment of the system world. The nsm’s promise to reshape the public agenda by raising issues concerning the quality of life, emphasising the social conditions required for individual self-realisation and seeking to extend democratic participation and control to every sphere of social life. This makes it possible for citizens to constitute a genuine public and consciously decide how shared, non-renewable resources are to be dispersed. Mobilising and organising around other than materialist interests, the nsm’s become a motor for processes of pluralisation and individualisation which contain the potential to subvert the relations of hierarchy and domination associated with the centralised public of the state (Habermas 1994:91 92; 1991:51; Ingram 1987:165/6).

Habermas employs Marx’s critique of alienation to explain how the encroachment of instrumental rationality from the system world destroys the social fabric of interaction, solidarity, identity and communication in the lifeworld. The conflict which follows implies new forms of struggle and politics taking place at ‘the seam between the system and the lifeworld’. New forms of conflict ‘no longer arise in the areas of material reproduction; they are no longer channelled through parties and organisations; and they can no longer be alleviated by compensations that conform to the system’. Since the ‘new conflicts arise in areas of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialisation’, they are expressed in ‘sub-institutional, extra-parliamentary forms of protest’.

The problem cannot be confined to distribution within official politics but pertains to ‘the grammar of forms of life’ (Habermas 1981:33/7). These novel forms of conflict and resistance demand a new public sphere which articulates issues of ecology, peace, gender and race as well as of citizen movement, community mobilisation and workers self-management.

In subjecting corporate and administrative bureaucracy to the democratic accountability of ‘autonomous public spheres’, the nsm’s embody a potential to create counter-institutions which replace the political and economic dependency represented by buyer-seller, employer-employee, client-civil servant, elector-office holder relationships. This is to envisage a public sphere constituted by cooperative economic and participatory political organisations (Habermas 1989:51; Ingram 1987:165/7).







103 URBAN PLANNING AFTER HABERMAS
The rational ethic emphasises the extent to which freedom is a collective project in which the freedom of each co-exists with the freedom of all. This ensures that planning in the name of the good is undertaken via collective action that is informed by principles of mutual recognition and solidarity. In a plural society, however, there cannot be just the one road to the good but many. The emancipatory project thus needs to focus not only upon the restructuring of social relations so as to ensure social control of the economy but also upon discovering ways of ‘living together differently but respectfully’ (Rustin 1985). There is a need to ensure that this overarching frame of reference embodying the universal remains rooted in actual plural identities and is not abstracted from the real world and reimposed as an ideal rationality.

It is on this issue that Habermas’ reformulation of modernity’s concept of reason offers a way forward. The dilemmas of modernity and modern urban planning can be resolved through the incorporation of communicative forms.

The dominant phase in the ideology of planning in twentieth century Britain has been the blueprint model. This sought to replace the piecemeal approach of the nineteenth century with a large scale approach to redevelopment. Development came to be overtaken by a logic of its own which worked to destroy the human well-being it was intended to produce, precisely because it failed to incorporate consultation, reassessment and monitoring of effects into the planning process. Building these elements into the process, the rational decision model was developed. Nevertheless, even here, it was still presumed that planning proceeded from the top downwards. The role of consultation, reassessment, and monitoring was limited to modifying the process rather than challenging or changing it in face of opposition. 

There are a couple of ways out of this impasse. The dominant approach has been a retreat to the bastions of scientific rationalism, as expressed through the resurgence of neoclassical economics accompanying the reduction of regeneration to economic development. An alternative rationalism is made available by Habermas’ communicative ethic. Incorporating Habermasian insights, Patsy Healey demands a concept of planning as debate. Such an approach renders given facts and policies problematic, presumes political differences and acknowledges cultural diversity, and gives equal weight to the views of residents as well as those of planners and developers with professional and commercial interests.

Healey thus gives the Habermasian definition of urban planning:





Habermas’ achievement lies in effecting a shift from an individualist, subject-object conception of reason to a reasoning developed through intersubjective communication. This kind of reasoning is necessary where ‘living together but differently’ in shared space and time compels a search for finding agreement on how to ‘act in the world’ so as to address collective affairs and act in the universal interest without that universal becoming an abstract and external imposition.

Habermas’ communicative ethic is invaluable in addressing the question of the normative content of urban planning in a postmodern context. Habermas seeks to replace the conception of the self-conscious autonomous individual, attaining knowledge via principles of logic and science, with the conception of reason as intersubjective, mutual understanding, as socially and historically situated. Subject and object are constituted through this process. The claims of knowledge are validated by a discursive reasoning rather than by appeals to logic and science. Such appeals to logic and science may be located within the context of communication action (Habermas 1990). This ensures that reason reveals rather than distorts or rationalises. For Habermas, late capitalism surrounds itself with a complex set of distortions in communication. These serve to conceal its operations from rational understanding. As a result, individuals are deprived of the power to understand their actions and so come to be excluded from the power to control their lives. Intersubjective communication makes it possible to penetrate the mystification which rationalises existing power relations.





The knowledge and principles for action and ways of acting come to be actively constituted by members of the communicative community, situated in time and space. This offers a way of determining the ‘good’ whilst respecting plural identities and difference. The ‘good’ is what individuals come together to agree upon, a common agenda across diverse interests and experiences. This notion of an intercommunicating community generating shared agreements means that it is not necessary to have recourse to abstract ideals of the good to guide practice. Planning, its purposes and its practices, is a mode of acting which agents may choose after debate. This perspective savours a little of Michael Walzer’s conception of principles of justice for different spheres of social activity

In this scenario, shared agreement freely obtained through debate in one period becomes an imposition upon the different differentiations of a later period. Habermas seeks to check this danger by developing criteria to ensure a dynamic critique at the heart of the reasoning process. Claims are thus assessed according to their comprehensibility, integrity, legitimacy and truth (Habermas 1991). Forester develops these criteria as heuristic terms with which planners subject themselves to criticism in the search for a planning that is progressive in challenging power (Forester 1989).

The shared agreements and mutual understandings achieved for a certain purpose at a certain time are never permanent and are always revisable through ensuring the continuous flow of communicative action. The community comes to achieve stability by being organised around principles of shared understanding that is always open to renegotiation and revision. This defines an emancipatory project in terms of a democratically pluralist participation.

The critics of rational modernity argue that the system of meaning proposed by logic and science is dominatory and excludes all other systems of meaning. Communicative action avoids this tendency to domination by nurturing mutual understanding through practices of interdiscursive communication. No one system of meaning ever fully understands enough (Geertz 1990). This defines a new form of planning based upon interdiscursive communication, a way of ‘living together differently through struggling to make sense together’. Such an approach affirms that notions of ‘progress’ and ‘the good’ still make sense (Forester 1992:83/122).

This broader understanding of knowledge, rooted in practical sense as much as in formalised knowledge (Bourdieu 1990), is introduced into collective ‘deciding and acting’ through intersubjective communication in the community as opposed to being the product of the self-reflective consciousness of autonomous individuals. The discursive effort of constructing mutual understanding comes to replace the subject centred ‘philosophy of consciousness’ that has been the dominant conception of reason (Habermas 1984:196/247). The specificities of time and place, of culture, of society and personality, the whole of what Bourdieu describes as ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1990) come to be constituted and articulated through the effort of reaching mutual understanding. A conscious intersubjective understanding of collective communication is a force which sustains an internally critical democratic effort, checking the dangers of rational principle turning into domination, the universal suppressing the particular.

The communicative approach affirms that knowledge is not preformulated but is continually renewed through the exchange of perceptions drawn from the stock of collective life experience and of aesthetic and moral knowledge available to all members of the community. The tasks which planning must address cannot, therefore, be predetermined. These tasks have to be specifically discovered and understood through the process of communication.

The outlines of the contours of an intercommunicative planning emerge from these principles (Healey 1992):

1)	Planning is an interactive and interpretive process which focuses ‘deciding and acting’ within a range of specialised allocative and authoritative systems but drawing upon the multidimensionality of ‘lifeworlds’ or ‘practical sense’ rather than a single formalised dimension. Planning processes are enriched by debate.
2)	The notion of interaction presupposes the existence of individuals engaging with each other in diverse, fluid and overlapping ‘discourse communities’. These communities possess their own meaning systems and, therefore, their own meaning systems and, therefore, their own knowledge forms and ways of reasoning. Communicative action thus focuses upon achieving mutual understanding for the purposes in view, retaining awareness of that which is not understood.
3)	Interaction involves discussion based upon mutual respect in and between discursive communities pursuing translative possibilities between different discursive communities.
4)	Planning interaction involves innovation through programmes of action but also in the construction of the arenas in which these programmes are formulated. Planning thus needs to be reflective about its own processes.
5)	All dimensions of knowing, understanding, appreciating, experiencing may be brought into play within the augmentation of these communicative processes. The struggle to engage in interdiscursive communicative action is to grasp these dimensions and discover ways of reasoning among the competing claims for action they generate, dismissing and devaluing none until it has been explored (Forester 1989).
6)	A reflexive and critical capacity ought to be at the heart of the processes of augmentation, employing Habermasian claims of comprehensibility, integrity, legitimacy and truth. The critical intent is directed not at the discourses of the different participative communities but at the discourse around specific actions invented through the communication process.
7)	Critique is built into the communicative process and serves as a morality for interaction. This fosters a project of democratic pluralism by according respect to all with interests at stake. Morality is addressed interdiscursively, forming the processes and arenas of debate.
8)	Seemingly fixed preferences can be altered when individuals and groups are encouraged to articulate their interests collectively. More than a form of exchange or bargaining around predefined interests, interaction involves mutually reconstructing the interests of the various participants. This defines a process of mutual learning through a collective search for understanding. 
9)	This is not just innovative but possesses the potential to transform existing power relations and material conditions through the continuous effort to ‘critique’ and ‘demystify’, increasing the understanding of participants and hence exposing oppression and dominatory forces, through creating well grounded arguments for alternative analyses and perceptions, actively constructing new understandings. In the final analysis, the transformatory potential of communicative action lies in the power embodied in ‘the better argument’ (Habermas 1990). How human beings talk about things helps to bring those things about (Bourdieu 1990).
10)	The purpose of this intercommunicative planning is to proceed in mutually agreeable ways through an effort at interdiscursive understanding drawing upon the internal critique. Where this leads to cannot be known in advance. But human beings can act with hope and ambition to achieve future possibilities. In this conception of communicative and potentially transformative planning neither the ‘comprehensive plan’ nor ‘goal direction’ programmes have more than a temporary existence.

The task is to discover how this conception of communicative practices for constructing and critiquing understanding between diverse discursive communities facilitates the development of planning systems, their local realisation and their specific contents. Communicative action is oriented to discovering rules and codes of conduct that individuals can agree upon and which are required to enable them to ‘live together but differently’ in shared environments.

There is a need to examine the ways in which local government organisations may use the ICT to enhance democracy because ‘it is at the local level that citizens most directly experience service provision, and act as direct participants in the democratic process’ (Musso et al 1993:3). The outline of reforms oriented towards people-centred governance requires more research of online forums. Online forums may be described as the technology to support a reform which values a dialogue about local-government issues that includes citizens.

‘People-centred governance refers to a series of reforms which aim to extend the role and participation of citizens in government activities. Such reform may take the form of the decentralisation of services and of governmental bodies. Thus, in Sweden, the process of decentralisation towards local government in many cities has involved the creation of local government districts with their own councils. As a result, ‘decentralisation has meant that responsibility for a number of elements of government – including schools, childcare, libraries and social welfare – has been devolved to a unit with a comparatively small population and geographical spread’ (Ranerup 1999:178). The principal concern of this reform is to bring representatives closer to the people who elect them and services closer to the people who use them. 

Citizens can become members of user boards at the local political level and have the right to determine the kinds of services provided by local government. Citizens could also be invited to become part of the board of, for instance, a school or some other such institution (Bogason 1996). This reform could also involve the extension of market mechanisms in the provision of services. This represents a commercial interpretation in which citizens are viewed as consumers, with the right to ‘shop around’ on the market for a certain kind of service (Bogason 1996). Parents may be offered a choice of schools for their children, and the disabled may be given the right to choose the nursing assistants who will help them in their daily lives (Noren 2000).

The use of a virtual public sphere that invites citizens to participate in discussions about local government issues is a further example of a reform that is intended to enlarge the role of citizens in decision-making (Musso et al 1999). This implies the subversion of the position and role of the ‘middle person’, the mediator who intervenes between representatives and represented, public policy and public opinion, who controls policy agendas and debates through manipulating the media such as television and newspapers and official political channels. Rather, citizens can engage in politics directly and are in a position to shape the agenda for discussion in relation to other citizens, influencing public policy to a greater extent than has before been possible. ‘The decision making model is considerably stretched. The old model of decide-announce-defend is challenged by the emergence of the citizen-as-a-partner. Networking online allows government to work closely with communities of interest. Citizens expect to be part of this dialogue’ (Richard 1999:79).

Attempts to extend participatory modes of government through involving citizens in the decision-making process, as opposed to limiting political action to a selected elite of political representatives has been considered problematic throughout history (Coleman 1999). Even in Athens, the birthplace of democracy in this sense, democracies tended to be short-lived, ending in chaos, accompanied by war and followed by tyranny. Philosophers from Rousseau to Mill have kept the rational dream alive. And what the great minds have always insisted upon is that democracy is more than merely counting heads or raised hands. Democracy rests on more than the opinion or prejudice of the masses. It is related to reason and truth. This points to the value of information, knowledge and communication. In recent times, theorists and politicians (Buchstein 1997; Coleman 1999) have projected a vision of a feasible direct democracy based upon information technology. Such vies avoid the idiocy of computocracy in which private, wired up individuals merely push a button without having actually engaged in anything that remotely looks like political debate and discussion. Debate in a virtual political public sphere is a significant improvement upon crude ideas of simply voting using IT. Further, ‘the vision of leaders and their governments actively working in collaboration with citizens and interest groups towards measurable goals is prominent in Internet-related discourse. This ideal may come from the fact that the Internet blends tools for public participation and representation in a unique way’ (Richard 1999:71).

Restricting e-democracy to simply having the masses voting as usual only with IT could actually be a tool of depoliticisation as opposed to repoliticisation. With the emphasis upon speed of communication rather than quality, technology will be used as a means of recording and counting votes more quickly. Quality of participation in the political process and quality of public debate will suffer in consequence. As against this nightmarish vision, it is to be expected that the democratic potentials of information technology will more likely be realised when used in connection with existing political institutions: ‘Here computer democracy would be based on the already existing community and used to distribute and to collect information and to foster deliberation’ (Buchstein 1997:260). In using information technology to enlarge democracy via communication there is a need to ensure that the electronic process joins and enhances the political process rather than displaces it in the manner of an electronic poll. In this latter scenario, political participation is reduced to the passive and private act of ICT being used to register preformed opinions (Buchstein 1997). Such a notion is anti-political; there is nothing to argue or reason about.

A problem to be addressed concerns the differences between people regarding their willingness to take part in political discussions: ‘There will always be people who are unable or unwilling to engage in .. discursive practices’ (Wilhelm 1999:176). A virtual public forum will not appeal to everybody.

Habermas’ rational philosophy underpins the concern to nurture community communication networks within an urban society practising dialogic democracy. The educative role of reason in the ‘rational’ perspective, connecting individuals in processes of mutual understanding is to the fore. The emancipatory normative themes of ‘rational’ philosophy are realised in an intersubjective community approach in which all individuals participate through reciprocal relationships. The process of communication educates individuals into citizenship, encouraging participation so as to exert democratic pressure, dissolving external forces within social life by self-socialising civil forces. Ultimately, the communicative process succeeds only if it is able to penetrate capitalist relations so as to enable individuals to act collectively so as to exercise a rational and ethical control over their self-made environment. This is why the new and urban social movements are so important. These movements, like environmentalism and feminism, are developing new modes of thought, action and organisation in this communicative direction. The potential exists for prefigurative models of change engendered from below to subvert the authoritarian-elitist structures of change imposed from above.

Against an urban planning which has fallen under the control of a dominating reason, there is a need to develop a dialogic, communicative mode of planning. This requires that planning be rooted in the everyday lifeworld of individuals, identifying in this context a planning practice for a better life and for the development and articulation of a shared understanding of the good. What emerges is a new form of planning, an intercommunicative form of planning which proceeds through debate and which presupposes symmetrical relations of equality and freedom. Procedural justice presupposes social justice. This responds to the failures of rational modernity and rejects the one dimensional conception of a dominatory reason. For Habermas, this represents the realisation of the Enlightenment project of extending democracy through the reasoned intersubjectivity of argument and agreement of individuals defining themselves as citizens. This is to argue that Habermas has discovered the grounds for a non-nostalgic recovery of the classical polis in (post)modern conditions. And this implies a new public sphere beyond the liberal institutional separation of the state from civil society.

104 THE PUBLIC SPHERE AFTER HABERMAS
The creation of an urban public sphere requires the widening of the spaces for popular participation so that progressively larger spheres of social life activity are subject to the discursive coordination of citizen interaction and association. Habermas’ communicative ethic and community, entailing a dialogic democratic community, establishes the framework which makes it possible to ground such a public sphere/s in citizen participation, overcoming the unitary bourgeois conception locked up in the abstract state. 

The public sphere is a social ecology for discourse that shapes policy, public opinion and the hegemonic intellectual themes of an epoch and has been theorised and debated by Habermas (1989), Calhoun (1992) and Negt and Kluge (1993). The significance of Habermas’ evaluation of the public sphere lies in its potential to form an alternative mode of societal integration to the legal-institutional-systemic apparatus of the state and capital. Public discourse and communicative action offer an alternative mode of coordination for social life to the non-discursive institutional-systemic (state power and the capital economy) mode of coordination that characterises contemporary society.

Habermas values the bourgeois public sphere for institutionalising not merely a set of interests but as a practice of rational-critical discourse on matters of political concern. This opens up possibilities for a rational approach to the world (Habermas ST 1989:27).





Habermas’ conceptual formulation of the ‘public sphere’ designates a space in modern society in which political participation is enacted through the medium of discourse. This social space exists as an institutionalised arena of discursive interaction in which citizens engage in debate over issues of common concern. Importantly, this public arena is distinct from the state and from the economy. Habermas’ public sphere is not an arena of political and market relations but of discursive relations. This makes it possible to distinguish public arenas of citizen discourse, interaction and association from the apparatuses of the state. Such a nuanced conception of the public realm rejects the identification of the state control of the economy with the control of the citizen body. The state is not the citizenry. Distinguishing the public sphere of discourse, interaction and association proceeding through relations between citizens from the state apparatus checks the incarnation of socialism as an authoritarian-bureaucratic form resting upon the descending theme of power. Affirming the ascending theme through citizen activity makes it possible to conceive the abolition of the state as the realisation of public life, extending public spaces in a participatory-democratic form throughout everyday life (Fraser 1992:109/10).

The extension of public spaces means that participation no longer depends on the institutional separation of the state from civil society, the liberal separation that is structured around the institution of private property. The notion of an urban public sphere rests upon social control as against the alien control of the state and capital. This enables individuals to participate as active citizens in the determination of their common affairs (Hohedahl 1992:99/100).

It is worth pointing out that the unitary bourgeois public, located in the state, was always a contested entity. A number of subaltern but competing counterpublics had always existed alongside the unitary bourgeois public – national publics, popular peasant publics, elite women’s publics, proletarian publics (Eley 1992:123; Spivak in Nelson and Grossberg 1988:271/313; Felski 1989; Fraser 1992:123). These exist as the social basis for resistance (Dawson 1994:206). Given the conflictual relations of these counterpublics to the bourgeois public sphere, it cannot be assumed that the bourgeois conception embodies an unrealised ideal (Fraser 1992:116/7) that the Left, in these ‘post-socialist’ times, must now concentrate upon realising – the liberal democratic turn addressed earlier. 

There are, then, many publics, counter- or subsidiary publics. One can defend the independence and legitimacy of these public spaces in relation to an official or formal public sphere.





Melucci introduces the notion of a ‘postindustrial’ democracy as a ‘democracy of everyday life’ in terms of the consolidation of independent public spaces which render ‘visible and collective’ the questions raised by the social movements (Melucci 1988:259). The conception of an urban public sphere goes further than this in dissolving the official or formal public sphere so that it becomes co-extensive with this self-regulating democratic public of everyday life. The conception of an urban public sphere overcomes the conflictual relations between the publics within everyday life on the one hand and between these everyday publics and the formal public sphere on the other. 

The notion of a ‘subaltern counter-public’ is important in pointing to alternative publics that may be formed within the dominant public and which may create their own social capital as a means of compensating for lack of resources and as a means of challenging the dominant public. Dawson poses the question concerning possibilities ‘for restructuring an oppositional subaltern public in the aftermath of a rightist backlash of historic proportions’ (Dawson 1994:215). In fine, the question concerns the extent to which social capital (Putnam) may be created to compensate, challenge and counteract inequalities in the dual city (Castells), on the part of socially excluded groups (Wilson) to engender a counter public sphere (Dawson) which unite in the associational space of civil society to form an urban public sphere.

This envisages the possibility of a multilayered social fabric sustained by a welter of democratic intermediary institutions and power. In stratified societies, arrangements that accommodate contestation among a plurality of competing publics better promote the ideal of participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, overarching public sphere (Fraser 122/3).

Fraser is forthright in confronting this insistence on institutional separation:





It is in this context that one can refer to the notion of the ‘proletarian public’. This is ‘characterised by its direct, sensual, and collective mode of experience’ in contradistinction to the ‘mediated, intellectual, mode of the bourgeois’. It would be a ‘public grounded in the process of production’ as distinct from the bourgeois separation of public and private spheres (Negt and Kluge in Medick 1982:87).

The notion of the experiential public sphere in contradistinction to the more intellectualised, abstractly mediated bourgeois public is suggestive of the attempt to open public spaces through the re-unification of political and civil spheres. This is to take an associational view of public space that revalues civil society as a site of public exchange and interaction. This contradicts the liberal model of public space as political dialogue as one finds it stated in the likes of Ackerman. Ackerman insists upon the typically liberal conversational constraint, a ‘dialogic neutrality’ which presumes the rightful coexistence of different conceptions of the good (Ackerman 1980:11).

One sees in Ackerman the intellectualised, abstracted and mediated mode of the bourgeois public. Ackerman’s liberal model conceives political relations in juridical terms. Thus the view that the just is neutral in relation to conflicting views of the good expresses the neutrality that is the cornerstone of the modern legal system. However, politics concerns more than neutrality: ‘Democratic politics challenges, redefines and renegotiates the divisions between the good and the just, the moral and the legal, the private and the public’ (Benhabib 1992:83).

In distinguishing between old and new modes of public thought, action and organisation, the perspective of Offe on new social movements is useful. The political paradigm created by the new social movements is associated with ‘dialogical’ forms whereas the political paradigm of industrial capitalist society is associated with monological forms.













MODES OF ACTION	centralising and bureaucratic	decentralising and democratic
RELATIONS OF REPRESENTATION	organisation and leadership FOR the constituents	organisation and leadership BY the constituents
DISCOURSE	instrumental rationality	substantive rationality

Monological modes are appropriate to an externally enforced social union imposing a descending theme of power via an abstract institutional-systemic world whilst dialogical modes project an internal coordination proceeding from within civil society according to the ascending theme of power.

The expansion of cultural complexity subverts the modernist schema and paradigm, destabilising and decentring previous urban sociology. Here, uni-linear progress comes to be replaced by the open spiral of hybrid cultures and ‘atonal ensembles’ (Said 1990:16). Urban reality embodies a multiplicity and heterogeneity, implying a creative uncertainty and disorder an interpolating space (Leopardi 1989:33). The possibility of theory becomes uncertain in the dissonance that lies between situated and disembodied knowledges (Mani 1989). The need for new modes of thought, organisation and action is thus apparent. An urban public sphere serves to ground politics and morality, self-understanding, in an heterogeneous urban reality. Habermas’s communicative ethic, implying a dialogic democratic community of active, rational, citizens practising intersubjective communication, makes a powerful contribution to the urban public sphere as a new mode. The final chapter develops these points with respect to a new mode of ethico-political expression within an urban public sphere in terms of an urban ecology which grounds being in nature. The discussion thus returns to classical Greek notions of scale, harmony and balance.

105 THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION
Eco-Epistemology – the Dialectic of the Rational

‘Reason and the rational may be less the willed-for and attained climax of human development than an evolutionary trait of which human beings are the heir (M.W. Wartofsky, ‘Is Science Rational?’ In: W.H. Truitt and T.W.G. Solomons (eds) science, Technology and Freedom (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1974). Reason as consciousness, in Bookchin’s unorthodox usage, needs to be untangled from the progressivist bias that sees reason as the crowning achievement of humankind. Reason developed ‘because it functions optimally for human survival’ (Wartofsky 1974:207). In view of the catastrophes of the twentieth century, there exist critical questions about the ability of reason to be adequate as a means for total ecospheric survival. In fact, the reasonableness, and even the dangerousness, of reason is worth pondering. Bookchin concludes that humans ‘are a curse on natural evolution, not its fulfilment’ (Bookchin EF 1982:238). This is the dialectic of reason.

 On the one hand, passionate defenders of the human would insist that reason is all that is good about human life. Detractors might say that the bad must be taken with the good and not merely repackaged as ‘unreason’. Reason’s nightmare is when it turns into its opposite (Gouldner The Two Marxisms New York: Seabury Press 1980). Bookchin’s solution of identifying reason with ‘consciousness’, and especially with the ultimate self-consciousness of humanity, is not an answer to the problem. Reason as consciousness implies that a pinnacle is reached in mankind-transcendent’.

‘Reason easily turns into its opposite while keeping the appearance of the rational; it can seem ‘reasonable’ while becoming repressive and instrumental. A serious question is whether rationality is a danger to the species (Wartofsky 1974:202).

 The scholastics had the concept of recta ratio (right reason). The antithesis of right reason is an unreasonable reason which seems to have evolved along with the tools, art, bipedalism, large brain, small pelvis, social structures, as well as everything else we know as human nature and culture. The dialectic of right reason and its negation are part of the natural history of human ecology.
 Can reason be saved? Are the defects of reason only pseudo-reason, or are they the inescapable shadow of reason? The answers are not clear.

 Reason and rhetoric are very closely related. Rhetoric is by definition instrumental. ‘The aim of rhetoric ..’ says a recent account, ‘is to affect the giving of sound decisions: i.e. good judgements’ (T.B. Farrell, ‘The Tradition of Rhetoric and the Philosophy of Communication’, Communication 7: 1983:162). There is a brotherhood between rhetoric and practical reason, since the purpose of rhetoric is to influence the making of ‘preferred or more defensible decisions’ (Farrell 1983).

‘Communication’ is a more neutral term than rhetoric. Communication is the branching and extended kinship of discourse and interchange, while rhetoric is the practice of ‘persuasive possibility’. If communication is ‘unfettered sharing’ in thought and feeling then rhetoric shows the limits of communicative possibility. Rhetoric’s reasonableness must be suspect, based on the history of the Western world. Farrell has noted that neither the rhetorical tradition nor the communicative philosophy tradition ‘depict accurately the reality of ongoing communicative practice’ (Farrell 1983:176). This is the realm of the ecology of communication which has been missed by both traditions. Traditional rhetorical theory sees the connections between speech and democracy (L Thomssen and A.C. Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: Ronald Press 1948). Traditional liberal democracy, rhetoric, and communication meet here. C Wright Mills describes the process:

The people are presented with problems. They discuss them. They decide on them. They formulate viewpoints. These viewpoints are organised and they compete. One viewpoint ‘wins out’. Then the people act on this view, or their representatives are instructed to act it out, and this they promptly do.

C Wright Mills The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press 1948

This is a fairy tale, according to Mills. The mass media are part of the reason why this kind of naïve democracy is extinct. Mills sees media as destroyers of discussion and interchange of opinion. And what is just as bad, the media are themselves part of the increased means of control and power at the disposal of the elites of power and wealth (Mills 1948:314 315). But media-as-evil was preceded by media-as-salvation. 

 The field of communication and media studies in the US started with high promise in the writings of Dewey, Cooley, Park and Mead. Dewey noted the deeper-than-etymological relationships between common, community, communion, and communication. ‘Men live in a community in virtue of the things they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common’ (John Dewey quoted in D. Czitrom, Media and the American Mind – from Morse to McLuhan Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982). Dewey’s early insight into communication had a practical, though progressivist, slant to it. Dewey thought communication was wonderful enough to be the fulfilment of the promise to restore the face-to-face small town community, with its accompanying values, in a nation which was hell bent on industrialising and expanding (and in the process, running over small towns and their ways). (Czitrom). But the Chicago School – the grandfathers of communication studies in the US – saw in the newer technologies of information exchange (spawned by industrialisation) potentialities for the transformation of society. The information made available by the new media would augment and improve public discourse, they thought. In their ideal democracy, if more information is made available, the decisions of the public could be more rational and therefore more democratic. Of course, the dream of a return to a small town face-to-face democracy by a media made ‘great community’ was never possible, as Mills pointed out.’ (Clark 190/1).

‘Communication theory should be guided by a vision of a wished-for society. The knowledge produced by communication research should make the present understandable and the future possible’ (Clark 191).

‘Bookchin calls this the ‘outlook of the organic society’. This picture of organic society is not a blueprint for a modern ecological society, but it is the ontological matrix of a society, not of communicative rationality, but of communicative ecstasy (to suggest an improvement over Habermas’ goal). This type of participatory, ecstatic, sensuous, aesthetic, imaginative, kinaesthetic, celebratory society represents a storehouse of social riches and diversity which no merely rational community can ever hope to match. With enough social ecological evolution, a recapturing of the best of past and present organic societies might be possible. Reason’s saving grace, even with its auto-nemesis lurking just inside itself, is its ability to transcend itself. When it is reasonable to go beyond reason to a newly remade, neo-organic, socially ecological community, then reason, both as ratio and as consciousness, can make the move.’ (Clark 193).

The Ecology of Distance

Notes to finish on.

‘Communication can be thought of as an attempt to regain and restore what was once whole. The separation by distancing, which is what communication is trying to overcome, can be psychological or multi-leveled, existential alienation.’ (Clark 193).
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106 REASON AND NATURE
Biosphere Politics
Security
This book is concerned with the meaning of human freedom, power and security as terms which are connected to each other and to nature. The book seeks to address the questions of human life to the rightful place of human beings within nature. This means developing a philosophy which establishes the links between reason and nature, setting human society and its culture within the wider ecology of the planet. As such, the book seeks to integrate a number of disciplines within a comprehensive vision of a biosphere political culture which is concerned with the conditions of an organic and sustainable society.

In every society throughout history, concepts of freedom and security are inextricably intertwined with the relationships that human beings’ have with each other and with their natural environment. Human beings are bound up with each other and with the world. The issues of securing sustenance, securing the socio-political order, securing peace of mind and securing the natural world are interconnected. And yet, in political economy and political philosophy, concepts of security are narrowly focused upon money and power in abstraction from nature and human anthropology. The environment is not considered in its widest sense. The consequence of treating society and nature as separate realms has been denaturalisation of the environment and the dehumanisation of society. Concepts of security are narrowly treated within the confines of political science, economics and military history considered as a realm apart from the environment and nature. The argument presented here analyses freedom and security in terms of the connections that link politics, economics, and ecology, affirming the unity of society and nature. The contemporary world order – the state and capital – still consider nature to be no more than an exploitable resource or externality. Real security requires that environmental principles be integrated into public policy.

As the full scale of the emerging environmental crisis that threatens to alter the very biochemistry of the planet becomes apparent in its affects, the need for new institutional thought and practice to ensure the continued existence of planetary ecosystems and so secure the future of life on earth has become pressing. The human race is inflicting infinite varieties of annihilation upon itself, from the promised Armageddon of the arms race and nuclear weaponry to global warming, acid rain and the poisoning of water tables, the vanishing atmosphere and ozone depletion, deforestation, desertification, and famine. Such terrors are the stuff of Biblical prophecy but descend upon us as the product of an eminently rational and pragmatic realism focused upon the pursuit of power and the making of money. Elites within business and government, redefining democracy to mean the counting of passive majorities through manufactured consent, have steered the ship of state this way without so much as looking at the direction, the genocidal end, so long as they remain at the controls. The massive extinction of species being witnessed is forcing the human species to look more seriously at securing the conditions – political and institutional as much as natural - of its own survival. This concern calls for the widest and most comprehensive conception of global ecological security. Questions of personal and political freedom are now more explicitly connected with issues of private and public security than ever before, particularly with respect to the magnitude of the environmental changes underway.

In calling for the politics of eternity to replace the politics of time, Roszak calls for an appreciation of the political meaning of William Blake’s prophetic poems. Roszak explores the nature of Blake’s radicalism in penetrating far beyond government and politics and class conflict to the ‘mental fight’ against the mad rationality of the modern culture science, technology and industrialism. Beyond the economic misery and political repression that accompanied the Industrial Revolution, Blake identified a more profound, more disturbing culture unfolding under the surface. To Blake, the inexorable advance of science and technology represented not ‘progress’ but a terroristic violence against precious human potentialities – terroristic in Ellul’s sense of forcing human beings to change as a matter of necessity and leaving no choice or option to refuse (Ellul). Reason divorced of its ethical – anthropological and natural - component takes the form of a rational madness or mad rationality. The ‘dark Satanic mills’ Blake criticised were much more than the institutions of class conflict and social oppression but were the expression of a ‘mind-forg’d manacles’, the rational culture of Newton, Locke, and Bacon that divorced technical from moral capacities. Blake’s target was Urizen, the demon of Reason, technical power mad with lust ‘to vegetate the divine vision’. Whereas radical and socialist politics in the coming couple of centuries came to focus upon the surface manifestations of social injustice centred upon class, Blake from the start highlighted the underlying spiritual violation (Roszak xxvi/xxvii).

The revolution that Blake demanded aimed at not merely the emancipation of the working class but the emancipation of the visionary powers from the institutional reality in which they have been confined by a rational technological-industrial necessity. At the beginning of the Industrial Revolution Blake had perceived the limits of the technocratic society and its promises of progress and freedom and envisaged the postindustrial revolution. Blake understood the pathos of means and ends, the extent to which means enlarge and come to replace the ends to produce not a world of progress, enlightenment and freedom but a nihilistic order in which things get worse as a result of getting better. With material abundance and scientific knowledge at its command, modernity exudes totalitarian violence on a scale that dwarfs so-called backward peoples. Two hundred years after Kant envisaged the achievement of ‘Perpetual Peace’, national and religious bigotry continues to scar the word and the promise of total war haunts the modern psyche. Advanced modern societies are characterised by nihilism and neurosis, obstructing the human happiness that political and business elites persuaded their subject peoples to be consequent upon economic growth. The key to unravelling this riddle lies in understanding the connection of reason and nature and identifying how the fundamental dualism of reason and nature has impacted upon human society, diverting institutional and technological potentialities for human freedom and happiness into their opposite. Human beings have expanded their physical and material power and wealth through the instrumental and technological conquest of nature. What has been ignored is the extent to which human beings are a part of this conquered nature. The price of technological and material ‘progress’ has been the denaturalisation of human beings and the dehumanisation of society. Denaturalisation and dehumanisation within and between nature and society is inextricably connected through the key figure of reason. 
 ‘We conquer nature, we augment our power and wealth, we multiply the means of distracting our attention this way and that .. but the despair burrows in deeper and grows fatter; it feeds on our secret sense of having failed the potentialities of human being.’ (Roszak xxviii).

Modernity has been shaped and defined by the mechanistic thinking of the Enlightenment and the instrumental orientation of capitalism. This era has been characterised by the privatisation and commodification of human and natural ‘resources’; abstraction from the natural world; and a pathological concern with equating liberty with security as the autonomous, atomistic existence of individuals in competition with other individuals for power and scarce resources, independent of each other and of the forces of nature. The nation-state in symbiotic relationship with private business is the primary institutional medium for instituting individual and collective security as a narrow protective concern. Genuine security is more than a protective institutional device concerned with the narrow pursuit of power and money within class relations but redefines the terms of reason and freedom and also the relationship between human beings to each other within society and between society and nature. ‘The twin ideals of intimate reparticipation in the communities of life and resacralisation of nature form the cornerstone of a new vision of security’ (Rifkin 4). The concern is to secure a rational unity between human beings, society and nature as an interlocking process through replacing a passive mode of existence with the achievement of an active exercise and use of human capacities as manifested in participation in community life and the public life of the body politic, in the outer life of the environment, and, indeed, in the inner life of human potentiality, restoring mind and body to health through the positive exercise of the human faculties. This is to envisage a public life that embraces not just all humankind but the whole of nature as a living organism, the human species as ally and accomplice in ensuring well-being as the proper functioning of the biosphere, all that sustains the diverse forms of life on earth within the thin chemical envelope that extends from the ocean depths to the stratosphere. 

The earth is under severe strain and can suffer only so much more damage before its health is seriously impaired. Modernity is characterised by blind, unconscious, uncontrolled human action, proceeding through a systemic-institutional world of state power and capital abstracted from human communities. The consequences of the tyranny of abstract, alien power operating according to imperatives of its own is the despoliation of the planet to an extent that threatens prevailing conditions of life. The failure of human beings to take ethical, ecological responsibility for their creative power, shifting responsibility to systemic and institutional imperatives, generates hubris, the pride that presages a fall, and will be followed by nemesis, the revenge taken when nature strikes back.

There is a need to delineate the meaning of the word ‘natural’. To argue that something is natural does not imply a fixed and unchangeable nature. Human beings have creative powers of reason and labour to fashion culture as a mediating force. A human being without a culture is like a computer without software, mere physical hardware. Human beings are designed to create and use culture to achieve ends.

The word ‘nature’ derives from the Latin nature (from nascora, to be born), which developed the Greek physis (from phyo, to bring forth or to grow). In its classical conception, nature was the nature of something; all things has a nature which defined what is essentially is. Nature could not be opposed to the human as such, only certain human products like the unnatural aspects of conventions, institutions or technologies. Nature could therefore be a critical tool, but it was not a realm unto itself. All life was infused with nature; all life was shot through with it.

The word ecology derives from the Greek words oikos (‘house’), and logos, (‘knowledge’) and pertains to all aspects of life and living in the Earth House Hold. As a scientific term, oekologie was first used by German biologist Ernest Haeckel in 1866 to refer to the study of animals and plant systems in relation to their environment. Obtaining professional status in 1930, ecology as a science emphasises the interdependence of different life-forms. The politics of ecology is specifically concerned with the human interaction with the environment. 

The science of ecology underpins the politics of the green movement and its attempt to locate humanity within an intricate web of nature. Ecology provides the green movement with key words such as ‘ecosystem’, an interdependent group of items forming a unified whole, ‘biosphere’, the thin chemical envelope that extends from the ocean depths to the stratosphere that sustains life on earth, and ‘ecosphere’, the part of the universe, especially the earth, where life can exist.
The politics of ecology is life-affirming and exposes the life-negating politics of administrative and technological power and material expansion. The goal of human life is defined in terms of promoting or supporting the life-support systems on which all life, including human life, depends. The politics of ecology support modes of thought and action which serve to promote and sustain life-support systems and attempts to uproot those modes which function to destroy or impair these systems. The crucial issue of an ecological politics, therefore, is the implementation of an ethic that serves to counter the growing forces of entropy.

Human power is therefore conceived not in abstraction or liberation from the world but in terms of integration with nature. Such an orientation celebrates unity in diversity, organic growth and the interdependence of life on earth, affirming the intrinsic value of all organisms in a non-hierarchical world. Conceiving nature as comprising self-regulating organisms to present biotic communities, ecological principles support values of participatory democracy, cooperation and mutual aid in decentralised and self-managing communities when applied to human society.

The separation between human beings and nature became explicit in the eighteenth century as a result of the Industrial Revolution, the coal mines and cotton mills, the inventions and the factories clearly removing the basis of society from the agricultural economy. These developments subverted the close and relatively stable union of human beings with the land from which they drew their sustenance, having been farmed productively for centuries. Industrialisation provoked the Romantic idealisation of pure nature as wilderness, idealising what had long since been lost. Long before industrialisation, the invention of farming had rendered ‘nature’ impure. The Romantic reaction, though, is telling in the way that it reveals the assumption, shared by the exploiters and defenders of ‘nature’, that human beings and nature exist in separate realms. To exploiters, nature is a resource that can be commodified and manipulated to return a profit. To defenders, nature has a purity that it loses through human intervention and which, therefore, must be preserved. Caught within this dualism there is great ambiguity in the statement that human beings are a part of nature. Although human beings are an integral part of nature, they are also the beings most capable of creative – and often damaging – intervention in nature’s processes. Since the nature of human beings is to build, create and transform, the caution that external nature be protected in its purity from human intervention amounts to a call for human beings to abandon their nature. At the same time, this creative power to transform which is natural to human beings often involves the despoliation of external natural. The fact that human beings are a part of nature does not in itself justify anything and everything that human beings do as being by definition natural. To argue otherwise is to debilitate the concept of nature as a critical tool which is capable of criticising human actions, relations, institutions for contradicting rather than corresponding to human anthropology. Overcoming the dualism that separates human beings and nature means recognising that just as human beings are a part of nature, so nature is a part of the human species.

Security has been pursued through the attempt to enclose the world, commodifying nature and making it an exploitable possession subject to human rapacity. Nature exists for all life forms to enjoy, but human beings have sought through technology to conquer it and monopolise its gifts. However, there is a price to be paid for such overweening ambition. Human beings have failed to understand what being part of nature implies. In the attempt to humanize nature, they have succeeded only in denaturing themselves, disfiguring ethical human powers, a loss for which no amount of material and technological wealth can compensate. The control of Nature has entailed the control of human beings; the conquest and destruction of nature has involved the conquest and destruction of human nature. In becoming denatured, reason was divested of its ethical and anthropological component, turning into a mad rationality. Crucial to this process was what the Greeks defined as techne, technology.

The argument in this book traces the question back to the rationalist tradition upon which Western civilisation is based, focusing upon the way that classical philosophy separated reason from nature, the mind from the body, and humanity from the environment. The separation of humanity from nature was confirmed, extended and entrenched by the mechanical thinking of the Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century which, in Bacon’s words, put nature on the rack in an attempt to discover its secrets. As is well known, any knowledge obtained through torture is highly unreliable and apt to cause more problems. The rise of capitalism and industrialisation ushered in the enclosure, privatisation and commodification of nature, putting the human relationship with nature on an instrumental basis. This mechanistic world-view generated a commercial, industrial, technocratic and human-centred global order which disenchanted the world, society and nature together. This world-view has been dominant for the last three centuries but is being increasingly challenged by a view that presents humanity as an integral part of the organic whole rather than apart and above it. This view affirms the interrelatedness of all things. With human beings as a part of nature, it follows that the well-being of humankind is conditional upon the well-being of nature as a whole.

A biosphere political culture implies an organic and sustainable society functioning in harmony with nature. This vision implies a radical transformation of the methods and goals of production and a reorientation and redefinition of needs and wants. This amounts to a paradigm shift in the modes of human thought, action and organisation in order to place civilisation on a new basis. There is a need for a new philosophy which grounds ecological principles and politics by affirming the unity of human beings with each other within society, and the unity of this society with nature.

Reason and nature
The relation between human beings and nature has always been fraught with difficulties and ambiguities. That human beings are a part of nature is clear enough. The problem lies with the fact that human beings see themselves to be not only the supreme creation of nature but as a creative force in their own right, independently of nature. Human beings are in, out and, at times, through their actions, even against nature. This ambiguity has issued in the modern predicament. It is one small step from conceiving oneself to be the supreme creation of nature to raising oneself out and above nature by technique, using that scientific rationality to regard and reduce nature to being a machine. Modern humanity claims to have expanded knowledge of nature to an unprecedented level, and has certainly transformed the natural environment on a vast scale. Nature has, however, been attacked with arrogance and ignorance. On the assumption that the scientific method truly reveals nature as it actually is, human beings have expressed themselves and their own nature through the same method, identifying themselves with it. In the process, they have misunderstood and misrepresented both nature and themselves. The consequence has been to erode, damage and threaten to destroy the relations of human beings to nature, to each other and to their own nature. Relationships are crucial in that they create form: without knowledge and recognition of relationships, there is a formlessness which expresses itself in state and society, in the external environment and, indeed, in the inner landscape of character, identity and personality. The structures of inner and outer human life are deteriorating. The symbol of this is the deterioration of the structure of the environment. To overcome this situation requires a philosophy that is both human and ecological, that establishes the relation between humanity and nature on an organic and sustainable basis.

The symbol of this is the deterioration of the structure of our soils, for this is acknowledged. Though we do not acknowledge the reason – that we neglect the life of the soil, the activity of micro-organisms and insects, that drains and creates the structure. The notion of soil as a hierarchy of activities has no place in the thinking of our officials and experts – and they admit it. Soil becomes as formless as personality and urban and rural planning. All this can be traced to our lack of a philosophy at once human and ecological.’ (Waller 10).

The rationalists have mechanised the world and all life forms within it, including humankind. Through conceiving human nature according to the scientific method, the rationalists have reduced human beings to a mechanical model. Paradoxically, although human beings appear omnipotent, with nature as a machine being ruled by the mechanistic method, human freedom has been diminished in terms of capacity to realise natural human potentialities. For humanity is a developing potentiality that is actualised not through the technocratic conquest of nature but a conscious mastery yielded through a true understanding of the relationship with nature as itself a developing organism. The individual conceived as presiding over nature as an organisation rather than an organism, imposing scientific methods, diverts attention from the genuine unfolding of Being through experience.

Security versus freedom – the ecology of fear versus the happy habitat
Although human beings have turned technology against nature, that technology has, in turn, turned against human beings and human society; the means for conquering nature have also conquered society. Technology is an abstraction of human power that has turned against its human creators; technology has become complex, domineering and overscale, aggressive in its intent towards nature and violent in its effects upon it. Technology has promised human beings security through artificial power, growth and control but has diminished freedom as the creative self-realisation of inherent human potentialities. The truth is that a genuine security is obtained not in abstraction from nature and society as external others but in nature and each other.
The rational madness of a technological progress pursued over against nature highlights a flaw within the human psyche, a flaw which sends the species down the path of hubris and nemesis – a failure to recognise necessity and limits involving a pursuit of the possible to an extent which an understanding of nature would reveal to be impossible. The character flaw is not irremediable but is associated with the failure to subordinate human technique and power to conscious control, letting technology run free according to its own imperatives. 
Human beings need to truly live up to their creative power, retaking responsibility from impersonal imperatives, repersonalising their powers by developing the cultural mechanisms for understanding the transformative implications of technology. The modern world evinces not so much human power as human impotence in the face of power out of control. Technology has become an end in itself, creating the milieu for its own expansion regardless of human ends and social and environmental consequences. Contemporary capitalism has immense systemic drive, its expansionary tendencies now embracing the whole planet. But it has little direction; an unprecedented capacity for travelling furthest quickest is of no use when the system has no idea of where it is going, no capacity for conscious direction. To overcome this requires a resolution of the problem of the inversion of means and ends. Human material and technical powers – institutions, mechanisms and systems – must be re-established as means to ends consciously set by human beings. This is to redefine progress in political and cultural terms, throwing off mechanistic conceptions (bigger and better machines), to integrate power within an organic picture of the unity of humanity and nature.

The hubris of material progress misleads us into thinking that it is possible to keep increasing the numbers of people on the planet, the number of cars on the road, build as many houses, factories, offices, roads .. keep expanding urban civilisation without reference to scale, balance, harmony, proportion, limits. In this overweening arrogance, human beings are guilty of using their capacity for reason in the most narrow of senses, developing no awareness of the world of nature of which they are a part. Such arrogance denies the essential principle of reason which sees the end of humanity in achieving reconciliation and harmony with themselves and their powers, with others in society and with nature. ‘Progress’ measured in narrowly technical and economistic terms, discards the ethical and anthropological component of reason and, in so doing, exalts an abstract and impersonal rationalism over against reason. Such rationalism expresses human power and potentiality in an as yet underdeveloped sense and needs to be enhanced and fulfilled through practical understanding, the relationship of causes, the proper ordering of means to ends, the recognition of necessity. If rationalism is not subordinated to the principles of reason in this manner, then progress will destroy humankind and damage life on earth. Technical and material rationalism must be supplemented and controlled by the ethical and anthropological component so that hitherto abstract powers are supplied with intentions which correspond to rather than contradict the human ontology, making it possible for human beings to realise their nature as whole beings.

To be worthy of the name, reason must be true to human nature and nature equally and at the same time. When speculating upon the ‘economic possibilities for our grandchildren’, Keynes predicted the resolution of the economic problem, the conquest of necessity so that everybody would be so rich that ‘we shall then once more value ends above means and prefer the good to the useful. But beware, he goes on, ‘the time for all that is not yet. For at least another 100 years we must pretend to ourselves and to everyone else that fair is foul and foul is fair: for foul is useful and fair is not’. Keynes admitted that capitalism is irreligious, meaning that it cannot recognise a moral input or direction. But reason without morality is not reason at all. The economic problem is one of material scarcity and is solved by production and consumption at a level which satisfies necessities of life; but at a more profound level there is a human problem and this cannot be so cheaply resolved. The human problem pertains to the creative realisation of immanent human potentialities. Human beings require a social organisation that enables them to work and create to a level commensurate with their capacities. This is to set the issue within a philosophical anthropology and human ecology. The human problem is a problem of reason and of morality and is not solved by ‘progress’ in merely its technical and economic aspect.
The economic and technological factors cannot be abstracted from other factors within nature, including the human factor. The institutional-systemic apparatus of the state and capital is an organisation, artificially regulated by institutions and mechanisms and systems, in contradistinction to an organism, which is essentially self-regulating. The institutional-systemic apparatus does not automatically respond to correct disorder within the whole order, but permits inequalities and imbalances on account of preserving the advantages for particular – dominant - parts. A self-regulating organism puts the health and vitality of the whole before particular advantages and would quickly identify and eliminate inequalities and imbalances. Thus reasonable intention must control material and technical power with the aim of achieving harmony between human beings in society and between society and nature.

 To be critical of technology, then, is not to be critical of reason as such, but to insist that reason be rational; this is to be critical of the assumption underlying the scientific rationality characterising the modern world. Modern rationality – in science and economics – was shorn of philosophical roots from the start, denormalised in abandoning ethics and value in favour of the accumulation of knowledge/power in impersonal and instrumental terms. The deterioration of human and natural ecology, exemplified in urban breakdown and natural despoliation, is a symptom a mechanistic culture that fails to understand power as an organic and natural entity. The mechanistic obsession with measuring, quantifying and commodifying the physical, the natural, has created an inner wasteland that corrupts human beings, society and nature from within, systematically devaluing and denigrating those areas of knowledge that human cultures have developed as steering signals to achieve essential values, goals, and give their society a sense of meaning. Much that modern science, economics etc promotes as rational would be considered highly irrational in a culture that conceives itself to be an organic, living community concerned with the common good of all.

The question of the common good raises the issue of the universal and its embodiment. Throughout history, attempts to achieve the universal order – whether in states or religions – have been characterised by the recourse to coercion to ensure unity. This had contradicted the reason implanted in all human beings and has therefore contradicted the essential humanity upon which a genuine universalism is based. A genuine unity is underpinned by a philosophical anthropology which yields a view of how human beings ought to live which harmonises human nature with the organic basis of life; a genuine universal ethic would therefore articulate a vision of the environment that corresponds to the realisation of human potential. This is to re-establish politics in its classical sense of creative human self-realisation, politikos bios as a human ecology concerned with the relationships that human beings have to nature within and without, to their own personal character, to others and to their environment. Such a politics would shift modes of thought and organisation from the atomism of modern rationality - whether Cartesian or empirical or the self-maximising bourgeois - to affirm the organic interdependence of each and all within society and of society with nature.





Therefore when Tao is lost, there is goodness,
When goodness is lost, there is kindness,
When kindness is lost, there is justice,
When justice is lost, there is ritual. 
Lao Tsu, Tao Te Ching, trans Gia-Fu Feng & Jane English (New York: Vintage 1972 ch38)

A person of the Tao will be good spontaneously without any judgement, without any utilitarian calculation of intentions or consequences of his actions. He will be sincere, simple, spontaneous, generous and detached. He will not force others to do things, but let them organise themselves’ (Marshall 15/6).


That something is awry in modern – Western – rationalism and that this something concerns the approach to nature is clear. There is a large secondary literature which highlights a contrast between the western positivistic and mechanistic approach to nature and that of non-Western or pre-modern peoples (Clarence Glacken 1970 Man Against Nature: an Outmoded Concept. in H Helfrich Jr (ed) The Environment Crisis Yale UP). The technological mastery of nature begins long before the capitalist urbanisation and industrialisation which constitutes modernity. The western conception can be traced to the classical Greeks after Socrates, Christianity as expounded in the early chapters of Genesis and in Baconian philosophy, all of which turn reason and even humanity itself against nature. Genesis explicitly desecrates nature and gives ‘man’ dominion over it. Genesis is clear that godliness is to be found not in nature comprising humanity but in the work of ‘man’ as apart from and above nature. This devalues nature; the only value is in nature as remade by man. Not surprisingly, Christian sources, from John onward, depict heaven as a city. This defines the dominant conception of western rationalism, pursuing freedom and power through control over nature, conceiving the latter as something not integral to but as alien to humanity, something to be subordinated to human purposes. Freedom and power defined in terms of such control defines the western idea of progress. 


Glacken argues that in the early stages of the reason-nature dualism, the rationalists delineated the relationship between humanity and nature in creative rather than antagonistic terms. However, the underlying orientation was one of antithesis and domination. Moreover, the understanding on which this orientation was based was expressed largely in mechanistic terms. Over the centuries, this attitude became one of fundamental opposition between humans and the natural world (and between the individual and society) and has been the dominant influence over the past two or three hundred years of capitalist industrialisation. The tendency to identify this mechanistic tradition with rationalism as such, however, ignores the counter tendencies which classical essentialism, pantheism, Romanticism and various idealist philosophies have expressed. 

The criticism of the burgeoning empire of capitalist urbanisation and industrialism as the replacement of a natural organic environment by an artificial environment has always formed a subterranean current to the dominant culture and can be found in the likes of Swift, Coleridge, William Blake, Rousseau and the Romantics. The tyranny of the machine and of machine culture has never been unchallenged. This book identifies its argument in a discriminating way with that subterranean thread which affirmed organic as against mechanistic modes. The organic challenge has always been undermined by necessity and the way that the capitalist system conquered material necessity only to impose artificial necessity – human beings are caught on a treadmill of production and consumption within an increasing artificiality. Values essential to human well-being - creativity, autonomy, recognition, dignity, and spontaneity - have come to be inseparably connected in the modern psyche with the instrumental power to manipulate nature.

The aim of this book is to show that the objective of transforming the world into a life enhancing socially and ecologically sound, sane, and sustainable order does not entail a revolt against reason but is, on the contrary, eminently rational in being an objective discernible in human nature and identified by a realisable ideal in civilisation, culture and philosophy. A critique of modern materialism, mechanism, atomism that characterises modern rationality does not imply regression to pre-modern, non-rational modes of thought. When Skolimowski exhorts ‘God save us from the scientific rationalists’ one has to ask which God? For the God of Spinoza is identical with Nature, the intellectual love of which forms the only possible freedom for human beings. Yet, despite being claimed for deep ecology by the likes of Ness, Spinoza’s position is rational rather than mystical showing how scientific rationalism is the only way that human beings can come to understand God or Nature and so achieve freedom. Putting the point this way is to affirm the possibility of realising by rational means the goal of human freedom, establishing the unity of human and natural ecology by integrating reason and nature.

The manufacture and manipulation of necessity in new artificial forms has been instrumental in creating and sustaining hierarchies of power. It persuades through an illusory promise of security through more technical control and material power, a promise made within an ecology of fear, social relations which deny individuals freedom, authenticity, power, security. Insecurity is an ineradicable element in human nature, and remains an impulse underlying human motives: it is an impulse that can force human beings to retreat into conservative modes through a politics of fear.

If this yearning for security is understood in terms of replacing antithesis between humans and nature with reconciliation then there is a basis for redefining reason in terms of growth. The organic basis of life is the relationship of each and all: in human society reason is concerned with the conditions for the fulfilment of this relationship and the human relationship with nature. The political problem is basically the rational one of securing the relationship of individuals on a collective scale. Ultimately, however, security is determined not only by the relationship of each and all in society but by the relationship of this society with the nature upon which all life depends. This is made clear by the fact that the deterioration of the environment that now clearly threatens the survival of life on earth appears as the product of specific social relationships. Hence, in defining the terms of ‘rational freedom’ means moving beyond affirming the unity of the freedom of each and all, the province of political philosophy, to embrace an organic and holistic concept of reason that can alone guarantee a genuine security. There is a need to recognise the roots of insecurity in the estrangement of human beings from each other, from their own nature and from society within the greater estrangement of humanity from nature; failure to address the question of security at its roots generates a fear and unreason that leads to social and ecological destruction. The rational project is concerned to conceive and secure the conditions of unity between human beings in society and between society and nature, that reconciliation in the one implies reconciliation in the other as a singular process. If one side is neglected, fear and insecurity will remain to undermine the promise of security made in the other realm. The task of philosophy is to define the conditions of rational unity within and between society and nature in this holistic and organic sense. This defines reason in the expansive sense of human relationships grounded within the framework of the environment given by nature and modified by human praxis.


107 SECURITY AS SECURING THE WORLD

The stature and authority of science and technology have been much diminished by their too close relation with an all too transparent power politics. Where once science and technology dazzled and inspired, they now provoke scepticism and fear. The ideological foundations of the modern era are cracking under the weight of misplaced ideals and false promises, opening the possibility for the recovery of reason in an organic and holistic sense in order to redirect the affairs of civilisation.

Far from securing human freedom and happiness, technological progress, the hegemony of science, and the global expansion of the capitalist economy have achieved the paradoxical result of physical impoverishment in the second and third world and spiritual impoverishment in the first world. Oliver James has recently written of the illness of affluenza, expressing the misery and unhappiness that is associated with the condition of excess material wealth. There is no wealth but life, John Ruskin argued more than a hundred years ago. The only basis for genuine human freedom and happiness lies in the development and exercise of immanent human potentialities and capacities but, as Karl Marx warned about capitalism’s material expansion, a society of too many useful things produces too many useless people. Freedom and happiness cannot be achieved by an expansion of material wealth achieved by the diminution and degradation of the human ontology or the life basis of the planet. Nature within and without is the only true wealth. As life has been sucked from the planet by means of a parasitic and exploitative economic system, the meaning of life has become perverted through its equation with ‘things’ to be acquired, possessed, denied others. The inversion of means and ends which characterises modernity involves an obsession with the artificial products achieved by the ‘how’ of things and an ignorance of the ‘why’ of existence. The misery and unhappiness that issues amidst unprecedented material abundance follows the sacrifice of the human ontology to a social system that promises freedom and happiness and security in terms of material exchange, acquisition and possession. This social system has dispossessed the human species in body and soul, a dispossession which has wider implications in terms of separating human beings from their means of production, their means of life, from nature and its life conditions generally. Humanity and nature together have been emptied of meaning, disenchanted, dispossessed, enclosed, made dependent upon artificial means for survival.

The technological domination of nature which constitutes modernity has its origins in the social, technological, and ecological changes of the Middle Ages. These developments prepared the ground for the ‘Renaissance’, ‘the Scientific Revolution’ and the ‘Industrial Revolution’. And the most important development of all was farming, creating a whole new landscape. Within a few centuries, the forests of Northern Europe were largely cleared and the wetlands drained to create vast open fields. By the middle of the twelfth century the Low Countries had begun the process of reclaiming land from the sea by means of dikes (and, later, windmills). The milling of new grain and new timber, and the making of other products was accelerated by the harnessing of wind and water power. The era also saw the revolutionising of mining, metallurgy, and glassmaking. Most importantly of all, mechanical clocks started the process of separating human beings in their everyday lives from the land, replacing the cycles and rhythms of nature with artificial tempos, preparing the way for the exact and severe regimes of landlords, managers and industrialists.
The impact of these innovations was far in excess of classical civilisation, as is indicated by the boom in the population of Northern and Western Europe from 12 million to 35.5 million between 1000 and 1340. The rate of growth was unprecedented. In the process, thousands of new towns emerged. This urban expansion itself was an important development in generating free cities where manufactures, trade and an incipient capitalism could flourish without hindrance. ‘In the course of three centuries the Europe we know today was opened or re-opened for settlement. This feat compares exactly with the opening of the North American continent between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries’ (Mumford in Eden 135).

The farming revolution marked the passing from the realm of nature to the realm of culture. In the process, farming sites came to exhibit geometrical precision rather than natural ecosystems. Patches and haphazard clusters become fields and rows. As farming is placed more systematically on a technological basis, the trappings of civilisation follow in the shape of cities, states, classes, bureaucracies. These, in turn, enlarge and accelerate the waves of human expansion by making waves of their own.

The first dramatic indication that urban expansion of such character and scale was beyond and against nature came with the Black Death. In the Decameron, Boccaccio condemns ‘the cruelty of Heaven, and perhaps in part of men’. Such a view is consonant with the anti-clerical and irreligious sentiment that broke out in response to the Black Death, blaming human beings only for a failure to care for each other in the aftermath of the plague. A closer examination yields solid evidence of human responsibility for the occurrence and extent of the Black Death. In switching rapidly from a natural to an urban existence, Europe was vulnerable. Since the farming revolution, the population explosion and the land boom, European towns had become filled with people whilst farmland had been exhausted or had run out. Malnutrition, overcrowding, and ecological degradation created the conditions for plague.

From this perspective the Black Death is nature’s revenge against human rapacity against nature, against their own nature as well as against the wider environment. The Black Death exposed the reason-nature dualism at the heart of humankind’s pursuit of ‘progress’, the diremption and antagonism in its character and consequences. Europe was overcrowded, disfigured by class inequality and social injustice and riven by hatred and suspicion. Whereas a natural ecosystem is self-regulation, this artificial metabolism created in increasing abstraction from nature required an expertise in regulation that exceeded human moral and intellectual capacities.

Florence offers an excellent case study. ‘For Florence in the fourteenth century had perhaps the first large industrial proletariat in the world. Of a population of some one hundred thousand before the plague struck, roughly a third were employed in the textile industry. Of these, the great majority were beaters, carders, washers, combers, and other wage laborers who scraped out a bare living. When you consider that another third of the population were classed as paupers – either unemployed or employed as servants, and too poor to pay taxes – you get some idea of the haven Pasteurella pestis would have found in the cramped warren that was Florence.
 The powerful merchants of the Lana and Calimala guilds controlled every step of the business, from the purchase of raw wool to its marketing abroad. They had their fingers in just about every pie in Florence from real estate to international banking and trade. Pioneers of double entry bookkeeping, letters of credit, bills of indebtedness, and other techniques, the merchants of Florence were the first modern capitalists’ (Eisenberg 205).

‘In 1378, the Ciompi (as the menial wage labourers were called) joined forces with some of the less privileged artisans’ guilds in a revolt that actually succeeded in toppling the government. But though the demands of the Ciompi were almost laughably modest – a voice in government, tax equity, the right to a guild of their own – they were enough to frighten the artisans, who broke ranks. In a matter of weeks, the uprising was bloodily crushed.
 The Ciompi episode would recur on various scales for the next few centuries. The Black Death, too, would recur: after its first visit, it would return roughly once every decade for the next eighty years’ (Eisenberg 205/6).
The ‘effort to flatten out inequalities in time produces inequalities in space – or, rather, between people. As soon as nature’s bounty can be stored, it can also be stolen and hoarded. Both the means and the reasons for one set of people to lord it over another are greatly increased. While this is by no means the origin of inequality – differences in status and in access to food and mates exist among most hunter gatherer peoples, as among animals – it does allow inequality to become fixed in a class system. That is something found rarely in nature except among the social insects.
 Hoping to make the Golden Age permanent, people turn to gold: the gold of grain, the gold of gold. In so doing, they generally put an end to some of the very qualities, such as freedom and equality, that made the Golden Age golden in the first place’ (Eisenberg 209).

The Shattering of the Organic-Holistic World View
The advent of farming and the associated emergence of centralised power in the bureaucracies and governments of states and urban centres entailed fundamental political and social changes but also profound cultural and conceptual changes in the way that human beings saw themselves and their world. These changes began the process of wrenching humankind away from direct relation with the natural world and fed the transformations of the past three or four centuries. Political economists emphasise the rise of individualism and private property, political philosophers emphasise the rise of the nation state and the principles of sovereignty and self-assumed obligation, sociologists emphasise the fundamental alteration in the character of human relationships in the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, from community characterised by ascriptive social relationships to society in which relationships were based on contract. The interrelated developments of technological innovation, the scientific revolution, urbanisation, industrialisation emphasise the great transformation that had taken place in the mode and nature of production. And this transformation was characterised by a reconceptualisation of human power, freedom and happiness and the definition of ‘progress’ in abstraction from nature. Land was no longer considered to be the primary resource or factor in production. Its place had been taken by machines. Further, material exchange ceased to be based upon the bartering of goods; money began to permeate all human relationships, subordinating all aspects of social life to its abstract power. 

These developments were based upon a mechanistic conception of nature. One could question whether this dogmatic mathematicisation of the person, society, and nature is ‘science’ as such. Although the ancient Greeks, like Pythagoras and Plato, had conceived mathematics and geometry to be the key to the human understanding of reality, they had nevertheless continued to affirm the universe as a living organism. Mathematics and geometry were therefore appropriate to the natural world as a living entity. In contrast, philosophers and scientists from the seventeenth century shared a mechanistic view of the world. Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Hobbes saw the world as a kind of machine. The scientist emerges as a super mechanic attempting to discover the workings of this machine by the application of mathematical theorems. Newton writes: ‘Natural philosophy consists of discovering the frame and operations of nature, and reducing them, as far as maybe, to general laws – establishing these rules by observations and experiments, and thence deducing the causes and effects of things..’’(Morris 28/9).

The mechanistic conception of nature came with important corollaries and consequences. God the creator was unceremoniously ejected from the universe, becoming an omnipotent creator standing outside the Creation, relating to Nature much as a clockmaker relates to a clock (Collingwood; Whitehead). Further, corresponding to the transformation in social relations of production, nature came to be conceived as a resource, a utility and a commodity to be enclosed, privatised, exploited.

These developments shaped the modern world and define the contemporary impasse.

The relation of human beings to the world came to take the form of an antithesis. The notion of ‘man against nature’ is explicit in the works of Francis Bacon. Far from being part of the science versus nature controversy, the self-image of modern historiography, the mechanistic conception of the universe, and the associated ‘man against nature’ postulate, were consistent with the Christian idea of a transcendental creator, and with Christian premises regarding the relation of human beings to divinity. Indeed, one could argue that the Baconian creed exalting human beings as exploiters of nature rather than as parts of nature has its origins in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Genesis refers to man being made in the image of God ‘to rule the fish in the sea, the birds in the heavens, the cattle and all the wild animals on earth’ and to ‘subdue’ the earth’ (Morris 29/31).

A whole series of alienating dualisms and dichotomies emerged from the conception of nature was a kind of machine created by god. Descartes theorised a dualistic reality consisting of two self-contained systems body and mind – ‘the ghost in the machine’. Another dualism which was articulated, and which formed the key figure of liberal political philosophy, was that between the individual and society. The link between the two is most explicit in the work of Thomas Hobbes, for whom humankind is a purely natural entity, and society is an artefact. The individual is simply a natural machine, driven by two powerful emotions, the desire for power, and for self-preservation. In a natural state, the human being is egoistic, competitive, aggressive, power-seeking. Social order and civility is possible only through a contract between individuals to form the state. The point is that the essential premises underlying this dualism of individual and society is an exaltation of reason or culture over nature based upon a mechanistic conception of humankind. 

The legacy of these seventeenth century philosophers was ambiguous in that the naturalistic outlook towards the world – an advance - was associated with an ethos which established an antithesis between human and nature to assert the human destiny to subdue, control, and exploit the world as if mankind owned it. This mechanistic philosophy established a dualism between reason and nature, and between the individual and society and corresponded with the expansion of capitalism and the rise of the nation state and the global expansion of European power in terms of political domination and economic coercion. The mechanistic attitude to nature, involving the idea that humankind and nature are in antagonistic relation, and therefore nature has to be subdued, conquered and controlled, was spread around the world.


These critical points apply not to ‘science’ as such but to an incomplete and partial understanding of science involving a fundamentally distorted relationship between human beings and nature. The province of science must be expanded as a rational understanding involving ethical, anthropological and ecological components. Urban capitalist civilisation, having abstracted itself from nature, and convinced of the omnipotence of administrative, monetary and technical rationality, continues to create ever greater numbers of experts, expanding government and the economy, in order to redeem the promises of the scientific and industrial revolutions. The potential for socialism that Marx identified in the advanced stage of capitalism’s development of the productive forces is restrained within prevailing social relations to produce technocracy.

The impersonal scientific approach attempts to abstract truth and knowledge from nature and from human relations in society as a source of bias and ignorance. Such an approach implies the end of civilisation. Without the philosophical anthropology and ecology which suggests that human life and life in general are essentially something and something essentially, there is no motivation or interest in doing anything at all, in living as opposed to merely existing. The fiction that there is an opposition between human beings and nature has fostered a denaturalisation of the world and a dehumanisation of human beings, an ethos which is perfectly consonant with a capitalist system which has sought to monopolise the natural resources of the world. To express outrage at the hollowing out of the public realm, the deterioration of the cities, the destruction of communities, the despoliation of the environment is risk condemnation for being emotional. Once reason is severed from nature, to express emotion is to be unreasonable. But which really is the unreasonable approach?

The failure to address the reason-nature dualism makes it possible for those concerned with political and economic power to equate power with dominion of the world, exploiting and ultimately exhausting the resources on which their power depends. But this is not real power and is not a genuine reason. Rather, the case for building a better society is made in the name of reason. Such a society affirms the unity of each and all in society and of society with nature so that power is in harmony with the reason implicit in all life and life-processes.

Henryk Skolimowski’s book Eco-Philosophy represents an important contribution to this project, making the case for a ‘new rationality’ against the dominant instrumental rationality, giving it the term ‘ecological humanism’. Skolimowski convincingly criticises the dominant mode of thought that pervades modern culture as positivist, empiricist, analytical, utilitarian and mechanistic. This is not a genuine rationality – which implies an ethics which integrates anthropology and ecology – but an instrumental rationality that separates human beings from nature, their own nature as well as external nature, in order to assert the separation of knowledge from values. Skolimowski reveals how it is only a short step from conceiving the natural word as a machine to be subdued and conquered to conceiving the natural world as a kind of ‘factory’ to be controlled, manipulated and exploited. This kind of ‘rationality’ is incarnated in the capitalist enterprise and has so permeated modern culture that it threatens to engulf us entirely through the globalisation of economic relations. Skolimowski notes the intrinsic relationship between such mechanistic rationality, the growing social inequalities within the world and the looming ecological crisis.





The encroachment of the system world upon the lifeworld delineated by Habermas generates pathological consequences which impact upon the city, inflicting a whole range of social disorders upon the urban environment. The crisis mentality that hung over the closing years of the twentieth century manifested itself in the urban environment as an ecology of fear. Hopes for progressive change have been thwarted as war within came to be combined with war without. This is a consequence not of a lack of development but of development proceeding beyond moral and institutional capacities/being constrained within existing relations. An examination of contemporary art, literature, philosophy, theology gives the impression that ‘disbelief, doubt, disillusionment, and despair have taken over’ (Nisbet 1980:318). The contemporary world is ‘almost barren of faith in progress’ (Nisbet 1980:353). For Marx, the world of capital expresses the domination of dead labour over living labour. This domination of the dead has now been imposed in its most direct form as a means of production, no longer capable of positive use, have been turned into means of destruction in order to drain off surplus value. To maintain a nihilistic system that is compelled to continuously expand values or die, development has proceeded well beyond sustainable scale. Overdevelopment has issued in an empty shell of an environment, a world in which far too much of everything never has enough for human happiness. The world of the dead dwarfs the world of the living in scale. 

Pathology is a praxis, the social result of the conscious, deliberate actions of human collectivities. Comprehending the current urban malaise and its connection with the pathological features of modernity requires the examination of the social structures and dynamics through which human beings are separated from each other, divided, set against each other. The unavoidable conclusion is that modernity’s social pathology has transformed the field of possibilities in that every positive possibility and emancipatory tendency possesses an often more realistic alternative which is grounded in social warfare. The dark underside to modernity is increasingly being manifested at surface level, threatening to become all-pervasive throughout the socio-institutional fabric. Further, the problem of overscale development, of alien power out of control, is increasingly destructive in social and ecological terms. 

The best hope is to extract the emancipatory core that is immanent in rationalised modernity from within the repressive encasing through which reason is presently projected. Hope does not lie in a lost past but in the potential future which is immanent in existing, if frustrated, lines of development. This is to revalue those elements of modernity that contain the potential for a future sociality. The only solution to the crises and contradictions afflicting modern urbanism is for creative human agency to occupy the centrestage presently occupied by the managers, representatives, officials and bureaucrats who monopolise social power in alien form.

The social pathology afflicting urban space has its origins in a politics that has systematically suppressed the humanistic and ethical dimensions of the classical origins of politics as creative self-realisation. The book has examined the potential of new and urban social movements to reclaim urban space for those who live, work and interact in that space, against those who, subject to the imperatives of alien power, seek to instrumentalise and commercialise that space. This resistance remains the basic reason for retaining hope that an alternative to the wasted urban landscape of the present can be found. This is to place hope in conscious, creative, constitutive praxis as integral to human self-realisation.

What fundamental alienation led to and is expressed in this social pathology? And how can it be overcome in order to reclaim urban space on the basis of the connection between public life and human self-realisation? Max Horkheimer argues that ‘man’s avidity to extend his power in two infinities, the microcosm and the universe, does not arise directly from his own nature, but from the structure of society’. Horkheimer targets class relations and their tendency towards ‘monopolistic collectivism’ through the perfection of reason and science as instruments of domination.





The project of dominating nature becomes a destructive force as it becomes entangled in specific class relationships, entering into the contradictory dynamics of exploitation and accumulation. Crises within urban space express the systematic imperatives of technological progress arising within relations of exploitation and domination. Capitalist industrialisation and urbanisation turn ‘the world into a world of means rather than ends’, undermining the realm of transcendence which had formerly justified human renunciation. ‘Therefore self-renunciation of the individual in industrial society has no goal transcending industrial society .. Since the subjugation of nature, in and outside of man, goes on without a meaningful motive, nature is not really transcended or reconciled but merely repressed’ (Horkheimer 1947:94).

Domination is not only destructive of the ecology of nature but also of the human ontology. Frustrated by the nihilism of this world, human nature is engulfed by a rage which threatens to explode. Human beings are unable to ‘overcome the tendency to regress in their mimetic and other atavistic urges’ (Horkheimer 1947:119). With no basis to assert ‘truth’ over ‘reality’, human beings develop a ‘deep rooted tendency to treat their own “inner nature” brutally and spitefully, to dominate it as they have been dominated by ruthless masters. When they give it rein, their actions are as warped and terrible as the excesses of slaves become tyrants. Power is the one thing they really respect and therefore seek to emulate’ (Horkheimer 1947:119/20).

Such ‘revolts’ as occur are a rage born of submission, expressing submission. ‘Hitler appealed to the unconscious in his audience by hinting that he could forge a power in whose name the ban on repressed nature would be lifted’ (Horkheimer 1947:120). This leads in a wholly destructive direction:





Alienation may be an instrument of progress but the concept of overscale indicates the extent to which a great deal of development of social organisation and technique is humanly regressive. With alienation, emancipatory possibilities and repressive realities coexist: the domination of nature and the revolt of nature; technological expansion and overscale; advance in human dignity and regress through the expansion of the technologies for controlling individuals; the advance in human skill and the advance in human destructiveness.

Overscale is accompanied by a vicious irrationality which a) attempts to impose control upon an uncontrollable urban space as it implodes; b) attempts to contain the threat posed by movements seeking to better and pacify social existence.

The pacification of social existence by means of urban incarceration does not resolve social pathology, merely designs it into the urban infrastructure; it is an expression of the ecology of fear and not a coherent response to it. Pathology is both internalised and externalised. This produces neither the peace or security promised but merely generalises fear, building it into the environing context of urban life. Rather than engage in social transformation, the comfortable and the affluent, those with a stake in existing society, choose to separate themselves from the pathological reality and from the people in it. Rather than confront social pathology at its roots, they choose the fog of separation, distance and illusion. This is accompanied by a psychic numbing which represses the unease that human beings have about such pathology but only by increasing the danger to human beings – the numbness ensures that human beings do not confront the dangers to the very existence of the species (Lifton 1982:108).

The fact that human beings are confronted by an overscale world which maintains its system of domination by a threat of total destruction raises the question of the character of social relations: ‘if “the hand mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill society with the industrial capitalist”, what are we given by those Satanic mills which are now at work, grinding out the means of human extermination?’ (Williams 1982:69).

In fear of and in flight from real conflicts, in resisting the real emancipatory possibilities that have the potential to restructure power, human beings are led to imprison themselves within the urban environment. Social warfare increasingly takes the form of the militarisation of urban space. Politically, socially and intellectually, the suppression or marginalisation of emancipatory forces leaves the space occupied by a regressive, irrational politics which works systematically to eradicate the Enlightenment ideals of reason, freedom, and progress.

The threatening alternative to social pathology that the carceral design for urban space seeks to repress is emancipation. The universal end of social struggle is a world in which human beings see themselves in their self-made world. This will be achieved once a genuine public life as a participatory mode of social existence is established. This realises a scaled civilisation that has eliminated surplus repression so that it is possible ‘to live without anxiety’ (Marcuse 1966:37 136). ‘A new basic experience of being would change the human existence in its entirety’ (Marcuse 1966:143). Such visions of peace and harmony are, however, beyond those living daily within the grip of the ecology of fear. In a possessive, insecure, competitive society, individuals will fight to keep hold of what they have got – or to get by fair means or foul what others have got. And the arms race in this war of all against all is escalating.

Disenchantment with cities is increasing as a result of rising crime, costs, unemployment, congestion, noise, poor and unsuitable housing. The strain of living in a continuously mobile society that lacks an overarching moral frame of reference and is subject to processes that are external to it is corrosive of urban life. Accelerated changes in the bases of urban life, in employment and communications, leave urban space without roots. These problems derive from the impossibility of sustaining the massive energy inputs required to reproduce city life. The process of urbanisation is increasing globally but its viability is increasingly in doubt.

The contemporary city, containing millions of individuals in giant metropolises in many cases, half a million in many more, is a recent phenomenon. The ‘cities’ of past civilisations were hardly cities at all by modern standards. The Athenian city-state had less than 50,000 citizens. But it was precisely that scale that made possible that citizen life which formed the content of a city. Classical and medieval cities were scaled to human dimensions, ensuring that there could be no expansion that exceeded the carrying capacity of the energy environment (Rifkin 1985:166). That scale is denied in the megalopolis of the modern world.

As Plato and Aristotle argued, there is a need for limits: ‘The Fall of Rome can be explained by the rise of Rome. The Latin city was carried to imperial heights not by the resources of its rural environs, but by spoils acquired from the systematic looting of the Near East, Egypt and North Africa. The very process involved in maintaining the Roman cosmopolis’ (Bookchin 1974:33).

An urban centre which does not respect the limitations that environing relations impose upon growth, both socially and ecologically, invites collapse. Ever greater inputs require an expansion in scale which in turn demands ever greater inputs. Such is the paradox of modern urbanisation. Having exceeded their carrying capacity of local energy environments, modern cities are prone to disorder and collapse’ Large cities require ever larger energy inputs to sustain their existence. With increased energy inputs and flows, however, the viability of the urban infrastructure is undermined. Cities suffer from higher levels of pollution, congestion, crime, poor health. Perhaps the most damaging result of large scale, however, is the destruction of city life itself, as measured by the quality of human reciprocity and interaction. Contemporary cities are characterised by anti-social behaviour, egoism, and anonymity. Given the sheer numbers of the aggregate of individuals in the city, it is impossible to maintain extensive interpersonal relations. Individuals in large cities have physical contact with more people than those living in lower density areas but they have personal contact with much fewer people as a percentage. Individuals living in close proximity are totally anonymous to each other. The association and interaction crucial to the formation of a civic life are denied. Large scale destroys citizenship as an everyday practice. It also denies public participation. In urban centres of appropriate scale it is possible to engage in effective local politics and maintain regular contact with representatives and officials. In a large city, such political activity is ineffective and meaningless.

The turn to civic repression and urban incarceration exhibits the inability of modern society to generate social order spontaneously through natural means. The recourse to force denotes the impotence of power. Like the hubris of many of the Greek heroes, the impotent power politics pursued by ruling classes and voted for by the powerless masses is the product of fear. Hubris refers to the way that a will to power is clothed in the garb of moral sincerity. Under the rubric of social protection in favour of the good life of the affluent, fear remains a natural and inevitable component of the urban vision. Massive wealth and technological means are available, yet the division and injustice at the core of social reality mean that order has to be imposed by institutionalised force. Social pathology, the ecology of fear, and institutional repression are the price that has to be paid within the urban environment for a failure to transform social relations. It is an attempt to maintain social relations beyond their social and historical relevance. The resort to repressive measures appears as an attempt to enforce a social order that lacks the capacity for self-regulation. The designing-in of carceral features appears as an attempt to contain social pathology as a substitute for engaging in the transformation of the iniquitous, asymmetrical social relations from which it issues.

The problem is not that the alienation of power has not been an instrument of material, social and cultural development but that it can only realise genuine progress in terms of human growth if power is brought within human comprehension and control. Only then can human beings creatively live up to their powers within society. With overscale, alien power comes to dominate human society with increasingly destructive consequences. Social warfare generating the militarisation of urban – and international – space issues from a social order which has more power than its relations are able to canalise and project positively and which commands more of the world’s resources than it is able to use efficiently. ‘Superpowers which have been locked .. in the postures of military confrontation increasingly adopt militaristic characteristics in their economies, their polity and their culture. What may have originated in reaction becomes direction. What is justified as rational self-interest by one power or other becomes, in the collision of the two, irrational. We are confronting an accumulating logic of progress’ (Thompson 1982:15).

In a social order that shows little tendency towards peaceful evolution there is too much accumulation of power to be rationally controlled within existing relations. The result is an imbalance which destroys the social and ecological bases of life. Overscale combines with unevenness to produce a moral and political fracturing which severely curtails the progressive dimensions of development.





The problem of overscale is rooted in the oldest aspect of the human project, the Promethean urge to dominate nature. Overscale states and cities are governed by political and business elites subject to the imperatives of the social metabolic system of alien control. Lewis Mumford refers to the ‘power system’ that is becoming increasingly pervasive regardless of the colour of the political regime. The power system has been identified with capitalism, fascism, communism and even the welfare state: ‘the power complex increasingly underlies all these institutional structures’ (Mumford 1970:168). At the root of the power system is the ‘imperious will to conquer nature’, which means to ‘remove all natural barriers and human norms and to substitute artificial, fabricated equivalents for natural processes: to replace the intense variety of resources offered by nature by more uniform, constantly available products spewed forth by the machine’ (Mumford 1970:171/2). This pursuit of ‘inordinate power and productivity’ issues directly in ‘equally inordinate violence and destruction’. In 1970, Mumford offered Auschwitz and Hiroshima as examples (Mumford 1970:253/8). The examples have been increasing exponentially since the last decade of the twentieth century.

The escalation of problems as a result of the expansion of techniques is inextricably linked to the ecological crisis. These problems include pollution, the destruction of the biosphere, the dissipation of non-renewable resources. These problems are the consequences of endless growth and the unrestricted imposition of technique upon nature.

The technocratic approach is to divide the problem up into particular compartments, such as air pollution or water pollution, and suggest a piecemeal solution. This is a technocratic delusion. The ecological crisis can only be resolved through a holistic approach that is aware of all the interconnections and implications. The crisis requires a wholesale reformation of institutional, social, moral and psychological modes.

There is no technological solution. For Jacques Ellul ‘history shows that every technical application from its beginning presents certain unforeseeable secondary effects which are more disastrous than the lack of the technique would have been’ (Ellul 1964:105). These problems generated by technology cannot be solved by technology. The problems increase at a faster rate than the solutions. The ‘more swift and powerful and gigantic technique becomes, the more serious and numerous are the instances when human control is absent’ (Ellul 1990:149). The more that the world is instrumentalised by technology, the more it becomes subject to disorder. The complexity of the world displays a tendency towards increased disorder, an increase that proceeds exponentially.

Kirkpatrick Sale in The Polis Perplexity contrasts the quality of life in the large cities of one million plus individuals with that of small cities of 100,000 individuals or less. In every aspect, small scale communities beat the large scale cities. On a daily basis in large cities ‘there are higher transportation costs because of congestion, higher employee sickness and death rates because of air and water pollution, higher energy costs because of the “heat island” effect over cities in the summer (and the inaccessibility of dense buildings to sunlight in the winter), higher security costs and higher loss rates because of crime, higher costs in training new workers because of bad schools’ (Sale 1978:68/9).

That point applies generally to urban space. Limitless urban growth combines increasing energy flows and disorders. The institutional complex of the city expands in an attempt to contain the disorder but this requires increasingly unaffordable investment in power, transport, education, police, housing, etc. ‘In the contemporary world, efficiency is defined in terms of applying more energy. in modern industrial society it is necessary to use up a thousand times more energy per person than was true a million years ago. This applies even though the work may be done by machines’ (Rifkin 1985:77). Conventional notions of efficiency no longer suffice. Efficiency is to be redefined as a reduction in the energy needed per individual for survival.

Complexity requires increased centralisation in order to manage enlargement. The institutional complex of society becomes so enlarged and centralised that it can no longer afford the energy it requires to maintain. ‘All along the energy line the flow slows up, and the society begins to atrophy’ (Rifkin 1985:101).

Dissolving complexity and centralisation makes it possible to minimize the input of energy. Once the energy flow-through is maintained at a low constant level, the institutions which transform it through the social system may be maintained in a steady low growth state, whereas a colonizing existence tends to large, centralised institutions to get more energy out of the environment, a climactic existence tends to small, decentralised institutions minimizing energy requirements’ (Rifkin 1985:102).

Social justice is imperative in the pursuit of environmental justice. Where specific individuals and institutions concentrate society’s wealth, power and energy under their control, these resources are denied to the rest of society. This concentration amounts to gross accumulation in one part of society and deprivation in another. Both poles are a threat to survival. ‘While nature relies on self-regulating biological laws to restore balance, society must rely on agreed-upon principles of economic justice to achieve the same ends’ (Rifkin 1985:213). ‘The overriding principle is to balance our economic budget with nature. In other words an effort is made not to consume faster than nature can produce. Emphasis is placed on de-centralised institutions, labour-intensive skills, greater diversity and regional self-sufficiency along with frugal and equitable use of nature’s resources. An appropriate technology approach and infrastructure is already developing in a fragmented fashion in communities across the country’ (Rifkin 1985:280).





The argument for merging social and ecological justice within the city needs to address the character of the human interaction with nature. If the city has been central to the development of the productive forces throughout history, existing as a site for accumulation, then it is also a human habitus which embodies the relation between human society and nature.

The question that this chapter poses is what kind of social relations produce a civilisation with social pathology at its core? What kind of social order rationalises and normalises the replacement of urban life with social incarceration? The technologies of social repression and control are the negative manifestation of capitalist urbanisation, the physical expression of social injustice.

Marxism is capable of offering an explanation of the paradoxes of progress by relating urbanisation to the expansionary drive and systemic dynamic of capital, showing how this is involved in the domination and destruction of nature. The Frankfurt School has done important work in developing the notion of capitalism as an institutionalised rationality which organises the domination of nature and translates into the domination of human beings. The themes raised by the Frankfurt School highlight the importance of dealing with the notion of ‘mastery’ in Marx’s critique (Schmidt 1971). The whole notion of rational control appears highly problematical, reason being implicated in an ethic of technological and bureaucratic domination and in the extension of instrumental rationality throughout the processes and institutions of the social order.

Rather than challenge capitalism there has been a tendency to opt for the socially imprecise term ‘industrialism’ (Bahro 1984:214/5 172). For Bahro, this indicates that the conflict is no longer between capitalism and socialism but concerns industrialism as embracing both. In rejecting Marxism for ecologism, Bahro brought ‘into question that traditional historical optimism for which the very essence of the human species points towards socialism, and not to barbarism, let alone a premature self-destruction’. For ‘it cannot be accidental that our civilisation should generate a tendency towards the self-destruction of its subject as a defining trait of its most recent stage’. Bahro thus identifies ‘exterminism’ as particular not only to nuclear weapons but as ‘the quintessence of the whole complex of tools and machines operative on humanity and the planet’. Nuclear weapons represent the extreme manifestation of overscale. There is a need to identify the roots of social pathology that generate this scale of destruction within the urban fabric of a ‘misdirected civilisation, which is aggressive in its innermost being, based on the principles of expansion and explosion’ (Bahro 1984:87).

On this reasoning, the project of extending domination over nature has made exterminist practices dominant within the whole process of industrialisation. These destructive practices ‘break up and destroy natural conditions, degrade energy potentials, suffocate the Earth’s surface and isolate human beings from spontaneous energy cycles. The result is inevitably a distortion of both body and mind, whose consequences range from cancer to crime’ (Bahro 1982:87/8).

Bahro demands not merely ‘a practical critique of the industrial system and its military spearhead’ but also a ‘fundamental critique of human nature itself’ (Bahro 1982:88/9). Quite so. The human ontology and the conditions which enhance or inhibit it is central to the study of public life, to an attempt to recover the conditions for reconnecting reason and freedom.

The identification of the root of social and ecological pathology in industrialism as such has been influential. Grundmann is a Marxist influenced ecologist who argues that it is ‘plainly wrong’ to argue that capitalism as such is the cause of ecological problems; these problems are intrinsic to the productive relation of humanity to nature and would therefore continue beyond capitalist class society (Grundmann 1991:51).

The investigation of the domination and destruction of nature cannot be abstracted from specific social relations. The problem is less ‘industrialism’ as a general category than the expression of advances of human productive and technical capacity within specific relations of domination and exploitation, relations which proceed between individuals within society and between society and nature.

This repudiation of industrialism in general fails to distinguish between social relations of production and thus has the consequence of facilitating the replacement of the centrality of class struggle by the general struggle of human beings and nature. Such a general approach sets up the dualism of society and nature as permanent and would condemn any productive relation of humanity to nature to alienation. Horkheimer and Adorno identify Marx with the project of the subject’s domination of nature as object, a view which denies emancipation on Marxist grounds. Against this, there are strong grounds for arguing for a Marxist ecologism in which ‘mastery’ has nothing to do with the domination of nature but instead refers to the conscious control exercised by human beings over their formerly alienated – and in their alienation, destructive – powers. The point that alienation and exploitation are related to specific social relations does not exclude the general point that human beings have come to dominate nature and, in the process, have subjected themselves to domination in their relationships with each other. It is far more profitable to argue that the dilemma at the heart of rational modernity, split between formal and substantive rationality, is resolvable only by locating the problem in the system of alienated labour. This makes it possible to address the humanity-nature relation in more specific terms of social relations of production.

There is certainly plenty of textual evidence to support an ecological reading of Marx. Throughout his writings, Marx exposes the ‘ecological contradictions of capitalism’ (Quaini 1982) in showing how the capitalist system continuously eats away at the resource base which sustains it. ‘Capitalist production .. develops the techniques and the degree of combination of the social process of production by simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth – the soil and the worker’ (Marx C1 1976:638). Marx’s point is that the same class system which exploits labour is also responsible for the exploitation and destruction of nature. The socialist and ecological movements possess a common enemy.

Marx has no difficulty associating human beings and nature, the worker and the soil. By pointing to the ecological contradiction at the heart of capital – the fact that the expansionary dynamics of capital accumulation undermine the sources of wealth – Marx is questioning the rationality of capitalist agriculture as well as capitalist production in general. This systemic compulsion behind capital means that it leaves ‘deserts’ and a thoroughly degraded natural environment behind as it endlessly pursues exchange value: ‘all progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time, is a progress towards ruining the more long-lasting sources of that fertility’ (Marx C1 1976:638). Marx establishes a direct connection between the destruction of the lasting fertility of the soil and the destruction of the physical health of the worker. Marx therefore charges capitalism with disturbing ‘the metabolic interaction between man and the earth’ (Marx C1 1976:637). Locating human beings within nature as a part of nature, ecologism is integral to the Marxism of Marx.

Social relations are significant. The recovery by human beings of their alienated powers makes it conceivable that there will be a shared and common responsibility in productive affairs. With production under the control of the associated producers, that systemic and expansionary drive of capital which lies behind the destruction of nature is removed. That is, with the abolition of alienation through the transformation of social relations it becomes possible for human beings to assume responsibility for their powers, including science and technology, thus affirming themselves as natural as well as social beings.

Marx’s ‘mastery’ is to be distinguished from that domination as nature by subjects to which Horkheimer and Adorno refer. Indeed, Marx’s ‘mastery’ entails the abolition of this domination, associated as it is with the subjection of human beings to the new social necessity of capital. Human beings have conquered nature, now they must conquer themselves. Mastery in this sense is interpreted not as breaking nature’s external will but, through cooperation, a coming to steer nature. ‘Nature in Marx is not anthropomorphus. Nature has no end in itself, it is man who imposes his ends on it. In order to do so, however, he has to respect the laws of nature’ (Grundmann 1991:57/61).

Human beings can satisfy their needs and purposes, themselves natural, by cooperating rather than warring with nature: ‘a society which does not take into account the repercussions of its transformations of nature can hardly be said to dominate nature at all’ (Grundmann 1991:92). An approach which turns everything it touches to gold, as with Midas, leads to starvation amongst abundance, poverty amidst riches. This is the self-contradictory basis of capitalist growth. Marx’s ‘mastery’ refers to the relations of human beings to nature being under conscious control so as to ensure balanced growth. Perceiving the ecological contradictions of capitalism in terms of specific exploitative and alienative relations makes it possible to realise the liberatory promise of the Enlightenment project against an ecologically destructive capitalist modernity. The material well-being of all humankind is achieved not through the mere fact of economic growth. Rather, the expansionary drive of the capital system is to be tamed by consciously managing productive powers for the satisfaction of needs. This entails the replacement of capital’s ‘domination’ of nature by human ‘mastery’. The ‘domination’ condemned by Horkheimer and Adorno is not domination by the subject over object but by capital as the alienated power of the subject which turns to dominate the subject itself as well as nature as object. Marx’s ‘mastery’ refers to the subject coming to assume conscious responsibility for its alienated power. Such an ecological Marxism repudiates the ‘instrumentalism’ of capitalism and also of a state socialism that has made Faustian bargains with the forces of capitalist modernity, Weber’s renascent gods in impersonal form. Marx’s communism is achieved by human beings coming to recognise the alien power of capitalist modernity – industry, science, technology – as their own, organising them as social and, indeed, natural powers.

Marx’s ‘mastery’ as conscious communal control by individuals of their social powers is not the cause of ecological destruction but its solution. The mastery of nature entails the mastery of the social nature created by human beings which, in alien form, is experienced as a new necessity. It is the absence of ‘mastery’ in these terms which is responsible for the domination and destruction of nature. This domination and destruction is inflicted not by human subjects in any direct and conscious sense but by their social power having escaped their conscious and direct control and having therefore taken alien form, imposing their own alien logic. The case for ‘mastery’ through conscious control means that ‘domination’ in Marx means steering nature by means of cooperation, not breaking nature as an alien will (Grundmann 1991:57/61).

In affirming the interdependence of society and nature, Marx is a forerunner of social ecology. Marx stresses the importance of the natural environment as it is incorporated into society through the development of the productive forces. Marx acknowledges capital’s powerful tendency to develop the productive forces and hence to potentially liberate human beings from natural necessity. Natural necessity has been conquered. The problem now is to conquer the new social necessity imposed upon society by the capital system. ‘Despite certain progressive aspects, capitalism .. both dehumanises man and perverts the natural world’ (Vaillancourt 1992:34). Marx’s conscious control entails rehumanisation as the practical reappropriation of alien powers and hence an intervention into nature that is the contrary of capital’s destructive systemic control. It is the unconscious control imposed by the capital system that constitutes domination.

Marx’s perspective on the society-nature dialectic acknowledges that ecological problems are socially caused through the technological domination and economic exploitation associated with the process of capitalist industrialisation and commercialisation. And this irrational destruction of nature possesses a class aspect. The ‘primary places at which ecological damage was inflicted were the factory and dwellings of industrial workers, the large agricultural estates and rural slums’ (Parsons 1977:22).

Marx’s society-nature dialectic recognises that as human beings transform nature through their productive activity, they also transform their own human nature. Social reality is a field of materialist immanence which, as a self-made reality, human agency as the conscious creative principle, to assume control. Human beings can appreciate the human character of what they create. The society-nature dialectic is developed by Marx into the idea of a transition from first to second nature.





With the transition from first to second nature under capitalist production, every use value is given an exchange value as it becomes a commodity. Under the capitalist mode of production it is no longer meaningful to distinguish between first and second nature by being commodified. In conquering natural necessity, human beings have come to be subject to capital’s social necessity, the tyranny of exchange value in the second nature. This is a necessity that remains to be conquered. The practical reappropriation of alienated social powers enables the assertion of human self-determination imposed by capital and instituted by the state over society.

Conscious common control of social relationships by the associating individuals involves stewardship as opposed to destruction and domination. It implies the assertion of a substantive human rationality over the instrumental rationality of ‘things’. It looks to liberate human potentiality within the self-made social world rather than repudiating this world as involving the destruction and domination of nature.





In drawing attention to the distinction between first and second nature, the intention is to demonstrate the extent to which the social and natural environment confronting human beings is a self-made social world. The notion is fundamental to Marx (Schmidt 1971; Redclift 1987; Smith 1984). The challenge is to take responsibility for the domination of nature to ensure that the control that human beings now exercise is rational in a human and ecological sense. Human beings take ethical responsibility for their powers. This puts an end to the destructive consequences of the extension of instrumental rationality, revealed as the external logic of alienated powers.

It could be argued that Marx valued nature only to the extent that human beings had intervened in it to change it, to draw it into the social environment. This is what the transition from first to second nature is about. Although Marx did display a Victorian optimism with regards to the expansion of the productive powers and material progress (Oldroyd 1980), his critical, dialectical perspective combines progress and catastrophe. Marx is closer to the ecologists than he is to the technological optimists. For the second nature that human beings had created was not an unqualified good. On the contrary, it rested upon the subjugation of human beings to their own powers. This second nature entails a new artificial necessity determined by the tyranny of exchange value and the self-expansion of capital. And it is this tyranny which is to be mastered. Mastery entails the end of domination. Mastery implies not domination but its converse, the exercise of skills and know-how so that transformation proceeds wisely, with a sense of balance in fulfilling legitimate human purposes.

In this context, Parsons argues that ‘on the question of mastery, Marxists must continue to make clear, as Marx and Engels did, that their ecological position is the very antithesis of capitalism: governed by care and not avarice .. generous and not possessive, planfull for nature and society’ (Parsons 1977:70).

The society-nature dialectic which is fundamental to Marx’s perspective on ‘mastery’ is inherently ecological. Marx is a pioneer in that his dialectic predates Haeckel’s ecology. For Marx and Engels: ‘man is inconceivable apart from his evolution in nature and his collective labours upon nature by means of his tools. Man’s dialectical relationship with nature, in which man transforms it and is therefore transformed, is the very essence of his own nature .. nature is definable as the materials and forces of the environment that create men and are in turn created by man’ (Parsons 1977:xi).

Moreover, Marx and Engels ‘had a definite (though not fully detailed) ecological position. As both working people and nature are exploited by class rule, so they will be freed by liberation from class rule’ (Parsons 1977:xii). To which must be added that both nature and society are dominated and exploited by an alienated system of production which rests upon alienated labour. The liberation from class rule, instituted under the form of private property, must rest upon the abolition of alienated labour at the more profound level of social relations of production.

Parson’s argument is that the ecological perspective of Marx and Engels is articulated through their writings on the interdependence between society and nature through the way that nature is transformed by labour as a mutual transformation. It is expressed also in the writing on the society-nature relationship before the rise of capitalism, on the alienation of nature and human beings under capitalism, and in the relationship that is projected to exist under communism.

In conclusion, the alternative to the pathology which is becoming all-pervasive in the institutional and urban fabric lies in developing an appropriate, harmonious relationship between human beings, society, productive powers and nature. Since human beings are a part of nature, the essence of human technique and organisation is not so much the capacity to dominate nature as ‘the mastery of the relationship between nature and humanity’. Whereas domination is accompanied by the destruction of nature, the goal of mastery is to ‘do justice to the subtle interplay of internal and external nature’ (Leiss 198). Whereas domination generates overscale and imbalance and unreason, mastery is characterised by harmonious interaction between all life-enhancing, life-affirming forces on earth. The disalienation of power renders power socially and ecologically effective in contrast to the destructive consequences of impotent overscale power.

This critique of overscale and the technology of unreason is positively oriented towards the social ecology of a non-repressive civilisation. This would represent a genuine public life in that the goal of human self-realisation is made integral to its socio-relational fabric. This brings power under human control and comprehension. The relationships between free and equal beings are at the core of this public life, a citizen identity which is extended to all on account of their humanity. Human beings would exercise common conscious control over their social existence for the first time in history. Emancipation achieves civilisation without repression and domination. This would point to a public life which has dissolved complexity into units scaled to human dimensions. This replaces the alien mediation of institutional structures, forms and practices with a social self-mediation.

111 THE STATIONARY STATE OF JOHN STUART MILL
‘By turning back to the founding fathers of our industrial civilisation – Science, Democracy and Progress – we find that it was not their intention that it should be a civilisation of numbers. Both Mill and Ricardo saw the rapid economic development of their time must finally lead to an economically stable state in which the population would have to be balanced against natural resources. If this was not done, both economists foresaw that it would be impossible for industry to make a profit – the converse of the conventional wisdom of our day’ (Waller 132).

‘When we fuse Mill’s insight with that of the modern ecologists, we have an understanding of the way in which western society is going to change its form’ (Waller 133).
‘Mill turns to the question of what society is for – to improve the lot of mankind. In the burst of the age of technology with its accompanying vast increase in population Mill saw that the problem of satisfying the human necessities was not to be solved by technology alone’ (Waller 135).
‘The decline of a philosophy based upon human relationships left the peoples of the world defenceless before the advance of industrialism. A renaissance of philosophy is essential if we are to overcome the dehumanisation of unrestrained industrialism’ (Waller 139).


John Stuart Mill represented the high water mark of classical political economy, applying the insights of Smith and Ricardo in the 19th century. A free trade liberal who extolled the virtues of market economics, Mill was also extremely critical of the social and economic features of Victorian capitalism. This, in many respects, is the more enduring part of Mill’s legacy. His thought is particularly relevant with respect to the urban ills of overscale, excess and endless growth. Mill’s argument presupposed the productive achievements of capitalism. To Mill, the economic problem had been solved; the key question in the advanced capitalist economies was no longer production but distribution. Mill therefore sought to place the emphasis upon the end of the capitalist economy rather than the means. In the process, he rediscovered the Greek principle of limitation to define a stationary state in which human growth replaces material growth. The emphasis is placed upon exploiting the margins for freedom that capitalism has achieved for human self-realisation away from the world of necessity. Mill’s stationary state defines a sense of scale, proportion and balance.

Mill defends a classical notion of citizenship against the prevailing atomistic or market model of politics. Mill sharply attacked the market conception of society as ‘a society only held together by the relations and feelings arising out of pecuniary interests’ (Mill 1985:120).

Against the egoistic and destructive forces which characterise market society, Mill looked to transform existing social institutions so as to realise a more integrated community. This integrated, harmonious community, overcoming the distinctions which set individuals above, below and against each other, seemed a realistic prospect. ‘Every step in political improvement renders it more so, by removing the sources of opposition of interest, and levelling those inequalities of legal privilege between individuals or classes, owing to which there are large portions of mankind whose happiness is still practical to disregard’ (Mill 1985:V). The socially divisive, iniquitous and destructive forms of differentiation were in the process of being overcome by legislative improvement, individual prudence, fair opportunity, education, extended participation in the political process. These advances would issue in a stable, harmonious, progressive state.

With ‘moral and intellectual improvements’ maintaining population at a stable level (Mill PPE II xiii), it would be possible to combine economic stagnation with the fullest development of all individuals. Beyond a certain level necessary for existence, economic growth loses its rationale and exhibits potentials for human growth. The resolution of the economic problems, the satisfaction of needs rather than the endless stimulation of wants, makes it possible to develop human capacities. This was Mill’s ideal society: ‘It is scarcely necessary to remark that a stationary conclusion of capital and population implies no stationary state of human improvement’ (Mill 1985:116). 

In the stationary state, socio-economic differentiation and class struggle would recede along with the money grubbing and drudgery associated with market society. Instead, society, resting on harmonious relations, would be characterised by the pursuit of higher pleasures. The quality of the mode of life would continuously improve. Society would be characterised by ‘a well-paid and affluent body of labourers; no enormous fortunes, except what were earned and accumulated during a single life-time, but a much larger body of persons than at present, not only exempt from the coarser toils, but sufficient leisure, both physical and mental, from mechanical details, to cultivate freely the graces of life, and afford examples of them to the classes less favourably circumstanced for their growth’ (Mill 1985:115).

Leisure would mean space free from economic necessity to engage in creative activity in developing one’s human capacities. In this harmonious, creative existence, beyond the imperatives of greed, egoism and self-maximisation, parliament would cease to be a meeting place of ‘the attorneys of certain small knots and confederalities of men’ (‘The Rationale of Political Representation’, Westminster Review XXX July 1935) individuals concerned only with their own particular interests, but would become a gathering of classless individuals concerned with the general interest in a condition of human solidarity. Mill thus projects a classless, egalitarian and solidaristic order which has overcome hierarchical distinctions within the people, making it possible for all individuals to emerge and act as citizens for the first time (PPE IV vii).

Mill acknowledges ‘the economical progress of society’ in terms of capital’s population and the productive arts. ‘But in contemplating any progressive movement, not in its nature unlimited, the mind is not satisfied with merely tracing the laws of the movement; it cannot but ask the further question of what goal? Towards what ultimate point is society tending by its industrial progress?’ (Mill 1985:111).

Mill’s question presumes that there is a point to economic development. Adhering to a philosophical anthropology which is concerned with human growth, there ought to be a point or an end so that material progress is inextricably connected with human self-realisation. The problem, however, is that capitalism has severed this connection and imposes structures and imperatives which inhibit rather than expand the human ontology. Capitalism is, in Keynes’s words, ‘irreligious’. The system lacks moral purpose and is nihilistic in being, literally, an endless growth, a growth without ends. Capital has to expand its values in order to accumulate the capital necessary for the process to begin again. There is no end to this process other than further growth. This endless growth derives from the capital system and its central dynamic of accumulation. The capital system must continuously expand its values or die. This imperative to expand colonises every aspect of society. The process is nihilistic, without ends.

Arguing that ‘the increase in wealth is not boundless’, Mill examines the stationary state as the ‘ultimate goal’ towards which all progress in wealth advances. For Mill, the stationary state entails freedom from the imperatives of economic necessity and the freedom to develop as a human being. He does not regard ‘the stationary state of capital and wealth’ with the ‘unaffected aversion’ manifested towards it by the political economists.





The ‘trampling, crushing, elbowing and treading on each other’s heels’ which characterises the form of personal interaction under capitalist relations represent simply a necessary but disagreeable feature of the present phase of industrial progress.





And this implies the abolition of the competitive, instrumental, exchange relations of capital, an asocial order organised around private property and the pursuit of wealth, with all of the external imperatives it imposes upon human relationships.

In arguing for the stationary state, Mill was arguing for the recovery of limits as crucial to asserting human ends. Mill thus argued that the expansion of production is a rational goal only in underdeveloped countries. In advanced countries, the crucial economic problem is distribution rather than production. And this emphasises the need for balance.

At a lesser stage of development, competition is justified. But whilst ‘the mere increase of production and accumulation’ is sufficient to excite the ‘congratulations of ordinary politicians’, Mill defines the ultimate end in terms of human development. Limits of the endless expansion of the economy are designed with the purpose of facilitating economic growth.





Mill is particularly critical of the United States in this regard. In the 1848 edition of the Principles of Political Economy, Mill condemns the US as a country where the expansion of riches has led only to a population of ‘dollar hunters’ and a mode of life ‘devoted to dollar hunting’ (Mill 1985:114).

Mill’s proposals for limits integrate an aesthetic and an ecological purpose with the anthropological purpose. Mill states that there is not much satisfaction in contemplating the world in which there is nothing left to the spontaneous activity of nature.





Mill’s view is striking for its ecological sensibility, not merely in terms of harmonising the relation of productive activity to nature. Mill goes further to argue that the limitless expansion of production and population would have the inevitable consequence of robbing the planet of its charm and beauty. The increasing wealth would not make humanity any happier, quite the contrary.

Mill’s purposes are, of course, anthropological. Mill seeks the maximum development of the human personality.





Mill even speculates that ‘the industrial arts might be as earnestly and as successfully cultivated’: ‘that instead of serving no purpose but the increase of wealth, industrial improvements would produce their legitimate effect, that of abridging labour’ (Mill 1985:116). Mill notes the paradox that mechanical inventions, rather than lightening the day’s toil of the workers, ‘have enabled a greater population to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment, and an increased number of manufactures and others to make fortunes’ (Mill 1985:116). For Mill, mechanical inventions ‘have not yet begun to effect those great changes in human destiny, which it is in their nature and futurity to accomplish’ (Mill 1985:116).

Mill concludes with a statement of human ends over technical and institutional means, overcoming the inversion of capitalism.





Mill’s hope was that humanity would content itself with remaining stationary once necessity had been overcome. Mill’s advice was not heeded. It could not be. Growth for the sake of growth is not the result of conscious decision, a process capable of being influenced by moral persuasion, but a systemic imperative structured around the dynamic of accumulation.

Marx directly responded to Mill’s argument, resolving the paradox of mechanical invention and human enslavement by reference to the systemic imperatives of the capital system.





Marx’s argument explains why predictions of the leisure society never materialise, despite vast improvements in production technique and organisation. The purpose of mechanical invention is not to reduce hours of labour but to expand the time given over to the production of surplus value which contributes to the accumulation of capital.

Mill argues the need for limits on anthropological, aesthetic, ecological and social grounds’ Limitless growth is not a viable option in a world of limited resources, quite apart from the destructive effect that constant increases beyond scale imposes in an immediate sense. But the ability to impose limits implies the ability to impose human ends upon the capital system; it implies the reappropriation of social power from the state and capital.

Oppenheim has argued that there is a fundamental similarity between Mill and Marx as regards ends. Both affirmed the rational conception of freedom as something which is both individual and collective, as implying a unity between each and all. Both shared ‘the same ultimate goal of society “in which the free development of each would be the condition of the free development of all”’ (Oppenheim 1968:54). Kaufman agrees with this comparison, arguing that ‘Mill’s ideal of the good life is more like Marx’s conception of unalienated man than it is like Bentham’s happy man’ (Kaufman 1971:202). There are clear similarities between Mill’s stationary state and Marx’s existential, life-affirming community beyond endless growth. Where Marx and Mill part company is on the means to this end. The imposition of limits upon growth and the concentration upon issues of distribution over production presumes that human beings have gained control of their socio-economic environment. And this implies the practical reappropriation of the social power alienated to capital. Capitalism is a systemic determinism resting upon the central dynamic of private accumulation. That dynamic controls all. The system does not respect conscious human choice or ethical code; it does not respect limits, however rational these limits may be from the perspective of human growth. Capital must expand its values or die. Capital rests upon a systemic self-expansion. Morally and anthropologically, Mill is correct to condemn the system of endless growth and he is correct to argue for limits. But to realise the principles that Mill affirmed require a conscious challenge to the dynamic underlying the system of economic growth, the class relations and the system of alienated production. Only with the assertion of conscious human control over systemic alien control can human beings ensure the condition of the stationary state.


112 MARTIN HEIDEGGER ONTOLOGY AND ECOLOGY
The German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) is full of profound wisdom and insight on the place of human beings on earth. His reputation as ‘the metaphysician of ecologism’ (George Steiner, The House of Being’, Times Literary Supplement 9 October 1981) justifies a close examination of his philosophy. First and foremost, Heidegger is a philosopher of ontology, the nature of being. Heidegger is concerned to discover precisely when and how human beings lost touch with being. Heidegger reveals that the loss of being in the modern world has its origins not in the Weberian process of modernisation and rationalisation but in the way that Western civilisation has conceived reason since classical times. Praising the pre-Socratics, Heidegger makes the challenging criticism that the Western philosophy has been on the wrong path since Plato. 

Arguing that ‘language is the house of Being’, Heidegger focused upon the etymology of words. His concern was to go to the roots of words in order to recover their original meaning. (Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ 1947, Basic Writings, ed David Farrell Krell, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978:193). Taking his stand upon the Greeks understanding of truth as a-lethia, ‘un-hiddenness’, Heidegger affirms truth as ‘letting-be’, as letting something be what it is, something which ‘exposes itself to what is, as such’ (Heidegger, ‘On the Essence of Truth’, Existence and Being, ed W. Brock, Chicago: Regnery 1949:306).

Heidegger was highly critical of the technocratic mentality and the rampant consumerism of contemporary capitalism. However, the problems afflicting the modern world were much more profound than the perversion of reason within capitalist processes of modernisation and addressed the very nature of reason itself. Heidegger locates the will to the rational and technological mastery over nature in the classificatory approach of Western metaphysics since its inception. This he refers to as nihilism. Against the analytical thinking which dissects and destroys, Heidegger opposed an ‘essential thinking’ which listens to the voice of being. The conclusion that Heidegger drew from his lengthy career as a philosopher was that human beings should abandon the pretence of being lords of creation and instead become ‘shepherds of Being’.

Heidegger’s philosophical approach is phenomenological in that he seeks to persuade not by proof but by description. The starting point of Heidegger’s philosophy is living participation in the world as against the observation of external phenomena on the one hand and the introspective investigation of the mind on the other. Denying the idea of a gap between the observer and the observed, Heidegger denies that there can be a perceiving subject who is a spectator of an objective world. Heidegger does not distinguish between consciousness and the external world in coming to examine the data of experience. Heidegger therefore repudiates a disembodied rationalism that is abstracted from human being. As much as reason, feeling and intuition are crucial to philosophical understanding. For Heidegger, moods, such as angst (dread or anxiety), can light up ‘the way we find ourselves’.

A philosopher of ontology, Heidegger begins his study of the totality of being through the analysis of human existence. For Heidegger, ‘being-in-the-world’ of particular human beings is characterised by the relationship to members of the community and to surrounding objects (Heidegger, Being and Time, SCM 1962:78f). The being of a person is inextricably linked to nothingness in that the human being is distinguished from other beings and objects in the world through being uniquely conscious of death: ‘In anguish, the human being discovers himself confronted by Nothing, which is the possible impossibility of his existence’. This awareness of ‘nothingness’ is an integral part of the ‘being’ of human beings. Hence Heidegger writes that ‘man alone exists. Rocks are’.

Human being comprises both ‘facticity’ and ‘possibility’. ‘Facticity’ pertains to the set of facts that surround human beings, all those elements in life which are simply given. ‘Possibility’ is the open and unmade future available to human beings. Whilst human beings cannot deny or alter facticity they are responsible for how this facticity is viewed and for the creation of their future through their own actions. Hence Dasein (‘being there’) refers to human beings coming to have an awareness of having a purpose and potential. Human beings can quite easily lose a sense of this ‘possibility’ and instead become absorbed in ‘facticity’. They are ‘thrown’ into the world and find themselves there without knowing from where they have come or to where they are going. Failing to appreciate their possibilities, human beings exist in a ‘fallen’ (verfallen) state within everyday affairs and preoccupations. In this ‘inauthentic’ condition, human beings lose themselves in the ‘mass’ of society and lose the sense of being able to create their future in coming to live only in the present (Michael Zimmerman, Eclipse of Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity (Athens: Ohio University Press 1981). The inauthentic condition involves ‘being in the midst of the world’, existing within an artificial human-made world characterised by a mechanical culture. In an inauthentic condition the individual fails to acknowledge the inevitability of death and is overwhelmed by anxiety and fear. In such a state, human beings come to define themselves as merely passive objects among objects. 

For Heidegger, the environment confronting human beings consists of objects (things and beings) that can be used. The relationship of human beings to these objects is characterised by concern. These objects have the fundamental property of being ‘ready at hand’. However, investigated scientifically or exploited commercially, these objects appear as being ‘present-on-hand’. Thus, a mountain is ‘ready-at-hand’ whilst a quarry is ‘present-on-hand’. In an inauthentic condition, human beings come to reduce the self and others to ‘on-hand’ beings.

Modern industrial-technocratic civilisation is therefore an inauthentic world in which things and beings have been reduced to being merely objects to be used and exploited, mere means to ends, ‘things-on-hand’. The human being, however, has the capacity to overcome the inauthentic condition and achieve authentic being. This requires that s/he abandons the ‘facticity’ of past and present to seize ‘possibility’ in the creation of the future. In this way, human beings come to appreciate the extent to which they can realize their potential and transform themselves by choice. In achieving authenticity the human beings appreciates that what distinguishes the human beings from other beings is uniqueness in being open and responsible for what they are. The human being comes to view himself as unique within a community of other beings that are ‘at-hand’ and not ‘on-hand’. By achieving authenticity through deliberate choice, the human being can acknowledge finitude and hence overcome feelings of guilt (for what he has not done) and anxiety (provoked by a sense of the ‘nothingness’ at the centre of being).

Ultimately, Heidegger’s main concern was not human being in particular but being in general. Identifying ‘the Being of beings’ as the only proper object of ontological philosophy implied going beyond description to reveal the world as it is. Such a conception seems plainly mystical. Thus, whereas geology is concerned with the study of the material composition and history of rocks, the concern of ontology is to ‘think the being of the rock’, to actually experience how being is manifested in the rock (In George Steiner, Heidegger, Fontana 1978:67).

Heidegger was concerned above all that human beings would come to repudiate the prevailing ‘technological-scientific-industrial character’ as the sole criterion of our sojourn on earth (Heidegger, ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, Basic Writings, op cit 1978:379). And this meant recovering the proper balance between humanity and nature. Heidegger criticised the anthropocentric approach of Western civilisation since Plato as inducing the technocratic mentality through the will to dominate and conquer nature for human ends. By conceiving themselves to be apart from and superior to Nature and by seeking freedom, power and happiness through the exploitation of Nature, human beings have inflicted a technological domination upon themselves that has turned all beings including themselves into objective, quantifiable and disposable material. In the modern era

the object-character of technological domination spreads itself over the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly and completely .. the humanness of man and the thingness of things dissolve into the calculated market value of a market which not only spans the whole earth .. but also .. trades in the nature of Being and thus subjects all beings to the trade of a calculation that dominates most tenaciously in those areas where there is no need of numbers.

‘What are Poets For?’, Poetry, Language, Thought New York 1975:114/5

Heidegger thus criticises technology as a ‘setting-upon’ and ‘ordering’ of nature, a violation which must necessarily have a detrimental effect upon human beings since human beings, like all beings, are a part of nature. Heidegger was a forerunner of modern ecology in this respect. In 1949 Heidegger wrote:

The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. It sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it. 
 In contrast, a tract of land is challenged in the hauling out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears different from how it did when to set in order still meant to take care and maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In sowing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released for destruction or for peaceful use.

‘The Question concerning Technology’ 1954, Basic Writings, op cit 296

Heidegger’s point was that human beings, no more than any other beings, are not the masters of nature. There can be no such mastery. Instead, all beings should be free to display themselves and reach their fruition within nature. Heidegger is referred to as an existentialist philosopher, but his existentialism is of a far different character than Sartre’s humanistic version. For Heidegger, no being, human or otherwise, is at the centre of the world. This means that Heidegger’s ecological existentialism proceeded to far deeper levels than notions of stewardship which still give priority to human beings. Heidegger has no truck with the careful husbanding of nature for human ends. Such notions did not go anywhere near far enough. Heidegger put aside humanistic conceptions and embraced the thoroughgoing ecologism of true being, the ‘ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of Being. It is the guardianship, that is, the care for Being’ (‘Letter on Humanism’ 1947, Basic Writings 221 222).

Which is not to argue that human beings have no creative role to play in Heidegger’s ecological existentialism. On the contrary, human beings are part of nature and, as conscious beings capable of creating their future as authentic beings, have a role in saving the earth. ‘Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from boundless spoilation’ (‘Building Dwelling Thinking, BW 328). The earth is not some inanimate astronomical entity, a mass of matter: ‘In the things that arise, earth occurs essentially as the sheltering agent’ (‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Basic Writings 169). Dwelling on the earth, human beings should make themselves open to and achieve the ‘fourfold of Being’: ‘By a primal oneness the four – earth and sky, divinities and mortals – become together in one’ (Building Dwelling Thinking BW 327).

Heidegger transcended the narrowness and limitation of analytical thinking to achieve ‘essential thinking’. Heidegger was not concerned to calculate and dissect and in consequence destroy in the manner of analytical philosophy but to recover philosophy’s birthright in essentialism. To empirical and analytical philosophers, Heidegger’s philosophy was a full-blown mysticism. Certainly, Heidegger urged people to listen to the soundless voice of being. Such philosophy is reverential and primordial and asks no questions: ‘the meditative man is to experience the untrembling heart of unconcealment’ in ‘the place of stillness’ (‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’ 1966 BW 387). With such notions Heidegger parts company with the rationalism of Western philosophy and achieves something closer to a passive and receptive opening of oneself to Nature. One should resist the temptation to find a parallel with Spinoza here. Spinoza’s equation of God and Nature is rigorously logical and entirely unmystical. Knowledge is crucial to Spinoza in a way that it is not to Heidegger. If Spinoza equated God with Nature, Heidegger replaced God with Being within Nature. Heidegger renounced eternity in favour of the passing seasons and cycle of life and death on earth.

In fine, Heidegger’s legacy is a rich one. There are many who profess astonishment that ecologists can find so much to praise in Heidegger, a man who never renounced his membership of the Nazi Party. Such views do not seriously engage with Heidegger’s philosophy. What was important to Heidegger was not Nazism as a movement or an ideology. Heidegger was not a political activist but worked on a much higher plane. Heidegger is to be judged in terms of his philosophical contribution. And here his achievements were great. Of particular importance is the way that Heidegger connected the critique of technological domination and rational metaphysics with the human attempt to master nature and the idea of human beings as ‘fallen’ in the midst of the world. Heidegger has been grouped with a range of German philosophers, from Nietzsche to the Frankfurt School, characterised for their cultural pessimism. Heidegger is critical of modern civilisation. But his philosophical message, if understood, is optimistic. For Heidegger asserts nothing less than the ability of human beings to transcend ‘facticity’ and grasp ‘possibility’ in order to achieve authentic dwelling on earth. Heidegger’s philosophy is not dryly rational but is reverential and primordial. For centuries, human beings have sought freedom, happiness, justice and security. The philosophers have argued how these values may be achieved. Reason in all its forms has been debated. Some link the rational argument with moral codes, laws and institutions ensuring that human beings are connected with their higher selves. Others, like Spinoza and Marx, place the accent on human powers and their realisation. Heidegger offers a strikingly original and powerful contribution in arguing for openness to the Being of all beings.


113 BIOSPHERE AND BEING

The recovery of Being
Heidegger forces us to think about what human being actually means in the world. What is this Being of being? With the mastery of Nature, human beings come to occupy a place at the centre of the world. But if technological domination is evidence of human power, one needs to ask where is the promised freedom, security and happiness? Which brings the question back to being. At the same time that the world has come to be rationalised, the core of the self has come to be occupied by the rational ego. Yet the evidence that human happiness has actually increased in this period of ‘progress’ – the modern disease of depression has the scale of an epidemic – indicates that human beings are vaguely aware of the extent to which something essential is being excluded. Call it wilderness – Nature unmastered, left alone to grow to become what it essentially is. Far from mastery, the uncertainty of the ego shows how hollow the centre is. The mastery seems precarious. Heidegger’s notion of the Being of being encourages us to locate the real centre of gravity of the self in places other than technical and institutional power, in the union of nature within and without as opposed to notions of mastery of nature as an external resource. This is to affirm the unified self and the unified world as mutually dependent notions; there cannot be the one without the other.

Human beings are not autonomous, separate from nature, but are a part of nature. It follows that human self-realisation involves the realisation of the nature within and without in a mutual process of unfolding and growth. Human beings are made of the very same substance of the biosphere, and the realisation of human powers is to be considered as part of the process that maintains the biosphere.

Human beings are so accustomed to leading their lives through an artificial technological and institutional mediation that they are prone to believe that this artificial human-made world is the only world. Human beings are apt to focus upon the air conditioning systems rather than the air itself; the chlorinated, fluoridated, piped-in water supply rather than the rainfall, lakes and rivers; the storage of canned and packaged food rather than the fruits of the earth itself. Nature is a world prior to and bigger than the human made world, from which human beings must continue to draw for sustenance.

This thinking should not be characterised in terms of a return to the classical wisdom, as though the story of human history since has been one of degeneration from the right idea. The kind of ecological society advocated in this book has never existed and has still to be created. Rather than journeying back to the past, the concern is to create the future. This will draw upon classical wisdom. But it will also reject the tendency to parochialism and xenophobia in the classical worldview in favour of a spatial relationship that embodies the inclusive and global perspectives of the high road of modernity. One can find Heidegger’s Being of being in the centeredness in the local biome within the greater centeredness expanding to fill the whole of the biosphere. Being, in the sense of becoming and authenticity within the ecological dwelling, means participating with and assuming responsibility for one’s own small neighbourhood within the biosphere. The capacity of think globally and act locally presumes a political ecology that transcends the boundaries of politics to create a new spatial map. Existing political borders were forced by the symbiotic relation of the nation state and capital, with expanding markets and the competition for resources being associated with military intervention and control. The capital system has long since become global within the old political map. The principal agents of this transformation are the transnational corporations, extinguishing spatial boundaries to take the world’s commons to a single world market. A political ecology will create a similarly global spatial map but along geographical lines rather than economic. This spatial politics will be grounded on the local level, rising to encompass the biosphere on a global level. This affirms the primacy of ecology over the economy. The ecosystem predominates over the economic system, checking the expansionary dynamic of commodity production within spatial limits.

A biospheric politics achieves security on the global level through ecosystem sustainability on the local level. 

Such a view builds upon the insights of Arnold Toynbee, who warned of the potentially irreversible catastrophe following the destruction of the biosphere through industrialisation. Toynbee outlined the contours of a biospheric politics to replace the geospheric politics of the nation state and the private corporation. The survival of human civilisation and the planet required a new, organismic politics that would create new political arrangements at both the local and the global level:





Whereas the state and capital created political arrangements which sought to enclose, monopolise, commodify and exploit the global commons, biospheric politics removes the political and commercial regulation to create the global commons as a single unified organism as opposed to a single market. The arteries of the biosphere are opened to create a planetary organism. At local level, biospheric politics is grounded in the ‘bioregion’. The bioregion is ‘any part of the earth’s surface whose rough boundaries are determined by natural characteristics rather than human dictates, distinguishable from other areas by particular attributes of flora, fauna, water, climate, soils, and landforms, and by the human settlements and cultures those attributes have given rise to’ (Kirkpatrick Sale ch 38 :2).

For centuries, the human race has been enjoying the material riches yielded by the technical mastery of Nature. The significance of the ecological crisis for modern civilisation lies in forcing humanity to consider, for the first time, how high the real price of capitalist industrialisation is. Payment has been deferred. True, human beings have been aware of the pollution, noise, congestion, the blight, but have failed to really address their causes by seriously questioning the whole system. There is a temptation to avoid a direct assault upon the systemic roots of the system and instead to adopt a piecemeal approach in response to the more obvious and pressing ecological problems, hoping that this will suffice to stave off ecological crisis. Even at this most superficial level brings industrial progress into question. For once the ecological question is raised, it will not go away. The system fights back to remind citizens of the extent to which much they consider to be necessary to their quality of life depends upon an ever expanding economic system. That has been the response since the sixties. And it does not suffice to end talk of the ecological crisis. Ecologists are charged with being enemies of progress, with wanting to prevent the benefits of economic growth being extended to all, with wanting to block the development upon which ‘the economy’ – that slippery euphemism for the capital system – and hence human happiness, freedom and comfort – consumption - depend. The ecological crisis forces us to raise some uncomfortable questions. Why have the benefits of industrial expansion not already been extended to all, if that is the purpose of economic growth? (It isn’t the purpose of economic growth, the self-expansion of values through commodity production is, the rewards being distributed unevenly on class lines). If economic growth really does issue in human freedom and happiness and security, why are these the very qualities so lacking in the modern world. And the accusation that ecology is antithetical to ‘the economy’ is no more than a reversal of the accusation that ‘the economy’ and its continuous expansion is damaging to the environment, destroying the very biospheric conditions which support life on earth.

Global Warming
Ecological crisis forces human beings to become conscious of and address the underside of the age of progress. Global warming and ozone depletion reveal the hidden costs of the technological mastery of Nature. Human mastery has proved to be illusory and transitory. The ecological crisis has contradicted the claims made in the age of industrial and technological progress. The mastery in autonomy from and opposition to Nature has dissolved into an ironic tragedy as the human race somehow find themselves afflicted by mass poverty, famine, disease, with massive population shifts owing to war and political instability. Even before factoring in the ecological debit, the fact is that human beings are less secure than they have ever been.
From a vague, unsettling awareness, the ecological crisis has become a matter of public concern. Scientists and scientific bodies have painstakingly gathered and published research over the years, drawing more and more alarming conclusions. Finally, government officials and business leaders around the world have had to take a lead in preparing public opinion for the shock news that centuries of industrial growth and technological domination have been a fraud and that the consequence of ‘progress’ is the biggest threat to human security in recorded history. No wonder that in the short term business and political elites have found it easier to continue to parrot the illusions of progress. 

Limits to economic growth
Once the human race educates itself to recognising limits, it will quickly ensure the freedom, happiness and security that it can achieve within natural possibility and abandon the vain pursuit of the impossible. Charles Darwin’s great grandson was a professor of physics at Cambridge. He wrote The Next Million Years: ‘If we are living in a fool’s paradise, it is surely better to know the facts. But the matter goes further than this; for we certainly can do something to control the world about us, and if we can appreciate the limits of what is possible, we may have some hope of achieving our aims, whereas if our aims are outside possibility, then we are doomed to failure. Therefore it is a practically important thing to see clearly the laws which must set absolute limits to what it is possible to do.. Can we not draw from this the parallel conclusion that, if we know the limits of what is possible for humanity, through determining some kind of law of thermodynamics, then we shall be more successful in doing good in the world, than if we recognise no limitations, and so are perpetually struggling to achieve what is in fact quite impossible’ (Charles Galton Darwin, The Next Million Years, London: Rupert Hart Davis 1952).

The central dynamic of modern civilisation is capital accumulation. Capital must continue to expand its values or the system has a whole will collapse. The result is endless economic growth. This is literally a nihilism in that the only ‘purpose’ of such growth is to accumulate in order to accumulate further. Hence the paradox of human beings having to keep working and producing despite the potential of technology to ease the burden of labour. Ever rational, John Stuart Mill wondered why continuous improvements in productivity had failed to expand the realm of human freedom from work. Mill looked forward to a time when the human race could settle down, all its needs satisfied, in the stationary society. The problem is that the capital system is unconcerned with natural human needs. The system continues to expand well beyond human needs and natural necessity and must do so. And its continuous expansion ensures that human beings will be forced to keep working – and consuming. Excess is the inevitable result. The ecological crisis forces human beings to recognise the principle of limitation in the form of the laws of thermodynamics and the carrying capacity of the environment. Unless human beings begin to plan for the stationary society, they will ensure inevitable doom.

In exalting industrial and technological mastery whilst really lunching off Nature the moderns have wagered with fate and lost – but continue to interpret this loss as a win. For how could science, technology, industry, money not equate with power and riches? One may as well ask where the profit is in Faustian bargains. In looking for people to blame, lining up the usual suspects in business and politics, there is a uncomfortable point to ponder - human beings are not merely deceived – they wish to be deceived.

The emergence of the new biospheric politics can be traced to many sources. Perhaps the most important of these is the work of James Lovelock. Lovelock’s ‘Gaia Hypothesis’, named after the ancient Greek earth mother Gaia, locates the whole range of life within a giant system which ensures the survival of life on earth by regulating the temperature and the composition of air, sea and soil. Gaia thus represents the highest level of biological organisation.

Most important of all is the ecosystem of humanity. The Gaia hypothesis clarified the way in which human beings are a part of Nature. No longer could Nature be conceived as an external force to master and exploit. Rather, Gaia is the ecosystem of humanity and, as such, must be preserved as a condition of self-preservation. 

Lovelock identifies three principal characteristics of Gaia which form the basis of a biospheric or organismic politics. Gaia has a ‘tendency to optimise conditions for all terrestrial life’; its ‘vital organs [are] at the core, as well as expendable or redundant ones mainly on the periphery’; and Gaia’s responses to changes for the worse ‘must obey rules of cybernetics’ (Lovelock, The Ages of Gaia: A Biography of Our Living Earth Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989:9-10)..
Lovelock maintains that human beings are inevitably part of the Gaian process of self-regulation, indeed, that humanity is ‘a part of, or partner in, a very democratic entity’ (1989:131 145). Lovelock believes that human beings have a special place in creation in that our technology makes it necessary for us to become responsible for the planet: ‘as the transfer of power to our species proceeds, our responsibility for maintaining planetary homeostasis grows with it, whether we are conscious of the fact or not’. Lovelock gives good reason as to why human beings should strive to become conscious: ‘Gaia is not purposefully antihuman but so long as we continue to change the global environment against her preferences, we encourage our replacement with a more environmentally seemly species’ (1989:236). Gaia can eliminate any species that threatens the survival of life on earth.

Lovelock’s ways of expressing the implications of the Gaia hypothesis can be question begging. Lovelock is surely right to argue that human beings are neither the owners or the tenants of the planet. He is also on safe ground in rejecting the Christian ecologism which conceives human beings to be the managers or stewards of Creation. Lovelock argues that in coming to act as representatives of other species, human beings should see their role as akin to that of shop stewards (John Ryle, ‘The Secret of Everything’, Independent on Sunday 22 September 1991). The metaphor is unfortunate. It implies that Gaia is some kind of global enterprise, with humanity as some kind of permanent proletariat having always to confront an exploitative boss. Most of all, the view reintroduces the dualism of humanity and Nature at a time when the prospects for affirming the unity have never been better. There are times when Lovelock can withdraw his insistence that humanity become active partners in Gaian self-regulation. Judged by their record, Lovelock argues, human beings cannot be trusted with responsibility for anything, and certainly not for something as important as regulating the earth. But Lovelock can temper this understandable pessimism by underlining the fact that human beings are an integral part of Gaia. Lovelock thus avoids an anti-humanism which considers human beings to be a cancer on the planet. It is not human beings that are responsible for the ecological crisis threatening Gaia’s health but human practices.

Lovelock identifies the end of his vision to be Blake’s Jerusalem in a green and pleasant land. Lovelock conceives this in terms of small, densely populated cities in close proximity and easy access to the countryside; one third of the land will revert to ‘natural’ woodland and heath with one sixth of the land given over to wildlife; agriculture will be a mix of intensive production and small unsubsidized farms. But this is not a Blakean vision at all but pre-war Britain, a thoroughly ‘humanized’ landscape concealed behind the arcadian myth of old England. This may be ‘a great work of art’ (Lovelock 1989:13), but it is narrow and reactionary in comparison with Blake’s Jerusalem.

Many scientists refuse to abandon analytical thinking for essentialist thinking and hence refuse to embrace the organismic politics that the Gaia hypothesis invites. Although microbiologist Lynn Margulis worked with Lovelock in the initial stages of the idea, she stops well short of acknowledging that Gaia is an organism and that the earth is alive: ‘Rather Gaia is an extremely complex system with identifiable regulatory properties which are very specific to the lower atmosphere’ (In P Bunyard and E Goldsmith eds Gaia: The Thesis, the Mechanisms and the Implications Camelford: Wadebridge Ecological Centre 1988).

Yet it is the promise of a new biospheric politics that represents the great promise of the Gaia hypothesis, striking a blow for essentialist thought against the analytical thought that has put Nature on the rack. The Gaia hypothesis suggests that Nature is alive and purposeful and, what is more, human beings are active partners in the process of self-regulation on earth. Such ideas promise to achieve the union of humanity and Nature whilst keeping a role for human beings as a conscious, creative agency. One is left wondering how far we are from Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura. Rupert Sheldrake conceives the field of Gaia as its morphic field, coordinating its various processes through interacting by ‘morphic resonance’ with other Gaia. Such an interpretation of the Gaia hypothesis reintroduces Providence somewhere as an invisible soul. This union of science and religion in the notion of purpose at the heart of Nature suggests Spinoza’s philosophy in that it explains the capacity of the earth to regulate itself by some immanent purpose rather than a transcendental God. Lovelock denies the teleological interpretation. Gaian self-regulation does not imply the earth’s ability to plan and have foresight. There is no immanent purpose within nature. Yet Lovelock does acknowledge that there are times when the planet seems to be celebrating a ‘sacred ceremony’. And Lovelock is explicit that Gaia is both a religious and a scientific concept: ‘She is of this Universe and, conceivably, a part of God. On Earth she is the source of life everlasting and is alive now; she gave birth to humankind and we are part of her’ (Lovelock 1989:205 206).

Such an approach opens a path towards rejecting the errors of the scientific paradigm whilst appropriating the positive achievements of science. A genuine knowledge is capable of transcending the science versus religion antithesis by encompassing what is of value in both. Science has made an important contribution to the growth of human consciousness, yielding genuine knowledge in relation to hitherto theological questions of the place of human beings in the ‘grand scheme of things’. One of Spinoza’s greatest achievements is to have preserved all that is of value in the theological attempts to conceive God through the pursuit of scientific knowledge with respect to Nature. There are obvious parallels here with the Gaian hypothesis. From this perspective, the concept of Gaia furnishes the possible basis for an emerging biospheric paradigm which transcends science and religion to achieve a true knowledge of a ‘human nature-in-nature’. Human beings are natural animals participating within a self-regulating Gaian ecosystem. This being so, ‘progress’ is not measured in terms of human technical or institutional power over against Nature as an external entity but by the extent to which human beings come to appreciate the extent to which they are within Nature. This implies human beings becoming conscious of their participation within Nature, cooperating with the self-regulating processes of Gaia. True knowledge is attained when human beings come to recognise the metabolism of the biosphere as their own, thus effecting the union between inner and outer nature.

There is a long line of teleological and essentialist thinking that reanimates Nature and shows the extent to which true freedom depends upon the extent to which human beings can identify their purposes with an immanent purpose unfolding within Nature. From the pre-Socratics to certain aspects of Plato and Aristotle, to the medieval revival of Aristotle in the Arab philosophers and in the likes of Bruno, onwards to Spinoza and all the way up to the Gaia hypothesis, there is a strong subterranean current that challenges the modern scientific paradigm of Nature as a machine. Rather, in these views, Nature appears as an organism, a teleological organism full of purpose. The key question is the extent to which human beings are active participants in the process of Gaian self-regulation. Human beings have a role to play, certainly, but what kind of role? It is clear that whilst human beings are natural beings and are therefore at one with Nature, the unique, all-embracing substance that is Nature is bigger than any species. Human beings are dependent upon Nature rather than vice versa. Human beings cannot autonomise themselves from Nature but, as the Gaia hypothesis makes clear, Nature can continue quite happily without the human species. From the perspective of Gaia, the human species is expendable. Human beings create their own progress or catastrophe through their technology, institutions and so on. The way that human beings choose to use these powers may wreak incredible ecological destruction. In the process the human race may wipe itself out, either through nuclear or chemical war or simply by destroying the biospheric conditions of its existence. But the planet would survive. This is Lovelock’s knockout blow. Gaia has a way of eliminating all species that fail to adjust to the requirements of the survival of life on earth. Further, with respect to other forms of life on earth, it is clearly advantageous to Nature for the human species to become extinct. If there is such a thing as a purpose at work within Nature as a living organism, if Nature is capable of regulating and sustaining itself, then the prospects for the human species are bleak. The radiant globe of Gaia, with its fertile lands and rejuvenating waters, will float in space for ages to come. Whether the human species will partake of the journey depends upon the extent they are capable of breaking free of the anthropocentric constraints of their thought, organisation and practice to appreciate the ‘human nature in nature and the nature in human nature’.

The work of Kirkpatrick Sale is full of insight on this symbiotic relation between human nature and nature. The bioregional vision he articulates in his book Dwellers in the Land is concerned to overcome the dualism of human beings and nature. Sale rejects notions of an untouched wilderness as implying that nature is external and apart from human beings, something out there that human beings should leave untouched. Sale’s commitment is to a regional consciousness in which humans and nature (in all its diversity) are in inter-connected. By identifying human beings as ‘dwellers in the land’, Sale explicitly locates human beings within the natural environment. A genuine unity involved in the ‘human nature in nature’ approach implies a balanced inter-relationship between human beings and nature that overcomes biocentrism and anthropocentrism in favour of an ecocentrism. 

Sale here draws upon Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis and Lovelock’s own awareness of a Gaian tradition going back to the Greeks. This tradition conceives the world as an organism, as animate. Sale is concerned to develop the approach to nature in this tradition by differentiating the organic from the religious (spiritual) by upholding the distinction between ‘life’ as something animate from ‘spirit’ as something supernatural. Sale thus conceives the world to be a living organism, ‘scientifically alive’. 

There is a need for an eco-philosophy that avoids a religious nature mysticism whilst distancing itself from the moribund scientific paradigm. To attain this state, Sale argues that human beings must learn from those ‘two great teachers’, ‘living nature’ and the accumulated wisdom of human history. This is where Sale defines his bioregional vision or paradigm. Human beings must repudiate the scientific will to power/knowledge over nature. To achieve true freedom, happiness and security and hence achieve the true wealth of Being, human beings must repudiate technological pretensions of mastery and instead become conscious of their role as participants in a self-regulating nature. And this consciousness of Being in the world is inextricably linking to the understanding of place in the world. The location of Being is the biotic community, the place where human beings earn their living.

Sale organises his bioregional vision in terms of scale, economy, polity and society. Sale is a critical of the nation state and an advocate of appropriate scale, emphasising that small communities and bioregions are the best forms for the development of human potential and well-being. The bioregional economy is based upon stability, conservation and self-sufficiency as opposed to endless expansion and agriculture is designed to diminish environmental disruption. The end in view is an ecosystem characterised by immediate and renewable sources of energy and a sustainable level of resource use. Sale distinguishes bioregional self-sufficiency from isolation and justifies it in terms of community health and economic stability. Fostering community self-reliance and cohesion, bioregional self-sufficiency undermines the tendency of modern individuals to perceive themselves to be clients of the state bureaucracies and transnational corporations rather than citizens of a public realm. The bioregional community practises mutual aid to such an extent that it becomes possible to replace the market mechanism and, with it, competitive and exploitative relationships and the domination of individualism and commercialism. In the bioregional community ‘the wealth of nature is the wealth of all’, but not in any exploitative sense. Sale rejects the private ownership of land and will allow only usufruct rights. Sale’s argument with respect to polity make clear the extent to which these views are ‘close to anarchism’. Sale places the emphasis upon decentralisation, bioregional diversity and shared decision-making. Sale argues that ‘no leader, no ruling committee, no oligarchy, only citizens of the bioregional polity performing necessary roles, perhaps community officers for accepted administrative functions’. These citizens ‘are people not with special power, only special functions, acting in complement and directed by policies established by the community at large’ (p101). Sale’s ‘bioregional vision’ outline the contours of an active citizenship forming the substance of a public realm worthy of the name. Sale emphasises the importance of diversity within the bioregions to check conflict by creating symbiotic relationships between the eco-city and its environs.

There has been a tendency to approach the problems facing human beings in a fractured rather than a holistic sense, the totality being divided according to narrow specialisms and intellectual disciplines. The debate over ecological crisis has tended to proceed in scientific or political terms detached from the currents of intellectual history, whether dominant or subterranean. This book has sought to highlight the ecological undercurrents of human thought and practice in the evolution of civilisation whilst infusing the new biospheric thinking with socio-theoretical and philosophical perspectives drawn from the wealth of human intellectual history. To affirm the unity of human beings and nature implies the possibility of an eco-philosophical approach, a philosophical ecology or ecosophy which clarifies the relation between human beings and nature. Such a perspective requires the reorientation of the intellectual disciplines along ecological lines.

The emerging biospheric sensibility is breaking out of its subterranean existence to reach the site of official politics.

Biospheric politics has the potential to subvert the geopolitics of the national state and capital. Whereas geopolitics regards nature solely as an exploitable resource, biospheric politics revalues the natural environment as the irreducible context sustaining life in all its forms. The biospheric approach establishes the conditions and also the limitations for human thought and practice so as to envisage sustainable communities in inter-relationship with the environment. The empowerment and growth of such self-sustaining eco-communities within a biospheric public realm spell the end of the nation-state as the dominant political institution and the capital system as the dominant economic institution.

The biospheric public community will innovate political and economic arrangements which correspond with a reverential approach to nature as a living organism. New modes of thought, organisation and politics will be grounded in the local biome and regional ecosystems, ascending to the global level, with the biosphere as a whole becoming the governing region for the human species.

Being and place are inter-connected. Human beings become what they have the potential to be only in a grounded context. The biospheric approach is concerned with recovering the ground of being. Already, biospheric thinking is beginning to impact upon existing public life - organic food and living, soft path energy technologies, recycling, objections to cruelty, socially responsible investment, self-managed enterprises. The participatory revolution that has been underway since the late 1960’s applies to much more than a demand that existing institutionalised politics be opened up. These practises imply a much more expansive opening-up. Human beings are demanding a reconnection with much more than their political power in the sense of a control over their elected representatives. Rather, these developments imply a recovery of the anthropological character of sovereignty as the essential humanity belonging to all on account of their humanity. Re-empowerment is being redefined in terms of a demand for reconnection with human nature, with our own nature, the nature of others and the nature of the environment. The participatory revolution is ultimately a demand for human reparticipation within environing Nature.

Biospheric thinking reorients perspectives about time and space. Temporal and spatial realities within the geospheric civilisation are characterised by antagonistic relations, expansionary drives and abstracting and centralising tendencies. This all stems from the identification of Nature as an exploitable resource. Capitalist modernity is thus characterised by the privatisation, commodification and despoliation of Nature. Science has been dedicated to wracking rather than understanding nature, little realising that the damage inflicted upon nature is one we inflict on ourselves. Nature has been analysed, dissected and quantified at the same time that human society has dissolved into a mass of competing atoms incapable of generating a collective purpose.

The stable or stationary state is actually the natural condition of a self-regulating nature. Since all things are interconnected and interdependent within the biosphere, homeostasis and decentralisation would prevail if Nature was left alone. Instability issues from the antagonistic and exploitative approach to Nature as signified by privatisation and commodification. Stability requires harmonising human practices with the contours of a self-regulating natural environment. 

In a condition of true Being, human powers would be manifested and exercised to a temporal and spatial scale that corresponded to rather than contradicted the processes and relationships of the ecosystem.

Such views will transform notions of freedom, happiness, and security. A geospheric civilisation makes autonomy – from nature, from each other (from being and place) – the overriding value. Separating human beings from being and place, this objective issues not in freedom and happiness but their very antithesis. Seeking security in terms of exercising a manipulative technical and institutional control over a remote and alien nature achieves nothing but a most profound insecurity by undermining the very conditions of Being and Place. In contrast, a biospheric civilisation achieves freedom, happiness and security through the recovery of Place and Being as reciprocal notions founded upon the reintegration of all life forms – human beings above all – within the self-regulating relationships and processes that comprise the body of nature. For centuries, political philosophers, movements and parties have sought democratisation and citizenship through participation in the public realm. The nature of the democratic challenge takes on a whole new expansive form with the new biospheric approach. With the attempt to ground Place and Being, the end becomes participation within the bioregional or organic community.

Biospheric politics proceeds from a reassertion of temporal and spatial grounding. Capitalist expropriation of the means of life destroyed the sense of belonging that is a condition of security. Freedom and happiness came to be redefined as private goods, as qualities which could be bought and sold on the market, acquired and monopolised against others. The ideologists of capitalism sought to re-educate people into believing that private ownership could function as a meaningful surrogate for the sense of belonging in a public community. They were wrong. Possessive individualism emphasises what separates individuals whereas a genuine freedom and happiness requires conditions which emphasises what people share in common as public beings. The possessive relationship to people and place is the most physically and psychologically insecure relationship that there is. It is a society in which, in Tawney’s words, people hoard to snatch and snatch to hoard. People distinguish themselves from each other by their level of possession. But what has been acquired is always under threat of being taken away. This is the most restless of societies. The more individuals possess, the more they are possessed by their private good. Security here is a function of a possession that, by its nature, can never be certain and guaranteed. Possessions isolate individuals from others and destroy the community of Being and Place characterised by solidary exchange, interaction, bodily contact, human warmth, reciprocity and affection, and meaningful participation with the social and natural world.

A biospheric civilisation implies a restructuring of power away from the institutions of the capital system, attacking the militarisation of urban society at its roots in the assault upon Nature. The demilitarisation of society and of the planet proceed together as a single process to achieve the bioregional infrastructure crucial to the stationary society. The end is to constitute a genuine public realm based upon a common ownership of the gifts that are shared in the maintenance and growth of life on earth. This is ownership in the sense of use contributing to the growth of being in all life forms rather than in the possessive sense. The approach uproots the acquisitive and monopolistic institutions and practices that have penetrated every locality, region and sphere of the planet under the auspices of the nation-state and capital, securing ecosystems, human and physical resources and markets for commercial exploitation and economic expansion. Such control is protected by a vast military apparatus that costs trillions yearly to maintain. The extent of the military budget measures precisely how insecure such security is.

The idea of living within an expansive public that connects the bioregion to the biosphere calls for new thought but also for an appreciation of the various strands and currents of thought and practice in human history that have always connected human happiness, freedom and security to some such understanding. The basis of this organismic politics can be clearly discerned in various attempts to conceive the public realm as a grounded place crucial to the natural health of being. The real discontinuity is with the abstract, analytical, mechanistic approach to the world – social and natural – which has its roots in the overemphasis upon reason in detachment from the body in Western philosophy but which came to full domination within capitalist modernity. This approach destroyed the sense of being and belonging that give meaning to the notion of a public realm with an emphasis on subjugation, possession, control, self-interest and autonomy from ‘external’ forces, from others, from being and place. Against this competitive atomism there is a need to delineate the conditions of a biospheric civilisation in the notion of an expansive public of relationships and obligations which extend from individuals to each other within society to the bioregion connected to the biosphere. This articulates a vision of a public freedom and happiness within a global security. 

The local and the global – the universal and the particular - biosphere
The local and the global, the particular and the universal are not incompatible but complementary. The one exists within the other in an ascending level of organic relationships and purposes. The universal need not be a totalitarian imposition and only becomes so by encroaching upon the proper spheres of other interests. The principle of this organismic politics is subsidiarity. This principle affirms the right of every community, scaled appropriately to its function, from a family, a neighbourhood, a district and a region to a country and a continent, to determine its collective affairs within reason – the reason of human nature-in-nature, of each and all in Society and of Society and Nature. Being and Place in conditions of persons-in-relations. There must be a ground of Being in that all life forms, including human beings, must have roots somewhere in something. Human beings are born into a family and are brought up and nurtured in particular places with their own cultures and practices. The feelings and emotions of human beings, the very things which form our Being, are attached to place in the environing world. But this does not imply that personality is narrow in any place-bound sense. Rather, there is a global dimension to the unfolding of life as a mutual process involving all forms of life. The universal is formed by and in turn informs the manifold particulars comprising life on earth. To retreat into the shells of the local and the particular is to arrest growth. Self-sufficiency or autarchy is not a closing off from the outside world but a self-realisation that expands to form the content of the universal. There is a temptation to retreat into the local as a defence against the depredations and degradations of capitalist globalisation, as though the universalisation of exploitative trade and capital flows is the only form globalisation can take. The ecological crisis, emphasising the increasing scarcity of material resources and energy supplies, encourages a further retreat into narrow national or regional identities. This is the most conservative and reactionary response to the global economic and ecological crisis. There should be an attempt to appreciate the extent to which the local and the global are two aspects of the same process. There should be an attempt to create a range of expansive and inter-related sovereignties as against focusing upon the division of the world into a number of competing exclusive sovereignties. Universalism predates the ‘new’ paradigm of ‘globalisation’. Western civilisation is based upon the universal order of the Roman Empire and the Roman Church. The global dimension existed long before trains, cars and aeroplanes made it an everyday reality for increasing numbers. The dreams of a united world are embedded in Western civilisation, in the universal church taking over from the Roman part. Far from being a ‘new’ ethos, globalisation is creating the material ties that makes it possible to envisage a return to a universal ethic that was the norm before modernity. From this perspective, the era of the nation state wedded to capital is the aberration. Older traditions can now be re-examined. But this task is genuinely new in that it amounts to much more than a recovery of lost or past practices of universalism. Universalism was always more aspirational than actual in the imperial and Christian order past. Further, the end in view is now much more than that of matching the freedom of each to that of all others in society but also of this reciprocal society to Nature. Universalism is integral to Being and Place. The value of ecology lies in the appreciation of diversity as essential to the health and well-being of the natural environment that nurtures society within. A thriving natural environment and a thriving social environment exist and unfold within a mutual inter-dependence. The increasing scale of the economic and ecological crises that the human race has inflicted upon itself make it imperative that the human race act at a similar level rather than taking refuge within old certainties and narrow institutions that are incapable of meeting the new challenge. The world must be a universal order formed out of the interlinked particulars of self-governing scaled communities. The health and well-being of the universal depends on the particular parts preserving their identity in mutually supportive relation. Being and Place are joined by interdependence – Each and All and Ecology.

Local and global - biosphere
The case for appropriate scale in political and economic organisations rests upon the observation that the larger that organisations become, the more resources they require without regard to persons: the end of such activity is to expand capital within an anti-human society. The ‘globalisation’ to which commentators and politicians constantly refer to is actually the globalisation of capitalist relations. That the principal agents of this globalisation are the transnational corporations risks discrediting the universal ideal as people retreat into the safety of their particular communities in order to defend themselves against the global priorities of the TNC’s who are concerned to organise capital accumulation on a global basis. The expansion of the private corporations to a global domination that lacks effective control threatens to subvert the political order and, with it, centuries old attempts to institute human rights, democracy and justice. There is also a danger that the anti-democratic character of capitalist globalisation may discredit the whole notion of a universal order and interest. The danger here is that people repudiate an illusory and totalitarian universalism and retreat into traditional national particularisms. The task is to organise the expanding complex of human relations within global structures so as to ensure a genuine universalism grounded in particular identities.

The nation state obstructs the universal and the particular. The nation state is an illusory community that in centralising power destroys real community. The power of the state is gained by depriving the provinces and the cities of the autonomy they require to function as public communities. At the same time, although the globalisation of economic relations demands the creation of supra-national institutions to regulate increasingly global power, the nation state refuses to accept a subordinate role within the appropriate international authority. The sovereignty that the nation state acquires from citizens to redefine as its own national sovereignty becomes increasingly impotent. To ensure a genuine universality there is a need to distribute power at appropriate levels within an international authority. The nation state serves to obstruct the proper functioning of both the local and the global in being parasitic on the former and impotent before the latter. The global community is formed by the common interests of the local communities. The global is therefore an organisation determining the inter-communal affairs of the world. Such an inter-communalism puts the relations between nations on a peaceful and cooperative basis, making it possible to conceive of a public realm which is capable of dealing with the question of acting to ensure the conditions for human ecology on a global basis, securing the health and well-being of the planet. 

Appropriate scale implies the correct balance between the local and the global, the small and the large. This will imply the decentralisation of many powers, but also a recentralisation of power upwards so that issues of global import can be settled by intercommunity organisations cooperating on a global basis? The increasing scarcity of resources and raw materials threatens a retreat to national autarchism and the degeneration of international relations into war and plunder. Such an outcome is probable if it proves impossible for people to separate their sovereign power from the authority of the nation state. There is a need to emphasise here that the universal ideal and the needs of the particular community unfold and expand in ecological relation. Failure to grasp the global dimensions of power will have the consequence of the nations of the world fragmenting into chaos and disorder.

Biosphere
The human race stands on the brink of at last becoming conscious of the fact that the biosphere – soil, water and air – is more essential to the health and well-being of human beings than class struggles over the ownership of the means of production, administration, communication, technology. That is to say that the freedom, happiness and security that have been the principal goals of political order have to be set within an ecological matrix that first and foremost is concerned with the protection of the biosphere. This is the sine qua non of security, ensuring the conditions for the survival of all life. At the present stage in which nation states and TNC’s dominate, the resources and raw materials of the world are being parcelled out and consumed for private advantage at an alarming rate. To check this ecologically disastrous orientation, the principle of the protection of the biosphere must become established internationally (inter-communally). 

Ecologizing the Dialectic
In conceiving biospheric politics there is a need to emphasise the ecological integration of society and nature. This is to make the clear the extent to which biospheric concerns do not imply abandoning human society and the concerns of public order for an ecology considered apart from human beings. The intention is to define a genuinely social and ecological philosophy that incorporates the accumulated principles and practices of human beings in pursuit of justice, freedom and democracy in the political order. The idea of a ‘biospheric politics’ indicates the extent to which the conception of the ecology of nature is infused with explicitly human notions. The conception of the biosphere emerges from the social sphere generated by human relations and practices and underlines the extent to which approaches to ecology must necessarily incorporate critical social analysis and radical institutional transformation. This is the case for social ecology. A biospheric consciousness neither supersedes nor displaces politics. So long as human beings remain human they will continue to require a politikos bios as a condition of the self-realisation and exercise of their human capacities. The questions of ‘rights’ and ‘democracy’ apply to the social, ethical and political spheres developed through centuries of human struggle and practice. Given the extent of human intervention in and claims of technological power over Nature, the concern to realise a genuine public realm will remain a burning issue in any biospheric politics. The point is that any biospheric politics cannot be purely ecological without once more maintaining a dualism of human beings and Nature. Rather, biospheric politics has a critical social content pertaining to institutions, relations and practices. The issue is as social as it is ecological in that a biospheric civilisation is a civil or public order and must necessarily be so if it is not to be anti-human. It will be a civilisation shaped by human empathy and the recognition of the unity of inner and outer nature. Since this presumes the intervention of human beings into the natural world, the concern is to ecologize reason rather than abandon it as equivalent with technological domination. This entail the humanisation of ecology and the naturalisation of human beings through an inter-penetration of values.

The argument makes clear the extent to which the struggle to define and practise reason throughout human history remains the crucial component of the peaceful and just resolution of the end of history. The rational philosophical tradition concerned with public life makes no arrogant claim to the superiority of human beings over the non-human world. True, the reason-nature dualism runs through the whole tradition, helping to explain the paradox of why the fullest manifestation of human technical and institutional powers, reason incarnated, issues not in freedom, happiness and security but the very opposite. Reason is not always rational and does not therefore always redeem its promises. But if reason is the problem it is also the solution. A genuine public life that actualises human potential must necessarily take account of the innate and essential naturalness of human beings – this implies reason with an ecological component. A rational public, therefore, concerns not technological and institutional power – over others and over nature – but the ethical and ecological regulation and exercise of power within a social practice of cooperation. Great philosophers and statesmen, states and empires and churches, social movements, classes, and rebellions have struggled throughout the ages to give expression and meaning to these goals of public life. The result is a vast intellectual resource which has plenty to offer attempts to outline the biospheric civilisation of the future. Social and political analysis will remain crucial to any attempts to conceive the future human order.

If tendencies to anthropocentrism are to be checked, there can be no discarding of humanism. Human beings are distinctive moral agent, capable of debating the issue and creation of a biospheric civilisation through the integration of society and nature. Since this is so, then it makes sense to write of an active relationship of human beings with nature and their active participation within the self-regulating processes of nature. Notions of human beings practising an ecological stewardship of nature make perfect sense and do not imply a separation of human beings from and the superiority of human beings over nature. How, then, does one deal with the paradoxical argument that if human beings are natural beings, then the human exploitation of the earth to the point of self-destruction is also natural? There is no ethical analysis possible here since this behaviour is precisely what human beings are naturally programmed to do. The truth is, of course, is that human beings are creative agents, highly intelligent and culturally sophisticated. Reason has always existed, claimed Marx, only not always in rational form. Human beings do not always behave in rational – or natural – ways, hence the extent to which institutions, relations and practices turn the potential for freedom, happiness and security into their opposites.

Since human beings are indeed creative agents, creating their own history and transforming the environment around them, the case for ethics and politics remains strong within a new ecological sensibility. The fact that human beings are change agents means that they have responsibility with respect to the natural world. The case for rational philosophy remains strong within a social ecology. For it is by virtue of this capacity for self- and social transformation, the capacity to engage in conceptual thought and innovate social practices and institutions, that makes it possible for human beings to alter their activity so as to cease having a damaging impact upon the biosphere and so create the ecological society. The point is that human beings are engaged in an historical struggle to embody its humanity in a social order through the actualisation of its potentialities, and that this rational expression of human potentiality is also the rational actualisation of nature’s creativity and fecundity so that human intervention into Nature is actually an integral part of the processes and relations of natural self-regulation.

By virtue of this evolutionary and dialectical viewpoint, which derives the human species from nature as the embodiment of nature’s own thrust toward self-reflexivity, the entire structure of the argument around competing ‘rights’ between human and non-human life forms changes radically into an exploration of the ways in which human beings intervene into the biosphere. Whether humanity recognizes that it is a fulfilment of a major tendency in natural evolution or whether it remains blind to its own humanity as a moral and ecological agent in nature becomes a social problem that requires a social ecology’ (Clark 216).

Goethe’s Faust came as a warning to the moderns, as an attempt to caution the modern age against the intoxication with technical power. Goethe was drawing attention to the ethical component of reason at a time when it was becoming easier to exalt technique and believe that all things were possible. There is a price to be paid for separating reason from morality, fact from value, power from ethics, and that price is the loss of the soul. This separation and the attempts to overcome its disastrous effects forms the essential drama of the modern era (Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Boston: Beacon Press 1966 esp ch6).

‘if, pretending to ignore what we know of them through our own situations, it were to set out to construct man and history on the basis of a few abstract indices .. then, since man really becomes the manipulandum he takes himself to be, we enter into a cultural regimen where there is neither truth nor falsity concerning man and history, into a sleep, or nightmare, from which there is no awakening’ (Merleau-Ponty).

‘Scientific thinking .. must return to .. the soil of the sensible and opened world such as it is in our life and for our body – not that possible body which we may legitimately think of as an information machine but that actual body I call mine, this sentinel standing quietly at the command of my words and of my acts’ (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Eye and Mind’, trans Carleton Dallery, in James M. Edie (ed.) The Primacy of Perception (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 1964:160/1).

There is a need to avoid replacing one one-sided worldview with another through a one-sided critique. The specific target of these criticisms is not science as such but the mechanistic science that has dominated since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Yes, there is such a thing as the technological bluff. The power of technology as such to create the new social order is vastly and dangerously exaggerated. One needs to ask whether new technologies induce human beings to close themselves off from the environment, from politics and society, from relations with others, from their own inner dreams and visions, or whether it opens them up to these humanising and naturalising forces? The answer to that question determines whether Merleau-Ponty’s pessimism was justified and that, in the name of reason, human beings are sinking into a sleep from which it is difficult to see how they could awake.

Modern technology has been forged within alienative and exploitative relations and inevitably assumes the character of those relations. The kind of technology that is developed within the military-industrial complex of the capital system is characterised by an increasing complexity, violence and estrangement. The mistrust of a value free science has prompted a search for more simple, more safe and more controllable technologies so as to create a sustainable society. The emergence of the ‘soft’, ‘intermediate’, and ‘alternative’ technology movements in recent decades have generated a number of ways of embedding technology in socially useful form, a form which is no longer exploitative of human beings or of nature. Most important here is ‘Appropriate technology’ (AT), involving cottage and intermediate industries, recycling, biologically intensive agriculture, local food economies, renewable energy systems, conservation of non-renewable resources, and bioclimactic architecture. AT embeds the use of technology within the cooperative relations and practices of community and regionally based economies. AT is more easily managed on a local or regional scale. In attempting to conceive a unit of habitat that can embed AT and demonstrate appropriate scale in terms of resource-use one can refer to bioregions. These are geographic areas, between a major watershed and a municipality, evincing a clear ecological and often cultural unity. Conceiving bioregions in terms of scale is an integral part of the attempt to redefine security. AT security goes beyond being safe to make clear the extent to which being safe from technology and its impact implies having control over that technology. In this respect, the bioregion is a self-sufficient and self-sustaining human habitat functioning according to economic and ecological constraints that are subject to an immanent control.

Such views imply contrasting paradigms in terms of modes of thought, organisation and action. These paradigms are contrasted in the table below, the dominant capitalist form on the left and the emerging bioregional form on the right.
 
Competition, possessive individualism	Symbiosis, sharing, cooperation
Specialism, analytical thought	Holistic, essentialist thought
Technocratic and institutional control	Unfolding human potential and social development
Deterministic models	Biological models
Value as deterrent to objectivity	Value as means of utility
Exploitative approach	Ecological approach
Efficient technology	Appropriate technology
Large, centralised units of production 	Small, decentralised economies, bioregions
Non-renewable resources	Conservation and renewable resources
Alienation from nature	Integration with natural processes and relations
Destruction of local cultures	Local cultures as integral community
Labor and machine intensive	Skill intensive
Energy intensive	Information intensive
Specialised knowledge controlled by a few	Knowledge available to all

Anarchism and Ecology
‘There can be no doubt that the central concerns of the ecology movement were foreshadowed in the writings of the early anarchists, specifically Proudhon and Kropotkin (Edward Hyams 1976 Soil and Civilisation).. An insistence upon decentralisation and on non-authoritarian forms of social organisation; a refusal to become over-enamoured with the virtues of industrial production or to accept that the industrial proletariat was the sole agent of revolutionary change; a stress on self-sufficiency, and the need to integrate local industry with agriculture, thus ending the false division between intellectual and manual work, and between the rural and urban sectors – such were the central themes of the early anarchists. Although some writers on ecology have acknowledged that their basic premises have been drawn, or are at least consonant with, those of the anarchist tradition, most environmentalists choose to ignore this connection. They take their bearings not from anarchism, but from oriental or tribal mysticism’ (Morris 8/9).

‘Ecological problems are essentially social problems, and our future survival, let alone well-being, depends on the creation of a society that is based essentially on anarchist principles – mutualism and cooperation, decentralisation, face-to-face forms of democracy with the full participation of people, a diversified technology that is scaled down to human needs, and bioregional forms of food production.’ (Morris 141).
 
‘What Chomsky argues for is council communism or anarcho-syndicalism, which, as social forms, he sees as highly appropriate to advanced industrial societies. What he would love to see is ‘centralised power eliminated, whether it’s the state or the economy, and have it diffused and ultimately under direct control of the participants’. He sees this as entirely realistic under present conditions…





Bookchin’s Re-Enchanting Humanity (1995)

The work of Murray Bookchin develops a radical ecological humanism which is opposed to the exploitation of human beings under free market capitalism, and to the human dominion over and the technological mastery of nature. These processes are clearly related. The crucial insight of social ecology is that the human domination of nature stems from the human domination of other human beings within historically and socially specific relations of production. This means that the demand that society should be reconstituted to correspond to ecological principles of unity in diversity, spontaneity and mutual aid proceeds not by simple analogy between society and nature but on the assumption that the social relationships between human beings condition the relationship of humanity with nature. If there is something awry in the latter, remedial action must proceed from the former. To put an end to the human domination of nature presupposes the abolition of relations of domination within human society.

Bookchin’s social ecology has clear affinities with anarchist socialism but also draws upon the essentialist political philosophers of Western intellectual history. Drawing upon organismic philosophical influences like Aristotle, Diderot and Hegel, Bookchin fashions a nature philosophy which conceives Nature to be an objective reality that is in the process of becoming. Thus the universe ‘bears witness to an ever-striving and developing – not merely moving – substance, whose most dynamic and creative attribute in its increasing capacity for self-organisation into increasing complex forms’ (The Philosophy of Social Ecology 1990). Bookchin perceives life and all its attributes to be latent in matter as an active substance rather than a ‘realm of necessity’.

By uniting Hegel’s dialectics with evolutionary theory, Bookchin conceives a ‘dialectical naturalism’. Nature is a conative and creative process in which all life forms are ‘active agents’ participating in their own evolution. For Bookchin, mutualism, self-reflection, creativity and freedom are inherent in nature as potentiality. The conative and creative process within Nature thus yields increasing complexity and diversity of ‘unity-in-diversity’. Bookchin maintains that there is no distinction between nature and ‘second nature’ – the society, culture and consciousness created by human beings– since this second nature is the product of natural evolution. Showing the influence of Hegel, Bookchin emphasises that through the creative impact of culture and consciousness, the human species is the embodiment of nature’s own immanent tendency towards a higher order. The ‘human stewardship of the earth’ requires the radical integration of ‘second nature’ (human culture and consciousness) within ‘first nature’ (from which human beings have evolved) and ultimately a transcendence of both into the new domain of ‘free nature’, thus developing evolution to a level of ‘self-reflexivity’ (Bookchin, The Philosophy of Social Ecology,177 182/3).
 
‘Dialectical naturalism’ is a mode of knowledge which is capable of comprehending the world as a developing process, yielding an objective ethic that is capable of guiding human beings through the ecological crisis. Bookchin is firmly in the rational tradition deriving from classical Greece. However, his perspective makes plain the extent to which reason is Janus faced. Bookchin distinguishes here between two kinds of reason – instrumental or analytical reason and dialectical reason. Bookchin is an advocate of dialectical reason, an organic form of reason that is articulated in Aristotle – particularly the Metaphysics - and in Hegel – particularly the Science of Logic. The organismic conception of reason possesses an ‘emergent’ interpretation of causality and is able to grasp reality as a developmental process. This conception understands that there is an underlying order in the world, with immanent processes leading to differentiation, and a directionality leading towards ever-greater complexity and wholeness. For Aristotle and Hegel, Being is a process of becoming in which the potential become actual in the history of the world. For Bookchin, these ideas entail the active participation of human beings in nature’s evolutionary process to engender more conscious and higher life forms.
 
The holistic conception of the progressive evolution of organic systems has moral and political implications (Bookchin, ‘the Radicalisation of Nature’, in Comment (July 1 1984:6). Social ecology draws upon the science of ecology to present a normative prescription for society in terms of a free society organised on libertarian moral principles. The principal lesson for society is ecology’s emphasis upon harmony in the ecosystem as realised through the increasing differentiation and enrichment of the parts, subverting hierarchy and domination. This presents a vision of an evolving and symbiotic universe achieved through the interdependence of all life forms and beings in dynamic balance. All life forms and beings have potential to be actualised in a natural process of mutual unfolding. Implicit in the ‘is’ is a radical ought-to-be. The human pursuit of the good life thus forms part of the process through which value emerges in nature and in which all living beings look to realise their good (Bookchin The Philosophy of Social Ecology 175; Clark 7). Whilst moral praxis is particular to human beings, Nature itself supplies the ground for ethical behaviour and is a valuable source for ideals, principles and norms in showing how human beings can live true to their nature. The question of ontology is also a question of ecology.

Social ecology incorporates the ecological principles of unity in diversity, spontaneity and complementarity within a concern for values of democracy, community and cooperation drawn from political philosophy and political movements. Social ecology seeks to create a social movement which is designed to transform the human relationship with nature as part of the same process of changing the relationship to each other within society. Such an approach conceives the balance and integrity of the biosphere as an end in itself. As such, the end of social ecology is to renew the earth by uprooting the premises upon which Western civilisation has been founded (John Clark, Renewing 1-2).

Bookchin is adamant that social ecology is capable of integrating first and second nature as two aspects of the same process. He is particularly scornful of that deep ecology that asserts the ‘self-realisation’ of nature over against human nature. It is possible to envisage a future world without human beings on that basis. And if human beings fail to modify their exploitative and instrumentalist assault upon Nature, this may well be the result. But Bookchin is aware of an alternative end, one of a much higher order and form. The ecological society that Bookchin envisages as necessary for the future well-being of the planet and the survival of life on earth he conceives to be immanent in nature’s evolutionary processes and as possible through the actualisation of nature’s potentialities. These potentialities include human culture and consciousness and are capable of uniting first and second nature so that self-reflexivity of nature takes the form of mutualism, diversity, spontaneity, self-consciousness and freedom. Nothing in this view supports the deep ecology caricature of ‘abstract’ laws and instrumentalism technological intervention. Rather the point is to ensure that human reason finally comes to terms with its ecological component to ensure that human practices are brought into correspondence with nature’s processes and relations so as to ensure that human action proceeds in harmony with nature and thus make clear the extent to which the self-realisation of human nature proceeds alongside the realisation of nature’s own purposes rather than against them.

Social ecology presumes the unity of human beings in Nature, that human beings are natural beings and need to be located within Nature in terms of their institutions, techniques and practices. The fundamental transformation required to resolve ecological crisis in inherently social to the extent that it is human beings who are the change agents. Social ecology understands that it is the alienative and exploitative social relations and institutions of domination and hierarchy, embodied in the state and capital system, that serve to obstruct, pervert and destroy the reciprocal growth and unfolding of humanity and Nature.

The separation of society and nature through the alienation of human technique and organisation has had the result of human beings coming to act against their own nature and against nature as such. It is not only Nature that has been perceived as a resource to be manipulated, dominated, commodified, exploited and made to serve external commercial ends. This is how human beings have been treated. What has been done to nature has been done to society. The dualism of society and nature has separated human beings from each other within society, from their own nature within, and from nature without. The contemporary crisis is both social and ecological in that it stems from the unravelling of the organic fabric of both society and nature (E A Gutkind, Community and Environment 1954). The capital system, with its one overarching purpose of accumulation, has created an abstract institutional infrastructure that has destroyed the complexity of both organic cultures and natural ecosystems in order to subordinate all things as a resource in the service of the process of accumulation. Organic diversity has been replaced by a highly institutionally and technically complex system that is governed by determinism and organised by principles of hierarchy and domination. The approach is mechanised, analytical, abstract rather than organic, living. It is a world of the dead in which all life forms, including human beings, are made to serve external systemic ends. Capital as dead labour dominates and is parasitic upon living labour. 

The causes of the ecological crisis are located specifically in prevailing social relations rather than general notions of ‘technology’ and ‘industry’. The assertion of human superiority over nature and the attempt to subject nature to technological domination is not a general species wide assault but of very specific classes within humanity. ‘The domination of nature by man stems from the very real domination of human by human’ (Bookchin The Ecology of Freedom 344). In general terms, the solution to the economic problem of scarcity has been presented in terms of the conquest of Nature by means of technique and organisation. It has been clear since Marx that this conquest also entailed the conquest and domination of human beings in general and certain classes in particular within specific relations of production. Not only Nature but also human beings and, indeed, human nature have become the victims of technological oppression and exploitation. The capital system is an anti-human system in that the pursuit of its systemic imperatives requires structures and processes that contradict the human ontology. Both Being and Place are destroyed by capital. The abolition of the ecological crisis therefore implies the positive resolution of the social crisis through social transformation. Transforming social relationships will simultaneously change the relations that humanity has with Nature, including their own nature. Such transformation as a single process ensures the recovery of Being and Place.

Bookchin argues that ‘the notion that man must dominate nature emerges directly from the domination of man by man’ (Bookchin Post-Scarcity Anarchism Berkeley: Ramparts Press 1971:63). The application of science and technology based on the a mechanical ‘paradigm’ ensured ‘progress’ through the Baconian domination of nature but in the process entailed the instrumentalisation of humanity. Progress in technical terms was therefore a regress in anthropological terms. ‘The subjective spirit which cancels the animation of nature can master a despiritualized nature only by imitating its rigidity and despiritualising itself in return’ (Horkheimer and Adorno Dialectic of Enlightenment p57). The development of hierarchy and domination in society fosters the emergence of cosmologies and epistemologies of rule. The ‘goal of dominating nature is not a shared human enterprise; indeed, quite to the contrary, it stems from the institutional, psychic, and ideological domination exercised by emerging gerontocracies, patriarchies, and finally, by economic classes and the state’ (Bookchin Preface to the German edition of Ecology of Freedom).

‘The decline of patriarchy, the end of the fossil-fuel age, and the paradigm shift occurring in the twilight of the sensate culture are all contributing to the same global process. The current crisis, therefore, is not just a crisis of individuals, governments or social institutions; it is a transition of planetary dimensions’ (Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point New York: Simon and Schuster 1983:33).

Social ecology affirms that the resolution of the ecological crisis requires the simultaneous transformation of the relation of human beings to nature and to each other within society. The end of social ecology is the reharmonization of culture and nature, a re-enchantment of Being and Place. A crucial aspect of that transformation is the grounding of Place and Being in community development. The precondition for the survival of life on earth is the creation of a decentralized society of face-to-face eco-communities which adopt AT’s, liberatory eco-technologies that make it possible to overcome the antagonism between humanity and nature. In the process, the individual self is able to re-connect with others and with Nature so as to become part of a larger social and ecological self.

Social ecology distinguishes its position from environmentalism and deep ecology in terms of the relation between humanity and nature. In their different ways, environmentalism and deep ecology maintain the human-nature dualism. Environmentalism continues to prioritise narrow human interests in antagonism to Nature, its instrumentalism conceiving nature as a passive resource of potentially exploitable objects. The main concern is to conserve nature for the long term benefit of the human race. Environmentalism is a plain reformism that acts to preserve the system rather than engage in fundamental transformation. It modifies the worst excess of industry and technology but does not attack the roots of the ecological crisis in exploitative and alienative social relations of production. Environmentalism understands that the roots of the ecological crisis lie in the organisation of human society. It does not, however, entertain a fundamental social transformation and, ultimately, is concerned only with reforms that extend current institutions and practices. 

For deep ecologists any such notion of human beings actively participating in nature reeks of human interventionism. There is no doubt that the harmony of nature has been destroyed by human technological intervention and exploitation for narrow ends in the last tens of thousands of years. The natural condition of humans and all beings require no artificial rules or laws: ‘that the conditions of life are violated, that the will of God does not triumph, that the beasts of the field are disorganized, that the birds of the air cry at night, that blight reaches the trees and the herbs, that destruction spreads among creeping things, - this, alas! is the fault of government’ (Chuang Tzu: Taoist Philosopher and Chinese Mystic, trans Herbert A Giles, Unwin Paperbacks 1980:113). But, the question is begged, which government, when and where. Government as such. The danger of deep ecology’s deliberate political innocence is never more apparent than in such blanket dismissals of government as such, repudiating as it does ALL human attempts to organise a public life for itself in order – as integral to the natural essence of human beings – to realise its own human nature. Since human beings are in the world, they are intervening and are active in natural processes. The question is whether they can act so as to ensure that their behaviour is natural and corresponds to the ontology of their own and of Nature’s Being. To answer that question requires that a position be taken on politics, on society, on organisation and social relationships.

Bookchin’s principal criticism of deep ecology is that it fails to take account of the social origin of ecological problems and hence is silent on the necessity of social transformation. In common with deep ecology, Bookchin seeks to ground ethics in Nature, scientific observations of Nature making it possible to evaluate the ‘is’ in terms of a potentiality to be realized. 

Deep ecology fails to understand the extent to which ecological crisis has its roots not in human society but in specific relations and institutions and practices. Deep ecology is political innocent and dangerously naïve in making the human species as a whole responsible for ecological destruction. Deep ecology fails to differentiate between nations, classes and sexes or to identify the variable impact of specific social relations. It fails to appreciate that the human will to dominate nature is socially and historically specific in terms of social relations of production. That means that deep ecology is ill-equipped to indicate just what needs to be changed in human society. The all or nothing approach is hopelessly pessimistic. The emphasis needs to be placed upon the special culture-creating capacity of human beings as change agents to create and re-create their society consciously and purposefully to serve their purposes. Since the ecological crisis is at its roots a social problem, it can only be solved by human agency through social and political means. Biological evolution needs to be considered alongside social evolution.

Social ecology proceeds from the awareness that evolution progressively unfolds towards increasing diversification and consciousness. Social ecology ‘presents a comprehensive conception of the self, society and nature. Starting from the ecological principle of organic unity in diversity, he asserts that the good of the whole can only be achieved through the ‘rich individuality and complex interrelationship of the parts’ (Clark, ‘What is Social Ecology’, Renewing the Earth, 5). The challenge is to conceive the regeneration of nature and the regeneration of society as a single process affirming the unity of humanity and nature. Human beings can do this precisely because the destruction of species and ecosystems has its origins in society. Unity with nature entails aligning human practices and goals with nature so as to foster richness, diversity, and complexity in both spheres. By cooperating with nature and integrating social and natural processes of self-regulation, human beings have the ability to create the non-dominating community in harmony with nature. The ecological principle of unity in diversity is socially embodied in the form of mutual aid, cooperation, and respect for individuality.

Social Ecology integrates self, society and nature within an holistic, organismic viewpoint. It proceeds from the understanding that human beings are a part of nature, exploring the implications of this understanding with respect to society and nature. Social ecology applies the fundamental ecological principle of organic unity in diversity to all realms of experience, overcoming the reason-nature dualism at the heart of Western civilisation. This dualism takes a number of forms: mind vs matter, soul vs body, humanity vs nature, subjectivity vs objectivity, and reason vs feelings. Society itself comes to be characterised by a series of antagonistic, alienating separations: ruler over ruled, rich over poor, city over country, ‘civilised’ over ‘savage’, male over female, in fine, the dominant over the dominated.

Against alienating dualism, Social Ecology affirms a principle of ecological wholeness, a ‘dynamic unity of diversity’ in which ‘balance and harmony are achieved by ever-changing differentiation’. In consequence, ‘stability is a function not of simplicity and homogeneity but of complexity and variety’ (Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy (Palo Alto, CA: Cheshire Books 1981:24). Such a view affirms that the good of the whole is realized through the rich individuality and complex interrelationship of the parts. Evolution is thus a progressive unfolding towards increasing diversification, an ever increasing richness of diversity in terms of biological variety and interrelatedness. Bookchin explicitly situates social ecology within a teleological tradition deriving from the ancient Greeks (Bookchin, ‘Radical Social Ecology’, Harbinger No 3 30). Bookchin rejects both the mechanistic materialism that conceives nature as a dead collection of resources but also the ‘spiritual mechanism’ that dissolves everything into a cosmic oneness. Bookchin develops the Greek concept of nous to argue that meaning and purpose are inherent in Nature. From the perspective of ‘dialectical naturalism’, Nature is not a ‘lump of minerals’ but a ‘complex web of life’ which is infused with ethical meaning (Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism 1974:64). Evolution is therefore a process of planetary development which has directiveness through the progressive unfolding of potentiality. 

In a view that savours a great deal of Lovelock’s Gaia, Bookchin argues that nature has an ability to organize and maintain itself. But what is distinctive about Bookchin’s argument is the teleological view that nature has an inherent striving towards increasing consciousness, complexity and subjectivity. This inherent intentionality manifests itself as ‘a graded development of self-organisation that yields subjectivity and, finally, self-reflexivity in its highly developed human form’ (Bookchin Ecology of Freedom 237). Human society is a ‘second nature’ formed from primeval ‘first nature’. Whereas ‘first nature’ emerges as a result of biological evolution, ‘second nature’ is the product of social evolution. Second nature is the product of the moral and cultural and social praxis of human beings, of culture and consciousness. The most salient characteristic of this second nature is that at the heart of second nature is a human agency which can act purposefully and creatively in a unique way (Bookchin ‘Social Ecology versus “Deep Ecology” 9-10).

The progressive unfolding of natural potentiality depends on the existence of symbiotic cooperation at all levels so that the actualisation of human freedom through the expansion of consciousness and culture is contiguous with Nature. Society has the end of the free, mutualistic society as the realisation of the fundamental levels of being. Restoring the balance and harmony between and within society and nature requires the creation of a decentralised society of ecocommunities using eco-technologies embedded in local ecosystems. The ecological society would comprises a federation of communes in which all members decided on their own affairs through popular assemblies based on majority vote. The ecological society will not seek to dominate its environmental context but will instead ensure that its institutions, structures and relations are carefully integrated within the ecosystem. Such an approach will ensure the continued health and well-being of the biosphere. The ecological perspective will return the economic to its original meaning, the careful attending to ‘the rules of the household’ as against living beyond one’s means through the system of endless, expansionary, uncontrolled production and consumption. The ecological community practises a true eco-nomy. Production would be cooperative and environmentally friendly; distribution would be based on usufruct rather than need. All individuals would be guaranteed a basic, irreducible minimum with which it would be perfectly possible to enjoy freely satisfy all needs and ensure the enjoyment of life. Rather than equal shares, the principle of the equality of unequals would apply, which compensates for disabilities and special needs.

Bookchin makes the achievement of harmony and balance within society the pre-condition for the achievement of harmony with nature. The organic community regulated through common ecological values and a commitment to the common life replaces a mechanistic institutional order based on asymmetrical relations of political and economic power (Bookchin, ‘Toward a Philosophy of Nature’ In: Michael Tobias (ed.) Deep Ecology (San Diego, California: Avant Books 1984:230).

Abundance will not be achieved by endless production and consumption but through the reshaping of the system of needs. The development of an ecological sensibility creates a society which is organised according to Ruskin’s observation that there is no wealth but life. Such a principle values cultural and spiritual richness over material abundance. This viewpoint emphasises empathetic and solidary human relationships, aesthetic enjoyment, the creative unfolding of manifold human potentialities, spontaneity, play, and all activities free from the deadening hand of productive and consumptive rationality. The ‘ecological sensibility’ that Bookchin delineates seeks to ‘re-enchant’ humanity and nature through a new animism, celebrating play and imagination (‘Social Ecology versus “Deep Ecology” 10). 

The ecocommunity replaces the complexity of the mystifying and dehumanising institutionalised order with the complexity of the integral personality, realising and exercising manifold human potentialities. The wealth of the ecocommunity will be measured in terms of the flowering of a richly articulated relationships of reciprocity within a libertarian and communitarian culture that embodies the ecological ideal of unity-in-diversity. The basic unit of the eco-community is the commune, a tightly knit, small community based on mutuality, solidarity, friendship, shared values, and commitment to a common life. Cooperative structures and institutions will become extensive throughout social life: mutualistic associations for production and distribution, health and education, for cultural creation and social recreation, for reflection and spiritual renewal. Social organisation will be concerned not with the continuous accumulation of power and resources but with the self-realisation of all persons as free social beings.

The social dimension of Bookchin’s social ecology is constituted by an emphasis upon libertarian municipalism, clearly informed by the concept of communitas that may be discerned in the work of Kropotkin, Mumford and Goodman. Bookchin’s vision of an ecological society progressively unfolding according to the dialectic of complexity and interdependence dovetails with a society grounded in the rich infrastructure of a democratic, participatory civic culture. Bookchin clearly hopes that the theory and practice of community development and commune democracy could mobilise a counter-public to the abstract publics of the state and capital. Bookchin pays close attention to the subterranean urban forms and communes that human beings have continually formed throughout history as the foci of public opposition to the abstract centralising publics of the state and government. Bookchin highlights the city in particular as the site for forms of associative and communal activity amongst the people. Bookchin emphasises the forms innovated by the people themselves during the American and French revolutions, the Paris Commune, the workers’ revolts of the twentieth century. These forms point to an enduring capacity of so-called ordinary people to create their own public life naturally and spontaneously when allowed to do so. The people can create their own public life.

Such a society presupposes not the end of ‘the political’ but its realisation in terms of its original meaning of politikos bios. Martin Buber went so far as to argue that ‘the whole fate of the human race’ depends upon the ‘rebirth of the commune’ (Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia (Boston: Beacon Press) 1955:136). Buber argued that the world can be steered off its self-destructive course only by becoming a universal community constituted as a ‘community of communities’. This is Aristotle’s polis extended through universal federation. The recovery of the original conception of public life. Human beings develop a deep sense of community and become communal beings by living in a community that is grounded in kinship, friendship and neighbourliness. Bookchin makes clear the extent to which ‘society, conceived of as a diversified and self-developing ecosystem based on complementarity, poses a very distinct notion of politics’, a politics that emphasises ‘human scale, decentralisation, non-hierarchy, communitarianism, and face-to-face interaction between citizens’ (Bookchin, ‘Radical Social Ecology’ p33). Decision-making mechanisms are based upon consensus and are designed to reach outcomes that give a full recognition of the worth and competence of all who are involved in the process. Since complete consensus all the time is unrealistic, participatory forms of democracy will operate, with ultimate authority resting at the level of the local community. The town or neighbourhood assembly is therefore a critical political unity which provides the arena for the citizenry to publicly express and formulate its needs and aspirations. This book has sought to conceive this assembly in terms of the urban public sphere. This is the sphere in which an active citizenship can be developed and sustained to form the content of the public life. 

The community assembly creates a forum through which the activities of the multiplicity of affinity groups, cooperatives, communes and associations can be united and coordinated to ensure the good of the whole community. This realises both aspects of the principle of unity-in-diversity. The concern of such arrangements is to ensure that the values of freedom and community are synthesised within the social practices of lived experience.

Social ecology conceives community development as a holistic process which integrates the social, political, economic, artistic, ethical, and spiritual dimensions of community life within the whole. These dimensions reinforce and enhance each other as they unfold in their interrelationships.

Bookchin makes clear the extent to which the contemporary crisis of politics stems from the economic reduction of the public realm. Bookchin’s writing revalues those historical societies where the civic arena was coextensive with a vigorous public life: the Greek polis, the Roman civitas, the medieval guilds and communes, the city-republics of the Italian Renaissance. Bookchin is not guilty of nostalgia, making it clear how limited and narrow these achievements were and how the society he envisages as the full realisation of the ecology of freedom has still to be created. These societies were forerunners of that ecology in certain aspects.

There is no uni-linear line of progressive development stemming from the city in history. Forces for urban democratic freedom at some times, cities have also been bastions of feudal society and allies of the nation state curtailing communal autonomies (L Holton, ‘Cities and the transitions to capitalism and socialism’, I Rev., ‘Local autonomy or centralism – when was the original sin committed?’, IJURR, Vol 8 No 1). The relationship between the city and freedom and democracy and community is complex and contradictory. The emerging subjectivity coterminous with modernity makes it possible to conceive of a communal autonomy grounded on urbanity and yet in practice is associated with a dependence upon the forces of commercial and bureaucratic domination within the capital system. Can the city break free of the structures and relations of dependence? According to Lewis Mumford, the most singular function of the city in history is to store and transmit the symbolic and practical heritage of humanity, a function which exceeds the capacity of any individual. Mumford quotes Emerson’s remark that the city ‘lives by remembering’ to argue that:

Through its durable buildings and institutional structures and even more durable symbolic forms of literature and art, the city unites times past, times present and times to come. Within the historic precincts of the city time clashes with time: time challenges time.

Mumford The City in History (London: Penguin) 1961:118

The truth of this argument depended upon the political community being bounded by transcendental religion. The task has been rendered difficult by the rise of a secular historic self-consciousness consequent on the death of immortality (C Lefort, ‘Mort de l’immortalité?’, Le temps de la reflexion Paris: Gallimard 1982). The sociological imagination that has emerged in the modern city, though expressing a society independent of its individual members, has transformed space and time to become the spectacular commodity-form that dominates contemporary social life. Bookchin’s attempt to revalue the rational civic dimensions of past urban cultures is an attempt to counter this tendency: ‘To reach back into these historic institutions, to enrich their content with our libertarian tradition and critical analyses, and to bring them to the surface of an ideologically confused world is to bring the past to the service of the present in a creative and innovative way’ (Bookchin, ‘Theses on Libertarian Municipalism’, Our Generation, Vol 16, Nos 3/4 20).

Moreover, it was the Roman empire, and not the city-state, that first conferred on all its non-slave male subjects juridical status of citizenship, thereby vastly enlarging the horizons of the political community. 

115 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE CITY

The city has an environmental as well as a social dimension which urban politics and planning must incorporate. The movement for social justice is also a movement for environmental justice. The social and the ecological interpenetrate. The economic system that imposes exploitative class relations upon society is also implicated in the exploitation and destruction of the natural environment. The denial of social justice and the denial of environmental justice derive from the same source. The concern with sustainable urban futures increasingly unites environmental issues with social awareness so that justice in the one area presupposes the achievement of justice in the other.

Not all environmentalism affirms incorporates all of these features. There is a need to locate environmental justice discourse within power relations to determine the character of the environmentalism being proposed (Harvey 1995:70/1). Environmentalism comes in a number of forms, some which fall within capitalist relations, some which challenge those relations. The environmentalism that would be sponsored by the World Bank contrasts with that promoted by local movements and communities. The provision of a pleasant environment is quite compatible with the continuation of capitalist relations and is indeed part of regeneration strategies that seek to encourage business to relocate. In the economic management perspective, state intervention is justified only when there is clear evidence of environmental damage as a result of market failure (Harvey 1995:72). Environmental management neither challenges nor obstructs the rights of private property or the mechanisms of valorisation and accumulation.

The ecological modernisation approach holds that since economic activity systematically generates economic harm, a proactive stand ought to be adopted with respect to environmental regulation. The piecemeal bureaucratic approach contained in the standard view needs to be replaced by a more systematic set of policies, institutional arrangements and regulation practices (Harvey 1995:75). The key word of this discourse is ‘sustainability’.

The plausibility of ecological modernisation lies in its refusal to see the trade-off between environmental concerns and economic growth in zero sum terms. This places the emphasis upon ‘win-win’ examples of ecological control. And this, too, brings ecological modernisation within capitalist relations and the process of accumulation. Ecological modernisation is promoted as being profitable for business. Environmental concern is shown to contribute to efficiency, increased productivity, reduced costs and long term preservation of the resource base for accumulation (Harvey 1995:76). This discourse can be appropriated by the transnationals to legitimise the control of global resources. Big business, government, high-tech and science come to appropriate global management of resources in order to protect the supposedly fragile health of the planet (Harvey 1995:80/1).

The environmental justice approach is far more resistant to corporate and governmental co-optation. The environmental justice movement places the survival of people in general and of the poor in particular at the centre of its objective. Combining the demand for empowerment with environmental goals means that the movement for environmental justice incorporates the demand for social justice (Harvey 1995:83).





This explicit denial of the neutrality of the monetary calculus savours a little of medieval justice as ‘at one and the same time a moral and a cosmic principle to which all human activity must be subordinated .. social justice is that by which the harmony of the whole is sustained and which denies none of their due deserts’ (Gurevich 1985). Affirming ecological unity, the interdependence of all things, the principles of environmental justice challenges ‘the liberal illusion’ (Benton 1993), the differentiation of natural and social life into autonomous spheres lacking relation to each other.

There is a universal ethic containing doctrines of cultural autonomy and dispersion, of tradition and of difference. This enables a loose alliance of forces around development strategies that emphasise geographical difference and cultural diversity against the imposed homogeneity of global market integration. This represents the translation of values into universal principles of environmental justice through an ecologically based particularism. The environmental justice movement attempts to connect particular struggles to a general struggle in a unique way. It sets out to actualise the view that the protection and advancement of certain particular interests, properly unified, is in fact the general interest (Williams 1989:115).

Integrating social and ecological justice, the notion of the environment comes to be redefined so as to include ‘the totality of life conditions in our communities – air and water, safe jobs for all at decent wages, housing, education, health care, humane prisons, equity, justice’ (Southern Organising Committee and Social Justice 1994).

This point goes further if one pursues the assumptions of biocentric thought to overcome the distinction between human activities and ecosystem activities.





Social and environmental concerns are inseparable. Pursuing environmental justice in the city means rebuilding the urban environment so as to improve the quality of life within urban space.





The ecological question is related to the process of globalisation. The movement towards local sustainability originates in an awareness of a trend towards unsustainability within each city and community as a result of capitalist globalisation. This has generated a new culture of global sustainability. There is a growing awareness that people, regardless of city, region or country, all live on ‘a single planet’ and hence share a common destiny. 

This emergence of a global perspective has two contrary dimensions that point towards diametrically opposed alternative futures. The first dimension involves continuity rather than real change, merely enlarging and entrenching existing capitalist and power relations on a global scale and pretending that this is a new social order. This is the dominant discourse of entrenched power, asserting the inevitability and/or desirability of an irrevocable process of capitalist globalisation. The environmental management and modernisation approaches are quite compatible with this discourse. Such views are not benign and are not politically neutral, implicitly and explicitly excluding possible alternative responses on the part of forces outside of the bloc of dominant interests. Against this is the second dimension deriving from a growing awareness of an ecological crisis of global proportions that threatens the future of all humankind. This dimension is capable of reinvigorating the international aspirations of the original socialist movement, concerned with social justice as a universal designation. As the connections between the social crises afflicting cities, regions and nations within and the ecological crises afflicting all without are established, the demands that the development model that is causing the deterioration must be exchanged for something more sustainable promise radical social transformation. The environmental justice approach is appropriate to this dimension.

There is an increasing awareness that the environment is in crisis and is in the process of a human-made degeneration that will get worse if action is not taken. From a vague, unsettling feeling, this awareness is developing into an acceptance that has far-reaching and potentially radical implications. The growing ecological perspective is changing the parameters of political action and of social legitimation. The accumulating evidence of global ecological crisis has pressured governments and business into cloaking their policies and purposes with the desired goal of ‘sustainability’. Whether the claims of government and business can be believed is not the important point. What is important is that the hegemony of the earlier industrial capitalist urban mentality has been broken. From this perspective, to assert that the future lies with projecting that mentality on a global basis is no alternative at all, merely a recognition that capitalist economic relations are in the process of being globalised. That simply promises that the social and ecological problems that are transforming awareness in the second dimension will be intensified and exacerbated, calling for real change and creating a mass constituency for environmental justice. People are living under political siege, enveloped in a situation in which the seeds of an ever-deepening crisis of legitimation sown within national capitalism’s past are beginning to flower on the global terrain but are subject to political authorities more concerned with serving the forces generating this crisis in the first place than with securing a sustainable resolution governed by social and ecological needs.

In the midst of this intensifying global siege, there is cause for optimism as a result of the local action undertaken by the movement of cities and town for sustainability. The argument returns to the importance of scale and balance. Solutions to the crises afflicting contemporary society are to be found in restoring human dimension and proportion. This points to the central importance of proximity and the need to innovate social forms of self-mediation through social lifeworld practices undertaken by the people themselves as distinct from – and opposed to – overarching institutional-systemic imperatives imposed in the service of alien power. Such social self-mediation makes it possible to establish the connections between the local and the global, empowering the many small local worlds in such a way that they can connect with, transform and regulate the vast and remote global processes that political and business leaders claim are uncontrollable as they attempt to induce subject peoples to accept their powerlessness and settle for political acquiescence. 

The need to connect the principles of social ecology to a movement towards social ecological urbanism derives from the fact that it does not suffice to provide evidence of global ecological crisis and call for socio-environmental changes to be made. Without a socio-ecological urbanism, environmentalism is limited to management and modernisation approaches, allowing existing business and political elites to assume responsibility for ‘sustainability’, making only such changes that preserve the very system which is implicated in social and ecological unsustainability in the first place. To be effective, socio-ecological principles need to be embodied in a community that is capable of assuming responsibility for its own future.

A new philosophy that is capable of uniting social and ecological perspectives is possible implies a social ecology which goes beyond capitalism to engender new social relations which place the economy in its true place – as a means to consciously determined human ends, no longer as an end in itself. The argument developed in this book goes much further than attempting to fit environmentalism within the needs of business and envisages the creation of ecological communities grounded in notions of self-sufficiency and self-reliance (Orrskog and Snickars 1992).


116 PROXIMITY: PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
Ecology and the urban public sphere

Major international conferences on global issues concerning the environment, poverty etc are nearly always accompanied by the depressing awareness of the lack of correspondence between the ambitious commitments made on the international stage and the paucity of the actions undertaken at national. The reason for the disparity is not just the fact that representatives of national governments never lose sight of the subjection of the state to processes of private capital accumulation (politicians may rationalise the point more diplomatically in terms of ‘the economy’) but also the fact that international and national institutions are too large to take effective action. The necessary mediative structures that are capable of translating stated objectives into policies and, from there, translating policies into effective action do not exist. Agenda 21 clearly points to a need to empower local authorities, a view which emphasises the need to reconstitute the city as a public space capable of constituting public order in ways which make democracy an active reality and not a fiction to be manipulated by politicians working to an agenda separate from the people. 

The principle feature is delineated thus: ‘As the level of governance closest to the people, they play a vital role in educating, mobilizing and responding to the public to promote sustainable development [..] By 1996, most local authorities in each country should have undertaken a consultative process with their populations and achieved a consensus on “a local Agenda 21” for the community (Agenda 21, Ch 28.1, “Basis for action”; and 28.2, “Objectives”, 1992).

The importance of Agenda 21 is hard to overestimate in underscoring the awareness of the need for action to achieve sustainability. Chapter 28 of the agenda for the twenty-first century, signed at the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, contains many important principles. The point is that since a good deal of the issues addressed by and solutions proposed by Agenda 21 have their origins in local activities, the existence of powerful and proactive local authorities will be critical in the successful realisation of the objectives of sustainable development. The lesson is clear. The attainment of global objectives requires the participation and cooperation of empowered, effective and resourced local authorities. A future is envisaged in which local authorities construct, operate and maintain economic, social and environmental infrastructure, oversee planning processes, establish local environmental policies and regulations, and assist in implementing national and regional environmental policies (Agenda 21, Ch 28.1, “The local authorities”, 1992). Establishing principles of scale and balance and proximity makes it possible to conceive the emergence of democracy in a form that its Athenian originators envisaged.

The cities as urban public spaces are capable of raising the politico-institutional siege since they occupy a terrain that is sufficiently local but which, given the interconnectedness of local things, is at the same time global. Herein lie the seeds of a potential future emergence of participatory mode of democratic government in which individuals define themselves as citizens and thus proceed to create real cities. The evidence is that global commitments and objectives undertaken on a local basis have a good chance of being put into effect whereas the national Agenda 21s drop off the list of government priorities – ‘the economy’ seems to be the only priority - and the international agreements fall victim to national disagreements. Whilst the supposedly powerful politicians and institutions give a demonstration of impotence, the movement of the towns and cities for sustainability proceeds in promising directions. The future points to a socio-ecological urbanism making democracy a reality. 80% of the European population lives in urban areas. Indeed, the majority of the population lives in urbanized areas or metropolises and the figure is growing. All of which points to the necessity of major changes. 

The representatives of the old monological forms of urban industrial capitalism attempt to claim a radical newness by wearing the clothes of ‘globalisation’. They assert that as against the old divisions of left and right, the new division is between globalisers and anti-globalisers. But once one analyses the term globalisation and what globalisation in various forms entails, those old divisions between socialists and capitalists soon re-emerge. There is no simple, uni-linear and homogeneous process of globalisation, however much representatives of the old state-capital symbiosis attempt to persuade people that there is. In truth, their attempt to restrict the ‘inevitable’ and irrevocable globalisation to the globalisation of capitalist relations of trade, investment and production indicates the extent to which their thinking, far from being new and radical, is the old industrial urban capitalist mentality writ large. It should be no surprise that the very things which some assert to be inevitable are the very things which they also desire; political necessity looks suspiciously like political choice. Ecologists can also assert the inevitability thesis. Either the human race creates practicable agendas for socio-ecological sustainability within cities as public spaces, or the global politico-economic crisis is without solution (Harvey 1998).

As against the failing overarching approaches of national governments at international conferences, the ‘Charter of the European Cities towards sustainability’ adopts a radically different approach to socio-environment problems. Whilst intergovernmental negotiations break down through the endless exchanging of multilateral blocks, the local urban movement for sustainability affirms the principle of taking unilateral action, setting an example to inspire reciprocal actions from the others.

The argument for a socio-ecological urbanisation led by cities as public spaces acknowledges the interconnection of social and ecological crises. This is what gives the increasing awareness and acceptance of the need for sustainability its radical dimension. Government and business are under pressure to act on the environmental crisis. And the fact is that the environmental crisis is part of a social crisis. At the heart of both are capitalist social relations and an injustice entrenched in the institutional fabric. The evidence confirms that environmental degradation and social polarization are associated and continue to grow unabated on a global basis (Brown et al 2000 and 2001; Flavin et al 2001; PNUD 2000; PNUMA 2000; World Resources Institute 2000). Local initiatives alone, in themselves, and in isolation from each other, cannot transform the relations driving global social and environmental injustice. There remains a need to form local resistances and counter-publics into ‘global’ forces possessing the structural capacity to challenge and transform the ‘total’ power of the state and capital. But the incipient movement of cities and towns for sustainability forms an essential means of drawing people into the politics of public good, building a momentum that, in time, will build a state within a state.

The implications of globalisation as an economic process entailing socio-ecological crises are radical in that there is a growing demand from the public for government and business to act to ensure sustainability. Quality of life issues are placed upon the political agenda. The growing ecological awareness on the part of citizens suggests possibilities for strengthening the democratic control of the state public from within local and regional publics. 

There is a fault line at the core of globalisation. The globalisation of economic relations – which capitalist apologists equate with globalisation as such - increases the distance between power and people, separating the processes of production and investment and trade from those subject to those processes. Further, there is a clear divergence between the processes of economic globalisation and those who suffer the ecological and social consequences of those processes. This growing distance multiplies the transactional costs when negotiating common solutions (Norgaard 1997:184). 

The expansion of exchange on a global basis not only increases physical distance it also increases psychological and emotional distance. Overscale power is accompanied by an inability to relate actions to consequences. Rather than increase contact and connection there is a compartmentalisation of life and life experiences that serves to block and suffocate public voices. Those who accrue the benefits of globalisation exist in one place, those who suffer iniquitous social and ecological consequences are located in another place, those capable of changing policies and remedying problems live somewhere else. Globalisation is accompanied by a separation that hinders communication and prevents the achievement of a consensus with respect to common action on problems of common concern. The separation that accompanies the global expansion of exchange value increases social distance and entrenches social polarisation since it diminishes shared experiences and collective forms of action.

Globalisation is the universalisation of capitalist relations that Marx wrote about in the 1840’s. But, far from bringing the world closer together, such globalisation has been accompanied by a universal separation or estrangement. The solution that Marx envisaged entailed the proletariat, as the only genuine ‘universal class’, using its structural capacity to act to transform social relations from within. Ever since socialist politics has waited for the entry of ‘the proletariat’ onto the political stage. Without the proletariat there is a need to constitute this ‘universal class’ in one form or another. ‘The people’, ‘the public’, inhabitants determined to assert place-based meaning concerning the quality of life must fill the vacuum and engage in the relocation of power. This implies a local orientation in public issues through the creation of economic, social and political networks. 

This notion of the interpenetration of social and environmental justice affirms ecological unity; interdependence; ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land; sustainability; cessation of environmentally damaging pollution and production; the cultural integrity of all communities; opposition to transnational corporations and to military occupation; changed consumption patterns. As opposed to wasting vast resources imported at increasingly greater costs (economic, ecological and social), public and private expenditure needs to be redirected towards the more efficient use of accessible, sustainable and renewable environmental resources and energies, such as wind, wave and tide, the sun, the rain and fresh food produce, thereby fostering the local development of new sectors of economic activity. “The design and engineering of new apparatuses and systems, the manufacture and installation of these goods for domestic, industrial and agricultural use, represent a huge potential for jobs that can be provided locally and which are sustainable”.

The concern with the creation of a local urban public characterised by scale and human proportion does not imply an excessively local or parochial perspective. By its very nature, sustainability is holistic, entailing the inter-connectedness of all things. If all forces creating a problem makes an appropriate and effective contribution to its solution, sustainable development develops a momentum of its own that soon evades attempts to control it within existing institutional parameters. While more resources will be committed, the decision-making process controlling their allocation will be brought closer to the people in their localities. 

People capable of satisfying their local needs through the efficient use of local resources will also be more able to establish independent relationships with the extra-local world. This effective attainment of a sustainable proximity enables the local public to attract the interest of distant investors through a quality of life perspective, and to negotiate with them from a position of local autonomy.

The issue is not simply pro- and anti-globalisation but the kind of globalisation that will be established. The representatives of state and capital equate globalisation as such with the globalisation of economic relations. This process, which has characterised capitalism for centuries, concentrates decision-making power in increasingly remote and autocratic centres of power, the HQ’s of the TNC’s in global cities. And that is only where it is meaningful to write of decision-making taking place at all. Mostly, systemic imperatives dictate actions via ungovernable media of alien control (the market, the need for capital to expand its values etc, processes of valorisation). Against this is a form of decision-making that rests upon local democratic autonomy, strengthening the local urban public realm. There is, then, a distinction between globalisation as the expansion and entrenchment of alien power and as the establishment of local interconnections on a global basis. The former asserts exchange value via an abstract institutional-systemic apparatus over urban space; the latter asserts use value via citizen control. The former will send the world down the path of universal degeneration (moral, social and political and hence, following classical thought anthropological and ecological); the latter promises a socio-ecological sustainable human development.


117 GREENING THE CITY
Ecological considerations have increasingly come to inform the debates over the future of the city. It is generally agreed that cities require an enormous amount of the non-renewable resources of the world for their operation. Further, it is apparent that cities contribute massively to pollution and toxic emissions. There are also quality of life considerations. Daily patterns of urban life necessitated by capitalist urbanisation are not only a threat to sustainability, generating pollution through the need to commute from home to work, with damage caused by carbon monoxide emissions of cars, but are inconvenient and ugly. Concern with the negative environmental impact of urban life has issued in work that seeks to envisage the ideal city from an ecological perspective. For Colin Ward, ‘the greening of the city’ is not an optional extra but an essential of city survival (Ward 1989:5). This has expressed itself in demands for a return to compact cities which are characterised by mixed uses, the polynucleated cities projected by the early town planners and the anarchists. This section seeks to take account of the need for sustainable urban development so as to envisage the city of the future as a liveable urban habitat.

Ecology is fundamental to urban thought, forming an underpinning logic to future urban regeneration and design. The whole notion of sustainability and sustainable development is becoming increasingly important in debates concerning the future of cities, involving issues of urban forms, economics, transport networks, patterns of life, architectural and building design. The issues raised by ecology are increasingly recognised as being critical to urban life. Ecological balance and sustainability form the fundamental basis undergirding life on earth. Ecological imbalance threatens life. 

A concern with ecological design is not new. Human beings have always been concerned to build settlements that fit the contours and patterns of the natural environment. In this respect, capitalism represents a radical break with the human relations with nature. Capital’s central dynamic of accumulation forces an endless search for investment and a constant expansion of production. This issues in a wasteful process of urbanisation that requires ever-greater resources to be sustained. The result of this process has been mono-functional zoning, the separation of home and work, and patterns of urban life that use resources to an extent that cannot be sustained. Against this, the form of and the mix of uses within the compact city offer sustainable patterns of daily living, developing an ecological alternative to a capitalist urbanisation that is wasteful of resources. Sin Van Der Ryn and Stuart Cowan (1995) refer to the ‘designed mess’ that has been made of cities, neighbourhoods and ecosystems as a result of the failure to understand ecology and its implications for design. Important here is the understanding that design is to be infused with the living processes of nature, emphasising the careful management of natural capital.

Human beings live in two interpenetrating worlds, the living world of nature and the artificial world of human design and construction. Both worlds are threatened by the condition of unsustainability that results from the lack of integration between the two worlds. The endless expansion of the capital system, propelled by its central dynamic of accumulation, results in the depletion of natural capital – crops, clean air, water and soil – to dangerously low levels.

Urban design offers a number of critical strategies for addressing this loss (Van Der Ryn and Cowan 1995): 

1)	Conservation involving recycling, insulation, fuel efficiency, and building denser communities, slows the rate at which scarce resources are used up. This implies that since damage is unavoidable, the best that can be achieved is its minimisation. For this reason, conservation on its own cannot achieve sustainability.
2)	Regeneration seeks to repair and renew the living tissue of a world damaged by environmentally insensitive design. This expands natural capital through the active restoration of damaged ecosystems and communities. Regeneration does more than preserve but restores lost natural capital.
3)	Stewardship pertains to the quality of care in the human relation to the natural landscape. Stewardship maintains natural capital by spending frugally and investing wisely.
4)	Ecological design embraces conservation, regeneration and stewardship alike. If conservation involves spending natural capital more slowly, and regeneration is the expansion of natural capital, then stewardship is the wisdom to live on renewable interest rather than eating into natural capital.
5)	Careful ecological design permits such a great reduction in energy and material flows that human communities can once again be deeply integrated into their surrounding ecological communities. By carefully tailoring the scale and composition of wastes to the ability of ecosystems to assimilate them, we may begin to recreate a symbiotic relationship between nature and culture.

Ecological design is a way of integrating human purpose with the flows, cycles and patterns of nature. Proceeding from a rich understanding of the ecological context of a design problem, solutions are developed which are consistent with the cultural context. Design is the work not just of experts but of a sustainable culture reweaving the multiple layers of natural and human design. Ecological designs are integral to the cultural processes underlying sustainability. ‘It embraces the best of the new ecological technologies but also inquires into the cultural foundations of sustainability’ (Ryn and Cowan 1995).

The first generation of ecological design was based upon small-scale experiments with living lightly in place. The ideas and technologies of this generation include alternative building materials, renewable energy, organic food, conservation and recycling. These have now been adopted in piecemeal fashion. The world now stands on the threshold of the second generation of ecological design, bringing forth ‘new ecologies of design that are rich with cultural and epistemological diversity’ (Ryn and Cowan 1995).

In Designing for a Safer Future, Victor Papanek argues that ‘ecology and the environmental equilibrium are the basic underpinnings of human life on earth, there can be neither life nor human culture without it’ (Papanek 1995). From this perspective, design must be the bridge between human needs, culture and ecology. The development of products, tools, machines, artefacts, and other devices comprising design must have a positive and unifying impact upon ecology.
In the Hannover Principles, William McDonough defines a set of principles for urban design, according ecology a central place in the shaping of urban life (McDonough in Jencks and Knopf eds 1997).

1)	Insist on rights of humanity and nature to co-exist in a healthy, supportive, diverse and sustainable condition.
2)	Recognise interdependence. The elements of human design interact with and depend upon the natural world, with broad and diverse implications at every scale.
3)	Respect relationships between spirit and matter.
4)	Accept responsibility for the consequences of design decisions upon human well-being, the viability of natural systems and their right to co-exist.
5)	Create safe objects of long-term value.
6)	Eliminate the concept of waste. Evaluate and optimise the full life cycle of products and processes, to approach the state of natural systems.
7)	Rely on natural energy flows. Human designs should, like the living world, derive their creative forces from perpetual solar income.
8)	Understand the limitations of design .. Treat nature as a model and a mentor.
9)	Seek constant improvement by the sharing of knowledge. Encourage direct and open communication between colleagues, patrons, manufacturers and users to link long-term sustainable considerations with ethical responsibility, and re-establish the integral relationship between natural processes and human activity.

This thesis has sought to elaborate the principles of co-existence regulating the common affairs between individuals within society and has now come to turn to the principles of co-existence between society and nature. Ryn and Cowan’s reference to the cultural processes and the cultural foundations of sustainability is important in that it underlines ecology as a moral praxis undertaken by human beings in integrating society and nature. Culture is an important part of ensuring that ecological principles of balance, limitation, sustainability and mastery are designed into the urban fabric as principles of co-existence between society and nature. 

The community is to be tailored to the nature and resources of the region. Culture mediates between society and nature. Culture is the moral praxis of citizens. The emphasis is upon citizens rather than planners, for it is the citizens who put these issues on the planning agenda. An informed, active citizenry with a concern for the quality of urban life are the environmental educators promoting ecologically viable policies in transport, industry and employment. The citizens within the local community are active in constructing an ethic of urban ecology that is concerned with making the human habitus liveable.

The argument at this point envisages possibilities for the emergence of a new socio-ecological urbanism to take the place of a moribund industrial urbanism and an iniquitous post-industrial urbanism. Colin Ward demands that cities be made green again. ‘The greening of the city is an issue that is advancing steadily forward in the urban agenda. At last, population movements have enabled us to re-create within the cities the kind of environment that people leave the cities to find, and which was normal before the industrial revolution packed the cities with the new urban proletariat’ (Ward 1989:105). There are numerous statements in the Green Book on the Urban Environment, presented to the European Commission in July 1990 (COM (90) 218 final: 30) which suggest new developments from within society may be able to influence existing institutions. The Green Book affirms that the ‘creative, multifunctional city, which is also the most habitable city, is the one which contaminates least’. 

There is a good deal of theoretical work being done concerning the achievement of future sustainable urban forms. In the work of Susan Owens, a sustainable form on a regional scale would comprise many relatively small units. Some of these units would be clustered to form larger settlements, with an optimum upper limit for the whole group of 150,000-250,000. For reasons of energy efficiency these units would be arrayed in a linear or rectangular form along a public transport spine. This sustainable form would, at the sub-regional scale, comprise compact settlements, also linear or rectangular in form, with employment and commercial opportunities dispersed to give a ‘heterogeneous’ land use pattern. At the local scale, sustainable form would comprise sub-units at pedestrian/bicycle scale, with medium to high residential density, maybe with high linear density; local employment, commercial and service opportunities would be clustered to allow multi-purpose trips. A significant aspect of Owens’ argument is that her proposals eschew the need for very high densities, which could be energy-inefficient; 10 dwellings per acre enables facilities with a catchment area of 8000 individuals to be within 2000 feet of all homes; a pedestrian scale cluster of 20,000 – 30,000 individuals would provide a sufficient threshold for many facilities without the need for high densities.

Such views repudiate the European Commission’s Green Book on the urban environment for its obsession with the high-density traditional European city. Like Owens, Michael Breheny and Ralph Rookwood propose linking small towns and new communities in mixed urban-rural areas through the creation of discontinuous corridors of development along public transport spines. Whilst this view formed the basis of the Thames Gateway development east of London, its origins lie in Howard’s 1898 Social City diagram: his Group of Slumless Smokeless Cities, linked by an Inter-Municipal Railway (Breheny 1991 1992; Owens 1986 1990:78-9; 1992:87-93).

Such views are consistent with those of the Californian planner Peter Calthorpe

Stephen Wheeler’s ‘Planning Sustainable and Liveable Cities’ (1998) identifies a number of key elements which orient planning in the direction of compact, efficient cities: ‘A metropolitan area might seek to move toward greater resource efficiency, environmental quality, social equity and community vitality, while moving away from automobile dependency, non-renewable resource consumption, hazardous waste generation, and inequality’ (Wheeler 1998). Wheeler associates sustainability with liveability ‘in that they both promote urban planning that enhances long term community well-being’ (Wheeler 1998).

The awareness that resources are finite and that growth has limits has paved the way for a notion of sustainability that rejects the wasteful and inefficient development processes and practices associated with profit, accumulation and economic growth. This is to assert human value over exchange value, building an environment that actualises rather than contradicts the human ontology. ‘The implications of such work is that people and perhaps entire societies can evolve towards more conscious, compassionate, and sustainable modes of existence, given the right conditions’ (Wheeler 1998).

Defining sustainable urban development as ‘development that improves the long term social and ecological health of cities and towns’, Wheeler elaborates upon the main directions for urban sustainability: 1) compact, efficient land use; 2) less automobile use, better access; 3) efficient resource use, less pollution and waste; 4) restoration of natural systems; 5) good housing and living environments; 6) a healthy social ecology; 7) a sustainable economics; 8) community participation and involvement; 9) preservation of local culture and wisdom. ‘Promoting a healthy and sustainable social ecology means looking for every opportunity to enhance human community, opportunity and empowerment’ (Wheeler 1998).

A restoration economy helps restore the environmental and social damage done in the past and prevent new problems from emerging. It is a human centred economy that provides meaningful work and meets human needs. And it is likely to be a locally-oriented economy, one which emphasises local ownership, local control, local investment, use of local resources, production for local markets. As much as is possible, economic activity is rooted in particular communities and regions (Wheeler 1998).

This goes some way towards restoring a sense of place and identity within communities increasingly subject to the abstracting power of the transnationals. The ‘free’ market global economy is dominated by large corporations and is run in their interests. This domination serves to subvert local democracy, control and ownership, replacing diversity with standardisation, exporting capital from local communities to financial centres in the world. The development of a functional local and regional democracy through community participation is a central component of urban sustainability. This forms the bedrock of the alternate model in that it opens up local processes of urban governance to democratic forces outside of the ‘official’ sector of capital and administrative power. Educating and informing citizens into citizenship, the extension of participatory structures promotes a responsible form of local decision making that forms the content of the urban public realm.





There is need, then, to conceive a broad-based counter-hegemony organised around the themes of citizen democracy. This envisages a long-range strategy built upon processes of dialogic democracy and consensus and communication, a process of public education, fostering organisational, political and intellectual capacities for self-government.

An urban public realm promotes goals of sustainability and liveability through the participation and involvement of a wide range of groups active in the local environment. Practising a communicative ethic in a dialogic democracy enables participating groups to reach agreement on values and goals to generate the culture that orients the community towards sustainability and liveability.

Constituting the culture upon which this urban public realm depends requires the effective development of a coalition of social, community and citizen groups determining common goals around the quality of urban political, social and environmental life. The cultural process is an ongoing one organised around networks of deliberation and communication. Most importantly, this process enables those who live in a community to affirm the use value of the city against the domination of an exchange value as determined by forces external to the city.

The urban public realm is the product of asserting social control over the alien control of the state and capital. Developing dialogic democracy and social capital, building cooperative relations between individuals and groups, the urban public realm actualises the philosophical ideal of the rational city as a civilising and humanizing process. The crises generated by the concentration of power in an overarching-institutional systemic apparatus to overscale through the practical reappropriation of social power alienated to the state and capital and its reorganisation as social power. This makes it possible to reorient social purposes away from the pursuit of exchange value and accumulation towards social and ecological well-being:





This inscribes the rational ethic upholding the unity of each and all into the urban fabric. And it ensures that the principles of co-existence between individuals within society and between society and nature are established.







The influence of the natural environment upon the future of the city has a global dimension. In Urban World/Global City, David Clark argues that a global urban society is evolving which unites all on the planet in a concern with the ecological damage inflicted by urbanisation. Global urbanisation is systematically destroying the ecosystem upon which life on earth depends.

The cities of the twenty first century will be increasingly integrated into a global context. The big question is whether this global context necessarily implies the further abstraction of structures, processes and institutions from individuals all over the world. Or whether the incorporation of an ecological dimension within politics facilitates the recovery of place and identity on a local and regional, i.e. sub-national and sub-institutional level. Answering this question means addressing the processes of capitalist urbanisation.

The present phase of capitalist urbanisation is intensifying long and deep-seated problems immanent in the processes of capitalist rationalisation constituting modernity. The globalisation of economic relations, the ICT revolution, the ecological imperative, the ever-elusive goals of social justice, democracy and freedom, provoke conflicts and raise demands. The unfolding and resolution of these conflicts and demands will determine the extent to which cities will become genuine public realms and individuals will become real citizens.

The ecological argument for the self-managing democratic community savour a great deal of the anarcho-Aristotelianism which this book has sought to define in terms of notions of mutuality, reciprocity and solidary exchange and interaction drawn from an ethic of ‘rational freedom’. This ethic rests upon a philosophical anthropology concerning the politikos bios that is integral to the creative realisation of the human ontology. This is the cultural dimension in which a universal morality, an overarching moral framework or conception of the good life is apprehended by citizens and reshapes society and nature through their praxis.





Ecology possesses a socio-cultural dimension, mediating the relationship of humanity, its technique and organisation, to nature. The balance of the biosphere is to be respected in social organisation. Unity in diversity is to be valued as a natural end of the ecosystem and also as the goal of the social system. The greater the diversity, the more balance that system evinces. Systems lacking diversity, reduced to dominant poles, are more prone to instability and breakdown. Ecology is not based on hierarchy in the ecosystem but a holistic aspiration to unity in diversity. Everything contributing to the life of the ecosystem possesses a coequal role in maintaining the balance of the whole.

Whereas the capitalist mode of production is characterised by overscale with the concentration and centralisation of power and resources in the alien forms of the state and capital, an ecological society restores balance and scale. The alternative to capitalist urbanisation is premised upon the decentralisation of city life so as to establish scaled communities tailored to human needs and ecological imperatives. This is not so much a counter-cultural community alternative as a civic movement squarely in the tradition of public life deriving from classical Greece. For both Plato and Aristotle, the city-state is a public community that is comprehensible and controllable by the individuals composing it, a true polis that is scaled to human proportions, taken in a single view. This notion of a scaled community continued to be the central principle of town life into the Middle Ages but was destroyed by the process of capitalist urbanisation.

Urban planning faces something of a dilemma. In origins, urbanism has been perceived as the summum bonum of human existence, expressing the individual need to associate with others and facilitating self-development. In terms of its philosophical and historical origins, the city is celebrated as the sphere of culture and civilisation, as a self-made substance through which individuals realise their human potentialities. The automatic connection of urban space with civilisation and humanisation has, however, been severed under the pressure of capitalist urbanisation, rendering the relation much more problematic and ambiguous. The commodification, quantification and standardisation associated with capitalist urbanisation reduces the complexity of the ecosystem to a one-dimensional form, simplifying the complex webs of the biosphere and replacing the organic with the inorganic.

Since advanced industrial capitalist societies are ‘complex’, bureaucratised and technological systems, they require a sophisticated institutional and organisational framework. From an ecological perspective, however, this complexity is sufficient explanation for the increasing tendency to breakdown exhibited in these societies (Rifkin 1985:79 88 89/90).





Rifkin presents the ecological argument for humanly scaled self-managing democracy.





This notion of democratically run city-states clearly invokes the polis ideal and savours a great deal of the urban public sphere which this book has sought to define. A decentralised participatory democracy is justified not merely on moral and political grounds but also on ecological grounds in minimizing energy flow.

Affirming unity in diversity recovers the richness, balance and interdependence crucial to the totality of life. To achieve this requires the dissolution of the alien complexity of overscale structures and institutions so as to scale power to human dimensions. This asserts conscious human praxis against the inertial praxes of alienated society.

To turn unreason into reason requires a return to scale. This rests on a control and comprehension that simplifies the world for human beings. In incorporating social power into individual relationships, humanity as a whole becomes strong enough to assume conscious control of the institutional-systemic apparatus in the process of constituting a public life appropriate to human scale.

The task is to articulate a philosophy of relationships that individuals have to each other and to their environment. Ecologists confront the overscale of ‘complexity’ with human scale (King and Schneider 1992:chs 4 6 8). The anarchist and social demand for the abolition of the state in favour of federalism and decentralisation has become the core value of social ecology (Marshall 1992:300 307). The emphasis is upon the creation of a decentralised society based upon face-to-face communities employing emancipatory technology (Marshall 1992:424/9; The Ecologist 1972:50/4 57 62). On these grounds, Marshall projects future society as an ‘Ecotype’. The ecological perspective would dissolve complexity in favour of self-regulation through citizen initiative based upon direct control over social and political forces. Greater participation by citizens is achieved by decentralising and simplifying administrative units. In the eco-decentralist model based upon cooperative economic exchange and minimum coordination, all social, economic and political structures would be oversee able, manageable units subject to popular control.

The question of complexity is a question of scale. As against the increasing complexity associated with the technological fix, taking the world beyond human scale, ecologists argue that the physical and social environment should reflect the needs of human beings to live in a world that they can recognise as their own. Kirkpatrick Sale defines the ‘human scale alternative’ in precisely these terms, calling for the decentralisation of institutions and the devolution of power. Large scale systems which create and perpetuate crisis would be replaced by ‘smaller, more controllable, more efficient, people-sized units, rooted in local circumstances and guided by local circumstances’ (Sale 1980).

Appropriate scale dissolves complexity in favour of a mode of life based upon active and directly democratic community (Spenta and Capra 1985:45/7; Ward 1976:ch 14; Ward 1979:ch 1 166/7; Commoner 1972:1; Wilhelm 1977:100/8; McBurney 1990:24 36 42 47 71 85 147/49 168 172). There has been a growing body of work on a green economy based upon sustainable development (Pearce et al 1989; Olson and Landsberg 1975; World Commission on Environment and Development 1987:ch2; Schumacher 1974: ch 5 ‘A Question of Size’ and ch 10 ‘Technology with a Human Face’).

Eco-communities recognise a multi-dimensional conception of human scale. The eco-community represents a new relationship between humanity and nature, incorporating an ecological dimension into society so as to conceive public life as itself an ecosystem affirming unity in diversity, creativity and spontaneity, and non-hierarchical relations. This recovers the importance of needs and instincts and emotions within reason so as to challenge the repressive rationalisation of capitalist modernity. The complexity of life – as opposed to artificial systems – is cultivate and respected.

An eco-community practises mutual aid, appropriate technology and achieves harmonious relations between human beings and between humanity and nature. Ecology possesses a social dimension.

With the humanisation of relationships, reason is articulated to realise human needs and ecological diversity. To the extent that human beings are a part of the natural world, human reason could be described as nature rendered conscious, oriented towards balanced social and sociological ends. Some such notion is explicit in classical philosophy, feeding into the holistic conceptions of ‘rational’ philosophy.

A holistic, organic conception of public life adopts a decentralising conception of scale and a keen affirmation of human beings as ends in themselves. The philosophical conception of the good society develops into social ecology in the concern to establish communities that harmonize relationships between humanity and society and between society and nature. The restoration of harmony between human beings and their powers makes it possible to incorporate an ecological perspective into notions of urban space as a human habitus.

The concern with scale is ‘rational’ in that it is premised upon self-consciousness as the distinctive attribute of the human species. Human beings engage in rational action. They are reflexive and teleological beings, capable of projecting ends and reflecting upon their actualisation. Reflexivity is built into human action. Praxis is rational; it is ethical and cultural. Evaluating the human habitat in these terms means focusing upon more than physical artefacts. The human habitus is to be evaluated according to whether it promotes the good life, realises human potentialities, expands rather than inhibits the growth of human capacities.

By the urban criteria laid down by Plato and Aristotle, a habitat that is beyond human comprehension and control is unjust. An overscale habitat is inhuman, lacking in balance and proportion with respect to size and quality. Overscale destroys participatory structures and diversity and in their place centralises and concentrates power. The exclusiveness of political and economic functions denies citizens the opportunity to participate in the determination of forces and decisions affecting collective life.

The trend towards overscale in the modern world is dehumanising in that it represents the devaluation of public life. Individuals denied the opportunity to participate in the public sphere lose not only their citizenship but their sense of self-identity; they lose the culture which enables them to regulate their relations with each other within society and their relations with the external environment. The diminution of the public sphere is also a diminution of possibilities for human growth and development. The urban question is not simply settled by establishing human proportions. Beyond the question of scale there remains the question of justice and of the good. A mode of life qualifies as ‘good’ to the extent that it achieves material sufficiency and reflexivity in a community that is ethical as well as ecological, a community which is founded upon justice, participation and mutual recognition. This is to conceive of an authentic public sphere as comprising political institutions and social infrastructure and overarching values. The individuals composing a public life become a true association as opposed to a mere aggregate in integrating political, material, normative and psychological structures in a ‘human’ way of life. 

The conceptual formulation of the urban public sphere achieves form out of the formless urban aggregates that exist in the contemporary world. The scaling of power to human comprehension and control is crucial to the recovery of public life as integral to the creative self-realisation of the human ontology. It is also necessary in order to bring power under ethical control so as to end the socially and ecologically pathological consequences of irresponsible power. Human beings need to assume ethical control of their powers, creatively living up to the forces that their praxis has engendered. This envisages the urban public as an eco-community in which human beings are firmly a part of nature, using only such technology as respects the biosphere as the condition of life on earth. The humanly scaled public enables participation and self-development to proceed in mutual relation, achieving the interconnection of each with all and all with each in a rich, multi-sided nexus of an empowered urban infrastructure.


119 CONCLUSION CONSTITUTING PUBLICITY
Rationalising Cityspace

The argument in this book addresses the paradox that whilst liberal modernity generates a continuous need and demand for public life, its processes and institutions operate in such a way as to make this public unavailable. Liberal modernity both requires public life and renders it impossible.

The argument that has been developed throughout the three parts of this book has been premised upon a view of the urban environment as a public space. The philosophical roots of city studies have been examined to define the urban environment as the politikos bios that individuals need in order to realise their human potentialities. Public life has been shown to be crucial to self-identity and autonomy. Recognising that individuals need each other in order to be themselves, this genuine public life is associative. And it has social justice at its heart. Social justice ensures that the connection between the freedom of each and the freedom of all, the rational unity that ensures well-being, is established within the everyday relationships of urban social life rather than merely being invested in the legal-institutional apparatus regulating human interaction.

This book has sought to project the future rational city through the incorporation of the key principles of rational freedom – reciprocity, mutual respect, communication, communality, solidarity, intersubjectivity (which are formalised and institutionalised at the abstract level of the state and the law) – into the everyday social world of individual interaction and exchange. In the process, this thesis has critically addressed the transition from an emancipatory-normative reason, which in a philosophical tradition had projected the ideal of the perfect city, to a repressive-deontological rationalisation within capitalist processes of modernisation that have reduced the city to a site of economic activity. The argument has been concerned to affirm the original emancipatory promise of reason as against the life denying and autonomy impairing/destroying rationalisation driven by the capitalist processes of valorisation.

The full exploration of human possibilities, far beyond the limited freedom of subjective individualism, requires the construction of a larger frame of meaning, a public life that affirms freedom as a collective as well as an individual project. This position recognises that the individual achieves self-identity only in relation with other individuals. For these reasons, the postmodern or Foucaultian critique, though important in registering the contemporary innovation of alternate modes of political expression, can actually come to restate in different terminology the individualistic liberalism which the ‘rational’ tradition sought to supersede as capable of only a limited, subjective freedom. This thesis, therefore, developed an alternate route to a new participatory politics in a public realm that is coextensive with everyday reality.

The impasse blocking the realisation of this ideal of rational human association stems from the unavailability in a disenchanted and nihilistic world of a social identity connecting public and private interest and action. Max Weber’s social philosophy was examined to show the scale of the problem facing those who would attempt something resembling a new Hellenic-Sittlichkeit in the modern world. Given the modern polytheism or pluralism of values and the reduction of morality to irreducible subjective opinion, Weber denies the possibility of ever achieving a unifying conception of the good. If Weber is right, then the way that liberalism has shed its ethical dimension to assert a deontological position merely confirms the extent to which modern rationalisation condemns human beings to live in a deontological civilisation i.e. a world which contradicts rather than conforms to the human ontology, the very nature and being of human beings.

The argument has shown how there are two alternative routes forward from Weber’s rationalisation thesis.

The first possibility is to embrace a neutralised, demoralised liberalism that is deliberately silent on the good and, instead, offers a neutral framework of institutions and procedures that leave individuals to pursue their own personal goods. This position sheds the radical implications of liberalism as a philosophical doctrine premised upon values of autonomy and self-realisation. Such values cannot be realised within a modernity constituted on the basis of autonomy-denying and autonomy-impairing structures. For the sake of preserving liberal institutions – the limited state, the public-private separation, private property – the core liberal value of autonomy is sacrificed.

The second possibility retains the view that the development of autonomy requires a supportive environment based upon some notion of a common good uniting each and all. It certainly requires the abolition of structures and institutions that block autonomy. This book has pursued this possibility as a post- as opposed to an anti-liberalism.

The first part of this book identified a principle of rational unity in Plato and Aristotle and traced its evolution in the hands of philosophers like Aquinas, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx. This rational principle holds that the freedom of each is conditional upon and coexistent with the freedom of all. The principle affirms social justice to be at the heart of the ‘happy habitat’. No one individual can be truly free, no matter how much power and wealth s/he may accumulate, unless all individuals are free. Freedom possesses both an individual and a collective dimension, the integrity of each aspect needing to be realised and respected if freedom is to be achieved.

The point is that freedom, even in its personal aspect, is possible only within an integral complex of reciprocal relationships within the solidaristic structures of a community. The personal aspect of freedom can only be secured within interpersonal relations. The rational unity connecting each with all and all with each ensures that both the individual and the collective dimensions of freedom receive their due respect. It establishes the rational foundation of the common project. Crucially, it ensures that some do not achieve their freedom at the expense of the freedom of others. It establishes a principle of justice that applies equally to all. Since this is so, there is a need to analyse the conditions of justice in the social urban realm so as to reverse the tendency towards the unhappy habitat within existing relations of social injustice.

Harmony issues from instituting the principle that defines freedom by means of the relation of the individual to other individuals. This principle has taken various forms throughout the ‘rational’ tradition. Plato argued that ingrained in the soul of each will be ‘the habit of never so much as thinking to do one single act apart from one’s fellows, of making life, to the very uttermost, an unbroken consort, society, and community of all with all’ (942C).

Aristotle makes this unity between each and all integral to the good life as the ‘chief end’ of individuals, ‘both communally and individually’:





This associative conception is expressed also by Rousseau in his identification of the condition of a just public order: ‘the undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves’. As a result, ‘there is not a man who does not think of “each” as meaning him, and consider him in voting for all’ (Rousseau 1973:187). Rousseau constitutes public authority through the emancipatory interaction and reciprocity of individuals, uniting ‘each with all and all with each’ (Rousseau 1973:188).

The potential for an ideal public order which replaces coercion with morality emerges, albeit in more legalistic form, in Kant. Kant’s Universal Principle of Right is the categorical imperative, his universal principle of morality, applied to politics:





Kant projects a city of ends out of this principle, defining an ideal civil constitution in relation to Plato’s idea of the perfect city:





This principle defines a universal conception of justice. Marx realises this ideal civil constitution by locating the associative principle within the everyday social world:





This ethic leads directly to a public life situated on the material terrain of individuals. Justice can be embodied in a universal sense only by being realised within social relationships and practices. Jurgen Habermas gives this principle modern expression in his Autonomy and Solidarity:





In however different form the ‘rational’ ethic has come to be expressed, the essential point remains: each and all are united in a common project realising mutual well-being. Where this connection between each and all is severed, where some think it possible to appropriate the good life to themselves to the exclusion of others, the necessary consequence is injustice, unhappiness and unfreedom. The pursuit of justice throughout the centuries has been difficult. Justice has often proved elusive and, in the universal sense being defined here, has still to be attained. The connection between reason and freedom has never been automatic and, within the processes of modern rationalisation, has become ambivalent, as contradictory as they are commensurate. Nevertheless, the problematical status of reason in history does not justify the abandonment of the goal of the rational city or the rational society. The task is to formulate the conditions connecting reason to freedom, justice and happiness more clearly. It is because reason and freedom are not antithetical but cognate, so long as the connection between each and all, individual and community, is affirmed, that one may conclude with the view that the line of rational values which connect Plato and Aristotle in the classical world to Jurgen Habermas in the modern world remains the most intellectually coherent and morally compelling case for freedom that is available. The crucial question concerns how these values may be embedded in everyday relationships and urban space. Social – and environmental – justice leading to the Social City is an essential part of the answer. And this is the value of the urban public sphere in connecting emancipatory philosophical roots to emancipatory social practices. The philosophical ideal of ‘rational freedom’, which unites the freedom of each with the freedom of all within the rational city, is actualised as an associational freedom grounded in the real world of social exchange, interaction and solidarity.

This thesis goes back to the origins of political philosophy to identify the critical relation of the urban public to a particular ‘rational’ variant of liberalism, a corporate or social liberalism which retains something of the ‘classical’ conception of ‘the political’ as concerned with creative human self-realisation. The thesis has extracted principles of intersubjectivity from the tradition of ‘rational freedom’ – reciprocity, respect, interaction, cooperation – and placed them on a material basis at the heart of the associational space of civil society. The argument developed a concept of an urban public sphere as a new, genuine, public life, as the appropriate regimen for human self-realisation, what was once called the good life.

Historically, beginning in the civilisation of the ancient Greeks, the study of politics first emerged as a rigorous method of assisting man in this quest for the good life. Consciousness of the difference between existing reality and a non-existent, but potentially existent, future – a morally desirable future – was one of the most important ingredients of this quest. Unless we feel absolutely confident that we have now reached the limits of our capabilities and creativity, that we have advanced to perfection already, to dispense with utopianism would be to renounce a large part of what it is to be a political animal.

Goodwin and Taylor 1982:253

But are the people ready to join the philosophers in this quest for the good life? Can philosophy and politics ever be joined to realise Plato’s dream? Can philosophy be democratised so that the people achieve the good life by their own efforts, to realise Marx’s dream? Can the philosopher-ruler become the philosopher-people so that reason at last will be in control?

Galbraith’s thesis of a ‘culture of contentment’ implies that the prospects for affirmative answers to these fundamental questions are grim. Galbraith’s argument is premised upon the existence of a two third/one third society in which the ‘contented’ are in the majority. This split can be questioned. What we have is more like a 40-30-30 society in which those in the secure, well paid jobs in the top 40 are increasingly joining the insecure middle 30. 

In an important sense, though, majorities are not so important anyway. Rudolf Bahro argues that ‘when the forms of an old culture are dying, the new culture is created by a few people who are not afraid to be insecure’. The problem is that the urban crisis accompanying a dying social order has generated an ecology of fear which has provoked escalating demands from within the ranks of the contented for extra security. Rather than create the urban order anew there has been a tendency towards the militarisation of urban space to pacify and preserve an existing order. The politics of security in defence of an iniquitous order has proved to be more enticing to greater numbers than the politics of insecurity to change that society in order to achieve a just social order. The promise of ‘security’ is being dangled in front of the contented-affluent. Even those with only a little to defend within the existing order find the politics of security appealing. Sufficient numbers continue to buy the promise to maintain a sterile politics of protection, ‘police’ as opposed to polis. Such conservatism in a declining social order merely ensures the intensification of crisis. The promise of ‘security’ is being used to lead people into an urban incarceration that leads neither to a genuine safety nor a real and lasting contentment. Benjamin Franklin once said that those who exchange liberty for security end up with neither – he ought to have added that by their pusillanimity they also deserve neither. Freedom is not given; it is a practise, it has to be earned and exercised.

To understand why this is so is to restore urban studies to its philosophical roots. Colin Ward’s reference to the notion of ‘The Happy Habitat’ makes these roots explicit. The function of the city is the promotion not merely of business, nor of entertainment nor even of public safety. The function of the city in the philosophical conception is ‘happiness’. Although such a notion might be considered striking in the contemporary world, Ward is correct to point out that this would not have seemed an exaggerated claim in classical Greece, when Plato and Aristotle affirmed that while the city arises for the sake of life, it continues for the sake of the good life (Ward 1990:9).

The approach of the argument presented in this book predicates happiness upon the recovery of creative human subjectivity from within which it has come to be encased. The urban public sphere, in locating rational freedom in the everyday social world, offers more than a means of social government by exploring possibilities for alternative social forms more internally related to the capacities and needs of human beings. This actualises true individuality, community and democracy, it realises the good life as the ‘happy habitat’. 

Communal liberty, individuality, autonomy as conditional upon the relation of each and all, creative self-realisation, is seen from this ‘rational’ perspective to be the endowment not of the monadic, autonomous, self-moving agent of individualist liberalism but rather of the individual open to and realising personal aims within relationships with others. This reciprocity is realised within the urban public as a relational freedom at the level of a social existence that has come to be invested with the power formerly alienated to external forms of institutional and systemic control – the state and capital. 

This valorisation of the everyday world of real individual relationships – not abstract, instrumental relations between individuals as bourgeois and citoyens – achieves a new, expressive mode of political action and organisation and realises the ‘classical’ sense of politics as concerned with creative self-realisation. Further, the investment of the power of control over common affairs in the urban public realises ‘the political’ in an actively democratic, participatory sense. Power is thus appreciated in an internal as against an external conception, as an intimate phenomenon connected with subjectivity. Without this investment, the individual appears as an actor only in the formal sense of possessing formal liberty whilst being enmeshed within a reified network of control operating to suppress individuality.

The concept of the urban public sphere reworks the moral and political terrain of liberal conceptions of modernity beyond dualism and separation to realise an integral conception that connects all aspects of human self-realisation.

This argument is concerned to identify aspects of social life which are essential to human ontology but which are subject to a dehumanising rationalisation. The dominant form of reason confines human action and behaviour within carefully demarcated spheres. Recovering the classical connection between politics and human self-realisation implies a democratic conception of ontology and anthropology that serves to reinstate the most intimate aspects of everyday material and individual life as sources of the politics and morality of reason. This morality of everyday life challenges the instrumentalism of reason which divides human experience between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ aspects, devaluing much that is of significance in human self-realisation. The ‘rational’ idea that human self-realisation depends upon individuals being connected with their ‘higher’ selves has assumed historical form in the institutionalised shape of the state and law legislating the good and constraining individuals to the good by institutional means. The concept of the urban public sphere integrates politics and morality to reinstate the normative and political significance of needs, activities, desires hitherto confined to the ‘private’ sphere of social existence, conceiving them more substantively in their own particular terms as being integral to human self-realisation. The social embodiment of reason within a public sphere grounded in everyday urban life is thus read in and against the rationalist vision of modernity in which the good is defined, legislated and imposed externally upon individuals.

To be precise, overcoming the liberal dualism of public and private spheres at the level of everyday social and urban reality recovers the political and moral concern within the material aspect of the full range of human activities within social existence. Public life assumes an existential form. Within the rationalised sphere of alien control – with identity imposed externally – human self-realisation is achieved only within the rationalised realm of capitalist production and state citizenship – both presupposing an abstract, imposed, i.e. not self-created, self-assumed identity. The subversion of civil society by the state and capital results in self-regulation coming to be displaced by external institutional-systemic regulation. External regulation concentrates politics and production in large centralised units, involving the concentration and specialisation of functions. In consequence, each urban collectivity – town, city, neighbourhood – no longer functions according to needs that it defines for itself but is organised to facilitate abstract processes external to the urban area. The urban area is externally regulated by the institutional-systemic forces of the state and capital, by the various agencies and mechanisms of the capital system.

However, by abolishing the public-private dualism at the core of liberal modernity, the moral and political terrain is transformed to create an environment that exists as the public dimension of creative self-realisation. The new public life reworks the terms of rationalised modernity beyond the notion of control which implies the subordination of natural inclinations to external ends and purposes determined by alien systems of control.

The recovery of a sense of place depends upon territory becoming liveable rather than merely being saleable. To recover the urban terrain as the place where individuals work, learn, communicate, associate, play, relax requires that the urban collectivities of town, city, community and neighbourhood come to assert use value over exchange value. Beyond the urban wasteland produced by the external regulation of the state and capital lies an urban public realm in which individuals become citizens capable of determining urban functions, arranging urban space, integrating work, culture, communication, leisure, and the fulfilment of needs within a public life sustained by the social fabric of a real community.

The conceptual formulation of an urban public sphere revalues the governing capacity of civil society in order to secure the bases for social self-regulation. The revaluation of the autonomous capacities of individuals, expressed in their self-constituted civil organs and associations is the key to the constitution of a genuine public life. The urban public is grounded in the associational space of civil society and forges public bonds in the web of social relations that individuals establish between themselves in their everyday lifeworld.

The urban public rests upon a complex web of self-regulating and noninstitutional social relationships that connect each will all and all with each on the terrain of everyday life. The relations of cooperation and mutual aid that are practised within communities and neighbourhoods, generating solidaristic exchange and communication between individuals, constitute the ‘life’ of the public. Social justice is built into these relationships so that morality becomes an everyday practise of freedom.

The urban public has social justice at its core, developing this principle in a necessary association with environmental justice. It demands social and ecological responsibility in a self-managing grassroots civic culture that is decentralised, equitable and institutionally flexible. The concept of an urban public sphere envisages a cooperative global order comprising public spheres which have abolished relations of exploitation and domination in all spheres of activity. This fosters a rich communal life that recognises the pluralism of society. This vision seeks to frame contemporary problems of social and urban governance within a principled framework that corresponds with emerging and growing forms of self-socialisation represented by community control and citizens movements. This self-organisation and self-activity on the part of new and urban social movements generates forms which are capable of asserting social and ecological imperatives concerning balance, scale and harmony against nihilistic economic imperatives which impose endless growth.

This thesis has been concerned to emphasise the ecological principles of the ‘rational’ tradition, particularly in relation to the notions of limit, balance and harmony. The pursuit of harmony implies that human beings must creatively live up to their power. This end invokes a pre-rational tradition. Greek religion before Plato emphasised a notion of hubris. In seeking to master the world, human beings are challenging the gods and would be punished for their arrogance. Hubris would be followed by nemesis, the revenge of an abused and outraged nature.

This thesis nevertheless affirms the liberatory potential of the Enlightenment tradition. The expansion of the productive forces under capitalism has created a margin for freedom for greater numbers of human beings far in excess of any other possible social organisation. The key task is to assume an ethical and, indeed, ecological responsibility for that productive power. The reintegration of reason and nature thus proceeds through human beings coming to recognise the alien powers controlling the world as their own social powers, assuming responsibility for what they have created.

An urban public sphere adumbrates a public life that enhances rather than inhibits individual freedom, that seeks to develop a consensus whilst respecting dissent, that achieves the universal interest without becoming unitary, that is plural without becoming fragmented. A participatory mode of political representation and socialisation is expressed as the radical enlargement of the public sphere through which individuals are able to assume control of their social and individual life. The idea is of classical origin. Without participation in the public life, human beings cannot become individuals. Participation can be achieved through everyday social practices, decision-making processes, elections.

Perhaps the most significant way by which the structure of the abstract public of the capitalist state atomizes and pacifies the citizenry lies in the way that it limits public activity to voting in periodic elections, to choosing between pre-selected politicians offering pre-determined policies. The crucial task is to diminish this atomisation and pacification through the expansion of meaningful public spaces enabling individuals to participate directly in politics as citizens. If this savours a great deal of Rousseau, it assumes a more Hegelian character in going further than an atomistic conception of suffrage through recognising the public role of individuals as members of organised collectivities. If the facts of scale and quantity make something more than face-to-face democracy necessary, then the concept of self-representation must be extended to address the form of a necessary mediation. Here, Hegel’s differentiated conception of the suffrage is invaluable, organising individuals within civil institutions and associations according to ascending levels of competence. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to extend public spaces and establish social and civic organs of active democracy on the terrain around the central state administration. These organs exist as quasi-governmental forms of public administration. The purpose of admitting social collectivities into the public realm is to achieve more than extending the participation of individuals in political processes but, further, to ensure the participation of individuals within politics as members of socially rooted collectivities. The individualised and privatised forms of political participation embodied in voting in periodic elections comes to be supplemented with and buttressed by more collective and public forms of political life. The achievement of this objective makes it possible to undertake the debureaucratisation and deprofessionalisation of politics, ending politics as a specialist and exclusive function. The collective-public character of this participatory mode strengthens the political capacities of individuals, thus making democracy possible as an active citizen concept. It also contains the potential to entrench new social relations and structures within the citizen body, forging the civil bonds of a new public life.

This means drawing more individuals into community organisations and civil movements, expanding these to cover the whole of social life. Urban and social movements need to go beyond autonomy from the abstract state sphere, holding it in check and presenting demands to it, and instead seek to assume and exercise governmental power themselves. In order to accomplish this, political struggles within the formal conventional sphere must be organically linked to grass roots social movements oriented to issues of local and regional governance as much as national and international levels.

The intention of the urban public sphere is to replace coercive political arrangements that regulate society externally with cooperative associations of individuals and groups. This position valorizes the public significance of civil society at the expense of the abstract sphere of the state. This understanding is immanent in the normative ideal of ‘rational’ freedom and is implicit in Rousseau and in Kant’s ideal civil constitution as an internally coordinated republic of ends. Such a noumenological order is not organised through the coercion of the state but through self-legislated principles of practical reason. The realisation of the normative ideal comes socially rather than legally and politically. Reason on this analysis is an affair of society rather than the state.

The urban public practises a social ecology in its political and productive activity. The mega-structures of commerce and government fail to respect the principles and conditions of social and natural life, fail to respect the bonds that make a social sphere possible, whilst destroying the biosphere upon which all life depends. The respectful interaction which is a condition of social and environmental justice is systematically destroyed by such mega-structures of the overscale city and state. The alternative is a scaled, participatory politics and economics grounded in a social purpose which is determined by all citizens within the immediate environment. The urban public sphere functions as the voice of grassroots, citizen and community movements within a more structured, formal level which is capable of formulating a general will.

The emphasis is upon smaller, appropriately scaled, units of control to foster citizen initiative and social self-regulation. In contrast, the centralisation of power suppresses citizen involvement, removes power from citizen control and consequently channels power into socially, ecologically and ethically destructive purposes. This destruction is a consequence of overscale power, the failure of human beings to creatively live up to their power. With the alienation of control to the state and capital within social relations of injustice, the social power of citizens and producers is canalised into the destructive and sterile channels of exploitation and militarisation. Smaller units of power facilitate an ethical and social responsibility that enables a more creative use of power. Functions and purposes are determined through citizen communication and consensus within the urban public.
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